Template:492-493 - Revision history

Jere Krischel at 03:34, 27 December 2005

2005-12-27T03:34:12Z

Ken Conklin at 05:21, 25 December 2005

2005-12-25T05:21:04Z

Jere Krischel at 04:40, 9 December 2005

2005-12-09T04:40:04Z

New page

unprotected they are of no value, and Germany has ajual rights in the
former.
The concession in 1887 of Pearl Eiver, in Hawaii, to the United States
for use as naval station, with exclusive privilege of establishing a dry
dock, storehouses, and repair shops, is a valuable one, but has never
been utilized. The situation is admirable, and the estimated cost of
necessary fortifications and harbor works is moderate in view of the
great advantage to our nation.
Our position with regard to dry docks in the Pacific is peculiarly
weak. Modern war vessels require docking at intervals, and a fleet to
maintain command of the sea must have dry docks in which to make
repairs and maintain the ship in a state of full efficiency as to speed.
We have not one dock outside the mainland of our country which
would be available for our ships in time of war; and on the entire
Pacific coast have at present but one large and one small dock, at the
Mare Island navy-yard, and one building in Puget Sound, and our
vessels in the Pacific would have to return to them whenever docking
was requisite.
Great Britain, on the contrary, has made ample provisions in this
respect. Bordering on the Pacific she has Government dry docks at
Esquimault, Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, and Hongkong, while many
private docks are available in the ports of Australia, New Zealand,
Hongkong, Singapore, Penang, and Lndia.
France has Government dry docks in Kew Caledonia and Saigon,
Cochin China. Holland has governmental dry docks, which would
probably be available for Germany, in Sourabaya and Batavia; and
Bussia has two large ones in the southeast corner of Siberia, at Vladivostock.
We must have additional docking facilities if we are to
maintain either naval power or trade in the Pacific waters it time of
war.
Coming now to the strategic advantages from coast defense point of
view.
No naval force can operate on a hostile coast without a friendly base
within easy distance. Our Atlantic coast is faced by a line of foreign
bases. England has strongly fortified Halifax on our Northeast border,
and built Government dry docks both there and at St. Johns. Six
hundred and ninety miles from New York, and less than COO from the
Carolina coast, she has at great expense fortified Bermuda, furnished
it with the largest floating dry dock in the world, and supplied it with
great stores of coal and shops for repair work, and all for the sole purpose
of maintaining a base from which British naval forces could operate
against the Atlantic coast of the United States in time of war.
Jamaica and St. Lucia perform the same duty with regard to our Gulf
coasts and the isthmus transit; and it is a notable fact that the
defenses of all these places have been extensively augmented since an
isthmus canal became a possibility of the near future.
France has St. Pierre and Miquelon on our Northeast borders, with
Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Cayenne on the South coast. Spain has
her bases in Cuba and Porto Eico; the Dutch in Curacoa, and the
Danes in St. Thomas; and it is not improbable that either of the two
latter may be available for a German base should occasion arise.
Any power which has not such a naval base off our coast can not
make successful war upon the United States, a fact which was quickly
appreciated by Italy during a late diplomatic incident; and an early
move of the United States in a war with either of the European powers
possessing these bases would have to be their capture and retention, if

possible. If the United States held all the bases named it would be
practically free from attack on its Atlantic coast.
In the Pacific we now have the opportunity to secure our Western
coast by accepting possession of Hawaii as our most rational form of
coast defense. With adequate fortifications on these islands, and a
suitable naval force in the Pacific, our coast would be far more secure
in time of war than it could be made by any expenditure for harbor
defenses on the mainland alone.
Further, if our commercial interests are to predominate in the future
in those waters our fleet must predominate there also, and a properly
proportionate fleet would be a sufficient guaranty that serious attack
would not be made on this most important naval base.
The same is equally true of our entire Pacific coast, as with such a
fleet, with bases at San Francisco, Hawaii, and the entrance to the
Nicaragua Canal, not only would our Pacific trade be secure and that
of any other power untenable, but our coast line would be equally secure,
and American control of the canal, so far as the Pacific end of it is
concerned, would be assured.
Excepting Hawaii the only base for possible extensive naval operations
against the Pacific States is the British station at Esquimault,
which is susceptible of capture by a land expedition.
It must be distinctly understood that Hawaii can not remain independent
supported only by moral force. It is of too great strategic value
and will assuredly meet the fate of all islands and isolated iwints of
like value at the hands of either Great Britain, France, or Germany,
each of the two former having already once seized them (once in 1843
and once in 1849). Even if the United States were by moral force to preserve
Hawaiian independence during time of peace the islands would
undoubtedly be seized by the first naval power with whom we went to
war, and held by all the force it could muster, as a base from which to
attack our Western coast and gain control of the prospective canal.
For the United States to expend great sums on the local defense
of San Francisco in the shape of forts and harbor defenses, and leave
Hawaii to become a base for operations against them, is a short-sighted
and extravagant policy.
As Bermuda is a standing menace in front of our Atlantic coast, so
will Hawaii become a similar one to our Pacific coast, if we do not hold
it as an essential part of our coast defense.
COAL.
To make the advantage of Hawaii to this country from a naval standpoint
clearer I will devote a little time to some details of the question
of coal and coaling stations.
The possession of unlimited coal is a great advantage to a nation, but
in order to convert it into naval advantage it must be placed on board
of a ship of war. This is a simple thing with us so long as our naval
vessels are in home ports, or so long as we are at peace, wherever the
ships may be. It is in time of war that the difficulties of making our
naval strength felt away from our own coasts will become apparent.
Neutral ports will then be closed to our cruisers so far as supplying their
coal necessities is concerned, for coal will be contraband of war as much
as is other ammunition. Coaling in the open sea from supply ships is,
up to the present time, an unsolved problem, and even if satisfactory
mechanical arrangements be devised the supply vessels must run the
gauntlet of hostile cruis ^s for great distances. A certainty of finding

@@ Line 37: / Line 37: @@
 As Bermuda is a standing menace in front of our Atlantic coast, so will Hawaii become a similar one to our Pacific coast, if we do not hold it as an essential part of our coast defense.
-COAL.
+===COAL.===
 To make the advantage of Hawaii to this country from a naval standpoint clearer I will devote a little time to some details of the question of coal and coaling stations. The possession of unlimited coal is a great advantage to a nation, but in order to convert it into naval advantage it must be placed on board of a ship of war. This is a simple thing with us so long as our naval vessels are in home ports, or so long as we are at peace, wherever the ships may be. It is in time of war that the difficulties of making our naval strength felt away from our own coasts will become apparent. Neutral ports will then be closed to our cruisers so far as supplying their coal necessities is concerned, for coal will be contraband of war as much as is other ammunition. Coaling in the open sea from supply ships is, up to the present time, an unsolved problem, and even if satisfactory mechanical arrangements be devised the supply vessels must run the gauntlet of hostile cruisers for great distances. A certainty of finding

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-unprotected they are of no value, and Germany has ajual rights in the
+{{p|492}}
-possible. If the United States held all the bases named it would be
+unprotected they are of no value, and Germany has equal rights in the former.
 practically free from attack on its Atlantic coast.
-In the Pacific we now have the opportunity to secure our Western
+The concession in 1887 of Pearl River, in Hawaii, to the United States for use as naval station, with exclusive privilege of establishing a dry dock, storehouses, and repair shops, is a valuable one, but has never been utilized. The situation is admirable, and the estimated cost of necessary fortifications and harbor works is moderate in view of the great advantage to our nation.
 coast by accepting possession of Hawaii as our most rational form of
-coast defense. With adequate fortifications on these islands, and a
+Our position with regard to dry docks in the Pacific is peculiarly weak. Modern war vessels require docking at intervals, and a fleet to maintain command of the sea must have dry docks in which to make repairs and maintain the ship in a state of full efficiency as to speed. We have not one dock outside the mainland of our country which would be available for our ships in time of war; and on the entire Pacific coast have at present but one large and one small dock, at the Mare Island navy-yard, and one building in Puget Sound, and our vessels in the Pacific would have to return to them whenever docking was requisite.
 suitable naval force in the Pacific, our coast would be far more secure
-in time of war than it could be made by any expenditure for harbor
+Great Britain, on the contrary, has made ample provisions in this respect. Bordering on the Pacific she has Government dry docks at Esquimault, Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, and Hongkong, while many private docks are available in the ports of Australia, New Zealand, Hongkong, Singapore, Penang, and India.
 defenses on the mainland alone.
-Further, if our commercial interests are to predominate in the future
+France has Government dry docks in New Caledonia and Saigon, Cochin China. Holland has governmental dry docks, which would probably be available for Germany, in Sourabaya and Batavia; and Russia has two large ones in the southeast corner of Siberia, at Vladivostock. We must have additional docking facilities if we are to maintain either naval power or trade in the Pacific waters it time of war.
 in those waters our fleet must predominate there also, and a properly
-proportionate fleet would be a sufficient guaranty that serious attack
+Coming now to the strategic advantages from coast defense point of view.
 would not be made on this most important naval base.
-The same is equally true of our entire Pacific coast, as with such a
+No naval force can operate on a hostile coast without a friendly base within easy distance. Our Atlantic coast is faced by a line of foreign bases. England has strongly fortified Halifax on our Northeast border, and built Government dry docks both there and at St. Johns. Six hundred and ninety miles from New York, and less than 6OO from the Carolina coast, she has at great expense fortified Bermuda, furnished it with the largest floating dry dock in the world, and supplied it with great stores of coal and shops for repair work, and all for the sole purpose of maintaining a base from which British naval forces could operate against the Atlantic coast of the United States in time of war. Jamaica and St. Lucia perform the same duty with regard to our Gulf coasts and the isthmus transit; and it is a notable fact that the defenses of all these places have been extensively augmented since an isthmus canal became a possibility of the near future.
 fleet, with bases at San Francisco, Hawaii, and the entrance to the
-Nicaragua Canal, not only would our Pacific trade be secure and that
+France has St. Pierre and Miquelon on our Northeast borders, with Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Cayenne on the South coast. Spain has her bases in Cuba and Porto Rico; the Dutch in Curacoa, and the Danes in St. Thomas; and it is not improbable that either of the two latter may be available for a German base should occasion arise.
 of any other power untenable, but our coast line would be equally secure,
-and American control of the canal, so far as the Pacific end of it is
+Any power which has not such a naval base off our coast can not make successful war upon the United States, a fact which was quickly appreciated by Italy during a late diplomatic incident; and an early move of the United States in a war with either of the European powers possessing these bases would have to be their capture and retention, if
 concerned, would be assured.
-Excepting Hawaii the only base for possible extensive naval operations
+{{p|493}}
 against the Pacific States is the British station at Esquimault,
-which is susceptible of capture by a land expedition.
+possible. If the United States held all the bases named it would be practically free from attack on its Atlantic coast.
 It must be distinctly understood that Hawaii can not remain independent
-supported only by moral force. It is of too great strategic value
+In the Pacific we now have the opportunity to secure our Western coast by accepting possession of Hawaii as our most rational form of coast defense. With adequate fortifications on these islands, and a suitable naval force in the Pacific, our coast would be far more secure in time of war than it could be made by any expenditure for harbor defenses on the mainland alone.
-and will assuredly meet the fate of all islands and isolated iwints of
-like value at the hands of either Great Britain, France, or Germany,
+Further, if our commercial interests are to predominate in the future in those waters our fleet must predominate there also, and a properly proportionate fleet would be a sufficient guaranty that serious attack would not be made on this most important naval base.
 each of the two former having already once seized them (once in 1843
-and once in 1849). Even if the United States were by moral force to preserve
+The same is equally true of our entire Pacific coast, as with such a fleet, with bases at San Francisco, Hawaii, and the entrance to the Nicaragua Canal, not only would our Pacific trade be secure and that of any other power untenable, but our coast line would be equally secure, and American control of the canal, so far as the Pacific end of it is concerned, would be assured.
 Hawaiian independence during time of peace the islands would
-undoubtedly be seized by the first naval power with whom we went to
+Excepting Hawaii the only base for possible extensive naval operations against the Pacific States is the British station at Esquimault, which is susceptible of capture by a land expedition.
 war, and held by all the force it could muster, as a base from which to
-attack our Western coast and gain control of the prospective canal.
+It must be distinctly understood that Hawaii can not remain independent supported only by moral force. It is of too great strategic value and will assuredly meet the fate of all islands and isolated points of like value at the hands of either Great Britain, France, or Germany, each of the two former having already once seized them (once in 1843 and once in 1849). Even if the United States were by moral force to preserve Hawaiian independence during time of peace the islands would undoubtedly be seized by the first naval power with whom we went to war, and held by all the force it could muster, as a base from which to attack our Western coast and gain control of the prospective canal.
 For the United States to expend great sums on the local defense
-of San Francisco in the shape of forts and harbor defenses, and leave
+For the United States to expend great sums on the local defense of San Francisco in the shape of forts and harbor defenses, and leave Hawaii to become a base for operations against them, is a short-sighted and extravagant policy.
 Hawaii to become a base for operations against them, is a short-sighted
-and extravagant policy.
+As Bermuda is a standing menace in front of our Atlantic coast, so will Hawaii become a similar one to our Pacific coast, if we do not hold it as an essential part of our coast defense.
 As Bermuda is a standing menace in front of our Atlantic coast, so
-will Hawaii become a similar one to our Pacific coast, if we do not hold
+COAL.
 it as an essential part of our coast defense.
-COAL.
+To make the advantage of Hawaii to this country from a naval standpoint clearer I will devote a little time to some details of the question of coal and coaling stations. The possession of unlimited coal is a great advantage to a nation, but in order to convert it into naval advantage it must be placed on board of a ship of war. This is a simple thing with us so long as our naval vessels are in home ports, or so long as we are at peace, wherever the ships may be. It is in time of war that the difficulties of making our naval strength felt away from our own coasts will become apparent. Neutral ports will then be closed to our cruisers so far as supplying their coal necessities is concerned, for coal will be contraband of war as much as is other ammunition. Coaling in the open sea from supply ships is, up to the present time, an unsolved problem, and even if satisfactory mechanical arrangements be devised the supply vessels must run the gauntlet of hostile cruisers for great distances. A certainty of finding