Summary of Jewell's Testimony

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Jewell was not present in 1893, but speaks of the 1874 landing of U.S. peacekeepers to quell rioting following Kalakaua's election. He also testifies as to the details of the powers, authorities and regulations of naval officers and U.S. diplomats abroad. Senator Frye introduced documents containing U.S. rules and regulations tending to show it was proper for Capt. Wiltse's to land peacekeepers on his own discretion following a request from Minister Stevens; and hinting at the inappropriateness of Blount's orders to military personnel that countermanded what Stevens and Wiltse had done.

Theodore F. Jewell was Lieutenant Commander on the U.S. Tuscarora in 1874, and was Executive Officer when that ship landed peacekeeping troops to stop the rioting following Kalakaua's election by the legislature as King. American troops from 2 ships, and British troops from one ship, remained ashore and patrolled the streets for about 2 weeks; the ships remained about 6 weeks. Jewell had no part in the events of 1893. The Morgan committee questioned Jewell closely in order to get details of how the U.S. troops behaved in 1874, who gave orders to whom and at what point during those events; for the purpose of comparing American peacekeeping in 1874 with 1893. Jewell had also been involved in peacekeeping activities to protect American property due to political upheavals in Panama in 1872, and before that in Seoul, Korea. Discussion of importance of Hawaii in conjunction with anticipated canal through Nicaragua, regarding both military defense and commercial prosperity worldwide. Very lengthy list of rules and regulations was read into the record at the end of Jewell's testimony, by Senator Frye, regarding who has authority to give orders to whom, within and between different branches of the military and between military and civilian authorities; and rules of engagement for intervention in local affairs in foreign places. Documents showing civilian chain of command from President Cleveland to Minister Extraordinary Stevens and Paramount Minister Blount; Blount's orders [violating chain of command] to U.S. military personnel; Stevens' request [proper] to Captain Wiltse and Wiltse's orders to subordinates.

Theodore F. Jewell was Lieutenant Commander on the U.S. Tuscarora in 1874, and was Executive Officer when that ship landed peacekeeping troops to stop the rioting following Kalakaua's election by the legislature as King. The ship remained in Honolulu 6 weeks.

"Mr. Jewell. ... It was the general understanding that English influence was supporting Queen Emma and that the Americans were supporting Kalakaua. ... The riots which occurred during Kalakaua's election were entirely among the natives. There were a number of Americans who were in the Government at that time. The minister of foreign affairs was an American. ...Charles K. Bishop was his name.

"The Chairman. Were troops sent on shore from the Tuscarora? Mr. Jewell. Yes. The Chairman. Was there any other American ship in the harbor at that time? Mr. Jewell. Yes, the sloop Portsmouth was there, and men were landed from both ships. The Chairman. About what number? Mr. Jewell. I commanded the forces that were landed from the Tuscarora, perhaps 80 men, and perhaps the same number from the Portsmouth. The Chairman. When you landed did you go armed and equipped for fighting? Mr. Jewell. Yes. ... The Chairman. Did you go ashore on the invitation of the Hawaiian Government? Mr. Jewell. Yes; as I understand, at the request of the cabinet in the interregnum between the death of Lunalilo and the election of Kalakaua. The Government requested that men be landed if a riot should occur. It was anticipated it would happen because of the one that occurred at the election of the other King the year before. Capt. Belknap, who was in command of the Tuscarora, and who was the senior officer there, made some arrangement with Mr. Pierce, the American Minister, by which the men were to be landed if they were wanted.

"The Chairman. Lunalilo, the former King, was King by inheritance? Mr. Jewell. So; he was elected King. The Chairman. Was it not this way; that he was a King by inheritance, and he ordered a plebiscite to see if the people favored his going to the throne? Mr. Jewell. I am not prepared to say that; but I am quite certain that he was not King by inheritance. The Chairman. You understand that at the time of his election riots had occurred? Mr. Jewell. Yes.

"The Chairman. Had the election of Kalakaua taken place before you landed? Mr. Jewell. It had; yes. The Chairman. But you were in a state of preparation? Mr. Jewell. We were standing by. The captain of the Tuscarora went on shore on the morning of the election, about 9 o'clock, and left me in charge of the ship, with instructions to keep a look out on the American bark where one of our officers was stationed with a signal which was to be given to land the men if needed, and we were in a state of preparation all day. We got the signal about 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon. ... I think the whole force numbered 150 men. ... we stayed a week; I myself was on shore four days; and at the end of that time one-half of the force was withdrawn and the remainder stayed three or four days longer. ...There were several hundred people around the courthouse, the legislative building, when we got there. The courthouse was pretty well wrecked by the mob, was in possession of a mob of natives. They cleared out of the court-house the instant we arrived on the ground. We sent a small force into the building and the rioters jumped out of the windows and cleared out, although they hung around the grounds. They were making demonstrations and were talking loudly in their own language, which we did not understand, of course. ... They did not offer any resistance at all; no. There was one man who waved a club in front of a petty officer, but he took the man by the back of the neck and gave him a shake, and he was quieted.

"Mr. Jewell. ... The force from the Portsmouth had charge of the fort house and some other public buildings including the mint, the treasury, perhaps. I had charge of the prison and the armory. There was another significant fact connected with that landing. There was an English man-of-war in the harbor at the time. There had not been any prearrangement about the landing of her men; nevertheless, shortly after we got on shore, 75 or 80 men from the English vessel, under arms and organized, put in an appearance. ... They remained some days; just how long I do not know. The men were not allowed to circulate very much about the town, and I kept myself pretty well confined to the barracks. But after the mob was broken up down at the court-house, the most of them went up to Queen Emma's residence, which was some distance away, and the troops from the English man-of-war, on the suggestion of Mr. Bishop, I believe, went up there to clear out the mob, and remained there. They went there to drive off the mob assembled around Queen Emma. ... I understand there were some incendiary speeches made at that time in the neighborhood of Queen Emma's residence, and perhaps Queen Emma made some remarks herself. ... The first night there were some stones thrown at the men from the Portsmouth, and a pistol shot; but in the part of the town where we were it was pretty quiet. We patrolled the streets the first night, and I do not know but that we did it after that. ... The popular feeling amongst the natives in Honolulu at that time was against Kalakaua; that is to say, it was in favor of Queen Emma. But there were plenty of the better class of Kanakas who were in favor of Kalakaua.

"Senator Frye. Who was it requested the troops to land at that time? Mr. Jewell. It was understood that the request was made by Mr. Bishop, who was the minister of foreign affairs of the Hawaiian Government, to Mr. Pierce, the American minister resident; and between Mr. Pierce and Capt. Belknap—I do not know whether there was any written communication between them or not—but it was arranged between them that in the event of a riot the men were to be landed. ... the armory, where the principal part of my men was was right in the business part of the city. ... They remained in the court-house and Government buildings three or four days ...

"The Chairman. State what the instructions were that were given to you by Capt. Belknap to be executed by you in his absence. Mr. Jewell. The general instructions were to preserve order and to keep myself confined as much as possible to the quarters which had been assigned to us; not to excite the natives to opposition. I also had orders to patrol certain streets of the town during the night, to prevent any disorderly gathering of the people and to arrest people who were guilty of disorder. I can not remember any specific instructions otherwise. The idea was that order was to be preserved in the town, and that we were authorized to arrest people and turn them over to the civil authorities. ... We had no occasion to arrest anybody. ...Only during the first part of the riot when the troops arrived on the ground. Then men were arrested and turned over to the native police; but not after that. ... The Chairman. Was there anything in the situation that required you to participate on the one side or the other in any conflict or civil commotion that might occur among the people? Mr. Jewell. No; nothing whatever. The Chairman. You were ordered to preserve order, no matter who was disorderly? Mr. Jewell. Yes.

"The Chairman. The King did not appear on any occasion for the purpose of taking control of the forces? Mr. Jewell. No. He took the oath of office the next day after his election, and all the troops on shore were paraded at that time. The Chairman. Was that the day after you landed? Mr. Jewell. Yes. The Chairman. They were paraded how? Mr. Jewell. The forces from the two American ships, the Tuscarora and the Portsmouth, and those from the Tenedos, the English man-ofwar, were all at the courthouse to receive the King, and all presented arms when he passed into the building to take the oath of office. ...

"The Chairman. It was then a body of American soldiery, so far as you were concerned, that was there at the invitation of the cabinet of the former King to preserve order, to put down riot, to arrest disturbers of the peace and those who had been assailing the Legislature? Mr. Jewell. No; we were not to take any cognizance of anything which took place before the landing; we were only to arrest people whom we saw in the act. The Chairman. People caught flagrante delicto? Mr. Jewell. Yes; we took no notice of what happened before. The court-house was full of people; as we came into the front door they went out of the windows. But we did not arrest any of them. Capt. Belknap cautioned us to be discreet in anything we did, and not to assume too much. ...

"Mr. Jewell. In regard to this landing in 1874 I would say that there were at that time in the pro-English press of Honolulu, and have been since, charges made that we interfered at that time in the internal affairs of Hawaii. But I think nobody paid any particular attention to them. So short a time ago as December, 1892, an article appeared in a paper called The Illustrated American, published in New York, which charged that the American minister and American troops had interfered in the affairs of Hawaii in 1874, and had kept Queen Emma, who was "the rightful heir to the throne," off of the throne, and put Kalakaua in her place. I wrote a letter denying every statement in that paper, which I felt certain was inspired by some of the English-feeling people in Honolulu. I was told afterward that that was the case. It was full of misstatements, and I felt more or less indignation at the way in which they talked about the disgraceful manner in which the troops had taken part in the affairs of Hawaii. I replied to it. I did not know but what that brought me before this committee. ...

"The Chairman. Do you remember whether or not before you left the ship with those troops Kalakaua was elected by the Legislature or was the election pending? Mr. Jewell. I had not been informed as to the result of the election. We embarked our men by signal from shore—the signal was made on this American bark—and before I knew anything about the election I had my men on shore. The Chairman. But the preparation about which you spoke as having been made on the ship, to hold yourselves in readiness, to stand by, you say was begun before the election took place? Mr. Jewell. Yes. The Chairman. Some days before? Mr. Jewell. No, the morning of the day of the election. The Chairman. You knew that the election was about to take place? Mr. Jewell. Yes; a special session of the Legislature had been called for that purpose. The Chairman. And the military preparation on the ship anticipated the election? Mr. Jewell. A few hours; yes. The Chairman. And view of it, and in expectation that that election would create civil commotion? Mr. Jewell. In the fear of it, that it might be so. I believe that the cabinet was rather severely criticised for not having made better preparation and for not having asked that the troops be sent on shore earlier.

"The Chairman. Had you ever had anything to do with the landing of troops before that? Mr. Jewell. Yes. The Chairman. Where was it? Mr. Jewell. At Panama ; we took possession of that town for four or five days; that is, so far as we could. ... I knew very little about what led up to that. ... That was in 1872. The force of which I had command was landed to protect the Pacific Mail Company's property. Afterward a larger body was landed from the flagship, and went up into the city under the command of another officer.

"The Chairman. What port were you at before you went to Panama? Mr. Jewell. We had come up from Callao, I think. The Chairman. Did you come up for the purpose of protecting the property? Mr. Jewell. No. We came up for the purpose of taking a surveying party down on the isthmus, which was surveying for the inter-oceanic canal there. I also landed men when in command of the Essex on the China station at the request of the American minister in the capital of Corea. I landed men at Chemulpo and marched them up to Seoul, Corea. The Chairman. Coming back to Panama. Was that a political strife that existed in Panama at the time of which you spoke? Mr. Jewell. I believe so—one of the periodical revolutions which nobody can account for. The Chairman. How long did your troops remain on shore? Mr. Jewell. I think about six days. The Chairman. Did they camp on shore? Mr. Jewell. Yes. ...

"The Chairman. Now, the Corean incident. What was the occasion for landing there? Mr. Jewell. It was an excitement in Seaul, the capital. Threats had been made against the foreign population, and I think they were all more or less scared. I do not think they were in any very great danger. But the American minister wrote to me that he would probably call upon me for a small force for the protection of the legation, and soon after I received the letter I received a telegram from him asking me to dispatch the men. ... Twenty-five or 30—I think 30 men. ... stay ashore about a week; until quiet was restored. ... There were other men-of-war there at the time and they all landed troops. That is to say, there was a French man-of- war, a Russian man-of-war, and a Japanese man-of-war. I think they all sent men up there.

"The Chairman. Is it one of the standing orders or rules of the Navy that when the minister resident at a foreign port, or consul at a foreign port, requests the naval officer to land troops to protect the peace of the consulate, the naval officer is to do it? Mr. Jewell. The officer in command of a vessel has to decide that when it comes up. The Chairman. Upon the facts in every emergency? Mr. Jewell. Yes. Senator Frye. He can not relieve himself for responsibility except by the orders of a superior officer? Mr. Jewell. In no other way. He is responsible for any such landing or landings he may make. In my own case I had asked the admiral particularly in regard to the landing of men in Corea. I had asked him to give me instructions, but he said I would have to depend upon my own judgment in case of necessity, in case the request was made. The Chairman. So that a naval officer in command at any foreign port is thrown upon his individual judgment as to the necessity or propriety of landing forces? Mr. Jewell. Yes. The Chairman. Is he bound to receive from the consuls or ministers of the United States their orders or requests or direction as being military orders? Mr. Jewell. No. ...

"The Chairman. Oh, yes. Suppose a fleet of war ships of a modern pattern, first-class war ships, were to sail from any European port, either through the Mediterranean or around the Cape of Good Hope, or around Cape Horn, for the purpose of attacking San Francisco—I will put that as the objective point—would they be able to bring from any European port coal enough to sustain them in their voyage to San Francisco and during a series of naval operations, which would include a siege, say often days, without the assistance of tenders? Mr. Jewell. No; I think not. The Chairman. They could not carry in their bunkers coal enough to include a naval operation of that much voyage and that much sea? Mr. Jewell. No. There is a certain coal endurance which is assigned to these ships, certain number of miles, which is called the steaming radius of the vessel. I think, as a rule, that is exaggerated; at all events, a vessel would arrive on the ground empty. She would not have any coal left. I do not believe it would be possible for any vessel to arrive at San Francisco, under the circumstances which you have mentioned, without coaling in the meantime.

"The Chairman. Then any foreign power that undertook to attack our Western coast and had possession of the Sandwich Islands, with a full supply of naval stores, wood, and coal at that point, would they have very much greater advantages than they would have in the absence of their occupation of that port? Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes. The Chairman. Now, reverse the matter. Suppose the United States were in possession of the Sandwich Islands and had the supplies that would naturally be placed in such a position as that, would not that greatly increase the power of the naval defense of the United States? Mr. Jewell. I should say, decidedly, yes.

"The Chairman. Then I take it that you would regard the possession of the Sandwich Islands, the occupation of the Sandwich Islands, or some place there, as being of great strategic advantage as against any foreign country, either Asiatic or European, upon our coast? Mr. Jewell. I think it would; yes.

"The Chairman. In a commercial sense what would be the advantage of the possession of the Sandwich Islands by the United States? Mr. Jewell. It is immediately in the track of vessels bound from San Francisco to New Zealand and Australia and all the Southern Pacific islands; and it is not far from the direct track between San Francisco and Japan and China. In fact, the sailing route from San Francisco to Japan and China would be in the immediate neighborhood of the Sandwich Islands. The Chairman. What advantage would that be to the commerce of the United States, or to the United States as a Government, to have these resting places there in the center of the Pacific Ocean? Mr. Jewell. It would be an advantage to every steamship as a coaling point, and to other vessels for the purchase of supplies of various kinds, provisions, etc. is always desirable to have a stable government in such an important point in the trade route as the Sandwich Islands, and in that sense it would be, of course, an advantage to the commerce of the world. The Chairman. It would be to the advantage of the commerce of the world that any stable and great power should have the occupation of those islands, rather than a weak and uncertain power. Mr. Jewell. Yes. The Chairman. Such as would be furnished by the native population of Hawaii? Mr. Jewell. Yes; I should think so. The Chairman. I suppose you would consider that the commercial affairs of the world would be benefited by having in Hawaii a strong and just government? Mr. Jewell. I should say so; yes, beyond question. ...The Chairman. Do you know any place in any of the seas of the world where greater advantage can be bestowed upon the commerce of the world than could be obtained by the possession of the Sandwich Islands by a great maritime power, one that had the resources to preserve order and facilitate commerce? Mr. Jewell. No; I do not know any more important point; no place that occurs to me at this particular moment. ...

"The Chairman. Suppose that there were a canal under American protection through Nicaraugua of equal capacity with, or greater capacity than, the Suez Canal, as a fortified port or place in a chain connecting Hawaii in the center of the Pacific Ocean with our possessions in the United States, the mouth of the Mississippi River, and the various bays and harbors that we have here and the fortifications at Key West, would you then consider that Gibralter is more important to the British people than the possession of Hawaii would be to the American people? Mr. Jewell. It is hard to make a comparison of that kind; but if the Nicaragua Canal should be put through I consider that the possession of the Sandwich Islands by the United States would be absolutely essential. The Chairman. And for the reasons that we have been just adverting to? Mr. Jewell. Yes. I think it would be absolutely essential that the United States should take possession of those islands if the Nicaragua Canal is to be built. ...

"Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, for the convenience of the committee, I desire to put in the record certain naval regulations, and certain orders which I find scattered through these Executive documents in a very hopeless confusion; so much so, that it is almost impossible to find anything in there. I give in first an extract from every naval officer's commission which has been signed by the President. ... I have a copy of the rules, and it is very difficult to get hold of the book. These are the rules and regulations of 1893. ...

[Very lengthy list of rules and regulations was read into the record by Senator Frye at the end of Jewell's testimony, regarding who has authority to give orders to whom, within and between different branches of the military and between military and civilian authorities; and rules of engagement for intervention in local affairs in foreign places. Documents showing civilian chain of command from President Cleveland to Minister Extraordinary Stevens and Paramount Minister Blount; Blount's orders [violating chain of command] to U.S. military personnel; Stevens' request [proper] to Captain Wiltse and Wiltse's orders to subordinates.]

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