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Mr. Ludlow. Yes; when called upon.

The Chairman. Very good. When you go ashore do you take your flag?

Mr. Ludlow. Yes.

The Chairman. For what purpose?

Mr. Ludlow. As an insignia of who we are.

The Chairman. As an emblem of authority?

Mr. Ludlow. Yes.

The Chairman. Is there any difference between holding it on a pole in your hand, or hoisting it at a post?

Mr. Ludlow. Yes; there is a difference.

The Chairman. What is the difference?

Mr. Ludlow. The difference in this case is that there was no post established where that flag was.

The Chairman. Where was it?

Mr. Ludlow. Over the Government building.

The Chairman. But the Hawaiian flag was with our flag?

Mr. Ludlow. No; the American flag was not hoisted until the Hawaiian flag was hauled down.

The Chairman. In that particular your testimony is different from that of other witnesses who have appeared here.

Mr. Ludlow. There was but one flag flying there. It was visible from the harbor. It was flying from the cupola-the steeple.

The Chairman. Was there a Hawaiian flag displayed about the Government building at the time the United States flag was there?

Mr. Ludlow. I did not see any.

The Chairman. Are you certain it was not so? A number of witnesses have testified it was so.

Mr. Ludlow. Then they had it hidden somewhere. It was not in a prominent place-that is, a prominent place, similar to the flag that is flying over the Senate wing of the Capitol.

The Chairman. Can you tell how many flags are flying on this Capitol now?

Mr. Ludlow. I suppose there are two.

The Chairman. Suppose you were told that there were four, would you not be surprised?

Mr. Ludlow. Two are all that I have noticed.

The Chairman. There are four, and you have noticed only two. When you were there in the Hawaiian Islands did you make the acquaintance, socially, of Mr. Wilson, the commander in chief of the police?

Mr. Ludlow. Mr. Wilson is out of office. I do not think I ever saw him.

The Chairman. You did not have any conversation with him about the state of affairs in Hawaii?

Mr. Ludlow. No. That was all in the hands of the United States diplomatic agents on shore. We had nothing whatever to do with that; we had to mind our own business.

Senator Frye. I desire to call attention to a very important communication from Mr. S.M. Castle, whom we all know as one of the best men in the Hawaiian Islands. It gives a brief history of the French and English attempts to take possession of those islands, and of the English hoisting a flag and its being lowered again. It is a very interesting document, and I think it ought to be incorporated in our record.

The Chairman. That order will be made.


The document is as follows:


As some of the incidents which I may mention are entirely personal, and the inquiry will naturally arise as to their credibility, it will not be thought egotistical or indelicate for me to speak first of myself, so that any person reading these memoranda can judge of their credibility. My circumstances have been favorable both for hearing and seeing and for acquiring information generally upon matters spoken of. In July, 1836, I received the appointment of secular or financial agent of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions for these islands. Sailing from Boston December, 1830, and arriving April 9, 1837, I was identified with the mission, whose temporal necessities I came to provide for, of course, and the nature of my work also identified me at once with the business community.

For fourteen years I was devoted solely to the work of my agency. At the end of this time, at the suggestion and by the wish of the American board, Mr. Cooke, my assistant in the agency, and myself established the mercantile house of Castle & Cooke, which has now been in operation for thirty-two years. I continued to act as agent for thirty-two years from the date of my appointment. Thus I have been identified with this business community for forty-six years. I think there are none remaining but myself of those who were prominent in business. One house remains, but with no original partner. I have been honored by my fellow residents with various honorary positions, as president of the Chamber of Commerce, etc., and also in other than business relations in the political, religious, and other organizations. The institutions of the country when I came here were in a formative state, and as I came in a responsible and fiduciary character it was natural that I should be sometimes consulted and my counsel sought in matters in which I was supposed to be more fully informed than those who, from their circumstances, had not had so good opportunities of information as I have enjoyed.

I was invited to honorable positions in the Government service which I declined, but did not hesitate to give my opinion when it was sought upon political, religious, or civil topics, and thus I became acquainted with many things of which I should have known nothing in other circumstances. My position as a privy counselor and noble has added to my opportunities of learning the political status of the country.

In forming my opinion of the purposes of France and Great Britain respecting these islands in the past, I have been influenced by the tendency of events as well as utterances, either oral or written, of both France and Great Britain for the last forty years. They have been particularly active in extending their colonial system among the islands of the Pacific, and their dealings with these islands as well as some utterances, have looked to the same result; while the relations of the United States have seemed to be more those of a guardian for its ward, though not unmingled with interest, for the great body of its commerce has always been American. But, aside from this, citizens of the United States have spent millions of money as well as years of weary labor in Christianizing and civilizing the people; in giving them a written language, and books, and schools, and churches, and laws, as well as a civil polity, in making them what they are; and her military and naval


authorities and her statesmen declare the strategic position of the islands to be such that no other country should appropriate them, but American influence must be maintained paramount or they must take possession. Such remarks have been made to me personally by Gen. Schofield and different admirals. Gen. Schofield reiterates the same, with the reasons therefor, in a letter of December 30,1875, addressed to the Hon. J.K. Luttrell, M.C. Admiral Porter sustains these views in a letter to the Hon. Mr. Wood. The London Times says: "The maritime power that holds Pearl River Harbor and moors her fleet there holds the key of the North Pacific." Sir George Simpson says that "this archipelago is far more valuable on this account, that it neither is nor ever can be shared by a rival." Alexander Simpson says: "From the period of my first visit to the Sandwich Islands I became convinced of their value and importance and therefore desirous that they should form a British possession." Mr. Simpson says later: "I cannot but regret now seeing the undecided action of the British Government that some act on the part of Lord Geo. Paulet had not left any other conclusion open than that the dynasty of Kamehameha must cease to reign."

I have deemed the aggressions made by both British and French in former times to enforce demands having in my opinion but little foundation in justice, as part of a system of encroachment, having for its ultimate object the appropriation or possession of these islands.

Indeed it has been stated to me that the French consul said that had they, the French, supposed that the Government could have raised the $20,000 demanded, Capt. Laplace would have placed the sum so high that it could not have been raised, and he would have taken possession as at Tahiti. Shortly before the arrival of the Ambuscade in August, 1842, the French consul told a friend of mine that he had no complaints to make; everything was harmonious with the Government, but shortly the Ambuscade arrived, and the captain presented such a catalogue of inadmissible demands that it must have resulted in a cession had not Mr. Richards and Haalelio just sailed for the United States, England, and France to try to secure the acknowledgment of Hawaiian independence, and adjust any difficulties, if any were found to exist. Under these circumstances Capt. Malet consented to await the result of the mission.

Upon hearing of this, Admiral Richard Thomas, in command of the British Pacific squadron, lying at Valparaiso or Callao, dispatched Lord Geo. Paulet, with the frigate Carysfort, to Honolulu, to secure the settlement of any difficulties between the island Government and the British subjects. The Carysfort arrived on the 4th of February, 1843. On the 14th Lord Paulet presented demands to which the King yielded under protest. On the 20th the King visited the frigate and was received with royal honors, but the next day new demands were presented, amounting to $117,330.89. To satisfy these was beyond the King's power, and after some preliminary negotiations a temporary cessation was made on the 25th, and the administration was committed to two commissioners appointed by Lord Paulet and one by the King.

The French and English were no doubt determined to take and hold possession. They were playing against each other, and the islands were the stake.

Lieut. Frere, the head of the governing commission, told me that they saw the French were determined to have the islands, as they had taken possession of the Society and Marquesas, and they were determined to be beforehand with them. Britons sympathized with the feelings of Mr.


Sympson, already quoted, and they expected the session would be permanent. This, I think, was the general expectation of others as well, and, as I believe, it would have been so had not Lord Paulet sent his dispatches directly to the home Government, instead of through the admiral, as the proper channel. When the admiral heard of the session he immediately sailed for Honolulu, where he arrived July 26, and, after some preliminary negotiations, on the 31st a force of British marines with 2 brass field pieces marched to the plain east of the town, with the admiral and King present, when the British flag was lowered and the Hawaiian hoisted and saluted by the marines. The admiral was offended with Lord Paulet, as I plainly perceived by remarks made to myself when spending an evening at my house; and my belief that the flag would not have been restored but for this informality rests partly on the past practice of the British, and the statement made to me by Mr. Richards that the Earl of Aberdeen, the foreign secretary, or Mr. Addington, the under secretary, told him that if Admiral Thomas had not restored the flag the British Government would not have done so, and until they heard this Mr. Richards could not negotiate.

The London Times of August 20 of the same year, in a semi-official article, says:

It obviously becomes the duty of our Government to secure, by the most positive formal pledges, both from France and America, that independence which we now propose to restore to the native princes.

On the 28th of November, 1843, France and Great Britain jointly engaged reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State, and never to take possession, neither directly or under the title of protectorate, nor under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.

In 1846 the French treaty was revised and the $25,000, taken away in 1839, returned in 1849. The French consul, Dillon, with Admiral Tromline, presented a new list of grievances and demands, which the Government could not concede, in consequence of which the admiral landed his force and took possession of the custom-house, treasury, and fort, and held possession three days. After spiking the guns and committing some depredations the force was again embarked and sailed away, taking with them the King's yacht and the consul and family. It was said that they ordered the governor to pull down the Hawaiian flag, which he refused to do, and that they did not do it themselves out of respect to the treaty of November 28, 1843. In 1851 Mr. Perrin, a new French commissioner, arrived, with similar complaints and making similar demands. After long negotiations neither party would yield enough to enable them to come to an understanding, and matters assumed so serious and threatening an aspect that the consul sent to the British commissioner to inquire if in case of necessity he would hoist the British flag and protect the islands. He felt himself precluded from doing so by the obligation of the joint treaty. The United States commissioner was then applied to and consented to do so. I was informed that the French commissioner learned this through the British commissioner, and though the demands were not withdrawn he ceased to press them. The United States were not a party to the treaty, but were the first to recognize the independence of the islands in a Presidential message to Congress December 31,1842.

The demands made were in the main untenable and the claims not well founded, and even when well founded were untenable, because the claimants had refused first to have the local authorities act upon them.


By personal request of Admiral George Seymour and Gen. Miller, in company with Mr. Wylie and the Danish consul, I sat in arbitration and settlement of a number of these British claims in 1845, and no doubt satisfactory settlements would have been made by the constituted authorities had they been permitted to take their usual course. Of one large claim, Maj. Low, of the British army, said that in traveling through the islands he had not found one respectable man who believed it to be valid. But I have said enough to show why I thought that possession of the islands has entered into the wishes and plans of both the British and French in the past. I have no comments to make upon these plans. It is the practice of nations, and no doubt will continue to be so until causes of war are removed. The plea of necessity is used to justify it. The interests of the aggressing party require it. But no injustice is intended to individuals, and the general good is enhanced by it. So large numbers of good men felt when Great Britain occupied the Fijis and many other places. It meant safety to persons, stable government, civilization, Christianity, progress, and toleration. So also when the French occupied Algiers and other places, and so I think it will be better for the United States to extend its laws over all Indians in its territory, making them citizens and treating them as they do the white citizens. The case here is a little different, for under the auspices of a highly civilized nation the Hawaiians were making rapid progress in civilization. Safety and justice were as fully secured to all as they were anywhere else. If there were any preempted rights to the islands under any circumstances, it would seem to vest in those under whose auspices and at whose expense these improvements have taken place. And this is what had been done by the labors and at the expense of citizens of the United States. The complaint had been made to the British authorities that Americans, and particularly missionaries, were getting an undue influence and playing into the hands of the United States. Gen. William Miller, the British commissioner and consul-general with whom I had a very friendly acquaintance, invited me to listen to a letter from the Earl of Aberdeen, then the British foreign minister.

He wrote that complaints had been made to him of the undue influence of the missionaries, and the reply said that upon inquiry he could not find that they had acquired or used any influence which they were not legitimately entitled to. These complaints, by whomsoever made, were no doubt made to excite national jealousy and provoke national interference. Mr. Wylie, himself, a British subject, but Hawaiian foreign minister at that time, told me that all the interests of the islands by their local position would attach them to the United States if their independence should lapse, and that upon these views being communicated to Lord Clarendon, the then British foreign secretary, he wrote to the consul that Mr. Wylie was right; that by their adjacent position their interests called for their union to the States. The political question for the States would be: "Does our interest call for any such union or the maintenance of any such paramount influence as shall serve our purpose in case of war with any maritime power?" I have quoted both British and American views from their different standpoints, and I deduce French views from their course of action, and, in an account written by myself and published in the Hawaiian Spectator in October, 1839, giving an account of the French aggressions of July, 1839, I was sustained in my views of its character by a written request that sixteen of the commissioned officers of the United States East India squadron here in October, 1839, to reprint 1,000 copies of the account at their


expense for gratuitous distribution, which I did, and an endorsement of my views by the Hon. Rufus Choate in the North American Review.

Mr. Jarves, the historian of Hawaii, says:

They hold the key of the Pacific Ocean, for no trade could prosper or even exist whilst a hostile power, possessing a powerful and active marine, should send out its cruisers to prey upon commerce; but once firmly established upon them it might put to defiance any means of attack which could be brought to bear against them. Hence the commercial countries have been jealous lest some of them should have a superior influence.

Mr. Seward, in a speech in the Senate on the subject of the commerce of the Pacific, says:

Who does not see that henceforth every year European commerce, European politics, European thought, European activities, although actually gaining greater force, and European connections, although becoming more intimate, will nevertheless ultimately sink in importance while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter?

President Lincoln said:

In every light in which the state of the Hawaiian Islands can be contemplated it is an object of profound interest for the United States. Virtually it was once a colony. It is now a near and immediate neighbor. It is a haven of shelter and refreshment for our merchants, fishermen, seamen, and other citizens, when on their lawful occasions they are navigating the Eastern seas and ocean. The people are free and its laws, languages, and religion are largely the fruit of our own teaching and example.

The minority report of the Committee on Ways and Means regarding the treaty says:

Much stress is laid in the report of the majority upon the importance to the United States of obtaining a foothold upon these islands in the interest of our Pacific commerce with the continent of Asia, and of our safety in case of future war with any great naval power.

The undersigned are not insensible to these considerations. No European power should be permitted to claim sovereignty of these islands or to gain such influence in them as to menace our security. To allow this would be contrary to the well established canons of American policy by nearly a century of traditions and the conceded maxims of international law. No European power can deny to us the peculiar right to exclude them from possessing what would be a standing menace of danger to us and the possession of which by us would be no menace of danger to them.

War we hope never to see, and shall bless the time, if we are permitted to see it, when the reign of peace and good will to men shall be universal everywhere. But while the state of men continues to make it wise, "In time of peace to prepare for war."

I think I have shown, by the events related as occurring within the last fifty years and quotations from competent naval, military, and civil authorities, that it is both wise and proper for the United States to seek and retain such paramount influence and control of the islands as will prevent their being used as a menace to them in case of war. It will be noted that the incidents narrated and the remarks quoted from writers and speakers were nearly all of them many years antecedent to the treaty, and could only have related to the intrinsic value of the islands for their location and capability of production, and it is now nearly seventy years, as I am informed, since President Monroe uttered his views on this subject.

I may remark that Kamehameha IV said to me, while yet heir apparent, that if the nation died out and its sovereignty passed away, as it seemed by the course of events must inevitably be the case, they should and would go to the States, and the question when was only a question of time. If the authorities could enforce neutrality against all belligerents their strategic positions would not be so important, but


they have not the power to do so. Hence their strategic value to the United States, and they can in no way be so well utilized as by the perpetuation of this treaty, which will increase and retain a commanding American influence, such as it needs, and which will be better for all of its wants than annexation. Secretary J.G. Blaine makes the Monroe doctrine to include the islands because of their location.

A San Francisco Bulletin leader of May 2 says:

There seems to be no occasion to distrust what is known as our manifest destiny on this hemisphere, but prudent statesmanship will see that no germs are planted that may bo the cause of unnecessary trouble in the future. Upon this subject of European interference in the affairs of this continent the people are as set and determined in their opinions as they were in their maintenance of the Union of these States.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S.N. Castle.

Hon. Elwood Thorne,
Washington, D. C.

If the United States looks to commercial supremacy or even a participation upon equal terms in the great and growing commerce of the Northern Pacific they need a paramount influence in the Hawaiian Islands, and there is no method by which they can so obtain this object as by making reciprocity treaty perpetual. By doing this the islands become a commercial dependency of the United States, for the prosperity of the islands is made very dependent upon the commerce which the treaty promotes and stimulates and the effect would be to bind them closer and closer to the States, and their proximity gives them an advantage over any other maritime power in this respect. Mr. Lincoln truly says, "Virtually they were once a colony." They were nurtured and civilized and Christianized by its citizens and they have earned their right above any other nation. And as the London Times says, "The maritime power that holds the key to the North Pacific," and Sir Geo. Simpson says, "This archipelago is far more valuable that it neither is nor can be shared by a rival."

These are the recorded views of high British authorities, and I repeat, if the United States wish in the future to participate upon equal terms in the commerce of the North Pacific it seems wise to possess themselves of this "key" by making it a commercial dependency, and there is no way in which it can be done so well as to perpetuate this treaty. If the United States are content to control the commerce in her borders only they have no need of the islands. They have only to fortify impregnably their seaports and they will be secure from molestation, but they must be content to resign all commercial supremacy or even parity to others.

Since the incidents which I have narrated have transpired and the quotations which I have made were recorded, all the reasons which then existed to render the Hawaiian Islands valuable have been intensified and have rendered them more important than they were then. Both Great Britain and France have extended and strengthened their colonial possessions in this ocean, and the United States have added California and Alaska to its territory on the Pacific, and our Pacific commerce with China and Japan has grown up from California and Oregon, and since the reciprocity treaty went into effect imports from and exports to the Hawaiian Islands have been quadrupled.

Every political motive, as well as commercial, calls upon the United States to establish the advantage which the treaty has already given


them by making it perpetual, and to do it without delay, before any complications shall arise with any rival power and the control of the islands shall slip out of their hands. Wisdom calls for this without any loss of time.

The charge of fraud which has been brought by interested parties in regard to the importation of sugars and rice from other countries under its provisions is utterly baseless and has been so proved. Its originators are both base and criminal for taxing serious crimes without the shadow of a reason, and if the United States allows its present vantage to be lost by reason of these charges they will sustain a state loss which others will not be slow to improve for their own benefit.

S.N. Castle.

JUNE 13,1893.

Dear Sir: In conformity with your request I herewith inclose to you "Memoranda and Reminiscences of Incidents in Hawaiian History" which bear chiefly upon the wisdom of the treaty as a state political measure, and remain,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Samuel N. Castle.

Hon. E. E. Thorne.

Senator Gray. Mr. Chairman, I desire that these communications be made a part of this record.

The Chairman. There is no objection to that. The communications are as follows:

U.S.R.S. Dale, 3rd Rate,
Navy-Yard, Washington, D.C, January 25, 1894.
Sir: I respectfully request the necessary permission to forward the enclosed communication to the Hon. George Gray, M. C.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E.S. Houston,
Commander U.S. Navy, Commanding.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
[First endorsement.]
Navy Department,
Bureau of Navigation, January 27,1894.
Respectfully returned to Commander E.S. Houston, U. S. Navy, who is informed that he is authorized by the Department to forward the enclosed communication to the Hon. George Gray, M.C.
F. M. Ramsay,
Chief of Bureau.
[Second endorsement.]
Commandant's Office.
Navy-Yard, Washington, D.C, January 29, 1894.
Forwarded, returned to Commander E. S. Houston, with reference to the above.
J.A. Howell,
Captain, U.S. Navy, Commandant.

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