Transcribed Morgan Report Part 2

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Transcribed Morgan Report Part 1


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is the main street [indicating]. This [indicating] is a narrow street, not much frequented.

Senator Gray. What sort of fence is there?

Mr. Laird. A picket fence on this side and a picket fence on both sides. There was a roadway that came down there from the opera house, and the Japanese commissioner lived in this house [indicating], so that we did not encroach upon his territory at all.

Senator Gray. There was a picket fence here [indicating]?

Mr. Laird. Our province was a little beyond the building itself.

Senator Gray. And the lot in which you were stationed was inclosed by a picket fence?

Mr. Laird. A picket fence, probably 4 or 5 feet in height.

Senator Gray. There was no disturbance that afternoon, Tuesday, after the proclamation of the Provisional Government, and around in the neighborhood of where you were?

Mr. Laird. No.

Senator Gray. Around the Government building?

Mr. Laird. No.

Senator Gray. Were you in a place to have seen it if there had been?

Mr. Laird. After the drill was over I walked out in front, in the roadway, to see if there was any assemblage of people.

Senator Gray. Were you aware that the proclamation was being read?

Mr. Laird. No.

Senator Gray. You did not see any of it?

Mr. Laird. Did not see it and did not know it.

Senator Gray. Until you were told?

Mr. Laird. No.

Senator Gray. There was no disturbance there?

Mr. Laird. No.

Senator Frye. Was there any difficulty that night about finding quarters for your troops?

Mr. Laird. There must have been great difficulty, or the men would not have been kept out until half past 9.

Senator Frye. Were there men out seeking quarters?

Mr. Laird. Yes.

Senator Frye. And you did not get them until 9 o'clock?

Mr. Laird. It was later than that.

Senator Frye. Do you know whether Arion Hall was selected with any reference at all to the Queen's Government or Provisional Government?

Mr. Laird. I have no such knowledge. I do not think it was. It was accidental—it was available.

Senator Frye. And the only one, so far as you could find out, that was available? Was there anything in the location or disposition of the troops which prevented the Queen's troops from dislodging the men who took possession of the Government buildings?

Mr. Laird. No, I do not think there was.

Senator Frye. Under your orders, if the Queen's troops had undertaken to repossess themselves of the Government buildings, had you any right to interfere?

Mr. Laird. I would have been obliged to obey Mr. Swinburne's orders.

Senator Frye. I say, under the instructions?

Mr. Laird. Under the instructions, no.

Senator Frye. In Mr. Blount's report he states that the Queen's

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troops could not have done anything touching the Government buildings really without firing upon the American troops.

Senator Gray. Quoting Admiral Skerrett for that opinion.

Senator Frye. No; I do not think Admiral Skerrett gives that as his opinion.

Mr. Laird. I do not see how we could interfere in any way with the Queen's forces or Government forces.

Senator Frye. I do not, from the maps, if the maps are correct. Did you at any time while you were there learn the extent of the Queen's troops and the Queen's police?

Mr. Laird. No, I did not.

Senator Gray. Did you intend to allow any fighting over across the street from you?

Mr. Laird. I was under the immediate orders of Lieut. Swinburne at the time, and I would have been obliged to obey his instructions. I could not use my own judgment; he was the senior officer.

Senator Gray. How long did you stay on shore?

Mr. Laird. We were on shore from the 16th of January until the 1st of April.

Senator Gray. How far was Camp Boston from the landing place?

Mr. Laird. It was right in the heart of the city itself.

Adjourned until to-morrow, 11th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.


Contents

Washington, D. C., January 11, 1894.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, and Senator Dolph of the full committee.

Absent: Senators Sherman and Frye.

SWORN STATEMENT OF JAMES H. BLOUNT.

The Chairman. What time were you first informed of your selection by the President as the Commissioner to go to Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. The first intimation I had on the subject of my going to the Hawaiian Islands is contained in this dispatch, which I read:

"Washington, D. C., March 10,1893.
"Hon. James H. Blount,
Macon, Ga.:
"By authority I ask can you come here immediately prepared for confidential trip of great importance into Pacific Ocean? Answer."

The Chairman. Was that signed by Mr. Gresham?

Mr. Blount. No; by Hoke Smith.

The Chairman. You came in accordance with that request?

Mr. Blount. Yes. And if you will allow me I would say when I first got the telegram I made up my mind very promptly that I would not go; I did not want to go at all. My son opened the dispatch and found out what it was, and in that way was induced to bring it up to my house. I was at home. He asked me what I was going to do about it, and I said I was not going. I then showed it to his mother, and told her that I was not going. After some little while my son said, "Father, mother's health is very bad, and I think it would add five years to her life to go;" and under that appeal from him I said, "I will do anything for your mother's benefit; I will go." I then sent

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a telegram. I do not recollect its purport. I meant to give them to understand that I would come on to Washington.

The Chairman. When you came here you were informed of the place to which you were to be sent and the nature of your mission?

Mr. Blount. When I got here I went to see Mr. Hoke Smith, the Secretary of the Interior, and we went over to see the President, to pay my respects. I learned from Mr. Smith, not from the President, that the object in sending me over to the Hawaiian Islands was to make an investigation in regard to the revolution.

The Chairman. At that time did you have any prepossessions in regard to the condition of affairs in Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. You had formed no fixed opinions about it?

Mr. Blount. No. Two years ago, when I was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives, Mr. Thurston, with Mr. Mott Smith, came to the committee room and wanted to know if the Democratic party would consent to the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. I said to him, without telling him my reasons, "You had better see the Secretary of State about it."

The Chairman. Was that while John W. Foster was Secretary of State?

Mr. Blount. I do not know. I think he was not at that time.

The Chairman. Blaine then was Secretary of State?

Mr. Blount. Blaine. Did I say Foster?

The Chairman. No; I asked if Foster was Secretary of State.

Mr. Blount. He said to me, "I am a member of the Legislature and I mean to endeavor to bring about the annexation of the islands." Mr. Smith heard it. I said nothing at all; I had no authority at all from anybody on the subject, and I did not think I ought to be talking, especially to a gentleman who came in there talking about a movement of that sort. I thought he was a pretty uppish sort of person, and thought no more about it. Mr. Foster sometime in the month of February showed me a letter from Mr. Stevens, of November 20.

Senator Gray. November 20, 1892?

Mr. Blount. I think that was the date. I saw the newspaper accounts, and I was a little apprehensive; I thought there might be something wrong. But I had no idea about the condition of things at all

The Chairman. Has that letter been printed ?

Mr. Blount. Yes. The opinion that I reached was developed by events after I got there.

The Chairman. Got to Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. Yes. I was never more determined to be careful and hear the truth than I was on that occasion. The situation I was in was rather painful to me. I met those people on one side and the other with a great deal of freedom. It was important for me not to take any position one way or the other, because the most simple thing I might say would be likely to be construed as significant; so that I was left without anybody to consult, and it made my progress very slow. For some weeks in my house there was not fifteen minutes interval that there was not somebody there, from the time I got my breakfast until bed time at night—people of the several political parties; all were as cordial and as courteous as they could be.

Senator GRAY. On both sides of this question?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. YOU were visited by the native population of Hawaii? I call them the Kanakas.

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Mr. Blount. Yes. I was visited by all. I felt I was there to make an investigation, and I thought it was my duty to see the people.

The Chairman. Did they come there voluntarily to see you, or did you send out for them?

Mr. Blount. They came voluntarily. The truth of it is, it got to this point that I commenced to take testimony, and I was so much interrupted that I saw that it was necessary for me to fix a time for work and the time when I would see anybody. So that I refused to see anybody except the Government officials until after 2 o'clock each day.

The Chairman. We will get back to the starting point of this matter. When you saw the President did you have any conversation with him about the objects of your mission to Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. NO, not especially. He seemed to understand that I was there for the purpose of making the investigation.

The Chairman. My question referred to the President of the United States.

Mr. Blount. Repeat the question.

The question was read as follows:

"When you saw the President did you have any conversation with him about the objects of your mission to Hawaii?"

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. Did the President undertake to inform you of his opinions in regard to the situation in Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. Not in the slightest degree. And I never had at that time nor after I left any intimation as to what the President thought about it or felt. I was impressed with the belief that he wanted information.

The Chairman. Did he intimate or indicate in any way whether he was in favor of or opposed to the annexation of the islands?

Mr. Blount. Not in the slightest. On the contrary, he said to me— just a casual thing—"I understand from Mr. Springer that the Democrats in the House of Representatives are inclined to favor annexation." Seemed to be an inquiry. I said "I think Mr. Springer is in error about that; my impression is that the feeling in the House is that the members are not satisfactorily informed." He seemed, then, as though he had made a mistake, and said, "I ought not to have mentioned that," and he never said anything more. The impression made on my mind was that he was afraid he might give me some impression of his opinion or inclination.

The Chairman. Was that impression changed in any communication that you had with him at any time before you went to Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. Never.

The Chairman. From whom did you receive your instructions as to the mission you were to perform?

Mr. Blount. From the Secretary of State.

The Chairman. Were the instructions in writing?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. Are they set forth in your report?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you receive from the Secretary of State any instructions except those that are in writing?

Mr. Blount. I did not.

The Chairman. That, then, was the limit and the bound of your authority and course in Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. Yes. I might, perhaps, say that the Secretary of State expressed the opinion that there was no principle of international law

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that he thought justified the hoisting of the American flag—the establishment of an American protectorate there, and his idea was that it ought not to be continued.

Senator Dolph. That it ought not to be continued?

Mr. Blount. Ought not to be continued. But I understood from him that that was a matter largely in my discretion. There was no desire to make any change if it involved bloodshed. I took the impression generally that the opinion of the Secretary of State was that the flag had better be removed, if it was feasible to do it.

The Chairman. Did you receive, from the Secretary of State any orders or directions based upon his view of the merits or demerits of the revolution which was alleged to have taken place in Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. The opinions he expressed to you, as I understand, had reference to the matter of raising the flag and removing the protectorate over the islands?

Mr. Blount. Yes; that was the extent of it.

The Chairman. That your commission—did you have a regular commission?

Mr. Blount. I think that appears in the President's communication.

Senator Gray. Your letter of appointment?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Gray. It was not a regular commission, was it?

The Chairman. Was there anything beside that letter?

Mr. Blount. Let us see what paper was there?

Senator Gray. The paper will speak for itself.

The Chairman. I did not know that it had gotten in the report.

Senator Gray. It will speak for itself, if there be nothing beside that.

Mr. Blount (referring to his report). This recites that on the 11th of March, 1893, I was appointed special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands with instructions. These are the papers, and I guess you have the instructions in there.

The Chairman. Had you any commission independently of this?

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. Did you take any oath of office?

Mr. Blount. I do not think I did—not as commissioner; I took the oath of office as minister.

The Chairman. That was later?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. I will come to that after awhile. Now, at the time you left here the Senate was in session, what we call executive session, rather at the time you got your appointment?

Senator Gray. We know that. It was in session from the 4th of March or 5th of March, was it not?

The Chairman. Yes. Now, state whether it was your purpose to confine yourself in your operations in Hawaii in the execution of this commission of the President to the instructions you received, having reference, of course, to the discretion which was confided to you in respect to those orders.

Mr. Blount. It was not only my purpose, but I did it as rigidly as I ever did anything in my life.

The Chairman. Was your judgment, which you have given, your opinion here in your report in regard to the situation of affairs in Hawaii, and the regularities or irregularities that attended the conduct of the minister of the United States in connection with that revolution in any wise influenced by your desire either to promote or to prevent or retard the annexation of Hawaii to the United States?

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Mr. Blount. I would hate to think so. I had the idea that I was to conduct myself in decency and pursue the inquiry with fidelity.

The Chairman. The question is asked you to enable you to give an affirmative answer.

Mr. Blount. Well, I will say no. What is the question?

The question was read as follows:

"Was your judgment which you have given, your opinion—your report in regard to the situation of affairs in Hawaii and the regularities or irregularities that had attended the conduct of the minister of the United States in connection with that revolution—in any wise influenced by your desire either to promote or to prevent or retard the annexation of Hawaii to the United States?"

Mr. Blount. I am not conscious of any such feeling. On the contrary, I was impressed when I came to the investigation with the conviction that I had very much at stake. I had confidence in the integrity and high purposes of the President, and felt that I could give him no higher offense than to misinform him. I felt that any other than a truthful, an exhaustive, and impartial examination would bring about the contempt of the American people. I was, therefore, timid— over cautious, perhaps, in all my conduct in reference to it. I kept from their social life. I did not intimate any opinion to these people one way or the other. When I left those islands nobody had any idea, so far as I could gather, what my report was. Each side claimed in the newspaper that I was in favor of it. I studiously avoided communicating anything to anybody, and I turned the facts over and over again in my mind. I felt that I was alone, without anybody on earth to consult with, counsel with, and I often felt the need of somebody to advise with. But there was no impartial person to whom I could talk at all, and so the responsibility I felt the greater, and went on in that groove to the end.

Senator Gray. Was party feeling running high there?

Mr. Blount. Very high, very high.

The Chairman. You seem to have taken some of the testimony submitted to you upon oath, and other parts are without being sworn to. Did you administer the oaths to these witnesses yourself or did you have it done by the authorities of the islands?

Mr. Blount. I had no authority to administer an oath. It was a very delicate thing for an American to call upon those people to take an oath, especially members of the Provisional Government, and wherever I had the time I would take the testimony down in shorthand, and had the stenographer write out the shorthand and the witness certify to its correctness. I used him, the stenographer, all I could in that way. The communications would come in; some of them I did not think much of, and some I did. There was no opportunity to cross-examine.

Senator Gray. Any written statements?

Mr. Blount. Written statements, yes. I did not like very much to take them. It occurred to me, I am down here, I can take these things and weigh them; I shall know all about the parties and topics and if they are not pertinent I can discard them; and when I came to make up my report I said, all these things have been here with me; I will put them in this testimony and let all go along. The statements were sometimes from one side and sometimes from another.

The Chairman. Not being authorized to administer an oath yon received such statements as they brought to you?

Mr. Blount. They would hand them to me, and I would take them and look at them.

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Now, Mr. Chairman, there is one statement that this observation does not apply to, and as you have invited my attention to the matter I think it proper to say this. You will find a statement there in the form of a colloquy between W. O. Smith and Mr. Cooper and Mr. Cassell. The circumstances about that I wish to state. On one occasion I said to the President and members of his cabinet, "I would be very glad to have the statement of you gentlemen at any time if it is agreeable to you."

The Chairman. You are referring now to President Dole and his cabinet?

Mr. Blount. Yes. "I can conceive of reasons why you might not desire to do it." I did not state what they were, and they made no response and gave no indication of a desire to be examined. The attorney-general---

The Chairman. Who was he?

Mr. Blount. W. O. Smith. He came one day, as he did often, to the house where I stopped, and I said to him, "I would like to examine you." He agreed to it.

Senator Gray. He agreed to it.

Mr. Blount. He agreed to it. The time came for him to be examined and he said, "I would rather not be examined. I will bring you a paper, which is the history of the revolution, prepared by myself and some other gentlemen, and I will hand that to you." He brought this paper. He said it contained most of the history of the revolution, some unimportant matters only were omitted. I said, "Would you object to my seeing those?"

Senator Gray. Seeing what?

Mr. Blount. The unimportant matters. It was something left out. He hesitated and said, "Well, I will speak to Mr. Dole about it." I afterwards mentioned it to him again, and he answered he had not. I think that was about it. I did not pursue the matter further. You can readily understand my relations to the Provisional Government; they were of very great delicacy. Mr. Cooper, another gentleman in this colloquy, I invited to be examined. He came at a time when somebody else was being examined. I was a good deal crowded by lack of clerical force, and said to Judge Cooper, "Won't you sit down and write me out carefully a statement of the facts of this revolution?" He said, "Yes." Well, he apologized for not doing it once or twice on account of his court. But this paper never came. He never alluded to the matter again.

The Chairman. Did he not bring the paper to you or send it to you?

Mr. Blount. Mr. Smith brought a paper.

The Chairman. After that Judge Cooper never made any statement to you?

Mr. Blount. Never made any statement.

The Chairman. I want to ask you whether opportunity was accorded by you to all the members of that Provisional Government to make their statements of the history of the transaction?

Mr. Blount. As I have already stated on my own motion, I said to the President and cabinet together, I would be very glad to examine you gentlemen.

The Chairman. And what you have put in your report is all you have received in reply to that suggestion?

Mr. Blount. Everything in the world.

Senator Butler. I see in some criticisms of the testimony which you have taken, quite severe attacks upon the character of some of the witnesses. Did you adopt the usual method of ascertaining the quality

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of the testimony, if I may use that expression, examine such witnesses as were available?

Mr. Blount. Before I examined any witnesses I received everybody, heard what everybody said, and saw a good deal of the people, and judged as best I might as to the character of the witnesses. You can readily see that with this statement I could not pursue the methods that I would pursue here. If I were to go into the matter of the examination of the witness, say of the royalist side, and his statement was made known to the public immediately, you would find an outcry perhaps in the press about treasonable purposes, about opposing the Government, etc. There was an intense amount of feeling, and therefore I could not, on the ground of these attacks, do as suggested. If they had not been made in the press, I knew these feelings existed. Whom could I call on to say would you believe this man on his oath? I never allowed, so far as I could govern it, any one to know whom I had examined. I never allowed an annexationist to know I had examined a royalist, and never allowed a royalist to know I had examined an annexationist. The secrecy of my examination was the only way in which I could make a full investigation.

Senator Butler. In other words, you availed yourself of the best testimony you could get under the circumstances?

Mr. Blount. I did.

The Chairman. The communications that were made to you, I understand from your statements, you kept entirely secret?

Mr. Blount. Nobody saw them until they were seen in this country, in this Capitol, besides myself and my stenographer.

The Chairman. I will ask you, in the disturbed state of affairs in Hawaii, whether it would or would not have been impracticable to have obtained a full statement, frank statement, about the participation of these men in the revolution on the one side or the other, because of an apprehension in certain events they might be held responsible by whichever Government proved to be the permanent Government?

Mr. Blount. Possibly so. I am quite sure that that was true in reference to the people who were not in power, and I rather think the President and cabinet preferred not to be examined, because of the changes that might occur. But I could not say that I could give you tangible, substantial reasons for it. It was that I had in mind—I did not tell them so—when I said, "I should like to have your testimony; I can conceive of reasons why you might not want to testify."

Senator Gray. Your feelings and theirs both were ones of delicacy?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. And on the other hand there might be apprehension in the change of government of criminal prosecutions, because of the information they might give to you?

Mr. Blount. What their reason was I might conjecture, and it would not, perhaps, be the correct one.

The Chairman. I was asking you what your conjecture was—an opinion was—on that proposition, and whether that made it necessary, in your judgment, that you should observe this very conservative course.

Mr. Blount. That is what guided me in my approaches to the subject.

The Chairman. When you got to Hawaii, to whom did you report, to what Government?

Mr. Blount. To the Provisional Government.

The Chairman. Did you exhibit your letter of authority to the Provisional Government?

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. Did you inform the Provisional Government of the

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nature and purposes and extent of the commission and powers which you had been entrusted with in visiting the islands?

Mr. Blount. I did not.

The Chairman. What information did you give to President Dole?

Senator Gray. They were confidential, were they not?

Mr. Blount. They were confidential. You will see what the President communicated to me in the papers.

The Chairman. You gave no information to that Government of your instructions?

Mr. Blount. No, not for some time.

The Chairman. After a while we will get at what you did. But what you did then was, I suppose, to deliver the letter of the President of the United States to the President of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Blount. Yes. Well, I got to meeting them in a casual way, and there would be references to the examination, but no discussion of it. My time was taken up in making examinations.

The Chairman. How far did you put the Provisional Government in possession of knowledge of your authority as commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Blount. I never gave them any information in reference to the matter—I mean direct, official communication—until I published the instructions that I was acting under.

The Chairman. When did you publish those instructions?

Mr. Blount: That appears in the correspondence with the State Department. I have not seen it for six months.

The Chairman. Did you publish them in the newspapers?

Mr. Blount. All the newspapers of Honolulu.

The Chairman. What was your object in making public those instructions?

Mr. Blount. All sorts of conjectures as to what my powers were and the purposes of the Administration through me. For instance, there would be a claim on the part of the royalists that I was going to restore the Queen at a certain time; and on the other hand there would be a declaration on the part of the annexationists after the troops were ordered back to the vessel, on the appearance of any disorder I would bring them back for the purpose of suppressing it. The impression was that I would not allow a move of any political party there looking to a change of the Government, and I felt it to be my duty to inform those people, both sides, that I was not there to take any part either with one party or the other with reference to their affairs; that I should protect American citizens in their lives and property while they were observing the laws of the land and not participating in the conflict.

The Chairman. In order to give confidence and assurance to the people of Hawaii in the midst of these conjectures that were being made, you thought it was best to publish your instructions?

Mr. Blount. I ought to say that I had corresponded with the Secretary of State about these misapprehensions, and he authorized me in my discretion to publish them, and I did it promptly.

The Chairman. In what way were you received by the Provisional Government, in a friendly or in a reluctant way?

Mr. Blount. As friendly as I could desire or anybody could desire.

The Chairman. Did the President of the Provisional Government indicate to you that you were welcome in Hawaii as the representative of the United States Government?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Did you report to or have any official correspondence

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with Liliuokalani or her cabinet, or the cabinet that existed at the time of her abdication?

Mr. Blount. I never had any communication with her in any way until certain persons appeared there and were reputed to be authorized by the President to negotiate for her abdication. I think that is all printed.

Senator Gray. What is it?

Mr. Blount. Certain persons there claiming to have authority from the President of the United States to negotiate for the Queen's abdication.

The Chairman. Who were those persons?

Mr. Blount. I think their names appear in the printed papers—Dr. Bowen, correspondent of the New York World, and a Mr. Sewell.

The Chairman. It turned out that they had no such authority?

Mr. Blount. Yes. I thought the President of the Provisional Government and the Queen herself both ought to be informed that this was not true. I sent to Mr. Dole. I asked him to come to my house, which he did. I told him the circumstances, and that these gentlemen had no such authority. He said, "Well, would you object to its being stated you think the Queen's abdication would simplify the situation?" I said I would. I feel that I am authorized in saying that the Government of the United States has nothing to do with this matter one way or the other, and I had nothing to say for or against the measure. I had no authority from the Government, and until I had, did not want the name of the United States Government connected with it.

Senator Gray. If it could be brought about by the intervention of those gentlemen, without the United States Government having anything to do with it, you would have nothing to say about it?

Mr. Blount. No. Some hours after I called on Mr. Dole and said I have never called on the Queen; never called because I was afraid it would be misapprehended, misconstrued; because it was not proper conduct considering my relations to your Government. But I feel now that I ought to go to see her and say to her in connection with this matter what I have said to you. He said he could not see any impropriety in it. I went and stayed two or three minutes, making the same representation that I did to President Dole.

Senator Gray. The Queen speaks English?

Mr. Blount. She speaks English; but she evidently was very wary. She did not know what to make of me or the Government, and said very little. I left her. I did ask a member of her cabinet to inquire of her if she would not be willing to furnish me a copy of the constitution she proposed to proclaim.

Senator Butler. The one which was supposed to have been promulgated?

The Chairman. Promulgated and destroyed?

Mr. Blount. The one she proposed to promulgate. The answer was made she would do so. It was not done for a long while. I do not know why, but finally the paper was brought to me by some person, I do not know whom now. I sent for the members of the cabinet.

The Chairman. The Queen's cabinet?

Mr. Blount. Her cabinet. To see if they recognized that paper, and they agreed to all except one proposition. It contained a property qualification on voters for the legislative body, not nobles, but representatives, and they disagreed with her as to that.

The Chairman. Said that was not part of the paper as they understood?

Mr. Blount. Yes. They did not think there was any property

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----48

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qualification; they thought it was educational. I put it in my report because this man Peterson is a pretty bright lawyer, and I thought they would be much more likely to recollect correctly than the Queen. I never talked with the Queen about it at all.

The Chairman. That is all the information you got about the terms of the constitution which the Queen had proposed?

Mr. Blount. Except later. Sometime afterward a gentleman came to me, I think a Mr. Carter or a Mr. McFarlane, with a paper, which you gentlemen have here, containing a statement of the Queen; I looked over it. My first impression was that I ought not to use it; that she was disclosing a great many secrets in her feelings toward her political allies calculated to create feeling between her and them. She was a woman. Then it occurred to me after thinking the matter over, "I have nothing to do with that; I am here representing the Government of the United States, and I will put that with the other evidence." Those are all the communications on the constitution.

The Chairman. Did that paper purport to emanate from the Queen?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes; there is no question about that.

The Chairman. You say there is no question about that?

Mr. Blount. I have no question about that.

Senator Gray. Was that sent in with your report?

Mr. Blount. Yes; I have put everything in the bundle and sent it.

Senator Gray. You sent everything?

Mr. Blount. I sent everything.

Senator Gray. It is a statement signed by the Queen, is it?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Gray. There is but one statement from her, a sort of history of the revolution?

The Chairman. It was her version of the affair?

Mr. Blount. Her version. I never spoke to her about it at all.

The Chairman. During your stay in Hawaii did you have any official communication with Liliuokalani or her cabinet as in any sense representing an existing government?

Mr. Blount. No; not the slightest, not the slightest.

The Chairman. What communication you had with them at all was for the purpose of obtaining information that you thought would be useful to the Government of the United States?

Mr. Blount. Yes. I took opinions from both sides of people who were connected with public affairs at the time. For instance, if you will allow me, there was Mr. Damon, the Vice-President, who went to the station house to negotiate for the surrender of the station house, and went to the Queen. I took him, Mr. Bolte, who went with him to the station house; Mr. Waterhouse, who was on the committee of safety, and at whose house the final determination of the dethronement of the Queen occurred. I mention those persons, and I attempted to get the testimony of Mr. Smith and the statement of Mr. Cooper, who read the proclamation establishing the new Government; I went in that direction, and I found from Mr. Damon's testimony and Mr. Bolte's that they had gone to the station house and found certain persons connected with the Queen's Government, and I naturally took members of the cabinet, and so it led along as circumstances were.

The Chairman. As the question opened up to your mind you proceeded to investigate things that you thought would be useful to the Government here?

Mr. Blount. I did.

The Chairman. Before you left Hawaii did you receive any communication, statement, or information from the Government of the United

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States of any purpose to reinstate Liliuokalani on any terms or conditions whatever?

Mr. Blount. I never dreamed of such a thing as the reinstatement of Liliuokalani; I never heard it suggested until my return to the United States. I had a talk with the Secretary of State, and the inclination of his mind was that the circumstances created a moral obligation on the part of the United States to reinstate her. I gathered from the Secretary of State that the President had not any opinion—was thinking the matter over.

The Chairman. That the President had not formed his opinion?

Mr. Blount. Had not formed his opinion. I had never heard anything from the President indicating any opinion until the public had it.

The Chairman. Then at the time you left Hawaii nothing had been developed in the direction of a movement to reinstate Liliuokalani on the throne?

Mr. Blount. I never heard of it except as I heard of it in the American papers.

The Chairman. The papers that would find their way to Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. Yes; nothing from the Government. You asked me a moment ago about my having communication with the Queen. Those people down there are the most consummately brutal and unconscionable people I ever saw—on both sides; they say almost anything. On one occasion the attorney-general came to me at my office, and the Queen's name was mentioned. I said, "What sort of a person is she; I never saw her." He was surprised. He said, "You have never seen her?" I said, "No." He said, "That is very strange; the Government was informed that you called to see her, and she got on her knees, and pressed your hands, and cried," etc. Some time after that an attack was made in the Star, in which the writer was urging the deposition of the Queen, charged she was conspiring against the existing Government, and said she should be deposed, that she might have treasonable communications with public ministers, as witness her unhindered interviews with Commissioner Blount. That was the annexation organ. I thought it was very discourteous, and I wrote Mr. Dole a letter. Probably it appears in the published correspondence.

In that letter I set forth that I had never called upon the Queen at all except as indicated in an interview with him, in which it was agreed that there was no impropriety in my doing so, and that I felt this attack was an outrage on me as the American representative. He seemed to appreciate the situation, and an apology was brought about, a very poor one. But I think President Dole regretted it. The attorney-general, in referring to the article, said to me that this man Smith, of the annexation organ, had been to the Government (that is to say the President and cabinet), and said that he had the unquestionable proof that I had three long interviews with the Queen. He did not believe Smith. I never had any communication with the Queen looking to her protection or aid in any form.

The last interview I had with her came about in this way: I was going off from the islands; I made up my mind to leave; I thought everything was quiet. I felt I was taking some responsibility by leaving if anything should happen and I should not be there—that I would have to suffer the criticism. I talked with members of the Provisional Government; talked with some two or three gentlemen of character and standing on the royalist side as to whether there was any danger in my leaving, and then it occurred to me perhaps I had better go and see the Queen and ascertain just what she thought of the peacefulness of her people. I went to her and told her my purpose of leaving; all of which

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was kept quiet, because I did not want any demonstration made when I went away from there. It was understood by the Provisional Government. I talked to them freely about it.

I asked the Queen about the natives keeping quiet. She said there was no danger until the question of annexation was finally determined upon by the United States. She asked me, in the event of her arrest what would Admiral Skerrett do—what would the United States forces do in the way of protection. I said, "So far as I am concerned I must decline to answer as to what the Government of the United States will do; when I leave here Admiral Skerrett will be in command of the naval forces, and questions of public order, etc., will be left with him without my control." I never gave her an intimation.

Senator Gray. Is that all that occurred?

Mr. Blount. That is all that occurred.

Senator Gray. How many times had you had interviews with regard to public affairs with the Queen?

Mr. Blount. Had but two interviews; one concerning her abdication, and one just before I left, to see if there was danger of bloodshed when I left.

Senator Gray. The one you have just spoken of?

Mr. Blount. Yes. Those were the only conversations I ever had with her, and each of them I have substantially detailed.

The Chairman. In your estimate of her in those brief conversations, did you think her an intelligent, bright woman?

Mr. Blount. The conversations, I say, were very brief; the first one only two or three minutes, when she seemed to be a little wary and disinclined to talk except in response to questions. She was dignified and reserved. She was quite reticent. I had no means of determining her intelligence from any observation of my own. She was reputed by all the people there to be a very well educated woman.

The Chairman. A woman having dignity?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Having polite manners?

Mr. Blount. Yes. That is quite a feature of the Hawaiian people— dignity and good manners. So I learned from the people over there.

The Chairman. Was that your observation?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. I do not find in your report that you gave any advice to the Government of the United States in respect to the restoration of Liliuokalani to her former rule?

Mr. Blount. I did not give any advice. I was not called on to give any advice to anybody; I went down there to report facts; those were my instructions, and I reported as I believed them to be.

The Chairman. Does your report contain all the information you gave to the Government of the United States with regard to the forces there?

Mr. Blount. I think it does; it is the only way I carried it—on those papers.

The Chairman. And you had no motive in your report of interfering with or changing the Government that existed in Hawaii and restoring Liliuokalani?

Mr. Blount. It never entered my head to do anything about the restoration of the Queen until I returned to the United States, except, as I told you, I would see the matter discussed in an American paper.

The Chairman. But as a purpose on your part?

Mr. Blount. Oh, no. I was rigidly loyal to the idea that I was not there except to report information.

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The Chairman. How long after your arrival in Honolulu was it before you gave orders to Admiral Skerrett to remove troops from the islands and to haul down the American flag?

Mr. Blount. In two or three days. You will see a record of that. I met people day and night. They met me cordially, people of both factions there at the legation. The active leaders would resent the idea in the newspapers of there being any danger of disorder. They would say to me it would be folly for us to attempt anything to change the present condition of affairs until the question of annexation was disposed of; that if the United States wanted to annex the islands, they would annex them; what could they do? That seemed to be in their minds, and the thought that determined the peace of the islands up to the time I left, so far as I could see.

The Chairman. Up to the time you caused Admiral Skerrett to withdraw his force did you find the people in a quiet state?

Mr. Blount. It was as quiet a looking city as ever I saw.

The Chairman. You could then see no occasion for military demonstration on shore for the purpose of protecting the peace?

Mr. Blount. None in the world, as I said in my report. I went to President Dole and told him my impression about it, and my purpose to withdraw the troops, and asked if he could preserve order. He said he could presrve order. I was hastened for the reason which appears in the report. I had learned of a meeting of some eighty people who wanted to communicate to me certain political views, and it occurred to me the best thing to do was to have the troops removed. I intended to have them removed lest it would appear that they had brought about the removal of the troops.

The Chairman. The day that the troops were removed was there any civil commotion in Honolulu?

Mr. Blount. Not the slightest. I did not go down to the Government building at the removal. I did not know but possibly there might be some demonstration and my presence might occasion it. I asked Admiral Skerrett to see what demonstrations, if any, were made, and he has reported it. Capt. Hooper, of the Rush, took me over. He is quite an intelligent gentleman. He was on the shore, and I said I would be glad to have him go down there and see the impression it made on the people, what manifestations there were. His report is of record.

The Chairman. During the time that you were there, the flag was ordered down. Was there any civil commotion in Honolulu, or any part of it, of which you were informed?

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. Would you describe the condition of the people as one of peacefulness and quiet?

Mr. Blount. Yes, as a general rule, I would say that was true.

The Chairman. Was there any riot or outbreak of any kind?

Mr. Blount. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. Were you informed of any combinations of a political sort during your stay, to reinstate Liliuokalani by a counter revolution?

Mr. Blount. No. I have stated the condition of the native mind as far as I was impressed by it, and that was that they could do nothing until the United States determined upon the question of annexation.

The Chairman. Were the people quiet in their avocations?

Mr. Blount. Yes. There was nothing to indicate that there ever had been any revolution.

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The Chairman. Any disturbance in commercial affairs?

Mr. Blount. None that I could see.

The Chairman. Any depression in financial matters?

Mr. Blount. Yes, there seemed to be; but not so much as in the United States or in other parts of the world.

The Chairman. Was that due to the political situation, or attributable to their commerce?

Mr. Blount. One would think it was because of the political condition of affairs, and another that it was the general depression throughout the world.

The Chairman. Did you form any opinion while you were there of the financial situation in Hawaii, as to whether it had inspired confidence in it among the people—confidence in their banking institutions?

Mr. Blount. I could not say that I have formed an opinion worth stating. I do not think there was any trouble about their banking institutions or money.

The Chairman. This revolution does not seem to have interfered with the credit of the banks?

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. What is the circulating medium in Honolulu?

Mr. Blount. They have some silver that was issued during Kalakaua's reign, and gold, and our Treasury notes.

The Chairman. Our Treasury notes?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Gray. Our paper money?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Gray. Is it as common there as it is here?

Mr. Blount. Just the same.

Senator Butler. Do you mean our money, or issues of the Hawaiian Government?

Mr. Blount. Our money.

The Chairman. Have they any paper issues of their own?

Mr. Blount. None that I ever saw.

The Chairman. Neither of the banks or of the Government?

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. Did there seem to be a proper supply for the needs of the people?

Mr. Blount. I never heard any complaint.

The Chairman. The price of sugar was depressed while you were there?

Mr. Blount. An advance—there was a depression and rise, which was very inspiriting to the people. You spoke about a currency. There was no complaint. You will see that there had been in the Legislature some fellow who introduced a bill and got up an excitement on loaning money on real estate, just as you have seen here. But it did not take any form that indicated any stringency.

The Chairman. When you arrived in Hawaii, did you communicate your instructions to Mr. Stevens?

Mr. Blount. I did not.

The Chairman. Did you at any time before you left there?

Mr. Blount. I published the instructions.

The Chairman. Mr. Stevens did not have any official notice of them until they were published ?

Mr. Blount. No.

The Chairman. Did you confer with him when you directed Admiral Skerrett to remove the troops and haul down the flag?

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Mr. Blount. I did not. I did not confer with anybody except Admiral Skerrett.

The Chairman. Your orders appear here. I believe they were issued by you directly as a commissioner of the United States?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. And in virtue of this letter of authority to which you have already alluded?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. Is your letter of authority printed in the report?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Blount. My impression is that an order was made by the Secretary of the Navy, I am pretty sure there was, directing Admiral Skerrett to obey my orders. I do not know that that is in the printed report.

Senator Gray. Mr. Stevens was notified?

Mr. Blount. No.

Senator Dolph. Do you understand that Mr. Stevens was notified of the purpose and objects of Mr. Blount's commission?

Senator Gray. I think so. Let us see.

The Chairman. I think so. Senator Sherman. Did you communicate to Mr. Stevens the nature of the authority under which you were acting?

Mr. Blount. Mr. Stevens was informed by the Government itself. He had a communication which I think you will find there. I had no communication with Mr. Stevens at all with reference to my authority; the Government had undertaken to do that. My instructions were secret and I never gave them to anybody.

Senator Gray. I find on page 3 of this publication, document No. 2, letter from Department of State dated "Washington, March 11, 1893," which says:

"Department of State,
"Washington, March 11, 1893.
"Sir: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands the President has determined to send to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner, the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
"Mr. Blount bears credential letters in that capacity, addressed to the President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government, and you are requested to facilitate his presentation.
"In all matters pertaining to the existing or other Government of the islands the authority of Mr. Blount is paramount. As regards the conduct of the usual business of the legation, you are requested to continue until further notice in the performance of your official functions, so far as they may not be inconsistent with the special powers confided to Mr. Blount. You are also requested to aid him in the fulfillment of his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information, and the archives of the legation should be freely accessible to him.
"Mr. Blount is fully instructed touching his relations to the commanding officer of the United States naval force in Hawaiian waters.
"I am, etc.,
"W. Q. Gresham."

That is signed by Mr. Gresham.

Mr. Blount. I understood that the Government communicated to Mr. Stevens what it wanted him to know.

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Senator Sherman. They gave him direct instructions?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. That was the only occasion of the communication of your authority to Mr. Stevens ?

Mr. Blount. I did not make them; I had a copy.

The Chairman. That is all the information Mr. Stevens had of your authority?

Mr. Blount. So far as I have any information. I suppose the Government has given you copies of everything—all their communications to and from Mr. Stevens.

The Chairman. The orders that you gave to Admiral Skerrett are supported, if I understand you correctly, alone by the letter of authority given to you by the Secretary of State?

Mr. Blount. And the letter that Mr. Herbert, the Secretary of the Navy, sent to Admiral Skerrett.

The Chairman. To execute your orders? Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. You construed your authority, of which you have just been speaking, to be sufficient to justify you in taking command of that fleet?

Senator Butler. Control.

The Chairman. I put it "command," for the purpose of removing the troops off the shore, and of hauling down the flag that had been raised there upon the Hawaiian public buildings?

Mr. Blount. I thought I was justified under the instruction and that order given by the Secretary of the Navy, of which I had information.

The Chairman. If at any time while you remained there you had supposed that the preservation of life and property and their treaty rights made it necessary, you thought you would have had authority, under the construction of your powers, to have ordered the troops back upon the shore?

Mr. Blount. I think so. The letter of the Secretary of State speaks of it. I do not recollect the exact instructions; but it speaks about my conferring with Admiral Skerrett—makes some such suggestions. But taking that communication and the order from the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Skerrett, I thought I had authority to order the troops back to protect the property of American citizens.

The Chairman. You thought you were the judge of the political or actual situation in Hawaii, or in Honolulu, to the extent of authorizing you to protect the public peace, and thereby to protect American property and life?

Mr. Blount. I do not say to protect the public peace. I did not understand it to that extent. I understood that if there was a contest between the people of the Provisional Government and any other people there for the control of public affairs, if it did not involve the property and the persons of American citizens who were not participating in the conflict, I had nothing to do with it.

The Chairman. Would not a conflict of that kind in the city of Honolulu, with 20,000 population and a great many nationalities represented, necessarily involve some danger to American life and property and commerce?

Mr. Blount. I felt this way about that: I knew that that question was one that might come, and that I would wait until it came to see what discretion I would use under the circumstances that arose. I tried to carry out my power as I understood it.

The Chairman. And you construed your authority to be sufficient

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to enable you to use the naval forces of the United States then in the harbor for the purpose of protecting the life, liberty, and property and treaty rights of American citizens in the event of a commotion?

Mr. Blount. Yes. I think there is no doubt about that. I think that appears from my instructions. I think that is very clear.

Senator Butler. I understand that under your instructions if that exigency had arisen, and you thought it necessary, you would have ordered the troops ashore to protect life and property?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. In ordering these troops from the shore to the ship, were you influenced by this construction of your authority?

Mr. Blount. There were several things. It did not seem to me that an investigation could go on very well with the flag and troops there. They were calculated to repress certain people and prevent them testifying— if that condition of things were kept up. In the next place, it did not occur to me that there was any justification for it at all, for its continuance. I have nothing to say about the original placing of it; it was not a matter of my own to determine. But I found it there; I thought it could be removed without any difficulty, and I accordingly ordered the flag removed and the troops back on board the vessel. Before proceeding further, here are what I conceive to be the orders under which Admiral Skerrett was acting:

"March 11, 1893.
"Sir: This letter will be handed to you by the Hon. James H. Blount, Special Commissioner from the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
"You will consult freely with Mr. Blount, and will obey any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command.
"You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.
"Respectfully,
"Hilary A. Herbert,
"Secretary of the Navy.
"Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
"Commander in Chief United States Naval Forces,
"Pacific Station, Flagship Mohican, Honolulu, H.I. "

The Chairman. That was the order of the Secretary of the Navy to which you had reference?

Mr. Blount. Yes. Mr. Chairman, allow me a moment. I made a statement a while ago that until my instructions were published I had not communicated then to anybody. I forgot that I did communicate then to Admiral Skerrett. I felt that I could not confer with him about anything unless he knew my instructions.

The Chairman. Knew what your instructions were?

Mr. Blount.Yes.

The Chairman. The extent of your authority?

Mr. Blount.Yes. No officer connected with the vessels there other than Admiral Skerrett had any knowledge of it.

The Chairman. I will ask you the question: Was the movement of the troops or the orders for hauling down the flag in any respect intended to be an evidence of your participation in the domestic affairs

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of Hawaii, so as to favor either the Queen's form of government or the then existing Government—the Dole regime?

Mr. Blount. My idea about it was, the effect would be to impress both sides with the belief that I was not going to participate in their local affairs.

The Chairman. Was that your intention?

Mr. Blount. Such was my intention. I did not think the flag troops ought to be there. It did not occur to me just; it did not occur to me that investigation could go on with them there.

Senator Gray. I understand the chairman's question to be, did you intend the removal of those troops to give intimation to either side of your intention toward them?

Mr. Blount. I did not. I thought that it would be an intimation to both sides that I did not come down there to do anything with their controversies.

The Chairman. Your position was one of strict neutrality between them?

Mr. Blount. As much so as I could possibly make it. I never went into the house of a royalist but once while I was in Honolulu. I called on Mr. J. O. A. Carter with my family, with Mrs. Blount, just before leaving.

Senator Sherman. He was the former minister?

Mr. Blount. He was a brother of the former minister.

Senator Gray. I think the former minister is dead.

Mr. Blount. He is. He is the brother of the former minister, on whom I called. I called on President Dole, the attorney-general, the minister of the interior, the vice-president—the persons connected with the Government. I felt that I could do that without subjecting myself to general intercourse with the people. They were officials of the Government, and I announced to both sides that I felt bound to do that.

The Chairman. With the exception of the Queen and cabinet and the commander of the military forces, and of the civil forces, called the police, was there any substantial change in the personnel of the Government from what it was formerly, when you got to Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. As to the personnel?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Blount. Well, the---

Senator Butler. As I understand, you arrived there after the Provisional Government was established?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Butler. You have no information as to the personnel of the Queen's government?

The Chairman. My question relates to what Mr. Blount learned as to what was the composition of the former government, as to its personnel.

Mr. Blount. I think the police force as a rule was left untouched. I never went into it particularly.

The Chairman. The army was disbanded—the Queen's army, body guard.

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Do you remember whether any body guard was reserved to her for her protection ?

Mr. Blount. It was not so when I was there.

The Chairman. In other respects the Government went on under existing laws, saving, of course, the revolution which had taken place in the head of the Government?

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Mr. B ount. The information on that point appears in the correspondence between the Provisional Government and the Government here, and I would take it as the highest evidence.

The Chairman. That conforms to your own observations?

Mr. Blount. Yes, as to the character of the Government set up.

The Chairman. I suppose you ascertained that during the decade previously to this revolution there had been a great many changes in the political attitude of a great many leading men in Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Politics had been a pretty lively subject in Hawaii some years before you got there?

Mr. Blount. Everything is little down there. It was lively for them in noise.

Senator Butler. It would not be considered very lively in Georgia, New York, or Ohio, I suspect?

Mr. Blount. Oh, no.

The Chairman. Would you say that the people there are given to participating in political agitations?

Mr. Blount. I would say more so than in Alabama. They get them pretty well worked up.

The Chairman. Meeting in conventions, public meetings, and having their say?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes. I want to say that so far as that matter is concerned I took no testimony.

The Chairman. I am getting your impressions aside from the testimony you took.

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. You would say, I suppose, that there was a pretty large feeling on the part of the press in Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes. You would take up the papers there and read one side and the other where they would make the most villifying personal attacks that you could conceive of. I would learn when these gentlemen would meet that it was just a good joke. I spoke once to Mr. Dole about it; I said, "I do not see how you can keep the peace with the people attacking each other this way."

He said, "That does not amount to anything; they are friendly when they meet. My attention was directed to that because I was apprehensive from seeing these articles that some disturbance would come, and I always talked very freely to the Government about the public peace. I was doing no harm on that ground; they seemed to want to talk with me; they came to me when there was fear of disturbance, and I would not communicate it to the other side. Then the other side would come, and I did not mention what they said to the Government. In this way I got information of both sides. I saw that there would be no trouble.

The Chairman. We have gone through a general view of this matter; I will turn Mr. Blount over to any one who wishes to ask any questions.

Senator Dolph. I wish to ask a few questions.

Senator Gray. No questions occur to me now.

Senator Dolph. You say that Secretary Foster showed you a letter from Minister Stevens, written in November, 1892?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. Concerning affairs in the islands?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. That letter contains a pretty full account of the political situation there?

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Mr. Blount. That is amongst your papers.

Senator Dolph. I saw the letter at the time. I suppose it was shown to you in confidence because you were on the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House.

Mr. Blount. Very largely so.

Senator Dolph. Did you form any opinion at that time about Hawaiian affairs and as to the fitness of Mr. Stevens for the position he occupied?

Mr. Blount. I did not. I did not like the looks of the letter; but I think they did not make much impression on me. I went off home; I did not think much about it.

The Chairman. You had then declared your determination of retiring from Congress?

Mr. Blount. I did not intend to hold any place when I went away from here. I did not even pay my respects to the President.

The Chairman. You had determined to retire from public life?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

Senator Dolph. You did not consider there was any impropriety in such a letter coming from a minister of the United States?

Mr. Blount. No. Perhaps I misunderstood what you said.

Senator Gray. Mr. Blount did not speak about the impropriety; he spoke of the impression.

Mr. Blount. Oh, I rather had an impression—it was a vague one— that it manifested some passing beyond the proprieties for an American representative in a foreign country.

Senator Dolph. That was not long before the news arrived in the United States in reference to the revolution in Hawaii, was it?

Mr. Blount. My impression is that the treaty had been negotiated at the time. The Secretary of State sent for me and expressed a desire that I would endeavor to bring the Democratic party to the point of supporting the ratification of the treaty and acceptance of annexation.

Senator Dolph. Then you saw that letter after the news of the revolution had arrived here?

Mr. Blount. That is my impression. I think I am correct.

Senator Dolph. Did you express any opinion concerning the revolution, or the part which it was alleged had been taken by Minister Stevens in connection with the same, shortly after the news arrived and while Congress was still in session?

Mr. Blount. My impression is that I avoided the subject. I recollect saying once to a newspaper correspondent when the announcement was made of the establishing of an American protectorate by the American minister that "it looked a little lively." I did not think much about it at the time; I did not care much about it; I was going away.

Senator Dolph. Have you stated what the expression was you used?

Mr. Blount. I said, " It looked a little lively." That I believe to be it.

Senator Dolph. Did you express any opinion concerning the landing of the naval forces upon the island?

Mr. Blount. No. I say that because my recollection of it is that I did not know anything about the particulars at all.

Senator Dolph. Did you form any opinion shortly after the receipt of the news of the revolution, or after the treaty had been negotiated and sent to Congress, concerning the question of annexation?

Mr. Blount. I did not form any opinion.

Senator Dolph. Or express any?

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Mr. Blount. I had some apprehension that there might have been something imprudent done there; I had no opinion.

Senator Dolph. Did you not have conversations with various persons about the affair?

Mr. Blount. Very little. I was authorized to show that paper. It was given to me in manuscript—the letter of November. I was authorized to show it to some persons, in my discretion.

Senator Dolph. The letter of Minister Stevens to the Secretary of State?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. And you were furnished a copy?

Mr. Blount. Certainly, with a view of conferring with certain persons.

Senator Dolph. Did you show it to members of the House?

Mr. Blount. I showed it to Governor MeCreary and, possibly, Mr. Hitt, and possibly some others. I do not know now.

Senator Dolph. Did you have any conversations with those people about the subject of the annexation of Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. I can not remember that I did, other than showing that paper.

Senator Dolph. Did you undertake to secure the approval of your colleagues on that committee or in the House of annexation?

Mr. Blount. No.

Senator Dolph. Did you express any opinion in favor of annexation?

Mr. Blount. I think not.

Senator Dolph. Or against it?

Mr. Blount. I think not.

Senator Dolph. You think you simply handed that persons named, and possibly others, without any conversation or suggestions with regard to that?

Mr. Blount. Oh, I have not said that.

Senator Dolph. That is what I am trying to get at.

The Chairman. Allow me to ask if that is the letter to which you refer, and of which Mr. Foster gave you a copy (referring to Executive Document of the House of Representatives No. 74, page 111 of the Report.)

Mr. Blount. I think it is.

Senator Dolph. What did you say to Mr. Foster you would do concerning his request?

Mr. Blount. I did not say to Mr. Foster that I would do anything. He showed me that letter and expressed a desire that I would endeavor to bring the Democratic party to the support of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator Dolph. Mr. Foster gave you a copy of that letter and made that request, and you made no response to it?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes, I did.

Senator Dolph. I would like to know what you said to him.

Mr. Blount. I said to him, "I do not know anything about it." The paper was handed to me. He did not expect any answer. The whole thing was new to me.

Senator Dolph. You did not read it in Mr. Foster's presence?

Mr. Blount. No. He handed it to me to be read, and I said, "You have given me this paper; I can not converse with the Democrats without this paper." I had not seen the paper. Mr. Foster said, "I will leave that to your discretion."

Senator Dolph. I am asking if you expressed any opinion in the

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matter, because in the press it has been charged that you expressed an opinion.

Mr. Blount. Yes, I understand you.

Senator Dolph. You think you did not express an opinion?

Mr. Blount. I think not, because I did not have any.

Senator Dolph. You were here during the inauguration of President Cleveland?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. Did you call on the President before you left the city?

Mr. Blount. I did not.

Senator Dolph. Or Secretary Gresham?

Mr. Blount. No; I did not see Secretary Gresham. I knew him when be was Postmaster-General.

Senator Dolph. What time did you leave Washington?

Mr. Blount. I do not recollect; I stayed here three or four days.

Senator Dolph. After the inauguration?

Mr. Blount. Yes; there was a crowd, a jam, and I did not care to start home because of the liability to accidents, etc.

Senator Dolph. Can you recall any conversation with either of the gentlemen to whom you handed a copy of that letter?

Mr. Blount. I can not. I handed it to them; and I may possibly have said to them, "I am not satisfied to make any effort on this paper; I do not think there is information enough."

Senator Dolph. How many times did you see Mr. Gresham, the Secretary of State, before you left for Honolulu—when you came here in response to the telegraphic request of Mr. Smith?

Mr. Blount. I arrived here on Sunday morning, I think. I went with the Secretary of the Interior to the State Department. I met, casually, the Secretary of the Navy in the office of the Secretary of State. That is the first time I met the Secretary of State.

Senator Gray. The first time?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Gray. The first time you met Mr. Gresham since you knew him as Postmaster-General?

Mr. Blount. Yes. And the next time I met him was the next day. I went over to his office, and he took me into a little room—you recollect where the foreign ministers are received?

Senator Butler. For consultation ?

Mr. Blount. Yes. He had the clerk read the instructions over, with the view, rather, of putting them in a more tasteful form—criticising the instructions. That was the second time. And I possibly met him a third time.

Senator Dolph. How many conversations did you have with Secretary Gresham that second time?

Mr. Blount. I can not really tell you.

Senator Dolph. Was that the time that he told you that he knew of no principle of international law which justified the raising of the United States flag in Honolulu?

Mr. Blount. I can not say exactly what time it was.

Senator Dolph. You are not certain?

Mr. Blount. No. It may have been then or at a later conversation.

Senator Dolph. Did he not couple with his remark about the raising of a United States flag one about the landing of the United States marines and the assumption of a protectorate over the islands ?

Mr. Blount. Perhaps so.

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Senator Dolph. Is that all he said? Please give that conversation as nearly as you can recall it.

Mr. Blount. That would be a very difficult thing to do. At the time I just recollect the general impression that I had that he did not think the flag ought to be there or the troops on shore.

Senator Dolph. He did not think the flag ought to be there and the troops on shore?

Mr. Blount. That was his expression. But the instructions---

Senator Dolph. Did you understand that, while he left it to your discretion, unless the facts showed that it should not be done, the flag should be haulded down and the troops ordered off the island?

Mr. Blount. My impression is that he thought that ought to be done. But the islands were a long way off, and it was a matter in which I was to be guided very largely by circumstances. There was to be carefulness lest there should be bloodshed growing out of it— disorder. He could not tell.

Senator Dolph. Was anything said about the annexation of the islands at that time in your conversation, or at any other time?

Mr. Blount. Not that I recollect.

Senator Dolph. What was said, if anything, as to the time when these troops should be landed—as to whether there was any exigency for that, calling for the landing of the troops?

Mr. Blount. Nothing that I can recall.

Senator Dolph. Could you give the substance of that conversation?

Mr. Blount. I think I have given you the substance.

Senator Dolph. How long was the conversation?

Mr. Blount. That I do not remember. It has been some months ago.

Senator Dolph. Were you there an hour or minute?

Mr. Blount. Well, I might have been about the office—not with the Secretary—a half hour.

Senator Dolph. How long were you with the Secretary?

Mr. Blount. During the reading of that paper and criticizing the language. The time was occupied in that way. There was very little said.

Senator Dolph. If you saw the Secretary again before you left for Honolulu, state where and when it was.

Mr. Blount. My recollection is that I went over to the office, and by arrangement went back there and got the instructions, as they had been finally prepared and agreed on, and I went with the Secretary over to the White House, the expectation being that I would go in and talk with the President and Cabinet. I mean to say that was his idea. When I got over there I was not invited in until they had concluded their deliberations. I was introduced. Of course I knew the President and some members of the Cabinet. I was introduced to some others. The subject of the islands was not mentioned at all. I only staid a minute or two; in fact, I could not see why I was taken in there; nobody said anything to introduce a topic of conversation. I went to the President and said, "Mr. President, I shall try not to make any mistake under my instructions down there." He said, "I do not think you will." As I passed the table going out, the President said, in a careless way, "Blount, you will let us hear from you." I said I would, when there is anything worth writing about, and that is all that occurred. I called to pay my respects on Sunday morning.

Senator Dolph. I thought that was to the Secretary.

Mr. Blount. No.

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Senator Dolph. Did you have any talk with the President when you called Sunday morning to pay your respects?

Mr. Blount. The Secretary of the Interior and I were in there to pay my respects. It was Sunday morning, and we did not stay long.

Senator Dolph. Did the Secretary of State or his private secretary read over the instructions'?

Mr. Blount. The private secretary, I think, read them.

Senator Dolph. Did the private secretary retire during your conversation with Mr. Gresham?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes; he was not present at the conversation.

Senator Dolph. No one was present at your conversation with the Secretary of State about your duties in Hawaii ?

Mr. Blount. No.

Senator Dolph. You can not tell whether you were with him a half hour?

Mr. Blount. I do not recollect. The paper was read. That was the main thing—reading over that paper and looking at it. Very little was said.

The Chairman. I would like to ask a question on a matter some of you gentlemen may wish to interrogate Mr. Blount about. I find in a paper that has been printed by the House, Executive Document 13, which seems to be some additional correspondence not published before that time, at least in compliance with any request of the House or Senate, a telegram of Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens. It is on page 31 of this document which I hold in my hand.

"Department of State,
"Washington, February 14, 1893.
"Your telegram of the 1st instant has been received, with coincident report from commander of the Boston. Press telegrams from San Francisco give full details of events of 1st instant, with text of your proclamation. The latter, in announcing assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States, would seem to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. It is not thought, however, that the request of the Provisional Government for protection, or your action in compliance therewith, contemplated more than the cooperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen the authority of the Provisional Government, by according to it adequate protection for life and property during the negotiations instituted here, and without interfering with the execution of public affairs. Such cooperation was and is within your standing instructions and those of the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters.
"So far as your course accords to the de facto sovereign Government the material cooperation of the United States for the maintenance of good order and protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, it is commended; but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government in the capacity of protector, or to impair the independent sovereignty of that Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States, it is disavowed.
"Instructions will be sent to naval commanders, confirming and renewing those heretofore given them, under which they are authorized and directed to cooperate with yon in case of need. Your own instructions
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are likewise renewed and you are accordingly authorized to arrange with the commanding officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of American citizens and the repression of lawlessness threatening them whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such cooperation may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, being, however, always careful to distinguish between these functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.
"John W. Foster"

Senator Gray. That has been printed before.

The Chairman. That is addressed to Minister Stevens. I wish to inquire whether you had knowledge of the existence of this telegraphic dispatch before you went away?

Mr. Blount. I was going to say in response to the Senator that I expressed to the President the desire not to go off until I knew what was in the State Department in the way of information, and the Secretary of State had collected all the documents; they had all been sent to the Senate, and they were given to me in confidence. I took them and read them on the way from San Francisco to Honolulu, as much as I could with seasickness. I never looked at them in Washington.

The Chairman. The documents?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. Was the one I have just read amongst them?

Mr. Blount. Yes, given to me confidentially.

Senator Dolph. When you left for Hawaii you took your instructions?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. Which you considered private?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. And the communication to Admiral Skerrett which has been read ?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. And an official communication to the Provisional Government?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. And a letter to Minister Stevens?

Mr. Blount. Yes—no, I did not deliver the letter; the letter was sent to Minister Stevens.

Senator Dolph. You did not yourself carry him any communication?

Mr. Blount. No; I had a copy. Now, I believe I did hand that paper to Mr. Stevens on shipboard. I could not say positively about that.

Senator Dolph. It is immaterial.

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. Now, under your instructions and the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Skerrett, you were placed in supreme command of the naval forces in Hawaii, so far as any relation of our Government to the islands was concerned, were you not?

Mr. Blount. Well, that language might import more than I would be willing to admit. Without defining in general terms 1 felt from the instructions of the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Skerrett that

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----19

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I had the right to direct the removal of the flag and the return of the marines to the vessel, and that I had authority to protect American citizens in their persons and in their property and to see to the proper observance of treaties. 1 did not understand that I had any power beyond that.

Senator Dolph. You did not understand that it was your duty to wait until the actual destruction of the property of American citizens commenced, until their lives were in actual jeopardy, before you took steps to land the United States marines to prevent such injury to the lives and property of American citizens, did you? That was a matter resting in your discretion at the time, was it not?

Mr. Blount. That was not mentioned. My idea was that I could not anticipate. I thought it over. I could not anticipate the circumstances which might arise; but when they did I was to exercise the best judgment I had in connection with Admiral Skerrett.

Senator Dolph. You understood it rested in your judgment?

Mr. Blount. I understood that it rested in my judgment—the protection of American citizens in their lives and property in any disturbance on the islands. Any particular circumstances did not occur to my mind.

Senator Gray. You felt that it was in your judgment to act when the particular circumstances arose, when the exigency called for it?

Mr. Blount. That is it.

The Chairman. In my mind the evidence would seem to indicate that it was left to Mr. Blount to determine what was the political situation in Hawaii, and in consultation with Admiral Skerrett he was to determine what should be done in a military way—what should be done by the United States on that occasion ?

Senator Gray. Is that true?

Mr. Blount. 1 think that is true. I think, perhaps, it ought to be added, and my impression was, that if I had issued an order—and I took that not from the instructions but from the letter of the Secretary of the Navy—if I issued an order, the admiral would obey.

Senator Dolph. The Admiral was not to exercise his discretion as to whether it was proper or not?

Mr. Blount. I understood that I was to confer. That is clear in that paper. I was to confer with Admiral Skerrett, and I took it for granted that there would not be any difficulty about our differing on the question of landing troops.

Senator Dolph. Was there any chance of a difference?

Mr. Blount. Oh, there was a possible chance. But my idea was that in handling the troops on shore it would be a thing that ought to be very largely governed by Admiral Skerrett.

Senator Dolph. That Admiral Skerrett was to obey your orders?

Mr. Blount. You have the paper.

Senator Dolph. How long was it from the time you arrived in Hawaii until you published your instructions ?

Mr. Blount. That is a matter of record, and not in my mind. I want to say this: I have not seen these papers in six months; my mind has been diverted, and I can not recollect. I could tell you absolutely in a few minutes by looking at these documents.

Senator Dolph. Up until that time no one in the islands but Admiral Skerrett knew what your instructions were or what was the object of your mission in the islands?

Mr. Blount. They never knew definitely. Of course, I was conducting an examination; sometimes it would be a member of the Provisional

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Government and sometimes a royalist. I had no right to compel secrecy. There is a letter there from a man by the name of Ashford. He came in early, and I thought he was a pretty intelligent man. I did not know what sort of character he was. I thought I would learn something. He was disposed to talk. I said, "Will you not write me out your views;" and he did so. Sometime afterward, Mr. Smith, one of the editors of the annexation organ, the Hawaiian Star, said, "I got hold of something going on here; some of these fellows who come before you and are examined, tell." I said, "I did not tell you anything," and after that I found Ashford's letter published in the California papers. I did not see anything wrong, so far as the character of my investigation was concerned. I communicated nothing at all; but, of course, these people talked among themselves.

Senator Butler. I understand you to say that, so far as you were concerned, you made no communication of your instructions to anybody?

Mr. Blount. No; I did not.

Senator Dolph. Where were your headquarters; where was your investigation conducted?

Mr. Blount. It was conducted in a cottage on the grounds of the Hawaiian hotel, possibly some 50 yards from the main building, where I took my meals.

Senator Dolph. Were your family and suite the only occupants of the place?

Mr. Blount. When we got there some tourists occupied a part of it. It was not private enough, and I said unless I got the cottage to myself I would leave. It was accordingly arranged.

Senator Gray. The cottage belonged to the hotel?

Mr. Blount. Yes. I went to the hotel and got my meals; but I did not want to be where anybody was.

Senator Dolph. Were your examinations held at regular hours on appointed days, and adjourned from day to day, or were they just as you could get witnesses ?

Mr. Blount. I could always get a witness. The telephone system there is the finest you ever saw. I could get anybody I wanted. The rule I adopted was this: I would send for a witness on either side. I would telephone for him or use any other means I saw fit that was most convenient. I would examine the witness in the presence of my stenographer. Sometimes it would run over to the second day. I recollect once especially, in the case of Mr. Damon, whose examination was continued at his suggestion. When asked as to whether or not the recognition by Mr. Stevens took place before he went over to the palace, he said that he thought it did; but he wanted to talk about it to the attorney-general, Mr. Smith. He went off, and came back in a day or two and the examination was continued.

Senator Dolph. You misunderstood my question. I want to know whether you treated your proceedings in the nature of a court, and held regular sessions at an appointed hour, with adjournments from day to day?

Mr. Blount. Do you mean whether it was public?

Senator Dolph. No, not whether it was public, but whether you adjourned at regular hours, or conducted it to suit your convenience?

Mr. Blount. At my convenience. I had nothing to do with social life.

Senator Dolph. Who was present at any time?

Mr. Blount. Nobody present except my stenographer, the witness,

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and myself; and no man ever knew from me what anybody had testified to.

Senator Dolph. I suppose you talked with a great many persons about this subject?

Mr. Blount. Oh, they talked to me; but I never communicated my views.

Senator Dolph. You were told a great many things on both sides of this question by persons who had called upon you?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. And you never felt it incumbent upon you to make any record of what was said to you, or any report of it, except it was something which, in your judgment, ought to be taken down and reported? That is, you exercised your own judgment as to whether anything said to you should be made a part of your report; did you not?

Mr. Blount. If I were to answer that directly, without any qualification, perhaps I would not convey a correct impression. I saw people and they would talk to me. For instance, a man would come in and say he was a royalist, and he would commence to abuse Mr. Stevens. I would say nothing at all. I could not communicate to him, and did not encourage the conversation. And so somebody else on the other side would abuse the royalists. I could not help those things. Those were the things that occurred. I never indulged in conversation with people about affairs there, as a rule.

The Chairman. At what time did you send your report to the Secretary of State as to the condition of affairs in Hawaii?

Mr. Blount. The final report, I think, was in the month of July. But the record discloses that. I can not remember it.

The Chairman. Was it after you were appointed minister?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. It appears that you were appointed minister on the 22d of August; that is, a letter informing you of your appointment on that date, with various items of inclosure and instruction, was sent to you as minister of the United States. On that appointment you took the oath of office?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you then communicate your appointment to the Dole Government?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Did you make any communication of that to the Liliuokalani cabinet?

Mr. Blount. Not the slightest. I had nothing to do with Liliuokalani at all; it was not a proper thing, I did not think.

The Chairman. And you continued in that office until you were asked to resign and came home ?

Mr. Blount. I sent my resignation by the vessel that brought the appointment. I expected to leave when I got through the investigation. My private business was not satisfactory, and I wanted to get home. I was worried about it. I thought it might be childish in me to send an absolute resignation, and I did not put it in that form; but I did take occasion in some correspondence to assure the Secretary that I did not want the place at all. As I said, my private business required that I should be at home.

The Chairman. The question is whether, while you were minister, the instructions of the Government to you in regard to Hawaiian affairs had been in any wise altered ?

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Mr. Blount. No.

Senator Dolph. I do not think you understood my question a few minutes ago, that you did not consider it incumbent upon you to make any record of these statements made by the numerous persons who called upon you and talked about the situation in Hawaii or include them in your report.

Mr. Blount. No. If you will allow me to state, you will very readily see that I could not trust memory about those things, and hence I resorted to the plan of taking the statements in the form of interrogation and answer by the stenographer. I thought I would be enabled after the examination of witnesses on both sides, leading persons, to get at the condition of affairs; and, therefore, I did not trouble myself with every person whom I would meet who wanted to talk with me.

Senator Dolph. You exercised your own judgment and choice as to which of the persons you came in contact with you would examine?

Mr. Blount. I felt that I was there to conduct the examination, and I determined that I would conduct it according to my best judgment for the purpose of eliciting the truth. On one occasion, for instance, there was a committee came to me from the Annexation Club and said they had been appointed for the purpose of furnishing witnesses to me for the purpose of being examined. I was not pleased with it. That club was made up of people of all nationalities. I said to them, "Gentlemen, you do not understand my relation to you, or I do not. I am not a representative of any body in Honolulu; I am not under the control of any body in Honolulu; I am here to make an investigation for the Government of the United States, and while, perhaps, I will examine some persons you want examined, as a rule I want to direct these examinations and say whom I will examine and whom not."

Senator Dolph. You indicated plainly to them that you would not hear any witnesses?

Mr. Blount. I did not intimate anything of the kind.

Senator Dolph. What did you say in regard to the proposition of this committee to furnish witnesses on the question?

Mr. Blount. I said to them I would perhaps examine some of their witnesses; but I did not consent to the idea that the Annexation Club or anybody else was to furnish witnesses to me.

Senator Dolph. Did you examine any witnesses furnished by that committee?

Mr. Blount. Oh, I examined—the only name they ever mentioned to me was Mr. P. C. Jones.

Senator Gray. Tell about P. C. Jones's examination. Did you examine him?

Mr. Blount. No; I did not—regretted that I could not. There were other persons whom I would like to have examined. There was quite a mania on the part of the people on both sides to be examined when they saw the testimony was going into a public document. I would have gratified many of them if there had been an unlimited clerical force at my command; but I did not have it, and I did not believe it was going to elucidate anything to multiply witnesses.

Senator Gray. Did Mr. Jones proffer himself as a witness?

Mr. Blount. Oh, no. A young man came in there by the name of Wilder, a boyish sort of fellow, with this statement.

Senator Gray. About Mr. Jones?

Mr. Blount. About the wishes of the Annexation Club—a person whom I did not consider proper to take counsel with. I do not mean

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that he was not a gentleman, but I had an idea about the Annexation Club, that there was a pretty rough element in there, and I know that was the opinion of the Provisional Government—many of them indulging in threats of assassination. They wanted me to turn over the celebration of the Fourth of July to the club, a political organization, which I declined; whereupon it went out in the United States that I was not in favor of the celebration of the Fourth, refused to arrange for the celebration of the Fourth, and all that sort of thing, although I presided at the celebration. I did not go to their meeting one night, Mr. Severance agreeing to go in my place to make arrangements for the appointment of committees, etc.

The Chairman. Did you preside at the Fourth of July meeting?

Mr. Blount. Yes. "Marching Through Georgia" was played and all sorts of things.

Senator Dolph. Was Mr. Nordhoff there, the correspondent of the Herald?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. Did you meet him frequently?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. Talked to him freely about the condition of affairs?

Mr. Blount. I did not.

Senator Dolph. Did you see a comparison in the New York Sun of portions of your report with letters of Nordhoff to his paper?

Mr. Blount. I did not. If you will allow me, I never took up the subject of writing that report, never wrote a line until Mr. Nordhoff left the islands ?

Senator Dolph. You have not seen the Sun article?

Mr. Blount. No; I have not.

Senator Dolph. I understood you to say that none of the witnesses who appeared before you were sworn?

Mr. Blount. Oh, no; I did not feel that I had authority to swear witnesses. I had them sign their testimony after reading it over.

The Chairman. There were affidavits submitted to you?

Mr. Blount. There were some four or five affidavits—the matter in them very short. I did not have the time, and I said to those gentlemen, "I would be very glad if you would put these facts in the form of an affidavit, and they were brought there that way. It came about simply because of the pressure of time. I did not care to go into a general examination of those people; I did not have the means to do it.

Senator Dolph. Did you in all cases have the statements of the parties who appeared before you extended into longhand and approved?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. Was all that was said before you by Admiral Skerrett made a part of your report?

Mr. Blount. All that was said on what subject?

Senator Dolph. On any subject. Did you report the communication from Admiral Skerrett—make it a part of your report?

Mr. Blount. Yes, I did. For instance, I said to Admiral Skerrett, "Let us take a walk and see where those troops were located;" and we went. I wanted him to see, and I pointed out, where Arion Hall was, and the Government building from which the proclamation was read. I said, "What do you think about locating troops here so near the building under the circumstances?" He said, "They were not located here." He was under the impression that they were located some distance off. I said, "You are mistaken about that; I know they were located here." I said to him, "Now what do you think of this position of

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the troops?" Of course, this was on the street, and it was not taken down. I suppose you wanted to know that.

Senator Dolph. It is interesting, and I would like to hear it.

Mr. Blount. Then Admiral Skerrett expressed the opinion which is contained in his statement. I said to him, "Admiral, I would be glad if you would give me that in writing;" and he gave it to me, and I forwarded it.

Senator Gray. That is the statement that appears in print?

Mr. Blount. That is the statement that appears in print.

Senator Dolph. The whole statement appears in print?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. It was a conversation with you?

Mr. Blount. Yes. My relations were closer with Admiral Skerrett than anybody else, consulting with him and so on. You can understand that it is an unsatisfactory state to be in, to be 2,000 miles from your country and nobody to talk to but Admiral Skerrett and my stenographer. They were the only persons I could talk to.

Senator Dolph. Were any communications furnished to you upon the subject of your investigation which were not made a part of your report?

Mr. Blount. I do not understand what you mean.

Senator Dolph. Was everything included in your report which was furnished to you on the subject—written communication?

Mr. Blount. I do not think I left any out.

Senator Dolph. You have spoken in your examination of having said to the Provisional Government that you would be glad to receive a statement from those in power, and you spoke as though that had been addressed not only to the President but to the others.

Mr. Blount. I used to go to the Government building where the president and his cabinet were sitting about, and I made the statement.

Senator Dolph. Did you make a public statement, an address?

Mr. Blount. Oh, no. They were sitting around a table. They made a small party, the president and cabinet and myself sitting in there— no formality.

Senator Dolph. Hou came you to be present at the cabinet meeting?

Mr. Blount. It was not a cabinet meeting; they sat in the same room and talked. I used to go in there and talk, and they came to the legation.

Senator Dolph. Do you recollect the conversation that day between you and the members of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Blount. It was not of any consequence; I remember that portion of it.

Senator Dolph. Did you address your conversation to any particular one, and if so what was said?

Mr. Blount. President Dole and the cabinet were sitting around, and I said to them, "Gentlemen, I would like to examine any of you with regard to the revolution; I can conceive that you might not care to submit to it." There was no response.

Senator Dolph. Was that before or after the publication of your instructions?

Mr. Blount. My impression is that it was before.

Senator Dolph. So they knew nothing about the object of your mission except what had leaked out from the examination of witnesses when you made that suggestion?

Mr. Blount. Leaked out? There was not much leaking about it.

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Vice-President Damon came a few days afterward and was examined. Earlier than this Mr. Bishop, connected with the press, was examined. There were several persons on the annexation side who were examined. I did not suppose that there was any withholding of it from the Government at all; I think they knew very well what I was doing.

The Chairman. Allow me to inquire whether Sereno Bishop is a relative of the wealthy man who has made so many endowments there?

Mr. Blount. I think not; I think Charles E. Bishop came from Boston— a young man.

The Chairman. And married a native?

Mr. Blount. A native princess. He is a very excellent gentleman. Sereno Bishop's father was a missionary. I think I have this from Mr. Bishop. He was born down at Lahaina, on the island of Maui, the old capital.

Senator Dolph. Who were the people representing the Queen's cause—her side of the controversy ?

Mr. Blount. Do you mean before me?

Senator Dolph. No; I do not mean to say there was any representation before you. I understand that was with closed doors; there was no one present but you and the stenographer. I mean persons who saw you in the islands.

The Chairman. The alleged leaders of the Queen's cause.

Senator Dolph. The alleged leaders of her government.

Mr. Blount. Do you mean leaders in the sense of counseling in this investigation?

Senator Dolph. That assumes that I am assuming that you allowed yourself to be counseled and directed by these people. I do not wish to convey any such impression. People called on you and talked with you, and I understood they called from early morning until late at night, and they talked about the matter of this revolution.

Mr. Blount. I think you are entirely courteous; but this matter goes down in print, and therefore, I ask that everything be made plain, and that my every answer may be correct. I am not in the condition that you gentlemen are. I understand that I am the subject of a great deal of criticism, which is legitimate, and I want to understand the questions I am answering.

The Chairman. You mean to say that the right to criticise you is a legitimate one?

Mr. Blount. Yes.

Senator Dolph. I do not mean to criticise you. I wish to know who were the people who appeared, who called to represent the Queen's interest. That is all.

The Chairman. Who were the reputed leaders of the royal party?

Senator Gray. Whom you met.

Mr. Blount. The matter of leadership there is a very uncertain thing. There are a good many factions amongst them, as you will see from the testimony. But I would say that amongst the more prominent persons in the islands you will find Mr. J. O. A. Carter, Mr. E. C. MacFarlane, Mr. Parker---

The Chairman. Sam Parker?

Mr. Blount. Sam Parker—a man by the name of Bush. He is another leader amongst them. They rather struck me with a little more positive force than some others.

Senator Dolph. At the time the revolution took place how many of the cabinet acted in their interest while you were there?

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Mr. Blount. I never saw any cabinet at all. I kept aloof from their politics. I stayed in that building away from the social life.

Senator Gray. Did you participate in the social life of the city?

Mr. Blount. Not at all, except I found myself bound to accept invitations from President Dole and other officials. And there was a Mr. Glade, a German, there, a member of the committee of safety, and the consul-general of Germany. I thought I could make a few calls of that sort—calling on the officials.

The Chairman. You say Mr. Glade was the consul-general of Germany, and still a member of the committee of safety?

Mr. Blount. He was a member of the committee of safety and a very active man in it.

Senator Dolph. Did you meet those who were members of the Queen's cabinet at the time the revolution took place?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

Senator Dolph. Talk with them?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

Senator Dolph. Did any of them defend the restoration of the Queen, defend her rights?

Mr. Blount. They were all for restoration, as I understood them?

Senator Dolph. All the members of the cabinet?

Mr. Blount. Yes. I think that will appear from the papers.

Senator Dolph. Were they examined before you?

Mr. Blount. I remember very distinctly Mr. Parker's examination. Whatever was done is in the record. As I say, I have not seen these papers in six months.

Senator Dolph. Did Mr. Nordhoff talk to you about this matter?

Mr. Blount. Mr. Nordhoff was like a good many other people; he would talk; but I did not confide in Mr. Nordhoff.

Senator Dolph. You listened to what he had to say ?

Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.

Senator Dolph. You did not disclose your instructions to him, but got what information you could from him?

Mr. Blount. I let him talk. He never stayed long; he would talk and go away.

Senator Dolph. Was anybody examined through Mr. Nordhoff?

Mr. Blount. No.

Senator Dolph. Any documents furnished you through him?

Mr. Blount. He brought me one day a letter from Dr. Trosseau, a physician there, the family physician of Mrs. Carter, an excellent lady (the wife of the ex-minister and sister of the chief justice and of Justice Bickerton, as I learned by accident). I think so; I have not had a chance to examine these papers. It seems to me that that paper this man sent to me—he wanted access to me, and he went to Nordhoff and Nordhoff wrote me a note inclosing these papers. They were in there. And it seems there was this communication from Nordhoff and a communication from this other man missing.

Senator Gray. There is a communication from a Frenchman who was the physician of this Queen as well as the other people.

Mr. Blount. There was a communication he sent. I did not like it. I never said a word to anybody about this paper from this physician, and I never sent for him. I made it a point not to get acquainted with him for some time after that occurred. For some time he used to come to the hotel, and for a long time I never met him. I did not care for anybody else to make suggestions. I said nothing to Mr. Nordhoff in any way about it; but I did not send for Dr. Trosseau. I did not like

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the paper. The paper I have in mind was in relation to the amount of distribution of the sugar stock—sugar interests of the royalists and annexationists. It occurred to me it was very plainly an unreliable statement, not that he meant to deceive, but he was a man of prejudices.

I did not care to examine him, because I thought that I could get persons whose judgment was better than Dr. Trousseau's. I do not mean to say he was not intelligent and a very fine physician—I knew nothing against him. I must add this qualification: Learning much later on that Trousseau and other persons were with the Queen when she learned of the landing of the troops, I sought from them the effect on her mind and on the minds of those about her. For this purpose I asked Dr. Trousseau to write me his recollections of this matter.

Adjourned to meet on Saturday, the 13th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.


Washington, D. C, Saturday, January 13, 1894.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senator Frye.

Absent: Senators Butler, Gray, and Sherman.

SWORN STATEMENT OF COMMANDER THEODORE F. JEWELL, U. S. NAVY.

The Chairman. Were you attached to the ship Boston in January, 1893?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. Where were you when that ship was in Honolulu?

Mr. Jewell. I was here in Washington.

The Chairman. Have you ever visited the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; I was there twenty years ago, when Kalakaua was elected King.

The Chairman. To what ship were you attached then?

Mr. Jewell. The Tuscarora.

The Chairman. What was your rank and duty on that ship?

Mr. Jewell. My rank in the Navy was lieutenant-commander; I was executive officer of the ship Tuscarora.

Senator Frye. Do you mean that twenty years ago you were lieutenant- commander?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. How long did the Tuscarora remain at Honolulu then?

Mr. Jewell. She was there six weeks. This is to the best of my recollection.

The Chairman. Did the Tuscarora get there before the election of the King, or after it had occurred?

Mr. Jewell. She arrived there the day before the death of the former King; she was there before the election of Kalakaua.

The Chairman. And during the time?

Mr. Jewell. And during the time.

The Chairman. Did you go on shore after the ship arrived in the harbor?

Mr. Jewell. I was on shore occasionally in Honolulu, but not very

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much. The executive officer of a ship is usually pretty well occupied, and I was ashore only once or twice during the time we stayed there.

The Chairman. Did you attend the meeting of the legislative body that elected Kalakaua King?

Mr. Jewell. No, I did not. I was on board the ship at that time.

The Chairman. The contest at that time was between Kalakaua and Queen Emma?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you ascertain whether the Americans there who claimed Hawaiian denizenship, as well as those who did not, were in favor of Kalakaua or Queen Emma?

Mr. Jewell. It was the general understanding that English influence was supporting Queen Emma and that the Americans were supporting Kalakaua.

The Chairman. That was a marked fact in the situation?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, no question about it.

The Chairman. Did the Americans there, to your knowledge, take any active part in agitations, commotions, or insurrections?

Mr. Jewell. Not at all; no.

The Chairman. They stood aloof?

Mr. Jewell. The riots which occurred during Kalakaua's election were entirely among the natives. There were a number of Americans who were in the Government at that time. The minister of foreign affairs was an American.

The Chairman. Do you recollect his name?

Mr. Jewell. Charles R. Bishop was his name. But I think there was nothing in the nature of inflammatory meetings previous to this election.

The Chairman. Were troops sent on shore from the Tuscarora?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was there any other American ship in the harbor at that time?

Mr. Jewell. Yes, the sloop Portsmouth was there, and men were landed from both ships.

The Chairman. About what number?

Mr. Jewell. I commanded the forces that were landed from the Tuscarora, perhaps 80 men, and perhaps the same number from the Portsmouth.

The Chairman. When you landed did you go armed and equipped for fighting?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you take rations with you?

Mr. Jewell. No; we did not take rations, but we were in close communication with the ship all the time. As a matter of fact, we did not subsist ourselves on shore.

The Chairman. On whom did you subsist?

Mr. Jewell. The Hawaiian Government.

The Chairman. Did you go ashore on the invitation of the Hawaiian Government?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; as I understand, at the request of the cabinet in the interregnum between the death of Lunalilo and the election of Kalakaua. The Government requested that men be landed if a riot should occur. It was anticipated it would happen because of the one that occurred at the election of the other King the year before. Capt. Belknap, who was in command of the Tuscarora, and who was the senior officer there, made some arrangement with Mr. Pierce, the

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American Minister, by which the men were to be landed if they were wanted.

The Chairman. Lunalilo, the former King, was King by inheritance?

Mr. Jewell. So; he was elected King.

The Chairman. Was it not this way; that he was a King by inheritance, and he ordered a plebiscite to see if the people favored his going to the throne?

Mr. Jewell. I am not prepared to say that; but I am quite certain that he was not King by inheritance.

The Chairman. You understand that at the time of his election riots had occurred?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was it your understanding also on that occasion that American troops had been landed?

Mr. Jewell. I think not, but I am not prepared to say positively.

The Chairman. It was in the time of the interregnum, as you term it, properly between the death of Lunalilo and the election of Kalakaua, that the American Minister requested the commander of these ships to land troops?

Mr. Jewell. To be prepared to land troops in case of necessity.

The Chairman. Had the election of Kalakaua taken place before you landed?

Mr. Jewell. It had; yes.

The Chairman. But you were in a state of preparation?

Mr. Jewell. We were standing by. The captain of the Tuscarora went on shore on the morning of the election, about 9 o'clock, and left me in charge of the ship, with instructions to keep a look out on the American bark where one of our officers was stationed with a signal which was to be given to land the men if needed, and we were in a state of preparation all day. We got the signal about 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

The Chairman. Who was the ranking officer in order at that time?

Mr. Jewell. Capt. Belknap.

The Chairman. He had command of the forces on both ships?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. The senior naval officer, the ranking naval officer, is always assumed by virtue of his rank to be in command of the forces.

The Chairman. How many men did you land?

Mr. Jewell. We landed about 80 men. I do not know exactly as to the Portsmouth, but 80 men from the Tuscarora.

The Chairman. How many from the other ship, the Portsmouth?

Mr. Jewell. 75 or 80. I think the whole force numbered 150 men.

The Chairman. Did you spend the night on shore?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, we stayed a week; I myself was on shore four days; and at the end of that time one-half of the force was withdrawn and the remainder stayed three or four days longer.

The Chairman. What was the disposition of the people there when you landed as to their being peaceful or turbulent?

Mr. Jewell. There were several hundred people around the courthouse, the legislative building, when we got there. The courthouse was pretty well wrecked by the mob, was in possession of a mob of natives. They cleared out of the court-house the instant we arrived on the ground. We sent a small force into the building and the rioters jumped out of the windows and cleared out, although they hung around the grounds. They were making demonstrations and were talking loudly in their own language, which we did not understand, of course.

The Chairman. Did the mob make any fight?

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Mr. Jewell. They did not offer any resistance at all; no. There was one man who waved a club in front of a petty officer, but he took the man by the back of the neck and gave him a shake, and he was quieted.

The Chairman. Did you bivouack around the court-house that night?

Mr. Jewell. The men from the Portsmouth occupied the court-house, slept in the court-house.

The Chairman. Where did your men go?

Mr. Jewell. To the armory. This was a building in which there were several public offices, among them the captain's of the port; in one story there were some arms belonging to the Government, perhaps 100 stands of rifles.

The Chairman. Did you find the arms there when you got there?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was there any organized force of the Government?

Mr. Jewell. I think nothing but the police. I have an impression that there was a militia company, volunteers or militia, but not in the service of the Government?

The Chairman. At that time did you ascertain that the Government had any regular troops?

Mr. Jewell. It has been so long ago that I can not remember. But my impression is that there was nothing organized in the Government service except the police force.

The Chairman. Did you take command of both forces?

Mr. Jewell. No; the executive officer of the Portsmouth was the ranking officer on shore. But Captain Belknap was in communication with us, and he was supposed to be in command. Although Capt. Belknap stayed on board ship every night, he was on shore every day, and our reports were made to him. The force from the Portsmouth had charge of the fort house and some other public buildings including the mint, the treasury, perhaps. I had charge of the prison and the armory. There was another significant fact connected with that landing. There was an English man-of-war in the harbor at the time. There had not been any prearrangement about the landing of her men; nevertheless, shortly after we got on shore, 75 or 80 men from the English vessel, under arms and organized, put in an appearance.

The Chairman. How long did they remain on shore?

Mr. Jewell. They remained some days; just how long I do not know. The men were not allowed to circulate very much about the town, and I kept myself pretty well confined to the barracks. But after the mob was broken up down at the court-house, the most of them went up to Queen Emma's residence, which was some distance away, and the troops from the English man-of-war, on the suggestion of Mr. Bishop, I believe, went up there to clear out the mob, and remained there. They went there to drive off the mob assembled around Queen Emma.

Mr. Jewell. Yes. I understand there were some incendiary speeches made at that time in the neighborhood of Queen Emma's residence, and perhaps Queen Emma made some remarks herself.

The Chairman. Were there any incendiary fires during the time you were on shore?

Mr. Jewell. No. The first night there were some stones thrown at the men from the Portsmouth, and a pistol shot; but in the part of the town where we were it was pretty quiet. We patrolled the streets the first night, and I do not know but that we did it after that. That

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is to say, we sent out a small body of men for two or three hours to break up any disorderly gathering.

The Chairman. Were there any arrests made by the American forces?

Mr. Jewell. A few of the rioters were arrested at the court-house; but they were turned over to the police right away. As a rule the native police mingled with the crowd; they were as bad as the rest of them.

The Chairman. Did any of the Kanakas appear to take sides with Queen Emma?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. I mean with Kalakaua?

Mr. Jewell. The popular feeling amongst the natives in Honolulu at that time was against Kalakaua; that is to say, it was in favor of Queen Emma. But there were plenty of the better class of Kanakas who were in favor of Kalakaua.

The Chairman. I suppose it was a question, if I gather it correctly, between the pure native element and the mixed element of whites and half-whites and the better classes of the Kanaka people?

Mr. Jewell. I am sure I would not know how to divide the feeling in that way; I gathered it from very limited communication with the shore; I have only a general impression in regard to it, that most of the lower classes, the commoner Kanakas, were in favor of Queen Emma, and it was generally supposed the English residents were, particularly the English minister-resident, or whatever he may have been. It was an intrigue in favor of Queen Emma, and they had incited these common people to this performance, this riot.

The Chairman. Do you know where Kalakaua was during your stay there?

Mr. Jewell. No, I do not.

The Chairman. Did you see him?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; I saw him frequently.

The Chairman. In his palace?

Mr. Jewell. I think I never saw him in the palace, though he lived there after his election was proclaimed.

The Chairman. Kalakaua remained in his palace after his election was proclaimed?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Before that time, did you know about him?

Mr. Jewell. I simply knew he was a clerk in the custom-house or post-office, or some other office.

The Chairman. Do you know where he was between the time of the death of Lunalilo and the election?

Mr. Jewell. I know he was in Honolulu.

The Chairman. But where—you do not know whether he was under the protection of any foreign ship?

Mr. Jewell. I know he was not.

Senator Frye. Who was it requested the troops to land at that time?

Mr. Jewell. It was understood that the request was made by Mr. Bishop, who was the minister of foreign affairs of the Hawaiian Government, to Mr. Pierce, the American minister resident; and between Mr. Pierce and Capt. Belknap—I do not know whether there was any written communication between them or not—but it was arranged between them that in the event of a riot the men were to be landed.

Senator Frye. Your troops did not bivouac down in the business part of the city?

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Mr. Jewell. Yes; the armory, where the principal part of my men was was right in the business part of the city.

Senator Frye. But up around the court-house and the Government buildings?

Mr. Jewell. That was not the business part.

Senator Frye. They remained in the court-house and Government buildings three or four days?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

Senator Frye. Under the law and naval regulations, what do you understand to be the rights of a United States naval officer touching the preservation of order in a naval city? I ask you that question because I noticed in reading the wording of the order which Capt. Wiltse gave to Lieut. Swinburne that he recited the protection of the consulate, the legation, the lives and property of American citizens, and to preserve order. What would you do as an officer if you were ordered to go ashore and do those things? What do you understand "preserving order" to be—what right would you have?

Mr. Jewell. Do you mean if I were actually in command of a body of troops which had landed to preserve order?

Senator Frye. Yes.

Mr. Jewell. I should arrest disorderly persons. I should break up incendiary meetings and take the people into custody.

Senator Frye. Would you not do it in cooperation with the Queen or whoever was then in power?

Mr. Jewell. Unquestionably with the constituted authorities—yes.

The Chairman. You say that these troops were landed at the request of the cabinet which had been appointed by Kalakaua?

Mr. Jewell. No; the previous cabinet.

The Chairman. Which had gone out of office?

Mr. Jewell. It had not gone out of office—no.

The Chairman. Was that request communicated in writing?

Mr. Jewell. I do not know about that; but my impression is it was not.

The Chairman. Was the purport of that request communicated to you by your superior officer?

Mr. Jewell. Well, only in conversation. In giving me my instructions Capt. Belknap had told me what this arrangement was.

The Chairman. Were your instructions in writing?

Mr. Jewell. They were not; they were verbal entirely.

The Chairman. Be kind enough to state what orders Capt. Belknap gave you on that occasion, and upon what grounds he based his right to give you such orders?

Mr. Jewell. Do you mean the orders previous to the landing of the troops?

The Chairman. Capt. Belknap was in actual command of the forces while they were on shore?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. But while he was on shipboard you were the next in command?

Mr. Jewell. No; Lieut. Commander Clarke, of the Portsmouth, was the next in rank; but he was at the court-house, which was a quarter of a mile from where I was.

The Chairman. You were in command of the other detachment?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And you received your orders and instructions from Capt. Belknap and not through Lieut. Clarke?

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Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. State what the instructions were that were given to you by Capt. Belknap to be executed by you in his absence.

Mr. Jewell. The general instructions were to preserve order and to keep myself confined as much as possible to the quarters which had been assigned to us; not to excite the natives to opposition. I also had orders to patrol certain streets of the town during the night, to prevent any disorderly gathering of the people and to arrest people who were guilty of disorder. I can not remember any specific instructions otherwise. The idea was that order was to be preserved in the town, and that we were authorized to arrest people and turn them over to the civil authorities.

The Chairman. And you did so?

Mr. Jewell. We had no occasion to arrest anybody.

The Chairman. There were persons arrested, were there not?

Mr. Jewell. Only during the first part of the riot when the troops arrived on the ground. Then men were arrested and turned over to the native police; but not after that.

The Chairman. But you did arrest persons on that occasion and under these orders?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. Capt. Belknap was personally at the court-house when the force arrived there.

The Chairman. Then, if I gather your position correctly, the troops were invited by the cabinet to come ashore for the purpose of preserving the public order.

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was there anything in the situation that required you to participate on the one side or the other in any conflict or civil commotion that might occur among the people?

Mr. Jewell. No; nothing whatever.

The Chairman. You were ordered to preserve order, no matter who was disorderly?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. But you were there by the invitation and consent of the then Government?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Were you placed under the command of any military officer or authority of the Hawaiian Government?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. You were acting under your own orders?

Mr. Jewell. Entirely so; yes.

The Chairman. The King did not appear on any occasion for the purpose of taking control of the forces?

Mr. Jewell. No. He took the oath of office the next day after his election, and all the troops on shore were paraded at that time.

The Chairman. Was that the day after you landed?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. They were paraded how?

Mr. Jewell. The forces from the two American ships, the Tuscarora and the Portsmouth, and those from the Tenedos, the English man-ofwar, were all at the courthouse to receive the King, and all presented arms when he passed into the building to take the oath of office.

The Chairman. Did he pass through the ranks?

Mr. Jewell. I think he did. I do not know exactly what the form was.

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The Chairman. Were there any other troops there beside the English and American troops?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. And police force?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; I think the police were about, but not as an organized body of troops—not in the nature of a body of troops; they were in the crowd.

The Chairman. They were not a part of the receiving escort or force?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. The King came then and took his oath of office?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. After he took the oath of office did he take any control of the troops under your charge?

Mr. Jewell. No; not the slightest.

The Chairman. You did not look to him for any orders in regard to the conduct of the troops on the island so long as you remained there?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. If Capt. Belknap had any such orders you would have known it?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, I think so; yes.

The Chairman. It was then a body of American soldiery, so far as you were concerned, that was there at the invitation of the cabinet of the former King to preserve order, to put down riot, to arrest disturbers of the peace and those who had been assailing the Legislature?

Mr. Jewell. No; we were not to take any cognizance of anything which took place before the landing; we were only to arrest people whom we saw in the act.

The Chairman. People caught flagrante delicto?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; we took no notice of what happened before. The court-house was full of people; as we came into the front door they went out of the windows. But we did not arrest any of them. Capt. Belknap cautioned us to be discreet in anything we did, and not to assume too much.

Senator Frye. And you regarded what you actually did as very discreet?

Mr. Jewell. I did; yes.

The Chairman. In how many days did you return to the ship?

Mr. Jewell. My impression is that I went back to the ship in four days, when the force was reduced to one-half the original force, and I think the rest stayed four days longer, perhaps only three days longer. I think about a week our men were on shore.

The Chairman. Do you know on whose request it was that the troops retired from the islands?

Mr. Jewell. I think the first reduction of the force was made by Capt. Belknap without any request from the Government; but, after the new cabinet was organized, my impression is that the minister of foreign affairs wrote to the American minister resident and said that the occasion for the troops had passed and they might be withdrawn.

The Chairman. Do you remember whether the English forces were withdrawn before the American forces were?

Mr. Jewell. I think not; I think they remained about the same time.

The Chairman. You do not know, as a matter of fact, which of the forces actually withdrew first?

Mr. Jewell. No. I think our force was reduced before the English force. But to this day I do not remember seeing the English troops

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----50

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after they marched out of the court-house grounds up to Queen Emma's. I do not remember to have been brought into contact with them. As I said, we were in a different part of the city, and I confined myself and men to the barracks.

The Chairman. Did you have a flag when you went on shore?

Mr. Jewell. We carried our flag with the battalion.

The Chairman. Did you raise any colors on any pole or house?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. You know nothing about these later transactions of January, 1893?

Mr. Jewell. Only what I gathered from the newspapers.

The Chairman. I would be glad to have you state anything that pertains properly to this question.

Mr. Jewell. In regard to this landing in 1874 I would say that there were at that time in the pro-English press of Honolulu, and have been since, charges made that we interfered at that time in the internal affairs of Hawaii. But I think nobody paid any particular attention to them. So short a time ago as December, 1892, an article appeared in a paper called The Illustrated American, published in New York, which charged that the American minister and American troops had interfered in the affairs of Hawaii in 1874, and had kept Queen Emma, who was "the rightful heir to the throne," off of the throne, and put Kalakaua in her place. I wrote a letter denying every statement in that paper, which I felt certain was inspired by some of the English-feeling people in Honolulu. I was told afterward that that was the case. It was full of misstatements, and I felt more or less indignation at the way in which they talked about the disgraceful manner in which the troops had taken part in the affairs of Hawaii. I replied to it. I did not know but what that brought me before this committee.

The Chairman. Possibly so; but in making up your replies to that article did you think over the whole situation as it occurred and refresh your memory about it?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And you are satisfied that your statements here are correct?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

Senator Frye. Have you a copy of that communication?

Mr. Jewell. No; I have not in my possession.

The Chairman. Do you remember whether or not before you left the ship with those troops Kalakaua was elected by the Legislature or was the election pending?

Mr. Jewell. I had not been informed as to the result of the election. We embarked our men by signal from shore—the signal was made on this American bark—and before I knew anything about the election I had my men on shore.

The Chairman. But the preparation about which you spoke as having been made on the ship, to hold yourselves in readiness, to stand by, you say was begun before the election took place?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Some days before?

Mr. Jewell. No, the morning of the day of the election.

The Chairman. You knew that the election was about to take place?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; a special session of the Legislature had been called for that purpose.

The Chairman. And the military preparation on the ship anticipated the election?

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Mr. Jewell. A few hours; yes.

The Chairman. And view of it, and in expectation that that election would create civil commotion?

Mr. Jewell. In the fear of it, that it might be so. I believe that the cabinet was rather severely criticised for not having made better preparation and for not having asked that the troops be sent on shore earlier.

The Chairman. I suppose that this preparation was made on board ship because of some request that had been made or intimated to the commanding officer by the cabinet?

Mr. Jewell. The arrangement was made between Capt. Belknap and Minister Pierce, but it was at the solicitation of the Hawaiian Government.

The Chairman. And in anticipation of the fact that there might or would be civil commotion at the time the election took place?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Had you ever had anything to do with the landing of troops before that?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Where was it?

Mr. Jewell. At Panama ; we took possession of that town for four or five days; that is, so far as we could. We did not come into contact with the people who were fighting there.

The Chairman. Was there any minister resident at Panama at that time?

Mr. Jewell. No; there was a consul-general.

The Chairman. Was the landing made at his request?

Mr. Jewell. I do not know. I knew very little about what led up to that.

The Chairman. What year was that?

Mr. Jewell. That was in 1872. The force of which I had command was landed to protect the Pacific Mail Company's property. Afterward a larger body was landed from the flagship, and went up into the city under the command of another officer.

The Chairman. Who was that officer?

Mr. Jewell. P. E. Harrington, at present a commander in the Navy.

The Chairman. Hou many ships did he have in port at the time?

Mr. Jewell. Only two. The Tuscarora was lying there, and she was about landing her men when the flagship arrived. The landing of the men was suspended for an hour or so until the captain could communicate with the admiral, when they were sent on shore. My instructions were then that I was not to go into the city, but to confine myself to the Pacific Mail Company's wharf. There was a great deal of merchandise which had just been landed from one of the Pacific Mail steamers.

The Chairman. What port were you at before you went to Panama?

Mr. Jewell. We had come up from Callao, I think.

The Chairman. Did you come up for the purpose of protecting the property?

Mr. Jewell. No. We came up for the purpose of taking a surveying party down on the isthmus, which was surveying for the inter-oceanic canal there. I also landed men when in command of the Essex on the China station at the request of the American minister in the capital of Corea. I landed men at Chemulpo and marched them up to Seoul, Corea.

The Chairman. Coming back to Panama. Was that a political strife that existed in Panama at the time of which you spoke?

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Mr. Jewell. I believe so—one of the periodical revolutions which nobody can account for.

The Chairman. How long did your troops remain on shore?

Mr. Jewell. I think about six days.

The Chairman. Did they camp on shore?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was there any disturbance in the vicinity of your camp?

Mr. Jewell. No. Firing was going on all the time between these two parties, around corners, out of windows, etc., and every time we showed ourselves down on the wharf they would fire at us. They would fire at a light at night—amuse themselves that way; but never did any particular damage.

Senator Frye. But the troops from the other ship went up into the city?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. What distance was that; how far did they have to go to get into the city?

Mr. Jewell. Perhaps half a mile.

The Chairman. Did they remain in the city?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And the American troops remained on shore until peace was restored—order was restored?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. You have no particular information as to whether either faction of the people there desired your presence?

Mr. Jewell. No, I do not know about that at all. I think the call was made by the Pacific Mail Company, in the first instance, for the protection of the property in transit—merchandise in transit. I believe we have certain treaty rights down there in regard to landing men.

The Chairman. Now, the Corean incident. What was the occasion for landing there?

Mr. Jewell. It was an excitement in Seaul, the capital. Threats had been made against the foreign population, and I think they were all more or less scared. I do not think they were in any very great danger. But the American minister wrote to me that he would probably call upon me for a small force for the protection of the legation, and soon after I received the letter I received a telegram from him asking me to dispatch the men.

The Chairman. You were in command of the ship at that time?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. How many men did you send?

Mr. Jewell. Twenty-five or 30—I think 30 men.

The Chairman. How long did they stay ashore?

Mr. Jewell. I think about a week; until quiet was restored.

The Chairman. That was not a political revolution, but it was an opposition of the natives to the foreign population in general?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And you really landed for the purpose of protecting the American citizens there and the legation?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. There were other men-of-war there at the time and they all landed troops. That is to say, there was a French man-of- war, a Russian man-of-war, and a Japanese man-of-war. I think they all sent men up there.

The Chairman. Was there any other occasion when you have landed troops?

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Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. IS it one of the standing orders or rules of the Navy that when the minister resident at a foreign port, or consul at a foreign port, requests the naval officer to land troops to protect the peace of the consulate, the naval officer is to do it?

Mr. Jewell. The officer in command of a vessel has to decide that when it comes up.

The Chairman. Upon the facts in every emergency?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

Senator Frye. He can not relieve himself for responsibility except by the orders of a superior officer?

Mr. Jewell. In no other way. He is responsible for any such landing or landings he may make. In my own case I had asked the admiral particularly in regard to the landing of men in Corea. I had asked him to give me instructions, but he said I would have to depend upon my own judgment in case of necessity, in case the request was made.

The Chairman. So that a naval officer in command at any foreign port is thrown upon his individual judgment as to the necessity or propriety of landing forces?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Is he bound to receive from the consuls or ministers of the United States their orders or requests or direction as being military orders?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. Their orders address themselves to the naval officer's discretion?

Mr. Jewell. Yes, exactly. They come in the form of a request.

The Chairman. And they do not relieve the naval officer from responsibility as a naval officer.

Mr. Jewell. Not at all.

The Chairman. Whereas if the orders come from a superior authority the naval officer is bound to obey, and he is relieved from any responsibility in obeying?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Have you cruised much in the Pacific Ocean?

Mr. Jewell. No; except that I have been three years on that China station; not otherwise. I was two years and a half in the Tuscarora, and I was in the Pacific then.

The Chairman. Is the Tuscarora a steamship?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Have you been on steamships during all your cruises out there?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. What are the nearest points where a coal supply can be obtained? I do not mean the place where supplies have been accumulated, but where the countries produce the coal?

Mr. Jewell. Nearest to Honolulu?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Jewell. I do not know of any. They have an inferior kind of coal in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, at Vancouvers Island. I think that is the nearest point.

The Chairman. Is that what is called the Seattle coal?

Mr. Jewell. It may be Seattle coal.

The Chairman. It is the same thing?

Mr. Jewell. I have no doubt it is the same thing; but it is not a good quality of coal.

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The Chairman. And that is the nearest point to Honolulu where coal can be obtained?

Mr. Jewell. I think so; yes.

The Chairman. What is the next nearest point?

Mr. Jewell. I do not know of any natural coal bed nearer than in Japan. I do not know any nearer place where they produce coal.

The Chairman. Have you ever used that Japan coal?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; used it invariably out there on the station.

The Chairman. Is it a good coal?

Mr. Jewell. Very good coal.

The Chairman. Is it abundant?

Mr. Jewell. Quite so; yes.

The Chairman. Where do you take it on board ship?

Mr. Jewell. Anywhere; but Nagasaki was the port nearest the coal mines.

The Chairman. You can get it in sufficient quantities at any point to answer your purpose?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Now, the next nearest?

Mr. Jewell. There are coal mines on the Siberian (Kamchatkan) coast, or it may be in the northern island of the Japan group. There was a coal that I tried out there; I think an inferior coal, and not a very large supply. Of course, there are also Welsh coals, and others to be found in Hongkong.

The Chairman. In Souch America are there any coal mines, the product of which is good for steam navigation?

Mr. Jewell. I do not recall any at this time, until you get down in the Straits of Magellan.

The Chairman. How is that coal?

Mr. Jewell. It is a good deal like Nanaimo (Vancouver Island) coal.

The Chairman. Is it an inferior coal?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Hard to get out?

Mr. Jewell. Not too hard to get out; but it is not entirely carbonized. It is a lignite. It is very light, bulky, and burns up rapidly.

The Chairman. You have no knowledge of coals in South America north of the Straits of Magellan?

Mr. Jewell. No; I do not remember any coal mines.

The Chairman. Where do you get coal in Australia?

Mr. Jewell. I do not know.

The Chairman. Did you ever coal a ship at Sidney, Australia?

Mr. Jewell. No.

Senator Frye. They have coal mines there?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Oh, yes. Suppose a fleet of war ships of a modern pattern, first-class war ships, were to sail from any European port, either through the Mediterranean or around the Cape of Good Hope, or around Cape Horn, for the purpose of attacking San Francisco—I will put that as the objective point—would they be able to bring from any European port coal enough to sustain them in their voyage to San Francisco and during a series of naval operations, which would include a siege, say often days, without the assistance of tenders?

Mr. Jewell. No; I think not.

The Chairman. They could not carry in their bunkers coal enough to include a naval operation of that much voyage and that much sea?

Mr. Jewell. No. There is a certain coal endurance which is assigned

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to these ships, certain number of miles, which is called the steaming radius of the vessel. I think, as a rule, that is exaggerated; at all events, a vessel would arrive on the ground empty. She would not have any coal left. I do not believe it would be possible for any vessel to arrive at San Francisco, under the circumstances which you have mentioned, without coaling in the meantime.

The Chairman. Then any foreign power that undertook to attack our Western coast and had possession of the Sandwich Islands, with a full supply of naval stores, wood, and coal at that point, would they have very much greater advantages than they would have in the absence of their occupation of that port?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Now, reverse the matter. Suppose the United States were in possession of the Sandwich Islands and had the supplies that would naturally be placed in such a position as that, would not that greatly increase the power of the naval defense of the United States?

Mr. Jewell. I should say, decidedly, yes.

The Chairman. Then I take it that you would regard the possession of the Sandwich Islands, the occupation of the Sandwich Islands, or some place there, as being of great strategic advantage as against any foreign country, either Asiatic or European, upon our coast?

Mr. Jewell. I think it would; yes.

The Chairman. In a commercial sense what would be the advantage of the possession of the Sandwich Islands by the United States?

Mr. Jewell. It is immediately in the track of vessels bound from San Francisco to New Zealand and Australia and all the Southern Pacific islands; and it is not far from the direct track between San Francisco and Japan and China. In fact, the sailing route from San Francisco to Japan and China would be in the immediate neighborhood of the Sandwich Islands.

The Chairman. What advantage would that be to the commerce of the United States, or to the United States as a Government, to have these resting places there in the center of the Pacific Ocean?

Mr. Jewell. It would be an advantage to every steamship as a coaling point, and to other vessels for the purchase of supplies of various kinds, provisions, etc.

The Chairman. Is that very necessary or desirable in passing so vast an expanse of water as the Pacific Ocean?

Mr. Jewell. Very desirable, but, of course, not absolutely necessary— ships can carry them across. If it can be done, it is desirable that the supply should be obtained frequently.

The Chairman. If the Sandwich Islands were in possession of some great commercial nation, like the United States, capable of caring for them and securing neutrality and all the requirements of maritime law, navigation, etc., would such an occupation by the United States as I have indicated be of advantage to the commerce of the world?

Mr. Jewell. Of course, it is always desirable to have a stable government in such an important point in the trade route as the Sandwich Islands, and in that sense it would be, of course, an advantage to the commerce of the world.

The Chairman. It would be to the advantage of the commerce of the world that any stable and great power should have the occupation of those islands, rather than a weak and uncertain power.

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Such as would be furnished by the native population of Hawaii?

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Mr. Jewell. Yes; I should think so.

The Chairman. I suppose you would consider that the commercial affairs of the world would be benefited by having in Hawaii a strong and just government?

Mr. Jewell. I should say so; yes, beyond question.

The Chairman. It would give confidence to capital to embark in trade, I suppose.

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And increase the exports and imports of the different countries?

Mr. Jewell. I think so.

The Chairman. Do you know any place in any of the seas of the world where greater advantage can be bestowed upon the commerce of the world than could be obtained by the possession of the Sandwich Islands by a great maritime power, one that had the resources to preserve order and facilitate commerce?

Mr. Jewell. No; I do not know any more important point; no place that occurs to me at this particular moment.

The Chairman. Would you say that in a military sense the possession of Gibralter would be any more controlling or any more important to British interests in the Mediterranean than the possession of Hawaii would be to American interests in the Pacific Ocean?

Mr. Jewell. I consider that Gibralter is an extremely important point for the English to hold, because it is one of a chain of forts which they hold and which connects the Suez Canal with the Atlantic Ocean, and perhaps it would be of greater importance to England to retain possession of Gibralter than that the United States should have possession of the Sandwich Islands.

Mr. Chairman. Because Gibralter is one of a chain of fortifications held by England?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; fortified posts.

The Chairman. Which protect England's access to and outlet from the Suez Canal?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Suppose that there were a canal under American protection through Nicaraugua of equal capacity with, or greater capacity than, the Suez Canal, as a fortified port or place in a chain connecting Hawaii in the center of the Pacific Ocean with our possessions in the United States, the mouth of the Mississippi River, and the various bays and harbors that we have here and the fortifications at Key West, would you then consider that Gibralter is more important to the British people than the possession of Hawaii would be to the American people?

Mr. Jewell. It is hard to make a comparison of that kind; but if the Nicaragua Canal should be put through I consider that the possession of the Sandwich Islands by the United States would be absolutely essential.

The Chairman. And for the reasons that we have been just adverting to?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. I think it would be absolutely essential that the United States should take possession of those islands if the Nicaragua Canal is to be built.

The Chairman. You consider that the two propositions, the building of the Nicaragua Canal and occupation of Hawaii, either by including it in our territory or getting advantages there to enable us to have a naval station at that place, would be of the greatest importance?

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Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes. I say it would be absolutely essential to retain that control of the canal which we are bound to have.

The Chairman. Have you been to Honolulu more than once?

Mr. Jewell. No; only once.

The Chairman. Did you make any examination of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Jewell. No; I did not.

The Chairman. I will ask you in regard to the Bay of Honolulu, and get you, first, to describe its area and in what way it is protected from the inflow of the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

Mr. Jewell. It would be impossible for me to give any idea of the area from memory, because I do not recollect. I only know that the harbor is inclosed within a coral reef, with the exception of the entrance to the harbor of Honolulu. It is entirely closed by the coral reef.

The Chairman. How does it compare in area, according to your present recollection, with the harbor at Boston?

Mr. Jewell. I should say it is more contracted than the harbor of Boston.

The Chairman. Is it more contracted than the harbor of New York?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. You consider New York Harbor, up East River and North River, out to sea?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. My impression is that Honolulu is not an extensive harbor; perhaps it is a mile and a half long and a few hundred yards wide. It has been twenty years since I was there.

The Chairman. On the land side it is surrounded, I believe, by elevations of land?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Considerable elevations?

Mr. Jewell. Quite high mountains along about the interior of the island.

The Chairman. Down about the coast?

Mr. Jewell. Within a short distance of the city.

The Chairman. Where heavy guns could be mounted to protect the harbor?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; Honolulu could be very easily fortified.

The Chairman. Take the best class of guns that we now have and mount them upon the best elevations, how far out would you say would be the radius of the defense that those guns would afford?

Mr. Jewell. You know the range of modern guns is very much greater than that at which any action would probably be fought. I am quite sure that batteries could be arranged to keep any foreign fleet from approaching Honolulu within 5 miles. But I have no doubt if guns were numerous enough they could keep them away still further.

The Chairman. That would be really a sufficient protection against the attack of a foreign fleet?

Mr. Jewell. I think so.

The Chairman. The fleet might destroy the town, but could not take possession lying out there?

Mr. Jewell. They could not take possession; I am not entirely certain that they could destroy the town, except by chance shots.

The Chairman. Such fortifications as occur to you as being possible on those elevations around Honolulu Bay and around the city of Honolulu would be sufficient ro assist in protecting a fleet that might be in the harbor?

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Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; a fleet could be protected in the harbor.

The Chairman. There is no land barrier between the city of Honolulu and the sea, the ocean?

Mr. Jewell. No, nothing except this coral reef, which is uncovered at low water.

The Chairman. Barely covered?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. You could walk over it some distance at low water.

The Chairman. Water batteries could be established on those coral reefs for the protection of the harbor?

Mr. Jewell. Well, I do not know about that. I should mistrust those coral reefs as a foundation, but they might be sufficiently strong.

The Chairman. If sufficiently good as a foundation, they are sufficiently high out of the water to form good water batteries ?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. There is nothing to impede the fighting ship inside the harbor or those steamships outside the harbor that you would maneuver with?

Mr. Jewell. Nothing, except the contracted space within the harbor. There would be no space within the harbor for maneuvering vessels. But vessels could lie in the harbor, and by means of lines could be fought in almost any direction.

The Chairman. So that a vessel lying in Honolulu harbor would not be absolutely without power against ships outside?

Mr. Jewell. No; it is entirely open.

The Chairman. It is entirely open?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, for the convenience of the committee, I desire to put in the record certain naval regulations, and certain orders which I find scattered through these Executive documents in a very hopeless confusion; so much so, that it is almost impossible to find anything in there. I give in first an extract from every naval officer's commission which has been signed by the President. It is in these words:

"And he is to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as he shall receive from me, or the future President of the United States of America, or his superior officer set over him, according to the rules and discipline of the Navy."

I have a copy of the rules, and it is very difficult to get hold of the book. These are the rules and regulations of 1893. I read from the title page:

"The orders, regulations, and instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy, prior to July 14, 1862, as he may since have adopted, with the approval of the President, shall be recognized as the regulations of the Navy, subject to alterations adopted in the same manner. Section 1547, Revised Statutes."

On the opposite page is the following:

"Navy Department,
"Washington, D. C., February 25, 1893.
"In accordance with the provisions of section 1547 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the following regulations are established, with the approval of the President, for the government of all persons attached to the naval service. All regulations, orders, and circulars inconsistent therewith are hereby revoked.
"B. F. Tracy,
"Secretary of the Navy."
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On page 9 is the following:

"ARTICLE 18.

"1 . Officers of the line only can exercise military command,
"2. Only officers on duty pay can exercise, or are subject to command, except as provided for in article 211.
"3 . On all occasions where two or more ships' expeditions or detachments of officers or men meet, the command of the whole devolves upon the senior line officer.
"4. At all times and places not specifically provided for in these Regulations, where the exercise of military authority for the purpose of cooperation or otherwise is necessary, of which the responsible officer must be the judge, the senior line officer on the spot shall assume command and direct the movements and efforts of all persons in the Navy present.
"5. The senior line officer shall be held accountable for the exercise of his authority, and must not divert any officer from a duty confided to him by a common superior, or deprive him of his command or duty without good and sufficient reason."

On page 13 I read article 31:

"Officers of the Navy shall perform such duty as may be assigned to them by the Navy Department."

On page 15, article 48:

"Officers can not assume command of Army forces on shore, nor can any officer of the Army assume command of any ship of the Navy or of its officers or men unless by special authority for a particular service; but when officers are on duty with the Army they shall be entitled to the precedence of the rank in the Army to which their own corresponds, except command as aforesaid, and this precedence will regulate their right to quarters."

On page 20, section 5 of Article 54 is as follows:

"The officer in command of a ship of war is not authorized to delegate his power, except for the carrying out of the details of the general duties to be performed by his authority. The command is his, and he can neither delegate the duties of it to another, nor avoid its burdens, nor escape its responsibilities; and his 'aid or executive,' in the exercise of the power given to him for 'executing the orders of the commanding officer,' must keep himself constantly informed of the commander's opinions and wishes thereon; and whenever and as soon as he may be informed or is in doubt as to such opinion or wishes, he must remedy such defect by prompt and personal application, to the end that the authority of the captain may be used only to carry out his own views; and that he may not be, by its unwarranted exercise, in any measure relieved from his official responsibilities, which can neither be assumed by nor fall upon any other officer."

Page 66, Article 280, is in these words:

"1. He shall preserve, so far as possible, the most cordial relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States in foreign countries and extend to them the honors, salutes, and other official courtesies to which they are entitled by these regulations.
"2. He shall carefully and duly consider any request for service or other communication from any such representative.
"3. Although due weight should be given to the opinions and advice of such representatives, a commanding officer is solely and entirely
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responsible to his own immediate superior for all official acts in the administration of his command."

On page 67, article 284:

"On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof."

On same page, article 285:

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or against any one within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to states as well as to individuals, and in the case of states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the state or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation can not be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required."

Now, I wish to give in the Consular Regulations of 1888:

"Consular regulations prescribed for the use of the consular service of the United States."

Page following title page:

"Excecutive Mansion,
"Washington, D. C., February 3,1888.
"In accordance with the provisions of law, the following revised regulations and instructions ٭ ٭ ٭ are hereby prescribed for the information and government of the consular officers of the United States.
"Grover Cleveland."
"Department of State,
"Washington, February 3, 1888.
"I transmit herewith for your information and government the accompanying revised regulations and instructions which have been prescribed by the President. They are intended to supersede those which have been heretofore issued by this Department, and are to be carefully observed in all respects.
"I am, sir, your obedient servant,
"T. F. Bayard.
"To the several consular officers of the United States."
"Article 7, clause 96, page 33. They are also reminded that the Navy is an independent branch of the service, not subject to the orders of this Department, and that its officers have fixed duties prescribed for them; they will therefore be careful to ask for the presence of a naval force at their port only when public exigency absolutely requires it,
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and will then give the officers in command in full the reasons for the request, and leave with them the responsibility for action."

Now, I wish to give in an instruction from Secretary Gresham to Mr. Blount, taken from Executive Document 48, page 2:

"Department of State,
"Washington, March 11, 1893.
"To enable you to fulfill this charge your authority in all matters touching the relations to this Government to the existing or other government of the islands and the protection of our citizens therein is paramount and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn."

Then, in Executive Document No. 48, page 455:

"March 11,1893.
"Sir: This letter will be handed you by the Hon. James H. Blount, Special Commissioner by the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands. You will consult freely with Mr. Blount and will receive any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command. You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.
"Respectfully,
"Hilary A. Herbert,
"Secretary of the Navy.
"Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
"Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, etc."

Then, Document 47, page 6:

"Honolulu, March 31, 1893.
"Sir: You are directed to haul down the United States ensign from the Government building, and to embark the troops now on shore to the ship to which they belong. This will be executed at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of April.
"I am, sir, your obedient servant,
"James H. Blount,
"Special Commissioner of the United States.
"Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
"Commanding Pacific Squadron."

Now, on page 487 of Executive Document 48:

"United States Legation,
"Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.
"Sir: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command, for the protection of the United States legation and the United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.
"Yours, truly,
"John L. Stevens,
"Envoy Extraordinary, etc., of the United States.
"To Capt. C. C. Wiltse."
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Then, page 487 of Executive Document 48:

"Sir: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu

for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order. Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs, and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens. You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any changes in the situation.

"Very respectfully,
"G. C. Wiltse,
"Captain U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Boston.
"Lieut-Commander W. T. Swinburne,
"Executive officer, U. S. S. Boston."

The affidavits I have are as follows:

STATEMENT OF A. F. JUDD, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

A short sketch of my life and antecedents may, perhaps, give more credence to what I may say. I was born in Honolulu on the 7th of January, 1838. My father, Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, came with my mother to these islands in 1828. My father was physician to the American mission that had been established here eight years before his arrival here. His profession necessarily brought him into close and confidential relations with the Regent, Kaahumanu, the young King, Kamehameha III, and the high chiefs, who were then a large and influential class. At their earnest request, my father left the mission in 1843 and took office under Kamehameha III, first as interpreter and as a member of the treasury board, and later as minister, which office he held till 1853. We lived for three years on the palace grounds, and for many years I, with the rest of my brothers and sisters, were in intimate companionship in school and out of it with the young chiefs.

I attended the first royal school for a while in which were the sons of Kinau, who became Kamehamehas IV and V, their sister, Victoria Kamamalu, who was Kuhina Nui under her brother, Kamehama IV. At the same school were Queen Emma, Mrs. Bernice Bishop, David Kalakaua, his brother, James Keliokalani, and Liliuokalani, whose name at that time was Lydia Kamakaeha Paki. Several of these went later with me to the second royal school, under Dr. Beckwith. I learned to speak Hawaiian, and have lived continuously in these islands to the present time, with the exception of four years spent in the United States at Yale College, where I graduated in 1862, and at Harvard, where I studied law, returning to these islands in 1864. I have also made several visits to the United States and one to Europe.

My father's record in doing as much as anyone towards the creation of the Hawaiian Government and preserving its independence against the efforts of Great Britain and France are matters of public history. From my association with the Hawaiian people, my frequent visits to all parts of the group, I consider myself well acquainted with the Hawaiians, and admire and love such good qualities as they do possess. I have not spared myself in efforts to enlighten them, having carried on for years temperance and religious work among them. I

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was secretary to the constitutional convention of 1864, and witnessed the debates of that body which led to Kamehameha V abrogating the liberal constitution of 1852 and promulgating that of 1864. In 1868 I was elected a member of the Legislature without visiting the district that returned me, and I was again elected in 1872, this time from Honolulu. Kamehameha V having died after the Legislature closed, at a special session I voted for Lunalilo in 1873 (January 7), and was appointed his attorney-general, which office I held until Lunalilo died.

The election of a King again coming to the Legislature in February, 1874, I voted for Kalakaua as the best available candidate. He was unpopular with the natives, and if the members of Lunalilo's cabinet, Messrs. C. R. Bishop, E. O. Hall, R. Sterling, and myself, had thrown our influence, with other prominent whites, in favor of Queen Emma, who was the people's favorite, she would have been chosen in spite of Kalakaua's efforts and bribery. But we felt that the influences surrounding Queen Emma were such that English sentiment and ideas would control. We were threatened with a state church, and feared that all the court atmosphere would be adverse to the cultivation of closer commercial and political relations with the United States, which, owing to our geographical position and growing commerce and the character of our white population, were essential to our progress and prosperity. Kalakaua was elected, and a riot occurred, in which the court-house where the election was held was sacked, native members of the Legislature were attacked and beaten, and the town was at the mercy of the mob.

Owing to the timely assistance of troops from the two United States ships then in port and also from the British vessel the riot was quelled. Kalakaua took the oath of office, stating at the time (which I interpreted) that he had intended to promulgate a new constitution, but the riot had prevented it. The Government went on. I was appointed second associate justice of the supreme court February 18, 1874, promoted to first associate 1, 1877, and on the return of Kalakaua from his tour of the world was by him appointed chief justice November 5, 1881, which office I now hold. Having my chambers in the Government building I have been familiar with the political changes that have taken place during the past twenty years, have known all the twenty-six cabinets during Kalakau's reign, and have been kept informed of all important matters of state.

Our law reports and our published opinions will show nothing that would indicate on the part of the supreme court any aversion to a monarchical form of government for these islands. We maintained the personal veto of the sovereign as a constitutional right against much public pressure and under like circumstances of pressure declared in favor of the Queen Liliuokalani's right to appoint her own cabinet on her accession. It was my wish and hope that the autonomy of this archipelago should be preserved for many years to come. That we would lose it eventually was a belief shared by all—English, Americans and Hawaiians—owing to the fading of the native race and the want of material to make kings and queens of.

The justices of the Supreme Court were kept in ignorance of the league which resulted in obtaining from Kalakaua the constitution of 1887. Just before its promulgation Justice Preston and myself were invited to assist in its revision, which we consented to do under a written protest that we did not approve of the method of its promulgation as being unconstitutional. I think that both the coup d'etat of Kamehameha V and the revolution of 1887, though both were accomplished

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without bloodshed, lessened the respect of the Hawaiian for the constitution and encouraged the attempt of Robt. Wilcox, in June, 1889 to rebellion and the promulgation of a constitution that would restore the lost prerogatives of the King.

I tried Wilcox for conspiracy to commit treason and had to discharge one Hawaiian jury for violent conduct while in the jury box. The second jury acquitted him in spite of his own testimony admitting all the acts which constituted conspiracy. The testimony of that trial showed that Kalakaua was a party to the conspiracy, and only because he was afraid that it would not be successful he failed to go to the palace and promulgate the constitution. The native soldiers were in sympathy with Wilcox's plans, as also many of the native police, and Wilcox also relied upon V. V. Ashford's promise that the Honolulu rifles which he commanded would not help against him.

Mr. Ashford was very lukewarm in his efforts to dispossess the rebels of the Palace grounds and the Government building. I was a personal hearer of the altercations between him and his brother, C. W. Ashford, who was then Attorney-General. The Attorney General would urge one plan and another, always to be rebuked by Col. Ashford with the statement that it could not be done, or that he, the Attorney-General, knew nothing of such matters. It was mainly owing to the volunteer citizens soldiery who rallied to the support of the Cabinet that the rebellion was put down by force in which seven Hawaiians were killed and others wounded. Liliuokalani disavowed to me her knowledge or connivance with Wilcox's plans, but the fact that the armed party under Wilcox assembled at her own house in the suburbs and started from there to the Palace, gives credence to the belief that she knew of it.

At Minister Merrill's request marines from the U.S.S. Adams were landed and stayed all the afternoon and night at the legation, which was in one of the cottages of the Hawaiian Hotel, and close to Col. Ashford's headquarters. This went far to quiet apprehension of mob violence that night. The U.S.S. Boston troops were accustomed during their stay here to land weekly for drill and parade. We have for many years been accustomed to this spectacle from other ships of the United States Navy and occasionally from ships of other nationalities. As I have said, twice before the l6th of January, 1893, when the Boston troops landed, have we seen them land to protect American life and property. I knew Capt. Wiltse intimately. He often came to my house and often assured me that his instructions were to remain passive and only to use his forces for the protection of American life and property.

I do not deny that both Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse were not in sympathy with the disgraceful plans of those in the Legislature and out of it who would force a national lottery upon us that the history of Louisiana proved to us would, in time, have captured the entire Government, and that they both wished for purity in government in our community and for what all good Christian Americans would desire for this country and for their own. Such gentlemen could not from their nature sympathize with what was corrupting or vile. But I affirm that not in all my intercourse with these gentlemen have I heard any expressions from either of them that would lead me to hope or expect that they would use the forces of the United States in any violent act against the Queen's forces or in aid of any insurgents. The constant presence of ships of the United States Navy for years and years past has assured us that they would protect American life and property, and this assurance was the same whether the troops were landed or

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kept on board. Let others who were of the committee of safety and leaders of the movement of January 17 speak for themselves of their actions not known to me. My narrative is what came to my personal knowledge.

During the first part of the Queen's reign she was very friendly with the moral and Christian portion of our community, attending social and religious gatherings of the ladies in their various societies and contributing to their benevolent work. I felt that she was sincere in her intentions to rule wisely and well and to leave government to her cabinet, and I did all I could to make my friends trust her. On one occasion, owing to the public scandal created by her having around her in the palace women of bad repute, and both men and women of doubtful reputation invited to the palace balls, I had had a long conversation as to the necessity of purifying the atmosphere about her. She expressed sympathy with my views. But I knew from others that she was dissatisfied with the constitution of 1887; that she thought Kalakaua had yielded too tamely to the pressure and that she would not.

I knew from the native newspapers that the politicians were persuading the Hawaiians that the property qualifications of a voter for nobles being too high for the mass of them, practically deprived them of rights which they thought they ought to have and gave them to the white man. I was well aware that when the common native has his race prejudices excited on the stump and in his newspapers he is apt to think that all his ills and all his poverty are owing to the supremacy of the white race in this country. But Liliuokalani had been educated in Christian schools, had had advantages of association with the best people of our communities and with the cultured of all nations here as visitors, and I did not think that all this would go for naught when the time, as she thought, had come for her to assert herself as Queen of the native race alone. I had been frequently told that she disliked me and my influence, but I have never received any personal indication of it.

It was not until the Legislature was well along that her friends, I among them, began to fear that she was insincere. It could not be understood why she kept the appropriation bill so long after it passed the Legislature, or why she postponed the prorogation of the Legislature beyond the time set for it by the Legislature. The session had been long and fatiguing. The lottery bill had been the subject of most intense feeling in the community and of discussion in the newspapers of this city, and its adherents were shamed out of its advocacy. It was considered a dead issue. The act to reorganize the judiciary department was approved by the Queen only on condition that the cabinet propose an amendment that the district magistrates should be commissioned by the sovereign on the nomination of the cabinet in place of the law as it had stood for many years, whereby the chief justice, with the approval of the other justices, should commission them on the nomination of the cabinet. The cabinet yielded for the sake of peace.

This was to my mind the first open indication that she was desirous to regain the power that Kalakaua had either surrendered or which had been taken from him by statute. The appointment of 26 magistrates of her adherents all over the islands would give her great power. The next step she took was to refuse to commission Mr. Frear as circuit judge under the new act. Mr. Frear was in all respects the best available man for the place. I took the liberty of advising her to

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----51

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appoint him and used every argument that the facts justified. She wanted to appoint Mr. Antone Rosa. I told her of facts that unfitted him for the place, but they had no effect, and it was not until her adherents, among them Paul Neumann, told her that if she had promised her cabinet to appoint Mr. Frear that she must do so, that she signed the commission.

The paper-money bill having been defeated, and the lottery bill being considered dead, and a ministry possessing the confidence of the men of character, wealth, and intelligence of this country—G. N. Wilcox, M. P. Robinson, P. C. Jones, and Cecil Brown—having been appointed, the appropriation bill having been signed (usually the last act of the Legislature), the community were generally relieved and confidence was being restored, when events occurred which explained the Queen's delay in the matter of the appropriation bill and the postponing of the prorogation. Six among the best members of the Legislature had left town, some for the other islands and some for the United States, and one to England. The justices of the supreme court had shortly before this in a reply to the Legislature expounded the constitution to mean that to oust a ministry on a vote of want of confidence it would require the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Legislature, exclusive of the cabinet; that is, 25 votes were essential.

On the 4th of January, 1893, Mr. J. E. Bush, then an adherent of the Queen, though in the early part of the session he was violently opposed to her, introduced a vote of want of confidence in the Wilcox-Jones cabinet. It failed by a vote of 19 to 22, but rumors were thick that it would be tried again. Suddenly, on the 10th of January, the lottery bill was called up and after but little discussion it passed its second reading by a vote of 20 to 17. Only one white man voted for it. It was brought up again on the next day and passed its third reading by a vote of 23 to 20. This was considered as a test vote adverse to the cabinet, and the opposition lacked only two votes to oust the cabinet, twenty-five being the requisite number. On the 12th of January the Queen gave a lunch to the opposition members at noon. The members came into the House looking serious and excited. Two natives who had hitherto voted in favor of the cabinet came in from lunch with yellow wreaths on, which the Queen had given them. I found out that she had begged them to vote the ministry out, appealing to their loyalty to her and to their native land.

Mr. C. O. Berger, a noble (German), had promised that he would not go to the Legislature again, but at noon he was promised that his father-in-law, Judge H. A. Widemann, should form the new cabinet, and he went to the House, and, with W. H. Cornwell (who did not vote for the lottery bill owing to his mother's persuasions, who came to the Legislature and labored with him), the twenty-five votes were secured. The promise to Mr. Berger, was made by Mr. Samuel Parker, who went off as if to the palace from Mr. Berger's office and returned as if he had secured the Queen's consent. The resolution of "want of confidence" was introduced by J. N. Kapahu, member from Kau Hawaii. It expressed no reasons and was put to vote and carried without discussion.

When the lottery bill and the vote of want of confidence were passed the lobbies were full of natives, half-whites, and low foreigners, who gave vent to their feelings of joy by shouts, hurrahs, tossing up their hats, shaking hands, and all rushed out all jubilant as the House adjourned. The feeling all over town was intense and despair was seen reflected on many faces, but as yet all that was done was within the law. Mr. Berger and others tried to get members to coalesce and repair the mischief,

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but it was too late. A quorum was secured on Friday p. m., the 13th January, and the new cabinet came in with their commissions, Parker, Colburn, Cornwell, and Peterson. Mr. Parker had that morning told Mr. Widemann that he could go into the cabinet with himself. (Parker), Peterson, and Colburn. Mr. Widemann told me that he could not go into the cabinet with such a man as Colburn, and declined, and so the office of minister of finance was given to Cornwell.

On Saturday morning the cabinet announced that the Queen had signed the lottery and opium bills, and the Queen at 12 o'clock prorogued the Legislature. I think the Queen approved the opium bill and suppressed the Chinese registration act to please the Chinese, from which class she expected contributions of money, and she approved the lottery bill to please the natives and to get favor with the class of whites who opposed the "Missionaries," besides wishes for the revenue it would yield. Mr. John Phillips, one of the promoters of the lottery bill, said to a friend of mine, when every one was debating whether the Queen would sign it, "She will sign it; there is too much in it for her." That Saturday morning it leaked out to me that Bill White, the member from Lahaina, had said that after the prorogation the natives were all going to the palace and the Queen would proclaim a new constitution.

I went down town and mentioned this rumor to several persons, but only a few believed it. While near Mr. Hartwell's law office I saw Mr. Colburn (the minister) drive up and go into Mr. Hartwell's office, and thought it was a very strange proceeding, as he seemed excited and in a great hurry. Returning to the Government building I met Peterson, who looked very much agitated, and he said he did not expect to remain in office over a day or so. A large crowd of natives was collecting in the Government building premises and there was a general air of expectation. The ceremony of prorogation went off as usual and at the close the chamberlain invited us over to the palace. This was not unusual. I urged my associate, Justice Dole, to go to the palace with Justice Bickerton and myself, telling him my fears that the Queen was going to proclaim a new constitution. Jude Dole had another engagement and declined to go. I then noticed from my balcony that the Hui Kalaiaina, a political association, were marching out of the yard to the palace. They were all dressed in evening dress, with tall hats, banners, and badges, and marched two and two. In the front rank was John Akina carrying a large, flat package in front of his breast, suspended by ribbons about his shoulders. This was the new constitution.

When I reached the palace the Hui Kalaiaina were already in the throne room in regular lines, constitution in hand, and their president, Alapai, had an address to deliver which he had open in his hand. In their rear were members of the Legislature and the corridors were crowded with natives. We, i.e., the diplomatic corps, justices, Governor Cleghorn, and the young princess, President Walker and staff officers, were stationed in our usual positions for a state ceremony. But the Queen and cabinet did not come. They were closeted in the blue room. We waited and waited. I asked, in turn, Cleghorn, the princess, President Walker, the diplomatic corps, the staff officers, what the delay meant. No one knew. I told them my suspicions. One by one these person's left their positions, some went home, some went to the dining room. We waited.

Little by little we ascertained that the Queen was urging the cabinet to approve the new constitution. Wilson told me in great emotion

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that he had been fighting the battle alone all the morning and that the Queen was determined to proclaim a new constitution. He said the constitution was her own compilation. The members of the Hui Kalaiaina said that the constitution came from the Queen to them. Parker told me later that he staid by the Queen, for he was afraid if left alone she would sign the constitution, take it out to the people, proclaim it from the palace balcony, and say that her cabinet and judges would not approve of it, and tell the people to look out for them. Every one knows how quickly Colburn and Peterson, when they could escape from the palace, called for help from Thurston and others, and how afraid Colburn was. to go back to the palace. I sent messages to her twice to be excused from further attendance, but received answers to wait a little.

The troops, 100 in number, with ball cartridges, were kept all day in line in front of the palace. Finally, at about 4 p.m., the cabinet came in. Parker, in tears, told me the Queen had agreed to postpone the promulgation. Then the Queen came in angry, defiant, and yet under perfect control. Her speech I wrote down that evening and it was published. I asked a good many who heard it if my account was correct, and they said it was. She did not withdraw the constitution, she merely postponed its promulgation on account of the obstacles she had met with, and told the people to go to their homes and wait for it. This was understood by the natives to mean that the ministry had prevented it, for as soon as she had left the throne room, J. K. Kaunamano (member from Hamakua) turned to the people behind him (the room was full of natives) and said in a loud, excited tone, "What shall we do to these men who thwart our desires?" He was quieted by myself and others, and I then left the palace. I feel convinced that the Queen formed the idea of having a new constitution which would make her supreme long before she became Queen. She hesitated before taking the oath to the constitution of 1887, and only because Cummins and others, including Gov. Dominis, her husband, told her she had better swear to it that she did.

The new constitution restored to the Queen the right to appoint the Nobles, which virtually placed the whole legislative power in her hands. The justices of the supreme court were to be appointed for six years, which virtually destroyed the independence of the judiciary. The ministry were to hold at her pleasure, which would make an autocrat of her. This new constitution would have made it impossible for white men to live here. With the Legislature bribed as we know the last one was, and changing their votes at the will of the Queen, and a hostile Queen and a subservient cabinet, there was no safety for us or our property. This justified the revolution.

The mass meeting held on Monday afternoon, the 16th, showed the leaders of the revolution that they would be supported. This made cowards of the cabinet. How could they attempt to use force when they knew their Queen was wrong? They were aware that something serious was planned. It was in the air. Parker knew of it from what he said to me. Being unaware that Wilson's force was insufficient to take and hold the Government buildings it seemed strange to me that he did not take possession during Sunday or Monday. It is very easy to say that the Boston's men overthrew the Queen. They did nothing more than has been done often before—to land with the intention of protecting American interests if imperiled. The Queen's adherents had neither the character nor the ability to resist. Men are not eager to risk their lives in a bad cause.

I resume the narration. I did not attend the mass meeting, but had

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conversations all day with many persons of prominence, and some of those who are now royalists were fierce in their denunciations of the Queen. We all felt satisfied that in some way the Queen's policy would be defeated, but just in what way I could not tell. The people seemed determined and were satisfied to leave their cause in the hands of the committee. It was wise not to divulge openly their plan of overturning monarchy. The Queen's proclamation of Monday that she would not attempt a new constitution again and was impelled to the step by stress from her native subjects had no effect. This last statement was untrue. Even Mr. Widemann told me that it was a piece of folly, as it did not announce the resignation of the cabinet and indicate a new one in whom the country had confidence.

It is not true that the new constitution came from the people. It was the Queen's own idea and design, and her adherents had spread her sentiments among the people. It was admitted to me that she had shown this constitution to her ministers, Parker, Peterson, and Colburn, even before their appointment, and that they had promised to support her in it. They were only impelled to oppose her when she was attempting to carry out the scheme by fear of the consequences. Mr. J. O. Carter told Mr. P. C. Jones and myself on Saturday evening, the 14th of January, that both Cornwell and Colburn were in fear of their lives when they escaped from the palace, and were only induced to return and face the Queen again by strong persuasion on his part.

On Monday evening the Boston troops landed. Being then an outsider I knew nothing of the proceedings of the committee of safety. There were many rumors afloat as to what they would do, etc. All I really know is that the troops from the Boston marched up King street past the palace and Government building without pausing and camped in Mr. Atherton's premises, nearly half a mile from the Government building; and it was not until 9 p. m. that they found quarters in Arion Hall. This hall is a low wooden building in the rear of the Opera House and completely hidden by it, and commanded neither the palace, the Government building, nor the barracks. It was the only place convenient for men to sleep in that was available then. Its location was not to my mind significant of any intention on the part of the United States troops to defend any uprising against the Queen's Government. The Boston's men did not move from their quarters all day Tuesday, the 17th, nor did they make any demonstrations of any kind. No one outside of the committee of safety knew definitely what the plan was. It was apparent, however, that something important was to happen. Mr. Parker told me at about noon on that Tuesday that at 4 p.m. they, the cabinet, would be all out. The people were gathering in knots in the business part of the town, especially on Fort street. I heard a shot, saw the smoke of the pistol, saw a wagon dash up street near the corner of Fort and King streets. The crowd rushed up there to hear what it was, and soon the report came that a man in charge of an ammunition wagon had shot a native policeman who was trying to stop him. Soon the crowd swelled to great numbers. Finding the excitement too intense for me to remain longer in suspense, I walked with Mr. Paty to the Government building and saw a small number of persons gathered about the front door and listening to Mr. H. E. Cooper reading a proclamation. It was then near 3 p. m., and the reading was about half concluded.

As I passed the lane between the opera house and the Government building where Arion Hall was, I did not look at nor did I think of the U.S.S. Boston's troops, though I knew they were there. There were

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none in sight. As the proclamation finished I passed through the crowd, recognized my friends as in the movement, saw Col. Soper stripping a towel from a rifle, and at the foot of the staircase saw a man armed with a ritle. I passed upstairs and told my clerk to close up all the rooms and went down again to find arranged in a line from the staircase to the front door a body of armed men in ordinary clothes, and recruits were constantly coming in. I then walked back to the center of the town, which was full of people, all business being suspended and many of the shops shut.

Our fear was that the marshal would attempt to arrest Good, who had shot the policeman, and that this would precipitate a riot. I stood with the crowd and heard all the talk. Soon I learned that the ministers were in the station house with the marshal and a body of armed men with a gatling gun. It was said that when the Americans in the station house heard that the movement was for annexation to the United States they said they would not fight for the Queen on such an issue. We saw the Queen's cabinet go in pairs in carriages from the station house to the Government building and return. Things looked very critical. Some said that Minister Stevens had refused to recognize the Provisional Government, some said that he had or would; no one seemed to know.

I was then quite fatigued with the excitement and lack of food and went home to learn soon after that the force at the station house had surrendered and that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government, and that martial law was declared, etc. No one in the crowd, whether sympathizers with the Queen or not, suggested that the United States troops would help obtaining possession by the Provisional Government of the station house. My two eldest sons had gone off to the headquarters with their rifles in the afternoon, one with my knowledge and the other without it. I was informed by President Dole within a day or two that if the station house had not surrendered the building would have been surrounded, and as the men showed themselves, sharpshooters posted on the high building commanding it would pick them off, and, without food or water, it would only be a matter of time that they surrendered.

The committee when they went to the Government building from W. O. Smith's office believed themselves to be in extreme peril. They were not armed. They were exposed to attack by the Queen's troops coming from the barracks through the palace premises, and every man of the committee could either have been arrested as they came up to the Government building or shot down after they arrived, so far as a spectator could see, for there was no force supporting the movement in sight. An exhibition of force on the part of the revolutionists before the proclamation was read might have caused their arrest to be attempted and this would have precipitated a conflict.

It was evident to me that no one of the Queen's party dared to strike a blow, for at that time the indignation against the Queen was intense and nearly universal among the white people. The natives stood in astonishment, not knowing what was going on and saying nothing. If Marshal Wilson and the cabinet ever intended to resist the movement, they had ample time to do so, as they had from Saturday afternoon to Monday evening before the troops from the Boston had landed to attempt to place guards at all the Government buildings, and even to attempt the arrest of the leaders of the intended movement whom, Wilson well knew. I am informed that Chas. J. McCarthy, a man of military experience, and lately the clerk of the Legislature, spent Monday

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night in the Government building expecting a force of 50 or 100 armed men sent to him from the station-house, chafing because they did not come. By Tuesday night the Provisional Government had such accessions of men and arms that they were amply able to cope with any internal force.

I say, further, that my statement to Col. Blount was in response to explicit questions already apparently formulated in his mind and asked by him, and that I did not feel at liberty to volunteer information upon topics not covered by any of his questions and especially upon the matter of the alleged use by Mr. Stevens of United States troops to overthrow the Queen. My interview was on the 10th of May, 1893, and Col. Blount had evidently already settled that matter in his own mind. When I asked him to see some other gentlemen, naming them, he politely told me it was not necessary, but said he would ask Mr. P. C. Jones—but did not.

A. F. Judd.

Honolulu, December 4, 1893.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM C. WILDER.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

William C. Wilder, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have been a member of the Legislature of the Hawaiian Islands twice; I was elected in 1888 to fill the vacancy caused by my brother's, Samuel G. Wilder, death; and was elected representative for the first Honolulu district in 1892.

The conduct of the Queen became such toward the end of the session as to lead me to believe that she was determined to regain the powers taken away by the constitution of 1887; things went on from bad to worse until the 14th of January, 1893, when the Legislature was prorouged. When it was reported on that morning that the opium and lottery bills were signed and the Cornwell-Parker-Peterson cabinet came in, the tension of public feeling became most intense; every one felt that there was trouble in the air, but it was not on account of the ousting of the Wilcox reform cabinet. If matters had ended there, there would have been no uprising.

The reform members of the Legislature did not attend the prorogation, more as a protest against the unlawful acts of the Queen than anything else. When, however, after the prorogation, the Queen attempted to abrogate the constitution and proclaim a new one, which would have restored the ancient despotic rights of the throne, and would have trampled under foot all further semblance of liberty in Hawaii, the respectable, conservative, and property interests of the country, without any prior meeting or plans, simply arose in protest and to defend their rights. From what I saw, I have no hesitation in saying that the Queen's act in attempting to abrogate the constitution and promulgate a new one brought about the revolution.

The condition of the country was then very critical, politically and

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financially. The latter, because that the solid moneyed people of the country had lost all confidence in the Government, which was not then able to meet demands against it, particularly withdrawals from the postal Savings bank, which were increasing until there was almost a panic; and politically, because the course of the Queen during the whole course of the legislative session had been such as to cause a total loss of confidence of nearly the whole of the white portion of the Legislature and of the business people of the community.

For ten days prior to noon of Saturday, January 14, the day that the Queen attempted her revolutionary act, the U.S.S. Boston with Minister Stevens on board had not been in port. There had been no revolutionary meetings or conferences; such a thing had not been thought of. There had not been any consultation with Minister Stevens with regard to the matter, though of course he must have seen what a perilous condition the country was getting into. There were several meetings at the office of W.O. Smith, that day after the attempted promulgation of the new constitution. I was not present at the first impromptu gathering; at that meeting I was named as one of the committee of safety. A telephonic message was sent to me to meet the committee that evening, and again we met at his office. The only business done besides talking over matters was the appointment of the committee to canvass and report what arms and ammunition and how many men could be secured.

Another committee was appointed, of which I was a member, to call upon Minister Resident John L. Stevens to discuss the situation. We went at once and talked over the whole matter, and we asked what his course would be should we take possession of the Government and declare a Provisional Government. Mr. Stevens replied that if we obtained possession of the Government building and the archives and established a Government, and became in fact the Government, he should of course recognize us. The matter of landing the troops from the Boston was not mentioned at that meeting.

The next meeting of the committee of safety was held at W. R. Castle's house, where we were in session a good part of the day. We reported the result of our conference and received the report of the committee on arms and ammunition; after further discussion of the situation, we finally decided to call a mass meeting, and thereby ascertain the exact sentiment of the community.

The next meeting of the committee was at Thurston's office, Monday morning, at 9 o'clock. During its session Marshal Wilson came and warned us not to hold a mass meeting. Some negotiations had been going on between members of the Queen's cabinet and Mr. Thurston, on behalf of the committee of safety, of which I knew nothing except the fact of such conference; but at that meeting I was appointed one of a committee to wait on the cabinet to receive their communication in answer to the matter discussed by them with Thurston. We went to the government building and met the cabinet; they stated that they declined any further negotiations. I asked Minister Parker what was the meaning of their calling a mass meeting at the same hour at which ours was called; he replied to keep people from going to your meeting. The mass meeting called by the committee was held at 2 o'clock, and, in spite of threats and opposition, was an immense and overwhelming affair, with but one sentiment, and that was to resist further aggression ol the Queen.

At the request of many citizens, whose wives and families were helpless and in terror of an expected uprising of the mob, which would burn and destroy, a request was made and signed by all of the committee,

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addressed to Minister Stevens, that troops might be landed to protect houses and private property. It was not presented until after the mass meeting. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon another meeting of the committee of safety was held, at which it was decided to make the attempt to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Provisional Government. Troops were landed about 5 p.m. from the Boston, about 150, 1 should think. A squad was stationed at the residence of the United States Minister, another at the consulate, and the remainder were lodged, after considerable delay in procuring suitable quarters, at Arion Hall. It seemed to be the only available building that night, and it was also a very central location without regard to any of the government buildings.

I was not present at the next meeting of the committee, which was held that Monday evening at the house of Henry Waterhouse. Another meeting of the committee of safety was held Tuesday morning, at which arangements were completed. The executive and advisory councils were appointed and the proclamation was prepared; it was well known through the town that we would attempt to take the Government that day; the plan was for the two councils to meet the volunteer forces at 3 p.m. at the Government building. We were assured of a force of at least 150 well-armed men at that time. At half past 2 o'clock a wagon loaded with guns and ammunition, on its way through the town to the point of rendezvous, was attacked by some policemen, who attempted to capture it. Our guard shot and wounded one of the police officers, whereupon they desisted and the arms and ammunition were duly delivered. The incident caused great excitement, during which the two councils proceeded to the Government building, getting there about twenty minutes ahead of our forces. On our arrival we asked for the cabinet, and were informed that they had gone to the station house.

We then took possession in the name of the Provisional Government, and the proclamation was then read at the front door. During the reading our forces began to arrive, and in a few minutes we had not less than 130 well-armed and determined men, and after that they continued to arrive all the rest of the day. We had been at the building but a short time when a messenger, Deputy Marshal Mehrtens, arrived from the station house. He asked President Dole to call on the cabinet at the station house for a conference. President Dole informed the messenger that he was at the headquarters of the Government, and if they wished any conference they would have to come there, and assured their messenger of their safety in coming, and stated that a military escort would be furnished if needed. Shortly after two of the ministers, Parker and Corwell I think, came up, followed soon by the other two. On learning that they had not read the proclamation, it was read to them, and a demand was made for the immediate surrender of the station house. It was then getting towards dark, and Parker said he would like to have the matter settled before night to avoid collisions in the street. He said, " I see you have a good many armed men here." He asked if, before giving the answer, they be allowed to confer with the Queen. President Dole said it would be allowed, provided representatives from the new Government were present, and Mr. Damon was sent with them.

Soon after reading the proclamation, notice was sent to all the foreign and diplomatic and other representatives stating the facts and asking that the new Government be recognized. Not very long after this, messengers from Minister Stevens came to see whether the new Government was actually in possession of the Government building,

-p810-

archives, etc. After satisfying themselves they retired. As nearly as I can recollect it must have been half past 5 o'clock when an answer from Minister Stevens arrived. The conference was then going on with the Queen, and his answer was not made known and published till after the surrender of the station-house, Queen, and barracks.

Some time between 4 and 5, I think, Capt. Wiltse, of the Boston, visited our headquarters, and he was asked if we would be recognized as the Government. He replied that he would not until we were in possession of the barracks and station-house and were actually the de facto Government.

During the whole of this affair, while it is true the United States forces were on shore, they in no way whatsoever assisted in our capture of the Government or in deposing the Queen. They did not even go out upon the streets; they were spectators merely, and it is very fortunate that their services were not required duriug the previous night. It seems to me very probable that had it not been for the restraining influence of their presence there might have been rioting. As it was, two incendiary fires were started.

A few days later I was sent to Washington as one of the annexation commissioners. I returned early in March, and I think Blount arrived on the 29th of that month. I called upon him and let him know that I was thoroughly acquainted with the incidents connected with the revolution, and would be very glad to furnish him with all the information within my power. Such information, however, has never been asked for, and I furnished no statement in any way to him.

Dated Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4, 1893.

W. C. Wilder.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.


AFFIDAVIT OF J. H. SOPER.

J. H. Soper, of Honolulu, Oahu, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is colonel commanding the national guard of Hawaii; that he has read the published extracts from the report of Col. Jas. H. Blount, late commissioner of the United States in Hawaii, and American minister resident; that certain statements in said report are incorrect and not founded on fact; that it is not true that affiant left the meeting of the citizen's committee held at Mr. Waterhouse's house in Honolulu, on the evening of January 16, 1893, either alone or in conrpany with any other members of the committee until the meeting adjourned; that he did not visit Mr. Stevens, American minister, alone or in company with others at any time on that day; that he did not report to said committee that he had full assurance from said Stevens that he, the latter, would back up the movement, nor did he report any remarks as coming from said Stevens; that he did look for recognition by said Stevens in case a de facto government was successfully established, but he was well aware that no assistance would be given by the American minister in establishing such de facto government.

And he further says that he furnished to Lieut. Bertollette, of the U.S.S. Boston, a full statement of the arms and ammunition surrendered by the Queen's followers to the Provisional Government, and also a

-p811-

statement of the arms and ammunition in the hands of the supporters of the Provisional Government prior to such surrender by the Queen; that the supporters of the Provisional Government had a larger number of effective rifles than had the Queen's followers; that at Mr. Blount's request he furnished to him a copy of said report on June 10, 1893; that Mr. Blount appears to have made no mention of the same in his findings; that the arms of the Provisional Government were in the hands of white men who knew how to use them, and about whose determination to use them there could be no question. That affiant informed Mr. Blount, as was the fact, that the chief reason for his hesitating to accept the appointment of colonel was that he had no previous military training.

Dated Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4, A.D. 1893.

Jno. H. Soper,

Colonel Commanding N.G.H.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,

Notary Public.


AFFIDAVIT OF ALBERT S. WILCOX.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

My name is Albert S. Wilcox; was born on the island of Hawaii in the year 1844; my parents were American missionaries. I reside on the island of Kauai; served as a representative from Kauai in the Legislature during four sessions; was a member of the Legislature of 1892. On Saturday, the 14th of January last, I attended a meeting of the citizens of Honolulu at the law office of W.0. Smith. I distinctly remember John F. Colburn, then minister of the interior, being present at that meeting, and hearing him state to that meeting, in substance, that the Queen was intending to force a new constitution, and that she had already attempted to force the cabinet to agree to it; that they had escaped or got away from the palace and desired the assistance of the citizens to oppose her attempt.

A committee of safety of thirteen was appointed at that meeting, of which committee I was a member. That committee met that afternoon late and considered the situation. I attended a meeting of the same committee the next morning at the residence of W.R. Castle. The situation of public affairs was such that it was apparent to my mind, and I am confident that it was apparent to the mind of every member of the committee, that the Queen's Government could no longer preserve the public peace and had not the power to protect life and property, and that it was incumbent upon the citizens of Honolulu immediately to take measures to counteract her revolutionary conduct and to establish a government in the interest of law and order. At that meeting I resigned my position as a member of the committee, deeming that my interests on the island of Kauai required my personal attendance there, and that my place on that committee could be better filled by a permanent resident of Honolulu. At no time did I hear any proposition or suggestion to the effect that Minister Stevens or the United States forces would assist either in the overthrow of the monarchy or in the establishment of the Provisional Government.

I wish to state now that I served in the different sessions of the

-p812-

Hawaiian Legislature for no other reason than because I wished to do all that I could to assist the Hawaiian race, for whom I have great personal regard and aloha, in preserving if possible, a national government. I had an earnest desire to sustain the Hawaiian national institution. As I went through those sessions I was slowly convinced against my will of the difficulties of maintaining a monarchy, but it was not until the last revolutionary act of the Queen that I became convinced that a Hawaiian monarchy was inconsistent with the preservation of peace and prosperity and the protection of property in the islands. Until then I had never been an advocate of annexation to the United States, but had been opposed to it and had done all in my power to make it unnecessary.

I observed the landing of the United States forces on Monday evening; it was not done in pursuance of any request that I made myself, but I understood then that they were landed for the purpose of protecting the property and lives of Americans, but in no respect for the purpose of assisting the committee of safety.

Albert S. Wilcox.

Subscribed aud sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF C. BOLTE.

C. Bolte, of Honolulu, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he was born in Bremen, in Germany, and is 41 years of age.

That he resided in Germany until 1878, when he came to Honolulu, where he has ever since resided.

That he is vice-president of the firm of M.S. Grinbaum & Company, a mercantile corporation, which has continuously existed as a firm and corporation, and has done business in Honolulu since 1866.

That he was interviewed by Mr. James H. Blount, American minister resident in June, 1893. That during this interview, on several occasions, he objected to the method employed by said Blount, and he remonstrated with him that he did not put his questions fairly. That said Blount asked his questions in a very leading form, and that on several occasions when affiant attempted to more fully express his meaning said Blount would change the subject and proceed to other matters.

That affiant, seeing that in his testimony the Queen, and the Government under the Queen, were being confounded, prepared a statement, a copy of which is as follows, and handed the same to said Blount in June last, and requested him to insert it in his report in the proper place; affiant at present being ignorant whether this was done or not.

"The answers which I have given to Mr. Blount's questions, 'When was for the first time anything said about deposing or dethroning the Queen' might lead to misunderstanding in reading this report. I desire, therefore, to hereby declare as follows: Words to the effect that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not uttered to my knowledge at any meeting of the committee of safety until Monday evening, January 16, 1893; but at the very first meeting of citizens at W. O. Smith's office on Saturday, January 14, at about 2 p. m., or even before this meeting had come to order, Paul Neumann informed the arriving people that the Queen was about to promulgate a new constitution. The answer then given him by Mr. W. C. Wilder, by me, and by

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others, was: That is a very good thing and a splendid opportunity to get rid of the whole old rotten Government concern and now to get annexation to the United States. Paul Neumann thought that that might be going a little too far.

"At the second meeting at W. O. Smith's, between 3 and 4 p. m. on Saturday afternoon, January 14, 1893, when the committee of safety was appointed, sentiments of the same nature, that this is a splendid opportunity to get rid of the old regime, and strong demands for annexation, or any kind of stable government under the supervision of the United States, were expressed

"Therefore, even if the words that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not spoken, surely the sentiment that this must be done prevailed at or even before the very first meeting, on January 14, 1893.

"Honolulu, June 1893.
"C. Bolte."
Dated Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4,1893.
C. Bolte.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE N. WILCOX.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss.

My name is George N. Wilcox; I was born on the island of Hawaii in the year 1839 of American parents, who were missionaries in the Hawaiian Islands. My home since early childhood has been upon the island of Kauai. I was a representative from Kauai in the Legislature of 1880, and have since, as an elected Noble from the island of Kauai, served in four different sessions of the Legislature. In November of 1892 I was appointed by the Queen a member of her cabinet as minister of the interior, and remained such until by a majority vote of one of the Legislature the cabinet of which I was a member went out of office, on the 12th day of January last. On the 14th day of January last I was present in the afternoon at a meeting of the citizens of Honolulu in the law offices of W. O. Smith, where I learned from John F. Colburn, then the minister of the interior, that the Queen had attempted to force a new constitution, and that her ministers had refused to sign it and were ready to resist her attempt if the citizens would join in assisting them in their opposition.

The committee of safety was chosen at that meeting to take steps to preserve the public peace and secure the maintenance of law and order against the revolutionary acts of the sovereign. Up to that time I had, to the best of my ability, tried to sustain and support the Hawaiian monarchy, and especially in the interests of the Hawaiians to keep a clean and honest Government. Holding public office was something which was contrary to my personal wishes and interests; I had no personal objects to accomplish and no friends whose interests I sought to further, my sole desire being to help, as far as I could, to preserve the institutions of Hawaii; and it was not until that Saturday that I felt that the monarchy was no longer practicable, or able either to sustain itself or to be sustained by the intelligence of the country. No statement

-p814-

was made to me, nor was I aware that either Minister Stevens or Capt. Wiltse would assist or did assist the citizens of Honolulu in establishing the Provisional Government, or in overthrowing the monarchy. It was evident to me that the overthrow of the monarchy was due to its own inherent rottenness.

G.N. Wilcox.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN EMMELUTH.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

John Emmeluth, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows, to wit: I was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, and came to this country in February, 1878, and have been here since that time engaged in my business of tinsmith and plumber. I have accumulated some property and am married to a resident of the islands. I was nominated a member of the committee of public safety and was appointed one of the advisory council of the Provisional Government.

I know James H. Blount from seeing him once when I called with other members of the advisory council. The visit was never returned. He never said anything to me about the country, its resources, or history, or asked me any questions about the revolution. I tendered my statement through Mr. S.M. Damon, and understood that I would be notified when Mr. Blount was ready, but never heard anything from him.

Prior to the 14th of January I had become aware that a new constitution was to be promulgated and of the tenor of it by reason of a conversation between Arthur Peterson and John F. Colburn that I accidentally overheard in the office of John F. Colburn while I was waiting for his brother, the drayman. I stepped to the rear entrance of the warehouse, which is immediately adjoining his little private office, and while standing there I overheard Arthur Peterson remark to Colburn that the Queen had decided to promulgate a new constitution and that she would have no minister that would not agree to signing it and assisting in its promulgation, and that if he, Colburn, were agreeable to that that under the circumstances he could have the portfolio of minister of the interior.

This was on the Thursday previous to the announcement of that Colburn-Peterson cabinet. Colburn asked Peterson who the other members of the cabinet would be, and he told him Sam Parker and Billy Cornwell. Colburn agreed to go into that cabinet under those circumstances, and Peterson told him to go to the Queen with as little delay as possible and tell her that he was willing to go under that arrangement. I went back to my store, and standing in the front door within three minutes after Colburn came out in his brake, drove up along Nuuana to Merchant and up Merchant street, which leads to the palace. That was the last I saw of him that day. On the afternoon of the 14th, after the prorogation, it was noised about the town that the constitution would be promulgated. During the early part of the day I saw the members of the committee of the Hui Kalaaina that were to carry the constitution to the Queen to be signed.

Among the supposed members of that committee of the Hui Kalaaina

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I recognized at least twelve of the Queen's personal retainers, and the rest of them were men so old and decrepit that they would not know what they were doing in a matter so important, and there was not a solitary member of that committee that could have stated any ten good reasons why he wanted a new constitution, and I felt in my mind at the time that it was a crime to permit anything of that kind to go on. I was very busy that day my line of work, and about 2 o'clock, in going out to Waikiki, I saw the crowd gathering and heard that they were discussing the matter of promulgating the constitution, and on my way back I came in on horseback. Just as I got to the palace gate the Queen stepped out on the balcony upstairs and addressed the natives that were gathered in the grounds there.

They came together, and I rode on horseback about half way into the yard, sufficiently far in to hear what she had to say, and in Hawaiian she addressed them and told them that owing to the perfidy of her ministers she was unable to give what they and she so much cherished, but that she would guarantee them that within the following week they should have the constitution. I was not aware at that time that there had been any meeting of citizens. Not until I was on my way home I met Judge Hartwell and he told me of it. The following morning I was told that there was to be a meeting at the house of W. R. Castle, and that I was expected to be there. I went over and had a conversation with Mr. Thurston at the time, and spoke of the situation. At a meeting later in the day I attended, and from that time on became an active participant.

The committee of public safety had as a basis for organization the different companies of the old Honolulu Rifles. Taking them as a basis they worked up the membership by taking the old lists and finding as many as were in town of the old members and getting their consent to work for the cause. Company A is the only one I can speak of; every member of the old company under Capt. Ziegler that was at hand signified his willingness to stand by this movement. The membership, if I recollect Capt. Ziegler's conversation, was 63 at the time of disbanding, and of the 63, 60 reported for duty. There never was at any time any anticipation on the part of the committee as a whole or of myself or any of the other members, to my knowledge, that the forces of the Boston were to land for the purpose of assisting the committee.

After we had seized the Government building and while the proclamation was being read, Company A drew up in line on each side of the building. Members of Company B, if I recollect right, came up in front and a third company in the rear of building; in all, I should say, about 180 men arrived within the five minutes. Of Company A everyone had his arms, his Springfield rifle, and the other companies were armed with private weapons and such as they could gather together, but they were all armed, all of those 180 men. A little after the reading of the proclamation the committee retired into the office of the minister of the interior and there congregated around the large table. I don't remember in what order they came, but among the business transacted was the sending out of notices to the different representatives of the foreign powers of the establishment of a government de facto.

There was an order issued to close the saloons. I forget what time martial law was declared. I doubt if I could give the events in the succession in which they occurred. I remember the individual instances. I distinctly recollect young Pringle coming in there and taking observations. I remember Lieut. Lucien Young coming in there,

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and late in the evening I remember Capt. Wiltse calling on us. During the interval I remember Deputy Marshal Mehrtens coming in—that was a very short time after the Government was organized—with a request that the Government should go down to the station house aud meet the cabinet down there. They declined to do that, but sent a committee consisting of Sam Damon and C. Bolte to the station house. That committee afterwards returned with Sam Parker and Billy Cornwell.

Sam Parker and Billy Cornwell came in there and after a conversation they in company with Sam Damon, if my memory serves me right, went over to the palace to see the Queen. I am quite sure that Bolte didn't go with them on that errand. Sam Damon was the only one that went on that errand. Sam Damon returned after a time and it was then given out that the Queen had agreed to surrender under protest and that she would give instructions for the station house and the barracks to be given up to the Provisional Government. In the meantime we removed to the minister of finance's offices, and it was there that Sam Nowlein, in command of the Queen's military, late at night— it must have been 8 or 9 o'clock—reported to President Dole, and the President told him to keep his men together and all arms inside the barracks for the night; nothing should be disturbed, and he should simply carry on their routine duties within the inclosure for that night. Nowlein asked whether he would mount guard as usual in the palace inclosure, and he was told no.

The reason why I fail to recollect much of what transpired there was from early in the day, that is, very soon after our getting into the building, we agreed that all conversation should be conducted by Mr. Dole himself in order to prevent a confusion of ideas, and for that reason I did not store up things as rigidly as I might have done if I had a personal say in the matter. I was busy outside about the organization of our forces. I met a number of Company A, and as soon as Company A entered the building I went out and found the old stand-bys of 1887 and 1889 and had a conversation with them. They were all ready for doing any duty that was required of them, they were well armed and had ample ammunition.

I consider that the trend of things for twelve years back to my recollection has all been in the direction of the revolution, for the reasons of the corruptness of the Government; the debaucheries and social infamies that were being practiced constantly in and about the palace. I saw that those things could not go on in a community that claimed to be Christian, such a thing could only reach a certain state where public safety and the best interests of the nation would demand reform. From my knowledge of things and my observation of the workings of the monarchy I was thoroughly satisfied that it was only a matter of time when a different form of government would have to be established here, and very soon after my coming here I came to the conclusion that these Islands rightfully and justly belonged, on the point of both their dependence and proximity to the United States, I felt that they were a part and parcel of the American States, and I have been an annexationist for the last twelve years.

Insertion and corrections made by—

John Emmeluth.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

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AFFIDAVIT OF F. W. McCHESNEY.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

F. W. McChesney, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I was born in Iowa, came to Honolulu in 1885, where I have since been engaged as a partner in the house of M. W. McChesney & Son in the wholesale grocery and feed business established in 1879, doing a large volume of business. I was a member of the committee of public safety and of the advisory council of the Provisional Government up to a few days prior to June 28th, 1893, on which day I went to the United States for a visit.

I saw James H. Blount land at Honolulu, but never met him nor had any conversation with him.

I signed a roll with other citizens in the office of W. O. Smith on the afternoon of Saturday, January 14, 1893, pledging myself as a special police officer in support of the cabinet against the proposed aggression of the Queen, and was in the same office at the meeting of citizens when the committee of public safety was appointed. There was talk at the meeting of the committee at W.R. Castle's, on the next (Sunday) morning, of having resolutions abrogating the monarchy and pronouncing for annexation, offered at the mass meeting; but it was decided to keep within bounds, while matters were to be made perfectly plain. It was reported by Mr. Thurston that the Queen's cabinet had gone back on us, so we decided to proceed without them.

I never understood at any time that the United States troops would fight our battles; they might come ashore to protect life and property and all of those who wanted to go to them during the rumpus, but they were not going to do any fighting for us. I thought we could overturn the Government on short notice after getting our men and arms together and then after our new Government was formed they would recognize us and protect us if any armed force was needed.

The committee of safety had taken pains to investigate the force opposed to us and found that the Queen had only 80 men at the barracks and that Wilson had about 125 regulars with possibly 75 special police, among whom were only about 12 or 15 white men, and the forces surrendered showed these to be facts.

Had fighting actually been necessary we would have had 600 men armed and with plenty of ammunition.

The committee agreed to go up to the Government building at 3 o'clock, and broke up at 2:30, when the shot was fired on the corner of King and Fort streets, and we said: "Now is the time to go." For it seemed as though the fighting would begin, so we all started at once. I jumped into a hack and went home for my pistol, and got back just as the others were entering the yard. They all walked up in plain view, and were pretty close together. When we first got into the building, after the proclamation was read, about 25 or 30 men of Ziegler's company came from the old armory, and then we adjourned to the minister of the interior's room to start up the new Government. We had sent word round to the different squads we had ready and waiting to be at the Government building at 3 o'clock. We counted on 100 men. But we got there ahead of time—at fifteen minutes before three—and after that they came in pretty thick; so that we must have had 150 men there. We addressed letters to the different ministers asking them to recognize us. To this letter Mr. Stevens sent an aid down (Mr. Pringle) to see if we actually had possession. Mr. Dole said: "You see we have

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----52

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possession, and have troops here to protect us." Then he took a look around, and politely bowed and left.

During this time we had sent for the old cabinet and they came in. They sent word that they were afraid to come, but we sent word that everything was perfectly safe, so Cornwell and Colburn came, then the other two. We told them what had been done and gave them a copy of the proclamation and demanded the surrender of the Queen and the station house and barracks. They asked for time to go and see Her Majesty. We positively refused to let their guards patrol the town during the night. Mr. Damon went with them to the palace. We refused to let them have time until the next day.

During all this time, in response to our call for volunteers, they were coming in pretty thick, and presently word came back from the palace that the Queen surrendered, but wanted ten minutes' time for Marshal Wilson to get out of the station house; a protest came, too, which Mr. Dole received. Captain Wiltse came in just before the surrender, and said he had come to see if we had possession. He said, "Have you got possession of the palace, barracks, and the station house?" Mr. Dole said, "No, not yet; we are now arranging that." "Well," he says, "you must have them before we can recognize you as a power; we can not recognize you when there is another Government across the street." While he was speaking a tap came on the door and the others were returning with the Queen's surrender.

About this time Mr. Stevens's recognition came, and then Mr. Wodehouse, the British minister, came to see if we had possession and what we were doing. We told him and gave him a copy of the proclamation.

Then we went ahead getting ready for the night. We tried to get things in shape before dark as near as we could. I recollect I came out just before dark when we were talking about preparing for the night in case of trouble, as it had been threatened that the town would be burned. We began getting guards to go out over town, and as I looked around I counted at least 150 men there. Before dark we sent 20 men to the police station with Capt. Ziegler. There were so many things happening between 15 minutes to 3 until dark that it is hard to tell what came first.

During our meetings from the 14th to the 17th we had been looking up men, arms, and ammunition, and in every meeting had reports. We had figured up about 200 of the old Honolulu Rifles besides from 400 to 600 citizens that would shoulder a gun if it became necessary. We had to make estimates, as we could not expect to succeed without backing. We counted on those men as ready in squads around town to be at the building at 3 o'clock.

As to the causes which led to the revolution at the time the Jones cabinet was fired I know positively, for I was on the street all the time, that there was awful indignation about it all over town, and the question was raised then as to what would become of the country, and that the citizens would have to take care of themselves, something would have to be done. I took part in the revolutions of 1887 and 1889 both. It was always the brains and moneyed men of the country against the King and the ignorant. The best class of people took part in all three revolutions. They started the revolution of 1887, and they defeated the revolution of 1880, protecting the King when they thought he was trying to do what was right. When the news came that this Queen had tried to give us a new constitution I knew that the good citizens would have to take hold and do something.

At the time the Queen adjourned the Legislature in the way she did

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I first got the idea of actually starting in and using force to dethrone her. As soon as that kind of talk became general we began to hear threats of having our property burned. We called on the minister to bring the troops ashore to protect lile and property, by which we meant to prevent any fires which we expected and had been threatened.

We never agreed in council nor was the question ever brought up that the Provisional Government would join with the Queen in submitting a controversy to the Government of the United States. The controversy was settled then and there when the Queen surrendered.

F. W. McChesney.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of December, A. D. 1893

[SEAL.]

Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.


WASHINGTON, D. C, January 15,1894.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: The chairman (Senator MOrgan) and Senators Gray and Frye.

Absent: Senators Butler and Sherman.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF PROF. WILLIAM DEWITT ALEXANDER.

The Chairman. I want to ask you some questions about your supreme court. I do not know whether in your constitutional paper you have said anything about the supreme court.

Mr. Alexander. Yes; I have.

The Chairman. The supreme court consists of five judges?

Mr. Alexander. Three at present.

The Chairman. Is that the law at the present time?

Mr. Alexander. At present.

The Chairman. It has been changed from five to three?

Mr. Alexander. In 1880 the law was passed increasing the membership of the supreme court bench to five, and afterward a law was passed which provided that no vacancy should be filled until the membership was reduced to three, and that it should remain at three.

The Chairman. Has the membership been reduced to three?

Mr. Alexander. Yes. At the last session of the legislature a bill was passed reorganizing the courts on a new plan.

The Chairman. And provision was made in that law for the supreme court?

Mr. Alexander. The supreme court in the last bill was made a final court of appeal, and provided that no judge should have a case to come before him in which he had previously sat.

The Chairman. Does the supreme court consist of a chief justice?

Mr. Alexander. And two associate justices. Before that the supreme court judges held circuit courts, and there was complaint about that.

Senator Gray. On the ground that it was an appeal from Caesar to Caesar?

Mr. Alexander. Yes; they abolished that system.

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The Chairman. Who were the supreme court judges of Hawaii?

Mr. Alexander. A. F. Judd, R. F. Bickerton, and W. Frear. The first is chief justice and the other two are associate justices. They are in for life—good behavior. They can be impeached.

The Chairman. Mr. Dole, the present President of the Government, was a member of that court?

Mr. Alexander. Yes; he resigned.

The Chairman. Did he resign during the reign of Liliuokalani?

Mr. Alexander. Yes; the last day of her reign, or the day of the revolution.

The Chairman. On the 14th or 16th of January?

Mr. Alexander. I think it was the morning of the 17th.

The Chairman. To whom did he address his resignation, to the Queen?

Mr. Alexander. To the cabinet.

The Chairman. Are you positive about that?

Mr. Alexander. No.

The Chairman. It was to Liliuokalani or her cabinet?

Mr. Alexander. Undoubtedly.

The Chairman. He did not resign to the Dole Government?

Mr. Alexander. No.

The Chairman. You are sure of that?

Mr. Alexander. I think so; but that is rather an inference on my part. The fact can be accurately ascertained. The new Government had not been organized. I think there is reason for believing it was to the old government that he resigned.

The Chairman. Did Mr. Dole's resignation leave 3 judges on the bench?

Mr. Alexander. No ; it would leave 2.

The Chairman. You have just stated that the court consisted of three members, and you gave their names.

Mr. Alexander. The question, then, is when Frear came on to the supreme court bench.

The Chairman. Did Frear take Dole's place?

Mr. Alexander. I think he did; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Who appointed him?

Mr. Alexander. Frear had been appointed during the Queen's reign to the position of circuit judge when Jones and his colleague were ministers.

The Chairman. The Wilcox cabinet?

Mr. Alexander. Yes; I think they appointed him circuit judge.

The Chairman. When did Frear become a supreme court judge?

Mr. Alexander. He was appointed to take Mr. Dole's place.

The Chairman. By the House?

Mr. Alexander. By the present government, I think.

The Chairman. I would like to have those facts accurately, if I can get them.

Mr. Alexander. I can verify it when I go home.

The Chairman. I wish you would; I would like to get those things down right. Have you any knowledge of a case where a clerk of the supreme court was removed because of disloyalty?

Mr. Alexander. I have heard of a case.

The Chairman. Who is the party?

Mr. Alexander. F. Wunderberg.

The Chairman. Is he a man who had been previously connected with some of these political affairs?

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Mr. Alexander. Yes; he took an active part in this last revolution.

The Chairman. On which side?

Mr. Alexander. On the side of the revolution. He was one of the committee of safety. He was employed to look up arms.

The Chairman. Is there any other person of his name who has been connected with these political affairs?

Mr. Alexander. No; he was tried before the court on this charge.

The Chairman. Before what court?

Mr. Alexander. The supreme court.

The Chairman. Was he the clerk of the supreme court?

Mr. Alexander. He was clerk of the supreme court.

Senator Gray. When was he tried?

Mr. Alexander. Well, it was recently.

The Chairman. Under the Dole government?

Mr. Alexander. Yes.

Senator Frye. It was treason under the Dole government?

Mr. Alexander. Yes. He had a hearing before the court, and I think he had an attorney. I think C. W. Ashford assisted him as attorney. The case was argued before the court.

Senator Gray. What was the result of the trial?

Mr. Alexander. I know the judges removed him.

The Chairman. For disloyalty to the Dole government?

Mr. Alexander. Yes.

The Chairman. Was some one appointed in his place?

Mr. Alexander. Yes; but I am not certain now who it was.

Senator Gray. What sort of trial was it? Do you mean it was an indictment for a criminal offense, treason, and regularly prosecuted?

Mr. Alexander. No; I think it was not a trial.

Senator Gray. It was an examination before the judges, who had the power of appointment to that position, for the purpose of determining whether they would remove Mr. Wunderberg—that sort of trial.

Mr. Alexander. Yes. Then he said he must have a public hearing, a chance to defend himself in open court. I think it was not a criminal trial.

Senator Gray. Do you know Mr. Wunderberg personally?

Mr. Alexander. Yes.

Senator Gray. How old a man is he?

Mr. Alexander. I should think he was 40.

Senator Gray. Is he the man whom the Provisional Government offered to make collector of customs?

Mr. Alexander. Yes.

The Chairman. The information in that case was printed in the newspapers in Honolulu?

Mr. Alexander. I think so.

Senator Gray. Was Mr. Wunderberg a man of good character?

Mr. Alexander. He was a man who was honest in business matters— financial matters.

Senator Gray. Did he bear a good reputation for honesty in the community in which he lived?

Mr. Alexander. I think he had a fair reputation for honesty; he had been politically a singular man.

Senator Gray. I am not talking about that. I know you gentlemen have very intense feelings in politics. Separating that entirely, is his character for honesty and fair dealing between man and man good or bad?

Mr. Alexander. I think it was.

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Senator Gray. You think it was good? Am I to understand you as saying that?

Mr. Alexander. Yes; I think so. He had been on several different sides; he changed sides several times in politics.

The Chairman. Is there any method of contesting the election in Hawaii for members of the Parliament or Legislature; any way provided by law?

Mr. Alexander. For contesting elections?

Mr. Alexander. Yes.

The Chairman. Those questions are decided by the House?

Mr. Alexander. Yes.

The Chairman. By the house to which the man claims to be elected, or by both houses in conjunction?

Mr. Alexander. I do not quite understand you.

The Chairman. Is the vote as to the qualification of a member, his election to a seat, taken in the house of nobles, if he claim election as a noble, or the house of representatives, if he claim election as a representative?

Mr. Alexander. Both, I think; they act as one chamber.

The Chairman. Both houses vote in cases of contested elections?

Mr. Alexander. Yes.

Senator Gray. They vote separately?

Mr. Alexander. No, they sit together.

The Chairman. Is the vote called separately?

Mr. Alexander. Called separately for the nobles and representatives.

Senator Gray. But they do not count separately; it is hotch-potch.

Mr. Alexander. That was fixed in the constitution of 1864, and they allowed it to remain. I have verified the statement I made about the supreme court. Hon. Walter Frear was appointed judge of the first circuit of Oahu by the Wilcox-Jones ministry in December, 1892; Hon. S. B. Dole resigned his position on the bench of the supreme court on the morning of January 17, 1893, placing his resignation in the hands of Sam Parker, the then premier.

Adjourned to meet on Wednesday, the 17th instant, at 10 o'clock.


WASHINGTON, D. C, Wednesday, January 17, 1894.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Gray, Sherman, and Frye.

Absent: Senator Butler.

SWORN STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COMMANDER W. T. SWINBURNE.

The Chairman. What is your age and rank in the Navy?

Mr. Swinburne. I am 46 years of age, and am lieutenant-commander in the U. S. Navy.

The Chairman. You were attached to the ship Boston at the time of her visit to Honolulu, in 1892?

Mr. Swinburne. I was; I was executive officer of the Boston up to the 29th of April, 1893.

The Chairman. When did the Boston arrive in the harbor?

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Mr. Swinburne. I am not precise as to that date; either the 23d or 24th of August, 1892.

The Chairman. You left her there when you were detached?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. Had you been in Hawaii before that?

Mr. Swinburne. Many years before. I stopped there in 1870, when returning from a cruise in the Pacific in the Kearsarge.

The Chairman. Did you spend much time in Hawaii?

Mr. Swinburne. Only a week.

The Chairman. Between your visits did you discover that there was much progress made in Hawaii?

Mr. Swinburne. Very great progress; the town had grown enormously; in every way a great change in the place.

The Chairman. When you got back to Honolulu in 1892 what, in your opinion, was the condition of the people there as to quietude and the peaceful conduct of their industries and enterprises and associations?

Mr. Swinburne. Everything seemed to be perfectly quiet. The Legislature was in session, and the principal topic of conversation among the people was the prospective lottery bill. Everybody seemed to be much exercised over the lottery bill, which was a bill about to be presented to the Legislature, granting a charter to certain men to establish a lottery, or, at least, these men had the right to control all lotteries in the islands, and for that right they were to pay, my recollection is, something like $500,000 a year, and lay a cable between the United States and Honolulu. The Legislature, as I say, was in session; the Queen at that time had a ministry in power who were assumed to be favorable to the lottery scheme and some other schemes which she favored, and the majority of the citizens—when I speak of citizens I mean the white citizens or the moneyed interests of the place—opposed. The principal topic of conversation on shore was the necessity of having a responsible ministry, so that foreign capital might be attracted there. Business was very dull.

I remember one interest in particular which people were hoping might be established there—the extension of the railroad around the island of Oahu. Gen. Willey, from San Francisco, during the time I was there and some time before January, visited the island in the interest of a British syndicate. He was favorably and hopefully impressed with the whole situation, but timid on the subject of the insecure— not exactly the insecure, but the want of responsibility in the ministry. The people talked of hard times, and seemed to feel that something was necessary to attract money, to make capital come there and help them. The Legislature dragged on; one ministry was deposed; that is, a vote of want of confidence was brought in against this ministry of the Queen; another was appointed, and a vote of want of confidence was brought against them. Finally, after quite a length of time a ministry in every way favorable to business interests and to all the commercial interests of the place, known as the Wilcox-Jones ministry, was appointed by the Queen. Everybody seemed to be satisfied with it, and everything looked hopeful. In fact, my own personal opinion is that if the Wilcox-Jones ministry had remained in the Queen would have been on the throne to-day. Everybody was satisfied with the Wilcox-Jones ministry. They were opposed to the lottery bill.

The Chairman. Were they voted out?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. On the 1st of January Capt. Wiltse began to talk about his target practice; we had no target practice for nine

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months. Minister Stevens was anxious to visit Hilo and other places on the islands, and would not have another opportunity, as he expected to go home in April, and he thought that would be a good opportunity to visit Hawaii, which he had not seen.

The Chairman. You mean the island of Hawaii?

Mr. Swinburne. The island of Hawaii. I said to the captain: "It seems to me it is rather risky for us to leave the island at this time; the legislature will hardly remain in session more than two or three weeks longer, and we have stayed here now four months; it seems to me it is not worth while to go just now." The captain said: "The Wilcox-Jones ministry can not be voted out; I am certain of that; I have looked at the situation, and I am satisfied the Queen can not get votes enough to bring in a vote of want of confidence; besides that, the minister has looked into the situation, and you do not think he would leave the island if the Wilcox-Jones ministry could be ousted?" I said nothing more about it. We sailed to Hilo on the 4th of January, and finished up our target practice in Lahaina on the evening of the 13th.

The Chairman. There was no appearance of agitation at that time?

Mr. Swinburne. Not the slightest; everything looked perfectly safe. On the evening of the 13th we anchored off Lahaina, intending to get under way at midnight and return to Honolulu. I went to bed early, because I had to be up at midnight, and when I got up at midnight I heard that a steamer had arrived from Honolulu and brought some papers. I picked them up and, much to my surprise, found that the lottery and opium bills had been passed and the Wilcox-Jones ministry voted out. Of course everybody was quite taken aback; still we did not anticipate any particular trouble.

The Chairman. Before you got this intelligence from the little island steamer were you aware of the existence of any plot, scheme, conspiracy, or combination for the purpose of dethroning the Queen or for the purpose of annexing the islands to the United States?

Mr. Swinburne. None at all.

The Chairman. It never occurred to you?

Mr. Swinburne. It never occurred to me. If that ministry had remained in, or an equally responsible ministry had been put in, everything could have remained as it was. Of course there was an immense opposition on the part of the foreign population to this lottery bill.

The Chairman. By foreign population do you mean the white population?

Mr. Swinburne. The white population.

The Chairman. Whether they were citizens or not?

Mr. Swinburne. Citizens or not.

The Chairman. They were all called foreigners?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. Those born in the islands are spoken of as Hawaiians, as a rule. In fact, an enormous petition was sent to the Queen, signed by the white ladies of the island, which petition was spoken of as the "mothers' petition." It was against this lottery bill.

The Chairman. When you got back to Honolulu—got into the harbor— how long did Minister Stevens remain aboard the vessel?

Mr. Swinburne. He could not have remained aboard more than an hour. In fact, so soon as it was convenient to get a boat off, he left. I do not think it could have been an hour.

The Chairman. Do you know whether Minister Stevens' daughter came out for him?

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Mr. Swinburne. Yes; his daughter came out; and my impression is Mr. Severance came on board.

The Chairman. He is the consul-general?

Mr. Swinburne. He is the consul-general.

The Chairman. Did the young lady, Miss Stevens, come on board?

Mr. Swinburne. No.

The Chairman. You are sure Mr. Severance did?

Mr. Swinburne. I am pretty sure he did. Mr. Stevens went on shore in the captain's gig, and very shortly afterward Lieut. Young went ashore to represent the ship at the prorogation of the Parliament, which took place at noon.

The Chairman. That is the ceremony which the ship's officers were expected to participate in in conformity with the customs of Hawaii?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. Mr. Young was detailed to that duty by Capt. Wiltse.

The Chairman. Do you know how long it was after Mr. Stevens left the Boston on Saturday morning until he returned to the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. I do not remember to have seen him on board again until Monday afternoon, about 2 o'clock.

The Chairman. Being the executive officer of the ship, if Mr. Stevens had come on board, would you have known it?

Mr. Swinburne. Without a doubt, unless he should have come when I was on shore, and then Mr. Moore would have known it.

The Chairman. At the time he left the Boston, had you heard of any outbreak or hostile demonstration of any kind amongst the people in Honolulu?

Mr. Swinburne. None at all. But I knew from all the conversation during all these many months that the Legislature had been in session, about the passage of the lottery bill and the character of the new ministry, the people must be very much excited. They were a perfectly irresponsible set of men as ministers.

The Chairman. Do you remember whether any messengers came back to the ship from Lieut. Young, bearing messages to Capt. Wiltse in regard to the situation of affairs in Honolulu on Saturday?

Mr. Swinburne. I do not. I was very busy Saturday morning mooring the ship, getting her settled, and I do not recall now exactly what time Mr. Young returned, nor exactly what time he went ashore; but it was sometime before lunch, before 12 o'clock.

The Chairman. At what time did you commence making military preparations on board the Boston for the landing of troops?

Mr. Swinburne. On Saturday afternoon, at the usual time for making out the liberty lists. It is customary while in port to make out liberty lists before 12 o'clock on Saturday; that was their best day and I was so busy I could not attend to it; but immediately after lunch I went to the cabin to speak to the captain about the liberty list. He said, "Don't let any men go ashore at all; everything is in a chaotic state; I do not know when we will be called upon to protect property, and I do not want the men to leave the ship. Notify all the officers to return on board ship when a gun is fired." I was not very much surprised, because we had been there for months to protect property and American citizens.

The Chairman. You understood that was your purpose in the harbor there?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. For months?

Mr. Swinburne. For months; yes

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The Chairman. State the progress that was made in the preparations for landing troops.

Mr. Swinburne. Well, on Saturday nothing was done at all; on Sunday I had the same orders from the Captain—" No men to go ashore, and officers to return on board ship on the firing of a gun." On Sunday afternoon I went on shore myself. I went to the club, and I found that there was an immense amount of feeling, that there was a very distinct race feeling grown up; the white people felt that the new constitution which the Queen was about to promulgate on Saturday afternoon had created a great deal of feeling. I did not know what that new constitution was; nobody knew exactly; but it was freely talked of there that one clause disfranchised all white people not married to native women, and also that it gave the Queen complete and entire control of the ministry—to make it and unmake it as she saw fit. Those two clauses were talked about, and the Queen's manner in talking to the natives from the balcony showed that she was ready to fan into a flame every race prejudice she could.

The Chairman. You mean that was the feeling you found among the people?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. Some gentlemen I had not known to talk much about political subjects before that said to me, "You fellows got back here entirely too soon; if you had stayed away we could have settled this matter." They seemed to think our coming back prevented them. They said, " We could have settled this matter before you came back." I regarded the situation as very grave; that is, under the circumstances, with the Queen's attitude toward the foreigners and the manner of her own people as they were turned away from the palace that morning, and her stating to them that she would not give them the constitution, but would hold it until some better opportunity. i could see that the people were afraid of outbreaks, rioting.

The Chairman. What meaning did you understand to be conveyed by that statement made by citizens, "If you had not gotten back so soon we would have settled the matter?"

Mr. Swinburne. Why, that they would have deposed the Queen and had the whole business settled before we got there, as they were capable of doing.

The Chairman. That was on Sunday?

Mr. Swinburne. On Sunday.

The Chairman. Sunday afternoon?

Mr. Swinburne. Sunday afternoon. There was a distinct feeling of tension in the town; no doubt about it. In fact I know several gentlemen who moved their families from the town to Waikiki in the event of trouble. Mr. Hopper, who is an American, I think, and who lives within a block or two of the Queen's palace, he moved his family to Waikiki.

The Chairman. How far is that?

Mr. Swinburne. Two miles and a half; in the suburbs. He told me he thought there would be some trouble, and he removed his family.

The Chairman. To a place of greater security?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. So it went on all day Sunday and Sunday night.

The Chairman. Did you remain on shore Sunday night?

Mr. Swinburne. I did not remain on shore Sunday night. Of course, there was a great deal of talk; all the white people were very much excited, and it appeared as if there was likely to be an outbreak of some kind most any time.

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The Chairman. What time did you get back to the ship that evening?

Mr. Swinburne. I got back to dinner at 6 o'clock.

The Chairman. Did you have a conference with Capt. Wiltse when you got back?

Mr. Swinburne. No; Capt. Wiltse and I very rarely discussed the situation at all. In fact, if I remember aright, the only time I undertook to give any advice at all was the occasion of leaving the island, on the 4th of January.

The Chairman. Was Capt. Wiltse receiving communications on the subject from the shore?

Mr. Swinburne. Not that I am aware of. I think he was ashore himself. He used to go ashore a great deal, every afternoon. I think his custom was to go every afternoon.

The Chairman. Do you remember any messenger being sent from the U.S. legation or consulate to the ship to give information to Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Swinburne. No; I do not think I would have known. There was no reason for me to have known if they had come. The captain was on shore on Saturday and Sunday.

The Chairman. You remained on the ship on Monday as executive officer?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. On Monday morning I laid my plans to start out and give the ship a cleaning. We had been ten days away, and the ship was very dirty, and I expected to be all day at the job. By 10 o'clock I had the spars fairly cleaned, and about 11 o'clock, when the decks were covered with sand, the captain sent for me and said, "you had better make your preparations for lauding the battalion; have them ready at a moment's notice."

The Chairman. Are you aware of any communication having been received from the shore by Capt. Wiltse on that Monday morning which determined him to put his ship and his troops in condition for hostilities?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. Just before he gave me that order—I think about 11 o'clock, as nearly as I can remember—he sent for me. There was a gentleman in the cabin; I think it was Mr. Cooper, a man I had not seen before. The captain introduced me to him. He told me that Mr. Cooper had come from the—I may have dates mixed up; my impression is that Mr. Cooper had come with a message of some kind from the committee of safety. But what was the nature of his communication to the captain I do not know.

The Chairman. During that morning, and before the orders were given you to put the ship in condition for fighting, did you know of the arrival of any message or messenger from Mr. Stevens, the minister, or from Mr. Severance, the consul-general of the United States?

Mr. Swinburne. None whatever, only this man that I saw just before lunch time.

The Chairman. Being executive officer of the ship, if any messenger of that kind had come in from the legation or the consulate would you have known it?

Mr. Swinburne. Not necessarily.

The Chairman. But do you believe you would have known it?

Mr. Swinburne. That would depend very much on the gravity of the message. An ordinary message I would not have known at all; any message connected with the landing of the battalion I would have known very quickly. No preparation was made until after 11 o'clock on Monday morning, and the captain then told me to have everything

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in readiness for landing. I asked what he wanted. He said: "You had better take a gatling gun and a 37 millimeter." I said, "Two gatling guns would be better than a 37 millimeter;" and the captain said, "Take a 37 millimeter." I stopped the work of scrubbing, left it just where it stood, had the canteens filled and belts filled, and the caisson of the 37 millimeter filled. I had lowered the two heavy boats that took the guiis; and after dinner, 1 o'clock, had the guns lowered into the boats, so as to save time, and by half-past 2 I was practically ready for landing.

The Chairman. You took provisions along with you?

Mr. Swinburne. No provisions at all.

The Chairman. No tents?

Mr. Swinburne. We had no tents.

The Chairman. You did not know how long you would be detained on shore?

Mr. Swinburne. Not the slightest idea. The minister came on board at half past 2, or thereabouts. I knew there was to be a mass meeting of the citizens at half past 2, and I knew there was to be a counter mass meeting called by the Queen's party. My impression was, when I heard that in the morning, that the two meetings would probably bring the matter to a crisis.

Senator Turpie. You spoke of going to the club. What club was it?

Mr. Swinburne. It is known as the British Club. It is the foreign club of the place there. The first time I saw Mr. Cooper, I recollect now, was on Saturday. He came aboard to see the captain. My recollection is he came from Judge Hartwell to bring the news of the Queen's attempt to promulgate this new constitution. When this attempt was made and after the ministry had refused to aid her, two of them took the news to Judge Hartwell's office.

The Chairman. You are now telling what you were informed?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. The first time, as I stated before, that I saw Mr. Cooper, was this Saturday afternoon just after lunch.

The Chairman. When Cooper came on board the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. And my impression is that he was the same messenger who came on Monday morning and brought some message to the captain which decided him to have the troops in readiness.

The Chairman. Now, as I understand you, between the time you got the troops ready to go on shore, the caisson lowered into the boat, and other preparations made, and the time of your going on shore, Minister Stevens came on board?

Mr. Swinburne. Mr. Stevens came aboard. He arrived at about half past 2. I met him at the gangway with the captain, and walked as far as the cabin door. I did not go in. In about three-quarters of an hour or an hour afterwards the captain sent for me and said, " I want you to land with the battalion at 5 o'clock; as near 5 o'clock as possible." I suggested it would be a good idea to have supper before we went on shore; we could not get anything to eat afterward. The captain said, "Let the men have supper at 4 o'clock, and take some biscuits for the night." We had supper at 4 o'clock, and at half past 4 the men were organized in heavy marching order with a change of clothes and 80 rounds of ammunition—no baggage at all.

The Chairman. Before that occurred had Minister Stevens left the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. He had left the ship; yes. I think he left—I will not be certain but my impression is he left about 4 o'clock.

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The Chairman. Did you hear any interview between him and Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Swinburne. None at all, except that I suggested that it would be well to have all the company captains present to find out what the orders would be, as nearly as we could find out. At that meeting it was decided----

Senator Frye. Mr. Stevens was present?

Mr. Swinburne. Mr. Stevens was present. I asked where we were to go. Mr. Stevens said he did not know where we would be able to go; that he had not thought the matter over; that he would have to have some large building somewhere, and he thought the opera house would be a good place if we could get it. The opera house faces the palace. I said that my own desire and preference would be to be near the landing, because 1 would be nearer my base, and nearer the liquor shops. My idea was, if there was an outbreak of any kind, my first move would be to close all liquor stores, and if necessary leave a guard there, or nail them up, to prevent people from getting liquor. Mr. Stevens said he did not know of any building around the water front, but he thought we could get the opera house. Then be said: "By the way, there is a Mr. Atherton, an American, who lives down on King street; suppose you let the troops go on there." That was to the captain. So that that was finally decided upon in an unofficial sort of way. The captain said: "You can stop at the consulate and send half tbe marines to the minister's; detail an orderly sergeant in charge of the squad you send to the minister's; leave the other half in charge of Lieut. Draper at the consulate and march on, and by that time we will be able to tell you where you are to go." I said: " In the event of not getting any orders"—I wanted to get the men off the street so soon as possible—"I will go to Mr. Atherton's." The captain said: "Yes."

At 5 o'clock we landed. There was no demonstration, but there were a great many people about, the same as usual when we landed to drill, as we had done once a week. We arrived and marched up to the consulate; marched up King street past the palace. I was told afterward the Queen was standing on the balcony. We gave the salute. It was always the custom to give the royal salute on passing the palace, and we did on this occasion—the men at port arms, four flourishes of the trumpet, and the flag lowered—ordinary marching salute. We marched on a block beyond there, and then I halted and went into the house of Mr. Hopper and asked the privilege of using his telephone. I telephoned to the captain and asked if they had decided where we were to go. He said he had not. I then marched on to Mr. Atherton's, fully three blocks further, quite a distance down the street. Mr. Atherton said he had no objection to our coming in there—he had large grounds—and we marched in, stacked arms, established sentries, and settled down. I telephoned the captain two or three times when it got dark.

It was a new experiment to me. I did not know how the men would behave. I wanted to get them under cover. We had found no place At 9 o'clock the captain's aid came down and told me to go up to Arion Hall. I did not know the place and the aid marched on ahead. We marched down (it was late) without any drum, in order not to attract attention. We got to Arion Hall, which is a long, narrow building in the rear of the opera house. It has a very narrow yard on the street side—the street which separates it from the Government building—and yards on tho other three sides. Arion Hall is a 1-room building, with a veranda on tbe two sides. The guns were parked, the men turned in, and sentries posted. I took a lantern and went around to see what

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sort of a place I would have to defend, if necessary. I had sentries posted, and we settled down there for the night.

Senator Frye. Had it been raining that evening?

Mr. Swinburne. No, not at all. I did not sleep any; no one slept any, the mosquitoes were so bad. About 12 o'clock there was an alarm of fire. I went out and met Mr. Castle, an American, coming along on his bicycle, and he said: "That fire is out beyond my house, on the plains—some distance—I can get there and back in a short time on my bicycle, and bring you the news." He came back—he was not gone more than ten minutes—and said it was an unoccupied barn. It was an incendiary fire, but there was no trouble. At 3 o'clock there was another alarm. I turned out for that. It appeared to be in the direction of the Hawaiian Hotel. It made a big blaze. I went up to that. It was discovered to be an arbor in Emma Square, with a tree growing over it. That was also an incendiary fire, unquestionably; but it was put out without any trouble.

The next morning we settled down to get the men in condition to keep them occupied, laid out the drills, and made preparations—sanitary preparations. Drains were dug and the whole place fixed up. About 1 o'clock Tuesday afternoon Mr. Charles Carter, who was afterward one of the commissioners to this country, came in to see me.

Senator Gray. What relation is he to the late minister to the United States?

Mr. Swinburne. A son of the late minister to the United States, a prominent lawyer there, and a man whom I had met frequently. He came in and stayed some time, this afternoon, and said: "It is the intention of the committee of safety to take possession of the Government building. You will recognize them by Mr. Dole; you know Mr. Dole; he is the tallest man in the party; if you see him in the party you will know what he is doing. They are going to take possession of the Government building." He said: "Have you any objection to my seeing your orders?" I said I had not. I called his attention to the orders lying on the table. As he handed them back to me I said: "You see my orders are to protect the legation, the consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving order; I do not know how to interpret that; I can do it in but one way. If the Queen calls upon me to preserve order I am going to do it." He said nothing further to me about that, and went off. The men were just coming in from drill.

It was, perhaps, half past 2 or a quarter to 3 when a man rushed up to the gate, an American, with a Winchester and belt of cartridges, quite excited, and said: "The police have attempted to stop our ammunition wagon; it was necessary for it to go on, and the policeman was shot and killed, and that there was a large crowd collected ou Merchant street" (Merchant street is where the police station is), "and I was ordered to come and tell you." I said: "Who are you, and what is 'our ammunition wagon?'" He said: "I belong to one of the companies raised by the committee of safety, and our ammunition, which has been loading all day outside of Hall's store, was stopped by the policeman, and he was shot." He said: "After Mr. Good warned the policeman off he dropped his whip and fired on him."

The Chairman. Was the policeman killed?

Mr. Swinburne. It turned out afterward that he was not killed. This man said to me: "Can I stay here at your camp until my company arrives?" I said: "Yes." He was an American citizen and could stay anywhere. I suppose that was naturally the beginning of the riot. The

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crowd collected, and I had the signal sounded, got the companies in the rear of the building out of sight to stack arms, and had the men kept at their company parades, so that they would not lounge about or expose themselves.

The Chairman. What time of day was this?

Mr. Swinburne. Three or 4 o'clock.

The Chairman. On Tuesday?

Mr. Swinburne. On Tuesday. Then I stood at the gate to see what would happen. The next thing was the arrival of Mr. Dole at the building. The proclamation was read. At the time they commenced to read the proclamation the companies commenced to come in, one at a time. This was about half-past 4 o'clock. So far as time is concerned, however, it is all guesswork; these events happened without my knowing what was coming, and 1 have simply to judge from the routine of the camp. About half-past 4 or 5 o'clock I got a note from President Dole asking me if I would come to see him in the Government building. The captain arrived at the time these people entered the Government building and he took command. I showed the note to the captain and said: "I will go over and tell Mr. Dole you are here and will see him." The captain said: "I have no objection to seeing him." I went over and told Mr. Dole that the captain had arrived, and if he (Mr. Dole) had any propositions to submit the captain would see them. I took a note from Mr. Dole to the captain, asking if he could come over. I asked to be present at the meeting and the captain said yes. I went over, and in the office of the minister of the interior was Mr. Dole, Mr. Jones, W.O. Smith, and a number of other gentlemen.

A large number of arms was piled up in the room, a large quantity of ammunition stacked in the hall, and there was at least 100 men under arms. There was an armed sentry at every gate; the whole place had the appearance of being well guarded. We went in and Mr. Dole greeted the captain. My impression is that W.O. Smith and Mr. Jones did the most of the talking. They announced to the captain that they had formed themselves into a provisional government. A proclamation had been read declaring the Queen dethroned and the ministry dissolved; that they had possession of the archives, the Government building, and the treasury, and that they were a de facto government. They asked the captain if he was prepared to recognize them as such. The captain said: "Have you charge of the police station and the barracks, and are you prepared to guarantee the safety of life and property?" Mr. Dole said: "We have not charge of the police station at present, but it is a mere matter of time; it is bound to be given up in a few minutes; I expect to hear that it is given up at any time." The captain said: "Until you are prepared to guarantee that you can give protection to life and property I can not recognize you as the de facto government," or words to that effect. Just then the late ministry was announced, and there seemed to be nothing further for us to say and we went out.

The Chairman. Was anything said at that conversation about being in possession of the barracks?

Mr. Swinburne. No. We knew they were not in command of the barracks; the Queen's troops were there, and sentries—just as quiet as possible. We returned to the building at 6 o'clock, and the men had supper. In the meantime all these companies had arrived and were drilling. At half-past 6 o'clock the captain said "I must go up to the minister's; before I go I want to state to you that the minister has recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the islands; you will consider them as such." That was at half-past

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6, and that was the first time I had heard of any official recognition from the minister at all.

The Chairman. Were the Queen's troops still at the barracks and under arms at the time of that information?

Mr. Swinburne. The sentry was there.

Senator Gray. So far as you could see, no change had taken place?

Mr. Swinburne. No.

The Chairman. That was the time that Capt. Wiltse informed you the minister had recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; at half-past 7—I had a telephone put in that day—I had a call from central that said "the citizen troops had taken charge of tbe armory." Then I got a call from the marine officer, who was right near and could see the building from where he was.

The Chairman. At tbe time that Capt. Wiltse informed you what had been done by this Provisional Government, and when he said he would go up and see the American minister, did he give you any instructions as to whether you should or should not recognize that Government?

Mr. Swinburne. Oh, yes; that I was to recognize that Government. My impression is that he satisfied himself that they had troops enough to handle the situation. I think they had myself. Then I got a message from Mr. Draper, tbe marine officer, stating the same thing—that the police station had surrendered to the forces. The central simply notified me that the citizen troops had taken charge of tbe police station, and that was followed by a communication from Mr. Draper, at the consulate, tbat tbe troops had taken possession of the police station.

Senator Gray. Who was Mr. Draper?

Mr. Swinburne. Tbe marine officer.

Senator Gray. He was where he could see?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

Senator Gray. Near the police station?

Mr. Swinburne. Near the police station. By standing on the sidewalk he could look down and see what was going on. At11 that night it was perfectly quiet—no disturbance of any kind. The next morning about 11 o'clock, while standing outside the camp, the English minister and the Portuguese minister came along.

Senator Gray. When was that?

Mr. Swinburne. Wednesday morning. The English minister stopped and notified me that he had just been to notify the Provisional Government that he would recognize them as the de facto Government, pending advice from his Government; but he said, as a sort of parenthesis, "I found it necessary to ask them, if they were the de facto Government, why it was necessary to bring foreign troops on the soil." He expected an answer from me. I looked as if I had no answer to give, and he looked at me a few minutes and went on. The Queen surrendered the palace that day; the Royal standard was hauled down, and she retired to Washington Place. She was allowed a guard of half her former troops, household guards—a force of 15 or 16 men.

The Chairman. Of Hawaiian troops?

Mr. Swinburne. Hawaiian troops—the rest were disbanded, paid to the end of the month, and they left pretty cheerfully. On Thursday we moved into our new quarters on Fort street, which had been procured for us, the property of Mr. Bishop. Mr. Damon was the agent of the property, and through him this was arranged. We moved in there and stayed there, and the next step was the hoisting of the flag, on the 1st of February. For two or three weeks before

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the 1st of February there had been a great many rumors of an outbreak; the current report was that the Royalists thought it necessary to make a demonstration of some kind before the departure of the steamer on the 1st of Febuary, and for that reason for three or four nights everything was guarded very closely at the Government building; they had extra patrols, and every preparation was made to prevent any surprise. On the evening of the last day of January Capt. Wiltse said to me, "I want you to be ready to have the battalion under arms at half past 8, when I will come on shore and give you your orders."

At half past 8 the battalion was paraded, the captain arrived and handed me the orders, a copy of which is there, and dated the 1st of February. He ordered me to take charge of tbe Government building, the flag to be hoisted at 9 o'clock. I marched down with the battalion. At the Government building I found all tbe members of tbe advisory council and the members of tbe cabinet of tbe Provisional Government. The three companies of troops were drawn up on tbe three sides of tbe square. We marched in and were drawn up in front of the building, and then by direction of tbe captain the adjutant read the proclamation of the minister establishing a protectorate over the islands pending negotiations with tbe United States. As I understand, tbat was at the request of the Provisional Government. Then the American flag was hoisted and saluted. After the American flag was hoisted the Hawaiian flag was hoisted.

Senator Gray. How was the American flag saluted?

Mr. Swinburne. The troops presented arms, and three flourishes of the trumpets were given.

Senator Gray. Was a salute fired from tbe ship?

Mr. Swinburne. A salute of 21 guns was fired from the ship.

Senator Gray. What was the salute from the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. The national salute.

The Chairman. And then you faced about----

Mr. Swinburne. Faced about and gave the same honors to the Hawaiian flag.

The Chairman. Was any salute fired?

Mr. Swinburne. No salute was fired. Then the building was turned over to my custody, and the Provisional Government's troops marched out. By Capt. Wiltse's order I left a marine guard of 25 men which had been withdrawn from the consulate and legation that day, leaving only 5 men at the legation. They were placed in charge of the Government building. There was a change apparent at once; no more rumors of uprising of any kind—uprising of the Royalists; the transaction of public business was much facilitated, because the marines had orders to let anybody come and go without being bothered about passes or anything of the kind. So two days passed, when President Dole came to me and said he would like to have the Government building opened that the court might be held, and to that end he would like to have the sentry removed from the front gate during the hours from 9 till 4.

The Chairman. What court?

Mr. Swinburne. The supreme court. I suggested that it would be better to go further than that, to remove all sentries for the time so as not to have the appearance of keeping anybody away, which was done. All the sentries were taken from the public building from 9 to 4, all tbe gates were opened, and tbe court held its sessions. A short time afterwards one company of 36 men was sent on board ship (Mr. Young's company), reducing the force on shore to 120 men. Then, on the 20th of March, by direction of Rear-Admiral Skerrett, another

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----53

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company of 36 men was withdrawn, and that, with the casualties that occurred, left the force on shore about 90 men; I think less than that.

Senator Gray. What do you mean by casualties?

Mr. Swinburne. Some men sent on board ship for punishment, and quite a number sent onboard sick. Somewhere in the neighborhood of 80 to 90 men left, including the drum corps and color guard.

The Chairman. At what time did Admiral Skerrett come into the harbor?

Mr. Swinburne. I forget the date of his arrival; but it was after the flag was hoisted.

The Chairman. On what ship did he come?

Mr. Swinburne. The Mohican.

The Chairman. Is that his flagship?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. What was Admiral Skerrett's command?

Mr. Swinburne. The Pacific Station.

The Chairman. That included Hawaii?

Mr. Swinburne. That included Hawaii; yes.

The Chairman. How long did Capt. Wiltse remain on the Boston after Admiral Skerrett's arrival?

Mr. Swinburne. My impression is that he remained until about the 5th of March, when he was relieved by Capt. B. F. Day.

The Chairman. Did he leave on account of sickness?

Mr. Swinburne. He left because of the termination of his cruise. He was there a little longer than the termination of his cruise. Two years is now the ordinary term of a captain at sea; that had expired in February, and in the ordinary course of routine Capt. Day was sent out to relieve him.

The Chairman. How long did Capt. Wiltse live after that?

Mr. Swinburne. I have forgotten the date of his death—probably six weeks or two months.

The Chairman. After he arrived in the United States?

Mr. Swinburne. After he arrived in the United States. He had been apparently in good health; but he had one stroke of apoplexy while he was attached to the ship. I was not surprised.

The Chairman. Are those the orders under which you left the ship with that detachment (exhibiting paper)?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. They are as follows:

U. S. S. Boston, Second-rate,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16,1893.
Lieut. Commander W. T. Swinburne,
U. S. Navy, Executive Officer U.S.S. Boston:
Sir: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order.
Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens.
You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any change in the situation.
Very respectfully,
G. C. Wiltse,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. Boston.
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What time of day were these orders delivered to you?

Mr. Swinburne. About half past 4 on the afternoon of the 16th.

The Chairman. When you received these orders did you receive any personal or private instructions from Capt. Wiltse in addition?

Mr. Swinburne. None at all, except what I have stated in regard to where we were to go.

The Chairman. Did you at that time know of the formation of a provisional government in Hawaii?

Mr. Swinburne. No; not at all. In fact I knew nothing about that until Mr. Carter spoke of it on Tuesday afternoon.

The Chairman. That was the first knowledge you had?

Mr. Swinburne. That was the first knowledge I had.

The Chairman. So that, in landing with those troops you were not landed for the purpose of protecting the Provisional Government.

Mr. Swinburne. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. Or inaugurating a provisional government?

Mr. Swinburne. Not at all.

The Chairman. You were not certain that you were to do anything more than to protect the----

Mr. Swinburne. Protect American property and the lives of citizens— particularly the property. There had been always a feeling during the time we were there that we were there to look out, in the event of any domestic disturbance in the islands, that no harm came to the Americans or their property in any way.

The Chairman. You are not certain whether that order to assist in preserving public order related to the Queen's Government or any other government?

Mr. Swinburne. I supposed it to mean the Queen's Government; that was my interpretation. There was no other government when I landed.

The Chairman. So that, if the Queen had addressed to you a request to preserve the public order, or if you had found that the public order was being disturbed by opposition to her, you would have felt required to respond?

Mr. Swinburne. That request would have come through the minister to me, merely to preserve order. I did not know that I was there to fight her battles any more than anybody else's. I was there to preserve order; protect the peaceful rights of citizens in the town. I should have been ready if called upon to lend a hand.

Senator Gray. You were going to prevent fighting?

Mr. Swinburne. I was going to prevent any fighting that endangered peaceable American citizens in the town.

Senator Gray. Did Capt. Wiltse say anything to you, or in your presence say anything about preventing any fighting in the town, or not allowing any fighting in the town?

Mr. Swinburne. No; not at all.

Senator Gray. Never did?

Mr. Swinburne. No.

Senator Gray. That if they wanted to fight they would have to go outside?

Mr. Swinburne. The order said, I thought, no more than to see that peaceable citizens were not interfered with.

Senator Gray. Did Capt. Wiltse say that if there was to be any fighting it should be out of town?

Mr. Swinburne. No; he said nothing to me about fighting at all. We had no discussion of the orders.

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Senator Gray. Did he say it in you presence?

Mr. Swinburne. I never heard it.

The Chairman. Your construction of the fighting order was to see that peaceful citizens were not interfered with?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. By anybody?

Mr. Swinburne. By anybody.

Senator Frye. I understand that under the rules and regulations of the U. S. Navy, naval officers in foreign ports are required to protect the lives and property of American citizens. Now, do you not understand that, so far as this order related to the preservation of order, that you were to preserve order so as to render safe the lives and property of American citizens?

Mr. Swinburne. Precisely.

Senator Frye. You would not have felt called upon to stop it if the Queen's troops had fired into the Provisional troops.

Mr. Swinburne. Oh, no.

Senator Frye. Your idea was that the order was for you to protect the lives and property of American citizens?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. The evening we landed it was reported, and the next morning Mr. Draper said the Chinese consul came to him at the consulate after the consul general had left and reported that his people were very much disturbed, and he did not know what was going to happen, and he wanted to know from Mr. Draper what they were to do. Mr. Draper said: "If your people behave themselves, go to their houses, and keep out of trouble I will see that they are protected." So that he notified me of that the next morning, and I said, "Certainly; in such a case as that there is no reason why we should not protect any man's life, when he is simply behaving himself and attending to his own business." That was the only question that ever came up. My idea was that I was to look out for American property. Of course, there was some American property there then in danger, and I was going to see that that property and the lives of the owners were looked out for.

The Chairman. By property do you mean goods?

Mr. Swinburne. Goods; yes, and houses. "What I feared was incendiary firing of houses, and that sort of thing, by an irresponsible mob.

The Chairman. Are those the orders under which you took possession of the Government Building [exhibiting paper]?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. They are laconic enough. The orders are as follows:

"U.S.S. Boston, Second-rate,
"Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 1, 1893.
"Lieut.-Commander W. T. Swinburne,
"Commanding Battalion, U.S.S. Boston.
"Sir: You will take possession of the Government Building, and the American flag will be hoisted over it at 9 a.m.
"Very respectfully,
"G. C. Wiltse,
"Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. Boston."

The Chairman. These are the orders under which you abandoned the island and went back to the ship? [Exhibiting paper.]

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; the orders detaching me from the command, and ordering me to return to the ship.

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The orders are as follows:

"U.S.S. Boston, Second Rate,
"Honolulu, H. I., March 20, 1893.
"Sir: In accordance with the instructions of Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett, U.S. Navy, commanding U.S. Naval Force, Pacific Station, you will, at 5:30 p.m. to-day, withdraw from shore one company of thirty-six men, with their officers, and repair on board the Boston and resume accustomed duties."
One company, with music, colors, and proper proportion of officers, will be left at 'Camp Boston,' and you will turn over the command of the same to Lieutenant Charles Laird, U. S. Navy, who will continue the duties and routine as heretofore.
"Very respectfully,
"B. F. Day,
"Captain U.S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. Boston.
"Lieut. Comdr. Wm. T. Swinburne,
"U.S. Navy"

WASHINGTON, D. C, Friday, January 19, 1894.

SWORN STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COMMANDER W. T. SWINBURNE. Continued.

The Chairman. Did you have any instructions in addition to or differing from the orders under which you started from the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. None at all.

The Chairman. Did you understand when you left the ship that you were going ashore for the purpose of sustaining the Provisional Government then in process of organization or in expectation of organization, or for the purpose of sustaining any government?

Mr. Swinburne. Not at all. I had never heard of the Provisional Government. I did not know, even, that there was such a movement on foot. I knew there was a movement of some kind on foot on the part of the citizens, and my idea was that it was to get some absolute assurances from the Queen that they could depend upon in the future.

The Chairman. Your idea was that the movement was to get some assurances from the Queen?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes. I did not expect it would ever come to the point of dethroning her. You will notice in my testimony given before that I had called Mr. Carter's attention to that part of my orders which referred to preserving order in the town. Before Mr. Carter had asked me if he could see my orders, when he told me that certain men were going to take the Government building, in calling attention to that part of my orders, I purposely exaggerated my orders, lest he should get an idea that as these men were Americans I would give them support, since I was there to protect American interests. I called his attention to the clause which directed me to assist in preserving order. I said, "My understanding of that is that l am to assist the Queen's Government in preserving order." Of course, a request from the Queen to assist in preserving order would have to come through the minister, but I thought it was proper to exaggerate that, so that he would go

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away with a complete understanding of how I stood with regard to the matter. That was the purpose of that statement.

The Chairman. Had you any purpose, or did you suspect any purpose on the part of any person concerned in this movement, either the United States minister, the United States consul, Capt. Wiltse, or any other official to establish a provisional government, or to dethrone the Queen?

Mr. Swinburne. Not at all.

The Chairman. You were not aware of any such purpose existing at all?

Mr. Swinburne. No.

The Chairman. At the time the troops disembarked—went on shore—do you know whether Mr. Stevens was on board the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. My impression is that he had gone on shore. I am not certain of that; but I am pretty sure.

The Chairman. When did you next see Mr. Stevens after you saw him on board the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. I do not remember to have seen him again until the day of his daughter's funeral, which must have been about four weeks from the date of our landing, though I can't be certain. It was not until the day of his daughter's funeral; I can not recall when that was, but it was while we were on shore.

The Chairman. Did Mr. Stevens interfere in any way with the management of the troops on shore?

Mr. Swinburne. Not at all.

The Chairman. Did he give any directions as to what they should or should not do?

Mr. Swinburne. All the directions that came to me were given to me by the captain.

The Chairman. I believe you have already stated what you know about the transaction, commencing with the time you landed. That is in your deposition?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. And up to the time you left----

Mr. Swinburne. Left Arion Hall.

The Chairman. And went down to Camp Boston?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. How long did you remain in Camp Boston?

Mr. Swinburne. A portion of the troops was there until the 1st of April—up to the time the flag was hauled down. I was detached on the 20th of March.

The Chairman. I want to call your attention to some remarks made by Mr. Willis in his reports or letters. In his letter of December 20, 1893, to Mr. Gresham, Mr. Willis says:

"The delay in making any announcement of your policy was, as you will understand, because of the direct verbal and written instructions under which I have been acting. Under those instructions my first duty was to guard the life and safety of those who had by the act of our own minister been placed in a position where there was an apparant antagonism between them and our Government. As I understood from the President and from you, the sole connection with our Government had with the settlement of the Hawaiian question was the undoing of what, from an international standpoint, was considered by the President to have been a wrong to a feeble, defenseless, and friendly power. In undoing this wrong I was, however, instructed first of all to see that proper safeguards were thrown around those who had been
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probably misled as to the position of our Government and the wishes of our people."

I understand that the protection Mr. Willis speaks of here has reference to those persons who were of the party of the Queen. Now, I wish to ask you whether, while you stayed upon that island, you saw or was informed of any demonstration whatever of a hostile character toward the person of the Queen or any of her supporters?

Mr. Swinburne. Not that I ever heard of, any further than the dethronement of the Queen—no attempt of a personal nature against the Queen or her followers.

The Chairman. Of course, I am speaking of their personal safety and protection.

Mr. Swinburne. Not at all; they had the same protection that any other person had.

Senator Frye. Did they not have more; did not the Provisional Government furnish the Queen with half her guard?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

Senator Frye. And did they not pay off the guard to the first of the month, when they were discharged?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; she had more protection than anyone else during the revolution. I never heard of a revolution carried on in that style.

The Chairman. Here is a statement in Mr. Willis's letter to the effect that the Japanese and English legations were guarded by the marines of their respective vessels, "and no American soldier has been stationed here and none will be." Do you recollect whether the Japanese and English legations were guarded during the time you were there?

Mr. Swinburne. Not at all. The Japanese asked permission to land a guard at the legation, and the Provisional Government, while they did not refuse, informed the minister that they were perfectly able to give them all necessary protection; and it was currently reported that the Provisional Government had given the Japanese minister permission to have a guard on shore if he wished it, but none were landed.

The Chairman. This permission of which Mr. Willis speaks must have occurred after you went back to the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; no foreign troops were ashore at all except our own.

The Chairman. At the time you withdrew and went on board that ship, will you say that the people of Honolulu were in a state of quietude, or in an agitated and insurrectionary state?

Mr. Swinburne. They were perfectly quiet; all the agitation was the conspiring of a few professional politicians belonging to the Queen's party. We could see that going on all the time.

Senator Gray. Were there any professional politicians belonging to the other party?

Mr. Swinburne. When I used that expression I referred to two or three men who never seemed to have any other means of existence except as a part of the Queen's party. The Queen being out of power, they had no visible means of support.

The Chairman. I want to read you some more extracts from Mr. Willis's letter, the one I quoted from a moment ago, to see whether you can concur in the opinions he has expressed and indorse the facts which he has brought to the attention of the Secretary of State.

Senator Gray. I will ask whether Lieut. Swinburne was in Honolulu at any time during the time that Mr Willis was on shore?

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Mr. Swinburne. No.

The Chairman. You mean you were not on shore?

Mr. Swinburne. I was not there at all. Mr. Stevens was still minister when I left, and Mr. Blount was there taking testimony. You see, I left there the 11th of May.

The Chairman. And this letter I have been reading from is dated December.

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. I now read from Mr. Willis's letter:

"The President's attention had been called by you to the evidence contained in Mr. Blount's report showing the extraordinary complications and dangers surrounding this community, among which were the racial prejudices, the intense feeling consequent upon the dethronement of the constitutional sovereign, the presence of so many different nationalities—Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Americans, and English— in such large numbers and with such diverse traits and interests, the possibility that the Japanese, now numbering more than one-fifth of the male population of the islands, might take advantage of the condition of affairs to demand suffrage and through it to obtain control of the Government, together with the discontent of the native Hawaiians at the loss of their Government and of the rights secured under it.
"In addition to these facts I was fully apprised by you in your personal conversations of the presence here of many lawless and disorderly characters, owing allegiance to neither party, who would gladly take advantage of the excitement and general derangement of affairs to indulge in rapine and mob violence; and also of the conflict between the active responsible representatives of the Provisional Government and certain men who were not officially connected with it, but who had undertaken to dictate its policy. The danger from this last source I found upon arriving here was much greater than you had supposed. As I stated to you in my dispatch, No. 2, of November 10, the President and ministers of the Provisional Government and a large per cent of those who support them are men of high character and of large material interests in the islands. These men have been inclined to a conservative course toward the Hawaiians.
"They had placed in the police and fire departments, and also in many other more important offices, native Hawaiians, thus endeavoring to conciliate the friendship and support of the 40,000 natives of the country. The irresponsible element referred to were pressing for a change of this wise and patriotic policy and insisting that they should be invested with all power, thus intensifying and aggravating the racial feeling already too extreme. Many of these men were open in their threats against the life of the Queen. They have even gone as far in the public prints and elsewhere as to threaten the representatives of the Provisional Government in the event they should listen to the President's supposed policy of peaceful settlement, if it involved the restoration of the Queen.
"Besides this danger, which would have been precipitated by any premature announcement of the policy of our Government, there was another danger deserving serious attention.
"The native Hawaiians, under the wise advice of their best native leaders, supplemented by that of many sympathizing foreigners, have maintained the policy of peace during the settlement of this question. While, however, they have been always known as a peaceful and law-abiding people, the evidence of the most thoughtful men in these Islands, including Mr. Damon, the present minister of finance, called
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attention to the fact that under proper leadership they might collect quite an effective and aggressive following; hence his opinion given to Mr. Blount while here and to me since that a strong force should be retained by the Provisional Government or else trouble might result from a sudden attack on their part."

Now, I wish to ask whether or not during the period you were there Mr. Willis has, in your judgment, correctly described the attitude of the different elements in Hawaii—Honolulu—and also the state of feeling— the temper of the people during that time?

Mr. Swinburne. During the time that I was on shore there seemed to be most of the time—everything was perfectly quiet—I felt there did exist a class of irresponsible men who, in the event of an outbreak, might take advantage of that to plunder or burn or destroy property, and it was that element I feared I would have to cope with when I was sent ashore to protect American interests. Those were the people I expected to have trouble with. So far as the average natives themselves— the ordinary class of natives, not the members of the legislature or leaders—were concerned, they appeared to be perfectly indifferent; they were always interested in our drills, always collected in large numbers to watch them. I could not see that they had any feeling against us whatever; they never exhibited it in any way.

The policemen throughout the city while I was on shore were natives, the majority of them. I could not see that they had any feeling against us at all. I knew quite a number of young men, halfcaste young men, who were in public office. I rather thought they had a bitter feeling against our people. But I myself imagined that that came from some fancied feeling of loss of social rank through the change in the Government—such as annexation to the United States. They were half-castes; they were young men in society there (this is my own idea), and, of course, I always felt that they were more bitter at the fact of any change in the future of the islands—that the annexation of the islands to this country would change their position; they would not have as good social position as they had before.

The Chairman. Were they a respectable class of men?

Mr. Swinburne. Oh, perfectly so.

The Chairman. Well educated?

Mr. Swinburne. Well educated.

The Chairman. And might very justly entertain such expectations?

Mr. Swinburne. I think that was, perhaps, natural that they should feel that way, although these men were occupying positions under the Government at the time.

The Chairman. And were not removed?

Mr. Swinburne. And were not removed.

The Chairman. Now, taking the description given by Mr. Willis of the different factions, social, political, racial, etc., as he has described them in the extract I have just read to you, would you, in such a community as that, think it would be necessary to have some demonstration of military force in order to prevent the occurrence of outbreaks which at any other time might spring up.

Mr. Swinburne. Any government there would have to have a force capable of coping with the situation; they would have to keep a military force there, unquestionably.

Senator Gray. Do you think these people are capable of self-government, as we understand it in the States. Take the whole people of the islands.

Mr. Swinburne. Of course, so far as the Chinaman is concerned,

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he would not occupy any different position there from what he would in the States; the Japanese are a restless, turbulent class of people; they are very tenacious of what they consider to be their rights; very prompt to take part in strikes. There is a plantation near Honolulu, at Ewa, where they seem to be constantly having trouble with their laborers. The Japanese would at a fancied slight quit work and come over to Honolulu. Another point was, the Japanese Government was very anxious that their citizens should have the right to vote. There was an impression, at least that Government contended that there was an agreement, when the first contract laws were passed, that their people should have the right to vote. Of course, the laborers come there under contract, I forget now the length of time, but it could not have been more than five years; I could not see how they should have the right to vote for five years. They were looked out for by the commissioners; their rights were protected by the Japanese commissioners; although contract laborers, they are in no sense slaves; they come there under a contract for a certain length of time, and the Japanese Government sees that the contract is kept in its entirety. And moreover, they have money kept for them until their time is up.

Senator Gray. They see that the contract is kept on their part aud on the part of the contractor, too?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

Senator Gray. Suppose the contract should be violated?

Mr. Swinburne. I am not sufficiently posted to give any details; but it seems to me that they say to the laborer that he is to keep his contract; that the contract should be kept so loug as both parties observe its terms.

The Chairman. I desire to get from you a further explanation upon the hypothesis of the facts which I read to you from Mr. Willis' report. Do you mean to say that in a community situated as that was, the evidence of official power is essential to the preservation of order, peace, and quiet?

Mr. Swinburne. I should say so.

The Chairman. It would not be safe to trust the city and people in the hands of these different factions, unless they were convinced that power, force, would be used to repress any mob violence?

Mr. Swinburne. I do not think it would be.

Senator Gray. You mean force outside of themselves?

Mr. Swinburne. Mr. Chairman, do you mean force outside of what the Government would have?

The Chairman. I mean force.

Mr. Swinburne. I do not think it would be possible.

The Chairman. In other words, there would have to be a force in Hawaii to keep these factions in check?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. Is not that a peculiar situation, and different from that in other countries? Do you know where such a condition of affairs exists or is likely to exist?

Mr. Swinburne. Well----

The Chairman. How is it in Panama?

Mr. Swinburne. Of course, in all the South American republics that I know of there is always a large standing army, and it is the army that controls politics.

The Chairman. Armies organized for the purpose of securing domestic peace and order rather than to protect against foreign enemies?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; I think so.

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The Chairman. That was really the function of the military organization in Hawaii?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. Had no reference to foreign war, offensive or defensive?

Mr. Swinburne. It could not do more than make an honorable stand against any foreign power whatever.

The Chairman. So that the military organization in Hawaii was simply intended for the preservation of the internal peace?

Mr. Swinburne. That is the way I understood it.

The Chairman. Now, was it for the purpose of assisting in that line of conduct, or was it for the purpose of making an assault upon any government or of participating in any political agitation or aiding any political party, that you went on shore with those troops in Honolulu?

Mr. Swinburne. My idea always has been, and was at the time, that we landed simply for the protection of American property and interests and lives; that in the event of an outbreak, any demonstration against the Queen, or any attempt to overthrow her power, there would be a good deal of lawlessness. That is a seaport town and is full of the ordinary irresponsible classes to be found in any seaport town; and at such a time as that, it would give the chance for lawless people, white or native, or whatever they might be, to plunder and fire property, probably do damage of any kind. That was my reason for desiring to be down near the wharf.

Senator Gray. And you were there, as I understand, under your orders to preserve order?

Mr. Swinburne. To preserve order, to protect the property and lives of Americans.

Senator Gray. And if a crowd of people, disorderly or otherwise, should have attempted to arrest or maltreat Mr. Damon, Mr. Dole, or Mr. Carter on that day, you would have protected them?

Mr. Swinburne. It would have depended upon what they were doing.

Senator Gray. Suppose they were walking up to the Government building, as they were doing that morning, and they were set upon, would you have protected them?

Mr. Swinburne. If they were going to the Government building?

Senator Gray. Yes.

Mr. Swinburne. I should think I would have been called upon to protect them.

Senator Gray. I think so.

Mr. Swinburne. They were entitled to the liberty of the streets, but if they were organized as a force----

Senator Gray. I say if they were going up to the Government building, as they were on that day, and were set upon?

Mr. Swinburne. And if I had been informed, as I was, that this party was going in to take the Government building?

Senator Gray. Would you have allowed them to be maltreated or set upon?

Mr. Swinburne. That is a difficult question to answer.

Senator Gray. I sympathize with you in it.

Mr. Swinburne. That would be difficult to answer.

Senator Gray. I think so.

Mr. Swinburne. I am satisfied that Mr. Carter knew exactly how I stood in the matter when he went into the building; that is, I let him

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understand that I was there simply to protect American property and life.

The Chairman. Did you gather the impression or belief there that any members of the Queen's cabinet were in sympathy with this political outbreak?

Mr. Swinburne. In sympathy with the Provisional Government?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Swinburne. Of the Queen's cabinet at that time?

The Chairman. For the purpose of overthrowing her, or for the purpose of establishing a provisional government?

Mr. Swinburne. I did not.

The Chairman. Did you hear anything about members of that cabinet going to the citizen's meeting and asking for protection or asking advice as to what they should do?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; I did hear that. I heard that two of them went to Judge Hartwell. Judge Hartwell is known to be a very ardent Annexationist.

Senator Gray. Was he on the bench?

Mr. Swinburne. Well, he had been.

Senator Gray. He was called "judge?"

Mr. Swinburne. Called "judge."

The Chairman. In point of time, did you hear that when you got on shore that day?

Mr. Swinburne. I heard that from the messenger who came off to Capt. Wiltse about noon. My impression is that it was Mr. Cooper.

The Chairman. He brought that information to Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Swinburne. Brought that to Capt. Wiltse.

The Chairman. That two members of the Queen's cabinet----

Mr. Swinburne. Had come to Judge Hartwell's office and disclosed to him the fact that the Queen had attempted to—they felt that the Queen was prepared to use force—to force them to sign that new constitution.

The Chairman. Did you stand from that statement that they had asked any protection from the citizens, or had asked advice from the citizens as to what they should do?

Mr. Swinburne. If you want my opinion, and not what I know?

The Chairman. No. I want to know the shape in which that information came aboard the ship that morning.

Mr. Swinburne. It came as a warning to Capt. Wiltse that the Queen was prepared to overthrow the constitution. It was brought to his attention there. His business was to watch over American interests in the islands.

The Chairman. Mr. Cooper brought that information to Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. Did it in any respect have reference to the Queen's cabinet having sought advice from the citizens against any project of hers to arrest them?

Mr. Swinburne. That is what I understood at the time. I know it was talked of in the town; but whether I heard it at that time or not, I do not know.

The Chairman. What I want is the information that was brought aboard the ship.

Mr. Swinburne. It is very difficult to separate the time when I heard these things. But I gathered the impression that day that these

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men were actually afraid that they would be arrested by the Queen when they went to Hartwell's office. That was my impression that day.

The Chairman. The object of their visit to Hartwell's office was either to get advice or assistance against such expected or proposed movement on the part of the Queen?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

Senator Gray. Was there any request came off to the ship from any other person to Mr. Stevens for the landing of the troops?

Mr. Swinburne. Not that I am aware of. I am certain there was a message came off to the captain that led him to make his preparations.

Senator Gray. Do you know from whom that message came?

Mr. Swinburne. I do not; I judge from the American minister.

Senator Gray. Other than the American minister?

Mr. Swinburne. I do not know. I judge, of course, there could not be any.

Senator Gray. Do you recollect any note coming to Mr. Stevens on the afternoon, and while he was on the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. That I do not know of my own knowledge, but I heard that there was a note. I was extremely busy after I had asked Capt. Wiltse to allow the captains of the companies to be present to gather such information as they could. I left the cabin and was in and out, and there was a good deal said between the captain and the captains of the companies that I did not hear. They asked questions as to their duties under certain circumstances; I heard what they were afterward, but I did not hear at the time. I had been there long enough to know what we were to do if we landed, what my business was, and my orders were not handed to me until just before we shoved off from the ship. But we were there for the purpose of protecting American property and American interests; and my idea was to protect them against people, who, I felt, might be guilty of incendiarism, plunder, or maltreatment of unoffending American citizens. That is what I was thinking about.

Senator Frye. Most of the buildings in Honolulu are constructed of wood?

Mr. Swinburne. They are most all wooden buildings.

Senator Frye. They would make serious fires?

Mr. Swinburne. I know that is what the people were afraid of.

Senator Frye. Is not that the resort of certain elements in revolutionary states when a revolution is under way?

Mr. Swinburne. It is.

Senator Frye. All through the South, down in Panama and everywhere else?

Mr. Swinburne. I should think so.

Senator Frye. I suppose the city of Honolulu is very much scattered?

Mr. Swinburne. Covers a good deal of ground.

Senator Frye. And the Americans' houses are also scattered all over the best part of the city?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; many of them up Nuuanu Valley and toward the plains, and a good many toward Waikiki?

Senator Frye. In case of mob violence in the city, that is the property, I take it, that is pretty likely to be burned up?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

Senator Frye. When you were about Arion Hall were you not situated as well as you could be to hit that class of property?

Mr. Swinburne. So far as American property was concerned I

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should say that Arion Hall is as good as any other place. There were as many Americans on one side as on the other.

Senator Frye. So far as you know, in selecting Arion Hall there was no purpose had except the protection of American life and property?

Mr. Swinburne. That is my understanding. At the time we were glad of a place to lie down.

Senator Frye. One of the witnesses before Mr. Blount makes the statement that when the Provisional Government marched up and took possession of the Government building the United States marines were drawn up in array with their Gatling guns, and all that sort of thing, in sight of the Provisional Government's men who were taking possession.

Mr. Swinburne. I should say they were not in sight. The men were drawn up in their company parades, because I had the information before these men arrived that a policeman had been shot, and that the men were collecting on the street, and I supposed there would be a demonstration immediately. The arms were stacked and the men standing in company parades, and were ready to move.

Senator Frye. Where were they?

Mr. Swinburne. My idea was to keep them as much out of sight as possible. Indeed, I had great difficulty in keeping the men in the ranks; they would slip through to the other side of the building and look over the fence to see what was going on.

Senator Frye. In order to see what was going on they had to do that?

Mr. Swinburne. Had to do that, go to the front of the building— get on the porch, and look over.

Senator Gray. Where were the Gatling guns?

Mr. Swinburne. In the only position in which they could be parked. The 37 millimeters, as I remember, stood on the right, on the Government house side, and the Gatling on the other side of it. They stood together where they were parked, the first night we went in, and where they remained all the time we were there—the most convenient place we could get.

Senator Gray. Near the street?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; 37 was nearest the street. It was a narrow yard. I should think that was not over 20 yards from the street; not over that.

Senator Frye. One witness before Mr. Blount stated that it would have been impossible for the Royalist troops to have made an attack upon the Provisional men that were taking possession of the Government building, without at the same time attacking the United States troops.

Mr. Swinburne. I thought of that condition. I thought at the time it was untenable in the event of a fight between the two factions. I expected to have to withdraw my men from that position. I thought I would have been between the two fires; at least I was not in a good position in the event of an outbreak. I had thought of that, and expected to have removed the men.

Senator Frye. Are you acquainted with Minister Stevens?

Mr. Swinburne. I had visited his house frequently while I was in Honolulu, nearly once a week.

Senator Frye. What estimate did you form of Minister Stevens' character?

Mr. Swinburne. I formed the idea that he was a man of the highest character.

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Senator Frye. Did you at any time know of his saying anything in favor of the overthrow of the Queen or the establishment of a provisional government?

Mr. Swinburne. He certainly never did in my presence, and I do not know of his having said anything of the kind.

Senator Frye. You were on board the ship when the ship went to Hilo, I suppose?

Mr. Swinburne. I was.

Senator Frye. Did Mr. Stevens have a conversation with you while on that trip?

Mr. Swinburne. Not on political questions.

Senator Frye. Did you hear of him having conversations with the officers in which he expressed the fact that he was glad peace had been accomplished and would remain for two years, as he could go home at the expiration of his term of office and leave it so?

Mr. Swinburne. I did not hear him say so then; but before we left the island I spoke of my reasons to Capt. Wiltse for a postponement of a trip for target practice. The captain said he was satisfied, and the minister said he was satisfied that the Wilcox-Jones ministry could not be voted out; that everything was as quiet as possible, and it was as good a time to go as could be.

The Chairman. I wish to read you some further extracts from Mr. Willis's communication to Secretary Gresham. He says: "There is, undoubtedly, in this Government a class of reckless, lawless men who, under the impression that they have the support of some of the better classes of citizens, may at any moment bring about a serious condition of affairs," but says that "the men at the head of the Provisional Government are of the highest integrity," etc.

Then he says what I have already quoted:

"The danger from this last source I found upon arriving here was much greater than you had supposed. As I stated to you in my dispatch, No. 2, of November 10, the President and ministers of the Provisional Government and a large per cent of those who support them are men of high character and of large material interests in the islands. These men have been inclined to a conservative course toward the Hawaiians."

Does that conform with your opinion of the character of the men who formed the Provisional Government?

Mr. Swinburne. While I was there, I should say it is an exaggeration. While there were men in the Provisional Government who I knew were in favor of more aggressive measures against the late monarchy, that is, were in favor of deporting the Queen, and while there were a great many in favor of turning out all the people who had been holding office under the late government, I do not think they could be called people who would foment trouble. They were people who were more radical, as there are in all parties—some are more radical than others—but as the statement was read there it seems to me an exaggeration of the composition of the Provisional Government party at the time I was in the city of Honolulu.

The Chairman. You are speaking now, I suppose, of the class which Mr. Willis designates as reckless and lawless men?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes.

The Chairman. Now, the other part, and the one to which I want specially to direct your attention, where he speaks of the men at the head of the Provisional Government as men of the highest integrity and public spirit. Do you concur in that view?

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Mr. Swinburne. Unquestionably. I think Mr. Dole, for instance, a man who was doing in the matter what he considered to be solely his duty.

The Chairman. Now, as to character.

Mr. Swinburne. I think that is correctly stated as to the character of the prominent men in the Provisional Government.

The Chairman. I notice on page 57 of Ex. Doc. No. 47 this communication from yourself to Mr. Blount. It is as follows:

"Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 3,1893.
"Hon. J. H. Blount,
"Special Commissioner of United States:
"Sir: In response to your verbal request for a written communication from me regarding certain facts connected with the recognition of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister to that country on the afternoon of January 17,1893, I have to state as follows:
"On the afternoon in question I was present at an interview between Capt. Wiltse, commanding the Boston, who was at that time present in his official capacity with the battalion then landed in Honolulu, and Mr. Dole and other gentlemen representing the present Provisional Government, in the executive chamber of the Government building. During the interview we were informed that the party represented by the men there present was in complete possession of the Government building, the archives, and the treasury, and that a Provisional Government had been established by them.
"In answer Capt. Wiltse asked if their Government had possession of the police station and barracks. To this the reply was made that they had not possession then, but expected to hear of it in a few minutes, or very soon. To this Capt. Wiltse replied, 'Very well, gentlemen, I can not recognize you as a de facto Government until you have possession of the police station and are prepared to guarantee protection to life and property,' or words to that effect. Here our interview was interrupted by other visitors, and we withdrew and returned to the camp at Arion Hall. As far as I can recollect this must have been about 5 o'clock p. m. About half past 6 Capt. Wiltse left the camp, and as he did so he informed me that the U.S. minister to the Hawaiian Islands had recognized the Provisional Government established by the party in charge of the Government building as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands. About half past 7 p.m. I was informed by telephone by Lieut. Draper, who was then in charge of a squad of marines at the U.S. consulate, that the citizen troops had taken possession of the police station, and that everything was quiet.
Very respectfully,
"Wm. Swinburne,
"Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy."

You knew that?

Mr. Swinburne. Yes; that is practically the same as my testimony already given.

The Chairman. Have you any explanation to make in regard to that?

Mr. Swinburne. No; I think that is exactly the same as I have already given. Is it stated that I wrote that? I had forgotten. I thought I just gave that verbally. I wrote another communication, in which I gave distances. I would suggest that the replacing of the word "and" after "police station" and before "are prepared to guarantee

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protection to life and property" by the conjunction "or," would more nearly convey the captain's idea as I then understood him.

SWORN STATEMENT OF LIEUT. DE WITT COFFMAN.

Senator Gray. You were an officer on board the U.S.S. Boston in Honolulu on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of January, 1893?

Mr. Coffman. I joined the Boston on the 14th; I was on her on the 15th, and landed on the 16th.

Senator Gray. You were connected with the Boston?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Gray. What was your position?

Mr. Coffman. Lieutenant and division officer on the Boston.

Senator Gray. Had you command of one of the companies of the battalion which landed on the 16th?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Gray. Mr. Coffman, with whom I have had a conversation, agrees with all that has been said by Mr. Swinburne and the other gentlemen who preceded him in regard to the landing of the troops and the instructions of Capt. Wiltse. I only called him here for one purpose and one fact. You were captain of one of the companies of the battalion which landed?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Gray. As such captain were you summoned to the cabin of Capt. Wiltse on Monday the 16th, before you landed?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Gray. Who were present?

Mr. Coffman. Capt. Wiltse, Minister Stevens, Mr. Swinburne, Lieut. Laird, Lieut. Young, Lieut. Draper, of the Marine Corps, and I think those were all, unless there were some of the junior officers, whom I do not remember—some of the midshipmen.

Senator Gray. While you were there was there any communication received from shore and communicated by anyone to Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Gray. State what you know about it.

Mr. Coffman. While in the office, or rather in the captain's cabin, after the consultation, or rather after the instructions were given to the officers, and about the time we were about to leave the cabin----

The Chairman. This was on Monday?

Mr. Coffman. On Monday—Cadet Pringle came to the cabin----

Senator Gray. Who was Cadet Pringle?

Mr. Coffman. He was a cadet on the Boston, and was serving as an aid to Minister Stevens at the time. He came into the cabin and handed to Minister Stevens a communication, which Mr. Stevens afterward read. It was from Mr. Thurston. It stated that they were holding a mass meeting; that it was a success; that there was a great crowd present; that the natives had held a mass meeting, had ratified the proclamation, and had gone home quietly; and it stated if the troops are to be landed, "I advise that they be landed at once." We went ashore about an hour afterward.

Senator Frye. Have you read the testimony of Lieut. Young or Lieut. Laird?

Mr. Coffman. No; I have not seen Mr. Laird's testimony at all.

The Chairman. Do you mean before this committee?

S. Doc. 231, pt 6—---54

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Senator Frye. Yes. Or the testimony of Mr. Swinburne?

Mr. Coffman. I read Lieut. Commander Swinburne's testimony; yes. I spoke about it to Mr. Swinburne, and he said he was probably not in the cabin at the time, as he had so much to do.

Senator Frye. Whom was the note from?

Mr. Coffman. Mr. Thurston.

The Chairman. And addressed to Mr. Stevens?

Mr. Coffman. Cadet Pringle brought the note.

Senator Frye. And he was a messenger from Mr. Thurston?

Mr. Coffman. Yes. He had been at the legation most of the time.

Senator Frye. Which company were you with; where did your troops go?

Mr. Coffman. With the main battalion—the blue jackets.

Senator Frye. To Arion hall?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Frye. Was it not for the protection of life and property, when you took into consideration the state of the city, the situation of the houses, etc., as central a place for their protection as any you could find—I mean Arion Hall?

Mr. Coffman. I do not know what you would call a central location.

Senator Frye. Were not the houses of American citizens on one side as well as on the other side of Arion Hall?

Mr. Coffman. I think there was more American property on Nuuanu avenue, not in the immediate vicinity of Arion Hall.

The Chairman. By American property, do you mean business houses?

Mr. Coffman. Business houses and private residences.

Senator Frye. Private residences, I mean. They are more likely to be burned up?

Mr. Coffman. Yes. I really do not know much about the ownership of property in Honolulu, with the exception of that which is the property of those who claim to be Hawaiians, who, to a certain extent, are of American parentage, and a few Americans.

Senator Frye. Were maps left with the captain?

Mr. Coffman. That I do not know.

Senator Frye. And the instructions were, as you understood them, to protect American life and property?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Frye. That you were not to be connected with either government, the establishment of one or the overthrow of the other.

Mr. Coffman. That I do not understand. I went as an officer simply to obey the instructions as I received them.

Senator Frye. And having read Capt. Swinburne's statement, you concur otherwise in what he said?

Mr. Coffman. I have only seen what he said as published in the papers. The Evening Star has a different account from that in the Baltimore Sun. I tried to get something out of it, but it was somewhat mixed.

Senator Gray. When you said you read Capt. Swinburne's testimony you meant that you read the newspaper accounts?

Mr. Coffman. I have not read the testimony before the committee; I have not seen it.

Senator Gray. You have talked it over with Lieut. Swinburne?

Mr. Coffman. Yes; the general situation.

Senator Gray. Do you differ?

Mr. Coffman. We do in some minor points.

Senator Gray. State the minor points in which you differ.

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Mr. Coffman. I thought that the battalion was badly placed, if they were there for the sole purpose of protecting American life and property.

Senator Gray. Do you differ in any other respect?

Mr. Coffman. Lieut. Swinburne differs with me as to where was a central place. I will give my reason: If there was to be trouble, that was the place where the trouble would be; and I did not see why we should go to the point where the trouble would occur if persons who were engaged in this trouble should go to that place and claim to be Americans and ask for protection. That is my point. That is the only thing we differed about at all—the mere fact of statements as to where we went and what was done. Mr. Swinburne has, I know, from talking to him time and again, given the facts. We agree on those things.

SWORN STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BREWSTER OLESON.

Senator Frye. What is your age?

Mr. Oleson. I am 43.

Senator Frye. How long have you been living in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Oleson. I have been living there fifteen years.

Senator Frye. What fifteen years?

Mr. Oleson. From August, 1878, until June, 1893.

Senator Frye. Were you in Honolulu through the entire revolution— the recent revolution?

Mr. Oleson. I was.

Senator Frye. And through the revolution of 1887?

Mr. Oleson. Through the revolution of 1887; yes.

Senator Frye. What has been your business in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Oleson. I have been a school-teacher during my residence there.

Senator Frye. What charge have you had?

Mr. Oleson. Two schools. I was appointed to one before I left this country on the large island of Hawaii, and of the Kamehameha Manual- Labor School at Honolulu in 1886. Mrs. Bishop, the last of the Kamehameha royal line, known as Princess Pauahi, left a large sum of money, some half million of dollars, to establish a manual-training school at Honolulu.

The Chairman. Mr. Bishop seems to have been a man of great wealth?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Do you know whether he accumulated his wealth in Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. In what business was he employed?

Mr. Oleson. Commission business at first, and most of the time in the banking business. I think he got the most of his money, or at least he got the large nucleus of his capital, during the whaling days.

The Chairman. He was not connected with planting?

Mr. Oleson. Not planting; but he is a stockholder.

The Chairman. In sugar companies, you mean?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. What companies?

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Mr. Oleson. Several. He had more stock in the Lihue company. I think sugar stock in the islands is like railway stock here.

The Chairman. Where was Mr. Bishop originally from?

Mr. Oleson. He came from New York State.

Senator Frye. Have you reduced to writing an account of the proceedings in the Hawaiian Islands during the disturbing times, to which you are willing to testify?

Mr. Oleson. I have. I thought likely I might be called upon for something of the kind.

Senator Frye. You may read it as part of your testimony.

Mr. Oleson. I have made this as personal and as specific as possible.

Senator Gray. And it includes matters within your own knowledge?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I have said nothing here that I was not personally cognizant of, unless it may be some deductions based on what I was personally cognizant of.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BREWSTER OLESON.

Have been a resident of the Hawaiian Islands since August, 1878. Went there from Ohio. During my residence of fifteen years was engaged in educational work among Hawaiians, first as principal of the largest school on the island of Hawaii, and later as organizer and principal of the Kamehameha Manual Training School, established by bequest of Princess Panahi, the last of the Kamehameha royal line.

My fifteen years' residence brought me into close contact with Hawaiians, first at Hilo, and later at Honolulu. Have known, by personal observation, of the changes that have taken place in the political history of Hawaii since 1878, and was present in Honolulu during the revolutions of 1887, 1889, and 1893, being an eyewitness of those events.

Have never held any office or appointment under the Hawaiian Government, and never acted in an official capacity, except in 1887, when, as a member of the committee of thirteen, appointed by the mass meeting of citizens, I went with others to present the demands of the citizens to the King, Kalakaua. My evidence is that of a citizen who knew what was in the minds of the people.

Attended the prorogation of the legislature, Saturday, January 14. I had the impression that it was to be an historic event. I do not know to what I am to lay the impression, except that things were culminating. I had not been in the habit of attending the prorogation of the legislature, having been there only once prior to that time. Noted the absence of the better class of citizens, and of many of the most upright legislators. Later, met some of the legislators on the street, who said, in reply to my question, "What are we going to do?" "We have done all we could in the legislature, and we can do nothing more."

This was the common feeling. Men were disheartened at the dismissal of the Jones-Wilcox cabinet and the passage of the lottery bill, but no one thought of anything else but submission to the inevitable until the next Legislature should meet two years after. It was hoped that the supreme court might decide the lottery bill to be unconstitutional, but I know there was no thought of organized opposition to the Government.

The foreign population that had been united in 1887 in the movement for a new constitution had lost its cohesion through the operation of several causes.

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Notably among these was the anti-Chinese agitation, which enlisted the mechanics and tradesmen against the planters and their sympathizers. So long as the foreigners were united they were able to guide the legislation and administration of the Government. When they became divided the leaders of the anti-Chinese agitation joined forces with the natives, and the political leadership fell into the hands of men who had little sympathy with the reform movement of 1887. I wish to state here that when I say foreigners I mean voters in the Hawaiian Islands of foreign extraction, and when I say natives I do not intend to raise any race question, but simply to show that the majority in Honolulu were natives.

The depressing effect of this division was apparent in January. Men despaired of accomplishing anything through organization, and many went to the mass meeting January 16, believing that it would accomplish nothing because of lack of unity. This fact accounts in a measure for the guarded utterances on that occasion. The speakers and the committee of safety were uncertain as to how far they would have the support of the citizens.

I know that the report about the city the forenoon the meeting was held, that Marshal Wilson had forbidden citizens to meet at the armory, created strong feeling and aroused opposition that vented itself in increasing the attendance.

I know that the speakers, with a possible exception, did not voice the indignation of the citizens. During the meeting, and afterwards on the street, men were angry that the resolutions were so tame. It was not until attention was called to the large powers voted the committee that men became satisfied that something adequate would be done to restore public confidence.

The emergencies of 1887 and 1889 had prepared the citizens for decisive action. Word went around, "Have your rifle ready."

Col. Fisher, the real, though not nominal, head of the armed forces of the Provisional Government, told me on Monday afternoon, January 16, "I can get about a hundred of my men out with rifles in ten minutes." Monday afternoon there was suppressed excitement throughout Honolulu. The marshal's antagonism to the gathering of the citizens, the manifesto issued by the cabinet, the counter-meeting to allay excitement, the determination of the citizens at the meeting at the armory, were all cumulative, indicating the certainty of collision, and emphasizing the fact that the city was nominally in the control of a government not having the respect or confidence of its influential citizens, who were at work taking steps to secure for themselves what they otherwise despaired of getting. I know that there was great apprehension of disorder and incendiarism that night.

The landing of the troops allayed this.

Tuesday, January 17, I went into Honolulu (my residence being nearly 2 miles from the city), and learned that definite action was to be taken by the committee of public safety at about 2 o'clock. This was at 1:30 p.m.

I went directly to the office of W. O. Smith, where the committee were in consultation. At the door I learned that the committee would go to the Government building at 2 o'clock to take possession, and that their supporters were to rally at the same hour at the armory. The streets were filled with groups of men earnestly canvassing the situation, and there was a general purpose to stand by the committee at any cost. Men were going home for their rifles and clerks in stores were hurrying to close up.

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Starting for the armory, I heard a pistol shot close at hand, around the corner of Fort and King streets, and presently saw a policeman running to the police station with his hands on his chest, where he had been shot in attempting to capture a wagon load of ammunition.

I believe that shot decided the contest. It certainly distracted the marshal and his forces, for they forthwith shut themselves up in the police station instead of proceeding at once to quell the uprising. It revealed the determination of the citizens and resulted in a rapid massing of their forces.

From this time, 2:15 p.m. (that I will not be absolutely positive about, but I judge it is very nearly correct), until the surrender of the police station at about 7 o'clock, citizens were hurrying with their rifles from every part of the city to the Government building, passing through the streets unmolested by the forces under the marshal, or by the soldiers at the barracks.

These men could have been arrested easily except for the panic that had seized the supporters of the old Government.

Marshal Wilson and his supporters remembered the spirit shown by these same men in 1889, when they rallied in a similar way, and, without organization, by their courage and promptness, suppressed the Wilcox insurrection.

Senator Gray. Are you quoting Marshal Wilson there?

Mr. Oleson. No; I say undoubtedly, he remembered that. He remembered the spirit of those men, and that was the reason for the panic.

After the incident of the shooting I hurried to the armory, but before reaching there met Capt. Zeigler with about 40 men marching down Punchbowl street, in military order, all armed, toward the Government building. Just as I reached the armory another company marched in the same direction. There were about 3O men in the latter company.

At the armory there were more men, and others constantly reporting, some with arms, others without, the latter being furnished both with arms and ammunition. As soon as a squad got together Col. Fisher, in charge, sent them to the Government building in charge of officers.

After noting these matters I went past the barracks, noting that the soldiers were all out of sight. When I reached the Government building the last words of the proclamation were being read. The citizens whom I had seen marching from the armory were at the Government building and guards had been stationed. There must have been a hundred men at that time, and they came trooping in from all directions until the station house surrendered. At that time I should estimate there were 4 companies of 60 men each, every man well armed, and the whole well officered.

The United States troops were not in sight when I reached the Government building, with the exception of their two sentinels, and did not show themselves or make any demonstration after that.

I know that the men in the ranks had no expectation of any aid whatever from United States troops. In 1889 they had fought all day against a determined insurrection, with United States troops within a stone's throw, drawn up in line, but absolutely neutral, and they knew they had nothing to expect in 1893 but the same absolute neutrality.

I know by conversation with men in the ranks that they realized that everything depended on their own courage. I know men who, as in 1889, on their own hook, had banded together to occupy buildings in the neighborhood of the police station, intending to lay siege and cut it

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off from supplies. The feeling among the citizens was one of indifference towards the United States troops as not being an element in the conflict. I speak of the sentiment and conviction of men on whom was to fall the brunt of the conflict.

I did not learn that Minister Stevens had recognized the Government until the next day, and I am quite sure that it was not generally known until then among the armed supporters of the new Government. I did not hear the matter mentioned, though I was constantly among the men. They were talking rather about laying siege to the station house and about the likelihood of several days' desultory fighting under cover.

There was no mention about the soldiers in the barracks. I explain this as a very natural ignoring of them as combatants in the light of their performances in 1887 and 1889, when they had shown themselves averse to conflict. The citizen soldiers treated them absolutely as though they had no existence.

Senator Frye. That is the Queen's guard you are speaking about?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The conviction was that the citizens were masters of the situation as soon as they took possession of the Government building, and that possession of the other buildings was sure to come as a matter of course.

This conviction was based on the evident panic that had seized the forces under the marshal's command, and on the belief that there was no concert of action among the leading adherents of the Queen, and no fighting material behind them.

In the movement of 1887 I was opposed to the project of a republic, deeming it better to secure safeguards under a continuation of the monarchy.

I have been a consistent supporter of the Hawaiian monarchy, in public and in private, out of deference to the prejudices of the aborigines.

It seemed wise to avoid any such radical change until it was actually thrust upon the community by the inevitable collapse of the monarchy.

The events of Saturday, January 14, convinced me that there was no option left to the intelligent and responsible portion of the community but to complete the overthrow initiated by the monarch herself. It was essentially either a return to semibarbarism or the continued control of the country by the forces of progress and civilization, and few men hesitated in making the choice, and the development of events has confirmed their decision.

Senator Frye. You made a more general statement at Worcester.

Mr. Oleson. No; at Boston.

Senator Frye. Have you that in print?

Mr. Oleson. It was printed, but not by me.

Senator Frye. You have it in print?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Frye. I have looked over the statement just referred to, and I would like, Mr. Oleson, to put that in as additional testimony. It is a little broader than that just read.

Senator Gray. I do not like to object, because we have large latitude; but when a witness is before us, and has read a statement which he has carefully prepared, he should stand on that, and not put in statements that he has made at a public meeting.

Mr. Oleson. This is to explain. It is quite different from the one I have just made. This is a sort of general consideration of the causes leading up to this change. It goes back to twenty years ago.

Senator Gray. It does not relate to these three important days.

Mr. Oleson. It touches upon those days very little indeed.

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Senator Frye. It touches it only so far as to indicate that this thing was of gradual growth. As we have been taking testimony this is undoubtedly admissible. It is nothing that you would object to.

Senator Gray. I withdraw my objection.

The Chairman. Do you confirm the statements made in that paper?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I would say that I have incorporated facts here that I was not cognizant of. That is not the case with my statement just read. But such facts have gone on record in the papers and records of the Legislature.

The Chairman. So far as the statements in that paper are within your knowledge they are true?

Mr. Oleson. Exactly.

The statement is as follows:

"SOME ELEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF HAWAII.
"At a recent meeting of the Congregational Club, in Horticultural Hall, Mr. William Brewster Oleson read a very interesting paper on Elements in the Political Evolution of Hawaii, as follows:
"I shall confine myself on this occasion to the period of twenty years ago, from January, 1873, to January, 1893. I shall also limit myself to a mere allusion to the more salient events in that brief period of constitutional development.
"An important factor in the political evolution of Hawaii was furnished by the career of Kalakaua, the immediate predecessor and brother of Liliuokalaui.
"In 1873 he advocated his election to the vacant throne by promising to abolish the poll tax, to fill all Government offices with natives, and to remove the prohibitions on the sale of liquor to the aborigines. He was unpopular with his own people, and his rival, Lunalilo, was enthusiastically elected King.
"Soon after Lunalilo died, and on February 12, 1874, Kalakaua was elected King by the Legislature. It was charged, and generally believed, that he was elected by the use of bribes. It is sufficient here to say that he was protected from a mob of his own people, for a period of five days after his election, by United States troops.
"During his reign he dismissed capable and upright officials and filled the civil service with political adventurers, who brought scandal to every department of the Government. He caused grogshops to be licensed in the country districts against the protests of his own people.
"He raised the cry, 'Hawaii for Hawaiians,' hoping thus to curry popularity by exciting race jealousies against foreigners. He sought to create a state church of which he should be the head. His visits to the other islands were utilized for the recrudescence of lascivious orgies of the old heathen religion. He rehabilitated the trade of sorcery, and turned the influence of the Kahunas to his own political advantage.
"He stationed soldiers with side arms in double rows at polling places, thus intimidating voters and pushing men out of line who were suspected of opposition to his schemes, thus forcibly preventing their voting. He appointed legislators to lucrative Government positions while they continued to retain seats in the Legislature.
"He had the Legislature in 1886 adjourn for three weeks so that members who were tax assessors might go home and perform their duties. These men he employed to carry through the Legislature pernicious and extravagant legislation in opposition to the sentiment of the people. He used the royal franking privilege to pass through the custom-
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house, free of duty, liquors belonging to certain firms, thus, In one instance, defrauding the Government of revenue to the amount of $4,749.35.
"For this service he received hundreds of cases of cheap gin, which he sent to every voting precinct to secure the election of his candidates to the Legislature. He went personally to one country district, with a company of soldiers, and by their votes defeated Pilipo, the lion of North Kona, Kalakaua's staunchest opponent in the Legislature.
"He laid claim to the 'primacy of the Pacific,' and sent royal commissioners to the New Hebrides and Gilbert Islands and Samoa to prepare for a Hawaiian protectorate over those islands. He warned the great powers of Europe, in a grandiloquent protest, against any further annexation of islands in the Pacific Ocean, claiming for Hawaii exclusive right 'to assist those islands in improving their social and political condition.'
"Finally, he accepted a bribe of $71,000 from a Chinaman, named Aki, for an opium license, which he had already sold and delivered to another Chinaman, who had paid $80,000 for it.
"This career of Kalakaua's had a twofold effect, viz, of arranging in increasing antagonism and bitterness the progressive and retrogressive elements in the population, and of bestowing leadership, on one hand, on the servile partisans of the King, and, on the other, on intelligent Anglo-Saxons, who have, from that time to this, counted as their adherents the more stalwart and independent Hawaiians.
"Another element in the political evolution of Hawaii has been the decay of the native race.
"The census of 1823 showed the population to be 130,313. According to the census of 1890 the native Hawaiians numbered 34,430, a decrease since 1823 of 95,877. The annual decrease since 1866 has averaged 1,085. Thus, since 1860, when the native Hawaiians numbered 66,984, the decrease has been 50 per cent.
"The native Hawaiians now number about one-third of the population. Thus the total population in 1890 was 89,990, of which the Hawaiian numbered 34,430, the Chinese, Japanese, and Polynesians 28,249, and the white foreigners, many of whom were born in the land, 27,305. This decrease of Hawaiians and the corresponding increase of foreigners have depressed the native race, but with an opposite effect on the two radically diverse wings. Thus, on those more susceptible to the corrupting influences of the throne who have fallen into dissipation, and who are seeking their own personal advancement at the expense of all political morality, this alarming decrease has had the effect of exciting intense race hatred.
"Of those, however, who are allied to the churches, who have been stalwart in their resistance to Kalakaua's demoralizing influences, who are to-day the personification of the character and conscience of this remnant of a race, this decrease has had the effect of drawing them into closer and trustful fellowship with the better class of Anglo-Saxons.
"Another element in the political evolution of Hawaii has been the growth of the Anglo Saxon population, which has naturally resulted in the bestowment of political privileges, not otherwise enjoyed even by the Hawaiian people themselves.
"This foreign population pays four-fifths of the taxes. It has furnished the capital and skill in the development of every business and industrial enterprise in Hawaii. It is a resident population, with permanent homes and schools and churches and libraries, and social,
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commercial, and industrial organizations. Under its influence the instruction in all the schools is in the English language. It has its chamber of commerce, its social science association, its historical society, its banks and railroads, and electric lighting, and manual training schools, and benevolent organizations, and elemosynary institutions. It constitutes the intelligent, progressive, patriotic, governing ability of Hawaii. Hawaiian churches and schools, and every good work among them, rely on this foreign population for financial assistance.
"The best elements among Hawaiians have in the past twenty years uniformly cast in their lot with the white foreigners, and have gratefully accepted their leadership.
"This foreign population did not possess suffrage rights until 1887. Under the comparatively wholesome reign of the Kamehameha dynasty there had arisen no occasion for foreigners to feel the need of suffrage rights to protect their interests.
"The career of Kalakaua led to several indignation mass meetings. The first, in August, 1880, protested against the summary dismissal, at 1 o'clock in the morning, of a worthy cabinet, having a majority of twenty-four in the legislature. This cabinet was dismissed at the instance of Claus Spreckels, because it would not permit his acquisition of certain Government water privileges in defiance of public interests.
"Two days later another mass meeting compelled the dismissal of the infamous Moreno ministry.
"On June 30, 1887, the patience of the foreign element having exhausted itself, an enthusiastic mass meeting passed resolutions to the effect 'that the administration of the Hawaiian Government has ceased, through corruption and incompetence, to perform the functions and afford the protection to personal and property rights, for which all governments exists, and exacting of the King specific pledges, within twenty-four hours, of future good conduct on the basis of a new constitution.
"The constitution of 1887, subsequently signed by the King, in conformity with the demands of this mass meeting, made 'every male resident of Hawaii, of American or European descent, after one year's residence, a legal voter.' Other privileges were conferred, distinctly enlarging the measure of Hawaiian citizenship, and effectually removing the throne from interference in the Government.
"This arrangement deferred to the traditions of the land, retaining the King as a figurehead, while it placed the responsibility for the Government on a cabinet subject to removal by vote of the Legislature elected by the people.
"Emerging thus from an era of bombastic display and political corruption and gross immorality, for six years Hawaii had a wise administration of affairs.
"Liliuokalani abhorred the constitution of 1887, and after she came to the throne, at the death of Kalakaua, sought to recover the ancient prerogatives of the throne. January of this year, after being baffled in her attempts for months by the majority in the Legislature, found Liliuokalani ready to resort to drastic measures.
"She secured enough votes to oust the best cabinet Hawaii had enjoyed, by agreeing on her part to sign the odious lottery bill. She appointed a ministry in sympathy with her desire for absolute power, prorogued the legislature, and undertook in the presence of her armed
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troops to abrogate the constitution of 1887 and to promulgate a new one, making her well-nigh an absolute monarch.
"This lead to the great mass meeting of January 10, 1893, which took steps to organize a new government and to seek annexation to the United States.
"In all their efforts since 1880 to gain reasonably good government and, having gained it, to retain it, the foreign population have never had the slightest aid from any foreign government, either by force of arms or by stroke of diplomacy.
"In 1889, when the police and royal troops proved unreliable and the citizens had to rally and suppress a thoroughly organized rebellion, they learned that the forces of law and order were not to expect, even in such crises, the slightest aid from United States troops, although those troops were ashore and under arms all day in close proximity to the scene of conflict.
"If a timid man, last January, was frightened and hoped for aid and protection from United States troops he had nothing to base that hope upon. The aroused citizens were better prepared to cope with the Queen's forces last January than in 1889, when they so successfully quelled the Wilcox insurrection; and, moreover, the Queen and her cabinet knew it, and discreetly avoided a conflict. Men in the ranks who had the fighting to do knew they must do it themselves. Any other representation is false to facts, which can be amply demonstrated.
"Granting that Mr. Blount sought an honest and impartial verdict on the circumstances attending the establishment of the Provisional Government, the nature of all the evidence submitted is such that another man, equally just and impartial, could have arrived, legitimately, at a diametrically opposite conclusion, with an abundance of facts to establish it.
"This foreign population, that has been such a potent factor in the political evolution of Hawaii, has never taken united action except in behalf of good government. It has been moderate in its demands, humane in its action, patient with the frailties of an effete monarchy, and uniformly considerate of the political rights of native Hawaiians.
"Twenty years of progressive participation in public affairs prepared the foreign population, when the monarchy collapsed, to assume the responsibility for initiating stable and efficient government in the interests of all. This it has courageously undertaken, and with a remarkable measure of success, while awaiting the decision of the United States on the proposal for annexation. It must be borne in mind that the United States was not requested to adjudicate domestic differences in Hawaii, nor was that the ground on which the Provisional Government was accorded recognition by all the civilized nations. Because of its peculiar relations to Hawaii, covering a period of fifty years, this great country was appealed to to provide a basis for progressive, responsible, republican government.
"Such an evolution as I have briefly outlined has crystallized antagonisms and prejudices which it will take years to dissolve, and which would menace and imperil any purely independent national existence. The liability to political unrest, if not actual revolution, would prove as disastrous to Hawaii as in so many instances it has proved to Central American republics.
"The situation is so peculiar as to call for the fostering supervision of some strong foreign power under which it would be possible for an efficient and progressive government to grow up, advantageous alike
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to Hawaii and the commercial and humanitarian interests of that vast ocean.
"Such a protective relation the United States has officially declared it will not permit any other nation to assume toward Hawaii. The progress of events demonstrates that, sooner or later, foreign intervention from some quarter is inevitable. If the United States insists that no other nation shall assume the responsibility of guaranteeing in Hawaii the blessings of civilized government, that responsibility the United States is morally bound to accept itself.
"Boston, November 29,1893."

Senator Gray. You say that you arrived at the Government house on the 17th when the last words of the proclamation of the Provisional Government were being read?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. And that you observed about 100 men there?

Mr. Oleson. I immediately went into the Government yard and looked about. I should say that there must have been 100 men inside and outside the building.

Senator Frye. Armed men?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. I understand you did not count them?

Mr. Oleson. No; did not count them. But I have been used to seeing military companies.

Senator Gray. As there have been other estimates, I want to understand whether you counted the men there.

Mr. Oleson. No; I did not count them.

Senator Gray. Did you that afternoon go over to Arion Hall, where the United States troops were?

Mr. Oleson. No; they did not make the slightest impression----

Senator Gray. I asked if you went over there.

Mr. Oleson. No. Coming down Richard street Arion Hall is in full view. I did not see any troops, as I say; I saw but 2 sentries. Richard street is to the west of the palace. If you have a map here, I will trace my course. Here [indicating on the diagram] on the corner of King and Bethel streets was the point from which I started. I went along King to Fort street. I went down to the corner of Merchant, to Mr. Smith's office; came back Fort street to King street to the spot I started from, to see some friends. I came here [indicating], nearly to the corner of King and Fort streets, when I heard the shot. Then I went up Fort street to Hotel street and came through Hotel street to Palace lane. Coming along Hotel street, I went up Palace lane past the barracks. This [indicating] is Palace lane. I went through here up to Punchbowl street; up Punchbowl street to Beretania street, where the armory is. As I arrived here on Palace lane, in full view of Punchbowl street, Capt. Ziegler was passing—going down Punchbowl street. When I got up to the corner of Punchbowl and Beretania there was another company started down Punchbowl street. I went into the armory and shortly afterward came down Punchbowl street to Palace lane, and noted that there were none of the royal soldiers in sight; came down Richard street, and in coming down Richard street Arion Hall is in full view, back of the opera house. I came down through Richard street to Palace Square, down through that little lane [indicating], and went into the Government yard.

Senator Frye. And all the troops that you saw at Arion Hall were the 2 sentries?

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Mr. Oleson. Yes. They may have been there, but I did not see them, and I think I should have seen them. I was walking down Richard street with Prof. Scott, and we were talking about the situation and hurrying toward the Government building. We might have been in conversation, and for that reason not have seen them. But my impression is they were not there.

Senator Frye. Not in view.

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. Did you know at that time that the soldiers were stationed there?

Mr. Oleson. Oh, yes; I knew they were there.

Senator Gray. And you did not look to see if they were there?

Mr. Oleson. No. I know they landed the night before and stopped on Mr. Atherton's grounds the night before.

Senator Gray. Who is Mr. Atherton, an American?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. Where is his house?

Mr. Oleson. He is a commission merchant.

Senator Gray. Will you point out his house?

Mr. Oleson. It is right out on King street.

Senator Gray. Has it large grounds around it?

Mr. Oleson. Yes—another house here [indicating], and then his grounds go clear through—extensive grounds.

Senator Gray. Were you out there when the troops were there?

Mr. Oleson. I went out when they were there; yes.

Senator Gray. That was on Monday evening?

Mr. Oleson. That was on Monday evening.

Senator Gray. Were you there when they marched away?

Mr. Oleson. I was not; no.

Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Stevens that day?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. Of course you had no conversation with him if you did not see him ?

Mr. Oleson. I did not see him after his trip to Hawaii.

Senator Gray. Did you know many of these men whom you saw with arms around the Government building that day?

Mr. Oleson. I lived outside of the city; I know a good many men, having little to do with the affairs of the city; I know a good many by name. I know a good many of them were engaged in the revolution of 1887 and 1889.

Senator Gray. Did you talk with any of them that day?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; while we were at the Government building.

Senator Gray. How many of them?

Mr. Oleson. I went from one group to another to see what the sentiment was.

Senator Gray. The men were in groups?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. Not in military array?

Mr. Oleson. A large guard and two companies in line; the others were in the Government building, with arms stacked in the legislative hall.

Senator Gray. They were the men you talked to?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; not the men in line.

Senator Gray. Not the men in the line?

Mr. Oleson. I talked with some of them.

Senator Gray. Whom?

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Mr. Oleson. Mr. Adnerson, who was one of my teachers. He was in one of the companies. I had special permission to go to the gate to see some friends who called to see me.

Senator Gray. Were you under arms?

Mr. Oleson. I was under arms; yes.

Senator Gray. Were you attached to any company?

Mr. Oleson. I was attached to one of the companies; yes.

Mr. Gray. Were you walking around all this time while you were under arms and attached to a company.

Mr. Oleson. I did not get my rifle until just before the police station was surrendered; so I was not in line with the other men until that time. I had reported and had been assigned to a company.

Senator Gray. But you were still walking around among the people and around the Government building?

Mr. Oleson. We were allowed to do that; yes.

Senator Gray. Were you in Honolulu when the troops were landed Monday evening?

Mr. Oleson. I was not in the city.

Senator Gray. You did not see them when they landed and marched out?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. It was afterward you heard they were there and went out?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I saw them in the evening, in Mr. Atherton's yard.

Senator Gray. And you saw them in Arion Hall?

Mr. Oleson. I heard the next day that they were in Arion Hall.

Senator Gray. I thought you said you were there when the troops marched back to Arion Hall?

Mr. Oleson. No; I just dropped off a horse car that evening where the troops were. I stopped to see what they were doing there. I asked the people what they were about, what the troops were there for, and the people did not seem to know.

Senator Gray. Did you not know they were there before you started out in the horse car?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. Where were you going?

Mr. Oleson. Out to make a call, I think.

Senator Gray. Where?

Mr. Oleson. I think I went out to Mr. W. A. Bowen's, a friend of mine.

Senator Gray. Where does he live?

Mr. Oleson. It is a street that runs parallel with King street—the second street to the north, running parallel to King street.

Senator Gray. How far out-past Mr. Atherton's?

Mr. Oleson. Oh, yes.

Senator Gray. Beyond Mr. Atherton's?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; quite a distance beyond.

Senator Gray. And you got out when you got to Mr. Atherton's for the purpose of seeing the troops?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. How long were you there?

Mr. Oleson. Just a few minutes.

Senator Gray. Then you went on and made your call?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

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Senator Gray. Hid you come in on the horse cars? When you came in did you see the soldiers ?

Mr. Oleson. I think I came in on the Beretania street line, the next street running parallel with King street.

Senator Gray. And you did not see the soldiers?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. And you did hear where they were?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. You did not hear until the next day, Tuesday?

Mr. Oleson. Tuesday.

Senator Gray. How did you learn it?

Mr. Oleson. I learned it through the morning paper. When I received that I do not know. I did not go into the city until about 1 o'clock.

Senator Gray. And you had your paper before you went into the city?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. You have been an instructor of education and connected with the islands for fifteen years?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. Does that bring you in contact with the native population?

Mr. Oleson. Altogether.

Senator Gray. What do you find among the common people—those whom you come in contact with—in regard to learning, manners, and the ordinary intellectual conditions?

Mr. Oleson. I have a great regard for the Hawaiians, having mingled with them so much, and I have a high estimate as to their good nature and imitative faculties, and as to their fitness for manual employment. I do not think the higher education is suitable for them—I do not think they are fit for it, and having obtained it, they can not make a right use of it.

Senator Gray. But they have had the opportunities?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. Since I have been in the islands my efforts have been to pull down the course of study. They had previously taught them calculus and trigonometry in the schools, but the Kamehameha school did not go beyond algebra. That was put in to please the boys.

Senator Gray. You thought it was better to adhere to the average native capacity?

Mr. Oleson. Certainly. We had extensive manual-training shops there, blacksmith, iron and machine works, wood turning, printing, carpenter work; and it was my aim in organizing the school—I had to overcome many difficulties—to make it a manual-training school, so as to develop the Hawaiians on the side they showed the most aptitude for.

Senator Gray. Do you think they are susceptible of as high training and as broad culture as the white race?

Mr. Oleson. They have very little faculty for originating—they are great imitators. That is shown in their manual-training work; they can do a thing after they are shown how to do it.

Senator Gray. Is not that a characteristic of the inferior races?

Mr. Oleson. Certainly.

Senator Gray. And you would consider them an inferior race?

Mr. Oleson. As compared with the Anglo-Saxon. They have many good traits, lovable traits, and I have cherished a high estimate for the Hawaiians since my residence in the islands. I do not know any men more stalwart than some of them have been under temptation.

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Senator Gray. You think that the population is capable of self government in the sense we understand it in the States and with our own race?

Mr. Oleson. With some conditions. Under the leadership of Anglo- Saxons, the Hawaiian population up to 1880 was pretty well divided up, with a majority against any encroachment on the part of the throne on the rights of the people. There was a demand for larger popular rights, and those people stood together. But, as I have undertaken to show in my paper, that majority was dissipated, as the effect of Kalakaua's reign in matters of bribery and intimidation and the revival of the old kahuna system in the country, which tended to subvert and to intimidate the Hawaiians. So that, while I have stayed there, I have witnessed that change. But to-day there is a good proportion of the Hawaiians who are stalwart and firm in their support of annexation as the best outcome for that country—staunch friends of the white man. And the effort made by the white men who have been allied with the reform movement has been to advance the interest of Hawaiians as well as those of the Anglo-Saxon. But there is a large element that is affected, intimidated by the throne, and they are indifferent to-day. They do not dare to do anything, much less take one side or the other. They can be appealed to by race prejudice in ways that the Anglo-Saxon can not approach them; and in that way the electorate is subverted, and, in my opinion, no matter how much I may think of the native, it is impossible to get an adequately representative vote among them

Senator Gray. Do you think a successful and prosperous government for the good of all interests, native as well as all others, is possible on those islands, except under a strong government ruled and controlled by men of our own race?

Mr. Oleson. Our race has always ruled the government, and I do not see any reason to change my opinion as to the necessity; that is history; that is the outlook. I do feel that the continuation of such a government as they have there now will eventually swing over to the side of the present government a large number of the natives, it may be a majority.

Senator Gray. The government you have there is a Provisional Government, and under the control of the superior race of the islands?

Mr. Oleson. It is entirely.

Senator Gray. And it is strong?

Mr. Oleson. It is strong in every sense of the word.

Senator Gray. It is autocratic?

Mr. Oleson. No; it is oligarchy.

Senator Gray. Oligarchy describes it better than the word I used?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. I accept your word as better than mine.

Mr. Oleson. I think it is an important matter to show how it was that the men who formed the committee of safety were able to take possession of that Government, and to call attention to that public meeting that was held in the public square on the same day that the meeting was held in the armory.

It was the general opinion on every side that the public manifesto of the Queen and cabinet announcing that there would be no further attempt from the throne to promulgate a constitution was a desperate move to placate the indignant foreign population. The mass meeting in Palace Square was engineered by the cabinet and the marshal who publicly stated that such men as Wilcox and Nawahi were not to be

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speakers. He said "We have given orders that the tone of the speaking must be moderate." Nawahi and Wilcox did speak, men who had always been fiery agitators and persistent in their demands for a new constitution. This meeting, made up of advocates of a new constitution, the leaders of which had conspired with the Queen to secure such constitution, voted an expression of thanks to the Queen for her manifesto.

Men knew that this action was insincere, as they also believed the Queen's to be, and the effect of the meeting and of the manifesto was to convince the community of the panic that had seized the Government and of their readiness to resort to any expedient to allay the indignation of the people and to prevent their organization. It was these considerations that help to explain the passivity of the Queen's forces and the ease with which the Provisional Government assumed control.

Senator Gray. Did you hear those orders given?

Mr. Oleson. Marshal Wilson told it to a gentlemen who told it to me.

Senator Gray. Marshal Wilson did not tell it to you?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. You were asked to confine yourself to facts that came within your own observation and what you knew. That is argumentative.

The Chairman. You are evidently speaking of matters which you know of only by common repute.

Mr. Oleson. I speak of matters in addition—matters of common talk on the streets after the mass meeting.

The Chairman. But not of matters within your personal knowledge?

Mr. Oleson. Certainly; knowledge of the character of these men who were speaking.

The Chairman. You believed it, but you did not hear it?

Mr. Oleson. I passed by the meeting. I know that those men were there.

The Chairman. Were they speaking?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I believe they were speaking.

The Chairman. Which one?

Mr. Oleson. Mr. Robert Wilcox, I think.

Senator Gray. Were you present at both meetings?

Mr. Oleson. I passed by one to the other; yes.

Senator Gray. What is your estimate of the number of persons present at the two meetings—a fair estimate?

Mr. Oleson. I should say that the numbers at the armory were considerably in excess of those at the public square. But there were men continually going to and fro.

Senator Frye. The public square meeting was a Royalist meeting, and the armory meeting was the Provisional Government meeting?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. You say that you think the numbers in the public square were less than those in the armory ?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I judge so.

Senator Gray. The meeting in the armory was in the building?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. And the meeting in the square was in the open?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. Were you not a little careful of comparing the numbers of those in the open to those in the four walls of the building?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I have been used to judging audiences, and I judged at the armory there were some 1,200 present. One of the

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editors of the paper stated that by actual count there were a little less than 1,100. He gave the actual numbers at the time.

Senator Gray. How far were those meetings apart?

Mr. Oleson. A little less than a quarter of a mile.

Senator Gray. Short distance enough to allow a shifting back and forth?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; there were very few went away from the meeting in the armory; but there were others outside, representing the indifferent class, to see how the thing was going. They would range themselves at the public square meeting, as on other similar occasions, on the sidewalk toward the palace, when the meeting was on the other side of the railroad track.

Senator Gray. You were at both meetings?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. You spoke of having a feeling of friendship for the Hawaiian people?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. And the Hawaiian character?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Will you state whether that is a common feeling amongst the white men of Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. That is a very difficult question to answer. There are two classes of white men in the country: it is doubtful which class is the more numerous. The more recent class in the country have a low estimate of the native character; but the older residents of the country have always been friendly, and have had an attraction toward the Hawaiians, and have always done a great deal for them.

The Chairman. That is the body of the people which you call missionaries?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; the older residents, who have known Hawaiians outside of Honolulu—known them under circumstances different from those which have come up since 1880.

The Chairman. In the Hawaiian Islands, who are classed as missionaries?

Mr. Oleson. Any man who is in favor of good order and against pernicious legislation is a missionary.

The Chairman. And so classed?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. And it is no matter whether he is of correct life or not.

Senator Gray. Because the missionary element leads that movement?

Mr. Oleson. I do not know, except that it comes about incidentally.

Senator Gray. Is it not a fact that the descendants of those missionaries, being descendants of our own race and blood, and living there and having an interest in the islands, are supposed to have an interest that does not belong to the later comers, to those more transient?

Mr. Oleson. In the native race, you mean?

Senator Gray. Yes.

Mr. Oleson. Yes?

The Chairman. The native race have a respect for the real missionary?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. There is hardly a man, an old resident, who has been in public life, who has any prominence in this movement, who has not at one time or another represented an almost entirely native constituency in the legislature.

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The Chairman. There seems to be a progress made in all educational development, Christian development, etc. Is that the work of the class called missionaries?

Mr. Oleson. I think it comes from the fact of their residence among the missionaries; yes.

The Chairman. And that gives impulse to all these movements to enlightenment and civilization in Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. The conditions have changed now. In earlier times, when the white population was less in number than now, the affiliations were greater between the Hawaiians and the whites, because they were thrown among each other in matters of residence— they were out in the country nearer together. The plantation system has broken that up; and the political situation—I speak of the revolution— has also brought about that change.

The Chairman. Is the progress of education in Hawaii due to the efforts of this party called the missionaries—the old missionaries there?

Mr. Oleson. I should say that all the intelligent and law-loving members of the community (with possible exceptions which can be explained) are in this movement. Those exceptions are men who are more or less connected with the embassies, or who are agitators of anti- American ideas, who, being adventurers in that country, have but little or no property interests—are interested in the schemes for smuggling opium, or laws which are intended for their personal interests. They use the natives, but they have no real regard for them. I can put in, use and abuse. I know about the attitude of this class who are at the head of the Government in relation to the schools.

The Chairman. Do you mean the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; men who are influential in it. I know of their generosity in the way of support of Hawaiians in the schools. I have had connection not only with the two schools I mentioned, but others; and I know the help granted by these men has been enormous. They have supported individuals in the schools, and have done it because of aloha for the natives.

The Chairman. Has there been a general dissemination of knowledge of English amongst the Hawaiians in the elementary studies?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. But a great many of them are able to read in an English book who can not talk English, except indifferently.

The Chairman. My question had reference to the extent.

Mr. Oleson. It is extensive in the sense that the Hawaiians can read and write as perhaps no other people can according to population.

The Chairman. Since you have been living in Hawaii, have you seen any marked progress in morality or personal respectability amongst what you call the Hawaiians, the native Kanakas?

Mr. Oleson. I think that in the city of Honolulu there is much more immorality than there is out in the country. I shall have to associate my observation in Honolulu with that of an observer in Hilo. In the country, the commingling of the races and the immoralities which are the bane of Hawaiian social life are not so excessive and flagrant as in the city of Honolulu. But there are causes for that, of course.

The Chairman. But as a general rule or result, has the influence, the efforts of the missionary party (I will call them), in Hawaii been beneficial or otherwise to the people?

Mr. Oleson. Beneficial to the people. I do not think there has been

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a single thing gained by the Anglo-Saxon population that has not been shared with the Hawaiians. There has been no race feeling whatever on the part of the influential foreigner in the political reforms of recent years. One point showing race animosity on the part of Hawaiians was when the appointive power of the King for nobles was taken away from him and the nobles were made elective by the people. This was not to be by the fullest, broadest suffrage rights, but by limitations, educational and property, and the Hawaiians claimed that was inimical to them. But as a matter of fact there are a great many Hawaiians who are noble voters who are within those qualifications. I was present when some of the articles of that constitution were discussed, and I personally, with others, made a strenuous movement at the time, and it was pretty well supported, to make that property qualification less than was proposed, so as to take in the Hawaiian ministers. The Hawaiian ministers have, in a measure, been the backers of good government.

The Chairman. Let me ask you if these kindly measures and good efforts of the party which you now call the missionary party seem to have been influenced by the motive of selfish gain or aggrandizement, acquisition of power, or one of real generosity toward the people of Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. I think it has been one of generosity toward the people of Hawaii; a movement in their own interest. You may speak of it as a selfish movement, if you take the demand and determination to have a good government as selfish interest. It was not any sordid movement; it had its source in moral considerations.

The Chairman. That has characterized the whole interests of Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. Yes, one little fact will show you the character of the members of the Provisional Government and of the advisory council as men who, giving a great deal of valuable time to the necessary legislation of the present Government, are men receiving no salary whatever. The nobles received no salary whatever under the constitution of 1887.

The Chairman. Was there, at the date of this revolution, to your knowledge, any organization whatever, secret or open, for the purpose of dethroning the Queen?

Mr. Oleson. No.

The Chairman. Or for the purpose of annexing the islands to the United States?

Mr. Oleson. No.

The Chairman. If such an organization or combination had existed, would you have kncwn it?

Mr. Oleson. I would have known it.

The Chairman. Are you satisfied to state that there was no such organization ?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. When did you first hear of the movement to dethrone the Queen?

Mr. Oleson. That was whispered after the mass meeting. Men came from that and said: "Why don't they do something?" Large powers were given to the committee of safety to go on and organize the government, and men said, "That means that the Queen is out."

The Chairman. That was the first time you heard of it?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. After the mass meeting?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I do not know that that committee, previous to

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the meeting, expected to be backed to such an extent as to warrant them to go on; but, as I say, that is my opinion.

The Chairman. Amongst the Americans there in Hawaii, since you have resided on the islands, has there been any evident disposition to promote annexation to the United States?

Mr. Oleson. There has been no concerted attempt; it has been written on publicly in the papers. Men have advocated it in the papers, and Hawaiians have advocated it more than the Americans.

The Chairman. Do you speak of the Kanakas?

Mr. Oleson. Native Hawaiians. I am not speaking of the white people.

The Chairman. You said the Americans?

Mr. Oleson. No, the Kanakas, the native Hawaiians.

The Chairman. That they have advocated it more strenuously than the white people?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. I mean in public.

The Chairman. Then it was a subject of open political discussion?

Mr. Oleson. Yes—only that it was not very common; once in a while there would be something about it in the papers; some one would say something of it.

The Chairman. It is a topic that has been discussed?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; for a good many years.

The Chairman. Has there been any disposition evinced, to your knowledge, of annexation to any other country, or toward claiming a protectorate of any other country than the United States?

Mr. Oleson. No. When that has been broached in my presence I have uniformly heard disapprobation of it. That is the sentiment of the native Hawaiians, Kanakas, as well as amongst the Americans, and also among many of the English.

The Chairman. Do you know whether they celebrate our National days there?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; the Fourth of July has been the celebration day since I have been in the country.

The Chairman. Do the Kanakas celebrate?

Mr. Oleson. They do not participate in the speeches; but they do in the sports, the prizes, etc.—boat races.

The Chairman. They enter with enthusiasm into the celebration as a national fete.

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. How about the Thanksgiving that is proclaimed by the President of the United States?

Mr. Oleson. That day is observed in a quiet way; it is a semiholiday— the Hawaiians do not size that up, quite.

The Chairman. I notice that Mr. Willis mentions that it is observed?

Mr. Oleson. It is observed; but not anything like the Fourth of July.

The Chairman. Would you say that there was a feeling amongst the general population, white and Kanaka, of the Hawaiian Islands of a decided character in favor of the United States as a friendly government, or as the one to which they would ultimately look for protection in any emergency?

Mr. Oleson. I think that that is the majority sentiment in that country among all classes.

The Chairman. Has it been such since you have resided there?

Mr. Oleson. No; I think it has been gradually growing, as men of

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all classes have faced what they uniformly agreed was inevitable for Hawaii.

The Chairman. Upon what ground do you base that conclusion— that the monarchy must inevitably collapse?

Mr. Oleson. To, first, the dying out of the Kamehameha line; second, the abuses of the reign of Kalakaua among the Hawaiians, not yet become extinct. There was intense opposition to him when he became King. That lies dormant in the minds of the Hawaiians— that these kings are not high chiefs, that there must be an end to their rule sooner or later, and that they must have a government from elsewhere.

The Chairman. If you believed Kalakaua to be a heathen, why did you not attempt to overthrow him in 1887?

Mr. Oleson. There was a very strong sentiment to do it at the time.

The Chairman. Do you know the reason why it was not put into effect?

Mr. Oleson. As I said in my statement, because those men who were influential felt that it was better not to make any such radical change until the country was ripe for it and the situation demanded it.

The Chairman. You have been waiting for public sentiment to ripen upon this question and the coming of events to show that it was better for the safety and security of good government in Hawaii that the monarchy should fall?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Be substituted by a different form of government?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; as a logical sequence.

The Chairman. Monarchy through the world is regarded as being a stronger form of government than a republic. Did the people of Hawaii expect that when the monarchy should cease they would be able to establish and maintain a republican government in Hawaii of their own resources and without assistance from any other country?

Mr. Oleson. No; I did not, personally; and those that I talked with did not. We felt that it was impossible in the light of past experience, and of the facts that we knew, for us to sustain an independent national existence there.

The Chairman. So that, at the collapse of the monarchy, whenever that should occur, it was intimately associated, as I understand, with the idea of annexation to the United States?

Mr. Oleson. That was the solution of it.

The Chairman. And the two ideas ran together?

Mr. Oleson. Ran together. It was just as if the men had said "We will go on with the monarchy as long as we can, and when we can not the United States will take us."

The Chairman. That was the whole idea?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. The idea of going on separately from the United States without the protection of the United States or the other countries has not been entertained?

Mr. Oleson. That has not been entertained, except by Ashford and Wilcox, as I deem very natural, when we consider their personal interests lay in the direction of maintaining a republic. They would then be able to dicker with the United States and get appointments in that way. But I do not think men of intelligence have for a moment thought of it. They may be able to do it, after all, and sustain their rights. But when men followed this movement, they followed it as a tentative matter and thought that was the only responsible government

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they could get in the islands at the time. But the ultimate out come must be annexation to the United States.

The Chairman. The present provisional forces of the Provisional Government, that the Government seems to be able to equip, arm, and pay, as I gather from this testimony, are about 1,200 men.

Mr. Oleson. I do not know that there are as many as that to pay. Some of the volunteer forces are not under the pay of the Government.

The Chairman. Omitting the question of pay, the present military force of the Provisional Government is 1,200 men.

Mr. Oleson. I think between 1,200 and 1,500.

The Chairman. Are those men well armed and equipped?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. With modern guns?

Mr. Oleson. With modern guns; yes.

The Chairman. And modern ammunition?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Are they composed most largely of the white race?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Are there any native Kanakas enrolled in this force?

Mr. Oleson. I think there are some. Kanakas are not fighters.

The Chairman. They are not belligerent?

Mr. Oleson. They are in talking; but not beyond that.

The Chairman. They are a passionate people, and might be roused into hostility?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; but in cold blood I do not think the native would fight.

The Chairman. Suppose the Queen had the means of arming 1,000 or 1,200 natives, an equal number of natives, with equal facilities of all kinds, arms, ammunition, equipments, such as the Provisional Government forces have, and of placing such men under such drill as would make of them soldiers who could be handled in action, what would be your opinion of the ability of that number of Kanakas, thus armed and equipped, to stand against 1,200 white men?

Mr. Oleson. Wholly hypothetical.

The Chairman. What is your opinion?

Mr. Oleson. I do not think they would stand at all.

The Chairman. DO you think they would ever attempt to stand?

Mr. Oleson. No.

The Chairman. You think they have such an estimate of the courage of the white race, and of that race's fighting quality, that they would not make a stand against them?

Mr. Oleson. They would not.

The Chairman. Although they were perfectly armed, equipped, organized as an army ready to defend the Queen?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; they could not be depended upon—that has been proven repeatedly.

The Chairman. By actual experience?

Mr. Oleson. By actual experience.

The Chairman. Take the Queen in her present condition, with her present resources, present playing upon the affections of the Hawaiian natives, do you apprehend that she has any possible chance of reinstating herself upon the throne?

Mr. Oleson. Not at all; and she has not had any chance since January 14; not the ghost of a chance to reinstate herself by any force she could marshal in the islands.

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The Chairman. So that, in a conflict, native Kanakas under the leadership of the Queen could not stand against the forces under the leadership of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. That would be out of the question. That is my personal opinion.

The Chairman. That is what I am after, your personal opinion.

Mr. Oleson. In saying that I do not impute anything against the natives; it is simply due to the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon people.

The Chairman. As I understand your opinion, the Kanakas are not a military people, not aggressive?

Mr. Oleson. No, not aggressive. They will expose themselves to danger; are physically strong and able men. They are the reliance of the industries of that country, so far as the demand is for strength and daring. The interisland steamers, which require dexterity, courage, and strength, are manned by the Hawaiians. It is the only force in the islands to do that work.

The Chairman. Then you think they would make excellent sailors?

Mr. Oleson. They are. I have met them in New England. They had been sailors, and they had been all around the world.

The Chairman. Are they fond of their calling?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. Very much attracted to it.

The Chairman. Would you say that the Kanaka population, taking them at large, are what we would call a governing people?

Mr. Oleson. No; they are not.

The Chairman. Do you think they would have the requisite skill in the enactment of laws (if that were left entirely to them) to build up and maintain good government?

Mr. Oleson. They could not do it.

The Chairman. You think a legislature composed entirely of Kanakas, without respect to their intelligence, and including the highest order of intelligence, and a Kanaka cabinet, could not control the Government of Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. No; they could not.

The Chairman. You are perfectly satisfied on that point?

Mr. Oleson. Perfectly satisfied on that point. That is the case. By a late paper from Honolulu—I do not know whether you would rather have it or not—I see that President Dole has called upon Dr. Trousseau to explain certain testimony which he had given against President Dole, and calls for retraction. It is very brief. If you would like to have it I will pass it to you.

The Chairman. You can put it in if you think it will reflect any light.

Mr. Oleson. I think it will show that President Dole was not concerned in any conspiracy. And another thing, where Dr. Trousseau said he knew by personal knowledge of these things, in his retraction he states he got his information from a source which he supposed was reliable.

The Chairman. Have you seen any denial of their authenticity by Trousseau or Dole?

Mr. Oleson. No. In a later paper he made a retraction to 3 other men whom he had mentioned in the same connection—4 other men.

Senator Frye. In reference to the protection of Ameiican life and property, was the location of the troops at Arion Hall a central location?

Mr. Oleson. It was a central place for a rendezvous. The two main streets are at an angle—King street and Nuuanu street—and Arion

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Hall was a central location from which to scatter the troops in squads to available points. I do not well see how they could have been better located for the protection of life and property to better advantage than there.

The Chairman. Was there anything to prevent the location of those troops in Arion Hall when you went out to the Government building and the proclamation was being read—anything to prevent the loyalists from making an attack on the men who entered the Government building?

Mr. Oleson. No; the Queen's forces had plenty of ways in which they could have gotten there without passing by the United States troops, even if the United States troops had been out, which I do not admit.

Senator Frye. But if the United States troops were in their quarters there was nothing to prevent an attack being made by the loyalists on the men of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Frye. Was there anything in those mass meetings which were held to prevent an attack by the Queen's forces?

Mr. Oleson. No; the nominal Government could have suppressed by the force they had in their hands that mass meeting; but they did not dare to do it, because it would have aggravated things so that they would have gone to their worst.

Senator Frye. Peterson, and Colburn, and Neumann, and Rosa, being then the agents of the Queen and the Queen's cabinet as she formed it after she had removed the Wilcox-Jones cabinet, were they reputable men in the islands?

Mr. Oleson. I never considered any of them to be.

Senator Frye. Did you have any acquaintance with Mr. Stevens?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Frye. What was your estimate of him?

Mr. Oleson. I had a high estimate of Mr. Stevens as a man who was exceedingly discreet in his bearing toward events there. I feel that he was placed in a very difficult position at the time the troops were landed, on account of the merely nominal hold which the Government had on the situation—it was practically in the hands of the irresponsible portion of the community; there was practically no government that had any respect of the people. I have heard since that Minister Stevens did not request permission of the Government that the troops be allowed to land. If he had made any such request and it had been denied, I do not think Minister Stevens would have been justified in not landing the troops. There was no government; there was no agreement on a plan of action among the leaders of the nominal government; there were disagreements amongst them; there was no confidence, on the part of the intelligent portion of the community, in them, so that in that sense, while they had nominal control of things, it was simply a nominal government.

Senator Frye. Did you at any time, in your investigations and in your conversations with the men who were connected with the Provisional Government, obtain from them any idea that they expected any assistance from United States troops?

Mr. Oleson. No; not the slightest. I never heard it whispered, and I was in a way to meet a great many of the men on whom the fighting was to depend, if there was to be any fighting. They did not look for any assistance at all.

Senator Frye. Is it your opinion that it was a fact that the presence

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of the United States troops on shore had any effect in dethroning the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. I do not think it had the slightest.

Senator Frye. And if the troops had remained on board ship the same thing would have happened?

Mr. Oleson. I think the same thing might have happened. But I think something else would have happened—there might have been irresponsible parties turned upon the community, and incendiary fires and bloodshed might have followed.

Senator Frye. But as to the establishment of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. As to the establishment of the Government, I do not think it made any material difference.

Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, I received by this morning's mail, from Charles L. Carter, one of the commissioners, three or four statements which were printed in the public papers of Honolulu, containing, over the signatures of the men who are purported to have written them, contradictions of the testimony of Dr. Trousseau, who appears several times as a witness in Mr. Blount's report. I ask that they be incorporated in this testimony. One is from Sanford B. Dole, one from Chief Justice Judd, and one from Alfred S. Hartwell in answer to some statements made by Dr. Trousseau that these gentlemen, together with others named, had been for a long time in the habit of meeting at the office of the minister of the United States and conspiring to produce the revolution of 1893. They contradict Dr. Trousseau right straight through. They are as follows:

Trousseau once more—He is again brought to a reckoning—This time President Dole secures a retraction of some statements to Blount.

Honolulu December 27, 1893.
George Trousseau, M. D.:
Dear Sir:I notice in Mr. Blount's report, of which I have a copy on page 284 of Part II, the following statement in your letter to Mr Blount, dated May 16, 1893:
"Almost daily, to my personal knowledge, meetings were held at Mr. Stevens's house in which the possibilities of a peaceful revolution with the prospects of annexation were discussed. Prominent at these meetings were the chief justice, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, Charles Carter, and others, also Capt. Wiltse."
This statement, which has been published in the Commercial Advertiser at Honolulu, is incorrect as regards myself. I was never present at any such meetings, nor was I aware that such meetings were held until informed of it by the publication of your statement to that effect.
I desire that you will make due reparation in the matter with the same publicity which the above statement has already received.
I am, very sincerely, yours,
Sanford B. Dole.

December 28, 1893.
Hon. S.B. Dole,
President of the Provisional Government:
Dear Sir: When I made to Mr. Blount the statements you refer to in your letter of the 27th, I believed them to be correct, as my information came from a source that I could not consider but reliable.
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In spite of difference of opinion and bitterness of feeling on my part engendered by the vile abuse I have been submitted to by your political side, I have always considered you as a gentleman.
You say that you attended no meetings at Mr. Stevens's house; let it be so; I accept your word for it.
Very respectfully yours,
G. Trousseau.

Trousseau and truth—Where they fail to agree in their evidence—Chief Justice Judd and Judge A. S. Hartwell deny statements of his to Blount.

Editor Star:
Dr. Trousseau's statements to Mr. Blount, so far as they refer to me, are totally untrue. I never met any of the gentlemen named by him at Mr. Stevens's house. I never attended any meeting with the gentleman named or with any others at Mr. Stevens's house, or at any other place, where annexation was discussed.
I do not consider that I owe my "social and pecuniary position" to the natives, although I believe I have their confidence and good will. Before my appointment to the bench, now nearly twenty years ago, I was receiving a handsome income from my practice at the bar; greater than my salary as second associate justice, which was my first appointment.
I took no part whatever in the revolution of January, 1893, nor was I informed of the plans of the movers in it. I had no more information than any other "outsider."
A. F. Judd.
Honolulu, December 26, 1893.

Gen. Hartwell's denials.

Editor Star:
When Dr. Trousseau, in his statement to Blount and letter to Nordhoff, says that "meetings were held at Mr. Stevens's house in which the possibilities of a peaceful revolution were discussed," and that "prominent at these meetings were the chief justice, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, Charles Carter, and others, also Capt. Wiltse," Dr. Trousseau says, as far as I am concerned, that which is untrue. Mr. Charles T. Gulick's statement to Blount contains similar language with that of Dr. Trousseau, adding the expression that the persons named were so managing as to "save their precious carcasses." Mr. Gulick will be pleased to consider my denial of the truthfulness of both Nordhoff's and Dr. Trousseau's statements of the meetings in question, as applying also to his untruthful statement, in so far as I am concerned.
But while it so happens that I never attended any such meetings as Dr. Trousseau and Mr. Gulick have taken the grave responsibility of asserting, it is true that talk of revolutions has been rife here for years. The dread of it has been the main cause of many financial difficulties.
The viciousness of the above-mentioned statements of Messrs. Trousseau and Gulick is in the impression which they were meant to fix that we were plotting revolution, since otherwise such statements would be nothing but old women's gabble
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So far from plotting revolution, the people who are today supporting the Government of Hawaii, and who aided in its establishment, were to a man, as I believe, opposed to the attempts at revolution which were under several discussions in the early part of the year 1892, and for which attempts the arrests for treason were made spring before last.
For even defending those treason cases in court I found myself the subject of harsh criticism from many persons who are now staunch Government men and annexationists.
Messrs. Blount and Nordhoff have fallen into the absurd but grave error for which Dr. Trousseau and Mr. Charles T. Gulick have made themselves responsible, of supposing that Mr. Stevens and his friends were trying to bring about the revolutionary results, for attempting which Robert Wilcox, V. V. Ashford, and some 16 other Hawaiians were examined before a judge on a charge of treason.
Dr. Trousseau's suggestion to Blount that the ex-Queen propose a cession of Hawaii to Grover Cleveland and then abdicate, and that "all of us will assist," such result shows his view of the situation apart from his "point of view,"
Alfred S. Hartwell

Adjourned to meet to-morrow, the 20th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.


Washington, D. C, Saturday, January 20, 1894.

The sub-committee met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, Sherman and {{sc|Frye}, and Davis of the full committee.

SWORN STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCANDLESS.

The Chairman. What is your age?

Mr. McCandless. I am 40 years of age.

The Chairman. What is your occupation?

Mr. McCandless. In the Hawaiian Islands, an artesian-well driller.

The Chairman. What is the place of your nativity?

Mr. McCandless. Pennsylvania.

The Chairman. Are you of American parentage?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. When did you go to Hawaii?

Mr. McCandless. I went to Hawaii in 1881.

The Chairman. Did you go there to experiment in the boring of artesian wells?

Mr. McCandless. No; at that time it had passed that state, and the fact had been proven that they could get an artesian well. They had half a dozen at the time I arrived there.

The Chairman. To what part of the Islands did you go?

Mr. McCandless. Except seven months I have been on the island of Oahu all the time.

The Chairman. Did you get wells there?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you get water enough from the wells for sugar planting?

Mr. McCandless. Yes. On the island of Oahu they get water from artesian wells as well as from the mountain streams.

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The Chairman. Are there large plantations on the island?

Mr. McCandless. Yes. In 1890 one plantation had a capitalization of half a million, and they ran in debt another half a million before they got started.

The Chairman. How many hands does that sugar plantation employ?

Mr. McCandless. 600. On the island of Kauai we get artesian wells, but the water does not rise over 6 feet above the sea level. In most cases they have to pump the water.

The Chairman. Can not siphons be run out?

Mr. McCandless. No.

The Chairman. Do you bore in the flats?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; the flats near the sea level.

The Chairman. Is the geological construction of the islands of such a character as would warrant, in your opinion, the belief that that is going to be a valuable source of water supply in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. McCandless. There is now invested in artesian wells in the Hawaiian Islands about a half million dollars. We have ourselves done $100,000 worth of the work, and it is quite an industry.

The Chairman. It is on the windward that they have the wells?

Mr. McCandless. On both sides of the island of Oahu. The artesian-water belt extends all around the island of Oahu, with a few exceptions, where we were unable to get water.

The Chairman. Do you find the water in pockets or in the stone?

Mr. McCandless. We find it in the lava formation of the islands.

The Chairman. You drive the well down until you find the percolation of the water of sufficient strength to force an overflow?

Mr. McCandless. It is in the decomposed lava and the washing of centuries, which make a packing to keep it in, and of course we go to the open rock and get the water.

The Chairman. Do you look forward to the artesian system as one that is going to be valuable to that country?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Your labors in Hawaii, I suppose, have carried you amongst the people in the country?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Have you familiarized yourself with the character and condition of the people of Hawaii?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; our business has taken us all around the island of Oahu.

The Chairman. Have you had occasion to visit other islands also?

Mr. McCandless. The first well we drilled in the Kingdom was on the island of Hawaii. We were there seven months. That was a complete failure. Outside of that I have not been off the island of Oahu.

The Chairman. I will ask you now to state briefly what you found to be the condition of those people as to the comfort of living at their abodes.

Mr. McCandless. They lived in the country there just about as the poor do in any country that I have ever been in, except, perhaps, they are more indolent than the poor of our country.

The Chairman. Does nature furnish a larger supply of food to the natives of the Hawaiian Islands than it does to the natives of most countries, to relieve them of the necessity for labor?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; it does in this way: The taro patch (that is the food there)—I judge an acre of taro land, perhaps a half acre— will keep a large family in food the year round. That is in addition to the fish they catch.

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The Chairman. Are fish abundant off the coast of those islands?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; but fish commands a higher price in Honolulu than in any seaport town I have ever lived in. That is because the native will not go fishing unless the price of fish is high.

The Chairman. They are expert fishermen?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. And they have control of the fisheries?

Mr. McCandless. No; the Chinese have most of the fishing rights. There is a peculiar condition of affairs there in regard to the fisheries. The water front of the islands is owned by the landlords—the people who own the land—and the privilege of fishing on this water front is leased out.

The Chairman. By the owner of the soil?

Mr. McCandless. By the owner of the soil. So that the Chinese have been rather encroaching on that privilege and getting most of the valuable fishing rights.

The Chairman. How far out in the sea does this privilege extend?

Mr. McCandless. I can not say as to that.

The Chairman. Do the Hawaiians and Chinese fish offshore in boats and with seines and other tackle?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. When they are fishing offshore this water privilege does not interfere with them, does it?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; it interferes, except in the case of Government lands; there it is open to the natives.

The Chairman. There must be some limit to this right. Is it three miles?

Mr. McCandless. I think that would be the limit, the international limit.

The Chairman. You do not know about that?

Mr. McCandless. No.

The Chairman. In this way the Chinese and Hawaiians have what we term a practical monopoly of the fishing industry, and will not fish unless the market price justifies them in going out?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; that is the case with the Hawaiians; but the Chinese do not stop at all, they fish right along.

The Chairman. Around the islands other than Oahu is this fishing carried on by the natives?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; principally by the natives, because there is no market on the other islands.

The Chairman. What I want to get at is whether fishing in combination with the taro is the real, substantial food support of the common people of Hawaii?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Taro supplies the want for vegetable food?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. And takes the place of bread?

Mr. McCandless. Yes. I was going to say in regard to the natives, to show their indolence in regard to their crop, I have found it the case that the natives have leased out their taro patch to a Chinaman, and the Chinaman has worked it and paid the Hawaiian in taro, and still made a living off it himself. I have seen it many times.

The Chairman. Do the women in Hawaii work in the taro patches?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; but the men mostly. It is a crop easily taken care of.

The Chairman. Easily raised?

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Mr. McCandless. Easily raised. Of course, there must be an abundance of water—it grows in a pond; it must be flooded with water.

The Chairman. Have you, prior to January 17, 1893, been in any way engaged in the political affairs of Hawaii?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Have you been in any office there?

Mr. McCandless. No.

The Chairman. Your connection with it then was as a private citizen?

Mr. McCandless. It was as a private citizen—to help right wrongs.

The Chairman. We will suspend the examination of Mr. McCandless, for the purpose of hearing Mr. Stevens, who, I am informed, is not well and is desirous of returning to his home.

SWORN STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN L. STEVENS.

The Chairman. What is your age?

Mr. Stevens. Seventy-three.

The Chairman. Your place of nativity?

Mr. Stevens. Mount Vernon, Me.

The Chairman. When did you first go to Hawaii?

Mr. Stevens. I arrived there in September, 1889.

The Chairman. Was that your first visit?

Mr. Stevens. My first visit to Hawaii.

The Chairman. You went as Minister of the United States to that Government?

Mr. Stevens. I did.

The Chairman. Who was then the sovereign?

Mr. Stevens. King Kalakaua was the sovereign.

The Chairman. Under what administration were you sent there?

Mr. Stevens. By President Harrison.

The Chairman. Were you present at the time Liliuokalani succeeded to the regal authority in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Stevens. I was.

The Chairman. And you remained there until what time—what time did you leave the islands?

Mr. Stevens. The 24th of May, 1893.

The Chairman. Proceed and state what you know of your own personal knowledge in respect of the political affairs of Hawaii since your arrival there, the changes in political conditions, the circumstances that led to such changes, the effects produced by such changes; and we wish you to state also what participation you had at any time during your residence there in promoting the interests or welfare of any political party connected with the Queen's Government or opposed to the Queen's Government. When you shall have made your statement, or at any time while you are making it, the members of the committee will interpose such questions as they may desire, for the purpose of keeping your attention to the testimony we desire to elicit.

Mr. Stevens. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I will, of course, be under the necessity of condensing so far as possible. That inquiry might require a volume; but, of course, I understand the committee desires the salient facts. I will read what I think is better than I could verbally state, and we will have before us the events beginning twelve days prior to the overthrow of Liliuokalani. I can read of events prior to that; but I think I had better take twelve days prior.

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The Chairman. Take your own course, so that you answer the questions.

Mr. Stevens. The biennial Legislature assembled in May, 1892. The body very soon asserted its constitutional prerogative in voting out a ministry that had consented to the maladministration of the Queen and her favorite at the palace, who exercised dictatorial powers and rioted in official police corruption. Instead of appointing ministers possessing the confidence of the Legislative majority and of the business men of the islands, she continued to select those of her own type of character, those whom she knew would retain her palace favorite in power. Three successive ministers of this description were voted out by the Legislature, with the warm approval of all the best men of the islands. At last the Queen appeared to yield to the pressure of public opinion and consented to the appointment of four responsible men, three of them persons of wealth, and all of them men of good financial standing, who took the official places with reluctance, all four of them sharing the public confidence.

Known as the Wilcox-Jones ministry, it was believed that they would safely carry the country through the following eighteen months to the election and assemblage of the next Legislature. Fully sharing this belief, the United States minister and naval commander left Honolulu January 4, in the U. S. cruiser Boston, for Hilo and Volcano, the distance of nearly 300 miles. It was the first time for many months I had felt it safe for the United States minister and naval commander to be away from the Hawaiian capital. We were absent ten days. When we arrived in the harbor of Honolulu on our return from Hilo, in the forenoon of January 14, there came to us the startling news that the Queen and the ring of white adventurers who surrounded her had, by intrigue and bribery, carried the lottery and opium bills through the Legislature; had forced out the Wilcox and Jones ministry, had appointed in their places four of her palace retainers, two of whom the Legislature and the responsible public had recently and repeatedly rejected, headed by the man who had carried the lottery and opium bills through the Legislature.

In spite of numerous petitions and protests from all the islands, both of whites and native Hawaiians, and the earnest remonstrance of the chamber of commerce and the principal financial men of the country, the Queen immediately signed the iniquitous bills. Both she and the ring of adventurers who surrounded her expected thus to get the money to carry on the Government by making Honolulu a fortress of gamblers and semipirates amid the ocean, from which they could, by every mail steamer to the United States, send out the poisoned billets of chance by which to rob the American people of their millions of money—a method of gaining silver and gold as wicked and audacious as that of the freebooters who once established themselves in the West Indian seas and made piratical forays on American commerce. But even this was not enough for the semibarbaric Queen and the clique of adventurers around her. To fortify themselves in their schemes of usurpation and robbery they must have a new constitution. They were afraid the supreme court would decide their lottery bill unconstitutional. The supreme court must be reconstructed, so that the Queen could reappoint the judges and give the final appeal to the Queen herself. The new constitution was to be proclaimed in a way that the existing constitution expressly prohibits. Her four new ministers were in the plot.

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While the Boston was coming into the harbor of Honolulu, on the forenoon of January 14, the mob of hoodlums, at the call of the Queen and her retainers, were gathering in the palace grounds. The Legislature was prorogued at 12 a. m. The revolutionary edict of Hawaii's misguided sovereign was ready to be proclaimed, rumors of which were already in the public ear. The storm of public indignation began to gather. A few minutes before the appointed hour for the coup d'etat, immediately after my reaching the legation from the Boston, I was urged to go at once to the English minister to ask him to accompany me to the Queen and try to dissuade her from her revolutionary design. I promptly sought to comply with this request, went immediately to the English minister, who was ready to cooperate with me if there were any possibility of effecting any good. We went immediately to the foreign office to seek access to the Queen in the customary manner.

The hour of proroguing the Legislature had arrived. The ceremony concluded, the Queen went immediately to the palace, around which the mob was gathering. It was too late for the American and English ministers even to attempt to reason with the maddened, misguided woman, who had already launched the revolution which could not be arrested, though her cowardly ministers of the lottery gang became alarmed and drew back. She scorned their cowardice and pushed on to her doom. Saturday night told every intelligent man in Honolulu that the Hawaiian monarchy was forever at an end—that the responsible persons of the islands, the property holders and the friends of law and order, must thereafter take charge of public affairs. The great mass meeting of January 16—worthy of the best American towns, of the best American days, was held. It was made up of the best and chief men of the country—the owners of property, the professional and educated citizens, merchants, bankers, clerks, mechanics, teachers, clergymen.

This assemblage was a unit in opinion and purpose. It was stirred by a common sentiment, the love of country and the desire for public order and public security. It took its measures wisely and prudently. Its committee of public safety asked us to land the men of the Boston lest riot and incendiarism might burst out in the night, for no reliable police force longer existed, and whatever there was of this force was now in the control of the usurpers and the lottery gamblers who had initiated the revolution. Under the diplomatic and naval rules, which were and are imperative, the U. S. minister and naval commander would have shamefully ignored their duty had they not landed the men of the Boston for the security of American life and property and the maintenance of public order, even had the committee of public safety not requested us to do.

As American representatives, 5,000 miles from our Government, we could not have escaped our responsibilities even had we desired to do so. Fortunately the commander of the Boston and those under his command had no desire to shirk their duty. They appreciated the obligations of American patriotism and the honor of the American Navy. The allurements of a semibarbaric court and palace had not blinded their eyes to the condition of things in Honolulu. On shore in perfect order, they stepped not an inch from the line of duty. They never lifted a finger in aid of the fallen monarchy.

The Chairman. Who was then chamberlain?

Mr. Stevens. Mr. Robertson.

The Chairman. Who was prior to him?

Mr. Stevens. MacFarlane.

S. Doc 231, pt 6----56

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The Chairman. Who preceded him?

Mr. Stevens. MacFarlane was the chamberlain when I went there.

The Chairman. Was Mr. Carter ever chamberlain?

Mr. Stevens. I think not. The brother of Chief Justice Judd was, and my impression is that no one was between him and McFarlane. When Liliuokalani came in she wanted this favorite of hers to be in the cabinet as minister of the interior, which was an important place, and he could not get any responsible person to serve with him. Then they compromised it by allowing him to be made marshal, which is an office of great power and patronage, under which Chinese and Japanese lottery gambling can be carried on. It requires a man of great integrity, lest there be abuses, and the office was one having the most power under the administration. Wilson wanted that, and he was made marshal and installed in the palace.

There is a good deal of history between that, and contained in my despatches, of wrangling, by which the different ones were put in. I have the legislative votes that took place prior to that. Three cabinets had been voted out in the course of a few weeks. Parker, Spencer, Wideman, and Paul Neuman voted out August 30,1892, by 31 yeas to 10 nays. Parker, Maefarlane, Gulick, and Paul Neuman appointed September 12, 1892, and voted out October 17, 1892, by 31 yeas and 15 nays. November 1, 1892, Queen appointed Cornwell, Nawahi, Gulick, and Creighton, who were voted out the same day by 26 yeas to 13 nays.

The Chairman. Have you named all the persons?

Mr. Stevens. Peter C. Jones, W. L. Wilcox, Mark P. Robinson, and Cecil Brown. Jones and Wilcox were two strong financial men, worth more than $200,000 each; were not politicians; but they accepted their offices as a matter of duty to the country. Mark P. Robinson was a prominent business man, and Cecil Brown was a lawyer. All four of this Cabinet are gentlemen of integrity, having the confidence of the financial public. We were away from the Hawaiian capital but ten days.

The Chairman. Just there, if you please. In reference to what expected difficulty or complication of political affairs in Hawaii do you speak when you say that it was for the first time safe for you to leave the islands?

Mr. Stevens. The first time I deemed it safe for me to be away?

The Chairman. Yes; why?

Mr. Stevens. For the reason that there was liable to be trouble.

The Chairman. Do you mean it was safe for the interests of the United States?

Mr. Stevens. Safe for the interests of the United States.

The Chairman. Do you not mean safe for the opposing power to the then government?

Mr. Stevens. I mean the American interests in the islands, the commercial interests. In general terms that means nearly the whole, so far as commercial interests are concerned.

The Chairman. Proceed.

Mr. Stevens. It came to us.

The Chairman. You say it came to us. Whom do you mean?

Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiitse and to me. They sent out in boats. We got into the harbor about half past 10, and it took sometime to get to the wharf, and they came out in boats.

The Chairman. Who were the persons who informed you?

Mr. Stevens. We were informed.

The Chairman. Any official information given to you?

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Mr. Stevens. No official communication, as I remember now.

The Chairman. Who was your aid-de-camp at that time?

Mr. Stevens. I had none; there was no person allowed me.

The Chairman. Did any person come from the legation or the United States consulate to give you information of the situation there?

Mr. Stevens. My impression is that Mr. Severance, the consul, sent a verbal message as soon as possible. And others sent verbal messages. There would be perhaps twenty boats to come off.

The Chairman. Was any message sent to you by the United States consul, Mr. Severance, or anybody else?

Mr. Stevens. I do not know that there was; but I know that I received the information at once. My daughter with my carriage met me at the wharf with the most full information.

The Chairman. Well?

Mr. Stevens. In spite of protests and earnest remonstrances by the Chamber of Commerce and a number of financial men of the country, the Queen immediately signed the iniquitous bills. Both she and the ring of adventurers who surrounded her expected there would thus be established a scheme to rob the people of millions of money.

The Chairman. Those expressions are intense and liberal. Do you mean that they are your personal conclusions, based upon your knowledge of the affairs there?

Mr. Stevens. Knowledge of the bills before the Legislature and common rumor that had been going on all winter. The men in the lottery charter were, one man from St. Louis, another from Chicago, and several in Honolulu.

The Chairman. Did you, as the American minister resident in the Hawaiian Islands, receive any information in regard to the state of affairs which you have stated, and the purpose which actuated the Government, upon which you based the conclusions which you as minister came to as against the Queen's Government.

Mr. Stevens. The information came to me from all sources. I will say here that my many years' experience prior to these three years in revolutionary countries, had taught me that it was absolutely necessary to keep myself informed, and in order to keep myself informed I had to have somebody in the different cliques or parties on whom I could rely to get information. I kept myself constantly posted.

Senator Gray. And were you in communication with such persons?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. There was a contest about this lottery charter. It was controverted in the newspapers for months and months, and all the facts were as notorious as facts would be in Washington about any great national measure here.

The Chairman. In seeking information about these matters, did you confer also with members of the Queen's Government, or persons officially connected with the Queen's Government?

Mr. Stevens. From the time I went to Honolulu to the time I left, the adherents of the Queen, the royalists, had access to the legation more freely than anybody else.

The Chairman. Did you converse with them?

Mr. Stevens. I conversed with them. Of course, I had to exercise a good deal of caution in conversing with anybody, and had to pick out those I conversed with.

The Chairman. You have stated that your conclusions were reached after conferences and consultations with the persons you have mentioned, and also from the debates as printed in the newspapers?

Mr. Stevens. Upon debates. The newspapers published the debates

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just as you do here, and the bills were published. They have three newspapers, and everything of that character comes out.

Senator Gray. Did you avail yourself of the opportunities that were presented, of correspondence with other intelligent people than those connected with the Government, in order to inform yourself?

Mr. Stevens. That is a very important point; I am glad you have asked me in regard to it. I wish to say that five islands constitute the main portion of the islands. Those islands are separate, and on them live influential men. In order to know exactly the state of affairs in Hawaii, you must know what is going on in the different islands, and who these important men are. It took me one year of careful investigation to find out who they were, and to find out the state of things— who is who and what is what. In doing that I availed myself of all the agencies in the community.

Senator Gray. And you did not decline correspondence with anybody?

Mr. Stevens. Not any. Of course I had to avoid compromising myself with anybody.

Senator Gray. I meant, for the purpose of gaining information for yourself, not imparting it to anybody. You understood that?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. In order to amend the constitution of Hawaii, the amendment must be submitted to one Legislature. Their sessions are biennial, and the amendment must be passed by one Legislature and resubmitted to the succeeding Legislature and passed.

The Chairman. By a majority vote?

Mr. Stevens. I am not sure whether it is a two-thirds vote or a majority vote; but it must be submitted to the two Legislatures. Just at this moment I can not say whether it is a two-thirds vote or a majority; my impression is that it is two thirds.

The Chairman. Before you left Honolulu on board the Boston to go to Hilo, did you have any knowledge or information of the movements of which you have just been speaking, in regard to a change of the constitution by the Queen?

Mr. Stevens. Oh, that had been a mooted matter before. I ought to give some prior facts. In the Legislature before Liliuokalani came to the throne, Kalakaua was opposed by some persons, and he wanted to get his original power back.

The Chairman. By original power you mean the power he had prior to the constitution of '87?

Mr. Stevens. Prior to that. In order to accomplish that, in the winter of '90 he had delegations of natives from the islands to demand a new constitution through a constitutional convention. That would have been revolutionary, and it alarmed the business men of the islands. They came to me and asked me to go to the King and advise him of the danger of that. I said I would provided they got those having English affiliations to have the English minister do the same. They got the English minister; he arranged the meeting.

The Chairman. Mr. Wodehouse?

Mr. Stevens. Wodehouse. He strongly urged the King not to go into it, stating that it would be fatal to him. Then I followed, and went into it elaborately, stating that in my opinion he could not have gotten up a better scheme than that to overthrow the monarchy. I said, "If it is started, you do not know where it will end." The whites had made up their minds, if Kalakaua ever attempted that, they would break down the monarchy. It was hard for Kalakaua to take that advice. I stated it very courteously and kindly, and in a day or two he came around good naturedly and accepted our advice. When he was dead, and Liliuokalani came to be the sovereign, she said to the

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chief justice, "What will be the consequence if I do not take the oath to that constitution?" The chief justice, who had been a supporter of the monarchy, said in his courteous way, "You could not be Queen." With this answer of the chief justice Liliuokalani took the oath to support the constitution.

The Chairman. If I understand you, the subject of changing the constitution so as to restore to the monarchy the ancient power that it possessed before 1887 was the subject of discussion and action also on the part of Kalakaua as well as Liliuokalani?

Mr. Stevens. Certainly.

The Chairman. When you left on the Boston to go to Hilo did you know that the Queen had in contemplation, at that time or at any earlier period, to promulgate this constitution by apronuuciamento?

Mr. Stevens. I had come to the conclusion, as many men had, that so many ministries having been voted out and she accepting this Wilcox- Jones ministry, and Wilson, the marshal, being on friendly relations with the attorney-general, Mr. Brown, he thinking he was going to be kept in—putting all the facts together, the lottery bill dead, and the opium bill dead, we had made up our minds that the Queen and her favorite would abide by the ministry for eighteen months, or until the meeting of the new Legislature, and I did not dream of any revolution that the Queen had on foot.

The Chairman. Let me ask. After the Queen prorogued the Legislature would she have had authority to dismiss the ministry and reappoint another without assembling the Legislature?

Mr. Stevens. She could not remove the ministry except upon a vote of want of confidence by the Legislature. That was the constitution.

The Chairman. That is the only way in which she could do it?

Mr. Stevens. The only way—by a vote of want of confidence.

The Chairman. And, as I understand, you felt that no change of the constitution could take place?

Mr. Stevens. Certainly.

The Chairman. And that relieved your mind of any apprehension that there would be any effort made to revolutionize the Government with respect to the constitution?

Mr. Stevens. Certainly. We considered that those four ministers for the next eighteen months would be the Government—for all practical purposes.

The Chairman. Let me ask whether, if you had in contemplation anything of that kind, you would have felt authorized, as the American minister resident, to go away as you did?

Mr. Stevens. I would not. If I had thought she had that revolutionizing plan on hand, it would not have been proper for me to have gone away.

The Chairman. Why?

Mr. Stevens. Because I think I could have given her advice. I would have given her the advice that it would ruin public business and endanger life.

The Chairman. You felt at that time that the interests of the people of the United States would be exposed to danger?

Mr. Stevens. Exposed to danger.

The Chairman. And you felt---

Mr. Stevens. It would be my duty to go to her, as I had before gone to Kalakaua.

The Chairman. Ships of war of the United States had been kept in the harbor of Honolulu for some time?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

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The Chairman. How many years?

Mr. Stevens. Probably thirty-five or forty.

The Chairman. Was there ever a time during your residence there as minister of the United States when there was no ship of war in the harbor, no ship assigned to duty there?

Mr. Stevens. I do not think there was any time when there was no ship of war there, unless the ship was out of the harbor for target practice, or gone to Hilo, a trip of a few days.

The Chairman. But assigned to duty there?

Mr. Stevens. I do not think there was a single month, while I was there, that a United States ship was not assigned for duty at Honolulu?

The Chairman. What is the necessity of the United States keeping a ship of war in Honolulu, or in reach of the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Stevens. Because of the liability to anarchy. And why? To illustrate that point, this was no new thing—the landing of troops. It was done at least three times prior to January, 1893, if not more. I remember three. Prior to this at different times the official representatives of the Queen came to me and asked me to be in readiness to land soldiers; that there were certain contingencies before them that they could not provide for; and more than that number of times the naval officers of the different ships got everything in readiness.

Senator Gray. What was the nature of those contingencies?

Mr. Stevens. I will give this one: Prior to the overthrow of the Queen and the uprising of the business men to have a new government, many of the natives under the lead of Robert Wilcox, half white, and others who were hostile to Wilson, the favorite, because he stood between the natives and the Queen, engaged in revolutionary efforts.

Senator Gray. They were jealous of him?

Mr. Stevens. Jealous of Wilson, and that was the key to their action. For many months they were organized, my information was. It came in many ways, not only from those who were engaged in it, but from the Queen's Government. They contemplated her overthrow. That party was led by Mr. Wilcox, the same man who was in collusion with Liliuokalani in 1889, a few months before I arrived there, to change the constitution. Mr. Wilcox and several prominent white men of the adventurers class had organized what they called a Liberal Hawaiian League, and they had a military organization as well. Their constant fear was that we would not permit the Queen to be overthrown, and of course they always took occasion to find out what the naval officer and American minister would do if they undertook to overthrow the Queen. I could not make my instructions and intentions known.

The Queen was anxious to have me informed of her danger, and the Wilcox faction was anxious to know whether I would interfere in defense of the Queen. Of course, I had to keep noncommittal. That party would have dethroned the Queen if they had had the help of the white people. But the whites said, "No; we can not accept the Government from their hands." Consequently, there was a state of uneasiness, of uncertainty, all the time, as there had been months before I arrived there. Mr. Merrill had an experience with it for two years,, beginning with the revolution of 1887. After they got in the cabinet of 1887 they had a peaceful time up to the Wilcox outbreak, a few weeks before I arrived in the country.

The Chairman. Is the Wilcox of whom you speak the man who was educated in the military school in Italy?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

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The Chairman. Is there any other man of prominence of that name there?

Mr. Stevens. There are three or four who are prominent.

The Chairman. I mean of that name?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; the Wilcox in the Jones ministry was a very different person from the Wilcox who led the outbreak of 1889—he had been a member of the Legislature, but was not a politician. I refer to the member of the Jones cabinet. There were three or four of the name of Wilcox; but they were not related to Robert, the man at the head of the revolutionary movement.

The Chairman. Is the man who was in the Jones ministry an American?

Mr. Stevens. An American of pure blood. His father was a missionary. He lives on the island of Kauai—a man of business, education, and of high character.

The Chairman. Is he officially connected with the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. Only as an adviser and supporter.

The Chairman. Not officially?

Mr. Stevens. He was in the Jones ministry.

The Chairman. Which was succeeded by the Peterson cabinet?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; the Peterson cabinet.

The Chairman. Proceed.

Mr. Stevens. I need not restate, I suppose, what I have already said, and will proceed as requested.

The Chairman. The matters of which you are speaking occurred before you landed?

Mr. Stevens. Before we landed and while we were landing.

The Chairman. Before you personally landed?

Mr. Stevens. Before 12 o'clock was when I arrived. I am coming to that. As soon as I had arrived at the legation I was informed of the strong rumor that the Queen was about to attempt to proclaim a new constitution; and I was urged to go at once to seek the cooperation of the English minister to dissuade the Queen from her design.

The Chairman. Who made that request of you?

Mr. Stevens. That came through Judge Hartwell. He has been there twenty years, an American by birth, but married his wife there. He is a graduate of Harvard, and one of the leading lawyers of the islands and has been one of the supreme judges. As before stated, I at once endeavored to comply with this request. I went as soon as possible to the English minister and asked him to go with me to see the Queen. We went to the foreign office to seek an interview with the Queen in the customary manner.

The customary manner was to send it, of course, through the minister of foreign affairs.

Senator Butler. Did you get access to the Queen?

Mr. Stevens. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had gone to the ceremony of proroguing the Legislature. He came into the foreign minister's office. We staid in there two or three minutes—asked two or three questions. That was the first time I was let into the plot that there was to be a new constitution. He was very cautious as to what he said. I was not there when the invitations were sent out to come to the palace and receive a glass of wine.

I did not go to the palace, but the other officials did. Before the time arrived Mr. Wodehouse, who had been there so many years, said: "It is unusual for us to have this at the close of the Legislature," and the whole thing came into my mind what the Queen

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intended—she intended to have all the foreign officials there, with all the eclat possible. There were only five minutes left, and she had already gone into the palace. If we had been two hours earlier, we could perhaps have gotten at her and accomplished something. I did not go to the palace with the other foreign officials. Being absent on the Boston when the cards of invitation were sent out, I had received none to go to the palace, nor to the proroguing of the Legislature at 12 o'clock that day.

And only those present in Honolulu could know how thoroughly the monarchy was dead after the Queen's revolutionary attempt to proclaim a new constitution on the afternoon of July 14. I have already given account of the mass meeting, mostly of white citizens, of the appointment of a committee of safety, and of their request of us to land the naval force.

The Chairman. You say "us." Whom do you mean?

Mr. Stevens. Myself and Capt. Wiltse.

The Chairman. Do you mean that they made a joint request of you, or separate?

Mr. Stevens. They made the request to me.

The Chairman. And not to Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Stevens. Not to Capt. Wiltse. They always make it to the diplomatic officer.

The Chairman. In what form is that request made?

Mr. Stevens. In a note.

The Chairman. By whom?

Mr. Stevens. The committee of public safety.

The Chairman. Addressed to you, where?

Mr. Stevens. At the legation.

The Chairman. How long before you had arrived there?

Mr. Stevens. I arrived there on Saturday, and this meeting of the committee of public safety was on Monday. After the committee of public safety had been chosen, they made this request.

The Chairman. Was there any reason for making the request for the landing of the troops?

Mr. Stevens. Only the fears of the citizens.

The Chairman. I want to know whether any request had been made upon you before that time?

Mr. Stevens. No, only so far as individual citizens made representations of the danger.

The Chairman. Individual citizens did appear before you to represent the danger?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. Especially did I have a note from Rev. Mr. Bishop, a man 65 years of age, born on the islands. He has everybody's confidence. He informed me on Sunday that the Kahunas of the Queen, the sorcerers, were evidently around the Queen, and there were serious times ahead. He did not ask me, but he stated that that I might know the danger. I learned from other sources, of persons who knew perfectly well, if I did not do so, the legation would be crowded with many people fearing what might happen during the night.

The Chairman. They would come there for protection?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Who is this Rev. Mr. Bishop of whom you spoke?

Mr. Stevens. He was born on the islands; his father was a missionary; he was educated at a New York college. He has been identified with the islands for sixty-five years.

The Chairman. There is another Mr. Bishop who is very wealthy?

Mr. Stevens. He is a banker.

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The Chairman. Are they related?

Mr. Stevens. No. Mr. Bishop, the banker, is a native of New York; the other, I rather think, is the son of a Connecticut man.

The Chairman. A missionary?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Is this man, the Rev. Mr. Bishop, of whom you speak, a man of substance and property?

Mr. Stevens. He has some property; I do not know how much.

The Chairman. Any wealth?

Mr. Stevens. Not wealthy.

The Chairman. Is he reputable?

Mr. Stevens. Highly reputable. He is known outside of the islands as a man of science.

The Chairman. In addition to Mr. Bishop did other persons come to you and admonish you of the state of danger?

Mr. Stevens. Prior to my arrival—I had left one daughter at home and my wife---

The Chairman. You were informed of that on your return ?

Mr. Stevens. Before we returned, for many hours, persons in anxiety had been coming to the legation, hoping for the Boston to come back, lest something should turn up. The royalists were divided into two cliques, and loyalists came to the legation in anxiety as well as others.

The Chairman. To make it a little more clear, I will ask you whether, on your arrival, your family, including your wife, informed you that persons had been there to inform you in regard to the state of the public mind?

Mr. Stevens. Precisely; and of their anxiety that the Boston should return.

The Chairman. Did they give you that information immediately on your arrival?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Did they seem to be concerned about it?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; they thought they were safe when the Boston got there and I got back.

The Chairman. After your arrival there, and after receiving this information from your family, you spoke of Mr. Bishop coming to talk with you personally. Were there other persons who came to talk with you?

Mr. Stevens. I came in contact with a good many persons.

The Chairman. At the legation?

Mr. Stevens. At the legation, where I kept myself except for two or three hours that I was at the Government buildings, for the new ministers had got frightened and they sent to me. They sent to Mr. Wodehouse and the other diplomatic representatives to come to the Government building, and we went there and waited two hours.

The Chairman. What ministers do you speak of?

Mr. Stevens. Foreign ministers.

The Chairman. Representatives of foreign governments.

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Were they all invited?

Mr. Stevens. They all came over to the Government building while all this wrangling was going on about the Queen's constitution.

The Chairman. Did you join that party?

Mr. Stevens. I went over that afternoon to hear what they had to say, to find out about the constitution and obtain other information.

The Chairman. Did you meet them at the Government building?

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Mr. Stevens. Yes; we were there probably two hours.

The Chairman. Was any representative of a foreign government missing on that occasion ?

Mr. Stevens. I do not remember any.

The Chairman. You can state that it was a general conference.

Mr. Stevens. Oh, they invited the whole of them.

The Chairman. Who invited them?

Mr. Stevens. The invitation to come came from the clerk of the new minister of the interior, who got alarmed.

The Chairman. Who was the minister of the interior?

Mr. Stevens. I do not positively remember, but I think Colburn.

The Chairman. And the invitation came from Liliuokalani's minister of the interior to you?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; the chief clerk, Mr. Hassinger, who had been there for years, brought it to me at the legation.

The Chairman. Did he ask you to come to the Government building?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Did he tell you that there was an assemblage of the foreign ministers at the Government building?

Mr. Stevens. I am not sure; but I think he did.

The Chairman. Well, when you got there---

Mr. Stevens. One or two came in after I arrived; but we all left about the same time. We waited for the denouement at the palace, but two of the new ministers were afraid to go back to the palace.

The Chairman. What two ministers were afraid?

Mr. Stevens. Colburn and Cornwall seemed to be alarmed.

The Chairman. What made you think they were alarmed?

Mr. Stevens. Their appearance, and in sending for us. Then it came out that they were afraid to go to the palace. Their manner showed it.

The Chairman. Was there anything that indicated it?

Mr. Stevens. Only their sending for us and their general appearance— their going backwards and forwards from and to the palace.

The Chairman. Were they passing backwards and forwards between your meeting and the palace?

Mr. Stevens. Not between us. Finally, when Cornwall and Colburn left us, the message came from Mr. Parker, the minister of foreign affairs, and they left us and went to the palace, and I waited perhaps an hour or more and I went back to the legation and remained.

The Chairman. On those occasions when Liliuokalani's ministers were present, was any intimation given or proposition submitted to the foreign representatives in respect of the protection that should be extended to American citizens or anyone else?

Mr. Stevens. They made no intimation to us. They asked us at first to come there. We went there and waited, and did not confer with each other what to do.

Senator Butler. What day was that?

Mr. Stevens. That was on Saturday afternoon, January 14, the same Saturday afternoon when the Queen was present at the palace with the mob and the Queen's guard around it, and the chief justice was with her.

Senator Butler. That was the day the Boston returned?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

Senator Butler. That was the day before this public meeting of which you spoke?

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Mr. Stevens. Two days before.

The Chairman. You spoke of a mob about the palace. Do you mean a disorganized body of men?

Mr. Stevens. Disorganized body of natives; retainers who had been dressed up respectably, and their leader had a constitution on a velvet cushion.

The Chairman. I am going into the inquiry whether, in the American acceptation of the word, that was a mob or an assemblage of the Queen's supporters.

Mr. Stevens. That was, in the general acceptation of the word, a mob; you may call it an assemblage.

The Chairman. Was there any mob violence?

Mr. Stevens. The information came to me direct that when the Queen was baffled, when they learned that the Queen would not proclaim that constitution at that time, they swore they would kill her. I suppose that was a temporary outbreak. While I was not in that crowd, I received more reliable information from the chief justice of what took place, and of the wrangle between the Queen and Peterson about the constitution—of the Queen turning upon him and stating, "You have had that in your pocket for two or three weeks." I am not positive that I received these words from the chief justice. It came to me in such a form that I took it as correct.

The Chairman. Who was it informed you?

Mr. Stevens. Several parties.

The Chairman. Can you name them?

Mr. Stevens. The strongest testimony came from the chief justice. Whether he used that specific language or not, or I received that specific language from the chief justice, I could not say, because there were so many talked to me on the subject. But information as to the scenes in the palace and the revolutionary state of things came from the chief justice, who was there four hours.

The Chairman. All of which transpired before you went to the palace?

Mr. Stevens. No; all that transpired while we were over at the Government building and after we had left.

The Chairman. Before you went to the palace?

Mr. Stevens. I did not go to the palace that day. The officals were at the palace at 12 o'clock.

The Chairman. At the palace?

Mr. Stevens. Where the scenes took place.

The Chairman. I was going to ask the question, where the mob was assembled?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. It was at the palace that this constitution was expected to be proclaimed.

The Chairman. You did not enter into that crowd?

Mr. Stevens. Not at all. I went home to dinner, and this invitation of the minister of the interior was for us to come at half-past one. We went over to the Government building, and were there from one to two hours.

The Chairman. My point is that you did not go to the palace that afternoon.

Mr. Stevens. No; I attempted to go, but failed, as I have before testified, owing to it being too late.

The Chairman. Are you able to state from information that came to you, beside that from the committee of safety, that you would be

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willing and found yourself authorized, and, of course, compelled as a matter of public duty, to ask Capt. Wiltse to land troops?

Mr. Stevens. I would have felt it necessary if the committee of safety had not made any request.

The Chairman. Based upon your judgment of the situation?

Mr. Stevens. Upon my judgment of the situation. My only fear was that I delayed it twenty-four hours too long. Had anything happened Sunday night it would have been my risk. The landing of troops is something serious. I had previously discouraged it. When I did request it, I said it must be solely for the protection of American life and property. I used the old formula, which does not go so far as the formula given by Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill in 1887. I will read the substance of the Bayard dispatch.

"United States Department of State,
"Washington, July 12,1887.
٭ ٭ ٭ ٭ ٭ ٭ ٭
"In the absence of any detailed information from you of the late disorders in the domestic control of Hawaii and the changes which have taken place in the official corps of that Government, I am not able to give you other than general instructions, which may be communicated in substance to the commander of vessel or vessels of this Government, in the waters of Hawaii, with whom you will freely confer, in order that such prompt and efficient action may be taken as the circumstances may make necessary.
"While we abstain from interference with the domestic affairs of Hawaii, in accordance with the policy and practice of this Government, yet, obstruction to the channels of legitimate commerce under existing law must not be allowed, and American citizens in Hawaii must be protected in their persons and property, by the representatives of their country's law and power, and no internal discord must be suffered to impair them.
"Your own aid and council, as well as the assistance of the officers of the Government vessels, if found necessary, will therefore be promptly afforded to promote the reign of law and respect for orderly government in Hawaii.
٭ ٭ ٭ ٭ ٭ ٭ ٭
"T. F. Bayard,
"Secretary of State."

The Chairman. Have you any further statement to make in regard to the matter?

Mr. Stevens. Not on that point. I can answer any questions. Perhaps I will put in here that when I went on board to Captain Wiltse with my request, which said only for the protection of life and property, I found that he had his order to the officers already drawn. I found it was copied from the naval order, standing order, which covered more than mine did. He said to me, "If you think it better to strike that out, I will do so." I said, "Inasmuch as it is in the naval order and Mr. Bayard's instructions, I have no right to ask you to strike it out."

The Chairman. That conversation between you and Captain Wiltse occurred on Monday?

Mr. Stevens. That occurred on Monday, after I went on board.

The Chairman. About what hour?

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Mr. Stevens. I should think not far from 4 o'clock; he landed about 5 and it may have been 4 o'clock.

The Chairman. When Capt. Wiltse landed where?

Mr. Stevens. Landed from the Boston on shore.

The Chairman. Landed the troops?

Mr. Stevens. The troops. I went on board to confer with him, carrying with me my request with him to land the troops.

The Chairman. That was the first communication you had with the ship?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you send any message to Capt. Wiltse before that?

Mr. Stevens. No.

The Chairman. To any officers of the ship?

Mr. Stevens. Not that I remember.

The Chairman. And when you got on board Capt. Wiltse had his orders already drawn up?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. In writing?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. And they were submitted to you?

Mr. Stevens. Submitted to me.

The Chairman. In what form?

Mr. Stevens. One that had been in the Navy for years. Mr. Bayard's was the last one issued, and it seems that the Navy Department's instructions covered all that Mr. Bayard's covered. When I drew my request, I had forgotten Mr. Bayard's instructions. I read them when I went to the legation. Mine simply recited, "for the protection of American life and property;" but when I saw Capt. Wiltse's, I saw that it was in substance the same as Mr. Bayard's. I have Mr. Bayard's here.

The Chairman. Was the order that Capt. Wiltse had drawn up identical with the instructions you are about to read?

Mr. Stevens. Identical in substance; and I think the wording is exactly the same.

My request to Capt. Wiltse is the following:

"United States Legation,
"Honolulu, January 16, 1893.
"Sir: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States Legation and United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.
"Very truly, yours,
"John L. Stevens,
"Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States.
"Capt. G. C. Wiltse,
"Commander of the U. S. S. Boston."

The order of Capt. Wiltse, as read by him to me when I went on board the Boston, goes farther than mine. It not only requires the protection of American life and property, but the preservation af public order.

That goes considerably further than my request went.

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The Chairman. Here is the order of Capt. Wiltse under which the troops were landed from the Boston.

"U. S. S. Boston, Second Rate,
"Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.
"Lieut. Commander W. T. Swinburne
"U. S. navy, Executive Officer U. S. S. Boston:"
"Sir: You will take command of the battalion, and land in Honolulu, for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order.
"Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs, and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens.
"You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any change in the situation.
"Very respectfully,
"G. C. Wiltse,
"Captain, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Boston."

You say when you got on board ship that Monday afternoon, that order of Capt. Wiltse had been drawn up?

Mr. Stevens. Had been drawn up, a rough draft; whether Capt. Wiltse changed it afterwards, I could not say.

The Chairman. Is it your recollection that that order which was drawn up before you arrived on the ship and presented to you after your arrival, was identical with this order I have just read?

Mr. Stevens. As nearly as I can remember.

The Chairman. That is the best of your recollection—that it is identical with the order Capt. Wiltse read to you?

Mr. Stevens. It so strikes me.

The Chairman. Did you and Capt. Wiltse have any discussion on the subject?

Mr. Stevens. Only on this one point—the preservation of public order. I said first, that is not in my request; but I recalled that it was in Mr. Bayard's, and Capt. Wiltse was ready to strike it out.

The Chairman. You speak of "my order."

Mr. Stevens. I did not say "my order." The order that I referred to, my order, was a mere request.

The Chairman. What do you mean by "my" order; the request you sent to Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Stevens. My request that I meant to send to Capt. Wiltse for landing the troops.

The Chairman. Had you sent that request before you went aboard the ship?

Mr. Stevens. No; I carried it in person.

The Chairman. Had you any way of communicating with Capt. Wiltse before you went on board the ship ?

Mr. Stevens. I do not know that I had any. But I had conferred with Capt. Wiltse at different times, and he knew what would be the form.

The Chairman. Had you conferred with him between Saturday and Monday afternoon?

Mr. Stevens. I do not recall. He may have called at the legation a half dozen times; probably he did; but I could not say.

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The Chairman. Do you remember whether you had any conference with him between Saturday and Monday afternoon with regard to the form of the orders that he would give to his troops, or the form of the request you would make of him?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest. The only talk about form was on board the ship.

The Chairman. If I have a correct view of your testimony it is that when you arrived on board the ship you found that Capt. Wiltse had drawn up this order, which I have just read to you?

Mr. Stevens. I think it is identical.

The Chairman. He had drawn up this order and had it ready to deliver to his subordinate?

Mr. Stevens. That is it.

The Chairman. Did you find a complete state of military preparation for landing the troops when you got on board the ship?

Mr. Stevens. So far as I could judge; I saw the officers in the cabin and I got that statement, that they were ready to land.

The Chairman. Do you know on what request or demand Capt. Wiltse responded when he prepared this order for the landing of the troops on shore?

Mr. Stevens. On my request as the American minister.

Senator Frye. But you had not made it?

Mr. Stevens. When I got on board of the ship---

Senator Frye. Before that. The chairman asks if the troops were ready when you got on board—whether the order of Capt. Wiltse was in writing when you got on board.

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

Senator Frye. But had not been delivered?

Mr. Stevens. No.

Senator Frye. At whose request or demand had Capt. Wiltse made this preparation in advance?

Mr. Stevens. Undoubtedly on his knowledge of the situation. He may have come to the legation, and the consul was around and had written to the captain about it. He had gotten ready so many times, and these all knew perfectly well that mine would be a mere form of official request.

The Chairman. Would you, as United States minister at Honolulu, have extended to Capt. Wiltse any order or request not in writing, which you would have expected him to comply with or obey about so grave a matter as the landing of troops?

Mr. Stevens. No; I made no request except one in writing. I have no remembrance of any verbal request, but he called at the legation frequently.

The Chairman. And it is quite likely you discussed the situation?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; we had discussed it running up to Hilo and back.

The Chairman. Now, I understand you to testify that Capt. Wiltse, commanding that ship, did not have from you any written request or authority to put his troops in condition for landing and conducting military operations before the time you arrived, at 4 o'clock or thereabouts, on Monday, and that you then took the request in writing with you?

Mr. Stevens. I think I did. That is my memory.

The Chairman. Have you any recollection of having communicated with him—made any written request whatever before that?

Mr. Stevens. I have no recollection of it.

The Chairman. Are you sure you did not?

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Mr. Stevens. I think I did not. It is barely possible I sent him a note speaking of the danger on shore; but I think not, because the naval officers were as well aware of that danger.

The Chairman. Did you send him any request?

Mr. Stevens. None except that which is on file.

The Chairman. And which you took with you ?

Mr. Stevens. I think I took it with me; I have no recollection of sending it by any person. That is my memory.

The Chairman. Is that the paper which you prepared and presented to Capt. Wiltse and upon which the discussion arose as to a more enlarged scope of the order which he gave to Capt. Swinburne?

Mr. Stevens. That is all; and perhaps it was not more than two minutes' talk. After I carried my note, we compared them and found out the difference.

The Chairman. Your attention was called to the fact that Capt. Wiltse's order---

Mr. Stevens. Went further than mine.

The Chairman. Upon what precedent had you formulated the order which you took with you on board the ship?

Mr. Stevens. I had been in a revolutionary country before as minister, and I had gotten used to the formula, and the request that I carried to Capt. Wiltse was the formula I was then familiar with. The files of the legation show that. I knew that Mr. Bayard's instructions went further; but they had passed out of my recollection. When I saw Capt. Wiltse's order, I remembered that Mr. Bayard's went further than mine.

The Chairman. Where were you a minister before?

Mr. Stevens. In 1867,1870,1871, and 1873 in Paraguay and Uruguay. Uruguay was in civil war nearly all the time.

The Chairman. You were minister there?

Mr. Stevens. Had charge of the legation.

The Chairman. How long did you stay there?

Mr. Stevens. Three years. Paraguay had just gotten through that struggle with Brazil, and Uruguay was in a state of war for two years and a half, which was settled during my residence there.

The Chairman. So that you had gotten familiar with the duties of U. S. minister under the circumstances you have given?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; and the responsibilities of a naval commander, which made me exceedingly careful on every point.

The Chairman. Had you returned on shore before the troops left the ship?

Mr. Stevens. Before the troops left the ship.

The Chairman. Where did you go?

Mr. Stevens. To the legation.

The Chairman. Did you give any orders or advice as to the manner of landing the troops, the streets through which the troops were to proceed or march, the place at which they were to be posted, or the place where they were to be encamped?

Mr. Stevens. At first we arranged that a portion should go to the United States consulate.

The Chairman. Who arranged ?

Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse and I.

The Chairman. Where was that done?

Mr. Stevens. On board the ship. And as many at the legation as we could take. If our grounds could take any more, we would ; but we could not encamp more than 15 or 18. I assumed that the marines

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had their camp utensils, and I then learned that they needed a hall for the first time---

The Chairman. Why did you request that any troops be sent to the legation?

Mr. Stevens. Why did I?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Stevens. For the reason that the state of anarchy in which the city was, and knowing that the only government which existed there was that committee of safety and the citizens back of it, and the military force that we had—knowing that the legation is the one of all other places around which there should be some men, and that was a more important part of the city where a dozen men could be sent this way or that way to take care of the contingencies of fires. By stating a little more in this connection you will understand it better. The only two things that were new to me on the part of the request of the naval officers was this: So soon as we found that they were to land I learned from Capt. Wiltse and his officers that they must have a hall to stay in and maps of the city for use in case of fires. So that from the time I struck the legation, at 4 o'clock, up to nearly 10 o'clock, my entire time was consumed in finding maps and a hall for the officers and men for the night.

The Chairman. Did you go out in town?

Mr. Stevens. I stayed at the legation and sent a messenger.

The Chairman. Whom did you send?

Mr. Stevens. Mr. Pringle.

The Chairman. Your aide-de-camp?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you, at the time you left the ship and made this arrangement with Capt. Wiltse, have any apprehension that there was any danger of life and property at the American legation?

Mr. Stevens. I knew this, that there was a liability of a crank—or irresponsible persons—liable to come there and alarm my family.

The Chairman. Did you expect that the Queen's government or any mob of citizens of Hawaii would possibly or probably attack the American legation?

Mr. Stevens. No. What we alluded to were irresponsible parties in the night setting fire to property.

The Chairman. You apprehended that danger?

Mr. Stevens. We apprehended that danger.

The Chairman. Did you apprehend that danger?

Mr. Stevens. I apprehended it, or I would not have consented to the landing of the troops.

The Chairman. Did you apprehend it as an attack on the legation?

Mr. Stevens. I did not apprehend that the representatives of the Government or the Queen would have anything to do with that.

The Chairman. You also agreed that Capt. Wiltse should send a detachment to the consulate?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Had Mr. Severance requested the presence of any troops there?

Mr. Stevens. Prior to my visit on board ship, without my knowledge, Mr. Severance had communicated his fear to Capt. Wiltse.

The Chairman. Did Capt. Wiltse so tell you?

Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse so told me. And, still more, Capt. Wiltse had the note, and while I was on board the consul telephoned Capt. Wiltse that he would give a signal in case there was an outbreak.

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----57

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The Chairman. Was there telephonic communication between the ship and the shore?

Mr. Stevens. Between the ship and shore. All our naval vessels, so soon as they get in the harbor, make telephonic connection.

The Chairman. You say Mr. Severance sent a note to Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Stevens. Sent a note.

The Chairman. Did you see it?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. What was in it?

Mr. Stevens. It was a brief note. I think I have it. Moreover, he telephoned at the time that I was on board.

The Chairman. Where is that note?

Mr. Stevens. That is it [producing paper].

The Chairman. Is this the original note, or a copy of it?

Mr. Stevens. That is the original.

The Chairman. I will read this. It is headed personal:

"Honolulu, January ----, 1893.
"My dear Captain: In case of any outbreak or collision with the committee of safety at the mass meeting to-day and the Government forces with a view of suppressing said meeting, it might be necessary to land a force to preserve order or protect our property. In such case, should the telephone wires be cut, I can send you a signal by lowering my flag at half mast, and you will, of course, be governed by instructions from Minister Stevens. It is reported this a. m. that the mass meeting of the citizens will be interfered with or broken up by the Queen's forces. A mass meeting is reported to be held at the same hours.
"Very truly,
"H. W. Severance,
"Consul-General.
"Capt. Wiltse,
"Captain of the United States Ship Boston."

Before you left to go on board the ship did you have any conference with Mr. Severance?

Mr. Stevens. I did not.

The Chairman. Was there any?

Mr. Stevens. I did not know that that note was written until I got on board, or thought that a note was written.

The Chairman. Was it by virtue of that note that you and Capt. Wiltse agreed that troops should be left there at the consulate?

Mr. Stevens. I think I could have recommended, even if the consul's note had not been sent, because that is the usual way when there is trouble in a country, that the legislation and consulates are provided for. I made the same rule there.

The Chairman. When these troops were so disposed as to place a detachment at the consulate and another at the legation, was it the honest and bona fide intention of yourself, and, so far as you know, of Capt. Wiltse, to give protection to those American establishments, or was it the intention and purpose to make a display of the American forces at these respective points under the assurance of the American flag, or was it because of the movement of a popular character which you knew to be on foot for the purpose of overthrowing the Queen and the establishment of a new government?

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Mr. Stevens. It had sole relation to the protection of American life and property and, if you wish to cover it by Mr. Bayard's order, for the preservation of public order, I did not feel like going so far as that.

The Chairman. At the time you made this request upon Capt. Wiltse, and at the time you made this disposition of the troops, did you know of the existence of a purpose on the part of any of the citizens of Hawaii to organize an opposition to the Queen's Government, with a view to overthrowing or subverting it in any respect?

Mr. Stevens. All day Sunday and Monday when the meeting was held, everything was open and public, just as in a railroad meeting in any city—everybody knew it; reasons to believe there was no effective opposition. I believed the movements of the opponents of the monarchy were irresistible, and everybody understood what was going on.

The Chairman. Did you know of the actual organisation on Monday evening?

Mr. Stevens. I did not, only by such information as I could get. I put myself in contact with the Queen's representatives; they had access to the legation, and I would inquire very cautiously about this and that and a great many things. Many of the friends of the Provisional Government I knew, and a great many I did not.

The Chairman. Did you know of a programme, or whatever it was, before you went on board the ship, for the establishment of the new Government?

Mr. Stevens. I could not help but know it; it was all the talk Sunday and Monday. I knew it by the general appearance of things and the talk; the leaders did not communicate their plans to me.

The Chairman. As I understand, the public meeting had not been held at that time?

Mr. Stevens. It had been arranged for.

The Chairman. How did you know that?

Mr. Stevens. By constant reports to the legation, both from royalists and others.

The Chairman. It was information that you had?

Mr. Stevens. I did not go to church that day; I think I remained home all day.

The Chairman. Did you derive that information, before you went on board that ship, from a report or statement made to you by any member of a body that had organized or had agreed they would organize a Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. No; I think the representative men who were in it refrained from communicating their details.

The Chairman. Did they communicate it to you?

Mr. Stevens. I think not.

Senator Gray. Or did you have any conversation with any of them?

Mr. Stevens. I think I did not. I may have asked what they were doing, and they may have said they would have a Provisional Government. I should say that is probable. I could not learn what was going on; I would have to catechise somebody, and they would answer me.

The Chairman. But you knew at the time you went on board the ship that the state of public feeling there would culminate in an effort to overthrow the Queen's Government and establish a government in place of it?

Mr. Stevens. I understood that the Queen's government was at an end. The Queen's government ended on Saturday afternoon. There

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was no government of the Queen's for more than forty-eight hours; from 4 o'clock Saturday afternoon, the 14th of January, the Queen's government was absolutely dead, as much so as was that of Louis Phillipe's government was after he left the city of Paris in 1848.

The Chairman. From the time you spoke of going on board ship and conferring with Capt. Wiltse about troops going on shore, was there any government in Honolulu which could have issued any authentic order which the people would have respected?

Mr. Stevens. There was none. As I stated before, the only government was the thousand white citizens who were acting as a unit; they were absolutely masters of the situation, and their unity and self-possession and the presence of the Boston kept the city as it was.

The Chairman. The period of time from Saturday afternoon to Monday afternoon you regard as an interregnum?

Mr. Stevens. Absolutely an interregnum—theoretically and practically.

The Chairman. During that time did you receive any information to the effect that the Queen's forces were under arms and under orders in any way to protect the public order, or to protect life and property, or were engaged in any military operation?

Mr. Stevens. No authentic information.

The Chairman. Did you receive any information that that was the state of the case?

Mr. Stevens. I remember that Mr. Peterson and his associates called on me Sunday evening and made certain inquiries about the situation, and from them I got some impression. But it was only his story; I got no reliable information. It was the general situation that taught me my duty.

The Chairman. What was Mr. Peterson's story about the military preparation on the part of the Queen to protect the public security?

Mr. Stevens. Mr. Peterson was then between the opposing forces; he was expecting the natives and white citizens would support him, and he came to see what the United States officials would do. I did not promise him anything.

The Chairman. What was his story?

Mr. Stevens. His story was just what I have stated—that he was expecting

Senator Frye. The chairman asked you if you had any information that the Queen's troops or Queen's forces were in any condition to make any attack upon the Provisional Government or to preserve order and life or property?

Mr. Stevens. None at all.

The Chairman. Did you see any array of the Queen's troops anywhere in Honolulu between the time of your landing from the Boston on Saturday and your going back on the Boston on Monday?

Mr. Stevens. Not any.

The Chairman. No parade through the streets?

Mr. Stevens. No parade through the streets that I saw.

The Chairman. Did you see any parade through the streets, of any organization, or any police force in charge of Mr. Wilson?

Mr. Stevens. None whatever.

The Chairman. So that, as a part of the interregnum during these days, between Saturday noon and Monday afternoon, there was no display of military force on the part of the Queen's government?

Mr. Stevens. None whatever that I was made cognizant of.

The Chairman. Or on the part of the Queen?

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Mr. Stevens. None whatever.

The Chairman. Within your knowledge or information, did she during that time exercise any governmental act except the promulgation of the proclamation on Monday giving up the enterprise of overthrowing the constitution?

Mr. Stevens. That was all. She made a communication to me on Sunday—it may have come from the Queen or ministers—that I should meet at the Government house the English ministers and others. On Sunday, knowing the situation, I declined to go to the meeting, because, first, I did not want to leave the legation, and secondly, when this communication came I could not make a tripartite with Mr. Wodehouse and the Japanese minister, and I declined to go to this meeting. That meeting was evidently for the purpose of making an appeal for our assistance to save her.

The Chairman. The proclamation was the only effort on the part of the Queen to assert her government from the time you got off from the Boston on Saturday afternoon to Monday afternoon, when you went back on the Boston"?.

Mr. Stevens. That is all. I got a note from the Queen on Tuesday. That was twenty-two hours after the troops were landed. That is the only one.

The Chairman. I have not come to that; I am speaking of the period you are pleased to call the interregnum.

Mr. Stevens. That is all.

The Chairman. During that interregnum what military array, if any, was there on the part of citizens of Hawaii?

Mr. Stevens. You mean the citizens?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Stevens. My information was—of course I had to obtain from A, B, and C---

The Chairman. Did you see any military array?

Mr. Stevens. No.

The Chairman. What was your information?

Mr. Stevens. My information was that the citizens were preparing for a public meeting, and they were going to be governed by the exigencies of the case. All the information that I could get was that they were notifying all parts of the city and island to be at the mass-meeting and have their arms at the right time. I could not get reliable information of that; but it was such that I had no doubt about it.

The Chairman. Did you see any military organization or assemblage of the citizens during this period of interregnum, or have any knowledge of the fact?

Mr. Stevens. No; only at this meeting at the armory it came to me, not officially, but I learned it from others.

The Chairman. At the armory?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Did that meeting occur before you went on board the ship?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. And you knew of it?

Mr. Stevens. Knew of the results of it. I think they had not gotten entirely through when I went on board the ship. I could not swear to that; I did not go to the meeting.

The Chairman. Was there any meeting of the retainers or supporters of the Queen at the same time or about the same time?

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Mr. Stevens. I think they had one on the palace grounds the same afternoon.

The Chairman. You do not know?

Mr. Stevens. I think so; I cannot swear to it. I know they had one there the same afternoon, or preceding afternoon, and my impression is, the same afternoon.

The Chairman. Did you know that before you went on board the ship?

Mr. Stevens. I think so, because there were handbills posted in the street, handbills on both sides nearly all through the city, as well as I remember.

Senator Frye. Mr Chairman, if you can hold in your mind just where you want to start, I would like to ask a few questions at this point.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Frye. Mr. Stevens stated that he requested certain of the troops to be sent to the consulate, and certain of them to be sent to the legation; but he did not give any account of the disposition of the balance of the troops. Now, Mr. Stevens, answer my questions, and answer them only. You say you thought when the troops came ashore they would bring their tents with them?

Mr. Stevens. When I made my request?

Senator Frye. Yes.

Mr. Stevens. I stated that.

Senator Frye. When the troops came to the shore, you found they had no tents?

Mr. Stevens. And they had to have a hall.

Senator Frye. Up to that time did you ever know that there was such a hall in Honolulu as Arion Hall?

Mr. Stevens. Never, until the time the Opera House was refused.

Senator Frye. Did you call upon them for a place to have the troops?

Mr. Stevens. The officers said they would have to have a place to stay during the night.

Senator Frye. Did you send a man for a place?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

Senator Frye. What did you send him after?

Mr. Stevens. The Opera House.

Senator Frye. Is the Opera House a place that was before occupied by United States troops?

Mr. Stevens. I could not say as to that.

Senator Frye. Do you know it by report?

Mr. Stevens. I think it had been occupied before by a military force.

Senator Frye. Why did you send for the Opera House.

Mr. Stevens. Because I knew of that hall, and I knew of its capacity.

Senator Frye. And the only one that you knew of in the city as suitable for the purpose you wished to use it for?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

Senator Frye. Your man returned?

Mr. Stevens. He had to go 3 miles to find the man in charge, and returned with a negative—that the owner of the hall was not on the island and he would not like to have the hall used for that purpose. I found out that he was an Englishman and against the Americans.

Senator Frye. Then you heard of Arion Hall?

Mr. Stevens. I sent the same messenger, the same man.

Senator Frye. How far did you send him?

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Mr. Stevens. About a mile, to a man known to be a royalist—Kalakaua's minister. Mr. Walker had been a minister, and had been all through these troubles. He said he would be very glad to let us have the hall. He gave me the name of the manager. I sent a third man to the one who had the management of the hall, and he granted the right to use it. It was then well on to 10 o'clock. Consequently the men had to stay in the street that night to that hour.

Senator Frye. At Mr. Atherton's house?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; he had extensive grounds---

Senator Frye. In selecting Arion Hall for the use of those troops, did you have any reference whatever to their location as regards the Provisional Government or the Queen's Government?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest; it never entered into my head.

Senator Frye. Had anyone made any suggestion to you on behalf of the Queen or the Provisional Government that Arion Hall should be selected on account of its location near the Government building?

Mr. Stevens. Never.

Senator Frye. When you selected Arion Hall for the troops did you have any reference whatever to its being near the palace and the Government building?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

Senator Frye. Did you have any reference whatever in your selection to the location of the troops being effective to prevent the Queen's troops attacking the Provisional Government's troops?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

Senator Frye. As a matter of fact, is Arion Hall, so far as American property is concerned—and I mean by that, of course, residences as well as anything else—a reasonably central location?

Mr. Stevens. A reasonably central location.

Senator Frye. DO you know of any place large enough, other than that, for quartering those troops in the city of Honolulu?

Mr. Stevens. Not obtainable. I had thought of another on my own street. If Arion Hall had not been gotten we would have tried another hall, which was nearer me, but the owner was not there.

Senator Frye. The only purpose you had was to place the troops where they could be protected during the night?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; and where they would be useful in case of fire.

Senator Gray. You said that this was arranged on the Boston in a conference with Captain Wiltse. What was to be the route the troops were to take?

Mr. Stevens. No; I do not remember any arrangement as to the route; the arrangement was as to where they were to land.

Senator Gray. And where they were to go?

Mr. Stevens. No; we had not found this hall.

Senator Gray. How was it they came to go to Mr. Atherton's?

M. Stevens. Simply because he had extensive grounds, and he was an American.

Senator Gray. That was a matter of arrangement before you left the ship?

Mr. Stevens. I could not say that; I presume so. It was arranged where they would land, because they were going up the principal streets.

Senator Gray. You knew they were going to Mr. Atherton's?

Mr. Stevens. I can not say positively.

The Chairman. Did you know that before you left the ship?

Mr. Stevens. I can not say positively, for I do not remember it.

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The Chairman. Proceeding from this period when you say there was an interregnum to the time when you ordered the American flag to be hoisted in Hawaii, I will ask you what was the condition of the people as to order and quietude and the conduct of their ordinary vocations?

Mr. Stevens. You mean between the time of the recognition of the Provisional Government and the raising of the flag?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Stevens. I will say that the people were generally at their avocations, except that the citizens had constituted themselves soldiers— the men from stores, the banks, and the workshops, responsible men— were constituted the military force for the time being.

The Chairman. To what extent had this volunteer military organization increased?

Mr. Stevens. Volunteer and otherwise I could not tell precisely; but I should say all the way from 400 to 600 men.

The Chairman. Armed men?

Mr. Stevens. Men they could place arms with. They were white men accustomed to the use of muskets. But the men actually on military duty probably would not be half that number.

The Chairman. Were the men organized for the purpose of repressing mobs and incendiarism, or organized and armed for the purpose of supporting the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. The public order.

The Chairman. I want to ask you whether they were organized for the purpose of preserving public order, or for the purpose of supporting the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. They regarded the Provisional Government as the instrument through which they would preserve order.

The Chairman. They were considered troops of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. They were supporters of the Provisional Government.

The Chairman. Were they under the control of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. Those volunteers would never be called upon except in an emergency. They had a military force which was disciplined, and they had this force from the workshops.

The Chairman. What was the number of the disciplined force?

Mr. Stevens. I could not speak with accuracy at this moment.

The Chairman. What is your opinion?

Mr. Stevens. I should say 150 men—possibly 200.

The Chairman. Were they organized in military companies?

Mr. Stevens. Military companies.

The Chairman. Under the command of Col. Soper?

Mr. Stevens. Under Col. Soper, I think.

The Chairman. Were there captains of companies?

Mr. Stevens. I do not know Capt. Ziegler; but I think he was the captain of the German company at the Government house.

The Chairman. Were there other captains?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. I think there was another captain, Fisher, from one of the banks, who was the captain at the barracks; the third company, Capt. Goud.

The Chairman. In that period which you call the interregnum, was there any outbreak?

Mr. Stevens. There was no outbreak; they feared an outbreak.

The Chairman. Was there any demonstration to show that an outbreak was contemplated?

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Mr. Stevens. I think their fears came from private information. I think there was no external signs of it. Of course the authorities put themselves as much in touch with the facts as they possibly could, and they sometimes may have been alarmed unduly, as men would be in such circumstances.

The Chairman. Did you believe that there was a general public apprehension in that time, covering the period that I have just referred to, of any armed demonstration against the Provisional Government, or any incendiarism, or any mob violence?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; very strong; so strong they got information that they barricaded the Government building and got ready for anything. It is very likely half the time that the alarms were bogus?

The Chairman. During this period of time where was the Queen?

Mr. Stevens. The Queen was in her Washington house. That was the house left to her by her husband, and by the husband's mother left to him. It is the Washington house; well-known place, close to the tpalace.

The Chairman. Did the Queen have any guards about her?

Mr. Stevens. As nearly as I remember the Provisional Government allowed her a guard.

The Chairman. Of how many? What was your information on that subject?

Mr. Stevens. I think 12.

The Chairman. Armed men?

Mr. Stevens. I presume so; I never went to see.

The Chairman. Were the troops taken from the organization under the authority of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. As nearly, as I remember at first they allowed her 12 of her own guards. But, of course, the Government kept an eye on them, and subsequently they were changed to men of the Provisional Government.

The Chairman. Were they changed at the Queen's request?

Mr. Stevens. That I could not say. I probably knew at the time; but I would not be sure. I think they were changed. They regarded her native guard as of no consequence whatever. The reason I had for raising the flag, I will give you in as condensed form as I have it, when you reach that.

The Chairman. I have not reached that. I am trying to find out what the situation was at the time. Was there any interruption of the relations between the Provisional Government and the American Government or between the Provisional Government and any foreign government during this period of time after the proclamation of the Provisional Government and up to the time of the raising the flag?

Mr. Stevens. I should say no interruptions; but I would have to give the facts, that you might understand my answer fully. That will enter right into the reasons for raising the flag. I will give those reasons very specifically.

The Chairman. There were no interruptions of the relations?

Mr. Stevens. Do you mean the diplomatic relations?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Stevens. Not so far as I know.

The Chairman. What Governments had recognized the Provisional Government before the time of the raising of this flag?

Mr. Stevens. Every one represented there.

The Chairman. Which were—--

Mr. Stevens. The English Government, the German Government,

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the Austro-Hungary the Portuguese, the Japanese. The Chinese are only represented by a commercial agent. I think he recognized the Provisional Government in some form.

The Chairman. You do not know?

Mr. Stevens. I think he did.

The Chairman. Did you have any official information as minister of the United States from these respective Governments that their representatives there had recognized this Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. It was published in the papers the next morning. I heard of it the night before.

The Chairman. I am not speaking of that; I am asking whether you had any official information from the officers of these respective Governments?

Mr. Stevens. They did not call upon me to notify me; but they authorized the publication of their recognition in the paper of the next morning.

The Chairman. Is there an official paper?

Mr. Stevens. There is a paper the royal Government had used, "The Bulletin," which is the English organ, and the Provisional Government used "The Daily Advertiser," and they published that in the Advertiser. And I think the Bulletin got it too.

The Chairman. Was it understood by you that the publications in this gazette were official ?

Mr. Stevens. I understood that they were duly signed by the officials, and I learned that evening they were recognized by all in thirty minutes except by the English minister; he did not do it until the next morning. But he got ahead of me in calling on the Provisional Government. I was too ill, and did not call for several days; and he called within forty minutes after they were constituted.

The Chairman. Did these foreign governments officially communicate their recognition to the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; and it was published in the papers the next morning. That was the way I got at it.

The Chairman. You say that the English minister---

Mr. Stevens. Mr. Wodehouse.

The Chairman. Was he the minister?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. You say he withheld his written recognition until the next morning?

Mr. Stevens. Until the Claudine sailed for Washington.

The Chairman. What time did you make official recognition of this Government.

Mr. Stevens. I could not say positively, because the legation was thronged all the afternoon, and I was sick on the couch; but probably not far from 5 o'clock. My wife and daughter think it was a little later.

The Chairman. What day?

Mr. Stevens. The day they were constituted—perhaps three hours after they were sworn in and took possession of the buildings and were conducting the Government.

The Chairman. You were at the legation?

Mr. Stevens. At the legation.

The Chairman. And lying sick on a couch?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. How did you get information that this Provisional Government had been established?

Mr. Stevens. There were messengers coming from both sides.

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The Chairman. I am speaking of official information from the Provisional Government.

Mr. Stevens. I can not say now, because I received it in so many ways. I can say that the ministers of the Queen had access to me all that afternoon, and others, and it was borne to me in various ways.

The Chairman. What did you regard as the official information of the Government on which you, as the American minister, were authorized to act in recognition of that Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. I could not say; but there is probably a note on file in the legation in Honolulu; I presume there is—stating that they were constituted. But I learned it in very many ways outside of that. There was a complete want of government, an interregnum, from Saturday afternoon, and my purpose was to recognize the first real government that was constituted; and if Mr. Wilson had gone forward and shown any force and organized a government I should have recognized that.

The Chairman. You received a note informing you of the organization of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. Probably I did; I can not swear to that.

The Chairman. You wrote a note?

Mr. Stevens. Oh, yes; I wrote a note.

The Chairman. When did you write that note?

Mr. Stevens. In the afternoon.

The Chairman. What time in the afternoon?

Mr. Stevens. I could not say. I got up off the couch---

The Chairman. About what time?

Mr. Stevens. I could not swear to that. I prepared a note before; had it in readiness, because it was open as any railroad meeting would be in your city or mine; and I probably got the note ready without signature beforehand.

Senator Gray. A note to whom?

The Chairman. To the Provisional Government.

Mr. Stevens. I looked up the matter of form in the legation, and got it ready.

The Chairman. To whom did you send that note?

Mr. Stevens. My impression is I sent it by Mr. Pringle. I might have sent it by Mr. Carter. I had not been asleep for four nights; I could not sleep on the Boston, all this excitement going on, and about 1 o'clock I was violently attacked. I took my couch. A medical man would have said, "Don't speak to a man this afternoon;" but under the excitement they keep coming; I had no clerk, and my daughter— consequently, in this state of my health I could not stop to look at the clock when every man who came—the Queen's messenger this minute and another messenger another minute. I went over it, and I think, as I recall the incident, it was about 5 o'clock. Mrs. Stevens and my daughter afterward said they thought it was half past 5, because they knew when the messenger went.

The Chairman. During that afternoon, while you were still on the couch sick, as you say, some members of the recent cabinet of Liliuokalani came in to see you?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. I wish to know who they were?

Mr. Stevens. They were Mr. Peterson, Mr. Parker—the whole four. But I was too ill, so that I received them one at a time, and only two at all.

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The Chairman. You received only one at a time?

Mr. Stevens. I received two—Mr. Parker first. Mr. Parker was more of a gentleman, and he wanted to know if Mr. Peterson could come in. Mr. Peterson was the leader.

The Chairman. During your interviews with these two ex-ministers of Liliuokalani did they give you any intimation as to the proclamation of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. Their only errand was this---

The Chairman. What did they say to you? Did they give you any intimation that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?

Mr. Stevens. Not so far as I remember.

The Chairman. What did they communicate to you?

Mr. Stevens. I will make that clear. Before I had this violent attack, say about 1 o'clock, I received this note from the Queen asking me to come to the palace, and I received it about fifteen minutes before the time appointed. There were two reasons for not responding. I declined the Sunday before to go into a tripartite, especially with Mr. Wodehouse. After I received that note, probably forty-five minutes or an hour, these ministers arrived, and their message was this: whether I could not properly ask the aid of Capt. Wiltse's forces to sustain the Queen. Mr. Peterson went into a legal argument, while his associate, Mr. Parker, was silent. Mr. Parker said to Peterson: "You must make this very brief;" and the only answer I made was: "Gentlemen, these men were landed for one purpose only, a pacific purpose; I can not use this force for sustaining the Queen." Now, they say that they put the other alternative—"assist the Provisional Government." There was no alternative spoken of or hinted. I said: "These men were landed for a pacific purpose, and I can not use them to sustain the Queen."

The Chairman. A pacific purpose?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; what I have just stated is the substance of what occurred.

The Chairman. Was that the substance of what occurred?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. And that was argued by Mr. Peterson on a legal point. I ought to state the reason for that. In 1874 Kalakaua was elected, and the natives were opposed to it, as history will show. The American forces from the ship were landed to suppress the mob, and the suppression of that mob was practically the putting of Kalakaua on the throne. But that was not the specific intention; but, inasmuch as he had been elected and his opponents had control of the city and had driven the Legislature out, it resulted that way.

Now, in putting down the riot in 1874, which put Kalakaua on the throne, from that time on the Kalakaua family got the idea that the United States would do the same; that the minister was obliged to do it. I received formerly several times messengers from the Queen; whenever they called I would, as a matter of duty, use that force to sustain them, and in this belief Mr. Peterson made the argument that they were the legally constituted Government, and that I could properly do as he suggested—he knew that I did not claim to be a lawyer, and he thought he knew more about law than I did—that I could properly use the force. I made as brief an answer as possible—"that these men were on shore for a pacific purpose, and we can not take any part in any contest; can not use the force to sustain the Queen or anybody else."

The Chairman. Now, at that that time it seems, from what occurred and the argument that was addressed to you by these gentlemen, that

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the question arose as between the Provisional Government and the Queen's Government?

Mr. Stevens. His whole argument was on the point whether I could properly use the force. At the suggestion of Mr. Parker, because of my condition of health, he made it brief.

The Chairman. But you were simply contemplating the question at that time whether you could sustain the Queen's Government or the Provisional Government ?

Mr. Stevens. No; the other alternative was not put by him at all.

The Chairman. At the time that conversation occurred were you aware of the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?

Mr. Stevens. Probably I was. That was in the course of two or three hours recognized. I can not recognize the precise hour at which they took possession of the Government building and issued their proclamation.

The Chairman. Did you at that time know that it related to a controversy between the Queen's Government and the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. I knew from the conversation that they called upon me from the Queen—to save her.

The Chairman. To save her against dethronement?

Mr. Stevens. Against anybody—that their only hope for possession of that Government by the Queen was by my assistance.

The Chairman. Was there any suggestion made by these ministers when they came to the legation that the Queen's person or the person of any member of her cabinet was in any danger?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. So that, what you had to say in regard to it had no reference to the preservation of the life or security of the Queen or her ministers?

Mr. Stevens. Nothing whatever.

The Chairman. But it had reference to whether the Government of the United States would recognize---

Mr. Stevens. Put her in possession of the Government which she had lost.

The Chairman. How long was it after that interview with the Queen's ministers before you sent this note of recognition by Mr. Pringle to the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. I could not tell.

The Chairman. About how long?

Mr. Stevens. I would suppose it might have been two hours; might have been three.

The Chairman. That is your recollection—two or three hours?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; two or three hours. Probably it might have been—most likely was, two hours and a half; but that I would not swear to—whether it was two, two forty-five or three, because I had no record or watch at the time.

The Chairman. On that day, which was Tuesday, had you visited the Government building?

Mr. Stevens. I did not leave the legation from Monday evening until several days after—remained constantly in the legation.

The Chairman. Had you any conferences with members of the Provisional Government during that interval and while you remained at the legation?

Mr. Stevens. No.

The Chairman. Had no conferences with any of them?

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Mr. Stevens. No. AS an individual, some member of the Provisional Government may have called. But the Provisional Government leaders were intelligent, and they would not embarrass me with questions I could not answer—they were better posted men than their opponents. They kept their plans from me for reasons of their own.

The Chairman. I suppose you are not speaking of the official communications between you and the members of the Provisional Government— that they did not make any official communication?

Mr. Stevens. I presume they sent a communication asking recognition, and I presume that note is at the legation in Honolulu.

The Chairman. Beside that?

Mr. Stevens. Beside that I did not see one of them—they did not call; they probably sent their messenger, because they kept coming to the legation, representative men on both sides, constantly, and it would be impossible to make a record of every one. The whole town had been in excitement for days.

The Chairman. Was it your purpose in anything you did, from the time you left the Boston on Saturday up to the time of your making an official recognition in writing, to use the forces or the flag or the authority of the United States Government for the purpose of dethroning the Queen?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest—absolute noninterference was my purpose.

The Chairman. Was it your policy in any of these things that you had done to aid any plan or purpose of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States?

Mr. Stevens. Not at all. That was not the plan.

The Chairman. Since your residence in Hawaii as a minister have you personally—I do not speak of your ministerial character—favored the annexation of Hawaii to the United States? Have you been in favor of that movement?

Mr. Stevens. After I had been in Honolulu one year I came to the conclusion that the annexation of those islands was inevitable, or something else; that the then condition of things could not last very long, and therefore my official communications to our Government disclose just what my views were. But in my calculations for annexation I never supposed, nor was it expected by the friends of annexation, that it would be by revolution, but through negotiation, legislative action, and the assent of the Queen on the lines of the treaty of '54. That was the only plan thought of.

In that time I kept my own counsel, and nobody except the United States Government knew what my real view was. In that time I may have chatted with individuals and given an opinion when talking of the situation of the islands—with Judge Hartwell or Rev. Dr. Hyde, and I may have agreed with them that that would be the inevitable, sooner or later, because that had been the form of expression, as the records will show, for forty years. But that was merely an academic opinion privately expressed.

The Chairman. As a matter of interest to the people of Hawaii, and also the people of the United States and the Government of the United States, were your personal wishes or inclinations in favor of or against annexation?

Mr. Stevens. In the first twelve months I supposed something like a protectorate would be preferable.

The Chairman. After that what?

Mr. Stevens. I came to the conclusion that while a protectorate

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would be possible, annexation was the only logical and practical solution.

The Chairman. Did you favor it?

Mr. Stevens. Only as I reported to the Department.

The Chairman. I do not mean whether you advocated it, but whether, in your own mind, you favored it.

Mr. Stevens. In my own mind I came to the conclusion that annexation was better than protectorate, or something like what they have in Sweden and Norway. I know that there were some men when I first went there who have had the idea that it would be better to have the foreign relations managed at Washington and have an independent kingdom like Norway.

The Chairman. During this period of time in Hawaii, did you believe that it would be advantageous to the Government of the United States, in a commercial sense, to acquire the ownership of the islands?

Mr. Stevens. Most emphatically. I came to that conclusion after a study of the future of the Pacific.

The Chairman. You believed that the future of the islands lay in that direction?

Mr. Stevens. Exactly. I followed Mr. Seward for 25 years; I am a believer in his philosophy as to the future of America in the Pacific, and, of course, my investigations after I went to the islands confirmed me.

The Chairman. Having such an opinion and such a belief and such a trend of judgment about this important serious matter, have you in any way, at any time, or on any occasion employed your power as a minister of this Government for the purpose of promoting or accelerating that movement?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest, except in writing to Washington, and that was marked confidential. There I expressed my views of the situation. When I suggested a customs' union, I pointed out in that that the customs union had more difficulties than annexation, and that the protectorate system was a system which I could not see would work with the American system.

The Chairman. Was it your observation of the condition of feeling and sentiment amongst the Hawaiians, the native Kanaka population, that they felt friendly toward and grateful to what was termed the missionary element for their education and civilization in building up their institutions and towns and other things that have occurred, or were they possessed of a feeling of hostility toward the missionary element? By the missionary element I mean not all who are classed now as missionaries, but those men and their descendants who went to the islands for true missionary purposes?

Mr. Stevens. I would say in answer to that, that nearly all, if not all, the responsible natives of the islands (I mean the men of education and standing) are nearly all Americans, and the representative men would be the four members of the Legislature who resisted the threats and bribes in the struggle about the lottery bill, led by Mr. Kauhana, who had been a member of the Legislature for fifteen years. He is a man of character, and his three associates said, "The United States is our mother; let her take our children."

The Chairman. I want to know whether it was a custom amongst the Hawaiians with the white people there to celebrate our anniversaries, such as the Fourth of July?

Mr. Stevens. The 4th of July on all the four principal islands is celebrated with more uniformity and earnestness than in any part of the

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United States. I am familiar with the celebration of the 4th of July in my country fifty years ago, when they celebrated as they now do in Hawaii.

The Chairman. Is it regarded as a fete day?

Mr. Stevens. As a fete day.

The Chairman. How about the proclamations of Thanksgiving that go from the President out there?

Mr. Stevens. That is used in the churches, and much regarded, but not the same degree as the 4th of July; but it is still a very important day.

The Chairman. Is that regaded by the Kanaka population? Do they participate in the sentiment upon the request of our President?

Mr. Stevens. I think so.

The Chairman. Are you aware of the existence of a similar state of feeling on the part of the Hawaiian people, the Kanakas, toward any other foreign government?

Mr. Stevens. No.

The Chairman. Do you understand and do you believe and do you state, upon your understanding and belief, that there is an affectionate regard or sentiment on the part of the Kanaka population toward the people and Government of the United States?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; I will say the responsible portion of them.

The Chairman. How about the irresponsible, the ignorant people?

Mr. Stevens. The irresponsible, what we call the hoodlum—I use that term for convenience—are gathered in Honolulu, as they would be in any country, at the capital. That element is comparatively small in numbers, but it makes a good deal of noise, and is under the control of the white adventurers. And there is another element, which is quite numerous, and if they only get their point and things go on, they are satisfied.

The Chairman. I am speaking of the principal body of the Hawaiian people, who reside in the country.

Mr. Stevens. I would divide those in three classes: the first led by Mr. Kanhana and others like him. That makes the responsible and the religious element, led by the Americans. Then there would be the portion living in the country districts who do not care one way or the other.

The Chairman. Indifferent?

Mr. Stevens. Indifferent. If the demagogues were to go to them and say, "The Americans are going to take away your lands," they would get up a feeling, and they would all act at once. And then the hoodlum element—a few hundred dollars would buy them and use them, as the worst element in our cities.

The Chairman. Subject to be controlled, because they are purchaseable?

Mr. Stevens. Purchaseable. They would not do any very great harm, but they are corrupt.

The Chairman. Considering the condition that Honolulu is in, and considering all the facts that you have been commenting upon, what was your reason for requesting or directing the raising of the flag and the establishment of a protectorate in Honolulu?

Mr. Stevens. I have it here in writing; but I think I can condense it better.

Senator Frye. One moment before that question is answered, if the chairman please.

The Chairman. Yes.

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Senator Frye. You have been over the recognition of the Provisional Government and closed that chapter. In the recognition of the Provisional Government did you ask anything about the barracks and the station house?

Mr. Stevens. I did not go into the particulars.

Senator Frye. What importance on the question of the recognition of the Provisional Government did the barracks and the police station have?

Mr. Stevens. None whatever. As I have stated before, there was an absolute interregnum, and there was no effective force for the Queen at any time.

Senator Frye. In determining upon the question of recognition, did you take into consideration at all the surrender of the barracks or the police station?

Mr. Stevens. No.

Senator Frye. Capt. Wiltse is reported to have said that he would not recognize the Provisional Government until the barracks and police station had surrendered. Had Capt. Wiltse any authority in the premises, if he said so?

Mr. Stevens. I would say that he never had any such conversation with me, and I have no idea he said anything of the kind.

Senator Frye. Is not the question of recognition a question entirely and solely for the American minister?

Mr. Stevens. I would say so. So far as the American Government is concerned, absolutely and entirely.

The Chairman. Was that request of the Provisional Government made in writing?

Mr. Stevens. I think so.

The Chairman. Is it there?

Mr. Stevens. I think it is on file at the legation. In answer to the question of the chairman put a few moments ago I will proceed to state: These volunteer troops had been taken from their business for two weeks. The Japanese Government had a powerful ironclad that was soon expected. They had one ship there, but they had sent it off to Hilo, and of that visit to Hilo we got information, which I sent to the Department, that the Japanese were testing the sentiment of the men upon the plantations as to whether they would aid the Japanese. Now, right here, it is important that I should be specific. The Japanese Commissioner had but recently arrived. He came to me prior to my going to Hilo and prior to the fall of the Queen and said that he wanted the same rights of suffrage for the Japanese that other nationalities had. He wanted to get my encouragement, to find out what I was about. That was before I went to Hilo. Of course I had to be very diplomatic and did not make him any pledges or any signs.

At about the same time he had made this demand on the Queen's Government, which was before the overthrow, and which was followed up immediately on the Provisional Government—to give them the right of suffrage. On the island of Oahu, as the reports came to me, they had 700 or 800 Japanese who had been in the Japanese army. Information came to the Provisional Government and came to me that the adherents of the Queen, in a revolutionary attempt to replace her just at this time before the flag was put up, might call upon the Japanese laborers and residents, and that the Queen would promise them, for the sake of their aid, that they should have the right of suffrage. There was a good opportunity for the Japanese and the Queen's supporters. The commissioner had sent a request to Tokio by the Claudine, which

S. Doc 231, pt 6----58

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I found out afterwards, following the Japanese training ship which had arrived from San Francisco, and in the meantime the training ship had gone up to Hilo. We found out from what appeared to be a reliable source that some political action in concert with natives was in view. There was no proof of that except as this messenger conveyed it to us in writing and the manner he had gained the information. That might not be so, but there were outward signs of it.

The Provisional Government felt, as I felt, if the Queen's adherents should make that promise, and they could get the aid of the 700 or 800 Japanese soldiers, a revolutionary attempt would be dangerous. In the meantime the English minister, who had always insisted upon a tripartite action in anything that took place in Honolulu, expected the arrival of a British ship. The Provisional Government got the information that the attempt would be made for two purposes: First, that those representing the Queen and Mr. Neumann would want the information to go to Washington that there was a chaotic condition of things in Hawaii, and that the Provisional Government had no real, stable, authority—that an outbreak, although it might and would be crushed out, would have a very bad effect.

Fear on the part of the mob of adventurers who had surrounded the Queen—fear of the use of the Japanese force that might be used, the fear of the pressure of the Japanese commissioner, with two ships at his command (one of them larger than the Boston, with the attitude of the British minister, with the ship he expected, all combined to make me yield to the request to put up the flag. And the understanding on their part was expressed in their note and was expressed in my answer when we put it up—"That this must only go to the extent of supporting the Government against these outside contingencies," both from the English vessel and Japanese, but much more from the Japanese, because he was thoroughly in earnest to get that right of suffrage for his thousands of Japanese. Now, we may have been unduly alarmed, but the Provisional Government was alarmed, and that was the state of the case.

It was specifically understood that there should be no interference with the internal affairs of Hawaii, and there was no period in which I was more absolutely unconnected with internal affairs than in that period when the flag was up.

The Chairman. Did you receive any official or other information prior to the time of the raising of this flag that any government represented in Hawaii was opposed to the project of annexation, which information had been submitted to the United States?

Mr. Stevens. Opposition from any Government? I had this information, that Mr. Wodehouse, when he found that the Provisional Government was in favor of annexation, thought they ought to submit it to popular vote, and they thought that was a very cool proposition for any English minister to make. He made that proposition very soon after he found out that they favored annexation, and I think sent a note to that effect to the Provisional Government.

The Chairman. You had that information?

Mr. Stevens. I had that positively from Mr. Dole himself, and other information. I had repeated interviews with the Japanese commissioner. He stated his point, and wanted me to assent to the idea that the Japanese should have the right to vote. I had in a formal, diplomatic way, given him to understand that that was beyond my province and responsibility.

The Chairman. At the time of the raising of the flag, as well as

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before, the Japanese commissioner insisted upon the suffrage proposition?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. And he furthermore said if we were to annex the islands he hoped the American Government would give the Japanese the same rights as Americans or Englishmen or Germans. And he was very earnest and very tenacious about it. And the sending of a great war vessel under the circumstances was the one that caused the most outside fear.

The Chairman. And those were the reasons?

Mr. Stevens. The fear of anarchy and the fear of the Japanese, and the fear that Mr. Wodehouse and the Japanese commissioner would insist upon the same right with dealing with the affairs that I had, which I knew my Government was opposed to.

The Chairman. Those were the reasons which influenced you to accept the proposition from the Provisional Government for a protectorate?

Mr. Stevens. It was a modified and strictly limited protectorate.

The Chairman. It is a protectorate?

Mr. Stevens. To the extent specified, yes.

The Chairman. After that flag was raised and that protectorate was declared, did you, as the American minister, or in any other capacity, take any control or direction of any of the affairs of the Provisional Government, or any control or direction of the people there in any way?

Mr. Stevens. Not in the remotest degree. For two reasons, if you will allow me to state the reasons.

The Chairman. Never mind the reasons. I can think of a dozen reasons why you would not want to do it. Did you intend it, or did the Hawaiian Provisional Government intend it, so far as you know, as an attempt on the part of the United States to establish the right of sovereignty over the islands of Hawaii—I mean this protectorate?

Mr. Stevens. No; I understood then, as I understand now, that that was to sustain the sovereignty of the Provisional Government— that their sovereignty was threatened under the circumstances.

The Chairman. To prevent other governments from coming in there to interfere?

Mr. Stevens. That is it exactly.

The Chairman. It was pending the protectorate that Mr. Blount arrived?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Had you, before Mr. Blount arrived, received information from Mr. Secretary Foster that your act in establishing that protectorate had been disavowed?

Mr. Stevens. No; I understood his note as I understand it now. It is in exact accordance with the little document I have just read. In the liability of its being misunderstood, he thought it best to enlarge upon it and define how far our limited protectorate could go. I so understood it at the time. Secretary Foster went on to decide what we could do and what we could not; and what we could do was what we did.

The Chairman. When he disavowed what seemed to be a protectorate?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; he defined how far our protectorate could go.

The Chairman. Then he disavowed what seemed to be a protectorate. We will take his own language as conveying his actual meaning. Did you understand that that disavowal reached the point or

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proposition that you were forbidden, as American minister, to preserve or protect the public peace?

Mr. Stevens. Not at all; but just the opposite, because the language of the dispatch is explicit on that point.

The Chairman. And it was for that reason you considered his disavowal comported with the purpose of raising the flag ?

Mr. Stevens. Precisely. Everything I had done was in accordance with his dispatch. President Dole was familiar with international law, as well as Mr. Foster and myself, and never thought of asking more than Secretary Foster's dispatch allows.

The Chairman. How long did you remain there after Mr. Blount arrived?

Mr. Stevens. I think he arrived the 28th of March, and I left the 24th of May.

The Chairman. Did Mr. Blount carry over with him the dispatch of Mr. Foster regarding the protectorate?

Mr. Stevens. No; Mr. Foster's dispatch came by telegram, and in due course of mail afterward.

The Chairman. So that Mr. Foster's dispatch, whatever it meant, had been received by you before Mr. Blount's arrival?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; I think thirty days before.

The Chairman. Did you think, from Mr. Foster's dispatch, that you should haul down the flag and order the troops to go on board ship?

Mr. Stevens. Not in the slightest.

The Chairman. Is there anything which you can state except what you have already stated, about the Japanese, and foreign interference— any turbulence or danger that would require you to keep that flag flying and keep the protectorate in authority?

Mr. Stevens. My judgment was for its retention until there was an order to the contrary. The same reason that caused me to raise it, in my mind, continued. I do not know of any other than those I have stated.

The Chairman. You have stated all the reasons that then induced you to put up the flag and all the reasons that induced you to maintain it and maintain the protectorate after you received Mr. Foster's dispatch?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; certainly. My documents explain why I would do that and not do otherwise when negotiations were pending.

The Chairman. In the course which you took in maintaining the protectorate and in maintaining the flag over Hawaiian soil, did you understand that you were violating in any sense any order of the United States Government given through the State Department?

Mr. Stevens. No. I stated in my dispatch the serious responsibility I was under; that there was a contingency I knew no other way to meet than the method in which I met it.

The Chairman. How long before you received that dispatch was it that Admiral Skerrett came?

Mr. Stevens. I can not recall.

The Chairman. But it was before you received that dispatch disavowing---

Mr. Stevens. I shall object to the term disavowal; I do not admit it was a disavowal.

The Chairman. I use the word disavowal.

Mr. Stevens. Admiral Skerrett might have arrived ten days or two weeks after. There might have been a day more or a day less, but

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it would not vary from several weeks between the arrival of Admiral Skerrett and the dispatch of Mr. Foster.

The Chairman. The flag was flying when Admiral Skerrett arrived.

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett make any objection to it?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. Did he ever suggest to you that it was an improper attitude for the Government of the United States to maintain toward Hawaii?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. Or that he would refuse to maintain it with his troops on shore?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. Did you have conferences with Admiral Skerrett?

Mr. Stevens. Not on that specific point.

The Chairman. Were you in association with him?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; constantly.

The Chairman. Did you converse about Hawaiian affairs.

Mr. Stevens. I think after Admiral Skerrett had been there a certain length of time he said he would rather a portion of the troops would be on board ship. We conferred with the Provisional Government, and we reduced the number all around.

The Chairman. The number was reduced under Admiral Skerrett's suggestion and order, and with your assent?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Where was Capt. Wiltse?

Mr. Stevens. He had gone home. He remained thirty days after his time had expired.

The Chairman. He remained after the flag was raised?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. But Admiral Skerrett reduced the force on shore?

Mr. Stevens. After conference with me and the Provisional Government. We thought it was safe to do it.

The Chairman. That was while the flag was up?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett undertake to interfere with the existence of the protectorate?

Mr. Stevens. Not in the slightest. This was a mutual friendly arrangement all around; what the state of the case required—the reduction of the force.

The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett ever state to you before the arrival of Mr. Blount that he thought it his duty as the admiral in command to withdraw his entire force from the shore and haul down that flag?

Mr. Stevens. No; he never even spoke to me that it was bad policy to have it up—nothing of the kind. I think he had a captain who was there a while. I heard of his making that remark. But it was only a matter of chitchat. He did not agree with and could not get along with the missionary people, and he wanted to go with another class of people. I can not recall his name at this moment.

Senator Gray. Was he on Admiral Skerrett's ship?

Mr. Stevens. He was sent shortly up to Bering Sea.

Senator Gray. You might mention his name.

Mr. Stevens. I can not recall it.

The Chairman. He had formed and expressed an opinion, as you

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understood, contrary to the attitude of the Government of the United States at that time?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. And he thought that the whole thing was a mistake; but when he was conferred with by some of the citizens he denied it. So that I could not say what his real position was.

The Chairman. We do not want to go into that. When Mr. Blount arrived, did he communicate to you any of the special instructions that he had received?

Mr. Stevens. Not his instructions; but he gave me a copy of the instructions from Washington, by which his authority was paramount over mine, and that I should keep on with the ordinary duties of the legation. But he never showed me his instructions nor gave me a hint as to what they were.

The Chairman. You had only a conjecture as to what they might be?

Mr. Stevens. Only a conjecture.

The Chairman. Mr. Blount was cautious in withholding his instructions, was he? Did you ask to be informed of his mission there?

Mr. Stevens. Oh, no; I introduced him to the Provisional Government, and was courteous as I could be to him.

The Chairman. Did you demur, dissent, to his coming there as minister of the United States with authority paramount to your authority there?

Mr. Stevens. No. I kept that locked up in my breast.

The Chairman. So that, whatever his mission was, it was not a matter to arouse your antagonism?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest. On the other hand, I treated him with the utmost kindness. I knew that he came with a great deal of prejudice, and I was careful---

The Chairman. How do you know that he came with prejudice?

Mr. Stevens. By his conduct. It was very brusque with me in the start. It was brusque in his refusal to accept the offer of the American citizens that he should take a house rather than go the royalist hotel.

The Chairman. That offer was made by whom?

Mr. Stevens. That was a committee of American citizens. I can give you who they were and what they were.

The Chairman. Was it the committee of safety?

Mr. Stevens. They were not members of it. The chairman of it was Judge Hartwell, who had nothing to do with the revolution whatever, and the next member was Mr. Scott, a Kentucky gentleman, who has had charge of the high school for many years—not connected with the Government or even with politics.

The Chairman. How came the citizens to provide a house for Mr. Blount any more than for you as minister?

Mr. Stevens. For the reason that they knew that the Hawaiian Hotel was organized in the interest of the Queen's supporters and organized in a very corrupt way.

The Chairman. Was there no other hotel there except the one at which Mr. Blount stopped?

Mr. Stevens. That was the principal hotel. There were other good hotels.

Senator Gray. That was the principal hotel?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. There were other hotels.

Senator Gray. Mr. Blount says he went there because it was the leading hotel, and that he never saw its proprietor to speak to him for many weeks after he had been there, and he saw no men who were

-p919-

royalists, except they came for the purposes of examination. Do you know anything to the contrary?

Mr. Stevens. I know altogether to the contrary. The Hawaiian Hotel had been for many months as complete a lodge for all the Queen's supporters, to the extent that they watched every boarder who was brought there. The man who kept that hotel was of a firm that cheated the Government out of $80,000. One of the firm was sent to Washington as Kaiulani's counsel. The active manager of that hotel at the time is a graduate from the Oxford University, England. He was divorced from his wife in the United States. He wrote those vile letters in behalf of the Queen attacking me and Judge Dole.

Senator Gray. Do you know that Mr. Blount had any association with those people?

Mr. Stevens. That I can not swear to. I was giving the character of the hotel, the reasons why these citizens suggested that he go to a private house.

Senator Gray. Do you know that Mr. Blount associated with the people whom you have described on terms of intimacy or otherwise?

Mr. Stevens. I think it would be impossible for Mr. Blount to know, because they were strangers to him.

Senator Gray. Do you know that he did?

Mr. Stevens. I know that when I called at the cottage that they were generally there.

Senator Gray. Where?

Mr. Stevens. At the cottage where he stopped, close to the hotel. I found some of those parties were there.

Senator Gray. Who were some of those parties?

Mr. Stevens. Mr. Peterson was one. You asked me why these citizens made this offer. It was because while he was at the hotel he would be under espionage of the royalists.

Senator Gray. Do you say that Mr. Blount when he arrived went to the Hawaiian Hotel, and he there associated intimately or otherwise with those objectionable characters?

Mr. Stevens. I do not believe that he did.

Senator Gray. I will ask you whether or not that hotel is where all American tourists and strangers would go?

Mr. Stevens. More likely to go.

Senator Gray. Did not the tourists all go to that hotel?

Mr. Stevens. More or less. But so soon as they had been there any length of time, they generally left it. A good many Americans left it because of its anti-American character.

The Chairman. Now, as I understand your statement, this body of citizens undertook to provide quarters for Mr. Blount in order to prevent him from falling under what they conceived to be and you conceived to be evil influences?

Mr. Stevens. I will state it my own way. These citizens were of the highest respectability. This lady offered it because it was more convenient to the legation, and where both parties would have access without espionage, as the American citizens knew that they could not go to the royalists hotel without espionage. And I had to caution Mr. Blount that his papers would be seen by the representatives of the royalists. I think he regarded that caution.

Senator Gray. Did he make any objection to accepting the hospitality of any one, or simply that he preferred to go to the public hotel where he could pay his own expenses?

Mr. Stevens. I think he said Mr. Mills had arranged to go to the hotel. At that time he did not mean anything out of the way.

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Senator Gray. I ask you if he did not mean what I have said, or indicate something of that meaning?

Mr. Stevens. I think he indicated to me that Mr. Mills had arranged for going to the hotel. I can not say that is the form of the statement, but that is the implication.

Senator Gray. That he refused the hospitality?

Mr. Stevens. That would not be a fair statement. They did not propose free hospitality. They simply said he might pay the same as would be charged at the hotel. I only took the message from them. They asked me to give the message. I do not know—it was arranged that they would be willing to furnish him accommodations at the same rate as at the hotel.

Senator Gray. Was anything said about "from nothing up"?

Mr. Stevens. Some other parties might have used that expression, but I was asked to make no such offer.

Senator Gray. Did anybody go out with you?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; this committee went out.

Senator Gray. Who were the committee—a committee of what?

Mr. Stevens. Committee of citizens. Judge Hartwell, Dr. McGrew, and Mr. Scott. Judge Hartwell has been one of the supreme judges, a leading lawyer.

Senator Gray. Was Judge Hartwell one of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. No; he had no connection with it. And Mr. Scott is the teacher of the high school, a man of very high standing, and has been there for years. He was for six years at the royal college in Japan.

Senator Gray. Was there any committee from the Annexation Club who went out, or communicated with Mr. Blount in regard to it?

Mr. Stevens. I think the three gentlemen already named were members of the Annexation Club. I am not sure that Judge Hartwell was. They took these gentlemen because they were disconnected with the Provisional Government and were American citizens. The Provisional Government had nothing to do with it and did not know of it.

Senator Gray. After Mr. Blount's arrival there, and after he was established at his headquarters, did he ask any information of you about the situation of affairs in Hawaii?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. Did you offer to communicate to him any information which you had in regard to the situation of affairs there?

Mr. Stevens. It was not possible for me to do so without being discourteous.

The Chairman. Did you ask him to have any conference about the condition of affairs in Hawaii?

Mr. Stevens. No.

The Chairman. Did he ask you whether it would be politic or safe or unsafe to haul down the flag and order the troops on board ship?

Mr. Stevens. Not the least—not a word; never a hint of what he was going to do.

The Chairman. Did he ask you what your relations were to Hawaii and other foreign governments?

Mr. Stevens. Not the least. He did not ask me to do what is usual for a retiring minister to do—to go and introduce him to the foreign representatives. I do not think he meant any harm in that. I do not think he was posted as to diplomatic usage. But that is what custom requires.

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The Chairman. Did you in any way interfere in any investigation that he made while he was there?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. Did you enter any protest or objection to his removing troops from the shore?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

The Chairman. Or hauling down the flag?

Mr. Stevens. Not the least.

The Chairman. Did that act of removal, etc., produce any commotion in the community?

Mr. Stevens. An intense silent feeling.

The Chairman. I speak of outbreak or commotion?

Mr. Stevens. Just the opposite of that—intense silence. But in the homes of the families you would see the exhibition.

The Chairman. What is your information in regard to the power of Liliuokalani, as Queen of Hawaii, to organize and conduct any enterprise, political or military, for the purpose of displacing the Government that exists there now?

Mr. Stevens. I think she would have very little power. But I think there are parties who might in her name do it; but I do not think it probable.

The Chairman. Parties who might displace the existing Government?

Mr. Stevens. No; I do not say that. But I think it possible that an expedition organized in California or Vancouver might attempt it, if they could obtain the money to do it.

The Chairman. But I am speaking of the power of the Queen.

Mr. Stevens. Her own power—nil.

The Chairman. I understand you, then, that without assistance from foreign governments any enterprise of the character that I have just asked about would be a failure?

Mr. Stevens. An utter failure. There is not the least danger of any attempt being made except by outside aid. That is my opinion.

The Chairman. Suppose that Liliuokalani had the undivided support of the native born, of the Kanaka population, with all the resources at their command, do you believe that she would be powerful enough with that support to overturn the existing civil government in those islands?

Mr. Stevens. I think one-fourth of the force of the Provisional Government could resist all the native force on the islands.

The Chairman. Then your answer must be, she would not be powerful enough?

Mr. Stevens. Not powerful enough. Two hundred American soldiers could resist them all.

The Chairman. Do you consider the Hawaiian population, native-born Kanaka population, as being a warlike population?

Mr. Stevens. They are the reverse of that in every sense.

The Chairman. How would they compare with the American born?

Mr. Stevens. I should say that a native Kanaka force of 2,000, two hundred United States soldiers would more than equal.

The Chairman. So that you do not think the Provisional Government is in any danger from the Hawaiian population?

Mr. Stevens. Not the least. From the native population? It would be the whites from whom the organized opposition would come.

The Chairman. Did you ascertain before you left Hawaii, and after

-p922-

the declaration of the Provisional Government, that there was any white organization being attempted against the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. My information was to the effect that the same men who put the lottery bill through, what they called the lottery and opium men, had been acting together for a good while.

The Chairman. Did you hear of any attempt at organization amongst these, people, or any other white people, to overthrow or dislodge the Provisional Government, or impair it?

Mr. Stevens. Those rumors of attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government? They were constantly getting information of attempts to do it.

The Chairman. Attempts to do what, to form an organization?

Mr. Stevens. To catch them unawares—to surprise the Provisional Government.

The Chairman. Did you understand from any information that you had—of course anything like a reliable character—that there existed an organization?

Mr. Stevens. I should say that my information is that there are two or three organizations, mainly political. They have one organization called the Native Hawaiians; they have another, with a native name.

The Chairman. Are they natives?

Mr. Stevens. They are natives. They have political organizations among themselves.

The Chairman. State any other.

Mr. Stevens. They had at one time what they called the "Liberty League"; but I think that is disbanded. Those cliques have run together; but the same men can extemporize an organization within a week; because they drift together as naturally as similar men in our cities.

The Chairman. I will try to get back to the question whether you know or had any information of the existence of an organization amongst the white people in Hawaii against the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. What was it?

Mr. Stevens. I have forgotten the name of it; I think it is "Liberty League." But they had so many names that I can not remember; but I think it was "Liberty League."

The Chairman. Who was the leader of that organization, if it had any?

Mr. Stevens. It was understood that Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson were in it.

The Chairman. I am speaking of the time that this Provisional Government was established.

Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt that those things have varied so that there would be one clique in the League and then another clique.

The Chairman. I am speaking of the time of the organization of the Provisional Government, not any anterior time.

Mr. Stevens. Those since the Provisional Government was established would be the same as they had before.

The Chairman. Is there such an organization?

Mr. Stevens. There are several organizations of years' standing.

The Chairman. Is there now in existence, or was there at any time while you were in Hawaii, any political organization of white men for the purpose of antagonizing and breaking down that Provisional Government. Can you answer that?

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Mr. Stevens. I can give my opinion.

The Chairman. I do not want your naked opinion. I want your information.

Mr. Stevens. My information is that the men who controlled the Queen's Government mainly, and ever since she was in, have acted together so often that that is virtually an organization.

The Chairman. Do you understand that there is such an organization existing in Hawaii to-day?

Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt that it exists to-day.

The Chairman. Do you know anything about it?

Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt it does.

The Chairman. Have you any information about it?

Mr. Stevens. No; I see in Mr. Blount's report—--

The Chairman. I am not speaking of Mr. Blount's report.

Mr. Stevens. I knew it was when I left.

The Chairman. I want to get at the proposition whether or not there is any hostile opposition to the Provisional Government existing amongst the white people of Hawaii at this time, or was when you left there.

Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt there is. I have no doubt the men who acted before are acting now.

The Chairman. I want your information, if you have any information about it.

Mr. Stevens. I have no information that an organization exists sincel left there, because that was six or eight months ago.

The Chairman. When you were there did it exist?

Mr. Stevens. It existed.

The Chairman. Who were the leaders of it?

Mr. Stevens. The reason I referred to Mr. Blount's report is this: You will find the committee, of which Mr. Cummings was one—I have understood that he was; he was one of the leading members. That was one organization. Then another organization is the one that Nawahi was at the head of. When I was there he was one of the leaders of a political organization under Kalakaua, and it is possibly in existence to-day, for it has been in existence for years.

The Chairman. I am trying to ask you of organizations formed for the purpose of opposing the Provisional Government.

Mr. Stevens. I can not say that there is any such organization; I can only reason from cause to effect—that those organizations would be hostile to the Provisional Government.

The Chairman. You are not aware of the existence of any such organization now?

Mr. Stevens. No. In Mr. Blount's report I see he mentioned Mr. Bush and Mr. Nawahi. But I can not swear to it.

The Chairman. Now, what I want to get at is, whether among the white people resident in Hawaii, who are not American citizens or persons of American origin, there exists any opposition of an organized character, whether political or military, against the Provisional Government.

Mr. Stevens. What exists to-day? I cannot testify to that.

The Chairman. Was there in your knowledge at the time you left there?

Mr. Stevens. Only as it appeared in the papers.

The Chairman. Did it appear?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. You will see it in Mr. Blount's report, and that

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is what I referred to. Mr. Cummings is in it, and Mr. Nawahi. It ran, to some degree, all over the islands. But I can not say that it exists to day.

The Chairman. I want to know now whether any of these foreign people who are not Americans had any organization or association, within your knowledge, to oppose the Provisional Government of Hawaii, with a view to diverting Hawaii from the control or influence of the United States, either in the conduct of its current affairs or in the ultimate purpose of annexation ?

Mr. Stevens. I will begin with the Portuguese first; I will take them seriatim.

The Chairman. No; answer the question.

Mr. Stevens. No, I could not give any information to which I could testify. If you want to know the attitude of these different populations I will give it to you.

The Chairman. I have understood that some Germans are for us and some against us?

Mr. Stevens. As you have asked the question, let me answer it in a way that will enlighten it.

Senator Gray. The question is, whether you have any knowledge or information of any such association or combination?

Mr. Stevens. I will begin with the Portuguese, which were far the more numerous Caucasian population there; the Germans and English were smaller in numbers. The Portuguese number from 9,000 to 10,000. They are nearly, if not quite, a unit for America and for annexation. Why is it so? The young men have been educated in American schools, which are as positive in their American character as you can find in any of our American cities. Nearly all these Portuguese came from the Azores and Madeira poor. They saw the energy and vim of the Americans, and are largely employed by Americans. Then there is some antagonism between the Portuguese and the natives. I have stated the principal causes, and the Portuguese are a unit with us. When you come to the Germans, a very large majority is with us, except such Germans as may (and they are not very many) gather around Claus Spreckels. I will mention two German houses, at the head of which are men who have been there a long time. Their children were born there, and they expect to die there. Both those houses, and they are heavy houses, are with America, just as the English merchant is in New York—they know that their business and their future interests are entirely with us. They all talk English, and they are like Americans.

Take the English. A majority of the English affiliate with us. Why? For the reason that they do all their business with California, Washington, and Oregon. They go to American schools, and many of them have married in American families. There is Mr. Davies. He is one of the heaviest merchants, but is opposed to us having Pearl Harbor, and is very hostile to American predominance in Hawaii. With the exception of what gathers around Mr. Davies and Mr. Wodehouse (which is a very marked minority of the English), the English are with us as much as the Portuguese. When you come to the Norwegians, whose number is small, you may say it is a unit for us. Reduce the opposition to the Provisional Government to the white population, and you have the men whom the lottery and opium rings have had in their power, and who will respond to the beat of the political drum. Any one familiar with the political organizations in the cities of the United States knows what that is.

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They have what is called the hoodlum element in Honolulu. Pay them and you will have them. But what are called the missionary people are not persons to bribe voters, and if a man were to throw in $50,000 to carry a project against the missionary element, he could buy up the hoodlums, just as they bought the votes in the Legislature with lottery stock, and those who would not have lottery stock got cash down.

The Chairman. You have made that statement. Do you know anything of the payment of lottery stock or money to carry through the lottery scheme?

Mr. Stevens. I will answer the best I can. The facts are as notorious as they would be in any American capital where anything of the kind had been going on for years. I will give you this fact, and I will give you the name. Mr. Emuleuth, who is a native of Ohio, but who has been out there fifteen years, an enterprising and respectable man so far as I know. He is a member if the Provisional Government. The day before the lottery cabinet was appointed, which must have been the day before the coming back of the Boston, Emuleuth went into a commercial house in Honolulu, and as he was going upstairs, he heard Peterson and Colburn talking. Peterson did not want to put Colburn in the cabinet. Colburn had been the man who raised the money; and Emuleuth heard this as he stopped on the stairs. Colburn wanted to go into the cabinet, and Peterson was trying to reason him out of going in. Peterson knew Colburn was a hard man to carry, and it ran in this way: "Peterson, I paid this money, and if you don't put me in the cabinet, I will join the other side and blow you to hell."

The Chairman. Emuleuth gave you this information?

Mr. Stevens. Emuleuth.

The Chairman. When ?

Mr. Stevens. He gave that to me some days after the overthrow of the Government.

The Chairman. When?

Mr. Stevens. A week or ten days after the overthrow; merely as a historical fact, he gave it to me.

The Chairman. Prior to the time of your leaving Honolulu on the Boston, to go down to Hilo, did you have any information or reason to suspect that such influences were to be employed in favor of either the lottery or opium bill?

Mr. Stevens. No; just as I stated in my opening, after the Wilcox and Jones defeat of the lottery bill and the opium bill, I thought the fate of those bills were settled, and the cabinet would be carried over for eighteen months.

The Chairman. What information you gathered from Emuleuth or any other source in regard to corruption in the Legislature to procure these votes of want of confidence in the ministry and for the lottery and opium bills was communicated to you after you returned?

Mr. Stevens. Yes, and as a matter of history. Colburn knew his power. Then Peterson said, "if we put you in, will you agree to the constitution which the Queen is going to promulgate?" Colburn was opposed to it, but he answered, "damn, it, Pete; whatever you sign I will sign." Emuleuth said, "those four men were going in that cabinet for sure." They laughed at him; but when the cabinet was constituted they went in.

The Chairman. You, as the American minister, were forming opinions upon the public situation there?

Mr. Stevens. Public situation.

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The Chairman. And you included, of course, the action of the Legislature upon these respective measures?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; I got that not by going to the Legislature, but from the best sources I could.

The Chairman. You received that information from those sources which you considered most reliable?

Mr. Stevens. Most reliable.

The Chairman. I want to know whether you formed the opinion as minister of the United States before you left Honolulu to go down to Hilo that, if such measures as the lottery or opium bill should pass, they would produce a commotion or revolution? Were you of that opinion before you left for Hilo?

Mr. Stevens. I considered that settled, or I should not have gone off. The repeated attempts and their failure, the petitions from all the islands, the opposition of the chamber of commerce, and the Queen's assurance to the ladies who called on her, satisfied me that they were dead.

The Chairman. If, before you left Honolulu to go down to Hilo, you had been informed that the Queen intended to promulgate a new constitution, reversing the constitution of '87 and restoring the ancient powers of the monarchy, would you have expected that to create a revolution?

Mr. Stevens. I could not expect otherwise. I knew it, but I had repeatedly said so in conversations with Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, and others—that whenever an attempt should be made to undo the action of 1887, by the Queen going back on her oath and promises, there would be an end of the monarchy forever.

The Chairman. Had you been possessed of any information that Liliuokalani, after the prorogation of the Legislature, would promulgate this new constitution upon her own autliority, would you have left Honolulu?

Mr. Stevens. No; I would have stayed there. I considered it settled when those four men went in, because of their character and their means, and the information that the Queen's favorite had reason to think he should remain marshal.

The Chairman. You speak of the Wilcox-Jones cabinet?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; I considered that those men would be the Government for the next eighteen months.

Senator Frye. When you went on board the ship to go down to Hilo, did you not have conversations with the officers of the ship, in which you expressed yourself as satisfied that peace was restored to Hawaii, and that it would continue until your term of office would expire, and that you could go home in comfort?

Mr. Stevens. I did.

Senator Frye. Was not that your belief?

Mr. Stevens. It was.

Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg in his testimony says that the overthrow of the monarchy could not have been accomplished had it not been the general understanding that the American minister would make use of the troops. In your opinion, did the American troops have any effect on the overthrow of the monarchy?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

Senator Frye. And whether the troops were on shore or not, your opinion is that the monarchy would have been overthrown?

Mr. Stevens. Certainly.

Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg also states that shortly after the

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committee of safety met, on the 16th of January, it decided that they were not ready for the landing of American troops; that a committee of three, with Mr. Thurston, went to the American legation and asked Mr. Stevens to delay landing the Boston's men, and that it was reported that Mr. Stevens said, "The troops will land at 5 o'clock, whether you are ready or not."

Mr. Stevens. I am sure that no such committee came; but the fact is, the troops were landed aside from any wishes of the committee of safety.

Senator Frye. William H. Cornwall testified---

Mr. Stevens. He was one of the new cabinet.

Senator Frye. He states that Ministers Parker and Peterson called upon Minister Stevens and gave him to understand that the Government was able to take care of the situation, and asked him to keep the troops on board.

Mr. Stevens. Not true.

Senator Frye. Did Ministers Parker and Peterson ever call upon you and inform you that the Queen's Government was able to take care of the situation, and ask you to keep the troops on board?

Mr. Stevens. No. You had better ask about Gov. Cleghorn's protest. A great deal of importance was given to the island governor's protesting after the troops were landed. Cleghorn, I have no doubt, under the inspiration of the English minister—if you will ask me the reasons, I will answer, but not now—came to me and wanted to know why I landed them. I stated that the circumstances were such that I was compelled to take the responsibility. I was very polite to him. I said to him, "I do not blame you for coming, and if I were in your place I would make the protest"; and I was just as courteous as I could be. He went home, and I have no doubt he consulted the English minister and had done so before coming to me.

Senator Davis. Did you tell Mr. Cleghorn then for what purpose you had landed those troops?

Mr. Stevens. Probably my remarks implied that it was the necessity of the case. As nearly as I can recollect I said this: "The situation is such that I felt it necessary to take the responsibility." I probably put it in that form. My reason for saying that Cleghorn came by the inspiration of the English minister is this: I knew for months dating back in our intercourse that whatever the English minister wanted Mr. Cleghorn to do he would do. He was a good-natured man, and entirely under Mr. Wodehouse's influence. The governorship was of no account; it was abolished in 1887, and they reestablished it in 1890 as a mere honorary office, because Cleghorn was married to the sister of the Queen.

Senator Frye. Cornwall stated that Mr. Hopkins insisted upon knowing whether or not you intended to recognize the lawful Government or the revolutionary Government, and that you said that you should recognize the Provisional Government, because they were in possession of the Government building, and that you intended to support them?

Mr. Stevens. I am very glad you asked that question. I had no conversation with Mr. Hopkins whatever. I did not even know him. Mr. Hopkins brought me a note, and I sent an answer.

Senator Frye. Did you say that to anybody?

Mr. Stevens. Never. I want to say that Mr. Hopkins brought the note—they said it was Hopkins; I never had any conversation with

-p928-

Hopkins at any time. After he had left the legation my daughter said it was Mr. Hopkins.

Senator Frye. John F. Colburn testified that Thurston had an interview with them (him and Peterson) January 15, at 6 o'clock a. m., Sunday, and desired him and Peterson to depose the Queen; that in the course of the conversation he said that he could inform us that Mr. Stevens had given the committee of safety the assurance that if we two signed a request to land the troops of the Boston, he would immediately comply and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work.

Mr. Stevens. Who put that question?

Senator Frye. John F. Colburn testifies that Thurston in an interview with him and Peterson said that Stevens had given the committee of safety the assurance that if we two (that is, Colburn and Peterson) would sign a request to land the troops of the Boston he would immediately comply and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work.

Mr. Stevens. Nothing of the kind; as perfectly romantic as if born of another age. I am sure Mr. Thurston never said anything about it; he is a man of too much sense.

Senator Frye. Mr. Colburn says further that immediately on the landing of the troops he and Parker had an interview with you.

Mr. Stevens. Parker is the one who came with Mr. Cleghorn to protest.

Senator Frye. And he says that he (Colburn) had an interview with you; that in the course of that interview you said that there were a number of women and old men in town besides children, who were alarmed at the rumors of a revolution, and you wanted to offer them protection; whereupon Colburn said, "You want to annex the country," and you replied, "No, those troops are ashore to preserve the Queen on the throne, you gentlemen in your office, and to offer protection to the community at large."

Mr. Stevens. That is absolute, pure fiction.

Senator Frye. Mr. Colburn says further: "We had under arms 600 men with rifles, 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 8 brass Austrian field cannon, and 2 Catling guns."

Mr. Stevens. Why did they not use them?

Senator Frye. Did they have such a force?

Mr. Stevens No; they would have used it on Sunday and Monday, if they had had any such force. You have to look at the facts. I have answered that before. There was a complete collapse of the Queen's Government from Saturday afternoon of January 14. There was only one attempt at an exhibition of authority, which was by a policeman attempting to prevent two men carrying arms and ammunition up to the Government building. They had two men only. That is the only resistance they dared to make. Wilson knew every step that was taken, knew that the Provisional Government was being organized, just as you gentlemen would know of a railroad meeting in your town.

The Chairman. If there had been any force of 600 men under arms and under the control of the Queen would you have known it?

Mr. Stevens. There was nothing of the kind, or I should have known it. The royalists party had two or three factions, one made up with the Robert Wilcox element. So far as it was possible for me to know—I used all the judgment and experience I had—I was kept posted of the purposes and intentions of the various organizations that were opposed to the Queen and those in her favor; and just as I have stated before,

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there were two distinctive parties amongst the natives about the Queen.

The Chairman. I wanted to know whether your sources of information and the diligence of your inquiries made in regard to the actual situation in the islands gave you an opportunity to know satisfactorily to yourself whether they had as many as 600 armed force, or whether they had any organization of a military character that was considered dangerous?

Mr. Stevens. My information was directly the contrary; the only force that I understood they had was the native police force under the marshal and the Queen's guard of 70, men made up of native boys, not equal to 10 white soldiers. Ten American soldiers were equivalent to the whole of them. They never made any resistance, and did not dare.

Senator Frye. The Queen's ministers delivered an address which is given by Mr. Blount in his report, in which they stated that Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson reported that a committee of safety had been formed at the house of Mr. L. A. Thurston and had made overtures to them to assist in dethroning the Queen, and they intended to go ahead, and that your assistance, together with that of the United States Government, had been guaranteed to them. Is there any truth in that?

Mr. Stevens. None; I never knew of it until I saw it in that report. I never heard of it before. I never heard of it until I saw it in that report, as also that other inquiry about my promising Soper. You might ask me if that is in there.

Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg further says that Mr. Soper was offered the position of commander-in-chief; that he hesitated to take it; that he and others went over to see you, and then came back, saying, "I understood them to say that Mr. Stevens had told them that if they would take possession of the Government building and read their proclamation, he would immediately recognize them and support them, or, failing to get the Government building, any building in Honolulu."

Mr. Stevens. I never heard anything about it until I saw it in Blount's report. It is pure fiction, absolute fiction, as well as that other statement that Soper wanted to take military command. I did not know that Soper was to have the military command until I saw his appointment in the newspapers. Soper never came to me to ask me anything about it. The first I knew of Soper being appointed to the command was one or two days afteward.

Senator Frye. Kaulukou in his affidavit says that Minister Stevens wrote a letter, which he gave to Charles L. Hopkins, in which he said he would back and help the Provisional Government and not her Majesty the Queen's Government.

Mr. Stevens. That is all fiction.

Senator Frye. Did anything like that ever occur?

Mr. Stevens. No. I maintained one fixed policy.

Senator Frye. And that was utter impartiality between the two?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. To the representations made to me before to have the men landed, my answer was always the same, "The emergency must be a striking one, and then only for the protection of life and property."

Senator Frye. Paul Neumann, in his testimony, says that on Tuesday, the 17th of January, Mr. Peterson and Mr. Parker, about 3 o'clock, informed him that Mr. Stevens had told them categorically that he would support with the United States forces a provisional government if such were proclaimed. Did you ever tell Peterson or Parker anything like that?

S. Doc 231, pt 6----59

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Mr. Stevens. Nothing of the kind. The only interviews in which, as I have already stated, they asked my assistance to support the Queen; but they did not put the other alternative, because they would not insult me with that after I had refused the other. I said to them squarely that the troops were landed for a pacific purpose and could not take part in any contest.

Senator Frye. He also says that at a meeting at which J. O. Carter, Macfarlane, Widemann, and Damon were present, the statement was repeated that Mr. Stevens unqualifiedly stated that he would by force of arms sustain the Provisional Government. Did you say anything of the kind?

Mr. Stevens. No; just like the other.

Senator Frye. He also states that the U. S. legation had been at various times the meeting place of persons who had conspired to overthrow the Hawaiian Government.

Mr. Stevens. There never was any such meeting in the four years that I was there, at the legation. The people who had the entree of the legation and who dined there and had other attentions there were royalists quite as many as of their opponents. The dinner party spoken of was made up by my two parties; the Portuguese charge d'affaires made one; the French commissioner another; Judge Hartwell another; Mr. Thurston another, and, I think, one of the officers of the Boston, besides Capt. Wiltse. My daughter's conversation was with Mr. Thurston, and I talked with the Portuguese charge d'affaires. The meeting was of such a character that if we had wanted to talk politics we could not have done so.

Senator Frye. Mr. Charles T. Gulick testifies that the presence of the American troops and certain rumors with regard to the attitude of the American minister, caused the Hawaiian cabinet to confer with that official before taking action, and that they learned from him in writing that he recognized the Provisional Government and would support it with the United States troops. Was there anything of that kind?

Mr. Stevens. No. It was all done in the form that came from this note. The man Hopkins, whom I did not know, and my daughter happened to know, he returned, but did not have any conversation, did not speak to him, did not know him until that afternoon. My daughter happened to know him by sight. He never submitted me any question; he brought a note, and all he wanted was an answer. I think my daughter took the note out of his hand and put it in mine, if I remember correctly. I was sick at the time. Hopkins was one of those who had been engaged in the grossest maladministration.

Senator Frye. Mr. John Lot Kaulukou in his testimony says: "Next morning I read a letter from Minister Stevens in the newspaper. He said, 'I recognize the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, because it takes the palace, the station house, and the barracks. That is my reason why I recognize the Provisional Government.'" Did you write any such letter?

Mr. Stevens. No; the only one that I ever wrote on the subject is in that official pamphlet published by vote of the Senate last February. I never wrote any communication to any newspaper about it. Kaulukou is one of the most corrupt men in the country, formerly one of Kalakaua's ministers.

Senator Frye. He says further: "If Mr. Stevens had never sent any word of that kind, if he had never interfered, you would see these

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people cleaned out in fifteen or twenty minutes and the Queen remain on her throne till to-day." Did you interfere?

Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.

Senator Frye. Do you think if the troops had been in the United States of America the Queen would have been on her throne to-day?

Mr. Stevens. If our troops had remained at Hilo, 260 miles from Honolulu, and had known nothing of what was going on, it would have been the same. The Wilcox Jones cabinet was composed of some of the best men in the islands. The men who were leading this revolution were irresistible; they had the complete command of the situation. Wilson knew that, and that is the reason why his associates did not arrest anybody.

Senator Frye. Do you know Dr. G. Trousseau?

Mr. Stevens. I do.

Senator Frye. Is he regarded in the Hawaiian Islands as a truthful man?

Mr. Stevens. He is so notoriously untruthful that any story going the round of the capital they would say "That is one of Trousseau's lies." He is an adventurer who came from Paris. He is a man of a good deal of genius; he practices medicine in some American families because of his genius; but there are physicans who have no affiliations with him, because he has not his diploma. He has already apologized to Judge Hartwell and others because of statements he made with respect to them that he thought would not come back to the islands.

Senator Frye. Trousseau in his statement says that Dole, Charles Carter, and W. H. Castle, and one or two others, naming them, were in the habit of meeting at your house, the house of the American minister, and conspiring for overturning the Queen. Is there any truth in that?

Mr. Stevens. Not a particle. One of the parties was Mr. Castle; he had not been at my house but once for a year. I got acquainted with him and his venerable father when I first came to Hawaii, and I wondered why he had not called upon me. William Castle had only stopped at our house once in the year. Mr. Dole and Mr. Thurston were men of too much sense to be willing to have a meeting at my house. Although I was intimate in Mr. Dole's family, I never got a hint from Mr. and Mrs. Dole that he was to go into the Provisional Government. He was a man of too much culture to embarrass me with the knowledge that he was to take part in the revolutionary movement. It is the fact that he left the bench to which he had been appointed, with his salary of $5,000 a year, purely as a sense of duty, to take the responsibilities of the position he now holds. He is delicate, not a strong man, and the pressure of responsibility and anxiety is liable to break him down.

The Chairman. Who comprised the supreme court at the time you left Hawaii?

Mr. Stevens. At the time I left it was composed of Chief Justice Judd, who had been chief justice for nineteen years, and Judge Bickerton and Judge Frear. Judge Judd was educated in law at Harvard. Judge Bickerton is English.

The Chairman. After the revolution occurred there in the executive government, did that court continue to sit and discharge its functions?

Mr. Stevens. I so understood it; yes—right along. The Provisional Government interfered as little as possible with the statutes; they promptly repealed the lottery act and opium act, and I think that is

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about all they did. The courts went right on, stopping only a few days in the excitement.

The Chairman. Have you heard of any effort on the part of the Provisional Government or the Queen's Government, or the followers of the Queen or her cabinet, to deny the power and authority of the supreme court of Hawaii since the revolution?

Mr. Stevens. No.

The Chairman. Or any change in it?

Mr. Stevens. I have not. I know the constitution which it was intended to proclaim was intended to change the supreme court. I learned that when we had the conversation with Kalakaua before, and from other sources in the later case.

The Chairman. To hold for six years.

Mr. Stevens. And a final appeal from their judgment to the Queen.

The Chairman. I understand you to say, as a matter of fact, that since the Provisional Government was instituted there has been no one who has made any question of the authority of the supreme court and its power to go on and administer justice?

Mr. Stevens. I am not aware of anybody. There may be some lawyer.

The Chairman. The number of judges was reduced from five to three by an act of the Legislature ?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

The Chairman. So that as their terms expired there would be no reappointment until below the number of three?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; as one died they were able to reduce to three quite promptly.

The Chairman. Who took Judge Dole's place?

Mr. Stevens. Judge Frear.

The Chairman. Who appointed him?

Mr. Stevens. He was appointed since the Provisional Government was established. Mr. Dole resigned to take the place of President of the Provisional Government, and they filled his place by the appointment of Judge Frear.

Senator Frye. In the testimony of Mr. Sam Parker, pages 439 and 440, or in an interview with him, he produced a statement signed by A.B. Peterson, in which Mr. Peterson says: "On Sunday evening, January 15, at half past 7 o'clock, Samuel Parker, Her Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, and myself as attorney-general, called upon J. L. Stevens, American minister, at his residence, to talk over the situation." Did they call?

Mr. Stevens. They called Sunday evening. They did all the talking.

Senator Frye. He says, "Mr. Stevens stated that he desired to protect the Government and advised Her Majesty's Government not to resign, but said, in answer to a direct question put to him by me, that in case the Government called upon him for assistance he did not see how he could assist them as long as C. R. Wilson remained marshal of the Kingdom, terming Mr. Wilson a scoundrel."

Mr. Stevens. That is not true. I think there was some conversation that they made as to the embarrassment that Wilson was making as to the Queen's rule, because some of the Queen's supporters were as anxious to get rid of Mr. Wilson as were her opponents.

Senator Gray. Did you say that Wilson was a scoundrel?

Mr. Stevens. I do not remember that I did.

Senator Frye. Did you give them as the cause of your opposition to Wilson that he had caused the arrest of your Chinese coachman?

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Mr. Stevens. No. Let me tell the truth about that Chinese story. I had three Chinese servants. The man who drove my carriage was a Chinaman, as you have to have all the servants of one nationality. This coachman was a faithful fellow. His friends had lost money by lottery gambling, which Wilson allowed to go on, and he complained without my knowledge, and Wilson's police arrested him for having in his possession a knife which cost 15 cents. All I did was to telephone to the police station. I never had any conversation with Wilson, and he was never in my house. I telephoned to the police station to send back my servant and send back the money which they had taken from him when they arrested him, which was promptly done.

Senator Frye. Peterson says he and Parker called on you again on Tuesday, January 17.

Mr. Stevens. That was in the afternoon.

Senator Frye. And that you promised that if a proclamation declaring a provisional government was issued, you, on behalf of your Government, would immediately recognize it and support it with the United States forces at your command.

Mr. Stevens. That is pure fiction. That is the afternoon I was sick upon the couch.

Senator Frye. He says that he asked you what action you would take if he called upon you for assistance, and that you said that in that case you could not come to the assistance of the Government; that he then asked what your action would be if they replaced the Government, and you replied that in that case you would interfere with the forces at your command.

Mr. Stevens. That is all fiction. His argument was that I could legally and properly use the force to sustain the Queen. I replied that the troops were landed for a pacific purpose, and could not interfere. Nothing was said about the other side. They did not have the impudence to ask me that, because they were courteous in their manner.

Senator Gray. Do you know Mr. Waterhouse?

Mr. Stevens. Mr. Henry Waterhouse? There are several Waterhouses.

Senator Gray. The one who is a member of the Provisional Government.

Mr. Stevens. That is Henry Waterhouse.

Senator Gray. He lived near you?

Mr. Stevens. Near me.

Senator Gray. Did you see him after you came ashore from the Boston on Monday?

Mr. Stevens. I do not recollect that I did.

Senator Gray. At any time that Saturday, Monday, or Tuesday?

Mr. Stevens. I have no remembrance; but if you want me to be more specific as to Mr. Waterhouse I would say in this way, not officially. It is rarely that we ever talked about politics at all. He was a gentleman who would not embarrass me, and he knew how cautious I was. He never conversed with me at all about the formation of the Provisional Government, and the first news that I had that any meeting was held in his house, the first hint, I found in Mr. Blount's report. Henry Waterhouse was a man of character; he respected me, and would not insult me by any such proposition as aiding the overthrow of the Queen.

Senator Gray. Did you ever during those four days, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, see at your house or elsewhere any of these gentlemen who were in the committee of safety, or were afterward in the Provisional Government?

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Mr. Stevens. The committee called and presented their document, which I have made of record among the documents.

Senator Gray. When did they call?

Mr. Stevens. I think they called right after the close of their mass-meeting.

Senator Gray. That was on Monday?

Mr. Stevens. Monday.

Senator Gray. Did you see any of them on Saturday or Monday?

Mr. Stevens. I do not remember that I did. If I did, I saw them as individuals.

Senator Gray. I mean as individuals?

Mr. Stevens. I may have seen one or more of them; I can not say that I did. If I saw them, I saw them just as I did the other side. They had every access, both sides, to the legation; but the leaders of the Provisional Government were men of brains, and they did not embarrass me by coming there and letting me know their plans. And that is what I said of Mr. Dole, who is alleged to have conspired with me. He nor his wife never hinted to me his intention, and it was so of all the others.

Senator Gray. Did Mr. Thurston call upon you during any of those four days?

Mr. Stevens. Mr. Thurston, I think, called upon me once. Mr. Thurston was taken sick, if I remember aright, on Monday, after the mass meeting. I think he was sick and did not go out. I did not see him again until he left on the Claudine for Washington. I saw him for a few moments only before he went on board the Claudine.

Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Cooper during these days?

Mr. Stevens. Not at the legation.

Senator Gray. Or anywhere else?

Mr. Stevens. Nor anywhere else.

Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Cooper on board the Boston?

Mr. Stevens. No.

Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Castle on board the Boston?

Mr. Stevens. I did not. Mr. William R. Castle was a member of the committee of safety, and he called when they presented their request.

Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. W. O. Smith ?

Mr. Stevens. That is when they called and presented the request of the committee of safety. I think only the subcommittee of three called. Of course, there were so many who called during the three or four exciting days that I can not remember in each case who did call; I have to go on memory.

Senator Gray. Did you state to Mr. Thurston when he called, that the troops would have to be landed from the Boston?

Mr. Stevens. Not at all. My answer was the same—when the troops landed it would be for the purpose of protecting life and property.

Senator Gray. You say you made no statement to Mr. Thurston about landing troops?

Mr. Stevens. I do not remember any. I may have stated, as I did to other gentlemen—that the troops might be landed. I used great caution in my language; and you may be quite sure of this, that I was quite as courteous to the royalist emmissaries as I was to the others. There was reason: Mr. Thurston and Mr. Dole and others were men of too much sense to embarrass me with improper questions.

Senator Gray. Did Mr. Thurston state to you on that occasion that they had a proposition for establishing a provisional government?

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Mr. Stevens. No; it would have been absurd for him to have so stated. It was generally talked that the opponents of the Queen would form a new government.

Senator Gray. That they were going to establish a provisional government?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. When the Queen failed on Saturday, at the churches and everywhere else they were talking over the situation, and what they would do. They called a mass meeting for Monday, and appointed a committee of safety and proposed to establish some form of government, and that was notorious, and they would not have to give me any special information.

Senator Gray. Whom did you get your information from; you say it was notorious?

Mr. Stevens. Such parties as would call there at the legation. Men and ladies called there from both sides.

Senator Gray. Did you state to Mr. Thurston on the occasion when you state he may have called—I think you said he did call?

Mr. Stevens. I think he called on Sunday. If he did he remained but a few minutes.

Senator Gray. Did you say to him when the Government was established and actually in the possession of the archives and buildings that you would recognize it?

Mr. Stevens. It was not necessary. He and those acting with him knew perfectly well that the de facto government would have to be recognized, and Judge Dole and Mr. Thurston understand international law and usage as well as any of us. Judge Dole was too intelligent to ask me what I would do in the contingency named.

Senator Gray. When did the communication come to you at the legation, asking you to land the troops?

Mr. Stevens. That came to me on Monday just after the mass meeting.

Senator Gray. Who brought it?

Mr. Stevens. It was this committee of safety; I presume it was only a part of them; I think there were three.

Senator Gray. The committee of safety was composed of 13 members?

Mr. Stevens. I think there was a subcommittee of three. Mr. Castle was one, Mr. Smith another; the third I can not recall.

Senator Gray. That was before you went on board the Boston?

Mr. Stevens. Yes. I could not state the precise hour—whether it was 3, or half-past 3, or 4.

Senator Gray. And immediately after you went on board the Boston and requested the landing of the troops?

Mr. Stevens. Very soon. And my note was drawn up before the committee called, and if it had not called I would have made the request.

Senator Gray. And you saw Capt. Wiltse that day?

Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse called at the legation probably nearly every day after we got back from Hilo.

Senator Gray. I understood you to say that you went on board the Boston some time about 4 o'clock, you could not be precise as to the time, but it was after you received this communication from the subcommittee of safety. Now, I understood you to say, that prior to your going on board the Boston that day you had a full conference with Capt. Wiltse?

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Mr. Stevens. No; I did not say that. I presume I had. I think he called there on Sunday.

Senator Gray. On that Saturday or Sunday, when you had this conference with Capt. Wiltse, was it arranged that he should land the troops upon your making the request?

Mr. Stevens. The understanding was, if I did make the request, the troops would be landed.

Senator Gray. What was necessary?

Mr. Stevens. If it became necessary to land, that I would have to make the request. That was the official way, and I had the legation records before me running back twenty-five years. They could not land until the request came from me.

Senator Gray. When you went out to the ship, Capt. Wiltse was not surprised to have you make this request, because you had arranged with him before for such a contingency?

Mr. Stevens. Not at all.

Senator Gray. But you handed him the paper which you took out with you?

Mr. Stevens. The official paper which had been used time after time by my predecessors.

Senator Gray. And you have already stated that the arrangements were made then and there between you for the landing of the troops.

Mr. Stevens. Only contingently—if landed at all the request had to come from me. And Capt. Wiltse knew that as well as I did.

Senator Gray. After you left the Boston, I understood the arrangement was made between you for landing the troops, and you understood they would carry their camp equipage with them, and it would not be necessary that you should provide quarters for them?

Mr. Stevens. It never entered my mind; I took it for granted without consultation that the marines had their own tents.

Senator Gray. And you were there informed that a hall would have to be provided?

Mr. Stevens. Yes; and maps for the city.

Senator Gray. And when you left the ship it was understood that the troops were to march out to Mr. Atherton's place?

Mr. Stevens. They were to do exactly as was done in 1889; march through the streets and get a lodging as soon as they could.

Senator Gray. Was it understood that they were to go to Mr. Atherton's when you left the ship?

Mr. Stevens. I do not remember.

Senator Gray. Was Mr. Atherton talked about on the ship?

Mr. Stevens. I could not remember that; I think it was a mere casual idea—that Mr. Atherton had those extensive grounds, and was one of the leading American citizens, and they marched through the street to get grounds somewhere, and his grounds were large enough.

Senator Gray. Do you undertake to say it was not understood they were to go to Mr. Atherton's when they left the ship?

Mr. Stevens. I do not remember. Whatever it was, it was a mere incident, and with no special relation to anything in view. They had to go somewhere and secure a hall.

Senator Gray. When you sent the note of recognition to the Provisional Government, to whom did you send it?

Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt I sent it to the minister of foreign affairs. Mr. Dole, under their organization, was President and minister of foreign affairs. Of course, the official usage is to send such

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notes to the minister of foreign affairs. I have no doubt I sent it to the minister of foreign affairs. I presume I conformed to the custom.

The Chairman. Had you previously heard of the proclamation of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. Yes.

Senator Gray. Had you a copy of that proclamation?

Mr. Stevens. I can not say.

Senator Gray. Had you read that proclamation?

Mr. Stevens. I can not say that I had.

Senator Gray. Could you say that you had not?

Mr. Stevens. I could not say that I had not.

Senator Gray. Was any proclamation sent to you?

Mr. Stevens. Things had to be done very rapidly that afternoon. I had no clerk and I was a sick man, and it was impossible for me to make notes. I have no doubt I received the proclamation.

Senator Gray. And you can not say one way or the other whether a copy of that proclamation was sent to you?

Mr. Stevens. I can not; I presume so. Mr. Pringle brought me information and so did Mr. Carter, and so did others. I had it in various ways.

Senator Gray. Were you aware when it was sent to you that the terms of the Provisional Government were not settled until there was annexation to the United States?

Mr. Stevens. I did not understand that.

Senator Gray. Were you aware that the proclamation was so made?

Mr. Stevens. I never heard of it?

Senator Gray. Never heard of the proclamation?

Mr. Stevens. I did not know that that was the limit of the Provisional Government until this controversy of Mr. Thurston and Mr. Gresham.

Senator Gray. When you were acting for the Government, you did not understand the terms in which the Government you were about to recognize had been proclaimed?

Mr. Stevens. The only fact that I took under consideration was that it was a de facto Government, and if that de facto Government had proposed to annex to Mormondom I should have recognized it. I should have recognized it regardless of any ulterior purposes of that Government.

Senator Gray. In this important condition of affairs in Hawaii, you did not consider it necessary to examine the terms on which that Government was established?

Mr. Stevens. All I wanted to know was that it was a de facto Government, and that information I had.

Senator Gray. Where did you get it, except from the proclamation?

Mr. Stevens. From parties who came from the Government house and informed me, and I presume they sent a copy of the proclamation.

Senator Gray. Who were they?

Mr. Stevens. My impression is that Charles Carter was one and Mr. Pringle was another. Mr. Pringle was acting as my aid. Others gave me the information. Which one brought it first I could not swear. I think I first received the information from my daughter.

Senator Gray. What time in the afternoon did this fact come to your knowledge that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?

Mr. Stevens. Probably—I can not say positively; I did not look at the watch—half past 2 or 3. It might have been earlier or a little later.

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Senator Gray. By whom did you send your note of recognition?

Mr. Stevens. That I can not say positively.

Senator Gray. Did you send it back by the messenger from the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. I sent it by some one whom I considered a reliable messenger.

Senator Gray. And you can not say who it was?

Mr. Stevens. No; I can not say that. It may have been Mr. Pringle, or it may have been one of the clerks in the foreign office.

Senator Gray. How soon after you were notified of the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed that you sent your note of recognition?

Mr. Stevens. That I could not swear positively. I put it on record. I think it was about 5 o'clock. Mrs. Stevens and my daughter think that when this gentleman, meaning Hopkins, called with the note from the Queen's recent ministers it was later. But not regarding that a vital point I put it down in the records about 5. And the fact that the chief justice called on me shortly and said that they had the rumor all through the streets that the American minister had refused to recognize the Provisional Government. He came to see if it were so, and it was about dusk when Judge Judd called, when I said to him I had just recognized. But I put it down as my opinion that it was about 5.

Senator Gray. You do not claim to be accurate about that?

Mr. Stevens. No; the official records will show that.

Senator Gray. Have you the official record?

Mr. Stevens. I think that is in Honolulu. I do not know that Mr. Blount has put that on paper. My wife and daughter afterward said they thought it was later.

Senator Gray. After the messenger who first came from the Provisional Government to notify you that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed, what other intelligence did you receive of its proclamation?

Mr. Stevens. Now, I have to answer that in the way I have already answered, that I considered that there was an absolute interregnum between the afternoon of the 14th and the establishment of the Provisional Government, and my relief from the situation was that there was a de facto Government. The moment I got information that a de facto Government was established and was master of the situation, master of the archives, I thought it was my duty to recognize it, and all the other foreign officials immediately did the same. And the English minister called on the Provisional Government in person before I did.

Senator Gray. Recognized it before you did?

Mr. Stevens. The English minister in person went before I did and offered his congratulations.

Senator Gray. Did you before that get your note?

Mr. Stevens. I can not say. All those members of the official corps knew the circumstances under which the Provisional Government had been constituted as well as I did.

Senator Gray. I understood you to say, in answer to that question as to whether you had any other information of the proclamation of the Provisional Government than the messenger conveyed to you, although not directly responsive, that it was not necessary, because it was thoroughly understood for the last two or three days there was an

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interregnum, and that any government or any proclamation of any set of people would constitute a de facto government.

Mr. Stevens. I did not say that. Let me answer it.

Senator Gray. What did you say when I asked you in regard to the fact that it was notorious that there was an interregnum and it was not necessary to have the information?

Mr. Stevens. I do not put it in that form. I say that the collapse of all government on the islands took place on the attempted coup d'etat of the Queen on the 14th, and from that time up to the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings the only government was the 1,000 citizens who called the mass meeting, and the presence of ship Boston in the harbor. I had got information that I deemed reliable that a government springing out of that condition of things had become a de facto government, and by the invariable usage of the world I was bound to recognize it.

Senator Gray. Then, I suppose, you give that answer as accounting for the fact that you did not need any other information than the first reliable information which you received that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?

Mr. Stevens. I had the most thorough information on that.

Senator Gray. I ask you what that was?

Mr. Stevens. I said before, probably by a note. But by various means I got that information perhaps twenty times within an hour.

Senator Gray. From whom?

Mr. Stevens. The parties who called.

Senator Gray. Who were the parties?

Mr. Stevens. I will give you one instance. Chief Justice Judd is one of the representative men of the islands. He came, I may say, at 5 or a little later, and he said the rumor had got on the street that I had not recognized the Provisional Government. I am sure during those hours there were many persons who called and talked of what had been done.

Senator Gray. Who were the many persons?

Mr. Stevens. I could not be positive.

Senator Gray. Who was one?

Mr. Stevens. I presume that Mr. Dole sent his clerk of the foreign office, and in addition to that Mr. Cooper, Carter, and Pringle, and I presume there were many other persons who told me.

Senator Gray. Were they sympathizers with the Provisional Government who told you?

Mr. Stevens. They were men who would give me absolute information.

Senator Gray. I ask if that was a fact?

Mr. Stevens. That was a fact.

Senator Gray. You were not out of your house?

Mr. Stevens. Not out of my house.

Senator Gray. And on this information that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed you sent the note?

Mr. Stevens. So soon as I had evidence of the fact.

Senator Gray. What fact?

Mr. Stevens. The fact that out of that interregnum had sprung a de facto government.

Senator Gray. The fact of its being a de facto government is a conclusion?

Mr. Stevens. Of which I had to be the judge.

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Senator Gray. Did you judge that that was the de facto Government upon the information that came to you that a Provisional Government had been proclaimed?

Mr. Stevens. Only in part. I judged it from the condition of the town and all the circumstances. I knew that the Provisional Government had been talked of for sixty hours, and I had it from many persons. I was living on the principal street, and they would hear it on the street and tell my daughter about it, and would come by in a carriage and tell me.

Senator Gray. Had you any knowledge of any other fact in regard to the transactions of that afternoon that bore upon the question at all, except the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?

Mr. Stevens. I knew the fact an hour and a half before. You will see how importantly this fact bears on the situation, the efforts of the Provisional Government to transfer the arms from the store, and the abortive attempt of one of Mr. Wilson's policemen to interfere, and that was all the resistance for sixty hours—--

Senator Gray. Who told you that?

Mr. Stevens. I learned it probably from twenty different sources. I heard the shot.

Senator Gray. Tell me the names of some who told you?

Mr. Stevens. I guess my own daughter told me first.

Senator Gray. Who told you afterward?

Mr. Stevens. That I could not tell, because events passing so rapidly like that, and a hundred men calling on me, it would be impossible to remember who the individual was. But there were many.

Senator Gray. Why did you not wait until the next day before you sent the note of recognition ?

Mr. Stevens. For the reason that a half century of the study of government on both continents and 13 years of diplomatic experience would have told me it was right.

Senator Gray. That was the result of your study?

Mr. Stevens. My study and experience would have told me so.

Senator Gray. And your study and experience told you that it was right to recognize that government within an hour or an hour and a half?

Mr. Stevens. I do not accept it in that form.

Senator Gray. I ask you as a matter of fact whether you did recognize it within an hour or an hour and a half?

Mr. Stevens. I do not think that material; probably within an hour and a half or two hours.

Senator Gray. Whether it is material or not, answer the question.

Mr. Stevens. I do not know the precise time by the clock.

Senator Gray. That is sufficient; you do not know the time; you can not say whether it was an hour or an hour and a half?

Mr. Stevens. It was probably inside of two hours.

Senator Gray. Were you well acquainted with Mr. Thurston?

Mr. Stevens. Pretty well acquainted with him, because he was a minister of the Government when I went to Honolulu.

Senator Gray. Are you well acquainted with W. O. Smith?

Mr. Stevens. Passably well. He lived near me, within half a mile. I never had much acquaintance with him; met him occasionally, and, as Americans, we went to the same church. In the course of a year he and his wife called at our house two or three times. Senator Gray. Did any of these gentlemen, Mr. Thurston, Mr.

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Smith—any of them connected with the committee on public safety— call upon you on Sunday?

Mr. Stevens. I have already stated that Mr. Thurston called a few minutes at my house Sunday. I would not know when a gentleman called on me whether he was on the committee of safety or not, because I would not know until I saw the list. On Sunday they had not been appointed.

Senator Gray. I say, not whom you knew were on the committee of safety, but whether any of these gentlemen whom you knew afterward were on the committee of safety.

Mr. Stevens. I have said that I think that Mr. Thurston called; stopped in five minutes, as he passed down, and I think Judge Hartwell called also. Others called of both parties during Sunday.

Senator Gray. Did Mr. Damon call?

Mr. Stevens. I do not recollect Mr. Damon calling.

Senator Gray. What sort of a person is Mr. Damon?

Mr. Stevens. He is a man of the highest respectability.

Senator Gray. What is his business?

Mr. Stevens. He is a banker. Mr. Damon is the son of an American missionary, who went there forty years ago, and whom our Government recognized officially. He became a clerk to banker Bishop, and a great friend of the natives. He is an excellent financial manager, and largely increased the value of the property of two prominent natives. When the natives get into any financial trouble, Damon is the man they go to to get them out. He is a man of the highest character.

Senator Gray. Did Mr. Damon and Mr. Thurston call on Monday?

Mr. Stevens. I have no reliable recollection in that regard. My acquaintance with Mr. Thurston grew out of the fact that he was minister of the interior for the first thirteen months of my residence in Honolulu. I knew him officially and privately, for he lived in the part of the city in which the legation is situated.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES F. MORGAN.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

My name is James F. Morgan; I am 32 years old; was born in the city of New York of American parents; came here when I was about 2 years old; was educated and have lived here since; have been in business as auctioneer and commission merchant for about six years; I took the business of E. P. Adams, with whom I had been clerk for about ten years.

I have been a member of the advisory council of the Provisional Government from its formation, January 17, 1893. I have been closely interested in Hawaiian political affairs for many years, and have carefully watched the progress of events. I believe the Hawaiian monarchy came to an end at the time when it could no longer exist; it had survived its usefulness, and with the revolutionary acts of the Queen on January 14 matters culminated, and it was impossible to longer endure such a Government.

I was not a member of the committee of public safety, nor was I present at the meetings at W. O. Smith's office on the afternoon of the 14th; but I knew what was going on. After I was requested by the committee of public safety to become a member of the advisory council, and learning that it was the intention to seek annexation to the

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United States, believing that it was the only way to secure permanent and enduring peace and good government, I met with the members of the two councils at the office of W. O. Smith, on Tuesday. Sometime between half past 2 and 3, we went to the Government building, not armed. When we arrived we found only a few people present; our forces were not there when we arrived. Mr. Cooper read the proclamation; while it was being read, armed men commenced to come in, and in a few minutes there was at least a hundred, all armed and prepared.

Mr. C. McCarthy was there and said he was waiting for 100 armed men, who were to come and defend that building; he said if they had been on hand we would have been opposed and all shot down. We afterwards secured several thousand cartridges which had been stored in the building, in a preparation for the defense against us. Shortly after reading the proclamation we went into session for the purpose of immediately assuming the functions of Government. While we were in session Parker and Cormwell came up, and pretty soon the other two ministers. Before I went away Capt. Wiltse came in with his aids. They looked about and he said that Stevens had sent them to see whether we were actually in possession of the Government building, the Treasury, archives, etc. He was shown about the building.

Before I left I heard him say that we could not be recognized till we captured the barracks and station house. Up to that time and thereafter, I never have known anything about the United States troops supporting or assisting us. If there had been any such plan or expectation I am sure I should have heard it. I knew that the troops had landed, and supposed it was for the protection of women and children; I regarded that as necessary on account of the intense excitement which existed and had existed for several days. A very little thing would have caused an explosion. Shortly after the ministers came up from the station house I went off for a lot of arms and ammunition, which I had collected for the use of the Provisional Government.

When I got back to the Government building I believe the Queen's surrender had been received, and I heard a rumor that Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government, and thought it was started by some of our people to bear on the Queen's people in the station house and barracks to cause them to surrender. At any rate, they did surrender quite early in the evening.

After the commission went to Washington we continued to carry on the Government and could have continued so without any assistance, but there were rumors of uprisings, and a great many thought that if the United States flag was raised it would at any rate prevent bloodshed. This view prevailed against considerable opposition, and, the flag having been raised, there certainly has been no bloodshed.

When Blount arrived, the council learned that he had called on President Dole almost immediately and had stated to him that he must take down the flag for he could not continue negotiations while the flag was flying. This was done on the first of April. Shortly after the provisional council called on Commissioner Blount in a body. He received us courteously, and Mr. Damon, who acted as our spokesman, said that he would willingly give him all the information in our power. Mr. Blount replied that when he wanted any information he would send for us. Damon said that he could tell a good deal about the country, whereupon Mr. Blount slapped him on the shoulder and said: "I guess you're my man," and made an appointment for two or three

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days later. I never was called upon for any information, and saw no more of Commissioner Blount.

Mr. Fred Wundenburg said to me a day or two after the revolution, after Ashley's appointment as marshal, that on Saturday, January 14, he was made a committee to get arms and men, and that he ascertained that night that he could get over 200 armed and ready. He appeared to be angry that he was not made marshal, and seemed to think that such service demanded recognition. He said he had no further use for the Provisional Government from that time on.

While the Queen was attempting her revolutionary act on the 14th I met Marshal Wilson near the station house. He was dressed in his uniform. Said he was very much opposed to what she was doing. That if she did not desist he would go and shut her up in a room by herself. He also added that she was wild and angry, and would not listen to him; whereupon I said, thinking to test his sense of sincerity, and knowing that my suggestion, if followed, would probably bring her to terms: "You go right up to the Palace and tell her that if she does not stop at once and abandon that plan about a new constitution you will resign your position as marshal; and if she won't listen to you, resign then and there." Wilson did not appear to like that, and walked off, saying: "I guess I won't do that." One of the deputies standing near me said, very significantly, "Wilson is fooling you; he does not mean anything of that kind."

Jas F. Morgan

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson, Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R. CASTLE.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

My name is William R. Castle; I was born in Honolulu in March, 1849; my parents were American missionaries. My father arrived here in 1837 and still lives in Honolulu; he is the senior member of the mercantile house of Castle & Cooke. I have always resided in Honolulu, with the exception of two years spent at Oberlin College and five years in New York City, where I studied law and practiced for a short time. I returned to the Islands in 1876, at the request of King Kalakaua, as attorney-general. I have been more or less connected with Island politics ever since, though always unwillingly, as it has interfered with my business. Have been a member of the Legislature five sessions.

Until very recently I have constantly and consistently opposed annexation to the United States; I have a strong regard for the native people and have hoped that the native Government might continue, and it is only recently that I have felt compelled to change my views upon this subject. I do not think that it will ever be possible to have a government of security to person and property in Hawaii under the old forms. This conclusion has been reached very reluctantly, after closely watching political affairs since my return in 1876.

During the latter part of the legislative session of 1892 I felt certain that a climax must very soon be reached, and that some very radical change must take place in the Government, or that the monarchy must come to an end. Aside from conversation upon this subject with a

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few friends, and some speculation as to when a change might come, how it would be forced and who would do it, nothing was done; there was no organization, nor any plans made. During the last week of the Legislature the air was filled with rumors, and the prospect looked very dark. Still, nothing was done, and when the Queen, on the 14th of January, actually attempted her revolutionary act—so far as any preparation was concerned—we were actually taken by surprise.

I was intimately acquainted with Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, with both of whom I often talked over the political situation. We all felt that trouble was impending, but I do not think that anything was more strongly impressed upon my mind by what either of these men said than the thought that if trouble came and our rights, our liberties, and property were threatened, we must help ourselves, for we could have no outside help, unless, indeed, such things should occur as might ensue from a state of anarchy, when, as I understood, Americans might expect assistance to the extent of personal protection and the protection of property against mob violence. Knowing what a Hawaiian mob meant from the illustration given in 1874, considerable uneasiness was felt in Honolulu when the Boston, with Minister Stevens, left Honolulu a week or ten days before the prorogation of the Legislature, and her return was observed with great relief upon the morning of the 14th.

Several days before the prorogation, things were in a very precarious condition. Corruption was open and flagrant in the Legislature; the lottery and opium bills were suddenly taken up and passed, and the same combination immediately ousted the Wilcox cabinet, which was the only one since the session opened which had the entire confidence of the community. Upon this, the Reform members of the Legislature, by way of protest, hoping to prevent the obtaining of a quorum, with which any more outrageous legislation could be enacted, absented themselves from the House. Upon Saturday morning, however, the day set for the prorogation, they succeeded in getting a quorum, a new ministry was immediately anuounced, and the opium and lottery bills, to the consternation and surprise of the community, were returned signed.

After seeing personally what took place I returned to my business and remained at my office closely occupied until nearly 2 o'clock. As I was about to return to my home I heard that the Queen was trying to abrogate the constitution, and at once went to the street in front of the palace, where I could see what was going on. Natives were the favored ones, being allowed ingress and egress, and from them I learned what was taking place. I saw the Queen come out on the veranda and speak to the crowd of natives who assembled below. After speaking some little time a native came and told me that she had said that owing to unexpected opposition and difficulties over which she had no control she would not then promulgate the new constitution, but she stated that the matter was merely deferred for a few days.

Immediately after this I saw William White, the native member for Lahaina, come out of the palace, run part way down the steps where he stood, and began a loud and furious harangue. Twice I observed Maj. Boyd, who was in full uniform, come down the steps and, touching his shoulders, apparently say something to him, but he was furiously shaken off. Upon inquiry from another native who came out I learned that he was making a most incendiary speech; that he was saying that their hope of a new constitution was defeated by tne interference of whites, and he urged them to rush into the palace and kill

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such persons as were opposing this plan. I expected to see another such riot as that of 1874, but learned afterwards that someone else counseled them to wait a few days, when they would get all they desired.

Returning down town I went to the office of W. O. Smith, where an impromptu meeting of foreign residents had assembled. A paper was lying upon the table, which had been extensively signed, in which the signers pledged themselves to oppose to any extent the revolutionary plans of the Queen, and to sustain the cabinet, which was trying to fight her off. If I recollect right, Paul Neumann, Peterson, Colburn, and others who have subsequently come out strongly in favor of the Queen, were then present. I heard Colburn state the situation to the meeting, saying how the lives of members of the cabinet had been threatened in the palace on account of their opposition to the Queen's plans, and Mr. Colburn then called upon the community to support them in this opposition. We were not informed and did not then learn that the Queen had expressed surprise at Peterson's opposition, he having had a month to consider this proposed new constitution and not having made any objections.

The community was now thoroughly aroused; it was felt that life, property, and liberty were seriously imperiled, and the meeting immediately elected a chairman and secretary, and a committee of public safety of thirteen members was at once appointed, of which I was a member. Subcommittees were at once appointed, which went about their business immediately, and the meeting adjourned to meet at my house on Sunday morning. That evening a number of us met at Mr. Thurston's residence to talk over the situation and attempt to make some plans for a provisional government in case the radical measures of overthrowing the Queen should finally be deemed necessary as the only available course. During the evening Mr. Fred. Wundenburg came in and reported on what success he had met in a two or three hours' search for arms and men to oppose the Queen. So far as I can now recollect, he stated that he had not been able to find more than 60, although it was believed that a very much larger number could be obtained as soon as the community should know that it was required.

I think that after Mr. Wundenburg left a messenger came from the Drei Hundred, a well-known organization of Germans, offering the services of their men, numbering, to my recollection now, about 80, and their arms. The next morning the committee of public safety met at my residence and remained in session a considerable part of the day. It was finally decided that the proper method was to ascertain public feeling, for which purpose a mass meeting was called. We felt that if a representative meeting should demand the deposition of the Queen and the establishment of another government which the members of the meeting would back up, the time had come to make the attempt. The question was one of force sufficient to carry out the intention.

The meeting was called for Monday, and its voice was so unmistakable that preparations were concluded as rapidly as possible to take possession of the Government by force, establish a Provisional Government, and ask for annexation to the United States, which was also the almost unanimous desire of the meeting. From the close of the meeting till the final movement preparations were conducted openly and notoriously. The offer of arms, ammunition, and men came in from all sides; the thing lacking was a disciplined force, but there was no doubt as to the enthusiasm and determination of the respectable, conservative

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----60

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portion of the community to make an end of corrupt and misgovernment and get security and peace by good government.

During this period I saw Minister Stevens several times, also Capt. Wiltse, and conversed with them upon the situation. I stated freely that we proposed to fight for good government, and hoped that we should at least have the moral assistance of the United States by a recognition of the Provisional Government which was proposed to be established, but I have no hesitation in saying that we were given to understand clearly and definitely that the usual rule in such cases would be followed and that we could not be recognized unless we became in fact the Government of the country by taking possession of the seat of government, which I certainly understood to mean the various departments, including the treasury, the courts, and the archives of the Government. It was to this end that our efforts were directed and we expected a bloody fight to ensue when we went to the Government building.

According to my recollection now, the request to Minister Stevens to land United States marines was not thought of until Monday forenoon, when it was prepared in response to the request of numerous citizens of many nationalities, some of whom had a vivid recollection of the doings of the mob of 1874. They were people who thoroughly indorsed our course and believed that we would succeed, but who felt that while the attack was being made and the fight going on around the Government building, a brutal mob would, in all probability, be incited by the royalists to burn and destroy property, in the suburbs as well as in the business portions of the town and that outrages would be committed upon the persons of women and children. Threats of such violence were made, and certainly several members of the Legislature, if their words were to be believed, would not only incite, but lead on just such a mob.

The request was therefore made to Minister Stevens for exactly that kind of protection. It was put in writing, signed by all the Committee of Public Safety, and taken to Minister Stevens by Mr. Thurston and myself after the mass meeting. About 5 o'clock that evening troops were landed and disposed about the town where they could be most easily obtained should occasion require. Both Mr. Thurston and myself were ill with very severe colds, which in my case ran into an attack of asthma, and with Mr. Thurston into threatened pneumonia, which prevented our taking part in much which followed during the next twenty-four hours. Monday night was one of suspense and terror throughout the entire community. A riotous uprising of the mob element was feared at any moment; no confidence was felt in the ability or disposition of the Queen's Government to cope with the same. Two incendiary fires did, in fact, occur, but no outbreak happened.

It is my belief, which I think is shared by nearly every one, that the mere presence of United States troops exercised a restraining influence and prevented any riotous uprising. While the troops were landing and marching up Port street, I was in town and met Marshal C. B. Wilson, with several others, near the bank of Bishop & Co. Mr. Wilson quite sternly wanted to know what the troops were landed for. I told him exactly what had occurred, giving him the substance of the note to Minister Stevens, and stating that I believed the object for which the troops were landed would be strictly observed.

At this point I desire to state that if there had been any plan or conspiracy by which the United States troops were to land and assist the revolutionists in overturning the Government, I should most certainly

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have known it. There was no such plan, and I utterly repudiate the attempt to impugn the character and actions of both Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, and state here that it seemed to me at that time, and I believe now that they would have been perfectly justified in giving a quicker and more open support to the Provisional Government than was finally accorded by recognition, and that they still would have been within the requirements of international law upon that subject.

For a few moments on Tuesday evening between five and six o'clock I was able to go to the Government building, where I found the Provisional Government in full possession and exercising the functions of government. A military establishment was being rapidly perfected; there were hundreds of men under arms whose names were being enrolled in companies; patrols were already being set to guard the town, and there was every evidence of the Provisional Government's being in successful control. I inquired at once whether the United States minister had recognized the Provisional Government but was answered that such recognition had not yet been accorded.

The negotiations were going on at that time for the surrender of the barracks and station house, while a conference was held at the palace with the Queen. Going out of the building I saw that all was quiet at the Arion Hall; not a soldier being in sight excepting two or three sentries, who were pacing the yard. Indeed I saw nothing of United States troops after their landing on Monday night until my departure on the following Thursday morning with the annexation commission for Washington. The United States troops did not lift a finger to bring about the result. If the Queen's Government, the police department, thought they would be attacked by United States troops that certainly was their own concern, and nothing with which either the Provisional Government or the United States troops had anything to do.

When in the yard surrounding the Government building, somewhere between 5 and 6 in the evening, I met Capt. Wiltse and asked him with some surprise if they were not going to recognize the Provisional Government. I knew that we were in possession, and knowing the moral strength we should receive from such recognition and that we were certainly the de facto government, I felt that it might have been given sooner. Capt. Wiltse replied quickly: "Oh no, we can't recognize you until you are also in possession of the barracks and station house."

I returned from Washington on the 7th of April upon the same steamer which brought Mr. Charles Nordhoff to Honolulu. Mr. Blount was already here and the flag had already been lowered. Although there was some solicitude in town, I found everything orderly and quiet. Within a few days I called on Commissioner Blount and had a pleasant conversation with him. I informed him that I had an intimate knowledge of what had taken place, and believing that he desired to obtain only the facts and all the facts, should be happy to furnish him all the information in my power; and also put him in the way of receiving information on all subjects connected with the islands. Although I saw Commissioner Blount several times after this, up to the time of his departure, he has never accorded me an interview, nor has he asked for any statement in regard to the matter.

Owing to my intimate knowledge and acquaintance with the Hawaiian people, several deputations from other parts of the country came to me to procure interviews with Mr. Blount. I recollect particularly two instances in which I wrote a note, saying that the natives would like to interview him; that an interpreter would be furnished; that

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they were poor and wanted to return to their homes as soon as possible, and that a steamer would leave within three days after my note was dated, and requested an interview within such time. In each case, Mr. Blount fixed the interview after the departure of the steamer; in one case the natives remained at considerable expense, for another steamer did not go for ten days; in the other they were discontented and disgusted, and went home.

William R. Castle.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 5th day of December A. D., 1893.

[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD D. TENNEY.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

My name is Edward D. Tenney; I was born in the State of New York; I am 35 years of age; came to the Hawaiian Islands in 1877, and have lived here ever since. I am a member of the well-known mercantile house of Castle & Cooke; I am a member of the advisory council of the Provisional Government and have been such since the 17th of January, when the Government was proclaimed. Up to that time I have had nothing to do with Hawaiian politics, but have been a careful observer of the progress of events.

If we could have had good government I think the country would have been as well off, at least for the present, to have remained as it was, but the conviction has been growing upon me for several years that the Hawaiian monarchy could not last. It certainly had reached the end of its usefulness; corruption was rife and the Government was certainly upon the verge of financial disaster. The Queen made matters worse by her obstinate determination to assume despotic power and overthrow constitutional government, and I think that she is responsible for the overthrow of the monarchy and her own deposition.

I was present, a close observer of events, during January, 1893; had been at my business Saturday morning the 14th, but was at home most of the day. I heard from a passer-by of the Queen's attempt to abrogate the constitution. Drove into town very soon; found the general feeling was that the Queen had gone to a point where people could not yield any longer. There was a feeling of intense and feverish anxiety as to what might follow. It was so on Sunday and Monday; business was almost entirely suspended. It was very well known that men were preparing for action. In the afternoon all business was stopped and the community thronged en masse to the old rifles armory, where a most enthusiastic, but orderly and determined, meeting was held. All were serious; all in deep earnest. The purpose of the mass meeting, as it was there understood, was that the Queen must be deposed; that she had gone to a point where the community could no longer bear with her.

I knew nothing whatever of the plans which were being made; I had not consulted with any of the committee of safety. I had come to the conclusion that to insure safety, security to property, and good government, the form of Government must be changed; that night was one of intense excitement and uncertainty. There was great fear of what might happen; it was felt that if the mob element became aroused the Queen's Government would have no control whatever,

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and when it became known that United States troops were landed a feeling of security became general—among the women and children more particularly. The Queen's Government was very uncertain; they did not know where they stood, and I do not think they could have afforded protection.

The committee of safety proceeded openly. Its purpose was perfectly well known to dethrone the Queen and establish a new Government. It seemed to me certain that if the Queen's Government had felt themselves masters of the situation, they would have arrested the leaders, instead of which, the committee carried out its work at its own will. The next day, the 17th, there was the same feeling of unrest and uncertainty as to whether the Queen's Government would resist the new Government. About 11 o'clock in the morning, I was waited upon by a committee and asked if I would become one of the advisory council. All arrangements as I then understood were then completed.

I said that while I was somewhat in the dark, I believed the only way we could get settled government was to depose the Queen, and I consented. Nothing was said about Minister Stevens or of any support to be obtained from United States troops, nor had I heard any rumors of that kind. No doubt was felt that we could depose the Queen, and that under the prevailing conditions the new Government would be immediately recognized. At 1 p. m. I met the committee at W. O. Smith's office. The proclamation was read and agreed to and signed by all who were then present. About 2:30 we left for the Government building unarmed and walked up nearly all together. We asked for the ministers. There were none there; waited ten or fifteen minutes for some of them to appear.

There appearing no occasion for further delay, the proclamation was then read, no one being present but the executive and advisory councils, the committee on public safety, some Government clerks, and a few others. While the proclamation was being read, Col. Soper arrived, and it being deemed necessary that we have force at once I went to the armory on Beretania street, whereupon a force of armed men went there immediately. From that time on, dozens and scores of armed men poured in till the buildings and premises were filled to overflowing. I believe that before 5 p. m. 1,000 to 1,500 men were there, not all armed by any means, but asking for arms to support the Provisional Government. Several hundred were armed and all were determined to hold the position at any cost. As an evidence of the feeling of the community, I observed that many former supporters of the monarchy came in and joined us.

When we felt that we had force sufficient to hold our position, and that the monarchy was in fact overthrown, we being in possession of the headquarters and center of the Government, notes were sent to all the foreign ministers and consuls, stating the fact and asking for recognition as the de facto Government. I can not recollect whether, in fact, Stevens's recognition came in just before or just after the Queen's surrender. No one, at any rate, felt that there was any doubt that we were masters of the situation, and that no other government existed. As I recollect, before Stevens's recognition came, the order for the surrender of the station house and barracks had been received.

Although the United States troops were on shore absolutely none were seen, so far as I know. Arion Hall, where they were posted, faced a street opposite the Government building, but no troops were in sight, and they took absolutely no part at all. I recollect Capt. Wiltse came

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in with an aid and looked around, and he asked some questions as to the extent of our possession.

Martial law was immediately proclaimed by the Provisional Government, the town and surrounding country was at once divided into districts, our patrols were sent everywhere to maintain order and quell any possible disturbance. They were in possession of the entire town and surrounding country and maintained perfect order. As soon as it was known that the Provisional Government was established, suspense and anxiety subsided and everything settled down into a sense of security.

The United States flag was subsequently raised because it was thought that the mere act would operate to secure quiet and prevent bloodshed. The Provisional Government had no doubt of its ability to put down any revolt and maintain its position. Although there was some opposition, it was deemed best on the whole to ask for protection, and it was done.

Commissioner Blount arrived late in March, and pulled down the flag April 1. He wanted to do it the afternoon before, but it was deferred until the next day upon the Government's request to give time to have the town again patrolled and insure the maintenance of the peace. No disturbance followed, and the Government has been growing stronger and more secure every day since.

I called upon Commissioner Blount alone; was not with the advisory council when they called, but the commissioner knew that I Avas a member of the advisory council. Learning shortly after that he desired to see a sugar plantation, I was requested to take him to the Ewa plantation, of which our house are agents. I did so. Various matters were discussed, but no politics were talked of in any way. He has not asked me for any information at any time. I would have been glad to have furnished him with all in my power.

E.D. Tenney.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson, Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

We the undersigned hereby upon oath depose and say:

That we are the persons appointed as a citizens' committee of safety, at Honolulu, in January last.

That neither prior to nor after our appointment as such committee, did we or either of us, individually or collectively, have any agreement or understanding, directly or indirectly, with the U. S. minister, Mr. Stevens, or Capt. Wiltse, that they or either of them would assist in the overthrow of the monarchy or the establishment of the Provisional Provisional Government.

That at no time, either before or after such appointment, did Mr Stevens ever recommend or urge us, or either of us, to dethrone the Queen or establish a Provisional Government. That at no time, either before or after such appointment, did Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse promise us, or either of us, that the United States troops would be used to assist in the overthrow of the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government, and such troops, in fact, were not so used.

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That at the time the committee addressed Mr. Stevens concerning the landing of the troops to maintain the peace the Queen's Government was utterly demoralized. The Queen had denounced her cabinet and they had publicly appealed to the citizens to support them in a forcible resistance to the Queen. The new Government had not been organized and the air was full of rumors and threats of violence and conflict. The presence of the troops was a strong feature in preventing the irresponsible and lawless element of all nationalities from outbreak, but was not asked nor used for the purpose of dethroning the Queen nor establishing the Provisional Government.

That the forces that rallied to the support of the Provisional Government were ample to overthrow the monarchy and establish the Provisional Government, and such action would have been taken by the committee regardless of the presence or absence of the American troops.

That the reason of the confidence of the committee m its ability to accomplish its object was that the same men who were supporting the movement had carried through a peaceful revolution in 1887 and suppressed an armed uprising in 1889. The armed supporters of the movement were not a disorganized body, as has been represented, but were composed largely of the volunteer white militia which was in existence and formed the effective strength in the conflicts of 1887 and 1889, and which, although disbanded by the Boyalist Government in 1890, had retained its organization, and turned out under the command of its old officers, constituting a well drilled, disciplined, and officered military force of men of high character and morale, with perfect confidence in themselves, and holding in contempt the courage and ability of those whom they have twice before overawed and defeated.

C.Bolte.
Ed. Suhr.
F.W. McChesney.
J.A. McCandless.
William O. Smith.
Wm. R. Castle.
Andrew Brown.
John Emmeluth.
W.C. Wilder.
Theodore F. Lansing.
Henry Waterhouse.
L.A. Thurston.

Subscribed and sworn before me this 4th day of January, A. D. 1894, by C. Bolte, Ed. Suhr, F. W. McChesney, William O. Smith, Wm. R. Castle, Andrew Brown, John Emmeluth, W. C. Wilder, Theodore F. Lansing, Henry Waterhouse, and L. A. Thurston, as a true and correct statement.

[SEAL.] Thos. W. Hobron.
Notary Public.

STATEMENT OF PERSONS PRESENT AT MEETING OF COMMITTEE OF SAFETY, JANUARY 16.

We the undersigned, hereby depose and say that we were present at the meeting of safety at the residence of Henry Waterhouse on the night of Monday, January 16, last.

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That at such meeting no suggestion was made nor expectation expressed that the United States troops would assist in the overthrow of the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government.

That at no time during such meeting did Mr. Soper or any other member thereof go to Mr. Stevens's house, nor did Mr. Soper or any other member of such meeting report that they had seen Mr. Stevens and that he had assured them of the support of the Boston's men.

That the statement of F. Wundenburg upon this subject and others, as published in connection with Mr. Blount's report, are misleading and untrue.

John H. Soper.
J.H. Fisher.
Theodore F. Lansing.
Henry Waterhouse.
William O. Smith.
John Emmeluth.
J.B. Castle.
F.W. McChesney.
Andrew Brown.
C. Bolte.
J.A. McCandless.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of January, A. D. 1894, by John H. Soper, J. H. Fisher, Theodore F. Lansing, Henry Waterhouse, William O. Smith, John Emmeluth, J. B. Castle, F. W. McChesney, Andrew Brown, and C. Bolte as a true and correct statement.

[SEAL.] Thos. W. Hobron,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK BROWN.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

Frank Brown, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that he has resided in the Hawaiian Islands for the past forty-seven years; that he was a member of the Legislature for many sessions; that he was in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17,1893; that the period from Saturday until the troops landed he considered an interregnum; that in his opinion there was no government during those days; that he considered the landing of the United States troops a very good thing to show that there was some protection against incendiarism and destruction of private property in case anything should happen; he was in the riot at the time of Kalakaua's election when troops were landed, and was not sure but there would be a repetition of the trouble at that time; that in his opinion there was much more cause for landing the troops in January, 1893, than there was in 1887, as upon the former occasion the city was thoroughly guarded by the respectable element of the community, whereas in January last no such preparation had been made.

Frank Brown.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

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AFFIDAVIT OF P. F. A. EHLERS.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

P.F.A. Ehlers, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that he was born in Germany; that he has resided in Honolulu since 1866; that he has a family, is a householder, and is engaged in business here; that he was in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 14-17, 1893; that he talked with people, heard rumors, and that there was a state of great excitement and alarm; that the presence of the United States forces when they landed was a good thing, and prevented possible lawlessness which would have resulted in loss of property and possibly life.

P.F.A. Ehlers

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF J. H. FISHER.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

Joseph Henry Fisher, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is 36 years of age, born in San Francisco, Cal., United States of America, and has lived in Honolulu since February, 1883, and has been since that date employed as teller in the bank of Bishop & Co. Is married and has a family. Is a property owner. Was captain of Company B, Honolulu Rifles, disbanded in August, 1890. That on the 14th day of January began to recruit ex-members of Company B and others to join in the movement for deposing Liliuokalani and forming a Provisional Government. Knew that other ex-captains of the Honolulu Rifles were doing the same. Compared notes with them and found nearly all of the old members very prompt in volunteering, and also many who were not formerly members. The roll of Company B on the evening of 16th January had the names of 45 volunteers; nearly all had arms and ammunition.

On that evening at a meeting of the committee of safety were organized as a battalion. Was appointed lieutenant-colonel. On the morning of the 17th January turned command of Company B over to Lieut. Potter. Orders were issued to assemble at the old armory promptly at 3 o'clock on afternoon of January 17. Matters were precipitated by the shot fired by Ordnance Officer Good on Fort street about 2:20 o'clock. Was at the armory immediately after, and at the request of the members of the new Government sent men as fast as they arrived in squads to the Government building, the first sent being Capt. Zeigler with about 36 men. Had not been told nor did not believe the United States marines would take part one way or another. This being the fourth time during his residence in Honolulu that he has taken up arms in defense of good government in the Hawaiian Islands.

J.H. Fisher.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2d day of January, A. D. 1894.

[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

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AFFIDAVIT OF F. J. LOWREY.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

F.J. Lowrey, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen; that he is married, and a householder in Honolulu, and has large business interests in the Hawaiian Islands; that he was present in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17, 1893; that on Monday, the 16th, there was a general dread of incendiarism, and precautions were taken by himself and others for the protection of property; the feeling was so high that it was liable to break out into lawlessness and violence at any moment; that when he heard of the landing of the United States forces it was a great relief.

F.J. Lowrey.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A.D. 1893.

[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF C. B. RIPLEY.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

C.B. Ripley, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen, has a family, and is a householder in Honolulu; that he was present in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17, 1893; that in his opinion the landing of the United States forces was fully justified by the critical condition of affairs at that time, and unquestionably prevented riotous acts which would probably have resulted in loss of life and property.

C.B. Ripley.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF E. F. BISHOP.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolula, Oahu, ss:

E.F. Bishop, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he was born in the United States and has resided in Honolulu over ten years; that he is secretary of C. Brewer and Company, an Hawaiian corporation; that he is married and a householder in Honolulu; that he took no part in the revolution of January 17, 1893, and has since remained passive politically; that on the evening of Monday, January 16, he heard that the United States forces had landed at about 5 o'clock; he did not understand that they had landed for the purpose of taking any hand in the revolution, but for the purpose of protecting American life and property; that he believed that the landing of the forces for that purpose was justifiable, as there was a great deal of allayed excitement in Honolulu at the time: that during the same evening, at about 8 p. m., he was present with his father-in-law, J. S. Walker, when that gentleman received a note from J. L. Stevens, the American

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minister, asking for the use of Arion Hall as a shelter for the troops; that Mr. Walker immediately wrote a note informing the minister that the hall was leased to Mr. G. J. Waller, and dispatched this answer by the bearer who brought the minister's note.

E.F. Bishop.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th dav of December, A.D. 1893.

[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF J. B. ATHERTON.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

J.B. Atherton, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen; that he has resided in Honolulu for many years, has a family, a home, and large business interests; that on Monday, January 16, as an American citizen he went to see Mr. Stevens, the American minister, at about 2 p. m., to suggest the landing of the Boston's forces for the protection of American life and property; was told by the minister that it was his intention to land the forces, and was promised a guard for his home and property if he wished; that this affiant was very apprehensive and did not know what might happen; that he was present and witnessed the riot in 1874 at the time of the election of Kalakaua, and knew what such a thing meant as soon as the natives should be aroused and incendiarism suggested to them; that in his opinion there was more reason for the landing of the troops in January, 1893, than in 1874.

J.B. Atherton,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, 1893.

[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF W. L. WILCOX.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

W.L. Wilcox, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he was born in the Hawaiian Islands, and has resided here during his whole life; that he has acted as interpreter during very many sessions of the Legislature and is permanently employed as Hawaiian interpreter for the courts; that he is perfectly familiar with the native language, and during the three days from January 14 to January 17 circulated among the Hawaiian people in Honolulu; that particularly on the Monday before the landing of the troops threats were made by the natives that they would destroy property in Honolulu by burning; these threats he repeated to members of the committee of safety and others.

W.D. Wilcox

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. CARTER.

ONE INCIDENT IN THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION.

At the meeting of citizens on Saturday, January 14, in response to the call of the Queen's cabinet for help, the anxiety of persons near

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me and their requests for expression of their sentiments led me to ask Mr. Colburn, minister of the interior, at the close of his speech, what assurance there was that the constituted police and military forces would not make an attack? Whether the Queen's adherents would be removed from command of them? To this Mr. Colburn replied that as a cabinet minister he ought not to be asked to answer such a question in public, but that he could give assurances that a satisfactory settlement was even then being made. He then withdrew and called me to him—he was with Judge Hartwell—and to the best of my recollection one of them said in substance that the matter of which I had spoken was all right. A request to Mr. Stevens to land his forces had been prepared and was in Hartwell's hands to be delivered; that Mr. Stevens had consented to this for the purpose of defending the cabinet and the constitution against any possible aggression by the Queen. Later, Mr. Hartwell told me the paper had gone off for Mr. Peterson's signature and asked me to get it. I tried but failed to find Peterson.

I have since been told that Mr. Peterson still has the paper, and that for palpable reasons it was never shown to Mr. Blount.

The next morning the cabinet evaded all this and adhered to the Queen, and Mr. Stevens stated that he could not assist a counter revolution by the committee of safety.

The foregoing ought to explain the half truth upon which the old cabinet bases its charges against the American minister.

Charles L. Carter
Honolulu, January 2, 1893.


STATEMENT OF L. A. THURSTON, HAWAIIAN MINISTER, PUBLISHED NOVEMBER 21, 1893.

Washington, November 21.

"I am urged to make a statement for publication, setting forth the position and claims of the Hawaiian Government and making reply to charges contained in Mr. Blount's report.

"As I have received no official information that Mr. Blount has made a report, have not seen a copy of it, and do not know what it contains, except from reading newspaper abstractions therefrom, and am unaware of the present contentions of the U. S. Government concerning Hawaii, I am unable, at present, in the absence of such knowledge, to intelligently state what the position and claims of the Hawaiian Government are. It would, moreover, be contrary to diplomatic courtesy for me to publish a statement on such subject prior to informing the U. S. Government of the same.

"A large portion of the published extracts from Mr. Blount's report consists, however, of personal attacks upon me and those associated with me in the Provisional Government, impugning our veracity, good faith, and courage, and charging us with fraud and duplicity. I deem it proper, therefore, to make a personal reply to such charges, confining myself to statements of fact, of which, as a principal actor, I am prepared to testify to before any impartial tribunal.

"First, before stating such facts, I desire to call attention to Mr. Blount's method of constructing his report. Although he, in several places, states that I was the leader of the revolutionary movement, he has never asked me a question concerning the same, nor given me opportunity to make any statement, although I have at all times been

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ready and willing to do so. The same is true of a large number of other men who took a leading part in the movement of January last.

"In the second place his evidence consists exclusively of prepared affidavits or of answers to leading questions put by himself, at private interviews, no one else being present but the stenographer. In no instance has there been any cross-examination of witnesses or opportunity given to contradict or explain evidence given or present other evidence.

"A brief examination of the published portions of the report shows numerous incorrect statements. I shall endeavor for the present, however, to answer the more salient points only.

"First, Mr. Blount charges that the American troops were landed under a prearranged agreement with the committee of safety that they should so land and assist in the overthrow of the Queen. In reply thereto, I hereby state that at no time did Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse assure me or the committee of safety, or any subcommittee thereof, that the United States troops would assist in overthrowing the Queen or establishing the Provisional Government; and, as a matter of fact, they did not so assist. I can produce witnesses in support of this statement, of the highest responsibility, in overwhelming number, but Mr. Blount has rendered it unnecessary to do so. The statements of Mr. Wundenburg and Mr. Damon have been put forward as the strongest evidence in support of Mr. Blount's contention. In Mr. Wundenburg's statement he says that when the committee of safety told Mr. Stevens they were not ready to act, he replied: 'Gentlemen, the troops of the Boston will land at 5 o'clock whether you are ready or not.' The reason of this reply and the subsequent landing of the troops is manifest. The troops were landed to protect American citizens and property in the event of the impending and inevitable conflict between the Queen and the citizens, and not to cooperate with the committee in carrying out its plans. In fact, the troops did not cooperate with the committee, and the committee had no more knowledge than did the Queen's Government where the troops were going nor what they were going to do. The whole gist of Mr. Damon's long examination is likewise contained in his statement that when, after the organization and proclamation of the new Government, the request was made for the support of the United States troops it was refused, Commander Swinburne, the commanding officer, sending back word, 'Capt. Wiltse's orders are, "Remain passive.'"

"Second, Mr. Blount charges that the Queen had ample military force with which to have met the committee, and but for the support of the United States representatives and troops the establishment of the Provisional Government would have been impossible. In reply thereto I hereby state that, although the presence of the American troops had a quieting effect on the rough characters in the city and may have prevented some bloodshed, they were not essential to and did not assist in the overthrow of the Queen. The result of the movement would have been eventually the same if there had not been a marine within a thousand miles of Honolulu.

"In support of this statement I cite the following facts:

"1. The troops did not land till Monday night, the 16th of January, after the revolution had been in full progress since the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, during which time the committee of safety was openly organizing for the avowed purpose of overthrowing the Queen.

"2. There was absolutely no attempt at concealment from the Government of the objects and intentions of the committee.

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"3 . The Queen, her cabinet, and their supporters were utterly demoralized, suspicious of one another, and devoid of leadership.

"4. The committee of safety and their supporters were united; had ample force to execute their purpose; knew precisely what they wanted, and proceeded with intelligent deliberation, thoroughness, and confidence to do it.

"There is no conflict concerning the facts of the first proposition. It is admitted by all that the Queen began the revolution at noon on Saturday, the 14th, by attempting to promulgate a constitution; that such attempt was immediately followed by preparation on the part of the citizens for armed resistance, and that the United States troops landed at 5 o'clock Monday, the 16th.

"In support of the second proposition, that there was no concealment from the Government of the intentions of the committee, I submit the following:

"1. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, in reply to the request of the Queen's cabinet for advice as to what they had better do, the Queen then still insisting upon the proclamation of the constitution and supporting it by force, I advised them to declare the Queen in revolution and the throne vacant, and at their request and at the expressed approval of two of them and the tacit assent of the other two, then and there drew up a form of proclamation to that effect.

"2. At half past 4 in the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, at a meeting of about 200 citizens at the office of W. O. Smith, the Queen was denounced in the strongest terms, armed resistance and a counter revolution were openly advocated, and the Queen's minister of the interior, John Colburn, addressed the meeting, asking their armed support against the Queen. The Queen's attorney-general, Mr. Peterson, and her attorney, Paul Neuman, were both present taking part in the meeting. The committee of safety was publicly then and there named and proceeded forthwith to organize.

"3. At 6 o'clock on Sunday morning, the 15th, I told Mr. Peterson and Mr. Colburn, two members of the Queen's cabinet, that the committee intended to depose the Queen and establish a provisional government; that if they would take charge of the movement, well and good, otherwise the committee intended to take action on its own account. They ask for twenty-four hours in which to consider the matter. I declined to wait, stating to them that the committee intended to proceed forthwith.

"4. The committee met openly that morning at 10 o'clock, with the full knowledge of the Government of the place of its meeting. It remained in session during the greater part of the day, while several police kept watch of the building from the street.

"5. On Monday morning at 9 o'clock the committee, without attempt at concealment, met in my office, within 200 feet of the police station, Marshal Wilson's headquarters, where the entire police force was stationed. While the meeting was in progress Wilson came to the office and asked to speak to me privately, and we went into an adjoining room. Our conversation was, in substance, as follows:

"Wilson said: 'I want this meeting stopped,' referring to the mass meeting for that afternoon.

"I replied: 'It can't be stopped. It is too late.'

"He said: 'Can't this thing be fixed up in some way?'

"I replied: 'No, it can not. It has gone too far.'

"He said: 'The Queen has abandoned her new constitution idea.'

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"I replied: ' How do we know that she will not take it ap again as she said she would?'

"He said, 'I will guarantee that she will not, even if I have to lock her up in a room to keep her from doing it; and I'll do it, too, if necessary.'

"I replied : ' We are not willing to accept that guarantee as sufficient. This thing has gone on from bad to worse until we are not going to stand it any longer. We are going to take no chances in the matter, but settle it now, once and for all.'

"Wilson then left the office. He has since stated that he immediately reported to the cabinet and advised arresting the committee, but the cabinet was afraid and refused to allow it.

"6. At 2 o'clock on the afternoon of Monday, the 16th, a mass meeting of 3,000 unarmed men was held within a block of the palace. The meeting was addressed by a number of speakers, all denouncing the Queen. The meeting, with tremendous cheering and enthusiasm, unanimously adopted resolutions declaring the Queen to be in revolution, and authorizing the committee to proceed to do whatever was necessary. The police were present, but no attempt was made to interfere with the meeting or make any arrests. The meeting adjourned amid the most intense excitement, and the citizens dispersed throughout the town awaiting the further call of the committee. While this meeting had been in progress another was being held by the royalists in the streets, within a block of the armory, which adopted resolutions in support of the Queen.

"Never in the history of Hawaii has there been such a tense condition of mind or a more imminent expectation of bloodshed and conflict than there was immediately after the adjournment of these two radically opposed meetings. Mr. Blount's statement that the community was at peace and quiet is grossly inaccurate. It was at this juncture, two hours after the adjournment of the above meetings, that Capt. Wiltse and Mr. Stevens, acting upon their own responsibility and discretion, and irrespective of the request or actions of the committee, landed the troops, which were distributed in three parts of the city, instead of being massed at one point, as stated by Mr. Blount. The reason that the Queen's Government took no action against the committee, or its supporters, was that they were overwhelmed by the unanimous display of indignation and determination shown by the citizens, and were cowed into submission in the same manner that the King and his supporters were cowed under precisely similar circumstances by the same citizens in June, 1887.

"In support of the third proposition, that the Queen and her supporters were demoralized and devoid of leadership I submit the following:

"1. During the few weeks prior to the revolution Mr. Colburn, minister of the interior at the time of the revolution, had been one of the leaders of the political party opposed to myself, and he was bitterly hostile to me personally. My first intimation of the revolutionary intention of the Queen was at 10 o'clock on the morning of Saturday, the 14th, when Mr. Colburn came to me greatly excited. He told me of the Queen's intention to promulgate a new constitution, and asked my advice. I said to him: 'Why do you not go to the members of your own party?' He replied: 'I have no party. Those who have been our supporters are supporting the Queen. The down-town people [referring to the merchants] have got no use for me, and, unless the members of your party and other citizens will support us, we are going to resign right away.'

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"2. At 1 o'clock the same day I met all the members of the cabinet at the attorney-general's office. They had just come from an interview with the Queen, at which she had announced her intention of promulgating a constitution and demanded their support. They stated that she had threatened them with mob violence, whereupon they had immediately left the palace, each one going out by a separate entrance. While we were talking a messenger came from the Queen requesting them to immediately return to the palace. Peterson and Colburn positively refused to do so, stating that they did not consider their lives would be safe there. I shortly after left them and started down town. After I had gone about two blocks I was overtaken by a messenger from the cabinet asking me to return, which I did. They asked me to ascertain what support they could expect from citizens, and formally authorized me to state the condition of affairs to leading citizens and in their behalf to call for armed volunteers to resist the Queen. I immediately proceeded to comply with their request, and, with the assistance of others, within an hour or two thereafter about 80 leading citizens had signed a written agreement agreeing to support the cabinet against the Queen by force.

"3. Later the same afternoon Mr. Colburn informed me that they had finally gone to the palace and held a stormy interview with the Queen lasting for over two hours. He told me he had no confidence in his colleague, Mr. Peterson, who he believed was playing double with him, and told me to beware of telling Peterson anything further. As a reason for his distrust he said that he knew nothing of the intention to promulgate a constitution, but that, while they were discussing the matter with the Queen, she said, in reply to an objection made by Peterson: 'Why did you not make this objection before? You have had this constitution in your possession for a mouth and raised no objection to it.' Colburn said also that in reply to an objection made by Mr. Parker, minister of foreign affairs, she said: ' Why did you not tell me this last night when we were talking over the subject?' Colburn further stated to me that at a caucus of their party on the previous Friday night one of the members of the Legislature, Kaluna by name, had said that if he could establish the new constitution he would die happy if he could kill some other man before dying.

"4. The Queen was furiously angry at the refusal of the cabinet to join her in promulgating the constitution, and publicly denounced them therefor.

"5. When the Queen made announcement of her failure to promulgate the constitution, two of the leading royalist members of the Legislature, one in the throne room in the palace and one upon the steps of the building, addressed the assembled crowd, denounced the cabinet as traitors, and said that they wanted to shed blood. One of the committee included the Queen in his denunciations.

"6. During the entire time between noon of Saturday, the 14th, and the afternoon of Tuesday, the 17th, when the Provisional Government was proclaimed, the Queen's cabinet was without plan of action, and did practically nothing but rush about the city consulting with various foreign representatives or citizens of all parties as to what they had better do, begging the American minister for the support of the American troops against the committee of safety, and securing from the Queen a declaration that she would not again attempt to abrogate the constitution, which they hurried into print and distributed broadcast to try and appease the indignation of citizens and break up the proposed mass meeting.

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"In support of the fourth proposition that the committee and their supporters were united, had ample force to execute their purpose, and proceeded with deliberation and confidence to do so, I submit the following:

"An essential factor in judging whether the force of the committee was sufficient, and their confidence in themselves well founded, is to know what the same men under similar conditions have done upon previous occasions. Fortunately, there is no dispute as to the facts concerning two recent incidents in Hawaiian history in which the same parties who were brought into conflict in January, 1893, were arrayed against each other under similar circumstances:

"1 . In 1887 the King, by a manipulation of the electorate and the legislature, had encroached upon popular rights and obtained autocratic power over the people. In this course he was supported by practically the same persons who in January last, and now, constitute the Royalist party in Hawaii. The open bribery, corruption, and debauchery of the King and his supporters crystallized the opposition thereto into an organization of practically the same men who organized and now constitute the Provisional Government. Such organization was formed with the openly avowed intention of wresting from the King his autocratic powers or dethroning him. In preparation for the expected movement the King fortified the palace, loopholed its basement for sharpshooters, erected sandbag breastworks at the entrance of tbe building, mounted cannon and Gatling guns at all the approaches thereto, largely increased his regular military force, and defied the organization and public opinion.

The leaders of the revolutionary movement proceeded deliberately to collect such arms as were available and organized their plans. An executive committee of thirteen was appointed, who took entire control of the movement and called a mass meeting in the same building used for that purpose in January last. The King attempted to head off the meeting by sending a letter to it promising certain reforms. The letter had no effect. Resolutions were adopted denouncing the King and demanding the granting of a new constitution depriving the King of all personal power. The resolutions were forthwith presented to the King by the committee, who, unarmed and alone, proceeded direct from the meeting to the fortified palace with the ultimatum that he comply with the demands within twenty-four hours or take the consequences.

"The King was then in absolute control of the regular troops, the especial troops enlisted for the occasion, 4 companies of native militia, the police, all the artillery and Gatling guns, the government buildings, the palace, the barracks, and the station house, with full knowledge of, and weeks of preparation for, the action taken by the citizens. His military strength was greater and his control of the public buildings more complete than was that of the Queen in January last. He did not fire a shot; submitted to all demands; disbanded his troops and turned the whole control of the Government over to the revolutionary party, which, in consideration of his abject submission allowed him to continue on the throne in a figurehead capacity.

"2. In 1889, while the same men who now constitute the Provisional Government were in control of the King's Government, a conspiracy was organized among the royalist supporters by the King and Liliuokalani for the overthrow of the cabinet and the restoration of the old royal power and constitution. The conspirators took the cabinet by surprise, and on the night of July 29 took possession of the Government

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----61

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buildings and palace, and securing possession of all the artillery fortified the palace. The regular troops, by order of the King, refused to assist the cabinet, who called upon the white militia and white citizens for assistance. The call was promptly responded to. The revolutionists were protected by an 8-foot stone wall around the palace, and used artillery as well as rifles, while the cabinet supporters were armed with rilies alone. The fighting opened at 9 o'clock in the morning with less than 30 cabinet supporters in position in front of the palace, which number was later increased to about 500. The royalist revolutionists opened with a furious fire of both artillery and small arms. Within half an hour they were driven from their guns. Seven were killed and 12 wounded, and before dark all of them were dispersed or captured, while not one of the Cabinet supporters was injured.

"Such is the undisputed record of events upon two occasions when the royalists and the organizers of the Provisional Government have come into armed conflict when there has been no suggestion of support to either side by any outside power. Under these circumstances I submit that the burden of proof is upon those who claim that the leaders of the Provisional Government are cowards, or that they are incompetent to organize or successfully carry out a revolution against the royalists in Hawaii.

"It is unnecessary for me here to restate the details of the bitter constitutional conflict which had been carried on between the Queen and the Legislature during the seven months prior to January last, or to speak of the intense indignation existing among all classes of citizens by reason of the open and successful alliance of the Queen with the opium and lottery rings. The political liberties of the people had been trampled upon, and their moral sense shocked. It simply needed the added provocation of the arbitrary attempt to abrogate the constitution and disfranchise every white man in the country, to spontaneously crystallize opposition into a force that was irresistible.

"In reply to the sneer that the persons taking part in the movement were 'aliens,' I would say that every man of them was, by the laws of the country, a legal voter, whose right to the franchise was, by the proposed constitution, to be abrogated; a large proportion of them were born in the country, and almost without exception those who were not born there had lived there for years, owned property there, and had made it their home. They were the men who had built up the country commercially, agriculturally, financially, and politically, and created and made possible a civilized government therein. They were and are such men as to-day are the leading citizens of the most progressive communities of the United States, with interests as thoroughly identified with the interests of Hawaii as are the interests of native and foreign born citizens in similar communities in this country identified with it?"

Adjourned until Monday, the 22d instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.

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Washington, D.C., Monday, January 22, 1894.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan), and Senators Gray, Butler and Frye, and Senators Daniel and Davis, of the full committee.

SWORN STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCANDLESS—Continued.

The Chairman. What connection had you with political movements in Hawaii, and when did you first become associated with any political movement in Hawaii?

Mr. McCandless. My first connection was in 1887. During the winter of 1886 and 1887 there was organized, under the laws of the Kingdom, an organization called the Honolulu Rifles, and it suddenly became very popular with all the foreigners and whites of the islands. I joined that military organization, and continued to be a member of it until 1888, when I made a visit to the States.

The Chairman. Did you hold any office in that organization?

Mr. McCandless. I was nothing but a private. I was one of a committee of thirteen of the political organization.

The Chairman. At that time?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. What was the nature of that organization ?

Mr. McCandless. That was an organization to compel the King to grant a new constitution, or it was organized with the intention of forming a republic, making a republic—that is, deposing the King, making a republic with a view of annexing the islands to the United States.

The Chairman. Then why was not that purpose persisted in, or was it abandoned?

Mr. McCandless. It was persisted in that a great many people thought we should give the King one last show to redress the wrongs that he had committed, and take a great many of the prerogatives away from him, and perhaps he would do better. That spirit prevailed to such an extent that a mass meeting was called and strong resolutions were drawn up. They were made so strong that they did not think that any man of self-respect could accede to the demands of the resolutions, and so soon as he should refuse they would start the revolution.

The Chairman. How was that mass meeting as to numbers?

Mr. McCandless. The mass meeting of 1887 was a mass meeting of 1,200 people.

The Chairman. Of what class of people was that mass meeting composed?

Mr. McCandless. Of most of the white people of the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator Gray. Where did you go from to Hawaii?

Mr. McCandless. West Virginia.

Senator Gray. Where were you born?

Mr. McCandless. In Pennsylvania. My father moved from Pennsylvania when I was a boy. I went to California and stayed there a year and a half, and went to the Hawaiian Islands in 1881.

The Chairman. Your business out there was sinking artesian wells?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Did the King make concessions that reconciled this

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mass meeting or combination of citizens to his longer remaining on the throne?

Mr. McCandless. There was a committee of thirteen appointed at the mass meeting to wait on the King and present the resolutions to him, and he was given 24 hours to accede to the demands or take the consequences.

Senator Frye. And you were a member of that committee?

Mr. McCandless. No; I was of the executive committee. This was a committee appointed for the purpose of carrying the resolutions to the King.

The Chairman. Did the King accede to the demands?

Mr. McCandless. He did.

Senator Gray. Did he grant a new constitution?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; he proclaimed the new constitution which we wrote out. I can tell the details of that.

Senator Frye. That was the constitution of 1887?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

Senator Gray. Did the King proclaim that by his own authority?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Did his cabinet join him in signing it?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Do you know whether the legislative assembly took any action in regard to that constitution?

Mr. McCandless. It was taken in this way—recognized as the law of the land, and that question was never raised.

The Chairman. The general grievances of which you have been speaking, I suppose, consisted of the King's connection with the opium bill?

Mr. McCandless. That was one.

The Chairman. What else?

Mr. McCandless. It got to that point that the Government did not exist for anything but to tax the people and give them no return for it. Money was squandered in different directions—it was squandered in an embassy to Russia to assist at the coronation of the Czar. Then there was a man-of-war bought by Kalakaua, in which there was a stealage of something like $10,000. This was common report in Honolulu.

The Chairman. That is the information upon which you were acting?

Mr. McCandless. Yes. Two of the ministers got $500 a month, but they actually only got $150 a month, and the remainder went to the King. The register of public documents, an office the same as our county recorders, whose office is carried on and supported by fees— in that office the King put a notorious man and entered into an agreement with him that he should have $150 a month and the balance of the fees to go to the King.

The Chairman. This is a general description of the nature of the abuses of which the people were complaining?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. How long was it after that reconciliation or restoration of confidence in Kalakaua that you remained in Honolula or in the islands?

Mr. McCandless. Of course, the revolution was the 30th day of June, 1887, and I remained there until the middle of July, 1888.

The Chairman. Where did you go then?

Mr. McCandless. I went over to the State of Washington and

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stayed there about a year. But my interests were the same in the islands.

The Chairman. And you returned to the islands?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. And remained there until when?

Mr. McCandless. The 1st day of June, last year.

The Chairman. Where was your place of residence on the islands?

Mr. McCandless. Honolulu.

The Chairman. Were you carrying on this business of sinking wells duning all this time?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. That was your vocation in this country?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you have many men in your employ?

Mr. McCandless. The business varies there. At times I had 30 or 40 men.

The Chairman. Were these wells sunk on private account or Government account?

Mr. McCandless. Mostly on private account.

The Chairman. Did the Government have any interests in any of them?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; we have drilled wells for the Government.

The Chairman. Under contract?

Mr. McCandless. Under contract.

The Chairman. Between the period of the establishment of the constitution of 1887 and, I will say, within a year before this recent revolution, what was the state of the public mind, the public order, in Honolulu, I mean among the Hawaiian people?

Mr. McCandless. The state of the public mind from 1887 was that we had made a mistake, a serious one, that we had not carried out our intentions, because the King had no sooner proclaimed the new constitution than he began to reach out for his prerogatives, and it was a conflict from that day up to January, 1893, between the people and the sovereign.

The Chairman. During that period of time do you know of any movement to break down the constitution or of dethroning Liliuokalani or for the purpose of annexation to the United States?

Mr. McCandless. From that period up to the 14th of January of last year?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. McCandless. I do not; except the Ashford and Wilcox conspiracy.

The Chairman. If such an organization as that had existed in Hawaii would you necessarily have known it?

Mr. McCandless. I will state it this way: I was in the revolution of 1887, and was one of the executive committee. I was one of the committee of thirteen that made the constitution of 1887, and I was one of the committee of safety that was organized that afternoon from a large crowd, and I do not think anything of that kind could have been in existence in the Hawaiian Islands and I not know it.

The Chairman. So that your position was a prominent one in connection with this movement that you have been describing?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Now, at what time did you personally get the first information that Liliuokalani had discarded the constitution of 1887, or intended to do so?

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Mr. McCandless. So soon as she came on the throne, or so soon as the remains of Kalakua came back (of course that was the first information that we had of his death), rumors were circulated that she did not intend to, or would not, take the oath under the constitution of 1887. We had information that she hesitated, and that the chief justice urged her, and the friends urged her, to sign the constitution, and she did so with hesitancy. Then, probably in the fall of 1892, my brother came to me with the information that the Queen had a programme. This information came to him, I think, from Mr. Peterson, but I am not sure on that point—that is, her late attorney-general—that the programme was to give the opium to the Chinese, which would win the Chinese; to give the lottery to the gamblers, which would win the gamblers, and to grant a new constitution to the Hawaiiaus. All that was then left were the missionaries, who could go to Hades. That was the programme that was given to me in the fall of 1892. But we did not believe it. There were rumors of that kind constantly through the Legislature during the term of the Legislature of 1892. But anything aside from that—it came to me about half past 1 on Saturday afternoon, the 14th of January.

The Chairman. Do you recollect the month in which the Legislature met?

Mr. McCandless. On the 30th day of May.

The Chairman. And continued in session without interruption?

Mr. McCandless. Without interruption; yes.

The Chairman. Was that an exciting term of the Legislature?

Mr. McCandless. Very much.

The Chairman. And the public attention was brought to its proceedings?

Mr. McCandless. Constantly.

The Chairman. And it was during this session of the Legislature that you heard this rumor, that it was suggested that Liliuokalani intended to overthrow the constitution?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. And you stated the information to be that she had in fact attempted or intended to make the attempt to overthrow the constitution?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; on the 14th of January I was walking up Fort street and I met Mr. Hopper, a gentleman who has a large rice mill in the Hawaiian Islands and lives just adjoining the palace grounds. He said, "The Queen is up there attempting to promulgate a new constitution." I laughed at it, because she had won everything, and had appointed her own ministers and had control of everything for a year and a half.

The Chairman. And had passed the opium bill?

Mr. McCandless. Had passed the opium and lottery bills, and the ministry would do her bidding.

The Chairman. And you thought that was all she would do?

Mr. McCandless. I thought that was enough for her to do. He said, "You go into Spreckels' bank, and you will find out." I went into Mr. Spreckels' bank, to Mr. Spalding, and I said, "I understand that the Queen is giving us a new constitution." He said, "It is so; I have just come from there." I walked up to the corner of Fort and Merchant streets—that is probably the business center of Honolulu—and the people began to congregate immediately. In a little while the information began to come down from the palace, which was about three blocks from there, of how matters were progressing there. Finally

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the crowd grew to several hundred—of course this was all white people's business—and probably about 2 o'clock, or half past 2 o'clock, the information came down from the ministers to know what support they could get as against the Queen.

The Chairman. Who brought that information?

Mr. McCandless. I could not say; It was sent down by messenger.

The Chairman. Sent to whom?

Mr. McCandless. Just down town. They knew who the business men were and where they would be likely to be.

The Chairman. What did you say was the nature of the message which had been sent?

Mr. McCandless. To know what support the ministers could get from the white people as against the Queen. They went into the office----

The Chairman. Let me understand whether it was the common understanding of the crowd there that the ministers had made such a suggestion or such a request?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Then they went into the office?

Mr. McCandless. Went into the office of W. O. Smith. Someone took a piece of office paper, brown paper such as lawyers use, the size of a sheet of legal cap, and then wrote a heading in lead pencil stating that, "We hereby agree to stand by the ministers against the encroachments of the Queen"—something to that effect. It was only a line or two, and the people as they came in signed that.

The Chairman. About how many?

Mr. McCandless. There may not have been more than a hundred. That included most of the lawyers there. Paul Neumann----

The Chairman. Paul Neumann?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; and Mr. Cecil Brown, an Englishman, who was very much wrought up over the matter. There was scarcely anyone who entered the office, and whom I knew, but signed the paper.

The Chairman. DO you remember any person who refused to sign it?

Mr. McCandless. I do not.

The Chairman. Do you think there were as many as a hundred signatures to the paper?

Mr. McCandless. I should judge so.

The Chairman. What was done with that paper?

Mr. McCandless. I do not know.

The Chairman. Do you know who took charge of it?

Mr. McCandless. It was left on that desk. It was certainly there the next day. In fact, it was there Monday. Of course, the information kept coming down right along, and finally some of the ministers came down.

The Chairman. As I understand you, that was an enrollment of the citizens who were with these ministers in their antagonism to the Queen?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Well?

Mr. McCandless. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon two of the ministers came down.

The Chairman. What day?

Mr. McCandless. The same day, within an hour.

The Chairman. Do you mean Saturday or Monday?

Mr. McCandless. Saturday.

Senator Gray. Name the ministers.


Transcribed Morgan Report Part 3