Transcribed Morgan Report Part 2
Transcribed Morgan Report Part 1
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is the main street [indicating]. This [indicating] is a narrow street, not much frequented.
Senator Gray. What sort of fence is there?
Mr. Laird. A picket fence on this side and a picket fence on both sides. There was a roadway that came down there from the opera house, and the Japanese commissioner lived in this house [indicating], so that we did not encroach upon his territory at all.
Senator Gray. There was a picket fence here [indicating]?
Mr. Laird. Our province was a little beyond the building itself.
Senator Gray. And the lot in which you were stationed was inclosed by a picket fence?
Mr. Laird. A picket fence, probably 4 or 5 feet in height.
Senator Gray. There was no disturbance that afternoon, Tuesday, after the proclamation of the Provisional Government, and around in the neighborhood of where you were?
Mr. Laird. No.
Senator Gray. Around the Government building?
Mr. Laird. No.
Senator Gray. Were you in a place to have seen it if there had been?
Mr. Laird. After the drill was over I walked out in front, in the roadway, to see if there was any assemblage of people.
Senator Gray. Were you aware that the proclamation was being read?
Mr. Laird. No.
Senator Gray. You did not see any of it?
Mr. Laird. Did not see it and did not know it.
Senator Gray. Until you were told?
Mr. Laird. No.
Senator Gray. There was no disturbance there?
Mr. Laird. No.
Senator Frye. Was there any difficulty that night about finding quarters for your troops?
Mr. Laird. There must have been great difficulty, or the men would not have been kept out until half past 9.
Senator Frye. Were there men out seeking quarters?
Mr. Laird. Yes.
Senator Frye. And you did not get them until 9 o'clock?
Mr. Laird. It was later than that.
Senator Frye. Do you know whether Arion Hall was selected with any reference at all to the Queen's Government or Provisional Government?
Mr. Laird. I have no such knowledge. I do not think it was. It was accidental—it was available.
Senator Frye. And the only one, so far as you could find out, that was available? Was there anything in the location or disposition of the troops which prevented the Queen's troops from dislodging the men who took possession of the Government buildings?
Mr. Laird. No, I do not think there was.
Senator Frye. Under your orders, if the Queen's troops had undertaken to repossess themselves of the Government buildings, had you any right to interfere?
Mr. Laird. I would have been obliged to obey Mr. Swinburne's orders.
Senator Frye. I say, under the instructions?
Mr. Laird. Under the instructions, no.
Senator Frye. In Mr. Blount's report he states that the Queen's
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troops could not have done anything touching the Government buildings really without firing upon the American troops.
Senator Gray. Quoting Admiral Skerrett for that opinion.
Senator Frye. No; I do not think Admiral Skerrett gives that as his opinion.
Mr. Laird. I do not see how we could interfere in any way with the Queen's forces or Government forces.
Senator Frye. I do not, from the maps, if the maps are correct. Did you at any time while you were there learn the extent of the Queen's troops and the Queen's police?
Mr. Laird. No, I did not.
Senator Gray. Did you intend to allow any fighting over across the street from you?
Mr. Laird. I was under the immediate orders of Lieut. Swinburne at the time, and I would have been obliged to obey his instructions. I could not use my own judgment; he was the senior officer.
Senator Gray. How long did you stay on shore?
Mr. Laird. We were on shore from the 16th of January until the 1st of April.
Senator Gray. How far was Camp Boston from the landing place?
Mr. Laird. It was right in the heart of the city itself.
Adjourned until to-morrow, 11th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
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Washington, D. C., January 11, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, and Senator Dolph of the full committee.
Absent: Senators Sherman and Frye.
SWORN STATEMENT OF JAMES H. BLOUNT.
The Chairman. What time were you first informed of your selection by the President as the Commissioner to go to Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. The first intimation I had on the subject of my going to the Hawaiian Islands is contained in this dispatch, which I read:
- "Washington, D. C., March 10,1893.
- "Hon. James H. Blount,
- Macon, Ga.:
- "By authority I ask can you come here immediately prepared for confidential trip of great importance into Pacific Ocean? Answer."
The Chairman. Was that signed by Mr. Gresham?
Mr. Blount. No; by Hoke Smith.
The Chairman. You came in accordance with that request?
Mr. Blount. Yes. And if you will allow me I would say when I first got the telegram I made up my mind very promptly that I would not go; I did not want to go at all. My son opened the dispatch and found out what it was, and in that way was induced to bring it up to my house. I was at home. He asked me what I was going to do about it, and I said I was not going. I then showed it to his mother, and told her that I was not going. After some little while my son said, "Father, mother's health is very bad, and I think it would add five years to her life to go;" and under that appeal from him I said, "I will do anything for your mother's benefit; I will go." I then sent
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a telegram. I do not recollect its purport. I meant to give them to understand that I would come on to Washington.
The Chairman. When you came here you were informed of the place to which you were to be sent and the nature of your mission?
Mr. Blount. When I got here I went to see Mr. Hoke Smith, the Secretary of the Interior, and we went over to see the President, to pay my respects. I learned from Mr. Smith, not from the President, that the object in sending me over to the Hawaiian Islands was to make an investigation in regard to the revolution.
The Chairman. At that time did you have any prepossessions in regard to the condition of affairs in Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. You had formed no fixed opinions about it?
Mr. Blount. No. Two years ago, when I was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives, Mr. Thurston, with Mr. Mott Smith, came to the committee room and wanted to know if the Democratic party would consent to the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. I said to him, without telling him my reasons, "You had better see the Secretary of State about it."
The Chairman. Was that while John W. Foster was Secretary of State?
Mr. Blount. I do not know. I think he was not at that time.
The Chairman. Blaine then was Secretary of State?
Mr. Blount. Blaine. Did I say Foster?
The Chairman. No; I asked if Foster was Secretary of State.
Mr. Blount. He said to me, "I am a member of the Legislature and I mean to endeavor to bring about the annexation of the islands." Mr. Smith heard it. I said nothing at all; I had no authority at all from anybody on the subject, and I did not think I ought to be talking, especially to a gentleman who came in there talking about a movement of that sort. I thought he was a pretty uppish sort of person, and thought no more about it. Mr. Foster sometime in the month of February showed me a letter from Mr. Stevens, of November 20.
Senator Gray. November 20, 1892?
Mr. Blount. I think that was the date. I saw the newspaper accounts, and I was a little apprehensive; I thought there might be something wrong. But I had no idea about the condition of things at all
The Chairman. Has that letter been printed ?
Mr. Blount. Yes. The opinion that I reached was developed by events after I got there.
The Chairman. Got to Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. Yes. I was never more determined to be careful and hear the truth than I was on that occasion. The situation I was in was rather painful to me. I met those people on one side and the other with a great deal of freedom. It was important for me not to take any position one way or the other, because the most simple thing I might say would be likely to be construed as significant; so that I was left without anybody to consult, and it made my progress very slow. For some weeks in my house there was not fifteen minutes interval that there was not somebody there, from the time I got my breakfast until bed time at night—people of the several political parties; all were as cordial and as courteous as they could be.
Senator GRAY. On both sides of this question?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. YOU were visited by the native population of Hawaii? I call them the Kanakas.
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Mr. Blount. Yes. I was visited by all. I felt I was there to make an investigation, and I thought it was my duty to see the people.
The Chairman. Did they come there voluntarily to see you, or did you send out for them?
Mr. Blount. They came voluntarily. The truth of it is, it got to this point that I commenced to take testimony, and I was so much interrupted that I saw that it was necessary for me to fix a time for work and the time when I would see anybody. So that I refused to see anybody except the Government officials until after 2 o'clock each day.
The Chairman. We will get back to the starting point of this matter. When you saw the President did you have any conversation with him about the objects of your mission to Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. NO, not especially. He seemed to understand that I was there for the purpose of making the investigation.
The Chairman. My question referred to the President of the United States.
Mr. Blount. Repeat the question.
The question was read as follows:
"When you saw the President did you have any conversation with him about the objects of your mission to Hawaii?"
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. Did the President undertake to inform you of his opinions in regard to the situation in Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. Not in the slightest degree. And I never had at that time nor after I left any intimation as to what the President thought about it or felt. I was impressed with the belief that he wanted information.
The Chairman. Did he intimate or indicate in any way whether he was in favor of or opposed to the annexation of the islands?
Mr. Blount. Not in the slightest. On the contrary, he said to me— just a casual thing—"I understand from Mr. Springer that the Democrats in the House of Representatives are inclined to favor annexation." Seemed to be an inquiry. I said "I think Mr. Springer is in error about that; my impression is that the feeling in the House is that the members are not satisfactorily informed." He seemed, then, as though he had made a mistake, and said, "I ought not to have mentioned that," and he never said anything more. The impression made on my mind was that he was afraid he might give me some impression of his opinion or inclination.
The Chairman. Was that impression changed in any communication that you had with him at any time before you went to Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. Never.
The Chairman. From whom did you receive your instructions as to the mission you were to perform?
Mr. Blount. From the Secretary of State.
The Chairman. Were the instructions in writing?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. Are they set forth in your report?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you receive from the Secretary of State any instructions except those that are in writing?
Mr. Blount. I did not.
The Chairman. That, then, was the limit and the bound of your authority and course in Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. Yes. I might, perhaps, say that the Secretary of State expressed the opinion that there was no principle of international law
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that he thought justified the hoisting of the American flag—the establishment of an American protectorate there, and his idea was that it ought not to be continued.
Senator Dolph. That it ought not to be continued?
Mr. Blount. Ought not to be continued. But I understood from him that that was a matter largely in my discretion. There was no desire to make any change if it involved bloodshed. I took the impression generally that the opinion of the Secretary of State was that the flag had better be removed, if it was feasible to do it.
The Chairman. Did you receive, from the Secretary of State any orders or directions based upon his view of the merits or demerits of the revolution which was alleged to have taken place in Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. The opinions he expressed to you, as I understand, had reference to the matter of raising the flag and removing the protectorate over the islands?
Mr. Blount. Yes; that was the extent of it.
The Chairman. That your commission—did you have a regular commission?
Mr. Blount. I think that appears in the President's communication.
Senator Gray. Your letter of appointment?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Gray. It was not a regular commission, was it?
The Chairman. Was there anything beside that letter?
Mr. Blount. Let us see what paper was there?
Senator Gray. The paper will speak for itself.
The Chairman. I did not know that it had gotten in the report.
Senator Gray. It will speak for itself, if there be nothing beside that.
Mr. Blount (referring to his report). This recites that on the 11th of March, 1893, I was appointed special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands with instructions. These are the papers, and I guess you have the instructions in there.
The Chairman. Had you any commission independently of this?
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. Did you take any oath of office?
Mr. Blount. I do not think I did—not as commissioner; I took the oath of office as minister.
The Chairman. That was later?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. I will come to that after awhile. Now, at the time you left here the Senate was in session, what we call executive session, rather at the time you got your appointment?
Senator Gray. We know that. It was in session from the 4th of March or 5th of March, was it not?
The Chairman. Yes. Now, state whether it was your purpose to confine yourself in your operations in Hawaii in the execution of this commission of the President to the instructions you received, having reference, of course, to the discretion which was confided to you in respect to those orders.
Mr. Blount. It was not only my purpose, but I did it as rigidly as I ever did anything in my life.
The Chairman. Was your judgment, which you have given, your opinion here in your report in regard to the situation of affairs in Hawaii, and the regularities or irregularities that attended the conduct of the minister of the United States in connection with that revolution in any wise influenced by your desire either to promote or to prevent or retard the annexation of Hawaii to the United States?
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Mr. Blount. I would hate to think so. I had the idea that I was to conduct myself in decency and pursue the inquiry with fidelity.
The Chairman. The question is asked you to enable you to give an affirmative answer.
Mr. Blount. Well, I will say no. What is the question?
The question was read as follows:
"Was your judgment which you have given, your opinion—your report in regard to the situation of affairs in Hawaii and the regularities or irregularities that had attended the conduct of the minister of the United States in connection with that revolution—in any wise influenced by your desire either to promote or to prevent or retard the annexation of Hawaii to the United States?"
Mr. Blount. I am not conscious of any such feeling. On the contrary, I was impressed when I came to the investigation with the conviction that I had very much at stake. I had confidence in the integrity and high purposes of the President, and felt that I could give him no higher offense than to misinform him. I felt that any other than a truthful, an exhaustive, and impartial examination would bring about the contempt of the American people. I was, therefore, timid— over cautious, perhaps, in all my conduct in reference to it. I kept from their social life. I did not intimate any opinion to these people one way or the other. When I left those islands nobody had any idea, so far as I could gather, what my report was. Each side claimed in the newspaper that I was in favor of it. I studiously avoided communicating anything to anybody, and I turned the facts over and over again in my mind. I felt that I was alone, without anybody on earth to consult with, counsel with, and I often felt the need of somebody to advise with. But there was no impartial person to whom I could talk at all, and so the responsibility I felt the greater, and went on in that groove to the end.
Senator Gray. Was party feeling running high there?
Mr. Blount. Very high, very high.
The Chairman. You seem to have taken some of the testimony submitted to you upon oath, and other parts are without being sworn to. Did you administer the oaths to these witnesses yourself or did you have it done by the authorities of the islands?
Mr. Blount. I had no authority to administer an oath. It was a very delicate thing for an American to call upon those people to take an oath, especially members of the Provisional Government, and wherever I had the time I would take the testimony down in shorthand, and had the stenographer write out the shorthand and the witness certify to its correctness. I used him, the stenographer, all I could in that way. The communications would come in; some of them I did not think much of, and some I did. There was no opportunity to cross-examine.
Senator Gray. Any written statements?
Mr. Blount. Written statements, yes. I did not like very much to take them. It occurred to me, I am down here, I can take these things and weigh them; I shall know all about the parties and topics and if they are not pertinent I can discard them; and when I came to make up my report I said, all these things have been here with me; I will put them in this testimony and let all go along. The statements were sometimes from one side and sometimes from another.
The Chairman. Not being authorized to administer an oath yon received such statements as they brought to you?
Mr. Blount. They would hand them to me, and I would take them and look at them.
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Now, Mr. Chairman, there is one statement that this observation does not apply to, and as you have invited my attention to the matter I think it proper to say this. You will find a statement there in the form of a colloquy between W. O. Smith and Mr. Cooper and Mr. Cassell. The circumstances about that I wish to state. On one occasion I said to the President and members of his cabinet, "I would be very glad to have the statement of you gentlemen at any time if it is agreeable to you."
The Chairman. You are referring now to President Dole and his cabinet?
Mr. Blount. Yes. "I can conceive of reasons why you might not desire to do it." I did not state what they were, and they made no response and gave no indication of a desire to be examined. The attorney-general---
The Chairman. Who was he?
Mr. Blount. W. O. Smith. He came one day, as he did often, to the house where I stopped, and I said to him, "I would like to examine you." He agreed to it.
Senator Gray. He agreed to it.
Mr. Blount. He agreed to it. The time came for him to be examined and he said, "I would rather not be examined. I will bring you a paper, which is the history of the revolution, prepared by myself and some other gentlemen, and I will hand that to you." He brought this paper. He said it contained most of the history of the revolution, some unimportant matters only were omitted. I said, "Would you object to my seeing those?"
Senator Gray. Seeing what?
Mr. Blount. The unimportant matters. It was something left out. He hesitated and said, "Well, I will speak to Mr. Dole about it." I afterwards mentioned it to him again, and he answered he had not. I think that was about it. I did not pursue the matter further. You can readily understand my relations to the Provisional Government; they were of very great delicacy. Mr. Cooper, another gentleman in this colloquy, I invited to be examined. He came at a time when somebody else was being examined. I was a good deal crowded by lack of clerical force, and said to Judge Cooper, "Won't you sit down and write me out carefully a statement of the facts of this revolution?" He said, "Yes." Well, he apologized for not doing it once or twice on account of his court. But this paper never came. He never alluded to the matter again.
The Chairman. Did he not bring the paper to you or send it to you?
Mr. Blount. Mr. Smith brought a paper.
The Chairman. After that Judge Cooper never made any statement to you?
Mr. Blount. Never made any statement.
The Chairman. I want to ask you whether opportunity was accorded by you to all the members of that Provisional Government to make their statements of the history of the transaction?
Mr. Blount. As I have already stated on my own motion, I said to the President and cabinet together, I would be very glad to examine you gentlemen.
The Chairman. And what you have put in your report is all you have received in reply to that suggestion?
Mr. Blount. Everything in the world.
Senator Butler. I see in some criticisms of the testimony which you have taken, quite severe attacks upon the character of some of the witnesses. Did you adopt the usual method of ascertaining the quality
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of the testimony, if I may use that expression, examine such witnesses as were available?
Mr. Blount. Before I examined any witnesses I received everybody, heard what everybody said, and saw a good deal of the people, and judged as best I might as to the character of the witnesses. You can readily see that with this statement I could not pursue the methods that I would pursue here. If I were to go into the matter of the examination of the witness, say of the royalist side, and his statement was made known to the public immediately, you would find an outcry perhaps in the press about treasonable purposes, about opposing the Government, etc. There was an intense amount of feeling, and therefore I could not, on the ground of these attacks, do as suggested. If they had not been made in the press, I knew these feelings existed. Whom could I call on to say would you believe this man on his oath? I never allowed, so far as I could govern it, any one to know whom I had examined. I never allowed an annexationist to know I had examined a royalist, and never allowed a royalist to know I had examined an annexationist. The secrecy of my examination was the only way in which I could make a full investigation.
Senator Butler. In other words, you availed yourself of the best testimony you could get under the circumstances?
Mr. Blount. I did.
The Chairman. The communications that were made to you, I understand from your statements, you kept entirely secret?
Mr. Blount. Nobody saw them until they were seen in this country, in this Capitol, besides myself and my stenographer.
The Chairman. I will ask you, in the disturbed state of affairs in Hawaii, whether it would or would not have been impracticable to have obtained a full statement, frank statement, about the participation of these men in the revolution on the one side or the other, because of an apprehension in certain events they might be held responsible by whichever Government proved to be the permanent Government?
Mr. Blount. Possibly so. I am quite sure that that was true in reference to the people who were not in power, and I rather think the President and cabinet preferred not to be examined, because of the changes that might occur. But I could not say that I could give you tangible, substantial reasons for it. It was that I had in mind—I did not tell them so—when I said, "I should like to have your testimony; I can conceive of reasons why you might not want to testify."
Senator Gray. Your feelings and theirs both were ones of delicacy?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. And on the other hand there might be apprehension in the change of government of criminal prosecutions, because of the information they might give to you?
Mr. Blount. What their reason was I might conjecture, and it would not, perhaps, be the correct one.
The Chairman. I was asking you what your conjecture was—an opinion was—on that proposition, and whether that made it necessary, in your judgment, that you should observe this very conservative course.
Mr. Blount. That is what guided me in my approaches to the subject.
The Chairman. When you got to Hawaii, to whom did you report, to what Government?
Mr. Blount. To the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Did you exhibit your letter of authority to the Provisional Government?
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. Did you inform the Provisional Government of the
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nature and purposes and extent of the commission and powers which you had been entrusted with in visiting the islands?
Mr. Blount. I did not.
The Chairman. What information did you give to President Dole?
Senator Gray. They were confidential, were they not?
Mr. Blount. They were confidential. You will see what the President communicated to me in the papers.
The Chairman. You gave no information to that Government of your instructions?
Mr. Blount. No, not for some time.
The Chairman. After a while we will get at what you did. But what you did then was, I suppose, to deliver the letter of the President of the United States to the President of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Blount. Yes. Well, I got to meeting them in a casual way, and there would be references to the examination, but no discussion of it. My time was taken up in making examinations.
The Chairman. How far did you put the Provisional Government in possession of knowledge of your authority as commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Blount. I never gave them any information in reference to the matter—I mean direct, official communication—until I published the instructions that I was acting under.
The Chairman. When did you publish those instructions?
Mr. Blount: That appears in the correspondence with the State Department. I have not seen it for six months.
The Chairman. Did you publish them in the newspapers?
Mr. Blount. All the newspapers of Honolulu.
The Chairman. What was your object in making public those instructions?
Mr. Blount. All sorts of conjectures as to what my powers were and the purposes of the Administration through me. For instance, there would be a claim on the part of the royalists that I was going to restore the Queen at a certain time; and on the other hand there would be a declaration on the part of the annexationists after the troops were ordered back to the vessel, on the appearance of any disorder I would bring them back for the purpose of suppressing it. The impression was that I would not allow a move of any political party there looking to a change of the Government, and I felt it to be my duty to inform those people, both sides, that I was not there to take any part either with one party or the other with reference to their affairs; that I should protect American citizens in their lives and property while they were observing the laws of the land and not participating in the conflict.
The Chairman. In order to give confidence and assurance to the people of Hawaii in the midst of these conjectures that were being made, you thought it was best to publish your instructions?
Mr. Blount. I ought to say that I had corresponded with the Secretary of State about these misapprehensions, and he authorized me in my discretion to publish them, and I did it promptly.
The Chairman. In what way were you received by the Provisional Government, in a friendly or in a reluctant way?
Mr. Blount. As friendly as I could desire or anybody could desire.
The Chairman. Did the President of the Provisional Government indicate to you that you were welcome in Hawaii as the representative of the United States Government?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Did you report to or have any official correspondence
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with Liliuokalani or her cabinet, or the cabinet that existed at the time of her abdication?
Mr. Blount. I never had any communication with her in any way until certain persons appeared there and were reputed to be authorized by the President to negotiate for her abdication. I think that is all printed.
Senator Gray. What is it?
Mr. Blount. Certain persons there claiming to have authority from the President of the United States to negotiate for the Queen's abdication.
The Chairman. Who were those persons?
Mr. Blount. I think their names appear in the printed papers—Dr. Bowen, correspondent of the New York World, and a Mr. Sewell.
The Chairman. It turned out that they had no such authority?
Mr. Blount. Yes. I thought the President of the Provisional Government and the Queen herself both ought to be informed that this was not true. I sent to Mr. Dole. I asked him to come to my house, which he did. I told him the circumstances, and that these gentlemen had no such authority. He said, "Well, would you object to its being stated you think the Queen's abdication would simplify the situation?" I said I would. I feel that I am authorized in saying that the Government of the United States has nothing to do with this matter one way or the other, and I had nothing to say for or against the measure. I had no authority from the Government, and until I had, did not want the name of the United States Government connected with it.
Senator Gray. If it could be brought about by the intervention of those gentlemen, without the United States Government having anything to do with it, you would have nothing to say about it?
Mr. Blount. No. Some hours after I called on Mr. Dole and said I have never called on the Queen; never called because I was afraid it would be misapprehended, misconstrued; because it was not proper conduct considering my relations to your Government. But I feel now that I ought to go to see her and say to her in connection with this matter what I have said to you. He said he could not see any impropriety in it. I went and stayed two or three minutes, making the same representation that I did to President Dole.
Senator Gray. The Queen speaks English?
Mr. Blount. She speaks English; but she evidently was very wary. She did not know what to make of me or the Government, and said very little. I left her. I did ask a member of her cabinet to inquire of her if she would not be willing to furnish me a copy of the constitution she proposed to proclaim.
Senator Butler. The one which was supposed to have been promulgated?
The Chairman. Promulgated and destroyed?
Mr. Blount. The one she proposed to promulgate. The answer was made she would do so. It was not done for a long while. I do not know why, but finally the paper was brought to me by some person, I do not know whom now. I sent for the members of the cabinet.
The Chairman. The Queen's cabinet?
Mr. Blount. Her cabinet. To see if they recognized that paper, and they agreed to all except one proposition. It contained a property qualification on voters for the legislative body, not nobles, but representatives, and they disagreed with her as to that.
The Chairman. Said that was not part of the paper as they understood?
Mr. Blount. Yes. They did not think there was any property
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----48
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qualification; they thought it was educational. I put it in my report because this man Peterson is a pretty bright lawyer, and I thought they would be much more likely to recollect correctly than the Queen. I never talked with the Queen about it at all.
The Chairman. That is all the information you got about the terms of the constitution which the Queen had proposed?
Mr. Blount. Except later. Sometime afterward a gentleman came to me, I think a Mr. Carter or a Mr. McFarlane, with a paper, which you gentlemen have here, containing a statement of the Queen; I looked over it. My first impression was that I ought not to use it; that she was disclosing a great many secrets in her feelings toward her political allies calculated to create feeling between her and them. She was a woman. Then it occurred to me after thinking the matter over, "I have nothing to do with that; I am here representing the Government of the United States, and I will put that with the other evidence." Those are all the communications on the constitution.
The Chairman. Did that paper purport to emanate from the Queen?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes; there is no question about that.
The Chairman. You say there is no question about that?
Mr. Blount. I have no question about that.
Senator Gray. Was that sent in with your report?
Mr. Blount. Yes; I have put everything in the bundle and sent it.
Senator Gray. You sent everything?
Mr. Blount. I sent everything.
Senator Gray. It is a statement signed by the Queen, is it?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Gray. There is but one statement from her, a sort of history of the revolution?
The Chairman. It was her version of the affair?
Mr. Blount. Her version. I never spoke to her about it at all.
The Chairman. During your stay in Hawaii did you have any official communication with Liliuokalani or her cabinet as in any sense representing an existing government?
Mr. Blount. No; not the slightest, not the slightest.
The Chairman. What communication you had with them at all was for the purpose of obtaining information that you thought would be useful to the Government of the United States?
Mr. Blount. Yes. I took opinions from both sides of people who were connected with public affairs at the time. For instance, if you will allow me, there was Mr. Damon, the Vice-President, who went to the station house to negotiate for the surrender of the station house, and went to the Queen. I took him, Mr. Bolte, who went with him to the station house; Mr. Waterhouse, who was on the committee of safety, and at whose house the final determination of the dethronement of the Queen occurred. I mention those persons, and I attempted to get the testimony of Mr. Smith and the statement of Mr. Cooper, who read the proclamation establishing the new Government; I went in that direction, and I found from Mr. Damon's testimony and Mr. Bolte's that they had gone to the station house and found certain persons connected with the Queen's Government, and I naturally took members of the cabinet, and so it led along as circumstances were.
The Chairman. As the question opened up to your mind you proceeded to investigate things that you thought would be useful to the Government here?
Mr. Blount. I did.
The Chairman. Before you left Hawaii did you receive any communication, statement, or information from the Government of the United
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States of any purpose to reinstate Liliuokalani on any terms or conditions whatever?
Mr. Blount. I never dreamed of such a thing as the reinstatement of Liliuokalani; I never heard it suggested until my return to the United States. I had a talk with the Secretary of State, and the inclination of his mind was that the circumstances created a moral obligation on the part of the United States to reinstate her. I gathered from the Secretary of State that the President had not any opinion—was thinking the matter over.
The Chairman. That the President had not formed his opinion?
Mr. Blount. Had not formed his opinion. I had never heard anything from the President indicating any opinion until the public had it.
The Chairman. Then at the time you left Hawaii nothing had been developed in the direction of a movement to reinstate Liliuokalani on the throne?
Mr. Blount. I never heard of it except as I heard of it in the American papers.
The Chairman. The papers that would find their way to Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. Yes; nothing from the Government. You asked me a moment ago about my having communication with the Queen. Those people down there are the most consummately brutal and unconscionable people I ever saw—on both sides; they say almost anything. On one occasion the attorney-general came to me at my office, and the Queen's name was mentioned. I said, "What sort of a person is she; I never saw her." He was surprised. He said, "You have never seen her?" I said, "No." He said, "That is very strange; the Government was informed that you called to see her, and she got on her knees, and pressed your hands, and cried," etc. Some time after that an attack was made in the Star, in which the writer was urging the deposition of the Queen, charged she was conspiring against the existing Government, and said she should be deposed, that she might have treasonable communications with public ministers, as witness her unhindered interviews with Commissioner Blount. That was the annexation organ. I thought it was very discourteous, and I wrote Mr. Dole a letter. Probably it appears in the published correspondence.
In that letter I set forth that I had never called upon the Queen at all except as indicated in an interview with him, in which it was agreed that there was no impropriety in my doing so, and that I felt this attack was an outrage on me as the American representative. He seemed to appreciate the situation, and an apology was brought about, a very poor one. But I think President Dole regretted it. The attorney-general, in referring to the article, said to me that this man Smith, of the annexation organ, had been to the Government (that is to say the President and cabinet), and said that he had the unquestionable proof that I had three long interviews with the Queen. He did not believe Smith. I never had any communication with the Queen looking to her protection or aid in any form.
The last interview I had with her came about in this way: I was going off from the islands; I made up my mind to leave; I thought everything was quiet. I felt I was taking some responsibility by leaving if anything should happen and I should not be there—that I would have to suffer the criticism. I talked with members of the Provisional Government; talked with some two or three gentlemen of character and standing on the royalist side as to whether there was any danger in my leaving, and then it occurred to me perhaps I had better go and see the Queen and ascertain just what she thought of the peacefulness of her people. I went to her and told her my purpose of leaving; all of which
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was kept quiet, because I did not want any demonstration made when I went away from there. It was understood by the Provisional Government. I talked to them freely about it.
I asked the Queen about the natives keeping quiet. She said there was no danger until the question of annexation was finally determined upon by the United States. She asked me, in the event of her arrest what would Admiral Skerrett do—what would the United States forces do in the way of protection. I said, "So far as I am concerned I must decline to answer as to what the Government of the United States will do; when I leave here Admiral Skerrett will be in command of the naval forces, and questions of public order, etc., will be left with him without my control." I never gave her an intimation.
Senator Gray. Is that all that occurred?
Mr. Blount. That is all that occurred.
Senator Gray. How many times had you had interviews with regard to public affairs with the Queen?
Mr. Blount. Had but two interviews; one concerning her abdication, and one just before I left, to see if there was danger of bloodshed when I left.
Senator Gray. The one you have just spoken of?
Mr. Blount. Yes. Those were the only conversations I ever had with her, and each of them I have substantially detailed.
The Chairman. In your estimate of her in those brief conversations, did you think her an intelligent, bright woman?
Mr. Blount. The conversations, I say, were very brief; the first one only two or three minutes, when she seemed to be a little wary and disinclined to talk except in response to questions. She was dignified and reserved. She was quite reticent. I had no means of determining her intelligence from any observation of my own. She was reputed by all the people there to be a very well educated woman.
The Chairman. A woman having dignity?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Having polite manners?
Mr. Blount. Yes. That is quite a feature of the Hawaiian people— dignity and good manners. So I learned from the people over there.
The Chairman. Was that your observation?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. I do not find in your report that you gave any advice to the Government of the United States in respect to the restoration of Liliuokalani to her former rule?
Mr. Blount. I did not give any advice. I was not called on to give any advice to anybody; I went down there to report facts; those were my instructions, and I reported as I believed them to be.
The Chairman. Does your report contain all the information you gave to the Government of the United States with regard to the forces there?
Mr. Blount. I think it does; it is the only way I carried it—on those papers.
The Chairman. And you had no motive in your report of interfering with or changing the Government that existed in Hawaii and restoring Liliuokalani?
Mr. Blount. It never entered my head to do anything about the restoration of the Queen until I returned to the United States, except, as I told you, I would see the matter discussed in an American paper.
The Chairman. But as a purpose on your part?
Mr. Blount. Oh, no. I was rigidly loyal to the idea that I was not there except to report information.
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The Chairman. How long after your arrival in Honolulu was it before you gave orders to Admiral Skerrett to remove troops from the islands and to haul down the American flag?
Mr. Blount. In two or three days. You will see a record of that. I met people day and night. They met me cordially, people of both factions there at the legation. The active leaders would resent the idea in the newspapers of there being any danger of disorder. They would say to me it would be folly for us to attempt anything to change the present condition of affairs until the question of annexation was disposed of; that if the United States wanted to annex the islands, they would annex them; what could they do? That seemed to be in their minds, and the thought that determined the peace of the islands up to the time I left, so far as I could see.
The Chairman. Up to the time you caused Admiral Skerrett to withdraw his force did you find the people in a quiet state?
Mr. Blount. It was as quiet a looking city as ever I saw.
The Chairman. You could then see no occasion for military demonstration on shore for the purpose of protecting the peace?
Mr. Blount. None in the world, as I said in my report. I went to President Dole and told him my impression about it, and my purpose to withdraw the troops, and asked if he could preserve order. He said he could presrve order. I was hastened for the reason which appears in the report. I had learned of a meeting of some eighty people who wanted to communicate to me certain political views, and it occurred to me the best thing to do was to have the troops removed. I intended to have them removed lest it would appear that they had brought about the removal of the troops.
The Chairman. The day that the troops were removed was there any civil commotion in Honolulu?
Mr. Blount. Not the slightest. I did not go down to the Government building at the removal. I did not know but possibly there might be some demonstration and my presence might occasion it. I asked Admiral Skerrett to see what demonstrations, if any, were made, and he has reported it. Capt. Hooper, of the Rush, took me over. He is quite an intelligent gentleman. He was on the shore, and I said I would be glad to have him go down there and see the impression it made on the people, what manifestations there were. His report is of record.
The Chairman. During the time that you were there, the flag was ordered down. Was there any civil commotion in Honolulu, or any part of it, of which you were informed?
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. Would you describe the condition of the people as one of peacefulness and quiet?
Mr. Blount. Yes, as a general rule, I would say that was true.
The Chairman. Was there any riot or outbreak of any kind?
Mr. Blount. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Were you informed of any combinations of a political sort during your stay, to reinstate Liliuokalani by a counter revolution?
Mr. Blount. No. I have stated the condition of the native mind as far as I was impressed by it, and that was that they could do nothing until the United States determined upon the question of annexation.
The Chairman. Were the people quiet in their avocations?
Mr. Blount. Yes. There was nothing to indicate that there ever had been any revolution.
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The Chairman. Any disturbance in commercial affairs?
Mr. Blount. None that I could see.
The Chairman. Any depression in financial matters?
Mr. Blount. Yes, there seemed to be; but not so much as in the United States or in other parts of the world.
The Chairman. Was that due to the political situation, or attributable to their commerce?
Mr. Blount. One would think it was because of the political condition of affairs, and another that it was the general depression throughout the world.
The Chairman. Did you form any opinion while you were there of the financial situation in Hawaii, as to whether it had inspired confidence in it among the people—confidence in their banking institutions?
Mr. Blount. I could not say that I have formed an opinion worth stating. I do not think there was any trouble about their banking institutions or money.
The Chairman. This revolution does not seem to have interfered with the credit of the banks?
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. What is the circulating medium in Honolulu?
Mr. Blount. They have some silver that was issued during Kalakaua's reign, and gold, and our Treasury notes.
The Chairman. Our Treasury notes?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Gray. Our paper money?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Gray. Is it as common there as it is here?
Mr. Blount. Just the same.
Senator Butler. Do you mean our money, or issues of the Hawaiian Government?
Mr. Blount. Our money.
The Chairman. Have they any paper issues of their own?
Mr. Blount. None that I ever saw.
The Chairman. Neither of the banks or of the Government?
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. Did there seem to be a proper supply for the needs of the people?
Mr. Blount. I never heard any complaint.
The Chairman. The price of sugar was depressed while you were there?
Mr. Blount. An advance—there was a depression and rise, which was very inspiriting to the people. You spoke about a currency. There was no complaint. You will see that there had been in the Legislature some fellow who introduced a bill and got up an excitement on loaning money on real estate, just as you have seen here. But it did not take any form that indicated any stringency.
The Chairman. When you arrived in Hawaii, did you communicate your instructions to Mr. Stevens?
Mr. Blount. I did not.
The Chairman. Did you at any time before you left there?
Mr. Blount. I published the instructions.
The Chairman. Mr. Stevens did not have any official notice of them until they were published ?
Mr. Blount. No.
The Chairman. Did you confer with him when you directed Admiral Skerrett to remove the troops and haul down the flag?
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Mr. Blount. I did not. I did not confer with anybody except Admiral Skerrett.
The Chairman. Your orders appear here. I believe they were issued by you directly as a commissioner of the United States?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. And in virtue of this letter of authority to which you have already alluded?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. Is your letter of authority printed in the report?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Blount. My impression is that an order was made by the Secretary of the Navy, I am pretty sure there was, directing Admiral Skerrett to obey my orders. I do not know that that is in the printed report.
Senator Gray. Mr. Stevens was notified?
Mr. Blount. No.
Senator Dolph. Do you understand that Mr. Stevens was notified of the purpose and objects of Mr. Blount's commission?
Senator Gray. I think so. Let us see.
The Chairman. I think so. Senator Sherman. Did you communicate to Mr. Stevens the nature of the authority under which you were acting?
Mr. Blount. Mr. Stevens was informed by the Government itself. He had a communication which I think you will find there. I had no communication with Mr. Stevens at all with reference to my authority; the Government had undertaken to do that. My instructions were secret and I never gave them to anybody.
Senator Gray. I find on page 3 of this publication, document No. 2, letter from Department of State dated "Washington, March 11, 1893," which says:
- "Department of State,
- "Washington, March 11, 1893.
- "Sir: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands the President has determined to send to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner, the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- "Mr. Blount bears credential letters in that capacity, addressed to the President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government, and you are requested to facilitate his presentation.
- "In all matters pertaining to the existing or other Government of the islands the authority of Mr. Blount is paramount. As regards the conduct of the usual business of the legation, you are requested to continue until further notice in the performance of your official functions, so far as they may not be inconsistent with the special powers confided to Mr. Blount. You are also requested to aid him in the fulfillment of his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information, and the archives of the legation should be freely accessible to him.
- "Mr. Blount is fully instructed touching his relations to the commanding officer of the United States naval force in Hawaiian waters.
- "I am, etc.,
- "W. Q. Gresham."
That is signed by Mr. Gresham.
Mr. Blount. I understood that the Government communicated to Mr. Stevens what it wanted him to know.
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Senator Sherman. They gave him direct instructions?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. That was the only occasion of the communication of your authority to Mr. Stevens ?
Mr. Blount. I did not make them; I had a copy.
The Chairman. That is all the information Mr. Stevens had of your authority?
Mr. Blount. So far as I have any information. I suppose the Government has given you copies of everything—all their communications to and from Mr. Stevens.
The Chairman. The orders that you gave to Admiral Skerrett are supported, if I understand you correctly, alone by the letter of authority given to you by the Secretary of State?
Mr. Blount. And the letter that Mr. Herbert, the Secretary of the Navy, sent to Admiral Skerrett.
The Chairman. To execute your orders? Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. You construed your authority, of which you have just been speaking, to be sufficient to justify you in taking command of that fleet?
Senator Butler. Control.
The Chairman. I put it "command," for the purpose of removing the troops off the shore, and of hauling down the flag that had been raised there upon the Hawaiian public buildings?
Mr. Blount. I thought I was justified under the instruction and that order given by the Secretary of the Navy, of which I had information.
The Chairman. If at any time while you remained there you had supposed that the preservation of life and property and their treaty rights made it necessary, you thought you would have had authority, under the construction of your powers, to have ordered the troops back upon the shore?
Mr. Blount. I think so. The letter of the Secretary of State speaks of it. I do not recollect the exact instructions; but it speaks about my conferring with Admiral Skerrett—makes some such suggestions. But taking that communication and the order from the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Skerrett, I thought I had authority to order the troops back to protect the property of American citizens.
The Chairman. You thought you were the judge of the political or actual situation in Hawaii, or in Honolulu, to the extent of authorizing you to protect the public peace, and thereby to protect American property and life?
Mr. Blount. I do not say to protect the public peace. I did not understand it to that extent. I understood that if there was a contest between the people of the Provisional Government and any other people there for the control of public affairs, if it did not involve the property and the persons of American citizens who were not participating in the conflict, I had nothing to do with it.
The Chairman. Would not a conflict of that kind in the city of Honolulu, with 20,000 population and a great many nationalities represented, necessarily involve some danger to American life and property and commerce?
Mr. Blount. I felt this way about that: I knew that that question was one that might come, and that I would wait until it came to see what discretion I would use under the circumstances that arose. I tried to carry out my power as I understood it.
The Chairman. And you construed your authority to be sufficient
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to enable you to use the naval forces of the United States then in the harbor for the purpose of protecting the life, liberty, and property and treaty rights of American citizens in the event of a commotion?
Mr. Blount. Yes. I think there is no doubt about that. I think that appears from my instructions. I think that is very clear.
Senator Butler. I understand that under your instructions if that exigency had arisen, and you thought it necessary, you would have ordered the troops ashore to protect life and property?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. In ordering these troops from the shore to the ship, were you influenced by this construction of your authority?
Mr. Blount. There were several things. It did not seem to me that an investigation could go on very well with the flag and troops there. They were calculated to repress certain people and prevent them testifying— if that condition of things were kept up. In the next place, it did not occur to me that there was any justification for it at all, for its continuance. I have nothing to say about the original placing of it; it was not a matter of my own to determine. But I found it there; I thought it could be removed without any difficulty, and I accordingly ordered the flag removed and the troops back on board the vessel. Before proceeding further, here are what I conceive to be the orders under which Admiral Skerrett was acting:
- "March 11, 1893.
- "Sir: This letter will be handed to you by the Hon. James H. Blount, Special Commissioner from the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
- "You will consult freely with Mr. Blount, and will obey any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command.
- "You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.
- "Respectfully,
- "Hilary A. Herbert,
- "Secretary of the Navy.
- "Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
- "Commander in Chief United States Naval Forces,
- "Pacific Station, Flagship Mohican, Honolulu, H.I. "
The Chairman. That was the order of the Secretary of the Navy to which you had reference?
Mr. Blount. Yes. Mr. Chairman, allow me a moment. I made a statement a while ago that until my instructions were published I had not communicated then to anybody. I forgot that I did communicate then to Admiral Skerrett. I felt that I could not confer with him about anything unless he knew my instructions.
The Chairman. Knew what your instructions were?
Mr. Blount.Yes.
The Chairman. The extent of your authority?
Mr. Blount.Yes. No officer connected with the vessels there other than Admiral Skerrett had any knowledge of it.
The Chairman. I will ask you the question: Was the movement of the troops or the orders for hauling down the flag in any respect intended to be an evidence of your participation in the domestic affairs
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of Hawaii, so as to favor either the Queen's form of government or the then existing Government—the Dole regime?
Mr. Blount. My idea about it was, the effect would be to impress both sides with the belief that I was not going to participate in their local affairs.
The Chairman. Was that your intention?
Mr. Blount. Such was my intention. I did not think the flag troops ought to be there. It did not occur to me just; it did not occur to me that investigation could go on with them there.
Senator Gray. I understand the chairman's question to be, did you intend the removal of those troops to give intimation to either side of your intention toward them?
Mr. Blount. I did not. I thought that it would be an intimation to both sides that I did not come down there to do anything with their controversies.
The Chairman. Your position was one of strict neutrality between them?
Mr. Blount. As much so as I could possibly make it. I never went into the house of a royalist but once while I was in Honolulu. I called on Mr. J. O. A. Carter with my family, with Mrs. Blount, just before leaving.
Senator Sherman. He was the former minister?
Mr. Blount. He was a brother of the former minister.
Senator Gray. I think the former minister is dead.
Mr. Blount. He is. He is the brother of the former minister, on whom I called. I called on President Dole, the attorney-general, the minister of the interior, the vice-president—the persons connected with the Government. I felt that I could do that without subjecting myself to general intercourse with the people. They were officials of the Government, and I announced to both sides that I felt bound to do that.
The Chairman. With the exception of the Queen and cabinet and the commander of the military forces, and of the civil forces, called the police, was there any substantial change in the personnel of the Government from what it was formerly, when you got to Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. As to the personnel?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Blount. Well, the---
Senator Butler. As I understand, you arrived there after the Provisional Government was established?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Butler. You have no information as to the personnel of the Queen's government?
The Chairman. My question relates to what Mr. Blount learned as to what was the composition of the former government, as to its personnel.
Mr. Blount. I think the police force as a rule was left untouched. I never went into it particularly.
The Chairman. The army was disbanded—the Queen's army, body guard.
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Do you remember whether any body guard was reserved to her for her protection ?
Mr. Blount. It was not so when I was there.
The Chairman. In other respects the Government went on under existing laws, saving, of course, the revolution which had taken place in the head of the Government?
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Mr. B ount. The information on that point appears in the correspondence between the Provisional Government and the Government here, and I would take it as the highest evidence.
The Chairman. That conforms to your own observations?
Mr. Blount. Yes, as to the character of the Government set up.
The Chairman. I suppose you ascertained that during the decade previously to this revolution there had been a great many changes in the political attitude of a great many leading men in Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Politics had been a pretty lively subject in Hawaii some years before you got there?
Mr. Blount. Everything is little down there. It was lively for them in noise.
Senator Butler. It would not be considered very lively in Georgia, New York, or Ohio, I suspect?
Mr. Blount. Oh, no.
The Chairman. Would you say that the people there are given to participating in political agitations?
Mr. Blount. I would say more so than in Alabama. They get them pretty well worked up.
The Chairman. Meeting in conventions, public meetings, and having their say?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes. I want to say that so far as that matter is concerned I took no testimony.
The Chairman. I am getting your impressions aside from the testimony you took.
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. You would say, I suppose, that there was a pretty large feeling on the part of the press in Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes. You would take up the papers there and read one side and the other where they would make the most villifying personal attacks that you could conceive of. I would learn when these gentlemen would meet that it was just a good joke. I spoke once to Mr. Dole about it; I said, "I do not see how you can keep the peace with the people attacking each other this way."
He said, "That does not amount to anything; they are friendly when they meet. My attention was directed to that because I was apprehensive from seeing these articles that some disturbance would come, and I always talked very freely to the Government about the public peace. I was doing no harm on that ground; they seemed to want to talk with me; they came to me when there was fear of disturbance, and I would not communicate it to the other side. Then the other side would come, and I did not mention what they said to the Government. In this way I got information of both sides. I saw that there would be no trouble.
The Chairman. We have gone through a general view of this matter; I will turn Mr. Blount over to any one who wishes to ask any questions.
Senator Dolph. I wish to ask a few questions.
Senator Gray. No questions occur to me now.
Senator Dolph. You say that Secretary Foster showed you a letter from Minister Stevens, written in November, 1892?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. Concerning affairs in the islands?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. That letter contains a pretty full account of the political situation there?
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Mr. Blount. That is amongst your papers.
Senator Dolph. I saw the letter at the time. I suppose it was shown to you in confidence because you were on the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House.
Mr. Blount. Very largely so.
Senator Dolph. Did you form any opinion at that time about Hawaiian affairs and as to the fitness of Mr. Stevens for the position he occupied?
Mr. Blount. I did not. I did not like the looks of the letter; but I think they did not make much impression on me. I went off home; I did not think much about it.
The Chairman. You had then declared your determination of retiring from Congress?
Mr. Blount. I did not intend to hold any place when I went away from here. I did not even pay my respects to the President.
The Chairman. You had determined to retire from public life?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
Senator Dolph. You did not consider there was any impropriety in such a letter coming from a minister of the United States?
Mr. Blount. No. Perhaps I misunderstood what you said.
Senator Gray. Mr. Blount did not speak about the impropriety; he spoke of the impression.
Mr. Blount. Oh, I rather had an impression—it was a vague one— that it manifested some passing beyond the proprieties for an American representative in a foreign country.
Senator Dolph. That was not long before the news arrived in the United States in reference to the revolution in Hawaii, was it?
Mr. Blount. My impression is that the treaty had been negotiated at the time. The Secretary of State sent for me and expressed a desire that I would endeavor to bring the Democratic party to the point of supporting the ratification of the treaty and acceptance of annexation.
Senator Dolph. Then you saw that letter after the news of the revolution had arrived here?
Mr. Blount. That is my impression. I think I am correct.
Senator Dolph. Did you express any opinion concerning the revolution, or the part which it was alleged had been taken by Minister Stevens in connection with the same, shortly after the news arrived and while Congress was still in session?
Mr. Blount. My impression is that I avoided the subject. I recollect saying once to a newspaper correspondent when the announcement was made of the establishing of an American protectorate by the American minister that "it looked a little lively." I did not think much about it at the time; I did not care much about it; I was going away.
Senator Dolph. Have you stated what the expression was you used?
Mr. Blount. I said, " It looked a little lively." That I believe to be it.
Senator Dolph. Did you express any opinion concerning the landing of the naval forces upon the island?
Mr. Blount. No. I say that because my recollection of it is that I did not know anything about the particulars at all.
Senator Dolph. Did you form any opinion shortly after the receipt of the news of the revolution, or after the treaty had been negotiated and sent to Congress, concerning the question of annexation?
Mr. Blount. I did not form any opinion.
Senator Dolph. Or express any?
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Mr. Blount. I had some apprehension that there might have been something imprudent done there; I had no opinion.
Senator Dolph. Did you not have conversations with various persons about the affair?
Mr. Blount. Very little. I was authorized to show that paper. It was given to me in manuscript—the letter of November. I was authorized to show it to some persons, in my discretion.
Senator Dolph. The letter of Minister Stevens to the Secretary of State?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. And you were furnished a copy?
Mr. Blount. Certainly, with a view of conferring with certain persons.
Senator Dolph. Did you show it to members of the House?
Mr. Blount. I showed it to Governor MeCreary and, possibly, Mr. Hitt, and possibly some others. I do not know now.
Senator Dolph. Did you have any conversations with those people about the subject of the annexation of Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. I can not remember that I did, other than showing that paper.
Senator Dolph. Did you undertake to secure the approval of your colleagues on that committee or in the House of annexation?
Mr. Blount. No.
Senator Dolph. Did you express any opinion in favor of annexation?
Mr. Blount. I think not.
Senator Dolph. Or against it?
Mr. Blount. I think not.
Senator Dolph. You think you simply handed that persons named, and possibly others, without any conversation or suggestions with regard to that?
Mr. Blount. Oh, I have not said that.
Senator Dolph. That is what I am trying to get at.
The Chairman. Allow me to ask if that is the letter to which you refer, and of which Mr. Foster gave you a copy (referring to Executive Document of the House of Representatives No. 74, page 111 of the Report.)
Mr. Blount. I think it is.
Senator Dolph. What did you say to Mr. Foster you would do concerning his request?
Mr. Blount. I did not say to Mr. Foster that I would do anything. He showed me that letter and expressed a desire that I would endeavor to bring the Democratic party to the support of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.
Senator Dolph. Mr. Foster gave you a copy of that letter and made that request, and you made no response to it?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes, I did.
Senator Dolph. I would like to know what you said to him.
Mr. Blount. I said to him, "I do not know anything about it." The paper was handed to me. He did not expect any answer. The whole thing was new to me.
Senator Dolph. You did not read it in Mr. Foster's presence?
Mr. Blount. No. He handed it to me to be read, and I said, "You have given me this paper; I can not converse with the Democrats without this paper." I had not seen the paper. Mr. Foster said, "I will leave that to your discretion."
Senator Dolph. I am asking if you expressed any opinion in the
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matter, because in the press it has been charged that you expressed an opinion.
Mr. Blount. Yes, I understand you.
Senator Dolph. You think you did not express an opinion?
Mr. Blount. I think not, because I did not have any.
Senator Dolph. You were here during the inauguration of President Cleveland?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. Did you call on the President before you left the city?
Mr. Blount. I did not.
Senator Dolph. Or Secretary Gresham?
Mr. Blount. No; I did not see Secretary Gresham. I knew him when be was Postmaster-General.
Senator Dolph. What time did you leave Washington?
Mr. Blount. I do not recollect; I stayed here three or four days.
Senator Dolph. After the inauguration?
Mr. Blount. Yes; there was a crowd, a jam, and I did not care to start home because of the liability to accidents, etc.
Senator Dolph. Can you recall any conversation with either of the gentlemen to whom you handed a copy of that letter?
Mr. Blount. I can not. I handed it to them; and I may possibly have said to them, "I am not satisfied to make any effort on this paper; I do not think there is information enough."
Senator Dolph. How many times did you see Mr. Gresham, the Secretary of State, before you left for Honolulu—when you came here in response to the telegraphic request of Mr. Smith?
Mr. Blount. I arrived here on Sunday morning, I think. I went with the Secretary of the Interior to the State Department. I met, casually, the Secretary of the Navy in the office of the Secretary of State. That is the first time I met the Secretary of State.
Senator Gray. The first time?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Gray. The first time you met Mr. Gresham since you knew him as Postmaster-General?
Mr. Blount. Yes. And the next time I met him was the next day. I went over to his office, and he took me into a little room—you recollect where the foreign ministers are received?
Senator Butler. For consultation ?
Mr. Blount. Yes. He had the clerk read the instructions over, with the view, rather, of putting them in a more tasteful form—criticising the instructions. That was the second time. And I possibly met him a third time.
Senator Dolph. How many conversations did you have with Secretary Gresham that second time?
Mr. Blount. I can not really tell you.
Senator Dolph. Was that the time that he told you that he knew of no principle of international law which justified the raising of the United States flag in Honolulu?
Mr. Blount. I can not say exactly what time it was.
Senator Dolph. You are not certain?
Mr. Blount. No. It may have been then or at a later conversation.
Senator Dolph. Did he not couple with his remark about the raising of a United States flag one about the landing of the United States marines and the assumption of a protectorate over the islands ?
Mr. Blount. Perhaps so.
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Senator Dolph. Is that all he said? Please give that conversation as nearly as you can recall it.
Mr. Blount. That would be a very difficult thing to do. At the time I just recollect the general impression that I had that he did not think the flag ought to be there or the troops on shore.
Senator Dolph. He did not think the flag ought to be there and the troops on shore?
Mr. Blount. That was his expression. But the instructions---
Senator Dolph. Did you understand that, while he left it to your discretion, unless the facts showed that it should not be done, the flag should be haulded down and the troops ordered off the island?
Mr. Blount. My impression is that he thought that ought to be done. But the islands were a long way off, and it was a matter in which I was to be guided very largely by circumstances. There was to be carefulness lest there should be bloodshed growing out of it— disorder. He could not tell.
Senator Dolph. Was anything said about the annexation of the islands at that time in your conversation, or at any other time?
Mr. Blount. Not that I recollect.
Senator Dolph. What was said, if anything, as to the time when these troops should be landed—as to whether there was any exigency for that, calling for the landing of the troops?
Mr. Blount. Nothing that I can recall.
Senator Dolph. Could you give the substance of that conversation?
Mr. Blount. I think I have given you the substance.
Senator Dolph. How long was the conversation?
Mr. Blount. That I do not remember. It has been some months ago.
Senator Dolph. Were you there an hour or minute?
Mr. Blount. Well, I might have been about the office—not with the Secretary—a half hour.
Senator Dolph. How long were you with the Secretary?
Mr. Blount. During the reading of that paper and criticizing the language. The time was occupied in that way. There was very little said.
Senator Dolph. If you saw the Secretary again before you left for Honolulu, state where and when it was.
Mr. Blount. My recollection is that I went over to the office, and by arrangement went back there and got the instructions, as they had been finally prepared and agreed on, and I went with the Secretary over to the White House, the expectation being that I would go in and talk with the President and Cabinet. I mean to say that was his idea. When I got over there I was not invited in until they had concluded their deliberations. I was introduced. Of course I knew the President and some members of the Cabinet. I was introduced to some others. The subject of the islands was not mentioned at all. I only staid a minute or two; in fact, I could not see why I was taken in there; nobody said anything to introduce a topic of conversation. I went to the President and said, "Mr. President, I shall try not to make any mistake under my instructions down there." He said, "I do not think you will." As I passed the table going out, the President said, in a careless way, "Blount, you will let us hear from you." I said I would, when there is anything worth writing about, and that is all that occurred. I called to pay my respects on Sunday morning.
Senator Dolph. I thought that was to the Secretary.
Mr. Blount. No.
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Senator Dolph. Did you have any talk with the President when you called Sunday morning to pay your respects?
Mr. Blount. The Secretary of the Interior and I were in there to pay my respects. It was Sunday morning, and we did not stay long.
Senator Dolph. Did the Secretary of State or his private secretary read over the instructions'?
Mr. Blount. The private secretary, I think, read them.
Senator Dolph. Did the private secretary retire during your conversation with Mr. Gresham?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes; he was not present at the conversation.
Senator Dolph. No one was present at your conversation with the Secretary of State about your duties in Hawaii ?
Mr. Blount. No.
Senator Dolph. You can not tell whether you were with him a half hour?
Mr. Blount. I do not recollect. The paper was read. That was the main thing—reading over that paper and looking at it. Very little was said.
The Chairman. I would like to ask a question on a matter some of you gentlemen may wish to interrogate Mr. Blount about. I find in a paper that has been printed by the House, Executive Document 13, which seems to be some additional correspondence not published before that time, at least in compliance with any request of the House or Senate, a telegram of Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens. It is on page 31 of this document which I hold in my hand.
- "Department of State,
- "Washington, February 14, 1893.
- "Your telegram of the 1st instant has been received, with coincident report from commander of the Boston. Press telegrams from San Francisco give full details of events of 1st instant, with text of your proclamation. The latter, in announcing assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States, would seem to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. It is not thought, however, that the request of the Provisional Government for protection, or your action in compliance therewith, contemplated more than the cooperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen the authority of the Provisional Government, by according to it adequate protection for life and property during the negotiations instituted here, and without interfering with the execution of public affairs. Such cooperation was and is within your standing instructions and those of the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters.
- "So far as your course accords to the de facto sovereign Government the material cooperation of the United States for the maintenance of good order and protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, it is commended; but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government in the capacity of protector, or to impair the independent sovereignty of that Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States, it is disavowed.
- "Instructions will be sent to naval commanders, confirming and renewing those heretofore given them, under which they are authorized and directed to cooperate with yon in case of need. Your own instructions
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- are likewise renewed and you are accordingly authorized to arrange with the commanding officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of American citizens and the repression of lawlessness threatening them whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such cooperation may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, being, however, always careful to distinguish between these functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.
- "John W. Foster"
Senator Gray. That has been printed before.
The Chairman. That is addressed to Minister Stevens. I wish to inquire whether you had knowledge of the existence of this telegraphic dispatch before you went away?
Mr. Blount. I was going to say in response to the Senator that I expressed to the President the desire not to go off until I knew what was in the State Department in the way of information, and the Secretary of State had collected all the documents; they had all been sent to the Senate, and they were given to me in confidence. I took them and read them on the way from San Francisco to Honolulu, as much as I could with seasickness. I never looked at them in Washington.
The Chairman. The documents?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. Was the one I have just read amongst them?
Mr. Blount. Yes, given to me confidentially.
Senator Dolph. When you left for Hawaii you took your instructions?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. Which you considered private?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. And the communication to Admiral Skerrett which has been read ?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. And an official communication to the Provisional Government?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. And a letter to Minister Stevens?
Mr. Blount. Yes—no, I did not deliver the letter; the letter was sent to Minister Stevens.
Senator Dolph. You did not yourself carry him any communication?
Mr. Blount. No; I had a copy. Now, I believe I did hand that paper to Mr. Stevens on shipboard. I could not say positively about that.
Senator Dolph. It is immaterial.
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. Now, under your instructions and the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Skerrett, you were placed in supreme command of the naval forces in Hawaii, so far as any relation of our Government to the islands was concerned, were you not?
Mr. Blount. Well, that language might import more than I would be willing to admit. Without defining in general terms 1 felt from the instructions of the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Skerrett that
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----19
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I had the right to direct the removal of the flag and the return of the marines to the vessel, and that I had authority to protect American citizens in their persons and in their property and to see to the proper observance of treaties. 1 did not understand that I had any power beyond that.
Senator Dolph. You did not understand that it was your duty to wait until the actual destruction of the property of American citizens commenced, until their lives were in actual jeopardy, before you took steps to land the United States marines to prevent such injury to the lives and property of American citizens, did you? That was a matter resting in your discretion at the time, was it not?
Mr. Blount. That was not mentioned. My idea was that I could not anticipate. I thought it over. I could not anticipate the circumstances which might arise; but when they did I was to exercise the best judgment I had in connection with Admiral Skerrett.
Senator Dolph. You understood it rested in your judgment?
Mr. Blount. I understood that it rested in my judgment—the protection of American citizens in their lives and property in any disturbance on the islands. Any particular circumstances did not occur to my mind.
Senator Gray. You felt that it was in your judgment to act when the particular circumstances arose, when the exigency called for it?
Mr. Blount. That is it.
The Chairman. In my mind the evidence would seem to indicate that it was left to Mr. Blount to determine what was the political situation in Hawaii, and in consultation with Admiral Skerrett he was to determine what should be done in a military way—what should be done by the United States on that occasion ?
Senator Gray. Is that true?
Mr. Blount. 1 think that is true. I think, perhaps, it ought to be added, and my impression was, that if I had issued an order—and I took that not from the instructions but from the letter of the Secretary of the Navy—if I issued an order, the admiral would obey.
Senator Dolph. The Admiral was not to exercise his discretion as to whether it was proper or not?
Mr. Blount. I understood that I was to confer. That is clear in that paper. I was to confer with Admiral Skerrett, and I took it for granted that there would not be any difficulty about our differing on the question of landing troops.
Senator Dolph. Was there any chance of a difference?
Mr. Blount. Oh, there was a possible chance. But my idea was that in handling the troops on shore it would be a thing that ought to be very largely governed by Admiral Skerrett.
Senator Dolph. That Admiral Skerrett was to obey your orders?
Mr. Blount. You have the paper.
Senator Dolph. How long was it from the time you arrived in Hawaii until you published your instructions ?
Mr. Blount. That is a matter of record, and not in my mind. I want to say this: I have not seen these papers in six months; my mind has been diverted, and I can not recollect. I could tell you absolutely in a few minutes by looking at these documents.
Senator Dolph. Up until that time no one in the islands but Admiral Skerrett knew what your instructions were or what was the object of your mission in the islands?
Mr. Blount. They never knew definitely. Of course, I was conducting an examination; sometimes it would be a member of the Provisional
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Government and sometimes a royalist. I had no right to compel secrecy. There is a letter there from a man by the name of Ashford. He came in early, and I thought he was a pretty intelligent man. I did not know what sort of character he was. I thought I would learn something. He was disposed to talk. I said, "Will you not write me out your views;" and he did so. Sometime afterward, Mr. Smith, one of the editors of the annexation organ, the Hawaiian Star, said, "I got hold of something going on here; some of these fellows who come before you and are examined, tell." I said, "I did not tell you anything," and after that I found Ashford's letter published in the California papers. I did not see anything wrong, so far as the character of my investigation was concerned. I communicated nothing at all; but, of course, these people talked among themselves.
Senator Butler. I understand you to say that, so far as you were concerned, you made no communication of your instructions to anybody?
Mr. Blount. No; I did not.
Senator Dolph. Where were your headquarters; where was your investigation conducted?
Mr. Blount. It was conducted in a cottage on the grounds of the Hawaiian hotel, possibly some 50 yards from the main building, where I took my meals.
Senator Dolph. Were your family and suite the only occupants of the place?
Mr. Blount. When we got there some tourists occupied a part of it. It was not private enough, and I said unless I got the cottage to myself I would leave. It was accordingly arranged.
Senator Gray. The cottage belonged to the hotel?
Mr. Blount. Yes. I went to the hotel and got my meals; but I did not want to be where anybody was.
Senator Dolph. Were your examinations held at regular hours on appointed days, and adjourned from day to day, or were they just as you could get witnesses ?
Mr. Blount. I could always get a witness. The telephone system there is the finest you ever saw. I could get anybody I wanted. The rule I adopted was this: I would send for a witness on either side. I would telephone for him or use any other means I saw fit that was most convenient. I would examine the witness in the presence of my stenographer. Sometimes it would run over to the second day. I recollect once especially, in the case of Mr. Damon, whose examination was continued at his suggestion. When asked as to whether or not the recognition by Mr. Stevens took place before he went over to the palace, he said that he thought it did; but he wanted to talk about it to the attorney-general, Mr. Smith. He went off, and came back in a day or two and the examination was continued.
Senator Dolph. You misunderstood my question. I want to know whether you treated your proceedings in the nature of a court, and held regular sessions at an appointed hour, with adjournments from day to day?
Mr. Blount. Do you mean whether it was public?
Senator Dolph. No, not whether it was public, but whether you adjourned at regular hours, or conducted it to suit your convenience?
Mr. Blount. At my convenience. I had nothing to do with social life.
Senator Dolph. Who was present at any time?
Mr. Blount. Nobody present except my stenographer, the witness,
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and myself; and no man ever knew from me what anybody had testified to.
Senator Dolph. I suppose you talked with a great many persons about this subject?
Mr. Blount. Oh, they talked to me; but I never communicated my views.
Senator Dolph. You were told a great many things on both sides of this question by persons who had called upon you?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. And you never felt it incumbent upon you to make any record of what was said to you, or any report of it, except it was something which, in your judgment, ought to be taken down and reported? That is, you exercised your own judgment as to whether anything said to you should be made a part of your report; did you not?
Mr. Blount. If I were to answer that directly, without any qualification, perhaps I would not convey a correct impression. I saw people and they would talk to me. For instance, a man would come in and say he was a royalist, and he would commence to abuse Mr. Stevens. I would say nothing at all. I could not communicate to him, and did not encourage the conversation. And so somebody else on the other side would abuse the royalists. I could not help those things. Those were the things that occurred. I never indulged in conversation with people about affairs there, as a rule.
The Chairman. At what time did you send your report to the Secretary of State as to the condition of affairs in Hawaii?
Mr. Blount. The final report, I think, was in the month of July. But the record discloses that. I can not remember it.
The Chairman. Was it after you were appointed minister?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. It appears that you were appointed minister on the 22d of August; that is, a letter informing you of your appointment on that date, with various items of inclosure and instruction, was sent to you as minister of the United States. On that appointment you took the oath of office?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you then communicate your appointment to the Dole Government?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Did you make any communication of that to the Liliuokalani cabinet?
Mr. Blount. Not the slightest. I had nothing to do with Liliuokalani at all; it was not a proper thing, I did not think.
The Chairman. And you continued in that office until you were asked to resign and came home ?
Mr. Blount. I sent my resignation by the vessel that brought the appointment. I expected to leave when I got through the investigation. My private business was not satisfactory, and I wanted to get home. I was worried about it. I thought it might be childish in me to send an absolute resignation, and I did not put it in that form; but I did take occasion in some correspondence to assure the Secretary that I did not want the place at all. As I said, my private business required that I should be at home.
The Chairman. The question is whether, while you were minister, the instructions of the Government to you in regard to Hawaiian affairs had been in any wise altered ?
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Mr. Blount. No.
Senator Dolph. I do not think you understood my question a few minutes ago, that you did not consider it incumbent upon you to make any record of these statements made by the numerous persons who called upon you and talked about the situation in Hawaii or include them in your report.
Mr. Blount. No. If you will allow me to state, you will very readily see that I could not trust memory about those things, and hence I resorted to the plan of taking the statements in the form of interrogation and answer by the stenographer. I thought I would be enabled after the examination of witnesses on both sides, leading persons, to get at the condition of affairs; and, therefore, I did not trouble myself with every person whom I would meet who wanted to talk with me.
Senator Dolph. You exercised your own judgment and choice as to which of the persons you came in contact with you would examine?
Mr. Blount. I felt that I was there to conduct the examination, and I determined that I would conduct it according to my best judgment for the purpose of eliciting the truth. On one occasion, for instance, there was a committee came to me from the Annexation Club and said they had been appointed for the purpose of furnishing witnesses to me for the purpose of being examined. I was not pleased with it. That club was made up of people of all nationalities. I said to them, "Gentlemen, you do not understand my relation to you, or I do not. I am not a representative of any body in Honolulu; I am not under the control of any body in Honolulu; I am here to make an investigation for the Government of the United States, and while, perhaps, I will examine some persons you want examined, as a rule I want to direct these examinations and say whom I will examine and whom not."
Senator Dolph. You indicated plainly to them that you would not hear any witnesses?
Mr. Blount. I did not intimate anything of the kind.
Senator Dolph. What did you say in regard to the proposition of this committee to furnish witnesses on the question?
Mr. Blount. I said to them I would perhaps examine some of their witnesses; but I did not consent to the idea that the Annexation Club or anybody else was to furnish witnesses to me.
Senator Dolph. Did you examine any witnesses furnished by that committee?
Mr. Blount. Oh, I examined—the only name they ever mentioned to me was Mr. P. C. Jones.
Senator Gray. Tell about P. C. Jones's examination. Did you examine him?
Mr. Blount. No; I did not—regretted that I could not. There were other persons whom I would like to have examined. There was quite a mania on the part of the people on both sides to be examined when they saw the testimony was going into a public document. I would have gratified many of them if there had been an unlimited clerical force at my command; but I did not have it, and I did not believe it was going to elucidate anything to multiply witnesses.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Jones proffer himself as a witness?
Mr. Blount. Oh, no. A young man came in there by the name of Wilder, a boyish sort of fellow, with this statement.
Senator Gray. About Mr. Jones?
Mr. Blount. About the wishes of the Annexation Club—a person whom I did not consider proper to take counsel with. I do not mean
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that he was not a gentleman, but I had an idea about the Annexation Club, that there was a pretty rough element in there, and I know that was the opinion of the Provisional Government—many of them indulging in threats of assassination. They wanted me to turn over the celebration of the Fourth of July to the club, a political organization, which I declined; whereupon it went out in the United States that I was not in favor of the celebration of the Fourth, refused to arrange for the celebration of the Fourth, and all that sort of thing, although I presided at the celebration. I did not go to their meeting one night, Mr. Severance agreeing to go in my place to make arrangements for the appointment of committees, etc.
The Chairman. Did you preside at the Fourth of July meeting?
Mr. Blount. Yes. "Marching Through Georgia" was played and all sorts of things.
Senator Dolph. Was Mr. Nordhoff there, the correspondent of the Herald?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. Did you meet him frequently?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. Talked to him freely about the condition of affairs?
Mr. Blount. I did not.
Senator Dolph. Did you see a comparison in the New York Sun of portions of your report with letters of Nordhoff to his paper?
Mr. Blount. I did not. If you will allow me, I never took up the subject of writing that report, never wrote a line until Mr. Nordhoff left the islands ?
Senator Dolph. You have not seen the Sun article?
Mr. Blount. No; I have not.
Senator Dolph. I understood you to say that none of the witnesses who appeared before you were sworn?
Mr. Blount. Oh, no; I did not feel that I had authority to swear witnesses. I had them sign their testimony after reading it over.
The Chairman. There were affidavits submitted to you?
Mr. Blount. There were some four or five affidavits—the matter in them very short. I did not have the time, and I said to those gentlemen, "I would be very glad if you would put these facts in the form of an affidavit, and they were brought there that way. It came about simply because of the pressure of time. I did not care to go into a general examination of those people; I did not have the means to do it.
Senator Dolph. Did you in all cases have the statements of the parties who appeared before you extended into longhand and approved?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. Was all that was said before you by Admiral Skerrett made a part of your report?
Mr. Blount. All that was said on what subject?
Senator Dolph. On any subject. Did you report the communication from Admiral Skerrett—make it a part of your report?
Mr. Blount. Yes, I did. For instance, I said to Admiral Skerrett, "Let us take a walk and see where those troops were located;" and we went. I wanted him to see, and I pointed out, where Arion Hall was, and the Government building from which the proclamation was read. I said, "What do you think about locating troops here so near the building under the circumstances?" He said, "They were not located here." He was under the impression that they were located some distance off. I said, "You are mistaken about that; I know they were located here." I said to him, "Now what do you think of this position of
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the troops?" Of course, this was on the street, and it was not taken down. I suppose you wanted to know that.
Senator Dolph. It is interesting, and I would like to hear it.
Mr. Blount. Then Admiral Skerrett expressed the opinion which is contained in his statement. I said to him, "Admiral, I would be glad if you would give me that in writing;" and he gave it to me, and I forwarded it.
Senator Gray. That is the statement that appears in print?
Mr. Blount. That is the statement that appears in print.
Senator Dolph. The whole statement appears in print?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. It was a conversation with you?
Mr. Blount. Yes. My relations were closer with Admiral Skerrett than anybody else, consulting with him and so on. You can understand that it is an unsatisfactory state to be in, to be 2,000 miles from your country and nobody to talk to but Admiral Skerrett and my stenographer. They were the only persons I could talk to.
Senator Dolph. Were any communications furnished to you upon the subject of your investigation which were not made a part of your report?
Mr. Blount. I do not understand what you mean.
Senator Dolph. Was everything included in your report which was furnished to you on the subject—written communication?
Mr. Blount. I do not think I left any out.
Senator Dolph. You have spoken in your examination of having said to the Provisional Government that you would be glad to receive a statement from those in power, and you spoke as though that had been addressed not only to the President but to the others.
Mr. Blount. I used to go to the Government building where the president and his cabinet were sitting about, and I made the statement.
Senator Dolph. Did you make a public statement, an address?
Mr. Blount. Oh, no. They were sitting around a table. They made a small party, the president and cabinet and myself sitting in there— no formality.
Senator Dolph. Hou came you to be present at the cabinet meeting?
Mr. Blount. It was not a cabinet meeting; they sat in the same room and talked. I used to go in there and talk, and they came to the legation.
Senator Dolph. Do you recollect the conversation that day between you and the members of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Blount. It was not of any consequence; I remember that portion of it.
Senator Dolph. Did you address your conversation to any particular one, and if so what was said?
Mr. Blount. President Dole and the cabinet were sitting around, and I said to them, "Gentlemen, I would like to examine any of you with regard to the revolution; I can conceive that you might not care to submit to it." There was no response.
Senator Dolph. Was that before or after the publication of your instructions?
Mr. Blount. My impression is that it was before.
Senator Dolph. So they knew nothing about the object of your mission except what had leaked out from the examination of witnesses when you made that suggestion?
Mr. Blount. Leaked out? There was not much leaking about it.
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Vice-President Damon came a few days afterward and was examined. Earlier than this Mr. Bishop, connected with the press, was examined. There were several persons on the annexation side who were examined. I did not suppose that there was any withholding of it from the Government at all; I think they knew very well what I was doing.
The Chairman. Allow me to inquire whether Sereno Bishop is a relative of the wealthy man who has made so many endowments there?
Mr. Blount. I think not; I think Charles E. Bishop came from Boston— a young man.
The Chairman. And married a native?
Mr. Blount. A native princess. He is a very excellent gentleman. Sereno Bishop's father was a missionary. I think I have this from Mr. Bishop. He was born down at Lahaina, on the island of Maui, the old capital.
Senator Dolph. Who were the people representing the Queen's cause—her side of the controversy ?
Mr. Blount. Do you mean before me?
Senator Dolph. No; I do not mean to say there was any representation before you. I understand that was with closed doors; there was no one present but you and the stenographer. I mean persons who saw you in the islands.
The Chairman. The alleged leaders of the Queen's cause.
Senator Dolph. The alleged leaders of her government.
Mr. Blount. Do you mean leaders in the sense of counseling in this investigation?
Senator Dolph. That assumes that I am assuming that you allowed yourself to be counseled and directed by these people. I do not wish to convey any such impression. People called on you and talked with you, and I understood they called from early morning until late at night, and they talked about the matter of this revolution.
Mr. Blount. I think you are entirely courteous; but this matter goes down in print, and therefore, I ask that everything be made plain, and that my every answer may be correct. I am not in the condition that you gentlemen are. I understand that I am the subject of a great deal of criticism, which is legitimate, and I want to understand the questions I am answering.
The Chairman. You mean to say that the right to criticise you is a legitimate one?
Mr. Blount. Yes.
Senator Dolph. I do not mean to criticise you. I wish to know who were the people who appeared, who called to represent the Queen's interest. That is all.
The Chairman. Who were the reputed leaders of the royal party?
Senator Gray. Whom you met.
Mr. Blount. The matter of leadership there is a very uncertain thing. There are a good many factions amongst them, as you will see from the testimony. But I would say that amongst the more prominent persons in the islands you will find Mr. J. O. A. Carter, Mr. E. C. MacFarlane, Mr. Parker---
The Chairman. Sam Parker?
Mr. Blount. Sam Parker—a man by the name of Bush. He is another leader amongst them. They rather struck me with a little more positive force than some others.
Senator Dolph. At the time the revolution took place how many of the cabinet acted in their interest while you were there?
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Mr. Blount. I never saw any cabinet at all. I kept aloof from their politics. I stayed in that building away from the social life.
Senator Gray. Did you participate in the social life of the city?
Mr. Blount. Not at all, except I found myself bound to accept invitations from President Dole and other officials. And there was a Mr. Glade, a German, there, a member of the committee of safety, and the consul-general of Germany. I thought I could make a few calls of that sort—calling on the officials.
The Chairman. You say Mr. Glade was the consul-general of Germany, and still a member of the committee of safety?
Mr. Blount. He was a member of the committee of safety and a very active man in it.
Senator Dolph. Did you meet those who were members of the Queen's cabinet at the time the revolution took place?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
Senator Dolph. Talk with them?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
Senator Dolph. Did any of them defend the restoration of the Queen, defend her rights?
Mr. Blount. They were all for restoration, as I understood them?
Senator Dolph. All the members of the cabinet?
Mr. Blount. Yes. I think that will appear from the papers.
Senator Dolph. Were they examined before you?
Mr. Blount. I remember very distinctly Mr. Parker's examination. Whatever was done is in the record. As I say, I have not seen these papers in six months.
Senator Dolph. Did Mr. Nordhoff talk to you about this matter?
Mr. Blount. Mr. Nordhoff was like a good many other people; he would talk; but I did not confide in Mr. Nordhoff.
Senator Dolph. You listened to what he had to say ?
Mr. Blount. Oh, yes.
Senator Dolph. You did not disclose your instructions to him, but got what information you could from him?
Mr. Blount. I let him talk. He never stayed long; he would talk and go away.
Senator Dolph. Was anybody examined through Mr. Nordhoff?
Mr. Blount. No.
Senator Dolph. Any documents furnished you through him?
Mr. Blount. He brought me one day a letter from Dr. Trosseau, a physician there, the family physician of Mrs. Carter, an excellent lady (the wife of the ex-minister and sister of the chief justice and of Justice Bickerton, as I learned by accident). I think so; I have not had a chance to examine these papers. It seems to me that that paper this man sent to me—he wanted access to me, and he went to Nordhoff and Nordhoff wrote me a note inclosing these papers. They were in there. And it seems there was this communication from Nordhoff and a communication from this other man missing.
Senator Gray. There is a communication from a Frenchman who was the physician of this Queen as well as the other people.
Mr. Blount. There was a communication he sent. I did not like it. I never said a word to anybody about this paper from this physician, and I never sent for him. I made it a point not to get acquainted with him for some time after that occurred. For some time he used to come to the hotel, and for a long time I never met him. I did not care for anybody else to make suggestions. I said nothing to Mr. Nordhoff in any way about it; but I did not send for Dr. Trosseau. I did not like
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the paper. The paper I have in mind was in relation to the amount of distribution of the sugar stock—sugar interests of the royalists and annexationists. It occurred to me it was very plainly an unreliable statement, not that he meant to deceive, but he was a man of prejudices.
I did not care to examine him, because I thought that I could get persons whose judgment was better than Dr. Trousseau's. I do not mean to say he was not intelligent and a very fine physician—I knew nothing against him. I must add this qualification: Learning much later on that Trousseau and other persons were with the Queen when she learned of the landing of the troops, I sought from them the effect on her mind and on the minds of those about her. For this purpose I asked Dr. Trousseau to write me his recollections of this matter.
Adjourned to meet on Saturday, the 13th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
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Washington, D. C, Saturday, January 13, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senator Frye.
Absent: Senators Butler, Gray, and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF COMMANDER THEODORE F. JEWELL, U. S. NAVY.
The Chairman. Were you attached to the ship Boston in January, 1893?
Mr. Jewell. No.
The Chairman. Where were you when that ship was in Honolulu?
Mr. Jewell. I was here in Washington.
The Chairman. Have you ever visited the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Jewell. Yes; I was there twenty years ago, when Kalakaua was elected King.
The Chairman. To what ship were you attached then?
Mr. Jewell. The Tuscarora.
The Chairman. What was your rank and duty on that ship?
Mr. Jewell. My rank in the Navy was lieutenant-commander; I was executive officer of the ship Tuscarora.
Senator Frye. Do you mean that twenty years ago you were lieutenant- commander?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. How long did the Tuscarora remain at Honolulu then?
Mr. Jewell. She was there six weeks. This is to the best of my recollection.
The Chairman. Did the Tuscarora get there before the election of the King, or after it had occurred?
Mr. Jewell. She arrived there the day before the death of the former King; she was there before the election of Kalakaua.
The Chairman. And during the time?
Mr. Jewell. And during the time.
The Chairman. Did you go on shore after the ship arrived in the harbor?
Mr. Jewell. I was on shore occasionally in Honolulu, but not very
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much. The executive officer of a ship is usually pretty well occupied, and I was ashore only once or twice during the time we stayed there.
The Chairman. Did you attend the meeting of the legislative body that elected Kalakaua King?
Mr. Jewell. No, I did not. I was on board the ship at that time.
The Chairman. The contest at that time was between Kalakaua and Queen Emma?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you ascertain whether the Americans there who claimed Hawaiian denizenship, as well as those who did not, were in favor of Kalakaua or Queen Emma?
Mr. Jewell. It was the general understanding that English influence was supporting Queen Emma and that the Americans were supporting Kalakaua.
The Chairman. That was a marked fact in the situation?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, no question about it.
The Chairman. Did the Americans there, to your knowledge, take any active part in agitations, commotions, or insurrections?
Mr. Jewell. Not at all; no.
The Chairman. They stood aloof?
Mr. Jewell. The riots which occurred during Kalakaua's election were entirely among the natives. There were a number of Americans who were in the Government at that time. The minister of foreign affairs was an American.
The Chairman. Do you recollect his name?
Mr. Jewell. Charles R. Bishop was his name. But I think there was nothing in the nature of inflammatory meetings previous to this election.
The Chairman. Were troops sent on shore from the Tuscarora?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Was there any other American ship in the harbor at that time?
Mr. Jewell. Yes, the sloop Portsmouth was there, and men were landed from both ships.
The Chairman. About what number?
Mr. Jewell. I commanded the forces that were landed from the Tuscarora, perhaps 80 men, and perhaps the same number from the Portsmouth.
The Chairman. When you landed did you go armed and equipped for fighting?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you take rations with you?
Mr. Jewell. No; we did not take rations, but we were in close communication with the ship all the time. As a matter of fact, we did not subsist ourselves on shore.
The Chairman. On whom did you subsist?
Mr. Jewell. The Hawaiian Government.
The Chairman. Did you go ashore on the invitation of the Hawaiian Government?
Mr. Jewell. Yes; as I understand, at the request of the cabinet in the interregnum between the death of Lunalilo and the election of Kalakaua. The Government requested that men be landed if a riot should occur. It was anticipated it would happen because of the one that occurred at the election of the other King the year before. Capt. Belknap, who was in command of the Tuscarora, and who was the senior officer there, made some arrangement with Mr. Pierce, the
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American Minister, by which the men were to be landed if they were wanted.
The Chairman. Lunalilo, the former King, was King by inheritance?
Mr. Jewell. So; he was elected King.
The Chairman. Was it not this way; that he was a King by inheritance, and he ordered a plebiscite to see if the people favored his going to the throne?
Mr. Jewell. I am not prepared to say that; but I am quite certain that he was not King by inheritance.
The Chairman. You understand that at the time of his election riots had occurred?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Was it your understanding also on that occasion that American troops had been landed?
Mr. Jewell. I think not, but I am not prepared to say positively.
The Chairman. It was in the time of the interregnum, as you term it, properly between the death of Lunalilo and the election of Kalakaua, that the American Minister requested the commander of these ships to land troops?
Mr. Jewell. To be prepared to land troops in case of necessity.
The Chairman. Had the election of Kalakaua taken place before you landed?
Mr. Jewell. It had; yes.
The Chairman. But you were in a state of preparation?
Mr. Jewell. We were standing by. The captain of the Tuscarora went on shore on the morning of the election, about 9 o'clock, and left me in charge of the ship, with instructions to keep a look out on the American bark where one of our officers was stationed with a signal which was to be given to land the men if needed, and we were in a state of preparation all day. We got the signal about 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
The Chairman. Who was the ranking officer in order at that time?
Mr. Jewell. Capt. Belknap.
The Chairman. He had command of the forces on both ships?
Mr. Jewell. Yes. The senior naval officer, the ranking naval officer, is always assumed by virtue of his rank to be in command of the forces.
The Chairman. How many men did you land?
Mr. Jewell. We landed about 80 men. I do not know exactly as to the Portsmouth, but 80 men from the Tuscarora.
The Chairman. How many from the other ship, the Portsmouth?
Mr. Jewell. 75 or 80. I think the whole force numbered 150 men.
The Chairman. Did you spend the night on shore?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, we stayed a week; I myself was on shore four days; and at the end of that time one-half of the force was withdrawn and the remainder stayed three or four days longer.
The Chairman. What was the disposition of the people there when you landed as to their being peaceful or turbulent?
Mr. Jewell. There were several hundred people around the courthouse, the legislative building, when we got there. The courthouse was pretty well wrecked by the mob, was in possession of a mob of natives. They cleared out of the court-house the instant we arrived on the ground. We sent a small force into the building and the rioters jumped out of the windows and cleared out, although they hung around the grounds. They were making demonstrations and were talking loudly in their own language, which we did not understand, of course.
The Chairman. Did the mob make any fight?
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Mr. Jewell. They did not offer any resistance at all; no. There was one man who waved a club in front of a petty officer, but he took the man by the back of the neck and gave him a shake, and he was quieted.
The Chairman. Did you bivouack around the court-house that night?
Mr. Jewell. The men from the Portsmouth occupied the court-house, slept in the court-house.
The Chairman. Where did your men go?
Mr. Jewell. To the armory. This was a building in which there were several public offices, among them the captain's of the port; in one story there were some arms belonging to the Government, perhaps 100 stands of rifles.
The Chairman. Did you find the arms there when you got there?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Was there any organized force of the Government?
Mr. Jewell. I think nothing but the police. I have an impression that there was a militia company, volunteers or militia, but not in the service of the Government?
The Chairman. At that time did you ascertain that the Government had any regular troops?
Mr. Jewell. It has been so long ago that I can not remember. But my impression is that there was nothing organized in the Government service except the police force.
The Chairman. Did you take command of both forces?
Mr. Jewell. No; the executive officer of the Portsmouth was the ranking officer on shore. But Captain Belknap was in communication with us, and he was supposed to be in command. Although Capt. Belknap stayed on board ship every night, he was on shore every day, and our reports were made to him. The force from the Portsmouth had charge of the fort house and some other public buildings including the mint, the treasury, perhaps. I had charge of the prison and the armory. There was another significant fact connected with that landing. There was an English man-of-war in the harbor at the time. There had not been any prearrangement about the landing of her men; nevertheless, shortly after we got on shore, 75 or 80 men from the English vessel, under arms and organized, put in an appearance.
The Chairman. How long did they remain on shore?
Mr. Jewell. They remained some days; just how long I do not know. The men were not allowed to circulate very much about the town, and I kept myself pretty well confined to the barracks. But after the mob was broken up down at the court-house, the most of them went up to Queen Emma's residence, which was some distance away, and the troops from the English man-of-war, on the suggestion of Mr. Bishop, I believe, went up there to clear out the mob, and remained there. They went there to drive off the mob assembled around Queen Emma.
Mr. Jewell. Yes. I understand there were some incendiary speeches made at that time in the neighborhood of Queen Emma's residence, and perhaps Queen Emma made some remarks herself.
The Chairman. Were there any incendiary fires during the time you were on shore?
Mr. Jewell. No. The first night there were some stones thrown at the men from the Portsmouth, and a pistol shot; but in the part of the town where we were it was pretty quiet. We patrolled the streets the first night, and I do not know but that we did it after that. That
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is to say, we sent out a small body of men for two or three hours to break up any disorderly gathering.
The Chairman. Were there any arrests made by the American forces?
Mr. Jewell. A few of the rioters were arrested at the court-house; but they were turned over to the police right away. As a rule the native police mingled with the crowd; they were as bad as the rest of them.
The Chairman. Did any of the Kanakas appear to take sides with Queen Emma?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. I mean with Kalakaua?
Mr. Jewell. The popular feeling amongst the natives in Honolulu at that time was against Kalakaua; that is to say, it was in favor of Queen Emma. But there were plenty of the better class of Kanakas who were in favor of Kalakaua.
The Chairman. I suppose it was a question, if I gather it correctly, between the pure native element and the mixed element of whites and half-whites and the better classes of the Kanaka people?
Mr. Jewell. I am sure I would not know how to divide the feeling in that way; I gathered it from very limited communication with the shore; I have only a general impression in regard to it, that most of the lower classes, the commoner Kanakas, were in favor of Queen Emma, and it was generally supposed the English residents were, particularly the English minister-resident, or whatever he may have been. It was an intrigue in favor of Queen Emma, and they had incited these common people to this performance, this riot.
The Chairman. Do you know where Kalakaua was during your stay there?
Mr. Jewell. No, I do not.
The Chairman. Did you see him?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; I saw him frequently.
The Chairman. In his palace?
Mr. Jewell. I think I never saw him in the palace, though he lived there after his election was proclaimed.
The Chairman. Kalakaua remained in his palace after his election was proclaimed?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Before that time, did you know about him?
Mr. Jewell. I simply knew he was a clerk in the custom-house or post-office, or some other office.
The Chairman. Do you know where he was between the time of the death of Lunalilo and the election?
Mr. Jewell. I know he was in Honolulu.
The Chairman. But where—you do not know whether he was under the protection of any foreign ship?
Mr. Jewell. I know he was not.
Senator Frye. Who was it requested the troops to land at that time?
Mr. Jewell. It was understood that the request was made by Mr. Bishop, who was the minister of foreign affairs of the Hawaiian Government, to Mr. Pierce, the American minister resident; and between Mr. Pierce and Capt. Belknap—I do not know whether there was any written communication between them or not—but it was arranged between them that in the event of a riot the men were to be landed.
Senator Frye. Your troops did not bivouac down in the business part of the city?
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Mr. Jewell. Yes; the armory, where the principal part of my men was was right in the business part of the city.
Senator Frye. But up around the court-house and the Government buildings?
Mr. Jewell. That was not the business part.
Senator Frye. They remained in the court-house and Government buildings three or four days?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
Senator Frye. Under the law and naval regulations, what do you understand to be the rights of a United States naval officer touching the preservation of order in a naval city? I ask you that question because I noticed in reading the wording of the order which Capt. Wiltse gave to Lieut. Swinburne that he recited the protection of the consulate, the legation, the lives and property of American citizens, and to preserve order. What would you do as an officer if you were ordered to go ashore and do those things? What do you understand "preserving order" to be—what right would you have?
Mr. Jewell. Do you mean if I were actually in command of a body of troops which had landed to preserve order?
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Jewell. I should arrest disorderly persons. I should break up incendiary meetings and take the people into custody.
Senator Frye. Would you not do it in cooperation with the Queen or whoever was then in power?
Mr. Jewell. Unquestionably with the constituted authorities—yes.
The Chairman. You say that these troops were landed at the request of the cabinet which had been appointed by Kalakaua?
Mr. Jewell. No; the previous cabinet.
The Chairman. Which had gone out of office?
Mr. Jewell. It had not gone out of office—no.
The Chairman. Was that request communicated in writing?
Mr. Jewell. I do not know about that; but my impression is it was not.
The Chairman. Was the purport of that request communicated to you by your superior officer?
Mr. Jewell. Well, only in conversation. In giving me my instructions Capt. Belknap had told me what this arrangement was.
The Chairman. Were your instructions in writing?
Mr. Jewell. They were not; they were verbal entirely.
The Chairman. Be kind enough to state what orders Capt. Belknap gave you on that occasion, and upon what grounds he based his right to give you such orders?
Mr. Jewell. Do you mean the orders previous to the landing of the troops?
The Chairman. Capt. Belknap was in actual command of the forces while they were on shore?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. But while he was on shipboard you were the next in command?
Mr. Jewell. No; Lieut. Commander Clarke, of the Portsmouth, was the next in rank; but he was at the court-house, which was a quarter of a mile from where I was.
The Chairman. You were in command of the other detachment?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. And you received your orders and instructions from Capt. Belknap and not through Lieut. Clarke?
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Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. State what the instructions were that were given to you by Capt. Belknap to be executed by you in his absence.
Mr. Jewell. The general instructions were to preserve order and to keep myself confined as much as possible to the quarters which had been assigned to us; not to excite the natives to opposition. I also had orders to patrol certain streets of the town during the night, to prevent any disorderly gathering of the people and to arrest people who were guilty of disorder. I can not remember any specific instructions otherwise. The idea was that order was to be preserved in the town, and that we were authorized to arrest people and turn them over to the civil authorities.
The Chairman. And you did so?
Mr. Jewell. We had no occasion to arrest anybody.
The Chairman. There were persons arrested, were there not?
Mr. Jewell. Only during the first part of the riot when the troops arrived on the ground. Then men were arrested and turned over to the native police; but not after that.
The Chairman. But you did arrest persons on that occasion and under these orders?
Mr. Jewell. Yes. Capt. Belknap was personally at the court-house when the force arrived there.
The Chairman. Then, if I gather your position correctly, the troops were invited by the cabinet to come ashore for the purpose of preserving the public order.
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Was there anything in the situation that required you to participate on the one side or the other in any conflict or civil commotion that might occur among the people?
Mr. Jewell. No; nothing whatever.
The Chairman. You were ordered to preserve order, no matter who was disorderly?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. But you were there by the invitation and consent of the then Government?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Were you placed under the command of any military officer or authority of the Hawaiian Government?
Mr. Jewell. No.
The Chairman. You were acting under your own orders?
Mr. Jewell. Entirely so; yes.
The Chairman. The King did not appear on any occasion for the purpose of taking control of the forces?
Mr. Jewell. No. He took the oath of office the next day after his election, and all the troops on shore were paraded at that time.
The Chairman. Was that the day after you landed?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. They were paraded how?
Mr. Jewell. The forces from the two American ships, the Tuscarora and the Portsmouth, and those from the Tenedos, the English man-ofwar, were all at the courthouse to receive the King, and all presented arms when he passed into the building to take the oath of office.
The Chairman. Did he pass through the ranks?
Mr. Jewell. I think he did. I do not know exactly what the form was.
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The Chairman. Were there any other troops there beside the English and American troops?
Mr. Jewell. No.
The Chairman. And police force?
Mr. Jewell. Yes; I think the police were about, but not as an organized body of troops—not in the nature of a body of troops; they were in the crowd.
The Chairman. They were not a part of the receiving escort or force?
Mr. Jewell. No.
The Chairman. The King came then and took his oath of office?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. After he took the oath of office did he take any control of the troops under your charge?
Mr. Jewell. No; not the slightest.
The Chairman. You did not look to him for any orders in regard to the conduct of the troops on the island so long as you remained there?
Mr. Jewell. No.
The Chairman. If Capt. Belknap had any such orders you would have known it?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, I think so; yes.
The Chairman. It was then a body of American soldiery, so far as you were concerned, that was there at the invitation of the cabinet of the former King to preserve order, to put down riot, to arrest disturbers of the peace and those who had been assailing the Legislature?
Mr. Jewell. No; we were not to take any cognizance of anything which took place before the landing; we were only to arrest people whom we saw in the act.
The Chairman. People caught flagrante delicto?
Mr. Jewell. Yes; we took no notice of what happened before. The court-house was full of people; as we came into the front door they went out of the windows. But we did not arrest any of them. Capt. Belknap cautioned us to be discreet in anything we did, and not to assume too much.
Senator Frye. And you regarded what you actually did as very discreet?
Mr. Jewell. I did; yes.
The Chairman. In how many days did you return to the ship?
Mr. Jewell. My impression is that I went back to the ship in four days, when the force was reduced to one-half the original force, and I think the rest stayed four days longer, perhaps only three days longer. I think about a week our men were on shore.
The Chairman. Do you know on whose request it was that the troops retired from the islands?
Mr. Jewell. I think the first reduction of the force was made by Capt. Belknap without any request from the Government; but, after the new cabinet was organized, my impression is that the minister of foreign affairs wrote to the American minister resident and said that the occasion for the troops had passed and they might be withdrawn.
The Chairman. Do you remember whether the English forces were withdrawn before the American forces were?
Mr. Jewell. I think not; I think they remained about the same time.
The Chairman. You do not know, as a matter of fact, which of the forces actually withdrew first?
Mr. Jewell. No. I think our force was reduced before the English force. But to this day I do not remember seeing the English troops
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----50
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after they marched out of the court-house grounds up to Queen Emma's. I do not remember to have been brought into contact with them. As I said, we were in a different part of the city, and I confined myself and men to the barracks.
The Chairman. Did you have a flag when you went on shore?
Mr. Jewell. We carried our flag with the battalion.
The Chairman. Did you raise any colors on any pole or house?
Mr. Jewell. No.
The Chairman. You know nothing about these later transactions of January, 1893?
Mr. Jewell. Only what I gathered from the newspapers.
The Chairman. I would be glad to have you state anything that pertains properly to this question.
Mr. Jewell. In regard to this landing in 1874 I would say that there were at that time in the pro-English press of Honolulu, and have been since, charges made that we interfered at that time in the internal affairs of Hawaii. But I think nobody paid any particular attention to them. So short a time ago as December, 1892, an article appeared in a paper called The Illustrated American, published in New York, which charged that the American minister and American troops had interfered in the affairs of Hawaii in 1874, and had kept Queen Emma, who was "the rightful heir to the throne," off of the throne, and put Kalakaua in her place. I wrote a letter denying every statement in that paper, which I felt certain was inspired by some of the English-feeling people in Honolulu. I was told afterward that that was the case. It was full of misstatements, and I felt more or less indignation at the way in which they talked about the disgraceful manner in which the troops had taken part in the affairs of Hawaii. I replied to it. I did not know but what that brought me before this committee.
The Chairman. Possibly so; but in making up your replies to that article did you think over the whole situation as it occurred and refresh your memory about it?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. And you are satisfied that your statements here are correct?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
Senator Frye. Have you a copy of that communication?
Mr. Jewell. No; I have not in my possession.
The Chairman. Do you remember whether or not before you left the ship with those troops Kalakaua was elected by the Legislature or was the election pending?
Mr. Jewell. I had not been informed as to the result of the election. We embarked our men by signal from shore—the signal was made on this American bark—and before I knew anything about the election I had my men on shore.
The Chairman. But the preparation about which you spoke as having been made on the ship, to hold yourselves in readiness, to stand by, you say was begun before the election took place?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Some days before?
Mr. Jewell. No, the morning of the day of the election.
The Chairman. You knew that the election was about to take place?
Mr. Jewell. Yes; a special session of the Legislature had been called for that purpose.
The Chairman. And the military preparation on the ship anticipated the election?
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Mr. Jewell. A few hours; yes.
The Chairman. And view of it, and in expectation that that election would create civil commotion?
Mr. Jewell. In the fear of it, that it might be so. I believe that the cabinet was rather severely criticised for not having made better preparation and for not having asked that the troops be sent on shore earlier.
The Chairman. I suppose that this preparation was made on board ship because of some request that had been made or intimated to the commanding officer by the cabinet?
Mr. Jewell. The arrangement was made between Capt. Belknap and Minister Pierce, but it was at the solicitation of the Hawaiian Government.
The Chairman. And in anticipation of the fact that there might or would be civil commotion at the time the election took place?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Had you ever had anything to do with the landing of troops before that?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Where was it?
Mr. Jewell. At Panama ; we took possession of that town for four or five days; that is, so far as we could. We did not come into contact with the people who were fighting there.
The Chairman. Was there any minister resident at Panama at that time?
Mr. Jewell. No; there was a consul-general.
The Chairman. Was the landing made at his request?
Mr. Jewell. I do not know. I knew very little about what led up to that.
The Chairman. What year was that?
Mr. Jewell. That was in 1872. The force of which I had command was landed to protect the Pacific Mail Company's property. Afterward a larger body was landed from the flagship, and went up into the city under the command of another officer.
The Chairman. Who was that officer?
Mr. Jewell. P. E. Harrington, at present a commander in the Navy.
The Chairman. Hou many ships did he have in port at the time?
Mr. Jewell. Only two. The Tuscarora was lying there, and she was about landing her men when the flagship arrived. The landing of the men was suspended for an hour or so until the captain could communicate with the admiral, when they were sent on shore. My instructions were then that I was not to go into the city, but to confine myself to the Pacific Mail Company's wharf. There was a great deal of merchandise which had just been landed from one of the Pacific Mail steamers.
The Chairman. What port were you at before you went to Panama?
Mr. Jewell. We had come up from Callao, I think.
The Chairman. Did you come up for the purpose of protecting the property?
Mr. Jewell. No. We came up for the purpose of taking a surveying party down on the isthmus, which was surveying for the inter-oceanic canal there. I also landed men when in command of the Essex on the China station at the request of the American minister in the capital of Corea. I landed men at Chemulpo and marched them up to Seoul, Corea.
The Chairman. Coming back to Panama. Was that a political strife that existed in Panama at the time of which you spoke?
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Mr. Jewell. I believe so—one of the periodical revolutions which nobody can account for.
The Chairman. How long did your troops remain on shore?
Mr. Jewell. I think about six days.
The Chairman. Did they camp on shore?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Was there any disturbance in the vicinity of your camp?
Mr. Jewell. No. Firing was going on all the time between these two parties, around corners, out of windows, etc., and every time we showed ourselves down on the wharf they would fire at us. They would fire at a light at night—amuse themselves that way; but never did any particular damage.
Senator Frye. But the troops from the other ship went up into the city?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. What distance was that; how far did they have to go to get into the city?
Mr. Jewell. Perhaps half a mile.
The Chairman. Did they remain in the city?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. And the American troops remained on shore until peace was restored—order was restored?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. You have no particular information as to whether either faction of the people there desired your presence?
Mr. Jewell. No, I do not know about that at all. I think the call was made by the Pacific Mail Company, in the first instance, for the protection of the property in transit—merchandise in transit. I believe we have certain treaty rights down there in regard to landing men.
The Chairman. Now, the Corean incident. What was the occasion for landing there?
Mr. Jewell. It was an excitement in Seaul, the capital. Threats had been made against the foreign population, and I think they were all more or less scared. I do not think they were in any very great danger. But the American minister wrote to me that he would probably call upon me for a small force for the protection of the legation, and soon after I received the letter I received a telegram from him asking me to dispatch the men.
The Chairman. You were in command of the ship at that time?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. How many men did you send?
Mr. Jewell. Twenty-five or 30—I think 30 men.
The Chairman. How long did they stay ashore?
Mr. Jewell. I think about a week; until quiet was restored.
The Chairman. That was not a political revolution, but it was an opposition of the natives to the foreign population in general?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. And you really landed for the purpose of protecting the American citizens there and the legation?
Mr. Jewell. Yes. There were other men-of-war there at the time and they all landed troops. That is to say, there was a French man-of- war, a Russian man-of-war, and a Japanese man-of-war. I think they all sent men up there.
The Chairman. Was there any other occasion when you have landed troops?
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Mr. Jewell. No.
The Chairman. IS it one of the standing orders or rules of the Navy that when the minister resident at a foreign port, or consul at a foreign port, requests the naval officer to land troops to protect the peace of the consulate, the naval officer is to do it?
Mr. Jewell. The officer in command of a vessel has to decide that when it comes up.
The Chairman. Upon the facts in every emergency?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
Senator Frye. He can not relieve himself for responsibility except by the orders of a superior officer?
Mr. Jewell. In no other way. He is responsible for any such landing or landings he may make. In my own case I had asked the admiral particularly in regard to the landing of men in Corea. I had asked him to give me instructions, but he said I would have to depend upon my own judgment in case of necessity, in case the request was made.
The Chairman. So that a naval officer in command at any foreign port is thrown upon his individual judgment as to the necessity or propriety of landing forces?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Is he bound to receive from the consuls or ministers of the United States their orders or requests or direction as being military orders?
Mr. Jewell. No.
The Chairman. Their orders address themselves to the naval officer's discretion?
Mr. Jewell. Yes, exactly. They come in the form of a request.
The Chairman. And they do not relieve the naval officer from responsibility as a naval officer.
Mr. Jewell. Not at all.
The Chairman. Whereas if the orders come from a superior authority the naval officer is bound to obey, and he is relieved from any responsibility in obeying?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Have you cruised much in the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Jewell. No; except that I have been three years on that China station; not otherwise. I was two years and a half in the Tuscarora, and I was in the Pacific then.
The Chairman. Is the Tuscarora a steamship?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Have you been on steamships during all your cruises out there?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. What are the nearest points where a coal supply can be obtained? I do not mean the place where supplies have been accumulated, but where the countries produce the coal?
Mr. Jewell. Nearest to Honolulu?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Jewell. I do not know of any. They have an inferior kind of coal in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, at Vancouvers Island. I think that is the nearest point.
The Chairman. Is that what is called the Seattle coal?
Mr. Jewell. It may be Seattle coal.
The Chairman. It is the same thing?
Mr. Jewell. I have no doubt it is the same thing; but it is not a good quality of coal.
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The Chairman. And that is the nearest point to Honolulu where coal can be obtained?
Mr. Jewell. I think so; yes.
The Chairman. What is the next nearest point?
Mr. Jewell. I do not know of any natural coal bed nearer than in Japan. I do not know any nearer place where they produce coal.
The Chairman. Have you ever used that Japan coal?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; used it invariably out there on the station.
The Chairman. Is it a good coal?
Mr. Jewell. Very good coal.
The Chairman. Is it abundant?
Mr. Jewell. Quite so; yes.
The Chairman. Where do you take it on board ship?
Mr. Jewell. Anywhere; but Nagasaki was the port nearest the coal mines.
The Chairman. You can get it in sufficient quantities at any point to answer your purpose?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Now, the next nearest?
Mr. Jewell. There are coal mines on the Siberian (Kamchatkan) coast, or it may be in the northern island of the Japan group. There was a coal that I tried out there; I think an inferior coal, and not a very large supply. Of course, there are also Welsh coals, and others to be found in Hongkong.
The Chairman. In Souch America are there any coal mines, the product of which is good for steam navigation?
Mr. Jewell. I do not recall any at this time, until you get down in the Straits of Magellan.
The Chairman. How is that coal?
Mr. Jewell. It is a good deal like Nanaimo (Vancouver Island) coal.
The Chairman. Is it an inferior coal?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Hard to get out?
Mr. Jewell. Not too hard to get out; but it is not entirely carbonized. It is a lignite. It is very light, bulky, and burns up rapidly.
The Chairman. You have no knowledge of coals in South America north of the Straits of Magellan?
Mr. Jewell. No; I do not remember any coal mines.
The Chairman. Where do you get coal in Australia?
Mr. Jewell. I do not know.
The Chairman. Did you ever coal a ship at Sidney, Australia?
Mr. Jewell. No.
Senator Frye. They have coal mines there?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Oh, yes. Suppose a fleet of war ships of a modern pattern, first-class war ships, were to sail from any European port, either through the Mediterranean or around the Cape of Good Hope, or around Cape Horn, for the purpose of attacking San Francisco—I will put that as the objective point—would they be able to bring from any European port coal enough to sustain them in their voyage to San Francisco and during a series of naval operations, which would include a siege, say often days, without the assistance of tenders?
Mr. Jewell. No; I think not.
The Chairman. They could not carry in their bunkers coal enough to include a naval operation of that much voyage and that much sea?
Mr. Jewell. No. There is a certain coal endurance which is assigned
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to these ships, certain number of miles, which is called the steaming radius of the vessel. I think, as a rule, that is exaggerated; at all events, a vessel would arrive on the ground empty. She would not have any coal left. I do not believe it would be possible for any vessel to arrive at San Francisco, under the circumstances which you have mentioned, without coaling in the meantime.
The Chairman. Then any foreign power that undertook to attack our Western coast and had possession of the Sandwich Islands, with a full supply of naval stores, wood, and coal at that point, would they have very much greater advantages than they would have in the absence of their occupation of that port?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Now, reverse the matter. Suppose the United States were in possession of the Sandwich Islands and had the supplies that would naturally be placed in such a position as that, would not that greatly increase the power of the naval defense of the United States?
Mr. Jewell. I should say, decidedly, yes.
The Chairman. Then I take it that you would regard the possession of the Sandwich Islands, the occupation of the Sandwich Islands, or some place there, as being of great strategic advantage as against any foreign country, either Asiatic or European, upon our coast?
Mr. Jewell. I think it would; yes.
The Chairman. In a commercial sense what would be the advantage of the possession of the Sandwich Islands by the United States?
Mr. Jewell. It is immediately in the track of vessels bound from San Francisco to New Zealand and Australia and all the Southern Pacific islands; and it is not far from the direct track between San Francisco and Japan and China. In fact, the sailing route from San Francisco to Japan and China would be in the immediate neighborhood of the Sandwich Islands.
The Chairman. What advantage would that be to the commerce of the United States, or to the United States as a Government, to have these resting places there in the center of the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Jewell. It would be an advantage to every steamship as a coaling point, and to other vessels for the purchase of supplies of various kinds, provisions, etc.
The Chairman. Is that very necessary or desirable in passing so vast an expanse of water as the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Jewell. Very desirable, but, of course, not absolutely necessary— ships can carry them across. If it can be done, it is desirable that the supply should be obtained frequently.
The Chairman. If the Sandwich Islands were in possession of some great commercial nation, like the United States, capable of caring for them and securing neutrality and all the requirements of maritime law, navigation, etc., would such an occupation by the United States as I have indicated be of advantage to the commerce of the world?
Mr. Jewell. Of course, it is always desirable to have a stable government in such an important point in the trade route as the Sandwich Islands, and in that sense it would be, of course, an advantage to the commerce of the world.
The Chairman. It would be to the advantage of the commerce of the world that any stable and great power should have the occupation of those islands, rather than a weak and uncertain power.
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Such as would be furnished by the native population of Hawaii?
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Mr. Jewell. Yes; I should think so.
The Chairman. I suppose you would consider that the commercial affairs of the world would be benefited by having in Hawaii a strong and just government?
Mr. Jewell. I should say so; yes, beyond question.
The Chairman. It would give confidence to capital to embark in trade, I suppose.
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. And increase the exports and imports of the different countries?
Mr. Jewell. I think so.
The Chairman. Do you know any place in any of the seas of the world where greater advantage can be bestowed upon the commerce of the world than could be obtained by the possession of the Sandwich Islands by a great maritime power, one that had the resources to preserve order and facilitate commerce?
Mr. Jewell. No; I do not know any more important point; no place that occurs to me at this particular moment.
The Chairman. Would you say that in a military sense the possession of Gibralter would be any more controlling or any more important to British interests in the Mediterranean than the possession of Hawaii would be to American interests in the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Jewell. I consider that Gibralter is an extremely important point for the English to hold, because it is one of a chain of forts which they hold and which connects the Suez Canal with the Atlantic Ocean, and perhaps it would be of greater importance to England to retain possession of Gibralter than that the United States should have possession of the Sandwich Islands.
Mr. Chairman. Because Gibralter is one of a chain of fortifications held by England?
Mr. Jewell. Yes; fortified posts.
The Chairman. Which protect England's access to and outlet from the Suez Canal?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. Suppose that there were a canal under American protection through Nicaraugua of equal capacity with, or greater capacity than, the Suez Canal, as a fortified port or place in a chain connecting Hawaii in the center of the Pacific Ocean with our possessions in the United States, the mouth of the Mississippi River, and the various bays and harbors that we have here and the fortifications at Key West, would you then consider that Gibralter is more important to the British people than the possession of Hawaii would be to the American people?
Mr. Jewell. It is hard to make a comparison of that kind; but if the Nicaragua Canal should be put through I consider that the possession of the Sandwich Islands by the United States would be absolutely essential.
The Chairman. And for the reasons that we have been just adverting to?
Mr. Jewell. Yes. I think it would be absolutely essential that the United States should take possession of those islands if the Nicaragua Canal is to be built.
The Chairman. You consider that the two propositions, the building of the Nicaragua Canal and occupation of Hawaii, either by including it in our territory or getting advantages there to enable us to have a naval station at that place, would be of the greatest importance?
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Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes. I say it would be absolutely essential to retain that control of the canal which we are bound to have.
The Chairman. Have you been to Honolulu more than once?
Mr. Jewell. No; only once.
The Chairman. Did you make any examination of Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Jewell. No; I did not.
The Chairman. I will ask you in regard to the Bay of Honolulu, and get you, first, to describe its area and in what way it is protected from the inflow of the waters of the Pacific Ocean.
Mr. Jewell. It would be impossible for me to give any idea of the area from memory, because I do not recollect. I only know that the harbor is inclosed within a coral reef, with the exception of the entrance to the harbor of Honolulu. It is entirely closed by the coral reef.
The Chairman. How does it compare in area, according to your present recollection, with the harbor at Boston?
Mr. Jewell. I should say it is more contracted than the harbor of Boston.
The Chairman. Is it more contracted than the harbor of New York?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. You consider New York Harbor, up East River and North River, out to sea?
Mr. Jewell. Yes. My impression is that Honolulu is not an extensive harbor; perhaps it is a mile and a half long and a few hundred yards wide. It has been twenty years since I was there.
The Chairman. On the land side it is surrounded, I believe, by elevations of land?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Considerable elevations?
Mr. Jewell. Quite high mountains along about the interior of the island.
The Chairman. Down about the coast?
Mr. Jewell. Within a short distance of the city.
The Chairman. Where heavy guns could be mounted to protect the harbor?
Mr. Jewell. Yes; Honolulu could be very easily fortified.
The Chairman. Take the best class of guns that we now have and mount them upon the best elevations, how far out would you say would be the radius of the defense that those guns would afford?
Mr. Jewell. You know the range of modern guns is very much greater than that at which any action would probably be fought. I am quite sure that batteries could be arranged to keep any foreign fleet from approaching Honolulu within 5 miles. But I have no doubt if guns were numerous enough they could keep them away still further.
The Chairman. That would be really a sufficient protection against the attack of a foreign fleet?
Mr. Jewell. I think so.
The Chairman. The fleet might destroy the town, but could not take possession lying out there?
Mr. Jewell. They could not take possession; I am not entirely certain that they could destroy the town, except by chance shots.
The Chairman. Such fortifications as occur to you as being possible on those elevations around Honolulu Bay and around the city of Honolulu would be sufficient ro assist in protecting a fleet that might be in the harbor?
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Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; a fleet could be protected in the harbor.
The Chairman. There is no land barrier between the city of Honolulu and the sea, the ocean?
Mr. Jewell. No, nothing except this coral reef, which is uncovered at low water.
The Chairman. Barely covered?
Mr. Jewell. Yes. You could walk over it some distance at low water.
The Chairman. Water batteries could be established on those coral reefs for the protection of the harbor?
Mr. Jewell. Well, I do not know about that. I should mistrust those coral reefs as a foundation, but they might be sufficiently strong.
The Chairman. If sufficiently good as a foundation, they are sufficiently high out of the water to form good water batteries ?
Mr. Jewell. Yes.
The Chairman. There is nothing to impede the fighting ship inside the harbor or those steamships outside the harbor that you would maneuver with?
Mr. Jewell. Nothing, except the contracted space within the harbor. There would be no space within the harbor for maneuvering vessels. But vessels could lie in the harbor, and by means of lines could be fought in almost any direction.
The Chairman. So that a vessel lying in Honolulu harbor would not be absolutely without power against ships outside?
Mr. Jewell. No; it is entirely open.
The Chairman. It is entirely open?
Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.
Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, for the convenience of the committee, I desire to put in the record certain naval regulations, and certain orders which I find scattered through these Executive documents in a very hopeless confusion; so much so, that it is almost impossible to find anything in there. I give in first an extract from every naval officer's commission which has been signed by the President. It is in these words:
- "And he is to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as he shall receive from me, or the future President of the United States of America, or his superior officer set over him, according to the rules and discipline of the Navy."
I have a copy of the rules, and it is very difficult to get hold of the book. These are the rules and regulations of 1893. I read from the title page:
- "The orders, regulations, and instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy, prior to July 14, 1862, as he may since have adopted, with the approval of the President, shall be recognized as the regulations of the Navy, subject to alterations adopted in the same manner. Section 1547, Revised Statutes."
On the opposite page is the following:
- "Navy Department,
- "Washington, D. C., February 25, 1893.
- "In accordance with the provisions of section 1547 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the following regulations are established, with the approval of the President, for the government of all persons attached to the naval service. All regulations, orders, and circulars inconsistent therewith are hereby revoked.
- "B. F. Tracy,
- "Secretary of the Navy."
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On page 9 is the following:
"ARTICLE 18.
- "1 . Officers of the line only can exercise military command,
- "2. Only officers on duty pay can exercise, or are subject to command, except as provided for in article 211.
- "3 . On all occasions where two or more ships' expeditions or detachments of officers or men meet, the command of the whole devolves upon the senior line officer.
- "4. At all times and places not specifically provided for in these Regulations, where the exercise of military authority for the purpose of cooperation or otherwise is necessary, of which the responsible officer must be the judge, the senior line officer on the spot shall assume command and direct the movements and efforts of all persons in the Navy present.
- "5. The senior line officer shall be held accountable for the exercise of his authority, and must not divert any officer from a duty confided to him by a common superior, or deprive him of his command or duty without good and sufficient reason."
On page 13 I read article 31:
- "Officers of the Navy shall perform such duty as may be assigned to them by the Navy Department."
On page 15, article 48:
- "Officers can not assume command of Army forces on shore, nor can any officer of the Army assume command of any ship of the Navy or of its officers or men unless by special authority for a particular service; but when officers are on duty with the Army they shall be entitled to the precedence of the rank in the Army to which their own corresponds, except command as aforesaid, and this precedence will regulate their right to quarters."
On page 20, section 5 of Article 54 is as follows:
- "The officer in command of a ship of war is not authorized to delegate his power, except for the carrying out of the details of the general duties to be performed by his authority. The command is his, and he can neither delegate the duties of it to another, nor avoid its burdens, nor escape its responsibilities; and his 'aid or executive,' in the exercise of the power given to him for 'executing the orders of the commanding officer,' must keep himself constantly informed of the commander's opinions and wishes thereon; and whenever and as soon as he may be informed or is in doubt as to such opinion or wishes, he must remedy such defect by prompt and personal application, to the end that the authority of the captain may be used only to carry out his own views; and that he may not be, by its unwarranted exercise, in any measure relieved from his official responsibilities, which can neither be assumed by nor fall upon any other officer."
Page 66, Article 280, is in these words:
- "1. He shall preserve, so far as possible, the most cordial relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States in foreign countries and extend to them the honors, salutes, and other official courtesies to which they are entitled by these regulations.
- "2. He shall carefully and duly consider any request for service or other communication from any such representative.
- "3. Although due weight should be given to the opinions and advice of such representatives, a commanding officer is solely and entirely
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- responsible to his own immediate superior for all official acts in the administration of his command."
On page 67, article 284:
- "On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof."
On same page, article 285:
- "The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or against any one within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to states as well as to individuals, and in the case of states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the state or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation can not be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required."
Now, I wish to give in the Consular Regulations of 1888:
- "Consular regulations prescribed for the use of the consular service of the United States."
Page following title page:
- "Excecutive Mansion,
- "Washington, D. C., February 3,1888.
- "In accordance with the provisions of law, the following revised regulations and instructions ٭ ٭ ٭ are hereby prescribed for the information and government of the consular officers of the United States.
- "Grover Cleveland."
- "Department of State,
- "Washington, February 3, 1888.
- "I transmit herewith for your information and government the accompanying revised regulations and instructions which have been prescribed by the President. They are intended to supersede those which have been heretofore issued by this Department, and are to be carefully observed in all respects.
- "I am, sir, your obedient servant,
- "T. F. Bayard.
- "To the several consular officers of the United States."
- "Article 7, clause 96, page 33. They are also reminded that the Navy is an independent branch of the service, not subject to the orders of this Department, and that its officers have fixed duties prescribed for them; they will therefore be careful to ask for the presence of a naval force at their port only when public exigency absolutely requires it,
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- and will then give the officers in command in full the reasons for the request, and leave with them the responsibility for action."
Now, I wish to give in an instruction from Secretary Gresham to Mr. Blount, taken from Executive Document 48, page 2:
- "Department of State,
- "Washington, March 11, 1893.
- "To enable you to fulfill this charge your authority in all matters touching the relations to this Government to the existing or other government of the islands and the protection of our citizens therein is paramount and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn."
Then, in Executive Document No. 48, page 455:
- "March 11,1893.
- "Sir: This letter will be handed you by the Hon. James H. Blount, Special Commissioner by the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands. You will consult freely with Mr. Blount and will receive any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command. You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.
- "Respectfully,
- "Hilary A. Herbert,
- "Secretary of the Navy.
- "Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
- "Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, etc."
Then, Document 47, page 6:
- "Honolulu, March 31, 1893.
- "Sir: You are directed to haul down the United States ensign from the Government building, and to embark the troops now on shore to the ship to which they belong. This will be executed at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of April.
- "I am, sir, your obedient servant,
- "James H. Blount,
- "Special Commissioner of the United States.
- "Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
- "Commanding Pacific Squadron."
Now, on page 487 of Executive Document 48:
- "United States Legation,
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.
- "Sir: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command, for the protection of the United States legation and the United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.
- "Yours, truly,
- "John L. Stevens,
- "Envoy Extraordinary, etc., of the United States.
- "To Capt. C. C. Wiltse."
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Then, page 487 of Executive Document 48:
- "Sir: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu
for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order. Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs, and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens. You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any changes in the situation.
- "Very respectfully,
- "G. C. Wiltse,
- "Captain U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Boston.
- "Lieut-Commander W. T. Swinburne,
- "Executive officer, U. S. S. Boston."
The affidavits I have are as follows:
STATEMENT OF A. F. JUDD, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
A short sketch of my life and antecedents may, perhaps, give more credence to what I may say. I was born in Honolulu on the 7th of January, 1838. My father, Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, came with my mother to these islands in 1828. My father was physician to the American mission that had been established here eight years before his arrival here. His profession necessarily brought him into close and confidential relations with the Regent, Kaahumanu, the young King, Kamehameha III, and the high chiefs, who were then a large and influential class. At their earnest request, my father left the mission in 1843 and took office under Kamehameha III, first as interpreter and as a member of the treasury board, and later as minister, which office he held till 1853. We lived for three years on the palace grounds, and for many years I, with the rest of my brothers and sisters, were in intimate companionship in school and out of it with the young chiefs.
I attended the first royal school for a while in which were the sons of Kinau, who became Kamehamehas IV and V, their sister, Victoria Kamamalu, who was Kuhina Nui under her brother, Kamehama IV. At the same school were Queen Emma, Mrs. Bernice Bishop, David Kalakaua, his brother, James Keliokalani, and Liliuokalani, whose name at that time was Lydia Kamakaeha Paki. Several of these went later with me to the second royal school, under Dr. Beckwith. I learned to speak Hawaiian, and have lived continuously in these islands to the present time, with the exception of four years spent in the United States at Yale College, where I graduated in 1862, and at Harvard, where I studied law, returning to these islands in 1864. I have also made several visits to the United States and one to Europe.
My father's record in doing as much as anyone towards the creation of the Hawaiian Government and preserving its independence against the efforts of Great Britain and France are matters of public history. From my association with the Hawaiian people, my frequent visits to all parts of the group, I consider myself well acquainted with the Hawaiians, and admire and love such good qualities as they do possess. I have not spared myself in efforts to enlighten them, having carried on for years temperance and religious work among them. I
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was secretary to the constitutional convention of 1864, and witnessed the debates of that body which led to Kamehameha V abrogating the liberal constitution of 1852 and promulgating that of 1864. In 1868 I was elected a member of the Legislature without visiting the district that returned me, and I was again elected in 1872, this time from Honolulu. Kamehameha V having died after the Legislature closed, at a special session I voted for Lunalilo in 1873 (January 7), and was appointed his attorney-general, which office I held until Lunalilo died.
The election of a King again coming to the Legislature in February, 1874, I voted for Kalakaua as the best available candidate. He was unpopular with the natives, and if the members of Lunalilo's cabinet, Messrs. C. R. Bishop, E. O. Hall, R. Sterling, and myself, had thrown our influence, with other prominent whites, in favor of Queen Emma, who was the people's favorite, she would have been chosen in spite of Kalakaua's efforts and bribery. But we felt that the influences surrounding Queen Emma were such that English sentiment and ideas would control. We were threatened with a state church, and feared that all the court atmosphere would be adverse to the cultivation of closer commercial and political relations with the United States, which, owing to our geographical position and growing commerce and the character of our white population, were essential to our progress and prosperity. Kalakaua was elected, and a riot occurred, in which the court-house where the election was held was sacked, native members of the Legislature were attacked and beaten, and the town was at the mercy of the mob.
Owing to the timely assistance of troops from the two United States ships then in port and also from the British vessel the riot was quelled. Kalakaua took the oath of office, stating at the time (which I interpreted) that he had intended to promulgate a new constitution, but the riot had prevented it. The Government went on. I was appointed second associate justice of the supreme court February 18, 1874, promoted to first associate 1, 1877, and on the return of Kalakaua from his tour of the world was by him appointed chief justice November 5, 1881, which office I now hold. Having my chambers in the Government building I have been familiar with the political changes that have taken place during the past twenty years, have known all the twenty-six cabinets during Kalakau's reign, and have been kept informed of all important matters of state.
Our law reports and our published opinions will show nothing that would indicate on the part of the supreme court any aversion to a monarchical form of government for these islands. We maintained the personal veto of the sovereign as a constitutional right against much public pressure and under like circumstances of pressure declared in favor of the Queen Liliuokalani's right to appoint her own cabinet on her accession. It was my wish and hope that the autonomy of this archipelago should be preserved for many years to come. That we would lose it eventually was a belief shared by all—English, Americans and Hawaiians—owing to the fading of the native race and the want of material to make kings and queens of.
The justices of the Supreme Court were kept in ignorance of the league which resulted in obtaining from Kalakaua the constitution of 1887. Just before its promulgation Justice Preston and myself were invited to assist in its revision, which we consented to do under a written protest that we did not approve of the method of its promulgation as being unconstitutional. I think that both the coup d'etat of Kamehameha V and the revolution of 1887, though both were accomplished
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without bloodshed, lessened the respect of the Hawaiian for the constitution and encouraged the attempt of Robt. Wilcox, in June, 1889 to rebellion and the promulgation of a constitution that would restore the lost prerogatives of the King.
I tried Wilcox for conspiracy to commit treason and had to discharge one Hawaiian jury for violent conduct while in the jury box. The second jury acquitted him in spite of his own testimony admitting all the acts which constituted conspiracy. The testimony of that trial showed that Kalakaua was a party to the conspiracy, and only because he was afraid that it would not be successful he failed to go to the palace and promulgate the constitution. The native soldiers were in sympathy with Wilcox's plans, as also many of the native police, and Wilcox also relied upon V. V. Ashford's promise that the Honolulu rifles which he commanded would not help against him.
Mr. Ashford was very lukewarm in his efforts to dispossess the rebels of the Palace grounds and the Government building. I was a personal hearer of the altercations between him and his brother, C. W. Ashford, who was then Attorney-General. The Attorney General would urge one plan and another, always to be rebuked by Col. Ashford with the statement that it could not be done, or that he, the Attorney-General, knew nothing of such matters. It was mainly owing to the volunteer citizens soldiery who rallied to the support of the Cabinet that the rebellion was put down by force in which seven Hawaiians were killed and others wounded. Liliuokalani disavowed to me her knowledge or connivance with Wilcox's plans, but the fact that the armed party under Wilcox assembled at her own house in the suburbs and started from there to the Palace, gives credence to the belief that she knew of it.
At Minister Merrill's request marines from the U.S.S. Adams were landed and stayed all the afternoon and night at the legation, which was in one of the cottages of the Hawaiian Hotel, and close to Col. Ashford's headquarters. This went far to quiet apprehension of mob violence that night. The U.S.S. Boston troops were accustomed during their stay here to land weekly for drill and parade. We have for many years been accustomed to this spectacle from other ships of the United States Navy and occasionally from ships of other nationalities. As I have said, twice before the l6th of January, 1893, when the Boston troops landed, have we seen them land to protect American life and property. I knew Capt. Wiltse intimately. He often came to my house and often assured me that his instructions were to remain passive and only to use his forces for the protection of American life and property.
I do not deny that both Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse were not in sympathy with the disgraceful plans of those in the Legislature and out of it who would force a national lottery upon us that the history of Louisiana proved to us would, in time, have captured the entire Government, and that they both wished for purity in government in our community and for what all good Christian Americans would desire for this country and for their own. Such gentlemen could not from their nature sympathize with what was corrupting or vile. But I affirm that not in all my intercourse with these gentlemen have I heard any expressions from either of them that would lead me to hope or expect that they would use the forces of the United States in any violent act against the Queen's forces or in aid of any insurgents. The constant presence of ships of the United States Navy for years and years past has assured us that they would protect American life and property, and this assurance was the same whether the troops were landed or
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kept on board. Let others who were of the committee of safety and leaders of the movement of January 17 speak for themselves of their actions not known to me. My narrative is what came to my personal knowledge.
During the first part of the Queen's reign she was very friendly with the moral and Christian portion of our community, attending social and religious gatherings of the ladies in their various societies and contributing to their benevolent work. I felt that she was sincere in her intentions to rule wisely and well and to leave government to her cabinet, and I did all I could to make my friends trust her. On one occasion, owing to the public scandal created by her having around her in the palace women of bad repute, and both men and women of doubtful reputation invited to the palace balls, I had had a long conversation as to the necessity of purifying the atmosphere about her. She expressed sympathy with my views. But I knew from others that she was dissatisfied with the constitution of 1887; that she thought Kalakaua had yielded too tamely to the pressure and that she would not.
I knew from the native newspapers that the politicians were persuading the Hawaiians that the property qualifications of a voter for nobles being too high for the mass of them, practically deprived them of rights which they thought they ought to have and gave them to the white man. I was well aware that when the common native has his race prejudices excited on the stump and in his newspapers he is apt to think that all his ills and all his poverty are owing to the supremacy of the white race in this country. But Liliuokalani had been educated in Christian schools, had had advantages of association with the best people of our communities and with the cultured of all nations here as visitors, and I did not think that all this would go for naught when the time, as she thought, had come for her to assert herself as Queen of the native race alone. I had been frequently told that she disliked me and my influence, but I have never received any personal indication of it.
It was not until the Legislature was well along that her friends, I among them, began to fear that she was insincere. It could not be understood why she kept the appropriation bill so long after it passed the Legislature, or why she postponed the prorogation of the Legislature beyond the time set for it by the Legislature. The session had been long and fatiguing. The lottery bill had been the subject of most intense feeling in the community and of discussion in the newspapers of this city, and its adherents were shamed out of its advocacy. It was considered a dead issue. The act to reorganize the judiciary department was approved by the Queen only on condition that the cabinet propose an amendment that the district magistrates should be commissioned by the sovereign on the nomination of the cabinet in place of the law as it had stood for many years, whereby the chief justice, with the approval of the other justices, should commission them on the nomination of the cabinet. The cabinet yielded for the sake of peace.
This was to my mind the first open indication that she was desirous to regain the power that Kalakaua had either surrendered or which had been taken from him by statute. The appointment of 26 magistrates of her adherents all over the islands would give her great power. The next step she took was to refuse to commission Mr. Frear as circuit judge under the new act. Mr. Frear was in all respects the best available man for the place. I took the liberty of advising her to
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----51
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appoint him and used every argument that the facts justified. She wanted to appoint Mr. Antone Rosa. I told her of facts that unfitted him for the place, but they had no effect, and it was not until her adherents, among them Paul Neumann, told her that if she had promised her cabinet to appoint Mr. Frear that she must do so, that she signed the commission.
The paper-money bill having been defeated, and the lottery bill being considered dead, and a ministry possessing the confidence of the men of character, wealth, and intelligence of this country—G. N. Wilcox, M. P. Robinson, P. C. Jones, and Cecil Brown—having been appointed, the appropriation bill having been signed (usually the last act of the Legislature), the community were generally relieved and confidence was being restored, when events occurred which explained the Queen's delay in the matter of the appropriation bill and the postponing of the prorogation. Six among the best members of the Legislature had left town, some for the other islands and some for the United States, and one to England. The justices of the supreme court had shortly before this in a reply to the Legislature expounded the constitution to mean that to oust a ministry on a vote of want of confidence it would require the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Legislature, exclusive of the cabinet; that is, 25 votes were essential.
On the 4th of January, 1893, Mr. J. E. Bush, then an adherent of the Queen, though in the early part of the session he was violently opposed to her, introduced a vote of want of confidence in the Wilcox-Jones cabinet. It failed by a vote of 19 to 22, but rumors were thick that it would be tried again. Suddenly, on the 10th of January, the lottery bill was called up and after but little discussion it passed its second reading by a vote of 20 to 17. Only one white man voted for it. It was brought up again on the next day and passed its third reading by a vote of 23 to 20. This was considered as a test vote adverse to the cabinet, and the opposition lacked only two votes to oust the cabinet, twenty-five being the requisite number. On the 12th of January the Queen gave a lunch to the opposition members at noon. The members came into the House looking serious and excited. Two natives who had hitherto voted in favor of the cabinet came in from lunch with yellow wreaths on, which the Queen had given them. I found out that she had begged them to vote the ministry out, appealing to their loyalty to her and to their native land.
Mr. C. O. Berger, a noble (German), had promised that he would not go to the Legislature again, but at noon he was promised that his father-in-law, Judge H. A. Widemann, should form the new cabinet, and he went to the House, and, with W. H. Cornwell (who did not vote for the lottery bill owing to his mother's persuasions, who came to the Legislature and labored with him), the twenty-five votes were secured. The promise to Mr. Berger, was made by Mr. Samuel Parker, who went off as if to the palace from Mr. Berger's office and returned as if he had secured the Queen's consent. The resolution of "want of confidence" was introduced by J. N. Kapahu, member from Kau Hawaii. It expressed no reasons and was put to vote and carried without discussion.
When the lottery bill and the vote of want of confidence were passed the lobbies were full of natives, half-whites, and low foreigners, who gave vent to their feelings of joy by shouts, hurrahs, tossing up their hats, shaking hands, and all rushed out all jubilant as the House adjourned. The feeling all over town was intense and despair was seen reflected on many faces, but as yet all that was done was within the law. Mr. Berger and others tried to get members to coalesce and repair the mischief,
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but it was too late. A quorum was secured on Friday p. m., the 13th January, and the new cabinet came in with their commissions, Parker, Colburn, Cornwell, and Peterson. Mr. Parker had that morning told Mr. Widemann that he could go into the cabinet with himself. (Parker), Peterson, and Colburn. Mr. Widemann told me that he could not go into the cabinet with such a man as Colburn, and declined, and so the office of minister of finance was given to Cornwell.
On Saturday morning the cabinet announced that the Queen had signed the lottery and opium bills, and the Queen at 12 o'clock prorogued the Legislature. I think the Queen approved the opium bill and suppressed the Chinese registration act to please the Chinese, from which class she expected contributions of money, and she approved the lottery bill to please the natives and to get favor with the class of whites who opposed the "Missionaries," besides wishes for the revenue it would yield. Mr. John Phillips, one of the promoters of the lottery bill, said to a friend of mine, when every one was debating whether the Queen would sign it, "She will sign it; there is too much in it for her." That Saturday morning it leaked out to me that Bill White, the member from Lahaina, had said that after the prorogation the natives were all going to the palace and the Queen would proclaim a new constitution.
I went down town and mentioned this rumor to several persons, but only a few believed it. While near Mr. Hartwell's law office I saw Mr. Colburn (the minister) drive up and go into Mr. Hartwell's office, and thought it was a very strange proceeding, as he seemed excited and in a great hurry. Returning to the Government building I met Peterson, who looked very much agitated, and he said he did not expect to remain in office over a day or so. A large crowd of natives was collecting in the Government building premises and there was a general air of expectation. The ceremony of prorogation went off as usual and at the close the chamberlain invited us over to the palace. This was not unusual. I urged my associate, Justice Dole, to go to the palace with Justice Bickerton and myself, telling him my fears that the Queen was going to proclaim a new constitution. Jude Dole had another engagement and declined to go. I then noticed from my balcony that the Hui Kalaiaina, a political association, were marching out of the yard to the palace. They were all dressed in evening dress, with tall hats, banners, and badges, and marched two and two. In the front rank was John Akina carrying a large, flat package in front of his breast, suspended by ribbons about his shoulders. This was the new constitution.
When I reached the palace the Hui Kalaiaina were already in the throne room in regular lines, constitution in hand, and their president, Alapai, had an address to deliver which he had open in his hand. In their rear were members of the Legislature and the corridors were crowded with natives. We, i.e., the diplomatic corps, justices, Governor Cleghorn, and the young princess, President Walker and staff officers, were stationed in our usual positions for a state ceremony. But the Queen and cabinet did not come. They were closeted in the blue room. We waited and waited. I asked, in turn, Cleghorn, the princess, President Walker, the diplomatic corps, the staff officers, what the delay meant. No one knew. I told them my suspicions. One by one these person's left their positions, some went home, some went to the dining room. We waited.
Little by little we ascertained that the Queen was urging the cabinet to approve the new constitution. Wilson told me in great emotion
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that he had been fighting the battle alone all the morning and that the Queen was determined to proclaim a new constitution. He said the constitution was her own compilation. The members of the Hui Kalaiaina said that the constitution came from the Queen to them. Parker told me later that he staid by the Queen, for he was afraid if left alone she would sign the constitution, take it out to the people, proclaim it from the palace balcony, and say that her cabinet and judges would not approve of it, and tell the people to look out for them. Every one knows how quickly Colburn and Peterson, when they could escape from the palace, called for help from Thurston and others, and how afraid Colburn was. to go back to the palace. I sent messages to her twice to be excused from further attendance, but received answers to wait a little.
The troops, 100 in number, with ball cartridges, were kept all day in line in front of the palace. Finally, at about 4 p.m., the cabinet came in. Parker, in tears, told me the Queen had agreed to postpone the promulgation. Then the Queen came in angry, defiant, and yet under perfect control. Her speech I wrote down that evening and it was published. I asked a good many who heard it if my account was correct, and they said it was. She did not withdraw the constitution, she merely postponed its promulgation on account of the obstacles she had met with, and told the people to go to their homes and wait for it. This was understood by the natives to mean that the ministry had prevented it, for as soon as she had left the throne room, J. K. Kaunamano (member from Hamakua) turned to the people behind him (the room was full of natives) and said in a loud, excited tone, "What shall we do to these men who thwart our desires?" He was quieted by myself and others, and I then left the palace. I feel convinced that the Queen formed the idea of having a new constitution which would make her supreme long before she became Queen. She hesitated before taking the oath to the constitution of 1887, and only because Cummins and others, including Gov. Dominis, her husband, told her she had better swear to it that she did.
The new constitution restored to the Queen the right to appoint the Nobles, which virtually placed the whole legislative power in her hands. The justices of the supreme court were to be appointed for six years, which virtually destroyed the independence of the judiciary. The ministry were to hold at her pleasure, which would make an autocrat of her. This new constitution would have made it impossible for white men to live here. With the Legislature bribed as we know the last one was, and changing their votes at the will of the Queen, and a hostile Queen and a subservient cabinet, there was no safety for us or our property. This justified the revolution.
The mass meeting held on Monday afternoon, the 16th, showed the leaders of the revolution that they would be supported. This made cowards of the cabinet. How could they attempt to use force when they knew their Queen was wrong? They were aware that something serious was planned. It was in the air. Parker knew of it from what he said to me. Being unaware that Wilson's force was insufficient to take and hold the Government buildings it seemed strange to me that he did not take possession during Sunday or Monday. It is very easy to say that the Boston's men overthrew the Queen. They did nothing more than has been done often before—to land with the intention of protecting American interests if imperiled. The Queen's adherents had neither the character nor the ability to resist. Men are not eager to risk their lives in a bad cause.
I resume the narration. I did not attend the mass meeting, but had
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conversations all day with many persons of prominence, and some of those who are now royalists were fierce in their denunciations of the Queen. We all felt satisfied that in some way the Queen's policy would be defeated, but just in what way I could not tell. The people seemed determined and were satisfied to leave their cause in the hands of the committee. It was wise not to divulge openly their plan of overturning monarchy. The Queen's proclamation of Monday that she would not attempt a new constitution again and was impelled to the step by stress from her native subjects had no effect. This last statement was untrue. Even Mr. Widemann told me that it was a piece of folly, as it did not announce the resignation of the cabinet and indicate a new one in whom the country had confidence.
It is not true that the new constitution came from the people. It was the Queen's own idea and design, and her adherents had spread her sentiments among the people. It was admitted to me that she had shown this constitution to her ministers, Parker, Peterson, and Colburn, even before their appointment, and that they had promised to support her in it. They were only impelled to oppose her when she was attempting to carry out the scheme by fear of the consequences. Mr. J. O. Carter told Mr. P. C. Jones and myself on Saturday evening, the 14th of January, that both Cornwell and Colburn were in fear of their lives when they escaped from the palace, and were only induced to return and face the Queen again by strong persuasion on his part.
On Monday evening the Boston troops landed. Being then an outsider I knew nothing of the proceedings of the committee of safety. There were many rumors afloat as to what they would do, etc. All I really know is that the troops from the Boston marched up King street past the palace and Government building without pausing and camped in Mr. Atherton's premises, nearly half a mile from the Government building; and it was not until 9 p. m. that they found quarters in Arion Hall. This hall is a low wooden building in the rear of the Opera House and completely hidden by it, and commanded neither the palace, the Government building, nor the barracks. It was the only place convenient for men to sleep in that was available then. Its location was not to my mind significant of any intention on the part of the United States troops to defend any uprising against the Queen's Government. The Boston's men did not move from their quarters all day Tuesday, the 17th, nor did they make any demonstrations of any kind. No one outside of the committee of safety knew definitely what the plan was. It was apparent, however, that something important was to happen. Mr. Parker told me at about noon on that Tuesday that at 4 p.m. they, the cabinet, would be all out. The people were gathering in knots in the business part of the town, especially on Fort street. I heard a shot, saw the smoke of the pistol, saw a wagon dash up street near the corner of Fort and King streets. The crowd rushed up there to hear what it was, and soon the report came that a man in charge of an ammunition wagon had shot a native policeman who was trying to stop him. Soon the crowd swelled to great numbers. Finding the excitement too intense for me to remain longer in suspense, I walked with Mr. Paty to the Government building and saw a small number of persons gathered about the front door and listening to Mr. H. E. Cooper reading a proclamation. It was then near 3 p. m., and the reading was about half concluded.
As I passed the lane between the opera house and the Government building where Arion Hall was, I did not look at nor did I think of the U.S.S. Boston's troops, though I knew they were there. There were
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none in sight. As the proclamation finished I passed through the crowd, recognized my friends as in the movement, saw Col. Soper stripping a towel from a rifle, and at the foot of the staircase saw a man armed with a ritle. I passed upstairs and told my clerk to close up all the rooms and went down again to find arranged in a line from the staircase to the front door a body of armed men in ordinary clothes, and recruits were constantly coming in. I then walked back to the center of the town, which was full of people, all business being suspended and many of the shops shut.
Our fear was that the marshal would attempt to arrest Good, who had shot the policeman, and that this would precipitate a riot. I stood with the crowd and heard all the talk. Soon I learned that the ministers were in the station house with the marshal and a body of armed men with a gatling gun. It was said that when the Americans in the station house heard that the movement was for annexation to the United States they said they would not fight for the Queen on such an issue. We saw the Queen's cabinet go in pairs in carriages from the station house to the Government building and return. Things looked very critical. Some said that Minister Stevens had refused to recognize the Provisional Government, some said that he had or would; no one seemed to know.
I was then quite fatigued with the excitement and lack of food and went home to learn soon after that the force at the station house had surrendered and that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government, and that martial law was declared, etc. No one in the crowd, whether sympathizers with the Queen or not, suggested that the United States troops would help obtaining possession by the Provisional Government of the station house. My two eldest sons had gone off to the headquarters with their rifles in the afternoon, one with my knowledge and the other without it. I was informed by President Dole within a day or two that if the station house had not surrendered the building would have been surrounded, and as the men showed themselves, sharpshooters posted on the high building commanding it would pick them off, and, without food or water, it would only be a matter of time that they surrendered.
The committee when they went to the Government building from W. O. Smith's office believed themselves to be in extreme peril. They were not armed. They were exposed to attack by the Queen's troops coming from the barracks through the palace premises, and every man of the committee could either have been arrested as they came up to the Government building or shot down after they arrived, so far as a spectator could see, for there was no force supporting the movement in sight. An exhibition of force on the part of the revolutionists before the proclamation was read might have caused their arrest to be attempted and this would have precipitated a conflict.
It was evident to me that no one of the Queen's party dared to strike a blow, for at that time the indignation against the Queen was intense and nearly universal among the white people. The natives stood in astonishment, not knowing what was going on and saying nothing. If Marshal Wilson and the cabinet ever intended to resist the movement, they had ample time to do so, as they had from Saturday afternoon to Monday evening before the troops from the Boston had landed to attempt to place guards at all the Government buildings, and even to attempt the arrest of the leaders of the intended movement whom, Wilson well knew. I am informed that Chas. J. McCarthy, a man of military experience, and lately the clerk of the Legislature, spent Monday
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night in the Government building expecting a force of 50 or 100 armed men sent to him from the station-house, chafing because they did not come. By Tuesday night the Provisional Government had such accessions of men and arms that they were amply able to cope with any internal force.
I say, further, that my statement to Col. Blount was in response to explicit questions already apparently formulated in his mind and asked by him, and that I did not feel at liberty to volunteer information upon topics not covered by any of his questions and especially upon the matter of the alleged use by Mr. Stevens of United States troops to overthrow the Queen. My interview was on the 10th of May, 1893, and Col. Blount had evidently already settled that matter in his own mind. When I asked him to see some other gentlemen, naming them, he politely told me it was not necessary, but said he would ask Mr. P. C. Jones—but did not.
A. F. Judd.
Honolulu, December 4, 1893.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]
Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM C. WILDER.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
William C. Wilder, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have been a member of the Legislature of the Hawaiian Islands twice; I was elected in 1888 to fill the vacancy caused by my brother's, Samuel G. Wilder, death; and was elected representative for the first Honolulu district in 1892.
The conduct of the Queen became such toward the end of the session as to lead me to believe that she was determined to regain the powers taken away by the constitution of 1887; things went on from bad to worse until the 14th of January, 1893, when the Legislature was prorouged. When it was reported on that morning that the opium and lottery bills were signed and the Cornwell-Parker-Peterson cabinet came in, the tension of public feeling became most intense; every one felt that there was trouble in the air, but it was not on account of the ousting of the Wilcox reform cabinet. If matters had ended there, there would have been no uprising.
The reform members of the Legislature did not attend the prorogation, more as a protest against the unlawful acts of the Queen than anything else. When, however, after the prorogation, the Queen attempted to abrogate the constitution and proclaim a new one, which would have restored the ancient despotic rights of the throne, and would have trampled under foot all further semblance of liberty in Hawaii, the respectable, conservative, and property interests of the country, without any prior meeting or plans, simply arose in protest and to defend their rights. From what I saw, I have no hesitation in saying that the Queen's act in attempting to abrogate the constitution and promulgate a new one brought about the revolution.
The condition of the country was then very critical, politically and
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financially. The latter, because that the solid moneyed people of the country had lost all confidence in the Government, which was not then able to meet demands against it, particularly withdrawals from the postal Savings bank, which were increasing until there was almost a panic; and politically, because the course of the Queen during the whole course of the legislative session had been such as to cause a total loss of confidence of nearly the whole of the white portion of the Legislature and of the business people of the community.
For ten days prior to noon of Saturday, January 14, the day that the Queen attempted her revolutionary act, the U.S.S. Boston with Minister Stevens on board had not been in port. There had been no revolutionary meetings or conferences; such a thing had not been thought of. There had not been any consultation with Minister Stevens with regard to the matter, though of course he must have seen what a perilous condition the country was getting into. There were several meetings at the office of W.O. Smith, that day after the attempted promulgation of the new constitution. I was not present at the first impromptu gathering; at that meeting I was named as one of the committee of safety. A telephonic message was sent to me to meet the committee that evening, and again we met at his office. The only business done besides talking over matters was the appointment of the committee to canvass and report what arms and ammunition and how many men could be secured.
Another committee was appointed, of which I was a member, to call upon Minister Resident John L. Stevens to discuss the situation. We went at once and talked over the whole matter, and we asked what his course would be should we take possession of the Government and declare a Provisional Government. Mr. Stevens replied that if we obtained possession of the Government building and the archives and established a Government, and became in fact the Government, he should of course recognize us. The matter of landing the troops from the Boston was not mentioned at that meeting.
The next meeting of the committee of safety was held at W. R. Castle's house, where we were in session a good part of the day. We reported the result of our conference and received the report of the committee on arms and ammunition; after further discussion of the situation, we finally decided to call a mass meeting, and thereby ascertain the exact sentiment of the community.
The next meeting of the committee was at Thurston's office, Monday morning, at 9 o'clock. During its session Marshal Wilson came and warned us not to hold a mass meeting. Some negotiations had been going on between members of the Queen's cabinet and Mr. Thurston, on behalf of the committee of safety, of which I knew nothing except the fact of such conference; but at that meeting I was appointed one of a committee to wait on the cabinet to receive their communication in answer to the matter discussed by them with Thurston. We went to the government building and met the cabinet; they stated that they declined any further negotiations. I asked Minister Parker what was the meaning of their calling a mass meeting at the same hour at which ours was called; he replied to keep people from going to your meeting. The mass meeting called by the committee was held at 2 o'clock, and, in spite of threats and opposition, was an immense and overwhelming affair, with but one sentiment, and that was to resist further aggression ol the Queen.
At the request of many citizens, whose wives and families were helpless and in terror of an expected uprising of the mob, which would burn and destroy, a request was made and signed by all of the committee,
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addressed to Minister Stevens, that troops might be landed to protect houses and private property. It was not presented until after the mass meeting. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon another meeting of the committee of safety was held, at which it was decided to make the attempt to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Provisional Government. Troops were landed about 5 p.m. from the Boston, about 150, 1 should think. A squad was stationed at the residence of the United States Minister, another at the consulate, and the remainder were lodged, after considerable delay in procuring suitable quarters, at Arion Hall. It seemed to be the only available building that night, and it was also a very central location without regard to any of the government buildings.
I was not present at the next meeting of the committee, which was held that Monday evening at the house of Henry Waterhouse. Another meeting of the committee of safety was held Tuesday morning, at which arangements were completed. The executive and advisory councils were appointed and the proclamation was prepared; it was well known through the town that we would attempt to take the Government that day; the plan was for the two councils to meet the volunteer forces at 3 p.m. at the Government building. We were assured of a force of at least 150 well-armed men at that time. At half past 2 o'clock a wagon loaded with guns and ammunition, on its way through the town to the point of rendezvous, was attacked by some policemen, who attempted to capture it. Our guard shot and wounded one of the police officers, whereupon they desisted and the arms and ammunition were duly delivered. The incident caused great excitement, during which the two councils proceeded to the Government building, getting there about twenty minutes ahead of our forces. On our arrival we asked for the cabinet, and were informed that they had gone to the station house.
We then took possession in the name of the Provisional Government, and the proclamation was then read at the front door. During the reading our forces began to arrive, and in a few minutes we had not less than 130 well-armed and determined men, and after that they continued to arrive all the rest of the day. We had been at the building but a short time when a messenger, Deputy Marshal Mehrtens, arrived from the station house. He asked President Dole to call on the cabinet at the station house for a conference. President Dole informed the messenger that he was at the headquarters of the Government, and if they wished any conference they would have to come there, and assured their messenger of their safety in coming, and stated that a military escort would be furnished if needed. Shortly after two of the ministers, Parker and Corwell I think, came up, followed soon by the other two. On learning that they had not read the proclamation, it was read to them, and a demand was made for the immediate surrender of the station house. It was then getting towards dark, and Parker said he would like to have the matter settled before night to avoid collisions in the street. He said, " I see you have a good many armed men here." He asked if, before giving the answer, they be allowed to confer with the Queen. President Dole said it would be allowed, provided representatives from the new Government were present, and Mr. Damon was sent with them.
Soon after reading the proclamation, notice was sent to all the foreign and diplomatic and other representatives stating the facts and asking that the new Government be recognized. Not very long after this, messengers from Minister Stevens came to see whether the new Government was actually in possession of the Government building,
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archives, etc. After satisfying themselves they retired. As nearly as I can recollect it must have been half past 5 o'clock when an answer from Minister Stevens arrived. The conference was then going on with the Queen, and his answer was not made known and published till after the surrender of the station-house, Queen, and barracks.
Some time between 4 and 5, I think, Capt. Wiltse, of the Boston, visited our headquarters, and he was asked if we would be recognized as the Government. He replied that he would not until we were in possession of the barracks and station-house and were actually the de facto Government.
During the whole of this affair, while it is true the United States forces were on shore, they in no way whatsoever assisted in our capture of the Government or in deposing the Queen. They did not even go out upon the streets; they were spectators merely, and it is very fortunate that their services were not required duriug the previous night. It seems to me very probable that had it not been for the restraining influence of their presence there might have been rioting. As it was, two incendiary fires were started.
A few days later I was sent to Washington as one of the annexation commissioners. I returned early in March, and I think Blount arrived on the 29th of that month. I called upon him and let him know that I was thoroughly acquainted with the incidents connected with the revolution, and would be very glad to furnish him with all the information within my power. Such information, however, has never been asked for, and I furnished no statement in any way to him.
Dated Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4, 1893.
W. C. Wilder.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]
Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF J. H. SOPER.
J. H. Soper, of Honolulu, Oahu, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is colonel commanding the national guard of Hawaii; that he has read the published extracts from the report of Col. Jas. H. Blount, late commissioner of the United States in Hawaii, and American minister resident; that certain statements in said report are incorrect and not founded on fact; that it is not true that affiant left the meeting of the citizen's committee held at Mr. Waterhouse's house in Honolulu, on the evening of January 16, 1893, either alone or in conrpany with any other members of the committee until the meeting adjourned; that he did not visit Mr. Stevens, American minister, alone or in company with others at any time on that day; that he did not report to said committee that he had full assurance from said Stevens that he, the latter, would back up the movement, nor did he report any remarks as coming from said Stevens; that he did look for recognition by said Stevens in case a de facto government was successfully established, but he was well aware that no assistance would be given by the American minister in establishing such de facto government.
And he further says that he furnished to Lieut. Bertollette, of the U.S.S. Boston, a full statement of the arms and ammunition surrendered by the Queen's followers to the Provisional Government, and also a
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statement of the arms and ammunition in the hands of the supporters of the Provisional Government prior to such surrender by the Queen; that the supporters of the Provisional Government had a larger number of effective rifles than had the Queen's followers; that at Mr. Blount's request he furnished to him a copy of said report on June 10, 1893; that Mr. Blount appears to have made no mention of the same in his findings; that the arms of the Provisional Government were in the hands of white men who knew how to use them, and about whose determination to use them there could be no question. That affiant informed Mr. Blount, as was the fact, that the chief reason for his hesitating to accept the appointment of colonel was that he had no previous military training.
Dated Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4, A.D. 1893.
Jno. H. Soper,
Colonel Commanding N.G.H.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]
Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF ALBERT S. WILCOX.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
My name is Albert S. Wilcox; was born on the island of Hawaii in the year 1844; my parents were American missionaries. I reside on the island of Kauai; served as a representative from Kauai in the Legislature during four sessions; was a member of the Legislature of 1892. On Saturday, the 14th of January last, I attended a meeting of the citizens of Honolulu at the law office of W.0. Smith. I distinctly remember John F. Colburn, then minister of the interior, being present at that meeting, and hearing him state to that meeting, in substance, that the Queen was intending to force a new constitution, and that she had already attempted to force the cabinet to agree to it; that they had escaped or got away from the palace and desired the assistance of the citizens to oppose her attempt.
A committee of safety of thirteen was appointed at that meeting, of which committee I was a member. That committee met that afternoon late and considered the situation. I attended a meeting of the same committee the next morning at the residence of W.R. Castle. The situation of public affairs was such that it was apparent to my mind, and I am confident that it was apparent to the mind of every member of the committee, that the Queen's Government could no longer preserve the public peace and had not the power to protect life and property, and that it was incumbent upon the citizens of Honolulu immediately to take measures to counteract her revolutionary conduct and to establish a government in the interest of law and order. At that meeting I resigned my position as a member of the committee, deeming that my interests on the island of Kauai required my personal attendance there, and that my place on that committee could be better filled by a permanent resident of Honolulu. At no time did I hear any proposition or suggestion to the effect that Minister Stevens or the United States forces would assist either in the overthrow of the monarchy or in the establishment of the Provisional Government.
I wish to state now that I served in the different sessions of the
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Hawaiian Legislature for no other reason than because I wished to do all that I could to assist the Hawaiian race, for whom I have great personal regard and aloha, in preserving if possible, a national government. I had an earnest desire to sustain the Hawaiian national institution. As I went through those sessions I was slowly convinced against my will of the difficulties of maintaining a monarchy, but it was not until the last revolutionary act of the Queen that I became convinced that a Hawaiian monarchy was inconsistent with the preservation of peace and prosperity and the protection of property in the islands. Until then I had never been an advocate of annexation to the United States, but had been opposed to it and had done all in my power to make it unnecessary.
I observed the landing of the United States forces on Monday evening; it was not done in pursuance of any request that I made myself, but I understood then that they were landed for the purpose of protecting the property and lives of Americans, but in no respect for the purpose of assisting the committee of safety.
Albert S. Wilcox.
Subscribed aud sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]
Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF C. BOLTE.
C. Bolte, of Honolulu, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he was born in Bremen, in Germany, and is 41 years of age.
That he resided in Germany until 1878, when he came to Honolulu, where he has ever since resided.
That he is vice-president of the firm of M.S. Grinbaum & Company, a mercantile corporation, which has continuously existed as a firm and corporation, and has done business in Honolulu since 1866.
That he was interviewed by Mr. James H. Blount, American minister resident in June, 1893. That during this interview, on several occasions, he objected to the method employed by said Blount, and he remonstrated with him that he did not put his questions fairly. That said Blount asked his questions in a very leading form, and that on several occasions when affiant attempted to more fully express his meaning said Blount would change the subject and proceed to other matters.
That affiant, seeing that in his testimony the Queen, and the Government under the Queen, were being confounded, prepared a statement, a copy of which is as follows, and handed the same to said Blount in June last, and requested him to insert it in his report in the proper place; affiant at present being ignorant whether this was done or not.
"The answers which I have given to Mr. Blount's questions, 'When was for the first time anything said about deposing or dethroning the Queen' might lead to misunderstanding in reading this report. I desire, therefore, to hereby declare as follows: Words to the effect that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not uttered to my knowledge at any meeting of the committee of safety until Monday evening, January 16, 1893; but at the very first meeting of citizens at W. O. Smith's office on Saturday, January 14, at about 2 p. m., or even before this meeting had come to order, Paul Neumann informed the arriving people that the Queen was about to promulgate a new constitution. The answer then given him by Mr. W. C. Wilder, by me, and by
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others, was: That is a very good thing and a splendid opportunity to get rid of the whole old rotten Government concern and now to get annexation to the United States. Paul Neumann thought that that might be going a little too far.
"At the second meeting at W. O. Smith's, between 3 and 4 p. m. on Saturday afternoon, January 14, 1893, when the committee of safety was appointed, sentiments of the same nature, that this is a splendid opportunity to get rid of the old regime, and strong demands for annexation, or any kind of stable government under the supervision of the United States, were expressed
"Therefore, even if the words that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not spoken, surely the sentiment that this must be done prevailed at or even before the very first meeting, on January 14, 1893.
"Honolulu, June 1893.
"C. Bolte."
Dated Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4,1893.
C. Bolte.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]
Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE N. WILCOX.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss.
My name is George N. Wilcox; I was born on the island of Hawaii in the year 1839 of American parents, who were missionaries in the Hawaiian Islands. My home since early childhood has been upon the island of Kauai. I was a representative from Kauai in the Legislature of 1880, and have since, as an elected Noble from the island of Kauai, served in four different sessions of the Legislature. In November of 1892 I was appointed by the Queen a member of her cabinet as minister of the interior, and remained such until by a majority vote of one of the Legislature the cabinet of which I was a member went out of office, on the 12th day of January last. On the 14th day of January last I was present in the afternoon at a meeting of the citizens of Honolulu in the law offices of W. O. Smith, where I learned from John F. Colburn, then the minister of the interior, that the Queen had attempted to force a new constitution, and that her ministers had refused to sign it and were ready to resist her attempt if the citizens would join in assisting them in their opposition.
The committee of safety was chosen at that meeting to take steps to preserve the public peace and secure the maintenance of law and order against the revolutionary acts of the sovereign. Up to that time I had, to the best of my ability, tried to sustain and support the Hawaiian monarchy, and especially in the interests of the Hawaiians to keep a clean and honest Government. Holding public office was something which was contrary to my personal wishes and interests; I had no personal objects to accomplish and no friends whose interests I sought to further, my sole desire being to help, as far as I could, to preserve the institutions of Hawaii; and it was not until that Saturday that I felt that the monarchy was no longer practicable, or able either to sustain itself or to be sustained by the intelligence of the country. No statement
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was made to me, nor was I aware that either Minister Stevens or Capt. Wiltse would assist or did assist the citizens of Honolulu in establishing the Provisional Government, or in overthrowing the monarchy. It was evident to me that the overthrow of the monarchy was due to its own inherent rottenness.
G.N. Wilcox.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]
Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN EMMELUTH.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
John Emmeluth, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows, to wit: I was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, and came to this country in February, 1878, and have been here since that time engaged in my business of tinsmith and plumber. I have accumulated some property and am married to a resident of the islands. I was nominated a member of the committee of public safety and was appointed one of the advisory council of the Provisional Government.
I know James H. Blount from seeing him once when I called with other members of the advisory council. The visit was never returned. He never said anything to me about the country, its resources, or history, or asked me any questions about the revolution. I tendered my statement through Mr. S.M. Damon, and understood that I would be notified when Mr. Blount was ready, but never heard anything from him.
Prior to the 14th of January I had become aware that a new constitution was to be promulgated and of the tenor of it by reason of a conversation between Arthur Peterson and John F. Colburn that I accidentally overheard in the office of John F. Colburn while I was waiting for his brother, the drayman. I stepped to the rear entrance of the warehouse, which is immediately adjoining his little private office, and while standing there I overheard Arthur Peterson remark to Colburn that the Queen had decided to promulgate a new constitution and that she would have no minister that would not agree to signing it and assisting in its promulgation, and that if he, Colburn, were agreeable to that that under the circumstances he could have the portfolio of minister of the interior.
This was on the Thursday previous to the announcement of that Colburn-Peterson cabinet. Colburn asked Peterson who the other members of the cabinet would be, and he told him Sam Parker and Billy Cornwell. Colburn agreed to go into that cabinet under those circumstances, and Peterson told him to go to the Queen with as little delay as possible and tell her that he was willing to go under that arrangement. I went back to my store, and standing in the front door within three minutes after Colburn came out in his brake, drove up along Nuuana to Merchant and up Merchant street, which leads to the palace. That was the last I saw of him that day. On the afternoon of the 14th, after the prorogation, it was noised about the town that the constitution would be promulgated. During the early part of the day I saw the members of the committee of the Hui Kalaaina that were to carry the constitution to the Queen to be signed.
Among the supposed members of that committee of the Hui Kalaaina
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I recognized at least twelve of the Queen's personal retainers, and the rest of them were men so old and decrepit that they would not know what they were doing in a matter so important, and there was not a solitary member of that committee that could have stated any ten good reasons why he wanted a new constitution, and I felt in my mind at the time that it was a crime to permit anything of that kind to go on. I was very busy that day my line of work, and about 2 o'clock, in going out to Waikiki, I saw the crowd gathering and heard that they were discussing the matter of promulgating the constitution, and on my way back I came in on horseback. Just as I got to the palace gate the Queen stepped out on the balcony upstairs and addressed the natives that were gathered in the grounds there.
They came together, and I rode on horseback about half way into the yard, sufficiently far in to hear what she had to say, and in Hawaiian she addressed them and told them that owing to the perfidy of her ministers she was unable to give what they and she so much cherished, but that she would guarantee them that within the following week they should have the constitution. I was not aware at that time that there had been any meeting of citizens. Not until I was on my way home I met Judge Hartwell and he told me of it. The following morning I was told that there was to be a meeting at the house of W. R. Castle, and that I was expected to be there. I went over and had a conversation with Mr. Thurston at the time, and spoke of the situation. At a meeting later in the day I attended, and from that time on became an active participant.
The committee of public safety had as a basis for organization the different companies of the old Honolulu Rifles. Taking them as a basis they worked up the membership by taking the old lists and finding as many as were in town of the old members and getting their consent to work for the cause. Company A is the only one I can speak of; every member of the old company under Capt. Ziegler that was at hand signified his willingness to stand by this movement. The membership, if I recollect Capt. Ziegler's conversation, was 63 at the time of disbanding, and of the 63, 60 reported for duty. There never was at any time any anticipation on the part of the committee as a whole or of myself or any of the other members, to my knowledge, that the forces of the Boston were to land for the purpose of assisting the committee.
After we had seized the Government building and while the proclamation was being read, Company A drew up in line on each side of the building. Members of Company B, if I recollect right, came up in front and a third company in the rear of building; in all, I should say, about 180 men arrived within the five minutes. Of Company A everyone had his arms, his Springfield rifle, and the other companies were armed with private weapons and such as they could gather together, but they were all armed, all of those 180 men. A little after the reading of the proclamation the committee retired into the office of the minister of the interior and there congregated around the large table. I don't remember in what order they came, but among the business transacted was the sending out of notices to the different representatives of the foreign powers of the establishment of a government de facto.
There was an order issued to close the saloons. I forget what time martial law was declared. I doubt if I could give the events in the succession in which they occurred. I remember the individual instances. I distinctly recollect young Pringle coming in there and taking observations. I remember Lieut. Lucien Young coming in there,
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and late in the evening I remember Capt. Wiltse calling on us. During the interval I remember Deputy Marshal Mehrtens coming in—that was a very short time after the Government was organized—with a request that the Government should go down to the station house aud meet the cabinet down there. They declined to do that, but sent a committee consisting of Sam Damon and C. Bolte to the station house. That committee afterwards returned with Sam Parker and Billy Cornwell.
Sam Parker and Billy Cornwell came in there and after a conversation they in company with Sam Damon, if my memory serves me right, went over to the palace to see the Queen. I am quite sure that Bolte didn't go with them on that errand. Sam Damon was the only one that went on that errand. Sam Damon returned after a time and it was then given out that the Queen had agreed to surrender under protest and that she would give instructions for the station house and the barracks to be given up to the Provisional Government. In the meantime we removed to the minister of finance's offices, and it was there that Sam Nowlein, in command of the Queen's military, late at night— it must have been 8 or 9 o'clock—reported to President Dole, and the President told him to keep his men together and all arms inside the barracks for the night; nothing should be disturbed, and he should simply carry on their routine duties within the inclosure for that night. Nowlein asked whether he would mount guard as usual in the palace inclosure, and he was told no.
The reason why I fail to recollect much of what transpired there was from early in the day, that is, very soon after our getting into the building, we agreed that all conversation should be conducted by Mr. Dole himself in order to prevent a confusion of ideas, and for that reason I did not store up things as rigidly as I might have done if I had a personal say in the matter. I was busy outside about the organization of our forces. I met a number of Company A, and as soon as Company A entered the building I went out and found the old stand-bys of 1887 and 1889 and had a conversation with them. They were all ready for doing any duty that was required of them, they were well armed and had ample ammunition.
I consider that the trend of things for twelve years back to my recollection has all been in the direction of the revolution, for the reasons of the corruptness of the Government; the debaucheries and social infamies that were being practiced constantly in and about the palace. I saw that those things could not go on in a community that claimed to be Christian, such a thing could only reach a certain state where public safety and the best interests of the nation would demand reform. From my knowledge of things and my observation of the workings of the monarchy I was thoroughly satisfied that it was only a matter of time when a different form of government would have to be established here, and very soon after my coming here I came to the conclusion that these Islands rightfully and justly belonged, on the point of both their dependence and proximity to the United States, I felt that they were a part and parcel of the American States, and I have been an annexationist for the last twelve years.
Insertion and corrections made by—
John Emmeluth.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]
Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
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AFFIDAVIT OF F. W. McCHESNEY.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
F. W. McChesney, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I was born in Iowa, came to Honolulu in 1885, where I have since been engaged as a partner in the house of M. W. McChesney & Son in the wholesale grocery and feed business established in 1879, doing a large volume of business. I was a member of the committee of public safety and of the advisory council of the Provisional Government up to a few days prior to June 28th, 1893, on which day I went to the United States for a visit.
I saw James H. Blount land at Honolulu, but never met him nor had any conversation with him.
I signed a roll with other citizens in the office of W. O. Smith on the afternoon of Saturday, January 14, 1893, pledging myself as a special police officer in support of the cabinet against the proposed aggression of the Queen, and was in the same office at the meeting of citizens when the committee of public safety was appointed. There was talk at the meeting of the committee at W.R. Castle's, on the next (Sunday) morning, of having resolutions abrogating the monarchy and pronouncing for annexation, offered at the mass meeting; but it was decided to keep within bounds, while matters were to be made perfectly plain. It was reported by Mr. Thurston that the Queen's cabinet had gone back on us, so we decided to proceed without them.
I never understood at any time that the United States troops would fight our battles; they might come ashore to protect life and property and all of those who wanted to go to them during the rumpus, but they were not going to do any fighting for us. I thought we could overturn the Government on short notice after getting our men and arms together and then after our new Government was formed they would recognize us and protect us if any armed force was needed.
The committee of safety had taken pains to investigate the force opposed to us and found that the Queen had only 80 men at the barracks and that Wilson had about 125 regulars with possibly 75 special police, among whom were only about 12 or 15 white men, and the forces surrendered showed these to be facts.
Had fighting actually been necessary we would have had 600 men armed and with plenty of ammunition.
The committee agreed to go up to the Government building at 3 o'clock, and broke up at 2:30, when the shot was fired on the corner of King and Fort streets, and we said: "Now is the time to go." For it seemed as though the fighting would begin, so we all started at once. I jumped into a hack and went home for my pistol, and got back just as the others were entering the yard. They all walked up in plain view, and were pretty close together. When we first got into the building, after the proclamation was read, about 25 or 30 men of Ziegler's company came from the old armory, and then we adjourned to the minister of the interior's room to start up the new Government. We had sent word round to the different squads we had ready and waiting to be at the Government building at 3 o'clock. We counted on 100 men. But we got there ahead of time—at fifteen minutes before three—and after that they came in pretty thick; so that we must have had 150 men there. We addressed letters to the different ministers asking them to recognize us. To this letter Mr. Stevens sent an aid down (Mr. Pringle) to see if we actually had possession. Mr. Dole said: "You see we have
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----52
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possession, and have troops here to protect us." Then he took a look around, and politely bowed and left.
During this time we had sent for the old cabinet and they came in. They sent word that they were afraid to come, but we sent word that everything was perfectly safe, so Cornwell and Colburn came, then the other two. We told them what had been done and gave them a copy of the proclamation and demanded the surrender of the Queen and the station house and barracks. They asked for time to go and see Her Majesty. We positively refused to let their guards patrol the town during the night. Mr. Damon went with them to the palace. We refused to let them have time until the next day.
During all this time, in response to our call for volunteers, they were coming in pretty thick, and presently word came back from the palace that the Queen surrendered, but wanted ten minutes' time for Marshal Wilson to get out of the station house; a protest came, too, which Mr. Dole received. Captain Wiltse came in just before the surrender, and said he had come to see if we had possession. He said, "Have you got possession of the palace, barracks, and the station house?" Mr. Dole said, "No, not yet; we are now arranging that." "Well," he says, "you must have them before we can recognize you as a power; we can not recognize you when there is another Government across the street." While he was speaking a tap came on the door and the others were returning with the Queen's surrender.
About this time Mr. Stevens's recognition came, and then Mr. Wodehouse, the British minister, came to see if we had possession and what we were doing. We told him and gave him a copy of the proclamation.
Then we went ahead getting ready for the night. We tried to get things in shape before dark as near as we could. I recollect I came out just before dark when we were talking about preparing for the night in case of trouble, as it had been threatened that the town would be burned. We began getting guards to go out over town, and as I looked around I counted at least 150 men there. Before dark we sent 20 men to the police station with Capt. Ziegler. There were so many things happening between 15 minutes to 3 until dark that it is hard to tell what came first.
During our meetings from the 14th to the 17th we had been looking up men, arms, and ammunition, and in every meeting had reports. We had figured up about 200 of the old Honolulu Rifles besides from 400 to 600 citizens that would shoulder a gun if it became necessary. We had to make estimates, as we could not expect to succeed without backing. We counted on those men as ready in squads around town to be at the building at 3 o'clock.
As to the causes which led to the revolution at the time the Jones cabinet was fired I know positively, for I was on the street all the time, that there was awful indignation about it all over town, and the question was raised then as to what would become of the country, and that the citizens would have to take care of themselves, something would have to be done. I took part in the revolutions of 1887 and 1889 both. It was always the brains and moneyed men of the country against the King and the ignorant. The best class of people took part in all three revolutions. They started the revolution of 1887, and they defeated the revolution of 1880, protecting the King when they thought he was trying to do what was right. When the news came that this Queen had tried to give us a new constitution I knew that the good citizens would have to take hold and do something.
At the time the Queen adjourned the Legislature in the way she did
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I first got the idea of actually starting in and using force to dethrone her. As soon as that kind of talk became general we began to hear threats of having our property burned. We called on the minister to bring the troops ashore to protect lile and property, by which we meant to prevent any fires which we expected and had been threatened.
We never agreed in council nor was the question ever brought up that the Provisional Government would join with the Queen in submitting a controversy to the Government of the United States. The controversy was settled then and there when the Queen surrendered.
F. W. McChesney.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of December, A. D. 1893
[SEAL.]
Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
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WASHINGTON, D. C, January 15,1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The chairman (Senator MOrgan) and Senators Gray and Frye.
Absent: Senators Butler and Sherman.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF PROF. WILLIAM DEWITT ALEXANDER.
The Chairman. I want to ask you some questions about your supreme court. I do not know whether in your constitutional paper you have said anything about the supreme court.
Mr. Alexander. Yes; I have.
The Chairman. The supreme court consists of five judges?
Mr. Alexander. Three at present.
The Chairman. Is that the law at the present time?
Mr. Alexander. At present.
The Chairman. It has been changed from five to three?
Mr. Alexander. In 1880 the law was passed increasing the membership of the supreme court bench to five, and afterward a law was passed which provided that no vacancy should be filled until the membership was reduced to three, and that it should remain at three.
The Chairman. Has the membership been reduced to three?
Mr. Alexander. Yes. At the last session of the legislature a bill was passed reorganizing the courts on a new plan.
The Chairman. And provision was made in that law for the supreme court?
Mr. Alexander. The supreme court in the last bill was made a final court of appeal, and provided that no judge should have a case to come before him in which he had previously sat.
The Chairman. Does the supreme court consist of a chief justice?
Mr. Alexander. And two associate justices. Before that the supreme court judges held circuit courts, and there was complaint about that.
Senator Gray. On the ground that it was an appeal from Caesar to Caesar?
Mr. Alexander. Yes; they abolished that system.
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The Chairman. Who were the supreme court judges of Hawaii?
Mr. Alexander. A. F. Judd, R. F. Bickerton, and W. Frear. The first is chief justice and the other two are associate justices. They are in for life—good behavior. They can be impeached.
The Chairman. Mr. Dole, the present President of the Government, was a member of that court?
Mr. Alexander. Yes; he resigned.
The Chairman. Did he resign during the reign of Liliuokalani?
Mr. Alexander. Yes; the last day of her reign, or the day of the revolution.
The Chairman. On the 14th or 16th of January?
Mr. Alexander. I think it was the morning of the 17th.
The Chairman. To whom did he address his resignation, to the Queen?
Mr. Alexander. To the cabinet.
The Chairman. Are you positive about that?
Mr. Alexander. No.
The Chairman. It was to Liliuokalani or her cabinet?
Mr. Alexander. Undoubtedly.
The Chairman. He did not resign to the Dole Government?
Mr. Alexander. No.
The Chairman. You are sure of that?
Mr. Alexander. I think so; but that is rather an inference on my part. The fact can be accurately ascertained. The new Government had not been organized. I think there is reason for believing it was to the old government that he resigned.
The Chairman. Did Mr. Dole's resignation leave 3 judges on the bench?
Mr. Alexander. No ; it would leave 2.
The Chairman. You have just stated that the court consisted of three members, and you gave their names.
Mr. Alexander. The question, then, is when Frear came on to the supreme court bench.
The Chairman. Did Frear take Dole's place?
Mr. Alexander. I think he did; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Who appointed him?
Mr. Alexander. Frear had been appointed during the Queen's reign to the position of circuit judge when Jones and his colleague were ministers.
The Chairman. The Wilcox cabinet?
Mr. Alexander. Yes; I think they appointed him circuit judge.
The Chairman. When did Frear become a supreme court judge?
Mr. Alexander. He was appointed to take Mr. Dole's place.
The Chairman. By the House?
Mr. Alexander. By the present government, I think.
The Chairman. I would like to have those facts accurately, if I can get them.
Mr. Alexander. I can verify it when I go home.
The Chairman. I wish you would; I would like to get those things down right. Have you any knowledge of a case where a clerk of the supreme court was removed because of disloyalty?
Mr. Alexander. I have heard of a case.
The Chairman. Who is the party?
Mr. Alexander. F. Wunderberg.
The Chairman. Is he a man who had been previously connected with some of these political affairs?
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Mr. Alexander. Yes; he took an active part in this last revolution.
The Chairman. On which side?
Mr. Alexander. On the side of the revolution. He was one of the committee of safety. He was employed to look up arms.
The Chairman. Is there any other person of his name who has been connected with these political affairs?
Mr. Alexander. No; he was tried before the court on this charge.
The Chairman. Before what court?
Mr. Alexander. The supreme court.
The Chairman. Was he the clerk of the supreme court?
Mr. Alexander. He was clerk of the supreme court.
Senator Gray. When was he tried?
Mr. Alexander. Well, it was recently.
The Chairman. Under the Dole government?
Mr. Alexander. Yes.
Senator Frye. It was treason under the Dole government?
Mr. Alexander. Yes. He had a hearing before the court, and I think he had an attorney. I think C. W. Ashford assisted him as attorney. The case was argued before the court.
Senator Gray. What was the result of the trial?
Mr. Alexander. I know the judges removed him.
The Chairman. For disloyalty to the Dole government?
Mr. Alexander. Yes.
The Chairman. Was some one appointed in his place?
Mr. Alexander. Yes; but I am not certain now who it was.
Senator Gray. What sort of trial was it? Do you mean it was an indictment for a criminal offense, treason, and regularly prosecuted?
Mr. Alexander. No; I think it was not a trial.
Senator Gray. It was an examination before the judges, who had the power of appointment to that position, for the purpose of determining whether they would remove Mr. Wunderberg—that sort of trial.
Mr. Alexander. Yes. Then he said he must have a public hearing, a chance to defend himself in open court. I think it was not a criminal trial.
Senator Gray. Do you know Mr. Wunderberg personally?
Mr. Alexander. Yes.
Senator Gray. How old a man is he?
Mr. Alexander. I should think he was 40.
Senator Gray. Is he the man whom the Provisional Government offered to make collector of customs?
Mr. Alexander. Yes.
The Chairman. The information in that case was printed in the newspapers in Honolulu?
Mr. Alexander. I think so.
Senator Gray. Was Mr. Wunderberg a man of good character?
Mr. Alexander. He was a man who was honest in business matters— financial matters.
Senator Gray. Did he bear a good reputation for honesty in the community in which he lived?
Mr. Alexander. I think he had a fair reputation for honesty; he had been politically a singular man.
Senator Gray. I am not talking about that. I know you gentlemen have very intense feelings in politics. Separating that entirely, is his character for honesty and fair dealing between man and man good or bad?
Mr. Alexander. I think it was.
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Senator Gray. You think it was good? Am I to understand you as saying that?
Mr. Alexander. Yes; I think so. He had been on several different sides; he changed sides several times in politics.
The Chairman. Is there any method of contesting the election in Hawaii for members of the Parliament or Legislature; any way provided by law?
Mr. Alexander. For contesting elections?
Mr. Alexander. Yes.
The Chairman. Those questions are decided by the House?
Mr. Alexander. Yes.
The Chairman. By the house to which the man claims to be elected, or by both houses in conjunction?
Mr. Alexander. I do not quite understand you.
The Chairman. Is the vote as to the qualification of a member, his election to a seat, taken in the house of nobles, if he claim election as a noble, or the house of representatives, if he claim election as a representative?
Mr. Alexander. Both, I think; they act as one chamber.
The Chairman. Both houses vote in cases of contested elections?
Mr. Alexander. Yes.
Senator Gray. They vote separately?
Mr. Alexander. No, they sit together.
The Chairman. Is the vote called separately?
Mr. Alexander. Called separately for the nobles and representatives.
Senator Gray. But they do not count separately; it is hotch-potch.
Mr. Alexander. That was fixed in the constitution of 1864, and they allowed it to remain. I have verified the statement I made about the supreme court. Hon. Walter Frear was appointed judge of the first circuit of Oahu by the Wilcox-Jones ministry in December, 1892; Hon. S. B. Dole resigned his position on the bench of the supreme court on the morning of January 17, 1893, placing his resignation in the hands of Sam Parker, the then premier.
Adjourned to meet on Wednesday, the 17th instant, at 10 o'clock.
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WASHINGTON, D. C, Wednesday, January 17, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Gray, Sherman, and Frye.
Absent: Senator Butler.
SWORN STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COMMANDER W. T. SWINBURNE.
The Chairman. What is your age and rank in the Navy?
Mr. Swinburne. I am 46 years of age, and am lieutenant-commander in the U. S. Navy.
The Chairman. You were attached to the ship Boston at the time of her visit to Honolulu, in 1892?
Mr. Swinburne. I was; I was executive officer of the Boston up to the 29th of April, 1893.
The Chairman. When did the Boston arrive in the harbor?
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Mr. Swinburne. I am not precise as to that date; either the 23d or 24th of August, 1892.
The Chairman. You left her there when you were detached?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. Had you been in Hawaii before that?
Mr. Swinburne. Many years before. I stopped there in 1870, when returning from a cruise in the Pacific in the Kearsarge.
The Chairman. Did you spend much time in Hawaii?
Mr. Swinburne. Only a week.
The Chairman. Between your visits did you discover that there was much progress made in Hawaii?
Mr. Swinburne. Very great progress; the town had grown enormously; in every way a great change in the place.
The Chairman. When you got back to Honolulu in 1892 what, in your opinion, was the condition of the people there as to quietude and the peaceful conduct of their industries and enterprises and associations?
Mr. Swinburne. Everything seemed to be perfectly quiet. The Legislature was in session, and the principal topic of conversation among the people was the prospective lottery bill. Everybody seemed to be much exercised over the lottery bill, which was a bill about to be presented to the Legislature, granting a charter to certain men to establish a lottery, or, at least, these men had the right to control all lotteries in the islands, and for that right they were to pay, my recollection is, something like $500,000 a year, and lay a cable between the United States and Honolulu. The Legislature, as I say, was in session; the Queen at that time had a ministry in power who were assumed to be favorable to the lottery scheme and some other schemes which she favored, and the majority of the citizens—when I speak of citizens I mean the white citizens or the moneyed interests of the place—opposed. The principal topic of conversation on shore was the necessity of having a responsible ministry, so that foreign capital might be attracted there. Business was very dull.
I remember one interest in particular which people were hoping might be established there—the extension of the railroad around the island of Oahu. Gen. Willey, from San Francisco, during the time I was there and some time before January, visited the island in the interest of a British syndicate. He was favorably and hopefully impressed with the whole situation, but timid on the subject of the insecure— not exactly the insecure, but the want of responsibility in the ministry. The people talked of hard times, and seemed to feel that something was necessary to attract money, to make capital come there and help them. The Legislature dragged on; one ministry was deposed; that is, a vote of want of confidence was brought in against this ministry of the Queen; another was appointed, and a vote of want of confidence was brought against them. Finally, after quite a length of time a ministry in every way favorable to business interests and to all the commercial interests of the place, known as the Wilcox-Jones ministry, was appointed by the Queen. Everybody seemed to be satisfied with it, and everything looked hopeful. In fact, my own personal opinion is that if the Wilcox-Jones ministry had remained in the Queen would have been on the throne to-day. Everybody was satisfied with the Wilcox-Jones ministry. They were opposed to the lottery bill.
The Chairman. Were they voted out?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. On the 1st of January Capt. Wiltse began to talk about his target practice; we had no target practice for nine
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months. Minister Stevens was anxious to visit Hilo and other places on the islands, and would not have another opportunity, as he expected to go home in April, and he thought that would be a good opportunity to visit Hawaii, which he had not seen.
The Chairman. You mean the island of Hawaii?
Mr. Swinburne. The island of Hawaii. I said to the captain: "It seems to me it is rather risky for us to leave the island at this time; the legislature will hardly remain in session more than two or three weeks longer, and we have stayed here now four months; it seems to me it is not worth while to go just now." The captain said: "The Wilcox-Jones ministry can not be voted out; I am certain of that; I have looked at the situation, and I am satisfied the Queen can not get votes enough to bring in a vote of want of confidence; besides that, the minister has looked into the situation, and you do not think he would leave the island if the Wilcox-Jones ministry could be ousted?" I said nothing more about it. We sailed to Hilo on the 4th of January, and finished up our target practice in Lahaina on the evening of the 13th.
The Chairman. There was no appearance of agitation at that time?
Mr. Swinburne. Not the slightest; everything looked perfectly safe. On the evening of the 13th we anchored off Lahaina, intending to get under way at midnight and return to Honolulu. I went to bed early, because I had to be up at midnight, and when I got up at midnight I heard that a steamer had arrived from Honolulu and brought some papers. I picked them up and, much to my surprise, found that the lottery and opium bills had been passed and the Wilcox-Jones ministry voted out. Of course everybody was quite taken aback; still we did not anticipate any particular trouble.
The Chairman. Before you got this intelligence from the little island steamer were you aware of the existence of any plot, scheme, conspiracy, or combination for the purpose of dethroning the Queen or for the purpose of annexing the islands to the United States?
Mr. Swinburne. None at all.
The Chairman. It never occurred to you?
Mr. Swinburne. It never occurred to me. If that ministry had remained in, or an equally responsible ministry had been put in, everything could have remained as it was. Of course there was an immense opposition on the part of the foreign population to this lottery bill.
The Chairman. By foreign population do you mean the white population?
Mr. Swinburne. The white population.
The Chairman. Whether they were citizens or not?
Mr. Swinburne. Citizens or not.
The Chairman. They were all called foreigners?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. Those born in the islands are spoken of as Hawaiians, as a rule. In fact, an enormous petition was sent to the Queen, signed by the white ladies of the island, which petition was spoken of as the "mothers' petition." It was against this lottery bill.
The Chairman. When you got back to Honolulu—got into the harbor— how long did Minister Stevens remain aboard the vessel?
Mr. Swinburne. He could not have remained aboard more than an hour. In fact, so soon as it was convenient to get a boat off, he left. I do not think it could have been an hour.
The Chairman. Do you know whether Minister Stevens' daughter came out for him?
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Mr. Swinburne. Yes; his daughter came out; and my impression is Mr. Severance came on board.
The Chairman. He is the consul-general?
Mr. Swinburne. He is the consul-general.
The Chairman. Did the young lady, Miss Stevens, come on board?
Mr. Swinburne. No.
The Chairman. You are sure Mr. Severance did?
Mr. Swinburne. I am pretty sure he did. Mr. Stevens went on shore in the captain's gig, and very shortly afterward Lieut. Young went ashore to represent the ship at the prorogation of the Parliament, which took place at noon.
The Chairman. That is the ceremony which the ship's officers were expected to participate in in conformity with the customs of Hawaii?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. Mr. Young was detailed to that duty by Capt. Wiltse.
The Chairman. Do you know how long it was after Mr. Stevens left the Boston on Saturday morning until he returned to the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. I do not remember to have seen him on board again until Monday afternoon, about 2 o'clock.
The Chairman. Being the executive officer of the ship, if Mr. Stevens had come on board, would you have known it?
Mr. Swinburne. Without a doubt, unless he should have come when I was on shore, and then Mr. Moore would have known it.
The Chairman. At the time he left the Boston, had you heard of any outbreak or hostile demonstration of any kind amongst the people in Honolulu?
Mr. Swinburne. None at all. But I knew from all the conversation during all these many months that the Legislature had been in session, about the passage of the lottery bill and the character of the new ministry, the people must be very much excited. They were a perfectly irresponsible set of men as ministers.
The Chairman. Do you remember whether any messengers came back to the ship from Lieut. Young, bearing messages to Capt. Wiltse in regard to the situation of affairs in Honolulu on Saturday?
Mr. Swinburne. I do not. I was very busy Saturday morning mooring the ship, getting her settled, and I do not recall now exactly what time Mr. Young returned, nor exactly what time he went ashore; but it was sometime before lunch, before 12 o'clock.
The Chairman. At what time did you commence making military preparations on board the Boston for the landing of troops?
Mr. Swinburne. On Saturday afternoon, at the usual time for making out the liberty lists. It is customary while in port to make out liberty lists before 12 o'clock on Saturday; that was their best day and I was so busy I could not attend to it; but immediately after lunch I went to the cabin to speak to the captain about the liberty list. He said, "Don't let any men go ashore at all; everything is in a chaotic state; I do not know when we will be called upon to protect property, and I do not want the men to leave the ship. Notify all the officers to return on board ship when a gun is fired." I was not very much surprised, because we had been there for months to protect property and American citizens.
The Chairman. You understood that was your purpose in the harbor there?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. For months?
Mr. Swinburne. For months; yes
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The Chairman. State the progress that was made in the preparations for landing troops.
Mr. Swinburne. Well, on Saturday nothing was done at all; on Sunday I had the same orders from the Captain—" No men to go ashore, and officers to return on board ship on the firing of a gun." On Sunday afternoon I went on shore myself. I went to the club, and I found that there was an immense amount of feeling, that there was a very distinct race feeling grown up; the white people felt that the new constitution which the Queen was about to promulgate on Saturday afternoon had created a great deal of feeling. I did not know what that new constitution was; nobody knew exactly; but it was freely talked of there that one clause disfranchised all white people not married to native women, and also that it gave the Queen complete and entire control of the ministry—to make it and unmake it as she saw fit. Those two clauses were talked about, and the Queen's manner in talking to the natives from the balcony showed that she was ready to fan into a flame every race prejudice she could.
The Chairman. You mean that was the feeling you found among the people?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. Some gentlemen I had not known to talk much about political subjects before that said to me, "You fellows got back here entirely too soon; if you had stayed away we could have settled this matter." They seemed to think our coming back prevented them. They said, " We could have settled this matter before you came back." I regarded the situation as very grave; that is, under the circumstances, with the Queen's attitude toward the foreigners and the manner of her own people as they were turned away from the palace that morning, and her stating to them that she would not give them the constitution, but would hold it until some better opportunity. i could see that the people were afraid of outbreaks, rioting.
The Chairman. What meaning did you understand to be conveyed by that statement made by citizens, "If you had not gotten back so soon we would have settled the matter?"
Mr. Swinburne. Why, that they would have deposed the Queen and had the whole business settled before we got there, as they were capable of doing.
The Chairman. That was on Sunday?
Mr. Swinburne. On Sunday.
The Chairman. Sunday afternoon?
Mr. Swinburne. Sunday afternoon. There was a distinct feeling of tension in the town; no doubt about it. In fact I know several gentlemen who moved their families from the town to Waikiki in the event of trouble. Mr. Hopper, who is an American, I think, and who lives within a block or two of the Queen's palace, he moved his family to Waikiki.
The Chairman. How far is that?
Mr. Swinburne. Two miles and a half; in the suburbs. He told me he thought there would be some trouble, and he removed his family.
The Chairman. To a place of greater security?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. So it went on all day Sunday and Sunday night.
The Chairman. Did you remain on shore Sunday night?
Mr. Swinburne. I did not remain on shore Sunday night. Of course, there was a great deal of talk; all the white people were very much excited, and it appeared as if there was likely to be an outbreak of some kind most any time.
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The Chairman. What time did you get back to the ship that evening?
Mr. Swinburne. I got back to dinner at 6 o'clock.
The Chairman. Did you have a conference with Capt. Wiltse when you got back?
Mr. Swinburne. No; Capt. Wiltse and I very rarely discussed the situation at all. In fact, if I remember aright, the only time I undertook to give any advice at all was the occasion of leaving the island, on the 4th of January.
The Chairman. Was Capt. Wiltse receiving communications on the subject from the shore?
Mr. Swinburne. Not that I am aware of. I think he was ashore himself. He used to go ashore a great deal, every afternoon. I think his custom was to go every afternoon.
The Chairman. Do you remember any messenger being sent from the U.S. legation or consulate to the ship to give information to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Swinburne. No; I do not think I would have known. There was no reason for me to have known if they had come. The captain was on shore on Saturday and Sunday.
The Chairman. You remained on the ship on Monday as executive officer?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. On Monday morning I laid my plans to start out and give the ship a cleaning. We had been ten days away, and the ship was very dirty, and I expected to be all day at the job. By 10 o'clock I had the spars fairly cleaned, and about 11 o'clock, when the decks were covered with sand, the captain sent for me and said, "you had better make your preparations for lauding the battalion; have them ready at a moment's notice."
The Chairman. Are you aware of any communication having been received from the shore by Capt. Wiltse on that Monday morning which determined him to put his ship and his troops in condition for hostilities?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. Just before he gave me that order—I think about 11 o'clock, as nearly as I can remember—he sent for me. There was a gentleman in the cabin; I think it was Mr. Cooper, a man I had not seen before. The captain introduced me to him. He told me that Mr. Cooper had come from the—I may have dates mixed up; my impression is that Mr. Cooper had come with a message of some kind from the committee of safety. But what was the nature of his communication to the captain I do not know.
The Chairman. During that morning, and before the orders were given you to put the ship in condition for fighting, did you know of the arrival of any message or messenger from Mr. Stevens, the minister, or from Mr. Severance, the consul-general of the United States?
Mr. Swinburne. None whatever, only this man that I saw just before lunch time.
The Chairman. Being executive officer of the ship, if any messenger of that kind had come in from the legation or the consulate would you have known it?
Mr. Swinburne. Not necessarily.
The Chairman. But do you believe you would have known it?
Mr. Swinburne. That would depend very much on the gravity of the message. An ordinary message I would not have known at all; any message connected with the landing of the battalion I would have known very quickly. No preparation was made until after 11 o'clock on Monday morning, and the captain then told me to have everything
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in readiness for landing. I asked what he wanted. He said: "You had better take a gatling gun and a 37 millimeter." I said, "Two gatling guns would be better than a 37 millimeter;" and the captain said, "Take a 37 millimeter." I stopped the work of scrubbing, left it just where it stood, had the canteens filled and belts filled, and the caisson of the 37 millimeter filled. I had lowered the two heavy boats that took the guiis; and after dinner, 1 o'clock, had the guns lowered into the boats, so as to save time, and by half-past 2 I was practically ready for landing.
The Chairman. You took provisions along with you?
Mr. Swinburne. No provisions at all.
The Chairman. No tents?
Mr. Swinburne. We had no tents.
The Chairman. You did not know how long you would be detained on shore?
Mr. Swinburne. Not the slightest idea. The minister came on board at half past 2, or thereabouts. I knew there was to be a mass meeting of the citizens at half past 2, and I knew there was to be a counter mass meeting called by the Queen's party. My impression was, when I heard that in the morning, that the two meetings would probably bring the matter to a crisis.
Senator Turpie. You spoke of going to the club. What club was it?
Mr. Swinburne. It is known as the British Club. It is the foreign club of the place there. The first time I saw Mr. Cooper, I recollect now, was on Saturday. He came aboard to see the captain. My recollection is he came from Judge Hartwell to bring the news of the Queen's attempt to promulgate this new constitution. When this attempt was made and after the ministry had refused to aid her, two of them took the news to Judge Hartwell's office.
The Chairman. You are now telling what you were informed?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. The first time, as I stated before, that I saw Mr. Cooper, was this Saturday afternoon just after lunch.
The Chairman. When Cooper came on board the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. And my impression is that he was the same messenger who came on Monday morning and brought some message to the captain which decided him to have the troops in readiness.
The Chairman. Now, as I understand you, between the time you got the troops ready to go on shore, the caisson lowered into the boat, and other preparations made, and the time of your going on shore, Minister Stevens came on board?
Mr. Swinburne. Mr. Stevens came aboard. He arrived at about half past 2. I met him at the gangway with the captain, and walked as far as the cabin door. I did not go in. In about three-quarters of an hour or an hour afterwards the captain sent for me and said, " I want you to land with the battalion at 5 o'clock; as near 5 o'clock as possible." I suggested it would be a good idea to have supper before we went on shore; we could not get anything to eat afterward. The captain said, "Let the men have supper at 4 o'clock, and take some biscuits for the night." We had supper at 4 o'clock, and at half past 4 the men were organized in heavy marching order with a change of clothes and 80 rounds of ammunition—no baggage at all.
The Chairman. Before that occurred had Minister Stevens left the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. He had left the ship; yes. I think he left—I will not be certain but my impression is he left about 4 o'clock.
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The Chairman. Did you hear any interview between him and Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Swinburne. None at all, except that I suggested that it would be well to have all the company captains present to find out what the orders would be, as nearly as we could find out. At that meeting it was decided----
Senator Frye. Mr. Stevens was present?
Mr. Swinburne. Mr. Stevens was present. I asked where we were to go. Mr. Stevens said he did not know where we would be able to go; that he had not thought the matter over; that he would have to have some large building somewhere, and he thought the opera house would be a good place if we could get it. The opera house faces the palace. I said that my own desire and preference would be to be near the landing, because 1 would be nearer my base, and nearer the liquor shops. My idea was, if there was an outbreak of any kind, my first move would be to close all liquor stores, and if necessary leave a guard there, or nail them up, to prevent people from getting liquor. Mr. Stevens said he did not know of any building around the water front, but he thought we could get the opera house. Then be said: "By the way, there is a Mr. Atherton, an American, who lives down on King street; suppose you let the troops go on there." That was to the captain. So that that was finally decided upon in an unofficial sort of way. The captain said: "You can stop at the consulate and send half tbe marines to the minister's; detail an orderly sergeant in charge of the squad you send to the minister's; leave the other half in charge of Lieut. Draper at the consulate and march on, and by that time we will be able to tell you where you are to go." I said: " In the event of not getting any orders"—I wanted to get the men off the street so soon as possible—"I will go to Mr. Atherton's." The captain said: "Yes."
At 5 o'clock we landed. There was no demonstration, but there were a great many people about, the same as usual when we landed to drill, as we had done once a week. We arrived and marched up to the consulate; marched up King street past the palace. I was told afterward the Queen was standing on the balcony. We gave the salute. It was always the custom to give the royal salute on passing the palace, and we did on this occasion—the men at port arms, four flourishes of the trumpet, and the flag lowered—ordinary marching salute. We marched on a block beyond there, and then I halted and went into the house of Mr. Hopper and asked the privilege of using his telephone. I telephoned to the captain and asked if they had decided where we were to go. He said he had not. I then marched on to Mr. Atherton's, fully three blocks further, quite a distance down the street. Mr. Atherton said he had no objection to our coming in there—he had large grounds—and we marched in, stacked arms, established sentries, and settled down. I telephoned the captain two or three times when it got dark.
It was a new experiment to me. I did not know how the men would behave. I wanted to get them under cover. We had found no place At 9 o'clock the captain's aid came down and told me to go up to Arion Hall. I did not know the place and the aid marched on ahead. We marched down (it was late) without any drum, in order not to attract attention. We got to Arion Hall, which is a long, narrow building in the rear of the opera house. It has a very narrow yard on the street side—the street which separates it from the Government building—and yards on tho other three sides. Arion Hall is a 1-room building, with a veranda on tbe two sides. The guns were parked, the men turned in, and sentries posted. I took a lantern and went around to see what
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sort of a place I would have to defend, if necessary. I had sentries posted, and we settled down there for the night.
Senator Frye. Had it been raining that evening?
Mr. Swinburne. No, not at all. I did not sleep any; no one slept any, the mosquitoes were so bad. About 12 o'clock there was an alarm of fire. I went out and met Mr. Castle, an American, coming along on his bicycle, and he said: "That fire is out beyond my house, on the plains—some distance—I can get there and back in a short time on my bicycle, and bring you the news." He came back—he was not gone more than ten minutes—and said it was an unoccupied barn. It was an incendiary fire, but there was no trouble. At 3 o'clock there was another alarm. I turned out for that. It appeared to be in the direction of the Hawaiian Hotel. It made a big blaze. I went up to that. It was discovered to be an arbor in Emma Square, with a tree growing over it. That was also an incendiary fire, unquestionably; but it was put out without any trouble.
The next morning we settled down to get the men in condition to keep them occupied, laid out the drills, and made preparations—sanitary preparations. Drains were dug and the whole place fixed up. About 1 o'clock Tuesday afternoon Mr. Charles Carter, who was afterward one of the commissioners to this country, came in to see me.
Senator Gray. What relation is he to the late minister to the United States?
Mr. Swinburne. A son of the late minister to the United States, a prominent lawyer there, and a man whom I had met frequently. He came in and stayed some time, this afternoon, and said: "It is the intention of the committee of safety to take possession of the Government building. You will recognize them by Mr. Dole; you know Mr. Dole; he is the tallest man in the party; if you see him in the party you will know what he is doing. They are going to take possession of the Government building." He said: "Have you any objection to my seeing your orders?" I said I had not. I called his attention to the orders lying on the table. As he handed them back to me I said: "You see my orders are to protect the legation, the consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving order; I do not know how to interpret that; I can do it in but one way. If the Queen calls upon me to preserve order I am going to do it." He said nothing further to me about that, and went off. The men were just coming in from drill.
It was, perhaps, half past 2 or a quarter to 3 when a man rushed up to the gate, an American, with a Winchester and belt of cartridges, quite excited, and said: "The police have attempted to stop our ammunition wagon; it was necessary for it to go on, and the policeman was shot and killed, and that there was a large crowd collected ou Merchant street" (Merchant street is where the police station is), "and I was ordered to come and tell you." I said: "Who are you, and what is 'our ammunition wagon?'" He said: "I belong to one of the companies raised by the committee of safety, and our ammunition, which has been loading all day outside of Hall's store, was stopped by the policeman, and he was shot." He said: "After Mr. Good warned the policeman off he dropped his whip and fired on him."
The Chairman. Was the policeman killed?
Mr. Swinburne. It turned out afterward that he was not killed. This man said to me: "Can I stay here at your camp until my company arrives?" I said: "Yes." He was an American citizen and could stay anywhere. I suppose that was naturally the beginning of the riot. The
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crowd collected, and I had the signal sounded, got the companies in the rear of the building out of sight to stack arms, and had the men kept at their company parades, so that they would not lounge about or expose themselves.
The Chairman. What time of day was this?
Mr. Swinburne. Three or 4 o'clock.
The Chairman. On Tuesday?
Mr. Swinburne. On Tuesday. Then I stood at the gate to see what would happen. The next thing was the arrival of Mr. Dole at the building. The proclamation was read. At the time they commenced to read the proclamation the companies commenced to come in, one at a time. This was about half-past 4 o'clock. So far as time is concerned, however, it is all guesswork; these events happened without my knowing what was coming, and 1 have simply to judge from the routine of the camp. About half-past 4 or 5 o'clock I got a note from President Dole asking me if I would come to see him in the Government building. The captain arrived at the time these people entered the Government building and he took command. I showed the note to the captain and said: "I will go over and tell Mr. Dole you are here and will see him." The captain said: "I have no objection to seeing him." I went over and told Mr. Dole that the captain had arrived, and if he (Mr. Dole) had any propositions to submit the captain would see them. I took a note from Mr. Dole to the captain, asking if he could come over. I asked to be present at the meeting and the captain said yes. I went over, and in the office of the minister of the interior was Mr. Dole, Mr. Jones, W.O. Smith, and a number of other gentlemen.
A large number of arms was piled up in the room, a large quantity of ammunition stacked in the hall, and there was at least 100 men under arms. There was an armed sentry at every gate; the whole place had the appearance of being well guarded. We went in and Mr. Dole greeted the captain. My impression is that W.O. Smith and Mr. Jones did the most of the talking. They announced to the captain that they had formed themselves into a provisional government. A proclamation had been read declaring the Queen dethroned and the ministry dissolved; that they had possession of the archives, the Government building, and the treasury, and that they were a de facto government. They asked the captain if he was prepared to recognize them as such. The captain said: "Have you charge of the police station and the barracks, and are you prepared to guarantee the safety of life and property?" Mr. Dole said: "We have not charge of the police station at present, but it is a mere matter of time; it is bound to be given up in a few minutes; I expect to hear that it is given up at any time." The captain said: "Until you are prepared to guarantee that you can give protection to life and property I can not recognize you as the de facto government," or words to that effect. Just then the late ministry was announced, and there seemed to be nothing further for us to say and we went out.
The Chairman. Was anything said at that conversation about being in possession of the barracks?
Mr. Swinburne. No. We knew they were not in command of the barracks; the Queen's troops were there, and sentries—just as quiet as possible. We returned to the building at 6 o'clock, and the men had supper. In the meantime all these companies had arrived and were drilling. At half-past 6 o'clock the captain said "I must go up to the minister's; before I go I want to state to you that the minister has recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the islands; you will consider them as such." That was at half-past
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6, and that was the first time I had heard of any official recognition from the minister at all.
The Chairman. Were the Queen's troops still at the barracks and under arms at the time of that information?
Mr. Swinburne. The sentry was there.
Senator Gray. So far as you could see, no change had taken place?
Mr. Swinburne. No.
The Chairman. That was the time that Capt. Wiltse informed you the minister had recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; at half-past 7—I had a telephone put in that day—I had a call from central that said "the citizen troops had taken charge of tbe armory." Then I got a call from the marine officer, who was right near and could see the building from where he was.
The Chairman. At tbe time that Capt. Wiltse informed you what had been done by this Provisional Government, and when he said he would go up and see the American minister, did he give you any instructions as to whether you should or should not recognize that Government?
Mr. Swinburne. Oh, yes; that I was to recognize that Government. My impression is that he satisfied himself that they had troops enough to handle the situation. I think they had myself. Then I got a message from Mr. Draper, tbe marine officer, stating the same thing—that the police station had surrendered to the forces. The central simply notified me that the citizen troops had taken charge of tbe police station, and that was followed by a communication from Mr. Draper, at the consulate, tbat tbe troops had taken possession of the police station.
Senator Gray. Who was Mr. Draper?
Mr. Swinburne. Tbe marine officer.
Senator Gray. He was where he could see?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
Senator Gray. Near the police station?
Mr. Swinburne. Near the police station. By standing on the sidewalk he could look down and see what was going on. At11 that night it was perfectly quiet—no disturbance of any kind. The next morning about 11 o'clock, while standing outside the camp, the English minister and the Portuguese minister came along.
Senator Gray. When was that?
Mr. Swinburne. Wednesday morning. The English minister stopped and notified me that he had just been to notify the Provisional Government that he would recognize them as the de facto Government, pending advice from his Government; but he said, as a sort of parenthesis, "I found it necessary to ask them, if they were the de facto Government, why it was necessary to bring foreign troops on the soil." He expected an answer from me. I looked as if I had no answer to give, and he looked at me a few minutes and went on. The Queen surrendered the palace that day; the Royal standard was hauled down, and she retired to Washington Place. She was allowed a guard of half her former troops, household guards—a force of 15 or 16 men.
The Chairman. Of Hawaiian troops?
Mr. Swinburne. Hawaiian troops—the rest were disbanded, paid to the end of the month, and they left pretty cheerfully. On Thursday we moved into our new quarters on Fort street, which had been procured for us, the property of Mr. Bishop. Mr. Damon was the agent of the property, and through him this was arranged. We moved in there and stayed there, and the next step was the hoisting of the flag, on the 1st of February. For two or three weeks before
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the 1st of February there had been a great many rumors of an outbreak; the current report was that the Royalists thought it necessary to make a demonstration of some kind before the departure of the steamer on the 1st of Febuary, and for that reason for three or four nights everything was guarded very closely at the Government building; they had extra patrols, and every preparation was made to prevent any surprise. On the evening of the last day of January Capt. Wiltse said to me, "I want you to be ready to have the battalion under arms at half past 8, when I will come on shore and give you your orders."
At half past 8 the battalion was paraded, the captain arrived and handed me the orders, a copy of which is there, and dated the 1st of February. He ordered me to take charge of tbe Government building, the flag to be hoisted at 9 o'clock. I marched down with the battalion. At the Government building I found all tbe members of tbe advisory council and the members of tbe cabinet of tbe Provisional Government. The three companies of troops were drawn up on tbe three sides of tbe square. We marched in and were drawn up in front of the building, and then by direction of tbe captain the adjutant read the proclamation of the minister establishing a protectorate over the islands pending negotiations with tbe United States. As I understand, tbat was at the request of the Provisional Government. Then the American flag was hoisted and saluted. After the American flag was hoisted the Hawaiian flag was hoisted.
Senator Gray. How was the American flag saluted?
Mr. Swinburne. The troops presented arms, and three flourishes of the trumpets were given.
Senator Gray. Was a salute fired from tbe ship?
Mr. Swinburne. A salute of 21 guns was fired from the ship.
Senator Gray. What was the salute from the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. The national salute.
The Chairman. And then you faced about----
Mr. Swinburne. Faced about and gave the same honors to the Hawaiian flag.
The Chairman. Was any salute fired?
Mr. Swinburne. No salute was fired. Then the building was turned over to my custody, and the Provisional Government's troops marched out. By Capt. Wiltse's order I left a marine guard of 25 men which had been withdrawn from the consulate and legation that day, leaving only 5 men at the legation. They were placed in charge of the Government building. There was a change apparent at once; no more rumors of uprising of any kind—uprising of the Royalists; the transaction of public business was much facilitated, because the marines had orders to let anybody come and go without being bothered about passes or anything of the kind. So two days passed, when President Dole came to me and said he would like to have the Government building opened that the court might be held, and to that end he would like to have the sentry removed from the front gate during the hours from 9 till 4.
The Chairman. What court?
Mr. Swinburne. The supreme court. I suggested that it would be better to go further than that, to remove all sentries for the time so as not to have the appearance of keeping anybody away, which was done. All the sentries were taken from the public building from 9 to 4, all tbe gates were opened, and tbe court held its sessions. A short time afterwards one company of 36 men was sent on board ship (Mr. Young's company), reducing the force on shore to 120 men. Then, on the 20th of March, by direction of Rear-Admiral Skerrett, another
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company of 36 men was withdrawn, and that, with the casualties that occurred, left the force on shore about 90 men; I think less than that.
Senator Gray. What do you mean by casualties?
Mr. Swinburne. Some men sent on board ship for punishment, and quite a number sent onboard sick. Somewhere in the neighborhood of 80 to 90 men left, including the drum corps and color guard.
The Chairman. At what time did Admiral Skerrett come into the harbor?
Mr. Swinburne. I forget the date of his arrival; but it was after the flag was hoisted.
The Chairman. On what ship did he come?
Mr. Swinburne. The Mohican.
The Chairman. Is that his flagship?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. What was Admiral Skerrett's command?
Mr. Swinburne. The Pacific Station.
The Chairman. That included Hawaii?
Mr. Swinburne. That included Hawaii; yes.
The Chairman. How long did Capt. Wiltse remain on the Boston after Admiral Skerrett's arrival?
Mr. Swinburne. My impression is that he remained until about the 5th of March, when he was relieved by Capt. B. F. Day.
The Chairman. Did he leave on account of sickness?
Mr. Swinburne. He left because of the termination of his cruise. He was there a little longer than the termination of his cruise. Two years is now the ordinary term of a captain at sea; that had expired in February, and in the ordinary course of routine Capt. Day was sent out to relieve him.
The Chairman. How long did Capt. Wiltse live after that?
Mr. Swinburne. I have forgotten the date of his death—probably six weeks or two months.
The Chairman. After he arrived in the United States?
Mr. Swinburne. After he arrived in the United States. He had been apparently in good health; but he had one stroke of apoplexy while he was attached to the ship. I was not surprised.
The Chairman. Are those the orders under which you left the ship with that detachment (exhibiting paper)?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. They are as follows:
- U. S. S. Boston, Second-rate,
- Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16,1893.
- Lieut. Commander W. T. Swinburne,
- U. S. Navy, Executive Officer U.S.S. Boston:
- Sir: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order.
- Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens.
- You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any change in the situation.
- Very respectfully,
- G. C. Wiltse,
- Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. Boston.
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What time of day were these orders delivered to you?
Mr. Swinburne. About half past 4 on the afternoon of the 16th.
The Chairman. When you received these orders did you receive any personal or private instructions from Capt. Wiltse in addition?
Mr. Swinburne. None at all, except what I have stated in regard to where we were to go.
The Chairman. Did you at that time know of the formation of a provisional government in Hawaii?
Mr. Swinburne. No; not at all. In fact I knew nothing about that until Mr. Carter spoke of it on Tuesday afternoon.
The Chairman. That was the first knowledge you had?
Mr. Swinburne. That was the first knowledge I had.
The Chairman. So that, in landing with those troops you were not landed for the purpose of protecting the Provisional Government.
Mr. Swinburne. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Or inaugurating a provisional government?
Mr. Swinburne. Not at all.
The Chairman. You were not certain that you were to do anything more than to protect the----
Mr. Swinburne. Protect American property and the lives of citizens— particularly the property. There had been always a feeling during the time we were there that we were there to look out, in the event of any domestic disturbance in the islands, that no harm came to the Americans or their property in any way.
The Chairman. You are not certain whether that order to assist in preserving public order related to the Queen's Government or any other government?
Mr. Swinburne. I supposed it to mean the Queen's Government; that was my interpretation. There was no other government when I landed.
The Chairman. So that, if the Queen had addressed to you a request to preserve the public order, or if you had found that the public order was being disturbed by opposition to her, you would have felt required to respond?
Mr. Swinburne. That request would have come through the minister to me, merely to preserve order. I did not know that I was there to fight her battles any more than anybody else's. I was there to preserve order; protect the peaceful rights of citizens in the town. I should have been ready if called upon to lend a hand.
Senator Gray. You were going to prevent fighting?
Mr. Swinburne. I was going to prevent any fighting that endangered peaceable American citizens in the town.
Senator Gray. Did Capt. Wiltse say anything to you, or in your presence say anything about preventing any fighting in the town, or not allowing any fighting in the town?
Mr. Swinburne. No; not at all.
Senator Gray. Never did?
Mr. Swinburne. No.
Senator Gray. That if they wanted to fight they would have to go outside?
Mr. Swinburne. The order said, I thought, no more than to see that peaceable citizens were not interfered with.
Senator Gray. Did Capt. Wiltse say that if there was to be any fighting it should be out of town?
Mr. Swinburne. No; he said nothing to me about fighting at all. We had no discussion of the orders.
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Senator Gray. Did he say it in you presence?
Mr. Swinburne. I never heard it.
The Chairman. Your construction of the fighting order was to see that peaceful citizens were not interfered with?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. By anybody?
Mr. Swinburne. By anybody.
Senator Frye. I understand that under the rules and regulations of the U. S. Navy, naval officers in foreign ports are required to protect the lives and property of American citizens. Now, do you not understand that, so far as this order related to the preservation of order, that you were to preserve order so as to render safe the lives and property of American citizens?
Mr. Swinburne. Precisely.
Senator Frye. You would not have felt called upon to stop it if the Queen's troops had fired into the Provisional troops.
Mr. Swinburne. Oh, no.
Senator Frye. Your idea was that the order was for you to protect the lives and property of American citizens?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. The evening we landed it was reported, and the next morning Mr. Draper said the Chinese consul came to him at the consulate after the consul general had left and reported that his people were very much disturbed, and he did not know what was going to happen, and he wanted to know from Mr. Draper what they were to do. Mr. Draper said: "If your people behave themselves, go to their houses, and keep out of trouble I will see that they are protected." So that he notified me of that the next morning, and I said, "Certainly; in such a case as that there is no reason why we should not protect any man's life, when he is simply behaving himself and attending to his own business." That was the only question that ever came up. My idea was that I was to look out for American property. Of course, there was some American property there then in danger, and I was going to see that that property and the lives of the owners were looked out for.
The Chairman. By property do you mean goods?
Mr. Swinburne. Goods; yes, and houses. "What I feared was incendiary firing of houses, and that sort of thing, by an irresponsible mob.
The Chairman. Are those the orders under which you took possession of the Government Building [exhibiting paper]?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. They are laconic enough. The orders are as follows:
- "U.S.S. Boston, Second-rate,
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 1, 1893.
- "Lieut.-Commander W. T. Swinburne,
- "Commanding Battalion, U.S.S. Boston.
- "Sir: You will take possession of the Government Building, and the American flag will be hoisted over it at 9 a.m.
- "Very respectfully,
- "G. C. Wiltse,
- "Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. Boston."
The Chairman. These are the orders under which you abandoned the island and went back to the ship? [Exhibiting paper.]
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; the orders detaching me from the command, and ordering me to return to the ship.
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The orders are as follows:
- "U.S.S. Boston, Second Rate,
- "Honolulu, H. I., March 20, 1893.
- "Sir: In accordance with the instructions of Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett, U.S. Navy, commanding U.S. Naval Force, Pacific Station, you will, at 5:30 p.m. to-day, withdraw from shore one company of thirty-six men, with their officers, and repair on board the Boston and resume accustomed duties."
- One company, with music, colors, and proper proportion of officers, will be left at 'Camp Boston,' and you will turn over the command of the same to Lieutenant Charles Laird, U. S. Navy, who will continue the duties and routine as heretofore.
- "Very respectfully,
- "B. F. Day,
- "Captain U.S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. Boston.
- "Lieut. Comdr. Wm. T. Swinburne,
- "U.S. Navy"
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WASHINGTON, D. C, Friday, January 19, 1894.
SWORN STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COMMANDER W. T. SWINBURNE. Continued.
The Chairman. Did you have any instructions in addition to or differing from the orders under which you started from the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. None at all.
The Chairman. Did you understand when you left the ship that you were going ashore for the purpose of sustaining the Provisional Government then in process of organization or in expectation of organization, or for the purpose of sustaining any government?
Mr. Swinburne. Not at all. I had never heard of the Provisional Government. I did not know, even, that there was such a movement on foot. I knew there was a movement of some kind on foot on the part of the citizens, and my idea was that it was to get some absolute assurances from the Queen that they could depend upon in the future.
The Chairman. Your idea was that the movement was to get some assurances from the Queen?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes. I did not expect it would ever come to the point of dethroning her. You will notice in my testimony given before that I had called Mr. Carter's attention to that part of my orders which referred to preserving order in the town. Before Mr. Carter had asked me if he could see my orders, when he told me that certain men were going to take the Government building, in calling attention to that part of my orders, I purposely exaggerated my orders, lest he should get an idea that as these men were Americans I would give them support, since I was there to protect American interests. I called his attention to the clause which directed me to assist in preserving order. I said, "My understanding of that is that l am to assist the Queen's Government in preserving order." Of course, a request from the Queen to assist in preserving order would have to come through the minister, but I thought it was proper to exaggerate that, so that he would go
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away with a complete understanding of how I stood with regard to the matter. That was the purpose of that statement.
The Chairman. Had you any purpose, or did you suspect any purpose on the part of any person concerned in this movement, either the United States minister, the United States consul, Capt. Wiltse, or any other official to establish a provisional government, or to dethrone the Queen?
Mr. Swinburne. Not at all.
The Chairman. You were not aware of any such purpose existing at all?
Mr. Swinburne. No.
The Chairman. At the time the troops disembarked—went on shore—do you know whether Mr. Stevens was on board the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. My impression is that he had gone on shore. I am not certain of that; but I am pretty sure.
The Chairman. When did you next see Mr. Stevens after you saw him on board the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. I do not remember to have seen him again until the day of his daughter's funeral, which must have been about four weeks from the date of our landing, though I can't be certain. It was not until the day of his daughter's funeral; I can not recall when that was, but it was while we were on shore.
The Chairman. Did Mr. Stevens interfere in any way with the management of the troops on shore?
Mr. Swinburne. Not at all.
The Chairman. Did he give any directions as to what they should or should not do?
Mr. Swinburne. All the directions that came to me were given to me by the captain.
The Chairman. I believe you have already stated what you know about the transaction, commencing with the time you landed. That is in your deposition?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. And up to the time you left----
Mr. Swinburne. Left Arion Hall.
The Chairman. And went down to Camp Boston?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. How long did you remain in Camp Boston?
Mr. Swinburne. A portion of the troops was there until the 1st of April—up to the time the flag was hauled down. I was detached on the 20th of March.
The Chairman. I want to call your attention to some remarks made by Mr. Willis in his reports or letters. In his letter of December 20, 1893, to Mr. Gresham, Mr. Willis says:
- "The delay in making any announcement of your policy was, as you will understand, because of the direct verbal and written instructions under which I have been acting. Under those instructions my first duty was to guard the life and safety of those who had by the act of our own minister been placed in a position where there was an apparant antagonism between them and our Government. As I understood from the President and from you, the sole connection with our Government had with the settlement of the Hawaiian question was the undoing of what, from an international standpoint, was considered by the President to have been a wrong to a feeble, defenseless, and friendly power. In undoing this wrong I was, however, instructed first of all to see that proper safeguards were thrown around those who had been
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- probably misled as to the position of our Government and the wishes of our people."
I understand that the protection Mr. Willis speaks of here has reference to those persons who were of the party of the Queen. Now, I wish to ask you whether, while you stayed upon that island, you saw or was informed of any demonstration whatever of a hostile character toward the person of the Queen or any of her supporters?
Mr. Swinburne. Not that I ever heard of, any further than the dethronement of the Queen—no attempt of a personal nature against the Queen or her followers.
The Chairman. Of course, I am speaking of their personal safety and protection.
Mr. Swinburne. Not at all; they had the same protection that any other person had.
Senator Frye. Did they not have more; did not the Provisional Government furnish the Queen with half her guard?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
Senator Frye. And did they not pay off the guard to the first of the month, when they were discharged?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; she had more protection than anyone else during the revolution. I never heard of a revolution carried on in that style.
The Chairman. Here is a statement in Mr. Willis's letter to the effect that the Japanese and English legations were guarded by the marines of their respective vessels, "and no American soldier has been stationed here and none will be." Do you recollect whether the Japanese and English legations were guarded during the time you were there?
Mr. Swinburne. Not at all. The Japanese asked permission to land a guard at the legation, and the Provisional Government, while they did not refuse, informed the minister that they were perfectly able to give them all necessary protection; and it was currently reported that the Provisional Government had given the Japanese minister permission to have a guard on shore if he wished it, but none were landed.
The Chairman. This permission of which Mr. Willis speaks must have occurred after you went back to the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; no foreign troops were ashore at all except our own.
The Chairman. At the time you withdrew and went on board that ship, will you say that the people of Honolulu were in a state of quietude, or in an agitated and insurrectionary state?
Mr. Swinburne. They were perfectly quiet; all the agitation was the conspiring of a few professional politicians belonging to the Queen's party. We could see that going on all the time.
Senator Gray. Were there any professional politicians belonging to the other party?
Mr. Swinburne. When I used that expression I referred to two or three men who never seemed to have any other means of existence except as a part of the Queen's party. The Queen being out of power, they had no visible means of support.
The Chairman. I want to read you some more extracts from Mr. Willis's letter, the one I quoted from a moment ago, to see whether you can concur in the opinions he has expressed and indorse the facts which he has brought to the attention of the Secretary of State.
Senator Gray. I will ask whether Lieut. Swinburne was in Honolulu at any time during the time that Mr Willis was on shore?
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Mr. Swinburne. No.
The Chairman. You mean you were not on shore?
Mr. Swinburne. I was not there at all. Mr. Stevens was still minister when I left, and Mr. Blount was there taking testimony. You see, I left there the 11th of May.
The Chairman. And this letter I have been reading from is dated December.
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. I now read from Mr. Willis's letter:
- "The President's attention had been called by you to the evidence contained in Mr. Blount's report showing the extraordinary complications and dangers surrounding this community, among which were the racial prejudices, the intense feeling consequent upon the dethronement of the constitutional sovereign, the presence of so many different nationalities—Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Americans, and English— in such large numbers and with such diverse traits and interests, the possibility that the Japanese, now numbering more than one-fifth of the male population of the islands, might take advantage of the condition of affairs to demand suffrage and through it to obtain control of the Government, together with the discontent of the native Hawaiians at the loss of their Government and of the rights secured under it.
- "In addition to these facts I was fully apprised by you in your personal conversations of the presence here of many lawless and disorderly characters, owing allegiance to neither party, who would gladly take advantage of the excitement and general derangement of affairs to indulge in rapine and mob violence; and also of the conflict between the active responsible representatives of the Provisional Government and certain men who were not officially connected with it, but who had undertaken to dictate its policy. The danger from this last source I found upon arriving here was much greater than you had supposed. As I stated to you in my dispatch, No. 2, of November 10, the President and ministers of the Provisional Government and a large per cent of those who support them are men of high character and of large material interests in the islands. These men have been inclined to a conservative course toward the Hawaiians.
- "They had placed in the police and fire departments, and also in many other more important offices, native Hawaiians, thus endeavoring to conciliate the friendship and support of the 40,000 natives of the country. The irresponsible element referred to were pressing for a change of this wise and patriotic policy and insisting that they should be invested with all power, thus intensifying and aggravating the racial feeling already too extreme. Many of these men were open in their threats against the life of the Queen. They have even gone as far in the public prints and elsewhere as to threaten the representatives of the Provisional Government in the event they should listen to the President's supposed policy of peaceful settlement, if it involved the restoration of the Queen.
- "Besides this danger, which would have been precipitated by any premature announcement of the policy of our Government, there was another danger deserving serious attention.
- "The native Hawaiians, under the wise advice of their best native leaders, supplemented by that of many sympathizing foreigners, have maintained the policy of peace during the settlement of this question. While, however, they have been always known as a peaceful and law-abiding people, the evidence of the most thoughtful men in these Islands, including Mr. Damon, the present minister of finance, called
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- attention to the fact that under proper leadership they might collect quite an effective and aggressive following; hence his opinion given to Mr. Blount while here and to me since that a strong force should be retained by the Provisional Government or else trouble might result from a sudden attack on their part."
Now, I wish to ask whether or not during the period you were there Mr. Willis has, in your judgment, correctly described the attitude of the different elements in Hawaii—Honolulu—and also the state of feeling— the temper of the people during that time?
Mr. Swinburne. During the time that I was on shore there seemed to be most of the time—everything was perfectly quiet—I felt there did exist a class of irresponsible men who, in the event of an outbreak, might take advantage of that to plunder or burn or destroy property, and it was that element I feared I would have to cope with when I was sent ashore to protect American interests. Those were the people I expected to have trouble with. So far as the average natives themselves— the ordinary class of natives, not the members of the legislature or leaders—were concerned, they appeared to be perfectly indifferent; they were always interested in our drills, always collected in large numbers to watch them. I could not see that they had any feeling against us whatever; they never exhibited it in any way.
The policemen throughout the city while I was on shore were natives, the majority of them. I could not see that they had any feeling against us at all. I knew quite a number of young men, halfcaste young men, who were in public office. I rather thought they had a bitter feeling against our people. But I myself imagined that that came from some fancied feeling of loss of social rank through the change in the Government—such as annexation to the United States. They were half-castes; they were young men in society there (this is my own idea), and, of course, I always felt that they were more bitter at the fact of any change in the future of the islands—that the annexation of the islands to this country would change their position; they would not have as good social position as they had before.
The Chairman. Were they a respectable class of men?
Mr. Swinburne. Oh, perfectly so.
The Chairman. Well educated?
Mr. Swinburne. Well educated.
The Chairman. And might very justly entertain such expectations?
Mr. Swinburne. I think that was, perhaps, natural that they should feel that way, although these men were occupying positions under the Government at the time.
The Chairman. And were not removed?
Mr. Swinburne. And were not removed.
The Chairman. Now, taking the description given by Mr. Willis of the different factions, social, political, racial, etc., as he has described them in the extract I have just read to you, would you, in such a community as that, think it would be necessary to have some demonstration of military force in order to prevent the occurrence of outbreaks which at any other time might spring up.
Mr. Swinburne. Any government there would have to have a force capable of coping with the situation; they would have to keep a military force there, unquestionably.
Senator Gray. Do you think these people are capable of self-government, as we understand it in the States. Take the whole people of the islands.
Mr. Swinburne. Of course, so far as the Chinaman is concerned,
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he would not occupy any different position there from what he would in the States; the Japanese are a restless, turbulent class of people; they are very tenacious of what they consider to be their rights; very prompt to take part in strikes. There is a plantation near Honolulu, at Ewa, where they seem to be constantly having trouble with their laborers. The Japanese would at a fancied slight quit work and come over to Honolulu. Another point was, the Japanese Government was very anxious that their citizens should have the right to vote. There was an impression, at least that Government contended that there was an agreement, when the first contract laws were passed, that their people should have the right to vote. Of course, the laborers come there under contract, I forget now the length of time, but it could not have been more than five years; I could not see how they should have the right to vote for five years. They were looked out for by the commissioners; their rights were protected by the Japanese commissioners; although contract laborers, they are in no sense slaves; they come there under a contract for a certain length of time, and the Japanese Government sees that the contract is kept in its entirety. And moreover, they have money kept for them until their time is up.
Senator Gray. They see that the contract is kept on their part aud on the part of the contractor, too?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
Senator Gray. Suppose the contract should be violated?
Mr. Swinburne. I am not sufficiently posted to give any details; but it seems to me that they say to the laborer that he is to keep his contract; that the contract should be kept so loug as both parties observe its terms.
The Chairman. I desire to get from you a further explanation upon the hypothesis of the facts which I read to you from Mr. Willis' report. Do you mean to say that in a community situated as that was, the evidence of official power is essential to the preservation of order, peace, and quiet?
Mr. Swinburne. I should say so.
The Chairman. It would not be safe to trust the city and people in the hands of these different factions, unless they were convinced that power, force, would be used to repress any mob violence?
Mr. Swinburne. I do not think it would be.
Senator Gray. You mean force outside of themselves?
Mr. Swinburne. Mr. Chairman, do you mean force outside of what the Government would have?
The Chairman. I mean force.
Mr. Swinburne. I do not think it would be possible.
The Chairman. In other words, there would have to be a force in Hawaii to keep these factions in check?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. Is not that a peculiar situation, and different from that in other countries? Do you know where such a condition of affairs exists or is likely to exist?
Mr. Swinburne. Well----
The Chairman. How is it in Panama?
Mr. Swinburne. Of course, in all the South American republics that I know of there is always a large standing army, and it is the army that controls politics.
The Chairman. Armies organized for the purpose of securing domestic peace and order rather than to protect against foreign enemies?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; I think so.
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The Chairman. That was really the function of the military organization in Hawaii?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. Had no reference to foreign war, offensive or defensive?
Mr. Swinburne. It could not do more than make an honorable stand against any foreign power whatever.
The Chairman. So that the military organization in Hawaii was simply intended for the preservation of the internal peace?
Mr. Swinburne. That is the way I understood it.
The Chairman. Now, was it for the purpose of assisting in that line of conduct, or was it for the purpose of making an assault upon any government or of participating in any political agitation or aiding any political party, that you went on shore with those troops in Honolulu?
Mr. Swinburne. My idea always has been, and was at the time, that we landed simply for the protection of American property and interests and lives; that in the event of an outbreak, any demonstration against the Queen, or any attempt to overthrow her power, there would be a good deal of lawlessness. That is a seaport town and is full of the ordinary irresponsible classes to be found in any seaport town; and at such a time as that, it would give the chance for lawless people, white or native, or whatever they might be, to plunder and fire property, probably do damage of any kind. That was my reason for desiring to be down near the wharf.
Senator Gray. And you were there, as I understand, under your orders to preserve order?
Mr. Swinburne. To preserve order, to protect the property and lives of Americans.
Senator Gray. And if a crowd of people, disorderly or otherwise, should have attempted to arrest or maltreat Mr. Damon, Mr. Dole, or Mr. Carter on that day, you would have protected them?
Mr. Swinburne. It would have depended upon what they were doing.
Senator Gray. Suppose they were walking up to the Government building, as they were doing that morning, and they were set upon, would you have protected them?
Mr. Swinburne. If they were going to the Government building?
Senator Gray. Yes.
Mr. Swinburne. I should think I would have been called upon to protect them.
Senator Gray. I think so.
Mr. Swinburne. They were entitled to the liberty of the streets, but if they were organized as a force----
Senator Gray. I say if they were going up to the Government building, as they were on that day, and were set upon?
Mr. Swinburne. And if I had been informed, as I was, that this party was going in to take the Government building?
Senator Gray. Would you have allowed them to be maltreated or set upon?
Mr. Swinburne. That is a difficult question to answer.
Senator Gray. I sympathize with you in it.
Mr. Swinburne. That would be difficult to answer.
Senator Gray. I think so.
Mr. Swinburne. I am satisfied that Mr. Carter knew exactly how I stood in the matter when he went into the building; that is, I let him
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understand that I was there simply to protect American property and life.
The Chairman. Did you gather the impression or belief there that any members of the Queen's cabinet were in sympathy with this political outbreak?
Mr. Swinburne. In sympathy with the Provisional Government?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Swinburne. Of the Queen's cabinet at that time?
The Chairman. For the purpose of overthrowing her, or for the purpose of establishing a provisional government?
Mr. Swinburne. I did not.
The Chairman. Did you hear anything about members of that cabinet going to the citizen's meeting and asking for protection or asking advice as to what they should do?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; I did hear that. I heard that two of them went to Judge Hartwell. Judge Hartwell is known to be a very ardent Annexationist.
Senator Gray. Was he on the bench?
Mr. Swinburne. Well, he had been.
Senator Gray. He was called "judge?"
Mr. Swinburne. Called "judge."
The Chairman. In point of time, did you hear that when you got on shore that day?
Mr. Swinburne. I heard that from the messenger who came off to Capt. Wiltse about noon. My impression is that it was Mr. Cooper.
The Chairman. He brought that information to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Swinburne. Brought that to Capt. Wiltse.
The Chairman. That two members of the Queen's cabinet----
Mr. Swinburne. Had come to Judge Hartwell's office and disclosed to him the fact that the Queen had attempted to—they felt that the Queen was prepared to use force—to force them to sign that new constitution.
The Chairman. Did you stand from that statement that they had asked any protection from the citizens, or had asked advice from the citizens as to what they should do?
Mr. Swinburne. If you want my opinion, and not what I know?
The Chairman. No. I want to know the shape in which that information came aboard the ship that morning.
Mr. Swinburne. It came as a warning to Capt. Wiltse that the Queen was prepared to overthrow the constitution. It was brought to his attention there. His business was to watch over American interests in the islands.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper brought that information to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. Did it in any respect have reference to the Queen's cabinet having sought advice from the citizens against any project of hers to arrest them?
Mr. Swinburne. That is what I understood at the time. I know it was talked of in the town; but whether I heard it at that time or not, I do not know.
The Chairman. What I want is the information that was brought aboard the ship.
Mr. Swinburne. It is very difficult to separate the time when I heard these things. But I gathered the impression that day that these
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men were actually afraid that they would be arrested by the Queen when they went to Hartwell's office. That was my impression that day.
The Chairman. The object of their visit to Hartwell's office was either to get advice or assistance against such expected or proposed movement on the part of the Queen?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was there any request came off to the ship from any other person to Mr. Stevens for the landing of the troops?
Mr. Swinburne. Not that I am aware of. I am certain there was a message came off to the captain that led him to make his preparations.
Senator Gray. Do you know from whom that message came?
Mr. Swinburne. I do not; I judge from the American minister.
Senator Gray. Other than the American minister?
Mr. Swinburne. I do not know. I judge, of course, there could not be any.
Senator Gray. Do you recollect any note coming to Mr. Stevens on the afternoon, and while he was on the ship?
Mr. Swinburne. That I do not know of my own knowledge, but I heard that there was a note. I was extremely busy after I had asked Capt. Wiltse to allow the captains of the companies to be present to gather such information as they could. I left the cabin and was in and out, and there was a good deal said between the captain and the captains of the companies that I did not hear. They asked questions as to their duties under certain circumstances; I heard what they were afterward, but I did not hear at the time. I had been there long enough to know what we were to do if we landed, what my business was, and my orders were not handed to me until just before we shoved off from the ship. But we were there for the purpose of protecting American property and American interests; and my idea was to protect them against people, who, I felt, might be guilty of incendiarism, plunder, or maltreatment of unoffending American citizens. That is what I was thinking about.
Senator Frye. Most of the buildings in Honolulu are constructed of wood?
Mr. Swinburne. They are most all wooden buildings.
Senator Frye. They would make serious fires?
Mr. Swinburne. I know that is what the people were afraid of.
Senator Frye. Is not that the resort of certain elements in revolutionary states when a revolution is under way?
Mr. Swinburne. It is.
Senator Frye. All through the South, down in Panama and everywhere else?
Mr. Swinburne. I should think so.
Senator Frye. I suppose the city of Honolulu is very much scattered?
Mr. Swinburne. Covers a good deal of ground.
Senator Frye. And the Americans' houses are also scattered all over the best part of the city?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; many of them up Nuuanu Valley and toward the plains, and a good many toward Waikiki?
Senator Frye. In case of mob violence in the city, that is the property, I take it, that is pretty likely to be burned up?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
Senator Frye. When you were about Arion Hall were you not situated as well as you could be to hit that class of property?
Mr. Swinburne. So far as American property was concerned I
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should say that Arion Hall is as good as any other place. There were as many Americans on one side as on the other.
Senator Frye. So far as you know, in selecting Arion Hall there was no purpose had except the protection of American life and property?
Mr. Swinburne. That is my understanding. At the time we were glad of a place to lie down.
Senator Frye. One of the witnesses before Mr. Blount makes the statement that when the Provisional Government marched up and took possession of the Government building the United States marines were drawn up in array with their Gatling guns, and all that sort of thing, in sight of the Provisional Government's men who were taking possession.
Mr. Swinburne. I should say they were not in sight. The men were drawn up in their company parades, because I had the information before these men arrived that a policeman had been shot, and that the men were collecting on the street, and I supposed there would be a demonstration immediately. The arms were stacked and the men standing in company parades, and were ready to move.
Senator Frye. Where were they?
Mr. Swinburne. My idea was to keep them as much out of sight as possible. Indeed, I had great difficulty in keeping the men in the ranks; they would slip through to the other side of the building and look over the fence to see what was going on.
Senator Frye. In order to see what was going on they had to do that?
Mr. Swinburne. Had to do that, go to the front of the building— get on the porch, and look over.
Senator Gray. Where were the Gatling guns?
Mr. Swinburne. In the only position in which they could be parked. The 37 millimeters, as I remember, stood on the right, on the Government house side, and the Gatling on the other side of it. They stood together where they were parked, the first night we went in, and where they remained all the time we were there—the most convenient place we could get.
Senator Gray. Near the street?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; 37 was nearest the street. It was a narrow yard. I should think that was not over 20 yards from the street; not over that.
Senator Frye. One witness before Mr. Blount stated that it would have been impossible for the Royalist troops to have made an attack upon the Provisional men that were taking possession of the Government building, without at the same time attacking the United States troops.
Mr. Swinburne. I thought of that condition. I thought at the time it was untenable in the event of a fight between the two factions. I expected to have to withdraw my men from that position. I thought I would have been between the two fires; at least I was not in a good position in the event of an outbreak. I had thought of that, and expected to have removed the men.
Senator Frye. Are you acquainted with Minister Stevens?
Mr. Swinburne. I had visited his house frequently while I was in Honolulu, nearly once a week.
Senator Frye. What estimate did you form of Minister Stevens' character?
Mr. Swinburne. I formed the idea that he was a man of the highest character.
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Senator Frye. Did you at any time know of his saying anything in favor of the overthrow of the Queen or the establishment of a provisional government?
Mr. Swinburne. He certainly never did in my presence, and I do not know of his having said anything of the kind.
Senator Frye. You were on board the ship when the ship went to Hilo, I suppose?
Mr. Swinburne. I was.
Senator Frye. Did Mr. Stevens have a conversation with you while on that trip?
Mr. Swinburne. Not on political questions.
Senator Frye. Did you hear of him having conversations with the officers in which he expressed the fact that he was glad peace had been accomplished and would remain for two years, as he could go home at the expiration of his term of office and leave it so?
Mr. Swinburne. I did not hear him say so then; but before we left the island I spoke of my reasons to Capt. Wiltse for a postponement of a trip for target practice. The captain said he was satisfied, and the minister said he was satisfied that the Wilcox-Jones ministry could not be voted out; that everything was as quiet as possible, and it was as good a time to go as could be.
The Chairman. I wish to read you some further extracts from Mr. Willis's communication to Secretary Gresham. He says: "There is, undoubtedly, in this Government a class of reckless, lawless men who, under the impression that they have the support of some of the better classes of citizens, may at any moment bring about a serious condition of affairs," but says that "the men at the head of the Provisional Government are of the highest integrity," etc.
Then he says what I have already quoted:
- "The danger from this last source I found upon arriving here was much greater than you had supposed. As I stated to you in my dispatch, No. 2, of November 10, the President and ministers of the Provisional Government and a large per cent of those who support them are men of high character and of large material interests in the islands. These men have been inclined to a conservative course toward the Hawaiians."
Does that conform with your opinion of the character of the men who formed the Provisional Government?
Mr. Swinburne. While I was there, I should say it is an exaggeration. While there were men in the Provisional Government who I knew were in favor of more aggressive measures against the late monarchy, that is, were in favor of deporting the Queen, and while there were a great many in favor of turning out all the people who had been holding office under the late government, I do not think they could be called people who would foment trouble. They were people who were more radical, as there are in all parties—some are more radical than others—but as the statement was read there it seems to me an exaggeration of the composition of the Provisional Government party at the time I was in the city of Honolulu.
The Chairman. You are speaking now, I suppose, of the class which Mr. Willis designates as reckless and lawless men?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes.
The Chairman. Now, the other part, and the one to which I want specially to direct your attention, where he speaks of the men at the head of the Provisional Government as men of the highest integrity and public spirit. Do you concur in that view?
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Mr. Swinburne. Unquestionably. I think Mr. Dole, for instance, a man who was doing in the matter what he considered to be solely his duty.
The Chairman. Now, as to character.
Mr. Swinburne. I think that is correctly stated as to the character of the prominent men in the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. I notice on page 57 of Ex. Doc. No. 47 this communication from yourself to Mr. Blount. It is as follows:
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 3,1893.
- "Hon. J. H. Blount,
- "Special Commissioner of United States:
- "Sir: In response to your verbal request for a written communication from me regarding certain facts connected with the recognition of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister to that country on the afternoon of January 17,1893, I have to state as follows:
- "On the afternoon in question I was present at an interview between Capt. Wiltse, commanding the Boston, who was at that time present in his official capacity with the battalion then landed in Honolulu, and Mr. Dole and other gentlemen representing the present Provisional Government, in the executive chamber of the Government building. During the interview we were informed that the party represented by the men there present was in complete possession of the Government building, the archives, and the treasury, and that a Provisional Government had been established by them.
- "In answer Capt. Wiltse asked if their Government had possession of the police station and barracks. To this the reply was made that they had not possession then, but expected to hear of it in a few minutes, or very soon. To this Capt. Wiltse replied, 'Very well, gentlemen, I can not recognize you as a de facto Government until you have possession of the police station and are prepared to guarantee protection to life and property,' or words to that effect. Here our interview was interrupted by other visitors, and we withdrew and returned to the camp at Arion Hall. As far as I can recollect this must have been about 5 o'clock p. m. About half past 6 Capt. Wiltse left the camp, and as he did so he informed me that the U.S. minister to the Hawaiian Islands had recognized the Provisional Government established by the party in charge of the Government building as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands. About half past 7 p.m. I was informed by telephone by Lieut. Draper, who was then in charge of a squad of marines at the U.S. consulate, that the citizen troops had taken possession of the police station, and that everything was quiet.
- Very respectfully,
- "Wm. Swinburne,
- "Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy."
You knew that?
Mr. Swinburne. Yes; that is practically the same as my testimony already given.
The Chairman. Have you any explanation to make in regard to that?
Mr. Swinburne. No; I think that is exactly the same as I have already given. Is it stated that I wrote that? I had forgotten. I thought I just gave that verbally. I wrote another communication, in which I gave distances. I would suggest that the replacing of the word "and" after "police station" and before "are prepared to guarantee
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protection to life and property" by the conjunction "or," would more nearly convey the captain's idea as I then understood him.
SWORN STATEMENT OF LIEUT. DE WITT COFFMAN.
Senator Gray. You were an officer on board the U.S.S. Boston in Honolulu on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of January, 1893?
Mr. Coffman. I joined the Boston on the 14th; I was on her on the 15th, and landed on the 16th.
Senator Gray. You were connected with the Boston?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. What was your position?
Mr. Coffman. Lieutenant and division officer on the Boston.
Senator Gray. Had you command of one of the companies of the battalion which landed on the 16th?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Mr. Coffman, with whom I have had a conversation, agrees with all that has been said by Mr. Swinburne and the other gentlemen who preceded him in regard to the landing of the troops and the instructions of Capt. Wiltse. I only called him here for one purpose and one fact. You were captain of one of the companies of the battalion which landed?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. As such captain were you summoned to the cabin of Capt. Wiltse on Monday the 16th, before you landed?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Who were present?
Mr. Coffman. Capt. Wiltse, Minister Stevens, Mr. Swinburne, Lieut. Laird, Lieut. Young, Lieut. Draper, of the Marine Corps, and I think those were all, unless there were some of the junior officers, whom I do not remember—some of the midshipmen.
Senator Gray. While you were there was there any communication received from shore and communicated by anyone to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. State what you know about it.
Mr. Coffman. While in the office, or rather in the captain's cabin, after the consultation, or rather after the instructions were given to the officers, and about the time we were about to leave the cabin----
The Chairman. This was on Monday?
Mr. Coffman. On Monday—Cadet Pringle came to the cabin----
Senator Gray. Who was Cadet Pringle?
Mr. Coffman. He was a cadet on the Boston, and was serving as an aid to Minister Stevens at the time. He came into the cabin and handed to Minister Stevens a communication, which Mr. Stevens afterward read. It was from Mr. Thurston. It stated that they were holding a mass meeting; that it was a success; that there was a great crowd present; that the natives had held a mass meeting, had ratified the proclamation, and had gone home quietly; and it stated if the troops are to be landed, "I advise that they be landed at once." We went ashore about an hour afterward.
Senator Frye. Have you read the testimony of Lieut. Young or Lieut. Laird?
Mr. Coffman. No; I have not seen Mr. Laird's testimony at all.
The Chairman. Do you mean before this committee?
S. Doc. 231, pt 6—---54
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Senator Frye. Yes. Or the testimony of Mr. Swinburne?
Mr. Coffman. I read Lieut. Commander Swinburne's testimony; yes. I spoke about it to Mr. Swinburne, and he said he was probably not in the cabin at the time, as he had so much to do.
Senator Frye. Whom was the note from?
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Thurston.
The Chairman. And addressed to Mr. Stevens?
Mr. Coffman. Cadet Pringle brought the note.
Senator Frye. And he was a messenger from Mr. Thurston?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. He had been at the legation most of the time.
Senator Frye. Which company were you with; where did your troops go?
Mr. Coffman. With the main battalion—the blue jackets.
Senator Frye. To Arion hall?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was it not for the protection of life and property, when you took into consideration the state of the city, the situation of the houses, etc., as central a place for their protection as any you could find—I mean Arion Hall?
Mr. Coffman. I do not know what you would call a central location.
Senator Frye. Were not the houses of American citizens on one side as well as on the other side of Arion Hall?
Mr. Coffman. I think there was more American property on Nuuanu avenue, not in the immediate vicinity of Arion Hall.
The Chairman. By American property, do you mean business houses?
Mr. Coffman. Business houses and private residences.
Senator Frye. Private residences, I mean. They are more likely to be burned up?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. I really do not know much about the ownership of property in Honolulu, with the exception of that which is the property of those who claim to be Hawaiians, who, to a certain extent, are of American parentage, and a few Americans.
Senator Frye. Were maps left with the captain?
Mr. Coffman. That I do not know.
Senator Frye. And the instructions were, as you understood them, to protect American life and property?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Frye. That you were not to be connected with either government, the establishment of one or the overthrow of the other.
Mr. Coffman. That I do not understand. I went as an officer simply to obey the instructions as I received them.
Senator Frye. And having read Capt. Swinburne's statement, you concur otherwise in what he said?
Mr. Coffman. I have only seen what he said as published in the papers. The Evening Star has a different account from that in the Baltimore Sun. I tried to get something out of it, but it was somewhat mixed.
Senator Gray. When you said you read Capt. Swinburne's testimony you meant that you read the newspaper accounts?
Mr. Coffman. I have not read the testimony before the committee; I have not seen it.
Senator Gray. You have talked it over with Lieut. Swinburne?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; the general situation.
Senator Gray. Do you differ?
Mr. Coffman. We do in some minor points.
Senator Gray. State the minor points in which you differ.
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Mr. Coffman. I thought that the battalion was badly placed, if they were there for the sole purpose of protecting American life and property.
Senator Gray. Do you differ in any other respect?
Mr. Coffman. Lieut. Swinburne differs with me as to where was a central place. I will give my reason: If there was to be trouble, that was the place where the trouble would be; and I did not see why we should go to the point where the trouble would occur if persons who were engaged in this trouble should go to that place and claim to be Americans and ask for protection. That is my point. That is the only thing we differed about at all—the mere fact of statements as to where we went and what was done. Mr. Swinburne has, I know, from talking to him time and again, given the facts. We agree on those things.
SWORN STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BREWSTER OLESON.
Senator Frye. What is your age?
Mr. Oleson. I am 43.
Senator Frye. How long have you been living in the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Oleson. I have been living there fifteen years.
Senator Frye. What fifteen years?
Mr. Oleson. From August, 1878, until June, 1893.
Senator Frye. Were you in Honolulu through the entire revolution— the recent revolution?
Mr. Oleson. I was.
Senator Frye. And through the revolution of 1887?
Mr. Oleson. Through the revolution of 1887; yes.
Senator Frye. What has been your business in the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Oleson. I have been a school-teacher during my residence there.
Senator Frye. What charge have you had?
Mr. Oleson. Two schools. I was appointed to one before I left this country on the large island of Hawaii, and of the Kamehameha Manual- Labor School at Honolulu in 1886. Mrs. Bishop, the last of the Kamehameha royal line, known as Princess Pauahi, left a large sum of money, some half million of dollars, to establish a manual-training school at Honolulu.
The Chairman. Mr. Bishop seems to have been a man of great wealth?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you know whether he accumulated his wealth in Hawaii?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. In what business was he employed?
Mr. Oleson. Commission business at first, and most of the time in the banking business. I think he got the most of his money, or at least he got the large nucleus of his capital, during the whaling days.
The Chairman. He was not connected with planting?
Mr. Oleson. Not planting; but he is a stockholder.
The Chairman. In sugar companies, you mean?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. What companies?
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Mr. Oleson. Several. He had more stock in the Lihue company. I think sugar stock in the islands is like railway stock here.
The Chairman. Where was Mr. Bishop originally from?
Mr. Oleson. He came from New York State.
Senator Frye. Have you reduced to writing an account of the proceedings in the Hawaiian Islands during the disturbing times, to which you are willing to testify?
Mr. Oleson. I have. I thought likely I might be called upon for something of the kind.
Senator Frye. You may read it as part of your testimony.
Mr. Oleson. I have made this as personal and as specific as possible.
Senator Gray. And it includes matters within your own knowledge?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; I have said nothing here that I was not personally cognizant of, unless it may be some deductions based on what I was personally cognizant of.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BREWSTER OLESON.
Have been a resident of the Hawaiian Islands since August, 1878. Went there from Ohio. During my residence of fifteen years was engaged in educational work among Hawaiians, first as principal of the largest school on the island of Hawaii, and later as organizer and principal of the Kamehameha Manual Training School, established by bequest of Princess Panahi, the last of the Kamehameha royal line.
My fifteen years' residence brought me into close contact with Hawaiians, first at Hilo, and later at Honolulu. Have known, by personal observation, of the changes that have taken place in the political history of Hawaii since 1878, and was present in Honolulu during the revolutions of 1887, 1889, and 1893, being an eyewitness of those events.
Have never held any office or appointment under the Hawaiian Government, and never acted in an official capacity, except in 1887, when, as a member of the committee of thirteen, appointed by the mass meeting of citizens, I went with others to present the demands of the citizens to the King, Kalakaua. My evidence is that of a citizen who knew what was in the minds of the people.
Attended the prorogation of the legislature, Saturday, January 14. I had the impression that it was to be an historic event. I do not know to what I am to lay the impression, except that things were culminating. I had not been in the habit of attending the prorogation of the legislature, having been there only once prior to that time. Noted the absence of the better class of citizens, and of many of the most upright legislators. Later, met some of the legislators on the street, who said, in reply to my question, "What are we going to do?" "We have done all we could in the legislature, and we can do nothing more."
This was the common feeling. Men were disheartened at the dismissal of the Jones-Wilcox cabinet and the passage of the lottery bill, but no one thought of anything else but submission to the inevitable until the next Legislature should meet two years after. It was hoped that the supreme court might decide the lottery bill to be unconstitutional, but I know there was no thought of organized opposition to the Government.
The foreign population that had been united in 1887 in the movement for a new constitution had lost its cohesion through the operation of several causes.
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Notably among these was the anti-Chinese agitation, which enlisted the mechanics and tradesmen against the planters and their sympathizers. So long as the foreigners were united they were able to guide the legislation and administration of the Government. When they became divided the leaders of the anti-Chinese agitation joined forces with the natives, and the political leadership fell into the hands of men who had little sympathy with the reform movement of 1887. I wish to state here that when I say foreigners I mean voters in the Hawaiian Islands of foreign extraction, and when I say natives I do not intend to raise any race question, but simply to show that the majority in Honolulu were natives.
The depressing effect of this division was apparent in January. Men despaired of accomplishing anything through organization, and many went to the mass meeting January 16, believing that it would accomplish nothing because of lack of unity. This fact accounts in a measure for the guarded utterances on that occasion. The speakers and the committee of safety were uncertain as to how far they would have the support of the citizens.
I know that the report about the city the forenoon the meeting was held, that Marshal Wilson had forbidden citizens to meet at the armory, created strong feeling and aroused opposition that vented itself in increasing the attendance.
I know that the speakers, with a possible exception, did not voice the indignation of the citizens. During the meeting, and afterwards on the street, men were angry that the resolutions were so tame. It was not until attention was called to the large powers voted the committee that men became satisfied that something adequate would be done to restore public confidence.
The emergencies of 1887 and 1889 had prepared the citizens for decisive action. Word went around, "Have your rifle ready."
Col. Fisher, the real, though not nominal, head of the armed forces of the Provisional Government, told me on Monday afternoon, January 16, "I can get about a hundred of my men out with rifles in ten minutes." Monday afternoon there was suppressed excitement throughout Honolulu. The marshal's antagonism to the gathering of the citizens, the manifesto issued by the cabinet, the counter-meeting to allay excitement, the determination of the citizens at the meeting at the armory, were all cumulative, indicating the certainty of collision, and emphasizing the fact that the city was nominally in the control of a government not having the respect or confidence of its influential citizens, who were at work taking steps to secure for themselves what they otherwise despaired of getting. I know that there was great apprehension of disorder and incendiarism that night.
The landing of the troops allayed this.
Tuesday, January 17, I went into Honolulu (my residence being nearly 2 miles from the city), and learned that definite action was to be taken by the committee of public safety at about 2 o'clock. This was at 1:30 p.m.
I went directly to the office of W. O. Smith, where the committee were in consultation. At the door I learned that the committee would go to the Government building at 2 o'clock to take possession, and that their supporters were to rally at the same hour at the armory. The streets were filled with groups of men earnestly canvassing the situation, and there was a general purpose to stand by the committee at any cost. Men were going home for their rifles and clerks in stores were hurrying to close up.
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Starting for the armory, I heard a pistol shot close at hand, around the corner of Fort and King streets, and presently saw a policeman running to the police station with his hands on his chest, where he had been shot in attempting to capture a wagon load of ammunition.
I believe that shot decided the contest. It certainly distracted the marshal and his forces, for they forthwith shut themselves up in the police station instead of proceeding at once to quell the uprising. It revealed the determination of the citizens and resulted in a rapid massing of their forces.
From this time, 2:15 p.m. (that I will not be absolutely positive about, but I judge it is very nearly correct), until the surrender of the police station at about 7 o'clock, citizens were hurrying with their rifles from every part of the city to the Government building, passing through the streets unmolested by the forces under the marshal, or by the soldiers at the barracks.
These men could have been arrested easily except for the panic that had seized the supporters of the old Government.
Marshal Wilson and his supporters remembered the spirit shown by these same men in 1889, when they rallied in a similar way, and, without organization, by their courage and promptness, suppressed the Wilcox insurrection.
Senator Gray. Are you quoting Marshal Wilson there?
Mr. Oleson. No; I say undoubtedly, he remembered that. He remembered the spirit of those men, and that was the reason for the panic.
After the incident of the shooting I hurried to the armory, but before reaching there met Capt. Zeigler with about 40 men marching down Punchbowl street, in military order, all armed, toward the Government building. Just as I reached the armory another company marched in the same direction. There were about 3O men in the latter company.
At the armory there were more men, and others constantly reporting, some with arms, others without, the latter being furnished both with arms and ammunition. As soon as a squad got together Col. Fisher, in charge, sent them to the Government building in charge of officers.
After noting these matters I went past the barracks, noting that the soldiers were all out of sight. When I reached the Government building the last words of the proclamation were being read. The citizens whom I had seen marching from the armory were at the Government building and guards had been stationed. There must have been a hundred men at that time, and they came trooping in from all directions until the station house surrendered. At that time I should estimate there were 4 companies of 60 men each, every man well armed, and the whole well officered.
The United States troops were not in sight when I reached the Government building, with the exception of their two sentinels, and did not show themselves or make any demonstration after that.
I know that the men in the ranks had no expectation of any aid whatever from United States troops. In 1889 they had fought all day against a determined insurrection, with United States troops within a stone's throw, drawn up in line, but absolutely neutral, and they knew they had nothing to expect in 1893 but the same absolute neutrality.
I know by conversation with men in the ranks that they realized that everything depended on their own courage. I know men who, as in 1889, on their own hook, had banded together to occupy buildings in the neighborhood of the police station, intending to lay siege and cut it
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off from supplies. The feeling among the citizens was one of indifference towards the United States troops as not being an element in the conflict. I speak of the sentiment and conviction of men on whom was to fall the brunt of the conflict.
I did not learn that Minister Stevens had recognized the Government until the next day, and I am quite sure that it was not generally known until then among the armed supporters of the new Government. I did not hear the matter mentioned, though I was constantly among the men. They were talking rather about laying siege to the station house and about the likelihood of several days' desultory fighting under cover.
There was no mention about the soldiers in the barracks. I explain this as a very natural ignoring of them as combatants in the light of their performances in 1887 and 1889, when they had shown themselves averse to conflict. The citizen soldiers treated them absolutely as though they had no existence.
Senator Frye. That is the Queen's guard you are speaking about?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The conviction was that the citizens were masters of the situation as soon as they took possession of the Government building, and that possession of the other buildings was sure to come as a matter of course.
This conviction was based on the evident panic that had seized the forces under the marshal's command, and on the belief that there was no concert of action among the leading adherents of the Queen, and no fighting material behind them.
In the movement of 1887 I was opposed to the project of a republic, deeming it better to secure safeguards under a continuation of the monarchy.
I have been a consistent supporter of the Hawaiian monarchy, in public and in private, out of deference to the prejudices of the aborigines.
It seemed wise to avoid any such radical change until it was actually thrust upon the community by the inevitable collapse of the monarchy.
The events of Saturday, January 14, convinced me that there was no option left to the intelligent and responsible portion of the community but to complete the overthrow initiated by the monarch herself. It was essentially either a return to semibarbarism or the continued control of the country by the forces of progress and civilization, and few men hesitated in making the choice, and the development of events has confirmed their decision.
Senator Frye. You made a more general statement at Worcester.
Mr. Oleson. No; at Boston.
Senator Frye. Have you that in print?
Mr. Oleson. It was printed, but not by me.
Senator Frye. You have it in print?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Frye. I have looked over the statement just referred to, and I would like, Mr. Oleson, to put that in as additional testimony. It is a little broader than that just read.
Senator Gray. I do not like to object, because we have large latitude; but when a witness is before us, and has read a statement which he has carefully prepared, he should stand on that, and not put in statements that he has made at a public meeting.
Mr. Oleson. This is to explain. It is quite different from the one I have just made. This is a sort of general consideration of the causes leading up to this change. It goes back to twenty years ago.
Senator Gray. It does not relate to these three important days.
Mr. Oleson. It touches upon those days very little indeed.
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Senator Frye. It touches it only so far as to indicate that this thing was of gradual growth. As we have been taking testimony this is undoubtedly admissible. It is nothing that you would object to.
Senator Gray. I withdraw my objection.
The Chairman. Do you confirm the statements made in that paper?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; I would say that I have incorporated facts here that I was not cognizant of. That is not the case with my statement just read. But such facts have gone on record in the papers and records of the Legislature.
The Chairman. So far as the statements in that paper are within your knowledge they are true?
Mr. Oleson. Exactly.
The statement is as follows:
- "SOME ELEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF HAWAII.
- "At a recent meeting of the Congregational Club, in Horticultural Hall, Mr. William Brewster Oleson read a very interesting paper on Elements in the Political Evolution of Hawaii, as follows:
- "I shall confine myself on this occasion to the period of twenty years ago, from January, 1873, to January, 1893. I shall also limit myself to a mere allusion to the more salient events in that brief period of constitutional development.
- "An important factor in the political evolution of Hawaii was furnished by the career of Kalakaua, the immediate predecessor and brother of Liliuokalaui.
- "In 1873 he advocated his election to the vacant throne by promising to abolish the poll tax, to fill all Government offices with natives, and to remove the prohibitions on the sale of liquor to the aborigines. He was unpopular with his own people, and his rival, Lunalilo, was enthusiastically elected King.
- "Soon after Lunalilo died, and on February 12, 1874, Kalakaua was elected King by the Legislature. It was charged, and generally believed, that he was elected by the use of bribes. It is sufficient here to say that he was protected from a mob of his own people, for a period of five days after his election, by United States troops.
- "During his reign he dismissed capable and upright officials and filled the civil service with political adventurers, who brought scandal to every department of the Government. He caused grogshops to be licensed in the country districts against the protests of his own people.
- "He raised the cry, 'Hawaii for Hawaiians,' hoping thus to curry popularity by exciting race jealousies against foreigners. He sought to create a state church of which he should be the head. His visits to the other islands were utilized for the recrudescence of lascivious orgies of the old heathen religion. He rehabilitated the trade of sorcery, and turned the influence of the Kahunas to his own political advantage.
- "He stationed soldiers with side arms in double rows at polling places, thus intimidating voters and pushing men out of line who were suspected of opposition to his schemes, thus forcibly preventing their voting. He appointed legislators to lucrative Government positions while they continued to retain seats in the Legislature.
- "He had the Legislature in 1886 adjourn for three weeks so that members who were tax assessors might go home and perform their duties. These men he employed to carry through the Legislature pernicious and extravagant legislation in opposition to the sentiment of the people. He used the royal franking privilege to pass through the custom-
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- house, free of duty, liquors belonging to certain firms, thus, In one instance, defrauding the Government of revenue to the amount of $4,749.35.
- "For this service he received hundreds of cases of cheap gin, which he sent to every voting precinct to secure the election of his candidates to the Legislature. He went personally to one country district, with a company of soldiers, and by their votes defeated Pilipo, the lion of North Kona, Kalakaua's staunchest opponent in the Legislature.
- "He laid claim to the 'primacy of the Pacific,' and sent royal commissioners to the New Hebrides and Gilbert Islands and Samoa to prepare for a Hawaiian protectorate over those islands. He warned the great powers of Europe, in a grandiloquent protest, against any further annexation of islands in the Pacific Ocean, claiming for Hawaii exclusive right 'to assist those islands in improving their social and political condition.'
- "Finally, he accepted a bribe of $71,000 from a Chinaman, named Aki, for an opium license, which he had already sold and delivered to another Chinaman, who had paid $80,000 for it.
- "This career of Kalakaua's had a twofold effect, viz, of arranging in increasing antagonism and bitterness the progressive and retrogressive elements in the population, and of bestowing leadership, on one hand, on the servile partisans of the King, and, on the other, on intelligent Anglo-Saxons, who have, from that time to this, counted as their adherents the more stalwart and independent Hawaiians.
- "Another element in the political evolution of Hawaii has been the decay of the native race.
- "The census of 1823 showed the population to be 130,313. According to the census of 1890 the native Hawaiians numbered 34,430, a decrease since 1823 of 95,877. The annual decrease since 1866 has averaged 1,085. Thus, since 1860, when the native Hawaiians numbered 66,984, the decrease has been 50 per cent.
- "The native Hawaiians now number about one-third of the population. Thus the total population in 1890 was 89,990, of which the Hawaiian numbered 34,430, the Chinese, Japanese, and Polynesians 28,249, and the white foreigners, many of whom were born in the land, 27,305. This decrease of Hawaiians and the corresponding increase of foreigners have depressed the native race, but with an opposite effect on the two radically diverse wings. Thus, on those more susceptible to the corrupting influences of the throne who have fallen into dissipation, and who are seeking their own personal advancement at the expense of all political morality, this alarming decrease has had the effect of exciting intense race hatred.
- "Of those, however, who are allied to the churches, who have been stalwart in their resistance to Kalakaua's demoralizing influences, who are to-day the personification of the character and conscience of this remnant of a race, this decrease has had the effect of drawing them into closer and trustful fellowship with the better class of Anglo-Saxons.
- "Another element in the political evolution of Hawaii has been the growth of the Anglo Saxon population, which has naturally resulted in the bestowment of political privileges, not otherwise enjoyed even by the Hawaiian people themselves.
- "This foreign population pays four-fifths of the taxes. It has furnished the capital and skill in the development of every business and industrial enterprise in Hawaii. It is a resident population, with permanent homes and schools and churches and libraries, and social,
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- commercial, and industrial organizations. Under its influence the instruction in all the schools is in the English language. It has its chamber of commerce, its social science association, its historical society, its banks and railroads, and electric lighting, and manual training schools, and benevolent organizations, and elemosynary institutions. It constitutes the intelligent, progressive, patriotic, governing ability of Hawaii. Hawaiian churches and schools, and every good work among them, rely on this foreign population for financial assistance.
- "The best elements among Hawaiians have in the past twenty years uniformly cast in their lot with the white foreigners, and have gratefully accepted their leadership.
- "This foreign population did not possess suffrage rights until 1887. Under the comparatively wholesome reign of the Kamehameha dynasty there had arisen no occasion for foreigners to feel the need of suffrage rights to protect their interests.
- "The career of Kalakaua led to several indignation mass meetings. The first, in August, 1880, protested against the summary dismissal, at 1 o'clock in the morning, of a worthy cabinet, having a majority of twenty-four in the legislature. This cabinet was dismissed at the instance of Claus Spreckels, because it would not permit his acquisition of certain Government water privileges in defiance of public interests.
- "Two days later another mass meeting compelled the dismissal of the infamous Moreno ministry.
- "On June 30, 1887, the patience of the foreign element having exhausted itself, an enthusiastic mass meeting passed resolutions to the effect 'that the administration of the Hawaiian Government has ceased, through corruption and incompetence, to perform the functions and afford the protection to personal and property rights, for which all governments exists, and exacting of the King specific pledges, within twenty-four hours, of future good conduct on the basis of a new constitution.
- "The constitution of 1887, subsequently signed by the King, in conformity with the demands of this mass meeting, made 'every male resident of Hawaii, of American or European descent, after one year's residence, a legal voter.' Other privileges were conferred, distinctly enlarging the measure of Hawaiian citizenship, and effectually removing the throne from interference in the Government.
- "This arrangement deferred to the traditions of the land, retaining the King as a figurehead, while it placed the responsibility for the Government on a cabinet subject to removal by vote of the Legislature elected by the people.
- "Emerging thus from an era of bombastic display and political corruption and gross immorality, for six years Hawaii had a wise administration of affairs.
- "Liliuokalani abhorred the constitution of 1887, and after she came to the throne, at the death of Kalakaua, sought to recover the ancient prerogatives of the throne. January of this year, after being baffled in her attempts for months by the majority in the Legislature, found Liliuokalani ready to resort to drastic measures.
- "She secured enough votes to oust the best cabinet Hawaii had enjoyed, by agreeing on her part to sign the odious lottery bill. She appointed a ministry in sympathy with her desire for absolute power, prorogued the legislature, and undertook in the presence of her armed
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- troops to abrogate the constitution of 1887 and to promulgate a new one, making her well-nigh an absolute monarch.
- "This lead to the great mass meeting of January 10, 1893, which took steps to organize a new government and to seek annexation to the United States.
- "In all their efforts since 1880 to gain reasonably good government and, having gained it, to retain it, the foreign population have never had the slightest aid from any foreign government, either by force of arms or by stroke of diplomacy.
- "In 1889, when the police and royal troops proved unreliable and the citizens had to rally and suppress a thoroughly organized rebellion, they learned that the forces of law and order were not to expect, even in such crises, the slightest aid from United States troops, although those troops were ashore and under arms all day in close proximity to the scene of conflict.
- "If a timid man, last January, was frightened and hoped for aid and protection from United States troops he had nothing to base that hope upon. The aroused citizens were better prepared to cope with the Queen's forces last January than in 1889, when they so successfully quelled the Wilcox insurrection; and, moreover, the Queen and her cabinet knew it, and discreetly avoided a conflict. Men in the ranks who had the fighting to do knew they must do it themselves. Any other representation is false to facts, which can be amply demonstrated.
- "Granting that Mr. Blount sought an honest and impartial verdict on the circumstances attending the establishment of the Provisional Government, the nature of all the evidence submitted is such that another man, equally just and impartial, could have arrived, legitimately, at a diametrically opposite conclusion, with an abundance of facts to establish it.
- "This foreign population, that has been such a potent factor in the political evolution of Hawaii, has never taken united action except in behalf of good government. It has been moderate in its demands, humane in its action, patient with the frailties of an effete monarchy, and uniformly considerate of the political rights of native Hawaiians.
- "Twenty years of progressive participation in public affairs prepared the foreign population, when the monarchy collapsed, to assume the responsibility for initiating stable and efficient government in the interests of all. This it has courageously undertaken, and with a remarkable measure of success, while awaiting the decision of the United States on the proposal for annexation. It must be borne in mind that the United States was not requested to adjudicate domestic differences in Hawaii, nor was that the ground on which the Provisional Government was accorded recognition by all the civilized nations. Because of its peculiar relations to Hawaii, covering a period of fifty years, this great country was appealed to to provide a basis for progressive, responsible, republican government.
- "Such an evolution as I have briefly outlined has crystallized antagonisms and prejudices which it will take years to dissolve, and which would menace and imperil any purely independent national existence. The liability to political unrest, if not actual revolution, would prove as disastrous to Hawaii as in so many instances it has proved to Central American republics.
- "The situation is so peculiar as to call for the fostering supervision of some strong foreign power under which it would be possible for an efficient and progressive government to grow up, advantageous alike
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- to Hawaii and the commercial and humanitarian interests of that vast ocean.
- "Such a protective relation the United States has officially declared it will not permit any other nation to assume toward Hawaii. The progress of events demonstrates that, sooner or later, foreign intervention from some quarter is inevitable. If the United States insists that no other nation shall assume the responsibility of guaranteeing in Hawaii the blessings of civilized government, that responsibility the United States is morally bound to accept itself.
- "Boston, November 29,1893."
Senator Gray. You say that you arrived at the Government house on the 17th when the last words of the proclamation of the Provisional Government were being read?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. And that you observed about 100 men there?
Mr. Oleson. I immediately went into the Government yard and looked about. I should say that there must have been 100 men inside and outside the building.
Senator Frye. Armed men?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. I understand you did not count them?
Mr. Oleson. No; did not count them. But I have been used to seeing military companies.
Senator Gray. As there have been other estimates, I want to understand whether you counted the men there.
Mr. Oleson. No; I did not count them.
Senator Gray. Did you that afternoon go over to Arion Hall, where the United States troops were?
Mr. Oleson. No; they did not make the slightest impression----
Senator Gray. I asked if you went over there.
Mr. Oleson. No. Coming down Richard street Arion Hall is in full view. I did not see any troops, as I say; I saw but 2 sentries. Richard street is to the west of the palace. If you have a map here, I will trace my course. Here [indicating on the diagram] on the corner of King and Bethel streets was the point from which I started. I went along King to Fort street. I went down to the corner of Merchant, to Mr. Smith's office; came back Fort street to King street to the spot I started from, to see some friends. I came here [indicating], nearly to the corner of King and Fort streets, when I heard the shot. Then I went up Fort street to Hotel street and came through Hotel street to Palace lane. Coming along Hotel street, I went up Palace lane past the barracks. This [indicating] is Palace lane. I went through here up to Punchbowl street; up Punchbowl street to Beretania street, where the armory is. As I arrived here on Palace lane, in full view of Punchbowl street, Capt. Ziegler was passing—going down Punchbowl street. When I got up to the corner of Punchbowl and Beretania there was another company started down Punchbowl street. I went into the armory and shortly afterward came down Punchbowl street to Palace lane, and noted that there were none of the royal soldiers in sight; came down Richard street, and in coming down Richard street Arion Hall is in full view, back of the opera house. I came down through Richard street to Palace Square, down through that little lane [indicating], and went into the Government yard.
Senator Frye. And all the troops that you saw at Arion Hall were the 2 sentries?
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Mr. Oleson. Yes. They may have been there, but I did not see them, and I think I should have seen them. I was walking down Richard street with Prof. Scott, and we were talking about the situation and hurrying toward the Government building. We might have been in conversation, and for that reason not have seen them. But my impression is they were not there.
Senator Frye. Not in view.
Mr. Oleson. No.
Senator Gray. Did you know at that time that the soldiers were stationed there?
Mr. Oleson. Oh, yes; I knew they were there.
Senator Gray. And you did not look to see if they were there?
Mr. Oleson. No. I know they landed the night before and stopped on Mr. Atherton's grounds the night before.
Senator Gray. Who is Mr. Atherton, an American?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where is his house?
Mr. Oleson. He is a commission merchant.
Senator Gray. Will you point out his house?
Mr. Oleson. It is right out on King street.
Senator Gray. Has it large grounds around it?
Mr. Oleson. Yes—another house here [indicating], and then his grounds go clear through—extensive grounds.
Senator Gray. Were you out there when the troops were there?
Mr. Oleson. I went out when they were there; yes.
Senator Gray. That was on Monday evening?
Mr. Oleson. That was on Monday evening.
Senator Gray. Were you there when they marched away?
Mr. Oleson. I was not; no.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Stevens that day?
Mr. Oleson. No.
Senator Gray. Of course you had no conversation with him if you did not see him ?
Mr. Oleson. I did not see him after his trip to Hawaii.
Senator Gray. Did you know many of these men whom you saw with arms around the Government building that day?
Mr. Oleson. I lived outside of the city; I know a good many men, having little to do with the affairs of the city; I know a good many by name. I know a good many of them were engaged in the revolution of 1887 and 1889.
Senator Gray. Did you talk with any of them that day?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; while we were at the Government building.
Senator Gray. How many of them?
Mr. Oleson. I went from one group to another to see what the sentiment was.
Senator Gray. The men were in groups?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. Not in military array?
Mr. Oleson. A large guard and two companies in line; the others were in the Government building, with arms stacked in the legislative hall.
Senator Gray. They were the men you talked to?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; not the men in line.
Senator Gray. Not the men in the line?
Mr. Oleson. I talked with some of them.
Senator Gray. Whom?
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Mr. Oleson. Mr. Adnerson, who was one of my teachers. He was in one of the companies. I had special permission to go to the gate to see some friends who called to see me.
Senator Gray. Were you under arms?
Mr. Oleson. I was under arms; yes.
Senator Gray. Were you attached to any company?
Mr. Oleson. I was attached to one of the companies; yes.
Mr. Gray. Were you walking around all this time while you were under arms and attached to a company.
Mr. Oleson. I did not get my rifle until just before the police station was surrendered; so I was not in line with the other men until that time. I had reported and had been assigned to a company.
Senator Gray. But you were still walking around among the people and around the Government building?
Mr. Oleson. We were allowed to do that; yes.
Senator Gray. Were you in Honolulu when the troops were landed Monday evening?
Mr. Oleson. I was not in the city.
Senator Gray. You did not see them when they landed and marched out?
Mr. Oleson. No.
Senator Gray. It was afterward you heard they were there and went out?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; I saw them in the evening, in Mr. Atherton's yard.
Senator Gray. And you saw them in Arion Hall?
Mr. Oleson. I heard the next day that they were in Arion Hall.
Senator Gray. I thought you said you were there when the troops marched back to Arion Hall?
Mr. Oleson. No; I just dropped off a horse car that evening where the troops were. I stopped to see what they were doing there. I asked the people what they were about, what the troops were there for, and the people did not seem to know.
Senator Gray. Did you not know they were there before you started out in the horse car?
Mr. Oleson. No.
Senator Gray. Where were you going?
Mr. Oleson. Out to make a call, I think.
Senator Gray. Where?
Mr. Oleson. I think I went out to Mr. W. A. Bowen's, a friend of mine.
Senator Gray. Where does he live?
Mr. Oleson. It is a street that runs parallel with King street—the second street to the north, running parallel to King street.
Senator Gray. How far out-past Mr. Atherton's?
Mr. Oleson. Oh, yes.
Senator Gray. Beyond Mr. Atherton's?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; quite a distance beyond.
Senator Gray. And you got out when you got to Mr. Atherton's for the purpose of seeing the troops?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. How long were you there?
Mr. Oleson. Just a few minutes.
Senator Gray. Then you went on and made your call?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
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Senator Gray. Hid you come in on the horse cars? When you came in did you see the soldiers ?
Mr. Oleson. I think I came in on the Beretania street line, the next street running parallel with King street.
Senator Gray. And you did not see the soldiers?
Mr. Oleson. No.
Senator Gray. And you did hear where they were?
Mr. Oleson. No.
Senator Gray. You did not hear until the next day, Tuesday?
Mr. Oleson. Tuesday.
Senator Gray. How did you learn it?
Mr. Oleson. I learned it through the morning paper. When I received that I do not know. I did not go into the city until about 1 o'clock.
Senator Gray. And you had your paper before you went into the city?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. You have been an instructor of education and connected with the islands for fifteen years?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. Does that bring you in contact with the native population?
Mr. Oleson. Altogether.
Senator Gray. What do you find among the common people—those whom you come in contact with—in regard to learning, manners, and the ordinary intellectual conditions?
Mr. Oleson. I have a great regard for the Hawaiians, having mingled with them so much, and I have a high estimate as to their good nature and imitative faculties, and as to their fitness for manual employment. I do not think the higher education is suitable for them—I do not think they are fit for it, and having obtained it, they can not make a right use of it.
Senator Gray. But they have had the opportunities?
Mr. Oleson. Yes. Since I have been in the islands my efforts have been to pull down the course of study. They had previously taught them calculus and trigonometry in the schools, but the Kamehameha school did not go beyond algebra. That was put in to please the boys.
Senator Gray. You thought it was better to adhere to the average native capacity?
Mr. Oleson. Certainly. We had extensive manual-training shops there, blacksmith, iron and machine works, wood turning, printing, carpenter work; and it was my aim in organizing the school—I had to overcome many difficulties—to make it a manual-training school, so as to develop the Hawaiians on the side they showed the most aptitude for.
Senator Gray. Do you think they are susceptible of as high training and as broad culture as the white race?
Mr. Oleson. They have very little faculty for originating—they are great imitators. That is shown in their manual-training work; they can do a thing after they are shown how to do it.
Senator Gray. Is not that a characteristic of the inferior races?
Mr. Oleson. Certainly.
Senator Gray. And you would consider them an inferior race?
Mr. Oleson. As compared with the Anglo-Saxon. They have many good traits, lovable traits, and I have cherished a high estimate for the Hawaiians since my residence in the islands. I do not know any men more stalwart than some of them have been under temptation.
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Senator Gray. You think that the population is capable of self government in the sense we understand it in the States and with our own race?
Mr. Oleson. With some conditions. Under the leadership of Anglo- Saxons, the Hawaiian population up to 1880 was pretty well divided up, with a majority against any encroachment on the part of the throne on the rights of the people. There was a demand for larger popular rights, and those people stood together. But, as I have undertaken to show in my paper, that majority was dissipated, as the effect of Kalakaua's reign in matters of bribery and intimidation and the revival of the old kahuna system in the country, which tended to subvert and to intimidate the Hawaiians. So that, while I have stayed there, I have witnessed that change. But to-day there is a good proportion of the Hawaiians who are stalwart and firm in their support of annexation as the best outcome for that country—staunch friends of the white man. And the effort made by the white men who have been allied with the reform movement has been to advance the interest of Hawaiians as well as those of the Anglo-Saxon. But there is a large element that is affected, intimidated by the throne, and they are indifferent to-day. They do not dare to do anything, much less take one side or the other. They can be appealed to by race prejudice in ways that the Anglo-Saxon can not approach them; and in that way the electorate is subverted, and, in my opinion, no matter how much I may think of the native, it is impossible to get an adequately representative vote among them
Senator Gray. Do you think a successful and prosperous government for the good of all interests, native as well as all others, is possible on those islands, except under a strong government ruled and controlled by men of our own race?
Mr. Oleson. Our race has always ruled the government, and I do not see any reason to change my opinion as to the necessity; that is history; that is the outlook. I do feel that the continuation of such a government as they have there now will eventually swing over to the side of the present government a large number of the natives, it may be a majority.
Senator Gray. The government you have there is a Provisional Government, and under the control of the superior race of the islands?
Mr. Oleson. It is entirely.
Senator Gray. And it is strong?
Mr. Oleson. It is strong in every sense of the word.
Senator Gray. It is autocratic?
Mr. Oleson. No; it is oligarchy.
Senator Gray. Oligarchy describes it better than the word I used?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. I accept your word as better than mine.
Mr. Oleson. I think it is an important matter to show how it was that the men who formed the committee of safety were able to take possession of that Government, and to call attention to that public meeting that was held in the public square on the same day that the meeting was held in the armory.
It was the general opinion on every side that the public manifesto of the Queen and cabinet announcing that there would be no further attempt from the throne to promulgate a constitution was a desperate move to placate the indignant foreign population. The mass meeting in Palace Square was engineered by the cabinet and the marshal who publicly stated that such men as Wilcox and Nawahi were not to be
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speakers. He said "We have given orders that the tone of the speaking must be moderate." Nawahi and Wilcox did speak, men who had always been fiery agitators and persistent in their demands for a new constitution. This meeting, made up of advocates of a new constitution, the leaders of which had conspired with the Queen to secure such constitution, voted an expression of thanks to the Queen for her manifesto.
Men knew that this action was insincere, as they also believed the Queen's to be, and the effect of the meeting and of the manifesto was to convince the community of the panic that had seized the Government and of their readiness to resort to any expedient to allay the indignation of the people and to prevent their organization. It was these considerations that help to explain the passivity of the Queen's forces and the ease with which the Provisional Government assumed control.
Senator Gray. Did you hear those orders given?
Mr. Oleson. Marshal Wilson told it to a gentlemen who told it to me.
Senator Gray. Marshal Wilson did not tell it to you?
Mr. Oleson. No.
Senator Gray. You were asked to confine yourself to facts that came within your own observation and what you knew. That is argumentative.
The Chairman. You are evidently speaking of matters which you know of only by common repute.
Mr. Oleson. I speak of matters in addition—matters of common talk on the streets after the mass meeting.
The Chairman. But not of matters within your personal knowledge?
Mr. Oleson. Certainly; knowledge of the character of these men who were speaking.
The Chairman. You believed it, but you did not hear it?
Mr. Oleson. I passed by the meeting. I know that those men were there.
The Chairman. Were they speaking?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; I believe they were speaking.
The Chairman. Which one?
Mr. Oleson. Mr. Robert Wilcox, I think.
Senator Gray. Were you present at both meetings?
Mr. Oleson. I passed by one to the other; yes.
Senator Gray. What is your estimate of the number of persons present at the two meetings—a fair estimate?
Mr. Oleson. I should say that the numbers at the armory were considerably in excess of those at the public square. But there were men continually going to and fro.
Senator Frye. The public square meeting was a Royalist meeting, and the armory meeting was the Provisional Government meeting?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. You say that you think the numbers in the public square were less than those in the armory ?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; I judge so.
Senator Gray. The meeting in the armory was in the building?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. And the meeting in the square was in the open?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you not a little careful of comparing the numbers of those in the open to those in the four walls of the building?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; I have been used to judging audiences, and I judged at the armory there were some 1,200 present. One of the
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editors of the paper stated that by actual count there were a little less than 1,100. He gave the actual numbers at the time.
Senator Gray. How far were those meetings apart?
Mr. Oleson. A little less than a quarter of a mile.
Senator Gray. Short distance enough to allow a shifting back and forth?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; there were very few went away from the meeting in the armory; but there were others outside, representing the indifferent class, to see how the thing was going. They would range themselves at the public square meeting, as on other similar occasions, on the sidewalk toward the palace, when the meeting was on the other side of the railroad track.
Senator Gray. You were at both meetings?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. You spoke of having a feeling of friendship for the Hawaiian people?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. And the Hawaiian character?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. Will you state whether that is a common feeling amongst the white men of Hawaii?
Mr. Oleson. That is a very difficult question to answer. There are two classes of white men in the country: it is doubtful which class is the more numerous. The more recent class in the country have a low estimate of the native character; but the older residents of the country have always been friendly, and have had an attraction toward the Hawaiians, and have always done a great deal for them.
The Chairman. That is the body of the people which you call missionaries?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; the older residents, who have known Hawaiians outside of Honolulu—known them under circumstances different from those which have come up since 1880.
The Chairman. In the Hawaiian Islands, who are classed as missionaries?
Mr. Oleson. Any man who is in favor of good order and against pernicious legislation is a missionary.
The Chairman. And so classed?
Mr. Oleson. Yes. And it is no matter whether he is of correct life or not.
Senator Gray. Because the missionary element leads that movement?
Mr. Oleson. I do not know, except that it comes about incidentally.
Senator Gray. Is it not a fact that the descendants of those missionaries, being descendants of our own race and blood, and living there and having an interest in the islands, are supposed to have an interest that does not belong to the later comers, to those more transient?
Mr. Oleson. In the native race, you mean?
Senator Gray. Yes.
Mr. Oleson. Yes?
The Chairman. The native race have a respect for the real missionary?
Mr. Oleson. Yes. There is hardly a man, an old resident, who has been in public life, who has any prominence in this movement, who has not at one time or another represented an almost entirely native constituency in the legislature.
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The Chairman. There seems to be a progress made in all educational development, Christian development, etc. Is that the work of the class called missionaries?
Mr. Oleson. I think it comes from the fact of their residence among the missionaries; yes.
The Chairman. And that gives impulse to all these movements to enlightenment and civilization in Hawaii?
Mr. Oleson. Yes. The conditions have changed now. In earlier times, when the white population was less in number than now, the affiliations were greater between the Hawaiians and the whites, because they were thrown among each other in matters of residence— they were out in the country nearer together. The plantation system has broken that up; and the political situation—I speak of the revolution— has also brought about that change.
The Chairman. Is the progress of education in Hawaii due to the efforts of this party called the missionaries—the old missionaries there?
Mr. Oleson. I should say that all the intelligent and law-loving members of the community (with possible exceptions which can be explained) are in this movement. Those exceptions are men who are more or less connected with the embassies, or who are agitators of anti- American ideas, who, being adventurers in that country, have but little or no property interests—are interested in the schemes for smuggling opium, or laws which are intended for their personal interests. They use the natives, but they have no real regard for them. I can put in, use and abuse. I know about the attitude of this class who are at the head of the Government in relation to the schools.
The Chairman. Do you mean the Provisional Government?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; men who are influential in it. I know of their generosity in the way of support of Hawaiians in the schools. I have had connection not only with the two schools I mentioned, but others; and I know the help granted by these men has been enormous. They have supported individuals in the schools, and have done it because of aloha for the natives.
The Chairman. Has there been a general dissemination of knowledge of English amongst the Hawaiians in the elementary studies?
Mr. Oleson. Yes. But a great many of them are able to read in an English book who can not talk English, except indifferently.
The Chairman. My question had reference to the extent.
Mr. Oleson. It is extensive in the sense that the Hawaiians can read and write as perhaps no other people can according to population.
The Chairman. Since you have been living in Hawaii, have you seen any marked progress in morality or personal respectability amongst what you call the Hawaiians, the native Kanakas?
Mr. Oleson. I think that in the city of Honolulu there is much more immorality than there is out in the country. I shall have to associate my observation in Honolulu with that of an observer in Hilo. In the country, the commingling of the races and the immoralities which are the bane of Hawaiian social life are not so excessive and flagrant as in the city of Honolulu. But there are causes for that, of course.
The Chairman. But as a general rule or result, has the influence, the efforts of the missionary party (I will call them), in Hawaii been beneficial or otherwise to the people?
Mr. Oleson. Beneficial to the people. I do not think there has been
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a single thing gained by the Anglo-Saxon population that has not been shared with the Hawaiians. There has been no race feeling whatever on the part of the influential foreigner in the political reforms of recent years. One point showing race animosity on the part of Hawaiians was when the appointive power of the King for nobles was taken away from him and the nobles were made elective by the people. This was not to be by the fullest, broadest suffrage rights, but by limitations, educational and property, and the Hawaiians claimed that was inimical to them. But as a matter of fact there are a great many Hawaiians who are noble voters who are within those qualifications. I was present when some of the articles of that constitution were discussed, and I personally, with others, made a strenuous movement at the time, and it was pretty well supported, to make that property qualification less than was proposed, so as to take in the Hawaiian ministers. The Hawaiian ministers have, in a measure, been the backers of good government.
The Chairman. Let me ask you if these kindly measures and good efforts of the party which you now call the missionary party seem to have been influenced by the motive of selfish gain or aggrandizement, acquisition of power, or one of real generosity toward the people of Hawaii?
Mr. Oleson. I think it has been one of generosity toward the people of Hawaii; a movement in their own interest. You may speak of it as a selfish movement, if you take the demand and determination to have a good government as selfish interest. It was not any sordid movement; it had its source in moral considerations.
The Chairman. That has characterized the whole interests of Hawaii?
Mr. Oleson. Yes, one little fact will show you the character of the members of the Provisional Government and of the advisory council as men who, giving a great deal of valuable time to the necessary legislation of the present Government, are men receiving no salary whatever. The nobles received no salary whatever under the constitution of 1887.
The Chairman. Was there, at the date of this revolution, to your knowledge, any organization whatever, secret or open, for the purpose of dethroning the Queen?
Mr. Oleson. No.
The Chairman. Or for the purpose of annexing the islands to the United States?
Mr. Oleson. No.
The Chairman. If such an organization or combination had existed, would you have kncwn it?
Mr. Oleson. I would have known it.
The Chairman. Are you satisfied to state that there was no such organization ?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. When did you first hear of the movement to dethrone the Queen?
Mr. Oleson. That was whispered after the mass meeting. Men came from that and said: "Why don't they do something?" Large powers were given to the committee of safety to go on and organize the government, and men said, "That means that the Queen is out."
The Chairman. That was the first time you heard of it?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. After the mass meeting?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; I do not know that that committee, previous to
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the meeting, expected to be backed to such an extent as to warrant them to go on; but, as I say, that is my opinion.
The Chairman. Amongst the Americans there in Hawaii, since you have resided on the islands, has there been any evident disposition to promote annexation to the United States?
Mr. Oleson. There has been no concerted attempt; it has been written on publicly in the papers. Men have advocated it in the papers, and Hawaiians have advocated it more than the Americans.
The Chairman. Do you speak of the Kanakas?
Mr. Oleson. Native Hawaiians. I am not speaking of the white people.
The Chairman. You said the Americans?
Mr. Oleson. No, the Kanakas, the native Hawaiians.
The Chairman. That they have advocated it more strenuously than the white people?
Mr. Oleson. Yes. I mean in public.
The Chairman. Then it was a subject of open political discussion?
Mr. Oleson. Yes—only that it was not very common; once in a while there would be something about it in the papers; some one would say something of it.
The Chairman. It is a topic that has been discussed?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; for a good many years.
The Chairman. Has there been any disposition evinced, to your knowledge, of annexation to any other country, or toward claiming a protectorate of any other country than the United States?
Mr. Oleson. No. When that has been broached in my presence I have uniformly heard disapprobation of it. That is the sentiment of the native Hawaiians, Kanakas, as well as amongst the Americans, and also among many of the English.
The Chairman. Do you know whether they celebrate our National days there?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; the Fourth of July has been the celebration day since I have been in the country.
The Chairman. Do the Kanakas celebrate?
Mr. Oleson. They do not participate in the speeches; but they do in the sports, the prizes, etc.—boat races.
The Chairman. They enter with enthusiasm into the celebration as a national fete.
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. How about the Thanksgiving that is proclaimed by the President of the United States?
Mr. Oleson. That day is observed in a quiet way; it is a semiholiday— the Hawaiians do not size that up, quite.
The Chairman. I notice that Mr. Willis mentions that it is observed?
Mr. Oleson. It is observed; but not anything like the Fourth of July.
The Chairman. Would you say that there was a feeling amongst the general population, white and Kanaka, of the Hawaiian Islands of a decided character in favor of the United States as a friendly government, or as the one to which they would ultimately look for protection in any emergency?
Mr. Oleson. I think that that is the majority sentiment in that country among all classes.
The Chairman. Has it been such since you have resided there?
Mr. Oleson. No; I think it has been gradually growing, as men of
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all classes have faced what they uniformly agreed was inevitable for Hawaii.
The Chairman. Upon what ground do you base that conclusion— that the monarchy must inevitably collapse?
Mr. Oleson. To, first, the dying out of the Kamehameha line; second, the abuses of the reign of Kalakaua among the Hawaiians, not yet become extinct. There was intense opposition to him when he became King. That lies dormant in the minds of the Hawaiians— that these kings are not high chiefs, that there must be an end to their rule sooner or later, and that they must have a government from elsewhere.
The Chairman. If you believed Kalakaua to be a heathen, why did you not attempt to overthrow him in 1887?
Mr. Oleson. There was a very strong sentiment to do it at the time.
The Chairman. Do you know the reason why it was not put into effect?
Mr. Oleson. As I said in my statement, because those men who were influential felt that it was better not to make any such radical change until the country was ripe for it and the situation demanded it.
The Chairman. You have been waiting for public sentiment to ripen upon this question and the coming of events to show that it was better for the safety and security of good government in Hawaii that the monarchy should fall?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. Be substituted by a different form of government?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; as a logical sequence.
The Chairman. Monarchy through the world is regarded as being a stronger form of government than a republic. Did the people of Hawaii expect that when the monarchy should cease they would be able to establish and maintain a republican government in Hawaii of their own resources and without assistance from any other country?
Mr. Oleson. No; I did not, personally; and those that I talked with did not. We felt that it was impossible in the light of past experience, and of the facts that we knew, for us to sustain an independent national existence there.
The Chairman. So that, at the collapse of the monarchy, whenever that should occur, it was intimately associated, as I understand, with the idea of annexation to the United States?
Mr. Oleson. That was the solution of it.
The Chairman. And the two ideas ran together?
Mr. Oleson. Ran together. It was just as if the men had said "We will go on with the monarchy as long as we can, and when we can not the United States will take us."
The Chairman. That was the whole idea?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. The idea of going on separately from the United States without the protection of the United States or the other countries has not been entertained?
Mr. Oleson. That has not been entertained, except by Ashford and Wilcox, as I deem very natural, when we consider their personal interests lay in the direction of maintaining a republic. They would then be able to dicker with the United States and get appointments in that way. But I do not think men of intelligence have for a moment thought of it. They may be able to do it, after all, and sustain their rights. But when men followed this movement, they followed it as a tentative matter and thought that was the only responsible government
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they could get in the islands at the time. But the ultimate out come must be annexation to the United States.
The Chairman. The present provisional forces of the Provisional Government, that the Government seems to be able to equip, arm, and pay, as I gather from this testimony, are about 1,200 men.
Mr. Oleson. I do not know that there are as many as that to pay. Some of the volunteer forces are not under the pay of the Government.
The Chairman. Omitting the question of pay, the present military force of the Provisional Government is 1,200 men.
Mr. Oleson. I think between 1,200 and 1,500.
The Chairman. Are those men well armed and equipped?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. With modern guns?
Mr. Oleson. With modern guns; yes.
The Chairman. And modern ammunition?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. Are they composed most largely of the white race?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
The Chairman. Are there any native Kanakas enrolled in this force?
Mr. Oleson. I think there are some. Kanakas are not fighters.
The Chairman. They are not belligerent?
Mr. Oleson. They are in talking; but not beyond that.
The Chairman. They are a passionate people, and might be roused into hostility?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; but in cold blood I do not think the native would fight.
The Chairman. Suppose the Queen had the means of arming 1,000 or 1,200 natives, an equal number of natives, with equal facilities of all kinds, arms, ammunition, equipments, such as the Provisional Government forces have, and of placing such men under such drill as would make of them soldiers who could be handled in action, what would be your opinion of the ability of that number of Kanakas, thus armed and equipped, to stand against 1,200 white men?
Mr. Oleson. Wholly hypothetical.
The Chairman. What is your opinion?
Mr. Oleson. I do not think they would stand at all.
The Chairman. DO you think they would ever attempt to stand?
Mr. Oleson. No.
The Chairman. You think they have such an estimate of the courage of the white race, and of that race's fighting quality, that they would not make a stand against them?
Mr. Oleson. They would not.
The Chairman. Although they were perfectly armed, equipped, organized as an army ready to defend the Queen?
Mr. Oleson. Yes; they could not be depended upon—that has been proven repeatedly.
The Chairman. By actual experience?
Mr. Oleson. By actual experience.
The Chairman. Take the Queen in her present condition, with her present resources, present playing upon the affections of the Hawaiian natives, do you apprehend that she has any possible chance of reinstating herself upon the throne?
Mr. Oleson. Not at all; and she has not had any chance since January 14; not the ghost of a chance to reinstate herself by any force she could marshal in the islands.
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The Chairman. So that, in a conflict, native Kanakas under the leadership of the Queen could not stand against the forces under the leadership of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Oleson. That would be out of the question. That is my personal opinion.
The Chairman. That is what I am after, your personal opinion.
Mr. Oleson. In saying that I do not impute anything against the natives; it is simply due to the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon people.
The Chairman. As I understand your opinion, the Kanakas are not a military people, not aggressive?
Mr. Oleson. No, not aggressive. They will expose themselves to danger; are physically strong and able men. They are the reliance of the industries of that country, so far as the demand is for strength and daring. The interisland steamers, which require dexterity, courage, and strength, are manned by the Hawaiians. It is the only force in the islands to do that work.
The Chairman. Then you think they would make excellent sailors?
Mr. Oleson. They are. I have met them in New England. They had been sailors, and they had been all around the world.
The Chairman. Are they fond of their calling?
Mr. Oleson. Yes. Very much attracted to it.
The Chairman. Would you say that the Kanaka population, taking them at large, are what we would call a governing people?
Mr. Oleson. No; they are not.
The Chairman. Do you think they would have the requisite skill in the enactment of laws (if that were left entirely to them) to build up and maintain good government?
Mr. Oleson. They could not do it.
The Chairman. You think a legislature composed entirely of Kanakas, without respect to their intelligence, and including the highest order of intelligence, and a Kanaka cabinet, could not control the Government of Hawaii?
Mr. Oleson. No; they could not.
The Chairman. You are perfectly satisfied on that point?
Mr. Oleson. Perfectly satisfied on that point. That is the case. By a late paper from Honolulu—I do not know whether you would rather have it or not—I see that President Dole has called upon Dr. Trousseau to explain certain testimony which he had given against President Dole, and calls for retraction. It is very brief. If you would like to have it I will pass it to you.
The Chairman. You can put it in if you think it will reflect any light.
Mr. Oleson. I think it will show that President Dole was not concerned in any conspiracy. And another thing, where Dr. Trousseau said he knew by personal knowledge of these things, in his retraction he states he got his information from a source which he supposed was reliable.
The Chairman. Have you seen any denial of their authenticity by Trousseau or Dole?
Mr. Oleson. No. In a later paper he made a retraction to 3 other men whom he had mentioned in the same connection—4 other men.
Senator Frye. In reference to the protection of Ameiican life and property, was the location of the troops at Arion Hall a central location?
Mr. Oleson. It was a central place for a rendezvous. The two main streets are at an angle—King street and Nuuanu street—and Arion
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Hall was a central location from which to scatter the troops in squads to available points. I do not well see how they could have been better located for the protection of life and property to better advantage than there.
The Chairman. Was there anything to prevent the location of those troops in Arion Hall when you went out to the Government building and the proclamation was being read—anything to prevent the loyalists from making an attack on the men who entered the Government building?
Mr. Oleson. No; the Queen's forces had plenty of ways in which they could have gotten there without passing by the United States troops, even if the United States troops had been out, which I do not admit.
Senator Frye. But if the United States troops were in their quarters there was nothing to prevent an attack being made by the loyalists on the men of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Oleson. No.
Senator Frye. Was there anything in those mass meetings which were held to prevent an attack by the Queen's forces?
Mr. Oleson. No; the nominal Government could have suppressed by the force they had in their hands that mass meeting; but they did not dare to do it, because it would have aggravated things so that they would have gone to their worst.
Senator Frye. Peterson, and Colburn, and Neumann, and Rosa, being then the agents of the Queen and the Queen's cabinet as she formed it after she had removed the Wilcox-Jones cabinet, were they reputable men in the islands?
Mr. Oleson. I never considered any of them to be.
Senator Frye. Did you have any acquaintance with Mr. Stevens?
Mr. Oleson. Yes.
Senator Frye. What was your estimate of him?
Mr. Oleson. I had a high estimate of Mr. Stevens as a man who was exceedingly discreet in his bearing toward events there. I feel that he was placed in a very difficult position at the time the troops were landed, on account of the merely nominal hold which the Government had on the situation—it was practically in the hands of the irresponsible portion of the community; there was practically no government that had any respect of the people. I have heard since that Minister Stevens did not request permission of the Government that the troops be allowed to land. If he had made any such request and it had been denied, I do not think Minister Stevens would have been justified in not landing the troops. There was no government; there was no agreement on a plan of action among the leaders of the nominal government; there were disagreements amongst them; there was no confidence, on the part of the intelligent portion of the community, in them, so that in that sense, while they had nominal control of things, it was simply a nominal government.
Senator Frye. Did you at any time, in your investigations and in your conversations with the men who were connected with the Provisional Government, obtain from them any idea that they expected any assistance from United States troops?
Mr. Oleson. No; not the slightest. I never heard it whispered, and I was in a way to meet a great many of the men on whom the fighting was to depend, if there was to be any fighting. They did not look for any assistance at all.
Senator Frye. Is it your opinion that it was a fact that the presence
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of the United States troops on shore had any effect in dethroning the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Oleson. I do not think it had the slightest.
Senator Frye. And if the troops had remained on board ship the same thing would have happened?
Mr. Oleson. I think the same thing might have happened. But I think something else would have happened—there might have been irresponsible parties turned upon the community, and incendiary fires and bloodshed might have followed.
Senator Frye. But as to the establishment of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Oleson. As to the establishment of the Government, I do not think it made any material difference.
Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, I received by this morning's mail, from Charles L. Carter, one of the commissioners, three or four statements which were printed in the public papers of Honolulu, containing, over the signatures of the men who are purported to have written them, contradictions of the testimony of Dr. Trousseau, who appears several times as a witness in Mr. Blount's report. I ask that they be incorporated in this testimony. One is from Sanford B. Dole, one from Chief Justice Judd, and one from Alfred S. Hartwell in answer to some statements made by Dr. Trousseau that these gentlemen, together with others named, had been for a long time in the habit of meeting at the office of the minister of the United States and conspiring to produce the revolution of 1893. They contradict Dr. Trousseau right straight through. They are as follows:
Trousseau once more—He is again brought to a reckoning—This time President Dole secures a retraction of some statements to Blount.
- Honolulu December 27, 1893.
- George Trousseau, M. D.:
- Dear Sir:I notice in Mr. Blount's report, of which I have a copy on page 284 of Part II, the following statement in your letter to Mr Blount, dated May 16, 1893:
- "Almost daily, to my personal knowledge, meetings were held at Mr. Stevens's house in which the possibilities of a peaceful revolution with the prospects of annexation were discussed. Prominent at these meetings were the chief justice, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, Charles Carter, and others, also Capt. Wiltse."
- This statement, which has been published in the Commercial Advertiser at Honolulu, is incorrect as regards myself. I was never present at any such meetings, nor was I aware that such meetings were held until informed of it by the publication of your statement to that effect.
- I desire that you will make due reparation in the matter with the same publicity which the above statement has already received.
- I am, very sincerely, yours,
- Sanford B. Dole.
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- December 28, 1893.
- Hon. S.B. Dole,
- President of the Provisional Government:
- Dear Sir: When I made to Mr. Blount the statements you refer to in your letter of the 27th, I believed them to be correct, as my information came from a source that I could not consider but reliable.
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- In spite of difference of opinion and bitterness of feeling on my part engendered by the vile abuse I have been submitted to by your political side, I have always considered you as a gentleman.
- You say that you attended no meetings at Mr. Stevens's house; let it be so; I accept your word for it.
- Very respectfully yours,
- G. Trousseau.
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Trousseau and truth—Where they fail to agree in their evidence—Chief Justice Judd and Judge A. S. Hartwell deny statements of his to Blount.
- Editor Star:
- Dr. Trousseau's statements to Mr. Blount, so far as they refer to me, are totally untrue. I never met any of the gentlemen named by him at Mr. Stevens's house. I never attended any meeting with the gentleman named or with any others at Mr. Stevens's house, or at any other place, where annexation was discussed.
- I do not consider that I owe my "social and pecuniary position" to the natives, although I believe I have their confidence and good will. Before my appointment to the bench, now nearly twenty years ago, I was receiving a handsome income from my practice at the bar; greater than my salary as second associate justice, which was my first appointment.
- I took no part whatever in the revolution of January, 1893, nor was I informed of the plans of the movers in it. I had no more information than any other "outsider."
- A. F. Judd.
- Honolulu, December 26, 1893.
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Gen. Hartwell's denials.
- Editor Star:
- When Dr. Trousseau, in his statement to Blount and letter to Nordhoff, says that "meetings were held at Mr. Stevens's house in which the possibilities of a peaceful revolution were discussed," and that "prominent at these meetings were the chief justice, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, Charles Carter, and others, also Capt. Wiltse," Dr. Trousseau says, as far as I am concerned, that which is untrue. Mr. Charles T. Gulick's statement to Blount contains similar language with that of Dr. Trousseau, adding the expression that the persons named were so managing as to "save their precious carcasses." Mr. Gulick will be pleased to consider my denial of the truthfulness of both Nordhoff's and Dr. Trousseau's statements of the meetings in question, as applying also to his untruthful statement, in so far as I am concerned.
- But while it so happens that I never attended any such meetings as Dr. Trousseau and Mr. Gulick have taken the grave responsibility of asserting, it is true that talk of revolutions has been rife here for years. The dread of it has been the main cause of many financial difficulties.
- The viciousness of the above-mentioned statements of Messrs. Trousseau and Gulick is in the impression which they were meant to fix that we were plotting revolution, since otherwise such statements would be nothing but old women's gabble
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- So far from plotting revolution, the people who are today supporting the Government of Hawaii, and who aided in its establishment, were to a man, as I believe, opposed to the attempts at revolution which were under several discussions in the early part of the year 1892, and for which attempts the arrests for treason were made spring before last.
- For even defending those treason cases in court I found myself the subject of harsh criticism from many persons who are now staunch Government men and annexationists.
- Messrs. Blount and Nordhoff have fallen into the absurd but grave error for which Dr. Trousseau and Mr. Charles T. Gulick have made themselves responsible, of supposing that Mr. Stevens and his friends were trying to bring about the revolutionary results, for attempting which Robert Wilcox, V. V. Ashford, and some 16 other Hawaiians were examined before a judge on a charge of treason.
- Dr. Trousseau's suggestion to Blount that the ex-Queen propose a cession of Hawaii to Grover Cleveland and then abdicate, and that "all of us will assist," such result shows his view of the situation apart from his "point of view,"
- Alfred S. Hartwell
Adjourned to meet to-morrow, the 20th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
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Washington, D. C, Saturday, January 20, 1894.
The sub-committee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, Sherman and {{sc|Frye}, and Davis of the full committee.
SWORN STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCANDLESS.
The Chairman. What is your age?
Mr. McCandless. I am 40 years of age.
The Chairman. What is your occupation?
Mr. McCandless. In the Hawaiian Islands, an artesian-well driller.
The Chairman. What is the place of your nativity?
Mr. McCandless. Pennsylvania.
The Chairman. Are you of American parentage?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. When did you go to Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. I went to Hawaii in 1881.
The Chairman. Did you go there to experiment in the boring of artesian wells?
Mr. McCandless. No; at that time it had passed that state, and the fact had been proven that they could get an artesian well. They had half a dozen at the time I arrived there.
The Chairman. To what part of the Islands did you go?
Mr. McCandless. Except seven months I have been on the island of Oahu all the time.
The Chairman. Did you get wells there?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you get water enough from the wells for sugar planting?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. On the island of Oahu they get water from artesian wells as well as from the mountain streams.
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The Chairman. Are there large plantations on the island?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. In 1890 one plantation had a capitalization of half a million, and they ran in debt another half a million before they got started.
The Chairman. How many hands does that sugar plantation employ?
Mr. McCandless. 600. On the island of Kauai we get artesian wells, but the water does not rise over 6 feet above the sea level. In most cases they have to pump the water.
The Chairman. Can not siphons be run out?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. Do you bore in the flats?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; the flats near the sea level.
The Chairman. Is the geological construction of the islands of such a character as would warrant, in your opinion, the belief that that is going to be a valuable source of water supply in the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. McCandless. There is now invested in artesian wells in the Hawaiian Islands about a half million dollars. We have ourselves done $100,000 worth of the work, and it is quite an industry.
The Chairman. It is on the windward that they have the wells?
Mr. McCandless. On both sides of the island of Oahu. The artesian-water belt extends all around the island of Oahu, with a few exceptions, where we were unable to get water.
The Chairman. Do you find the water in pockets or in the stone?
Mr. McCandless. We find it in the lava formation of the islands.
The Chairman. You drive the well down until you find the percolation of the water of sufficient strength to force an overflow?
Mr. McCandless. It is in the decomposed lava and the washing of centuries, which make a packing to keep it in, and of course we go to the open rock and get the water.
The Chairman. Do you look forward to the artesian system as one that is going to be valuable to that country?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Your labors in Hawaii, I suppose, have carried you amongst the people in the country?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Have you familiarized yourself with the character and condition of the people of Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; our business has taken us all around the island of Oahu.
The Chairman. Have you had occasion to visit other islands also?
Mr. McCandless. The first well we drilled in the Kingdom was on the island of Hawaii. We were there seven months. That was a complete failure. Outside of that I have not been off the island of Oahu.
The Chairman. I will ask you now to state briefly what you found to be the condition of those people as to the comfort of living at their abodes.
Mr. McCandless. They lived in the country there just about as the poor do in any country that I have ever been in, except, perhaps, they are more indolent than the poor of our country.
The Chairman. Does nature furnish a larger supply of food to the natives of the Hawaiian Islands than it does to the natives of most countries, to relieve them of the necessity for labor?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; it does in this way: The taro patch (that is the food there)—I judge an acre of taro land, perhaps a half acre— will keep a large family in food the year round. That is in addition to the fish they catch.
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The Chairman. Are fish abundant off the coast of those islands?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; but fish commands a higher price in Honolulu than in any seaport town I have ever lived in. That is because the native will not go fishing unless the price of fish is high.
The Chairman. They are expert fishermen?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. And they have control of the fisheries?
Mr. McCandless. No; the Chinese have most of the fishing rights. There is a peculiar condition of affairs there in regard to the fisheries. The water front of the islands is owned by the landlords—the people who own the land—and the privilege of fishing on this water front is leased out.
The Chairman. By the owner of the soil?
Mr. McCandless. By the owner of the soil. So that the Chinese have been rather encroaching on that privilege and getting most of the valuable fishing rights.
The Chairman. How far out in the sea does this privilege extend?
Mr. McCandless. I can not say as to that.
The Chairman. Do the Hawaiians and Chinese fish offshore in boats and with seines and other tackle?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. When they are fishing offshore this water privilege does not interfere with them, does it?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; it interferes, except in the case of Government lands; there it is open to the natives.
The Chairman. There must be some limit to this right. Is it three miles?
Mr. McCandless. I think that would be the limit, the international limit.
The Chairman. You do not know about that?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. In this way the Chinese and Hawaiians have what we term a practical monopoly of the fishing industry, and will not fish unless the market price justifies them in going out?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; that is the case with the Hawaiians; but the Chinese do not stop at all, they fish right along.
The Chairman. Around the islands other than Oahu is this fishing carried on by the natives?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; principally by the natives, because there is no market on the other islands.
The Chairman. What I want to get at is whether fishing in combination with the taro is the real, substantial food support of the common people of Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Taro supplies the want for vegetable food?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. And takes the place of bread?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. I was going to say in regard to the natives, to show their indolence in regard to their crop, I have found it the case that the natives have leased out their taro patch to a Chinaman, and the Chinaman has worked it and paid the Hawaiian in taro, and still made a living off it himself. I have seen it many times.
The Chairman. Do the women in Hawaii work in the taro patches?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; but the men mostly. It is a crop easily taken care of.
The Chairman. Easily raised?
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Mr. McCandless. Easily raised. Of course, there must be an abundance of water—it grows in a pond; it must be flooded with water.
The Chairman. Have you, prior to January 17, 1893, been in any way engaged in the political affairs of Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Have you been in any office there?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. Your connection with it then was as a private citizen?
Mr. McCandless. It was as a private citizen—to help right wrongs.
The Chairman. We will suspend the examination of Mr. McCandless, for the purpose of hearing Mr. Stevens, who, I am informed, is not well and is desirous of returning to his home.
SWORN STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN L. STEVENS.
The Chairman. What is your age?
Mr. Stevens. Seventy-three.
The Chairman. Your place of nativity?
Mr. Stevens. Mount Vernon, Me.
The Chairman. When did you first go to Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. I arrived there in September, 1889.
The Chairman. Was that your first visit?
Mr. Stevens. My first visit to Hawaii.
The Chairman. You went as Minister of the United States to that Government?
Mr. Stevens. I did.
The Chairman. Who was then the sovereign?
Mr. Stevens. King Kalakaua was the sovereign.
The Chairman. Under what administration were you sent there?
Mr. Stevens. By President Harrison.
The Chairman. Were you present at the time Liliuokalani succeeded to the regal authority in the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Stevens. I was.
The Chairman. And you remained there until what time—what time did you leave the islands?
Mr. Stevens. The 24th of May, 1893.
The Chairman. Proceed and state what you know of your own personal knowledge in respect of the political affairs of Hawaii since your arrival there, the changes in political conditions, the circumstances that led to such changes, the effects produced by such changes; and we wish you to state also what participation you had at any time during your residence there in promoting the interests or welfare of any political party connected with the Queen's Government or opposed to the Queen's Government. When you shall have made your statement, or at any time while you are making it, the members of the committee will interpose such questions as they may desire, for the purpose of keeping your attention to the testimony we desire to elicit.
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I will, of course, be under the necessity of condensing so far as possible. That inquiry might require a volume; but, of course, I understand the committee desires the salient facts. I will read what I think is better than I could verbally state, and we will have before us the events beginning twelve days prior to the overthrow of Liliuokalani. I can read of events prior to that; but I think I had better take twelve days prior.
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The Chairman. Take your own course, so that you answer the questions.
Mr. Stevens. The biennial Legislature assembled in May, 1892. The body very soon asserted its constitutional prerogative in voting out a ministry that had consented to the maladministration of the Queen and her favorite at the palace, who exercised dictatorial powers and rioted in official police corruption. Instead of appointing ministers possessing the confidence of the Legislative majority and of the business men of the islands, she continued to select those of her own type of character, those whom she knew would retain her palace favorite in power. Three successive ministers of this description were voted out by the Legislature, with the warm approval of all the best men of the islands. At last the Queen appeared to yield to the pressure of public opinion and consented to the appointment of four responsible men, three of them persons of wealth, and all of them men of good financial standing, who took the official places with reluctance, all four of them sharing the public confidence.
Known as the Wilcox-Jones ministry, it was believed that they would safely carry the country through the following eighteen months to the election and assemblage of the next Legislature. Fully sharing this belief, the United States minister and naval commander left Honolulu January 4, in the U. S. cruiser Boston, for Hilo and Volcano, the distance of nearly 300 miles. It was the first time for many months I had felt it safe for the United States minister and naval commander to be away from the Hawaiian capital. We were absent ten days. When we arrived in the harbor of Honolulu on our return from Hilo, in the forenoon of January 14, there came to us the startling news that the Queen and the ring of white adventurers who surrounded her had, by intrigue and bribery, carried the lottery and opium bills through the Legislature; had forced out the Wilcox and Jones ministry, had appointed in their places four of her palace retainers, two of whom the Legislature and the responsible public had recently and repeatedly rejected, headed by the man who had carried the lottery and opium bills through the Legislature.
In spite of numerous petitions and protests from all the islands, both of whites and native Hawaiians, and the earnest remonstrance of the chamber of commerce and the principal financial men of the country, the Queen immediately signed the iniquitous bills. Both she and the ring of adventurers who surrounded her expected thus to get the money to carry on the Government by making Honolulu a fortress of gamblers and semipirates amid the ocean, from which they could, by every mail steamer to the United States, send out the poisoned billets of chance by which to rob the American people of their millions of money—a method of gaining silver and gold as wicked and audacious as that of the freebooters who once established themselves in the West Indian seas and made piratical forays on American commerce. But even this was not enough for the semibarbaric Queen and the clique of adventurers around her. To fortify themselves in their schemes of usurpation and robbery they must have a new constitution. They were afraid the supreme court would decide their lottery bill unconstitutional. The supreme court must be reconstructed, so that the Queen could reappoint the judges and give the final appeal to the Queen herself. The new constitution was to be proclaimed in a way that the existing constitution expressly prohibits. Her four new ministers were in the plot.
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While the Boston was coming into the harbor of Honolulu, on the forenoon of January 14, the mob of hoodlums, at the call of the Queen and her retainers, were gathering in the palace grounds. The Legislature was prorogued at 12 a. m. The revolutionary edict of Hawaii's misguided sovereign was ready to be proclaimed, rumors of which were already in the public ear. The storm of public indignation began to gather. A few minutes before the appointed hour for the coup d'etat, immediately after my reaching the legation from the Boston, I was urged to go at once to the English minister to ask him to accompany me to the Queen and try to dissuade her from her revolutionary design. I promptly sought to comply with this request, went immediately to the English minister, who was ready to cooperate with me if there were any possibility of effecting any good. We went immediately to the foreign office to seek access to the Queen in the customary manner.
The hour of proroguing the Legislature had arrived. The ceremony concluded, the Queen went immediately to the palace, around which the mob was gathering. It was too late for the American and English ministers even to attempt to reason with the maddened, misguided woman, who had already launched the revolution which could not be arrested, though her cowardly ministers of the lottery gang became alarmed and drew back. She scorned their cowardice and pushed on to her doom. Saturday night told every intelligent man in Honolulu that the Hawaiian monarchy was forever at an end—that the responsible persons of the islands, the property holders and the friends of law and order, must thereafter take charge of public affairs. The great mass meeting of January 16—worthy of the best American towns, of the best American days, was held. It was made up of the best and chief men of the country—the owners of property, the professional and educated citizens, merchants, bankers, clerks, mechanics, teachers, clergymen.
This assemblage was a unit in opinion and purpose. It was stirred by a common sentiment, the love of country and the desire for public order and public security. It took its measures wisely and prudently. Its committee of public safety asked us to land the men of the Boston lest riot and incendiarism might burst out in the night, for no reliable police force longer existed, and whatever there was of this force was now in the control of the usurpers and the lottery gamblers who had initiated the revolution. Under the diplomatic and naval rules, which were and are imperative, the U. S. minister and naval commander would have shamefully ignored their duty had they not landed the men of the Boston for the security of American life and property and the maintenance of public order, even had the committee of public safety not requested us to do.
As American representatives, 5,000 miles from our Government, we could not have escaped our responsibilities even had we desired to do so. Fortunately the commander of the Boston and those under his command had no desire to shirk their duty. They appreciated the obligations of American patriotism and the honor of the American Navy. The allurements of a semibarbaric court and palace had not blinded their eyes to the condition of things in Honolulu. On shore in perfect order, they stepped not an inch from the line of duty. They never lifted a finger in aid of the fallen monarchy.
The Chairman. Who was then chamberlain?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Robertson.
The Chairman. Who was prior to him?
Mr. Stevens. MacFarlane.
S. Doc 231, pt 6----56
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The Chairman. Who preceded him?
Mr. Stevens. MacFarlane was the chamberlain when I went there.
The Chairman. Was Mr. Carter ever chamberlain?
Mr. Stevens. I think not. The brother of Chief Justice Judd was, and my impression is that no one was between him and McFarlane. When Liliuokalani came in she wanted this favorite of hers to be in the cabinet as minister of the interior, which was an important place, and he could not get any responsible person to serve with him. Then they compromised it by allowing him to be made marshal, which is an office of great power and patronage, under which Chinese and Japanese lottery gambling can be carried on. It requires a man of great integrity, lest there be abuses, and the office was one having the most power under the administration. Wilson wanted that, and he was made marshal and installed in the palace.
There is a good deal of history between that, and contained in my despatches, of wrangling, by which the different ones were put in. I have the legislative votes that took place prior to that. Three cabinets had been voted out in the course of a few weeks. Parker, Spencer, Wideman, and Paul Neuman voted out August 30,1892, by 31 yeas to 10 nays. Parker, Maefarlane, Gulick, and Paul Neuman appointed September 12, 1892, and voted out October 17, 1892, by 31 yeas and 15 nays. November 1, 1892, Queen appointed Cornwell, Nawahi, Gulick, and Creighton, who were voted out the same day by 26 yeas to 13 nays.
The Chairman. Have you named all the persons?
Mr. Stevens. Peter C. Jones, W. L. Wilcox, Mark P. Robinson, and Cecil Brown. Jones and Wilcox were two strong financial men, worth more than $200,000 each; were not politicians; but they accepted their offices as a matter of duty to the country. Mark P. Robinson was a prominent business man, and Cecil Brown was a lawyer. All four of this Cabinet are gentlemen of integrity, having the confidence of the financial public. We were away from the Hawaiian capital but ten days.
The Chairman. Just there, if you please. In reference to what expected difficulty or complication of political affairs in Hawaii do you speak when you say that it was for the first time safe for you to leave the islands?
Mr. Stevens. The first time I deemed it safe for me to be away?
The Chairman. Yes; why?
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that there was liable to be trouble.
The Chairman. Do you mean it was safe for the interests of the United States?
Mr. Stevens. Safe for the interests of the United States.
The Chairman. Do you not mean safe for the opposing power to the then government?
Mr. Stevens. I mean the American interests in the islands, the commercial interests. In general terms that means nearly the whole, so far as commercial interests are concerned.
The Chairman. Proceed.
Mr. Stevens. It came to us.
The Chairman. You say it came to us. Whom do you mean?
Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiitse and to me. They sent out in boats. We got into the harbor about half past 10, and it took sometime to get to the wharf, and they came out in boats.
The Chairman. Who were the persons who informed you?
Mr. Stevens. We were informed.
The Chairman. Any official information given to you?
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Mr. Stevens. No official communication, as I remember now.
The Chairman. Who was your aid-de-camp at that time?
Mr. Stevens. I had none; there was no person allowed me.
The Chairman. Did any person come from the legation or the United States consulate to give you information of the situation there?
Mr. Stevens. My impression is that Mr. Severance, the consul, sent a verbal message as soon as possible. And others sent verbal messages. There would be perhaps twenty boats to come off.
The Chairman. Was any message sent to you by the United States consul, Mr. Severance, or anybody else?
Mr. Stevens. I do not know that there was; but I know that I received the information at once. My daughter with my carriage met me at the wharf with the most full information.
The Chairman. Well?
Mr. Stevens. In spite of protests and earnest remonstrances by the Chamber of Commerce and a number of financial men of the country, the Queen immediately signed the iniquitous bills. Both she and the ring of adventurers who surrounded her expected there would thus be established a scheme to rob the people of millions of money.
The Chairman. Those expressions are intense and liberal. Do you mean that they are your personal conclusions, based upon your knowledge of the affairs there?
Mr. Stevens. Knowledge of the bills before the Legislature and common rumor that had been going on all winter. The men in the lottery charter were, one man from St. Louis, another from Chicago, and several in Honolulu.
The Chairman. Did you, as the American minister resident in the Hawaiian Islands, receive any information in regard to the state of affairs which you have stated, and the purpose which actuated the Government, upon which you based the conclusions which you as minister came to as against the Queen's Government.
Mr. Stevens. The information came to me from all sources. I will say here that my many years' experience prior to these three years in revolutionary countries, had taught me that it was absolutely necessary to keep myself informed, and in order to keep myself informed I had to have somebody in the different cliques or parties on whom I could rely to get information. I kept myself constantly posted.
Senator Gray. And were you in communication with such persons?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. There was a contest about this lottery charter. It was controverted in the newspapers for months and months, and all the facts were as notorious as facts would be in Washington about any great national measure here.
The Chairman. In seeking information about these matters, did you confer also with members of the Queen's Government, or persons officially connected with the Queen's Government?
Mr. Stevens. From the time I went to Honolulu to the time I left, the adherents of the Queen, the royalists, had access to the legation more freely than anybody else.
The Chairman. Did you converse with them?
Mr. Stevens. I conversed with them. Of course, I had to exercise a good deal of caution in conversing with anybody, and had to pick out those I conversed with.
The Chairman. You have stated that your conclusions were reached after conferences and consultations with the persons you have mentioned, and also from the debates as printed in the newspapers?
Mr. Stevens. Upon debates. The newspapers published the debates
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just as you do here, and the bills were published. They have three newspapers, and everything of that character comes out.
Senator Gray. Did you avail yourself of the opportunities that were presented, of correspondence with other intelligent people than those connected with the Government, in order to inform yourself?
Mr. Stevens. That is a very important point; I am glad you have asked me in regard to it. I wish to say that five islands constitute the main portion of the islands. Those islands are separate, and on them live influential men. In order to know exactly the state of affairs in Hawaii, you must know what is going on in the different islands, and who these important men are. It took me one year of careful investigation to find out who they were, and to find out the state of things— who is who and what is what. In doing that I availed myself of all the agencies in the community.
Senator Gray. And you did not decline correspondence with anybody?
Mr. Stevens. Not any. Of course I had to avoid compromising myself with anybody.
Senator Gray. I meant, for the purpose of gaining information for yourself, not imparting it to anybody. You understood that?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. In order to amend the constitution of Hawaii, the amendment must be submitted to one Legislature. Their sessions are biennial, and the amendment must be passed by one Legislature and resubmitted to the succeeding Legislature and passed.
The Chairman. By a majority vote?
Mr. Stevens. I am not sure whether it is a two-thirds vote or a majority vote; but it must be submitted to the two Legislatures. Just at this moment I can not say whether it is a two-thirds vote or a majority; my impression is that it is two thirds.
The Chairman. Before you left Honolulu on board the Boston to go to Hilo, did you have any knowledge or information of the movements of which you have just been speaking, in regard to a change of the constitution by the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. Oh, that had been a mooted matter before. I ought to give some prior facts. In the Legislature before Liliuokalani came to the throne, Kalakaua was opposed by some persons, and he wanted to get his original power back.
The Chairman. By original power you mean the power he had prior to the constitution of '87?
Mr. Stevens. Prior to that. In order to accomplish that, in the winter of '90 he had delegations of natives from the islands to demand a new constitution through a constitutional convention. That would have been revolutionary, and it alarmed the business men of the islands. They came to me and asked me to go to the King and advise him of the danger of that. I said I would provided they got those having English affiliations to have the English minister do the same. They got the English minister; he arranged the meeting.
The Chairman. Mr. Wodehouse?
Mr. Stevens. Wodehouse. He strongly urged the King not to go into it, stating that it would be fatal to him. Then I followed, and went into it elaborately, stating that in my opinion he could not have gotten up a better scheme than that to overthrow the monarchy. I said, "If it is started, you do not know where it will end." The whites had made up their minds, if Kalakaua ever attempted that, they would break down the monarchy. It was hard for Kalakaua to take that advice. I stated it very courteously and kindly, and in a day or two he came around good naturedly and accepted our advice. When he was dead, and Liliuokalani came to be the sovereign, she said to the
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chief justice, "What will be the consequence if I do not take the oath to that constitution?" The chief justice, who had been a supporter of the monarchy, said in his courteous way, "You could not be Queen." With this answer of the chief justice Liliuokalani took the oath to support the constitution.
The Chairman. If I understand you, the subject of changing the constitution so as to restore to the monarchy the ancient power that it possessed before 1887 was the subject of discussion and action also on the part of Kalakaua as well as Liliuokalani?
Mr. Stevens. Certainly.
The Chairman. When you left on the Boston to go to Hilo did you know that the Queen had in contemplation, at that time or at any earlier period, to promulgate this constitution by apronuuciamento?
Mr. Stevens. I had come to the conclusion, as many men had, that so many ministries having been voted out and she accepting this Wilcox- Jones ministry, and Wilson, the marshal, being on friendly relations with the attorney-general, Mr. Brown, he thinking he was going to be kept in—putting all the facts together, the lottery bill dead, and the opium bill dead, we had made up our minds that the Queen and her favorite would abide by the ministry for eighteen months, or until the meeting of the new Legislature, and I did not dream of any revolution that the Queen had on foot.
The Chairman. Let me ask. After the Queen prorogued the Legislature would she have had authority to dismiss the ministry and reappoint another without assembling the Legislature?
Mr. Stevens. She could not remove the ministry except upon a vote of want of confidence by the Legislature. That was the constitution.
The Chairman. That is the only way in which she could do it?
Mr. Stevens. The only way—by a vote of want of confidence.
The Chairman. And, as I understand, you felt that no change of the constitution could take place?
Mr. Stevens. Certainly.
The Chairman. And that relieved your mind of any apprehension that there would be any effort made to revolutionize the Government with respect to the constitution?
Mr. Stevens. Certainly. We considered that those four ministers for the next eighteen months would be the Government—for all practical purposes.
The Chairman. Let me ask whether, if you had in contemplation anything of that kind, you would have felt authorized, as the American minister resident, to go away as you did?
Mr. Stevens. I would not. If I had thought she had that revolutionizing plan on hand, it would not have been proper for me to have gone away.
The Chairman. Why?
Mr. Stevens. Because I think I could have given her advice. I would have given her the advice that it would ruin public business and endanger life.
The Chairman. You felt at that time that the interests of the people of the United States would be exposed to danger?
Mr. Stevens. Exposed to danger.
The Chairman. And you felt---
Mr. Stevens. It would be my duty to go to her, as I had before gone to Kalakaua.
The Chairman. Ships of war of the United States had been kept in the harbor of Honolulu for some time?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
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The Chairman. How many years?
Mr. Stevens. Probably thirty-five or forty.
The Chairman. Was there ever a time during your residence there as minister of the United States when there was no ship of war in the harbor, no ship assigned to duty there?
Mr. Stevens. I do not think there was any time when there was no ship of war there, unless the ship was out of the harbor for target practice, or gone to Hilo, a trip of a few days.
The Chairman. But assigned to duty there?
Mr. Stevens. I do not think there was a single month, while I was there, that a United States ship was not assigned for duty at Honolulu?
The Chairman. What is the necessity of the United States keeping a ship of war in Honolulu, or in reach of the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Stevens. Because of the liability to anarchy. And why? To illustrate that point, this was no new thing—the landing of troops. It was done at least three times prior to January, 1893, if not more. I remember three. Prior to this at different times the official representatives of the Queen came to me and asked me to be in readiness to land soldiers; that there were certain contingencies before them that they could not provide for; and more than that number of times the naval officers of the different ships got everything in readiness.
Senator Gray. What was the nature of those contingencies?
Mr. Stevens. I will give this one: Prior to the overthrow of the Queen and the uprising of the business men to have a new government, many of the natives under the lead of Robert Wilcox, half white, and others who were hostile to Wilson, the favorite, because he stood between the natives and the Queen, engaged in revolutionary efforts.
Senator Gray. They were jealous of him?
Mr. Stevens. Jealous of Wilson, and that was the key to their action. For many months they were organized, my information was. It came in many ways, not only from those who were engaged in it, but from the Queen's Government. They contemplated her overthrow. That party was led by Mr. Wilcox, the same man who was in collusion with Liliuokalani in 1889, a few months before I arrived there, to change the constitution. Mr. Wilcox and several prominent white men of the adventurers class had organized what they called a Liberal Hawaiian League, and they had a military organization as well. Their constant fear was that we would not permit the Queen to be overthrown, and of course they always took occasion to find out what the naval officer and American minister would do if they undertook to overthrow the Queen. I could not make my instructions and intentions known.
The Queen was anxious to have me informed of her danger, and the Wilcox faction was anxious to know whether I would interfere in defense of the Queen. Of course, I had to keep noncommittal. That party would have dethroned the Queen if they had had the help of the white people. But the whites said, "No; we can not accept the Government from their hands." Consequently, there was a state of uneasiness, of uncertainty, all the time, as there had been months before I arrived there. Mr. Merrill had an experience with it for two years,, beginning with the revolution of 1887. After they got in the cabinet of 1887 they had a peaceful time up to the Wilcox outbreak, a few weeks before I arrived in the country.
The Chairman. Is the Wilcox of whom you speak the man who was educated in the military school in Italy?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
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The Chairman. Is there any other man of prominence of that name there?
Mr. Stevens. There are three or four who are prominent.
The Chairman. I mean of that name?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; the Wilcox in the Jones ministry was a very different person from the Wilcox who led the outbreak of 1889—he had been a member of the Legislature, but was not a politician. I refer to the member of the Jones cabinet. There were three or four of the name of Wilcox; but they were not related to Robert, the man at the head of the revolutionary movement.
The Chairman. Is the man who was in the Jones ministry an American?
Mr. Stevens. An American of pure blood. His father was a missionary. He lives on the island of Kauai—a man of business, education, and of high character.
The Chairman. Is he officially connected with the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Only as an adviser and supporter.
The Chairman. Not officially?
Mr. Stevens. He was in the Jones ministry.
The Chairman. Which was succeeded by the Peterson cabinet?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; the Peterson cabinet.
The Chairman. Proceed.
Mr. Stevens. I need not restate, I suppose, what I have already said, and will proceed as requested.
The Chairman. The matters of which you are speaking occurred before you landed?
Mr. Stevens. Before we landed and while we were landing.
The Chairman. Before you personally landed?
Mr. Stevens. Before 12 o'clock was when I arrived. I am coming to that. As soon as I had arrived at the legation I was informed of the strong rumor that the Queen was about to attempt to proclaim a new constitution; and I was urged to go at once to seek the cooperation of the English minister to dissuade the Queen from her design.
The Chairman. Who made that request of you?
Mr. Stevens. That came through Judge Hartwell. He has been there twenty years, an American by birth, but married his wife there. He is a graduate of Harvard, and one of the leading lawyers of the islands and has been one of the supreme judges. As before stated, I at once endeavored to comply with this request. I went as soon as possible to the English minister and asked him to go with me to see the Queen. We went to the foreign office to seek an interview with the Queen in the customary manner.
The customary manner was to send it, of course, through the minister of foreign affairs.
Senator Butler. Did you get access to the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had gone to the ceremony of proroguing the Legislature. He came into the foreign minister's office. We staid in there two or three minutes—asked two or three questions. That was the first time I was let into the plot that there was to be a new constitution. He was very cautious as to what he said. I was not there when the invitations were sent out to come to the palace and receive a glass of wine.
I did not go to the palace, but the other officials did. Before the time arrived Mr. Wodehouse, who had been there so many years, said: "It is unusual for us to have this at the close of the Legislature," and the whole thing came into my mind what the Queen
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intended—she intended to have all the foreign officials there, with all the eclat possible. There were only five minutes left, and she had already gone into the palace. If we had been two hours earlier, we could perhaps have gotten at her and accomplished something. I did not go to the palace with the other foreign officials. Being absent on the Boston when the cards of invitation were sent out, I had received none to go to the palace, nor to the proroguing of the Legislature at 12 o'clock that day.
And only those present in Honolulu could know how thoroughly the monarchy was dead after the Queen's revolutionary attempt to proclaim a new constitution on the afternoon of July 14. I have already given account of the mass meeting, mostly of white citizens, of the appointment of a committee of safety, and of their request of us to land the naval force.
The Chairman. You say "us." Whom do you mean?
Mr. Stevens. Myself and Capt. Wiltse.
The Chairman. Do you mean that they made a joint request of you, or separate?
Mr. Stevens. They made the request to me.
The Chairman. And not to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. Not to Capt. Wiltse. They always make it to the diplomatic officer.
The Chairman. In what form is that request made?
Mr. Stevens. In a note.
The Chairman. By whom?
Mr. Stevens. The committee of public safety.
The Chairman. Addressed to you, where?
Mr. Stevens. At the legation.
The Chairman. How long before you had arrived there?
Mr. Stevens. I arrived there on Saturday, and this meeting of the committee of public safety was on Monday. After the committee of public safety had been chosen, they made this request.
The Chairman. Was there any reason for making the request for the landing of the troops?
Mr. Stevens. Only the fears of the citizens.
The Chairman. I want to know whether any request had been made upon you before that time?
Mr. Stevens. No, only so far as individual citizens made representations of the danger.
The Chairman. Individual citizens did appear before you to represent the danger?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. Especially did I have a note from Rev. Mr. Bishop, a man 65 years of age, born on the islands. He has everybody's confidence. He informed me on Sunday that the Kahunas of the Queen, the sorcerers, were evidently around the Queen, and there were serious times ahead. He did not ask me, but he stated that that I might know the danger. I learned from other sources, of persons who knew perfectly well, if I did not do so, the legation would be crowded with many people fearing what might happen during the night.
The Chairman. They would come there for protection?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Who is this Rev. Mr. Bishop of whom you spoke?
Mr. Stevens. He was born on the islands; his father was a missionary; he was educated at a New York college. He has been identified with the islands for sixty-five years.
The Chairman. There is another Mr. Bishop who is very wealthy?
Mr. Stevens. He is a banker.
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The Chairman. Are they related?
Mr. Stevens. No. Mr. Bishop, the banker, is a native of New York; the other, I rather think, is the son of a Connecticut man.
The Chairman. A missionary?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Is this man, the Rev. Mr. Bishop, of whom you speak, a man of substance and property?
Mr. Stevens. He has some property; I do not know how much.
The Chairman. Any wealth?
Mr. Stevens. Not wealthy.
The Chairman. Is he reputable?
Mr. Stevens. Highly reputable. He is known outside of the islands as a man of science.
The Chairman. In addition to Mr. Bishop did other persons come to you and admonish you of the state of danger?
Mr. Stevens. Prior to my arrival—I had left one daughter at home and my wife---
The Chairman. You were informed of that on your return ?
Mr. Stevens. Before we returned, for many hours, persons in anxiety had been coming to the legation, hoping for the Boston to come back, lest something should turn up. The royalists were divided into two cliques, and loyalists came to the legation in anxiety as well as others.
The Chairman. To make it a little more clear, I will ask you whether, on your arrival, your family, including your wife, informed you that persons had been there to inform you in regard to the state of the public mind?
Mr. Stevens. Precisely; and of their anxiety that the Boston should return.
The Chairman. Did they give you that information immediately on your arrival?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did they seem to be concerned about it?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; they thought they were safe when the Boston got there and I got back.
The Chairman. After your arrival there, and after receiving this information from your family, you spoke of Mr. Bishop coming to talk with you personally. Were there other persons who came to talk with you?
Mr. Stevens. I came in contact with a good many persons.
The Chairman. At the legation?
Mr. Stevens. At the legation, where I kept myself except for two or three hours that I was at the Government buildings, for the new ministers had got frightened and they sent to me. They sent to Mr. Wodehouse and the other diplomatic representatives to come to the Government building, and we went there and waited two hours.
The Chairman. What ministers do you speak of?
Mr. Stevens. Foreign ministers.
The Chairman. Representatives of foreign governments.
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Were they all invited?
Mr. Stevens. They all came over to the Government building while all this wrangling was going on about the Queen's constitution.
The Chairman. Did you join that party?
Mr. Stevens. I went over that afternoon to hear what they had to say, to find out about the constitution and obtain other information.
The Chairman. Did you meet them at the Government building?
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Mr. Stevens. Yes; we were there probably two hours.
The Chairman. Was any representative of a foreign government missing on that occasion ?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember any.
The Chairman. You can state that it was a general conference.
Mr. Stevens. Oh, they invited the whole of them.
The Chairman. Who invited them?
Mr. Stevens. The invitation to come came from the clerk of the new minister of the interior, who got alarmed.
The Chairman. Who was the minister of the interior?
Mr. Stevens. I do not positively remember, but I think Colburn.
The Chairman. And the invitation came from Liliuokalani's minister of the interior to you?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; the chief clerk, Mr. Hassinger, who had been there for years, brought it to me at the legation.
The Chairman. Did he ask you to come to the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did he tell you that there was an assemblage of the foreign ministers at the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. I am not sure; but I think he did.
The Chairman. Well, when you got there---
Mr. Stevens. One or two came in after I arrived; but we all left about the same time. We waited for the denouement at the palace, but two of the new ministers were afraid to go back to the palace.
The Chairman. What two ministers were afraid?
Mr. Stevens. Colburn and Cornwall seemed to be alarmed.
The Chairman. What made you think they were alarmed?
Mr. Stevens. Their appearance, and in sending for us. Then it came out that they were afraid to go to the palace. Their manner showed it.
The Chairman. Was there anything that indicated it?
Mr. Stevens. Only their sending for us and their general appearance— their going backwards and forwards from and to the palace.
The Chairman. Were they passing backwards and forwards between your meeting and the palace?
Mr. Stevens. Not between us. Finally, when Cornwall and Colburn left us, the message came from Mr. Parker, the minister of foreign affairs, and they left us and went to the palace, and I waited perhaps an hour or more and I went back to the legation and remained.
The Chairman. On those occasions when Liliuokalani's ministers were present, was any intimation given or proposition submitted to the foreign representatives in respect of the protection that should be extended to American citizens or anyone else?
Mr. Stevens. They made no intimation to us. They asked us at first to come there. We went there and waited, and did not confer with each other what to do.
Senator Butler. What day was that?
Mr. Stevens. That was on Saturday afternoon, January 14, the same Saturday afternoon when the Queen was present at the palace with the mob and the Queen's guard around it, and the chief justice was with her.
Senator Butler. That was the day the Boston returned?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Butler. That was the day before this public meeting of which you spoke?
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Mr. Stevens. Two days before.
The Chairman. You spoke of a mob about the palace. Do you mean a disorganized body of men?
Mr. Stevens. Disorganized body of natives; retainers who had been dressed up respectably, and their leader had a constitution on a velvet cushion.
The Chairman. I am going into the inquiry whether, in the American acceptation of the word, that was a mob or an assemblage of the Queen's supporters.
Mr. Stevens. That was, in the general acceptation of the word, a mob; you may call it an assemblage.
The Chairman. Was there any mob violence?
Mr. Stevens. The information came to me direct that when the Queen was baffled, when they learned that the Queen would not proclaim that constitution at that time, they swore they would kill her. I suppose that was a temporary outbreak. While I was not in that crowd, I received more reliable information from the chief justice of what took place, and of the wrangle between the Queen and Peterson about the constitution—of the Queen turning upon him and stating, "You have had that in your pocket for two or three weeks." I am not positive that I received these words from the chief justice. It came to me in such a form that I took it as correct.
The Chairman. Who was it informed you?
Mr. Stevens. Several parties.
The Chairman. Can you name them?
Mr. Stevens. The strongest testimony came from the chief justice. Whether he used that specific language or not, or I received that specific language from the chief justice, I could not say, because there were so many talked to me on the subject. But information as to the scenes in the palace and the revolutionary state of things came from the chief justice, who was there four hours.
The Chairman. All of which transpired before you went to the palace?
Mr. Stevens. No; all that transpired while we were over at the Government building and after we had left.
The Chairman. Before you went to the palace?
Mr. Stevens. I did not go to the palace that day. The officals were at the palace at 12 o'clock.
The Chairman. At the palace?
Mr. Stevens. Where the scenes took place.
The Chairman. I was going to ask the question, where the mob was assembled?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. It was at the palace that this constitution was expected to be proclaimed.
The Chairman. You did not enter into that crowd?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all. I went home to dinner, and this invitation of the minister of the interior was for us to come at half-past one. We went over to the Government building, and were there from one to two hours.
The Chairman. My point is that you did not go to the palace that afternoon.
Mr. Stevens. No; I attempted to go, but failed, as I have before testified, owing to it being too late.
The Chairman. Are you able to state from information that came to you, beside that from the committee of safety, that you would be
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willing and found yourself authorized, and, of course, compelled as a matter of public duty, to ask Capt. Wiltse to land troops?
Mr. Stevens. I would have felt it necessary if the committee of safety had not made any request.
The Chairman. Based upon your judgment of the situation?
Mr. Stevens. Upon my judgment of the situation. My only fear was that I delayed it twenty-four hours too long. Had anything happened Sunday night it would have been my risk. The landing of troops is something serious. I had previously discouraged it. When I did request it, I said it must be solely for the protection of American life and property. I used the old formula, which does not go so far as the formula given by Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill in 1887. I will read the substance of the Bayard dispatch.
- "United States Department of State,
- "Washington, July 12,1887.
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- "In the absence of any detailed information from you of the late disorders in the domestic control of Hawaii and the changes which have taken place in the official corps of that Government, I am not able to give you other than general instructions, which may be communicated in substance to the commander of vessel or vessels of this Government, in the waters of Hawaii, with whom you will freely confer, in order that such prompt and efficient action may be taken as the circumstances may make necessary.
- "While we abstain from interference with the domestic affairs of Hawaii, in accordance with the policy and practice of this Government, yet, obstruction to the channels of legitimate commerce under existing law must not be allowed, and American citizens in Hawaii must be protected in their persons and property, by the representatives of their country's law and power, and no internal discord must be suffered to impair them.
- "Your own aid and council, as well as the assistance of the officers of the Government vessels, if found necessary, will therefore be promptly afforded to promote the reign of law and respect for orderly government in Hawaii.
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- "T. F. Bayard,
- "Secretary of State."
The Chairman. Have you any further statement to make in regard to the matter?
Mr. Stevens. Not on that point. I can answer any questions. Perhaps I will put in here that when I went on board to Captain Wiltse with my request, which said only for the protection of life and property, I found that he had his order to the officers already drawn. I found it was copied from the naval order, standing order, which covered more than mine did. He said to me, "If you think it better to strike that out, I will do so." I said, "Inasmuch as it is in the naval order and Mr. Bayard's instructions, I have no right to ask you to strike it out."
The Chairman. That conversation between you and Captain Wiltse occurred on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. That occurred on Monday, after I went on board.
The Chairman. About what hour?
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Mr. Stevens. I should think not far from 4 o'clock; he landed about 5 and it may have been 4 o'clock.
The Chairman. When Capt. Wiltse landed where?
Mr. Stevens. Landed from the Boston on shore.
The Chairman. Landed the troops?
Mr. Stevens. The troops. I went on board to confer with him, carrying with me my request with him to land the troops.
The Chairman. That was the first communication you had with the ship?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you send any message to Capt. Wiltse before that?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. To any officers of the ship?
Mr. Stevens. Not that I remember.
The Chairman. And when you got on board Capt. Wiltse had his orders already drawn up?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. In writing?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. And they were submitted to you?
Mr. Stevens. Submitted to me.
The Chairman. In what form?
Mr. Stevens. One that had been in the Navy for years. Mr. Bayard's was the last one issued, and it seems that the Navy Department's instructions covered all that Mr. Bayard's covered. When I drew my request, I had forgotten Mr. Bayard's instructions. I read them when I went to the legation. Mine simply recited, "for the protection of American life and property;" but when I saw Capt. Wiltse's, I saw that it was in substance the same as Mr. Bayard's. I have Mr. Bayard's here.
The Chairman. Was the order that Capt. Wiltse had drawn up identical with the instructions you are about to read?
Mr. Stevens. Identical in substance; and I think the wording is exactly the same.
My request to Capt. Wiltse is the following:
- "United States Legation,
- "Honolulu, January 16, 1893.
- "Sir: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States Legation and United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.
- "Very truly, yours,
- "John L. Stevens,
- "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
- of the United States.
- "Capt. G. C. Wiltse,
- "Commander of the U. S. S. Boston."
The order of Capt. Wiltse, as read by him to me when I went on board the Boston, goes farther than mine. It not only requires the protection of American life and property, but the preservation af public order.
That goes considerably further than my request went.
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The Chairman. Here is the order of Capt. Wiltse under which the troops were landed from the Boston.
- "U. S. S. Boston, Second Rate,
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.
- "Lieut. Commander W. T. Swinburne
- "U. S. navy, Executive Officer U. S. S. Boston:"
- "Sir: You will take command of the battalion, and land in Honolulu, for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order.
- "Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs, and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens.
- "You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any change in the situation.
- "Very respectfully,
- "G. C. Wiltse,
- "Captain, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Boston."
You say when you got on board ship that Monday afternoon, that order of Capt. Wiltse had been drawn up?
Mr. Stevens. Had been drawn up, a rough draft; whether Capt. Wiltse changed it afterwards, I could not say.
The Chairman. Is it your recollection that that order which was drawn up before you arrived on the ship and presented to you after your arrival, was identical with this order I have just read?
Mr. Stevens. As nearly as I can remember.
The Chairman. That is the best of your recollection—that it is identical with the order Capt. Wiltse read to you?
Mr. Stevens. It so strikes me.
The Chairman. Did you and Capt. Wiltse have any discussion on the subject?
Mr. Stevens. Only on this one point—the preservation of public order. I said first, that is not in my request; but I recalled that it was in Mr. Bayard's, and Capt. Wiltse was ready to strike it out.
The Chairman. You speak of "my order."
Mr. Stevens. I did not say "my order." The order that I referred to, my order, was a mere request.
The Chairman. What do you mean by "my" order; the request you sent to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. My request that I meant to send to Capt. Wiltse for landing the troops.
The Chairman. Had you sent that request before you went aboard the ship?
Mr. Stevens. No; I carried it in person.
The Chairman. Had you any way of communicating with Capt. Wiltse before you went on board the ship ?
Mr. Stevens. I do not know that I had any. But I had conferred with Capt. Wiltse at different times, and he knew what would be the form.
The Chairman. Had you conferred with him between Saturday and Monday afternoon?
Mr. Stevens. I do not recall. He may have called at the legation a half dozen times; probably he did; but I could not say.
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The Chairman. Do you remember whether you had any conference with him between Saturday and Monday afternoon with regard to the form of the orders that he would give to his troops, or the form of the request you would make of him?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest. The only talk about form was on board the ship.
The Chairman. If I have a correct view of your testimony it is that when you arrived on board the ship you found that Capt. Wiltse had drawn up this order, which I have just read to you?
Mr. Stevens. I think it is identical.
The Chairman. He had drawn up this order and had it ready to deliver to his subordinate?
Mr. Stevens. That is it.
The Chairman. Did you find a complete state of military preparation for landing the troops when you got on board the ship?
Mr. Stevens. So far as I could judge; I saw the officers in the cabin and I got that statement, that they were ready to land.
The Chairman. Do you know on what request or demand Capt. Wiltse responded when he prepared this order for the landing of the troops on shore?
Mr. Stevens. On my request as the American minister.
Senator Frye. But you had not made it?
Mr. Stevens. When I got on board of the ship---
Senator Frye. Before that. The chairman asks if the troops were ready when you got on board—whether the order of Capt. Wiltse was in writing when you got on board.
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Frye. But had not been delivered?
Mr. Stevens. No.
Senator Frye. At whose request or demand had Capt. Wiltse made this preparation in advance?
Mr. Stevens. Undoubtedly on his knowledge of the situation. He may have come to the legation, and the consul was around and had written to the captain about it. He had gotten ready so many times, and these all knew perfectly well that mine would be a mere form of official request.
The Chairman. Would you, as United States minister at Honolulu, have extended to Capt. Wiltse any order or request not in writing, which you would have expected him to comply with or obey about so grave a matter as the landing of troops?
Mr. Stevens. No; I made no request except one in writing. I have no remembrance of any verbal request, but he called at the legation frequently.
The Chairman. And it is quite likely you discussed the situation?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; we had discussed it running up to Hilo and back.
The Chairman. Now, I understand you to testify that Capt. Wiltse, commanding that ship, did not have from you any written request or authority to put his troops in condition for landing and conducting military operations before the time you arrived, at 4 o'clock or thereabouts, on Monday, and that you then took the request in writing with you?
Mr. Stevens. I think I did. That is my memory.
The Chairman. Have you any recollection of having communicated with him—made any written request whatever before that?
Mr. Stevens. I have no recollection of it.
The Chairman. Are you sure you did not?
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Mr. Stevens. I think I did not. It is barely possible I sent him a note speaking of the danger on shore; but I think not, because the naval officers were as well aware of that danger.
The Chairman. Did you send him any request?
Mr. Stevens. None except that which is on file.
The Chairman. And which you took with you ?
Mr. Stevens. I think I took it with me; I have no recollection of sending it by any person. That is my memory.
The Chairman. Is that the paper which you prepared and presented to Capt. Wiltse and upon which the discussion arose as to a more enlarged scope of the order which he gave to Capt. Swinburne?
Mr. Stevens. That is all; and perhaps it was not more than two minutes' talk. After I carried my note, we compared them and found out the difference.
The Chairman. Your attention was called to the fact that Capt. Wiltse's order---
Mr. Stevens. Went further than mine.
The Chairman. Upon what precedent had you formulated the order which you took with you on board the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I had been in a revolutionary country before as minister, and I had gotten used to the formula, and the request that I carried to Capt. Wiltse was the formula I was then familiar with. The files of the legation show that. I knew that Mr. Bayard's instructions went further; but they had passed out of my recollection. When I saw Capt. Wiltse's order, I remembered that Mr. Bayard's went further than mine.
The Chairman. Where were you a minister before?
Mr. Stevens. In 1867,1870,1871, and 1873 in Paraguay and Uruguay. Uruguay was in civil war nearly all the time.
The Chairman. You were minister there?
Mr. Stevens. Had charge of the legation.
The Chairman. How long did you stay there?
Mr. Stevens. Three years. Paraguay had just gotten through that struggle with Brazil, and Uruguay was in a state of war for two years and a half, which was settled during my residence there.
The Chairman. So that you had gotten familiar with the duties of U. S. minister under the circumstances you have given?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; and the responsibilities of a naval commander, which made me exceedingly careful on every point.
The Chairman. Had you returned on shore before the troops left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. Before the troops left the ship.
The Chairman. Where did you go?
Mr. Stevens. To the legation.
The Chairman. Did you give any orders or advice as to the manner of landing the troops, the streets through which the troops were to proceed or march, the place at which they were to be posted, or the place where they were to be encamped?
Mr. Stevens. At first we arranged that a portion should go to the United States consulate.
The Chairman. Who arranged ?
Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse and I.
The Chairman. Where was that done?
Mr. Stevens. On board the ship. And as many at the legation as we could take. If our grounds could take any more, we would ; but we could not encamp more than 15 or 18. I assumed that the marines
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had their camp utensils, and I then learned that they needed a hall for the first time---
The Chairman. Why did you request that any troops be sent to the legation?
Mr. Stevens. Why did I?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that the state of anarchy in which the city was, and knowing that the only government which existed there was that committee of safety and the citizens back of it, and the military force that we had—knowing that the legation is the one of all other places around which there should be some men, and that was a more important part of the city where a dozen men could be sent this way or that way to take care of the contingencies of fires. By stating a little more in this connection you will understand it better. The only two things that were new to me on the part of the request of the naval officers was this: So soon as we found that they were to land I learned from Capt. Wiltse and his officers that they must have a hall to stay in and maps of the city for use in case of fires. So that from the time I struck the legation, at 4 o'clock, up to nearly 10 o'clock, my entire time was consumed in finding maps and a hall for the officers and men for the night.
The Chairman. Did you go out in town?
Mr. Stevens. I stayed at the legation and sent a messenger.
The Chairman. Whom did you send?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Pringle.
The Chairman. Your aide-de-camp?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you, at the time you left the ship and made this arrangement with Capt. Wiltse, have any apprehension that there was any danger of life and property at the American legation?
Mr. Stevens. I knew this, that there was a liability of a crank—or irresponsible persons—liable to come there and alarm my family.
The Chairman. Did you expect that the Queen's government or any mob of citizens of Hawaii would possibly or probably attack the American legation?
Mr. Stevens. No. What we alluded to were irresponsible parties in the night setting fire to property.
The Chairman. You apprehended that danger?
Mr. Stevens. We apprehended that danger.
The Chairman. Did you apprehend that danger?
Mr. Stevens. I apprehended it, or I would not have consented to the landing of the troops.
The Chairman. Did you apprehend it as an attack on the legation?
Mr. Stevens. I did not apprehend that the representatives of the Government or the Queen would have anything to do with that.
The Chairman. You also agreed that Capt. Wiltse should send a detachment to the consulate?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Had Mr. Severance requested the presence of any troops there?
Mr. Stevens. Prior to my visit on board ship, without my knowledge, Mr. Severance had communicated his fear to Capt. Wiltse.
The Chairman. Did Capt. Wiltse so tell you?
Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse so told me. And, still more, Capt. Wiltse had the note, and while I was on board the consul telephoned Capt. Wiltse that he would give a signal in case there was an outbreak.
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----57
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The Chairman. Was there telephonic communication between the ship and the shore?
Mr. Stevens. Between the ship and shore. All our naval vessels, so soon as they get in the harbor, make telephonic connection.
The Chairman. You say Mr. Severance sent a note to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. Sent a note.
The Chairman. Did you see it?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. What was in it?
Mr. Stevens. It was a brief note. I think I have it. Moreover, he telephoned at the time that I was on board.
The Chairman. Where is that note?
Mr. Stevens. That is it [producing paper].
The Chairman. Is this the original note, or a copy of it?
Mr. Stevens. That is the original.
The Chairman. I will read this. It is headed personal:
- "Honolulu, January ----, 1893.
- "My dear Captain: In case of any outbreak or collision with the committee of safety at the mass meeting to-day and the Government forces with a view of suppressing said meeting, it might be necessary to land a force to preserve order or protect our property. In such case, should the telephone wires be cut, I can send you a signal by lowering my flag at half mast, and you will, of course, be governed by instructions from Minister Stevens. It is reported this a. m. that the mass meeting of the citizens will be interfered with or broken up by the Queen's forces. A mass meeting is reported to be held at the same hours.
- "Very truly,
- "H. W. Severance,
- "Consul-General.
- "Capt. Wiltse,
- "Captain of the United States Ship Boston."
Before you left to go on board the ship did you have any conference with Mr. Severance?
Mr. Stevens. I did not.
The Chairman. Was there any?
Mr. Stevens. I did not know that that note was written until I got on board, or thought that a note was written.
The Chairman. Was it by virtue of that note that you and Capt. Wiltse agreed that troops should be left there at the consulate?
Mr. Stevens. I think I could have recommended, even if the consul's note had not been sent, because that is the usual way when there is trouble in a country, that the legislation and consulates are provided for. I made the same rule there.
The Chairman. When these troops were so disposed as to place a detachment at the consulate and another at the legation, was it the honest and bona fide intention of yourself, and, so far as you know, of Capt. Wiltse, to give protection to those American establishments, or was it the intention and purpose to make a display of the American forces at these respective points under the assurance of the American flag, or was it because of the movement of a popular character which you knew to be on foot for the purpose of overthrowing the Queen and the establishment of a new government?
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Mr. Stevens. It had sole relation to the protection of American life and property and, if you wish to cover it by Mr. Bayard's order, for the preservation of public order, I did not feel like going so far as that.
The Chairman. At the time you made this request upon Capt. Wiltse, and at the time you made this disposition of the troops, did you know of the existence of a purpose on the part of any of the citizens of Hawaii to organize an opposition to the Queen's Government, with a view to overthrowing or subverting it in any respect?
Mr. Stevens. All day Sunday and Monday when the meeting was held, everything was open and public, just as in a railroad meeting in any city—everybody knew it; reasons to believe there was no effective opposition. I believed the movements of the opponents of the monarchy were irresistible, and everybody understood what was going on.
The Chairman. Did you know of the actual organisation on Monday evening?
Mr. Stevens. I did not, only by such information as I could get. I put myself in contact with the Queen's representatives; they had access to the legation, and I would inquire very cautiously about this and that and a great many things. Many of the friends of the Provisional Government I knew, and a great many I did not.
The Chairman. Did you know of a programme, or whatever it was, before you went on board the ship, for the establishment of the new Government?
Mr. Stevens. I could not help but know it; it was all the talk Sunday and Monday. I knew it by the general appearance of things and the talk; the leaders did not communicate their plans to me.
The Chairman. As I understand, the public meeting had not been held at that time?
Mr. Stevens. It had been arranged for.
The Chairman. How did you know that?
Mr. Stevens. By constant reports to the legation, both from royalists and others.
The Chairman. It was information that you had?
Mr. Stevens. I did not go to church that day; I think I remained home all day.
The Chairman. Did you derive that information, before you went on board that ship, from a report or statement made to you by any member of a body that had organized or had agreed they would organize a Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. No; I think the representative men who were in it refrained from communicating their details.
The Chairman. Did they communicate it to you?
Mr. Stevens. I think not.
Senator Gray. Or did you have any conversation with any of them?
Mr. Stevens. I think I did not. I may have asked what they were doing, and they may have said they would have a Provisional Government. I should say that is probable. I could not learn what was going on; I would have to catechise somebody, and they would answer me.
The Chairman. But you knew at the time you went on board the ship that the state of public feeling there would culminate in an effort to overthrow the Queen's Government and establish a government in place of it?
Mr. Stevens. I understood that the Queen's government was at an end. The Queen's government ended on Saturday afternoon. There
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was no government of the Queen's for more than forty-eight hours; from 4 o'clock Saturday afternoon, the 14th of January, the Queen's government was absolutely dead, as much so as was that of Louis Phillipe's government was after he left the city of Paris in 1848.
The Chairman. From the time you spoke of going on board ship and conferring with Capt. Wiltse about troops going on shore, was there any government in Honolulu which could have issued any authentic order which the people would have respected?
Mr. Stevens. There was none. As I stated before, the only government was the thousand white citizens who were acting as a unit; they were absolutely masters of the situation, and their unity and self-possession and the presence of the Boston kept the city as it was.
The Chairman. The period of time from Saturday afternoon to Monday afternoon you regard as an interregnum?
Mr. Stevens. Absolutely an interregnum—theoretically and practically.
The Chairman. During that time did you receive any information to the effect that the Queen's forces were under arms and under orders in any way to protect the public order, or to protect life and property, or were engaged in any military operation?
Mr. Stevens. No authentic information.
The Chairman. Did you receive any information that that was the state of the case?
Mr. Stevens. I remember that Mr. Peterson and his associates called on me Sunday evening and made certain inquiries about the situation, and from them I got some impression. But it was only his story; I got no reliable information. It was the general situation that taught me my duty.
The Chairman. What was Mr. Peterson's story about the military preparation on the part of the Queen to protect the public security?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Peterson was then between the opposing forces; he was expecting the natives and white citizens would support him, and he came to see what the United States officials would do. I did not promise him anything.
The Chairman. What was his story?
Mr. Stevens. His story was just what I have stated—that he was expecting
Senator Frye. The chairman asked you if you had any information that the Queen's troops or Queen's forces were in any condition to make any attack upon the Provisional Government or to preserve order and life or property?
Mr. Stevens. None at all.
The Chairman. Did you see any array of the Queen's troops anywhere in Honolulu between the time of your landing from the Boston on Saturday and your going back on the Boston on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. Not any.
The Chairman. No parade through the streets?
Mr. Stevens. No parade through the streets that I saw.
The Chairman. Did you see any parade through the streets, of any organization, or any police force in charge of Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Stevens. None whatever.
The Chairman. So that, as a part of the interregnum during these days, between Saturday noon and Monday afternoon, there was no display of military force on the part of the Queen's government?
Mr. Stevens. None whatever that I was made cognizant of.
The Chairman. Or on the part of the Queen?
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Mr. Stevens. None whatever.
The Chairman. Within your knowledge or information, did she during that time exercise any governmental act except the promulgation of the proclamation on Monday giving up the enterprise of overthrowing the constitution?
Mr. Stevens. That was all. She made a communication to me on Sunday—it may have come from the Queen or ministers—that I should meet at the Government house the English ministers and others. On Sunday, knowing the situation, I declined to go to the meeting, because, first, I did not want to leave the legation, and secondly, when this communication came I could not make a tripartite with Mr. Wodehouse and the Japanese minister, and I declined to go to this meeting. That meeting was evidently for the purpose of making an appeal for our assistance to save her.
The Chairman. The proclamation was the only effort on the part of the Queen to assert her government from the time you got off from the Boston on Saturday afternoon to Monday afternoon, when you went back on the Boston"?.
Mr. Stevens. That is all. I got a note from the Queen on Tuesday. That was twenty-two hours after the troops were landed. That is the only one.
The Chairman. I have not come to that; I am speaking of the period you are pleased to call the interregnum.
Mr. Stevens. That is all.
The Chairman. During that interregnum what military array, if any, was there on the part of citizens of Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. You mean the citizens?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. My information was—of course I had to obtain from A, B, and C---
The Chairman. Did you see any military array?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. What was your information?
Mr. Stevens. My information was that the citizens were preparing for a public meeting, and they were going to be governed by the exigencies of the case. All the information that I could get was that they were notifying all parts of the city and island to be at the mass-meeting and have their arms at the right time. I could not get reliable information of that; but it was such that I had no doubt about it.
The Chairman. Did you see any military organization or assemblage of the citizens during this period of interregnum, or have any knowledge of the fact?
Mr. Stevens. No; only at this meeting at the armory it came to me, not officially, but I learned it from others.
The Chairman. At the armory?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did that meeting occur before you went on board the ship?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. And you knew of it?
Mr. Stevens. Knew of the results of it. I think they had not gotten entirely through when I went on board the ship. I could not swear to that; I did not go to the meeting.
The Chairman. Was there any meeting of the retainers or supporters of the Queen at the same time or about the same time?
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Mr. Stevens. I think they had one on the palace grounds the same afternoon.
The Chairman. You do not know?
Mr. Stevens. I think so; I cannot swear to it. I know they had one there the same afternoon, or preceding afternoon, and my impression is, the same afternoon.
The Chairman. Did you know that before you went on board the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I think so, because there were handbills posted in the street, handbills on both sides nearly all through the city, as well as I remember.
Senator Frye. Mr Chairman, if you can hold in your mind just where you want to start, I would like to ask a few questions at this point.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Frye. Mr. Stevens stated that he requested certain of the troops to be sent to the consulate, and certain of them to be sent to the legation; but he did not give any account of the disposition of the balance of the troops. Now, Mr. Stevens, answer my questions, and answer them only. You say you thought when the troops came ashore they would bring their tents with them?
Mr. Stevens. When I made my request?
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. I stated that.
Senator Frye. When the troops came to the shore, you found they had no tents?
Mr. Stevens. And they had to have a hall.
Senator Frye. Up to that time did you ever know that there was such a hall in Honolulu as Arion Hall?
Mr. Stevens. Never, until the time the Opera House was refused.
Senator Frye. Did you call upon them for a place to have the troops?
Mr. Stevens. The officers said they would have to have a place to stay during the night.
Senator Frye. Did you send a man for a place?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Frye. What did you send him after?
Mr. Stevens. The Opera House.
Senator Frye. Is the Opera House a place that was before occupied by United States troops?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say as to that.
Senator Frye. Do you know it by report?
Mr. Stevens. I think it had been occupied before by a military force.
Senator Frye. Why did you send for the Opera House.
Mr. Stevens. Because I knew of that hall, and I knew of its capacity.
Senator Frye. And the only one that you knew of in the city as suitable for the purpose you wished to use it for?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Frye. Your man returned?
Mr. Stevens. He had to go 3 miles to find the man in charge, and returned with a negative—that the owner of the hall was not on the island and he would not like to have the hall used for that purpose. I found out that he was an Englishman and against the Americans.
Senator Frye. Then you heard of Arion Hall?
Mr. Stevens. I sent the same messenger, the same man.
Senator Frye. How far did you send him?
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Mr. Stevens. About a mile, to a man known to be a royalist—Kalakaua's minister. Mr. Walker had been a minister, and had been all through these troubles. He said he would be very glad to let us have the hall. He gave me the name of the manager. I sent a third man to the one who had the management of the hall, and he granted the right to use it. It was then well on to 10 o'clock. Consequently the men had to stay in the street that night to that hour.
Senator Frye. At Mr. Atherton's house?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; he had extensive grounds---
Senator Frye. In selecting Arion Hall for the use of those troops, did you have any reference whatever to their location as regards the Provisional Government or the Queen's Government?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest; it never entered into my head.
Senator Frye. Had anyone made any suggestion to you on behalf of the Queen or the Provisional Government that Arion Hall should be selected on account of its location near the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. Never.
Senator Frye. When you selected Arion Hall for the troops did you have any reference whatever to its being near the palace and the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
Senator Frye. Did you have any reference whatever in your selection to the location of the troops being effective to prevent the Queen's troops attacking the Provisional Government's troops?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
Senator Frye. As a matter of fact, is Arion Hall, so far as American property is concerned—and I mean by that, of course, residences as well as anything else—a reasonably central location?
Mr. Stevens. A reasonably central location.
Senator Frye. DO you know of any place large enough, other than that, for quartering those troops in the city of Honolulu?
Mr. Stevens. Not obtainable. I had thought of another on my own street. If Arion Hall had not been gotten we would have tried another hall, which was nearer me, but the owner was not there.
Senator Frye. The only purpose you had was to place the troops where they could be protected during the night?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; and where they would be useful in case of fire.
Senator Gray. You said that this was arranged on the Boston in a conference with Captain Wiltse. What was to be the route the troops were to take?
Mr. Stevens. No; I do not remember any arrangement as to the route; the arrangement was as to where they were to land.
Senator Gray. And where they were to go?
Mr. Stevens. No; we had not found this hall.
Senator Gray. How was it they came to go to Mr. Atherton's?
M. Stevens. Simply because he had extensive grounds, and he was an American.
Senator Gray. That was a matter of arrangement before you left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say that; I presume so. It was arranged where they would land, because they were going up the principal streets.
Senator Gray. You knew they were going to Mr. Atherton's?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say positively.
The Chairman. Did you know that before you left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say positively, for I do not remember it.
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The Chairman. Proceeding from this period when you say there was an interregnum to the time when you ordered the American flag to be hoisted in Hawaii, I will ask you what was the condition of the people as to order and quietude and the conduct of their ordinary vocations?
Mr. Stevens. You mean between the time of the recognition of the Provisional Government and the raising of the flag?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. I will say that the people were generally at their avocations, except that the citizens had constituted themselves soldiers— the men from stores, the banks, and the workshops, responsible men— were constituted the military force for the time being.
The Chairman. To what extent had this volunteer military organization increased?
Mr. Stevens. Volunteer and otherwise I could not tell precisely; but I should say all the way from 400 to 600 men.
The Chairman. Armed men?
Mr. Stevens. Men they could place arms with. They were white men accustomed to the use of muskets. But the men actually on military duty probably would not be half that number.
The Chairman. Were the men organized for the purpose of repressing mobs and incendiarism, or organized and armed for the purpose of supporting the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. The public order.
The Chairman. I want to ask you whether they were organized for the purpose of preserving public order, or for the purpose of supporting the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. They regarded the Provisional Government as the instrument through which they would preserve order.
The Chairman. They were considered troops of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. They were supporters of the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Were they under the control of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. Those volunteers would never be called upon except in an emergency. They had a military force which was disciplined, and they had this force from the workshops.
The Chairman. What was the number of the disciplined force?
Mr. Stevens. I could not speak with accuracy at this moment.
The Chairman. What is your opinion?
Mr. Stevens. I should say 150 men—possibly 200.
The Chairman. Were they organized in military companies?
Mr. Stevens. Military companies.
The Chairman. Under the command of Col. Soper?
Mr. Stevens. Under Col. Soper, I think.
The Chairman. Were there captains of companies?
Mr. Stevens. I do not know Capt. Ziegler; but I think he was the captain of the German company at the Government house.
The Chairman. Were there other captains?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. I think there was another captain, Fisher, from one of the banks, who was the captain at the barracks; the third company, Capt. Goud.
The Chairman. In that period which you call the interregnum, was there any outbreak?
Mr. Stevens. There was no outbreak; they feared an outbreak.
The Chairman. Was there any demonstration to show that an outbreak was contemplated?
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Mr. Stevens. I think their fears came from private information. I think there was no external signs of it. Of course the authorities put themselves as much in touch with the facts as they possibly could, and they sometimes may have been alarmed unduly, as men would be in such circumstances.
The Chairman. Did you believe that there was a general public apprehension in that time, covering the period that I have just referred to, of any armed demonstration against the Provisional Government, or any incendiarism, or any mob violence?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; very strong; so strong they got information that they barricaded the Government building and got ready for anything. It is very likely half the time that the alarms were bogus?
The Chairman. During this period of time where was the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. The Queen was in her Washington house. That was the house left to her by her husband, and by the husband's mother left to him. It is the Washington house; well-known place, close to the tpalace.
The Chairman. Did the Queen have any guards about her?
Mr. Stevens. As nearly as I remember the Provisional Government allowed her a guard.
The Chairman. Of how many? What was your information on that subject?
Mr. Stevens. I think 12.
The Chairman. Armed men?
Mr. Stevens. I presume so; I never went to see.
The Chairman. Were the troops taken from the organization under the authority of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. As nearly, as I remember at first they allowed her 12 of her own guards. But, of course, the Government kept an eye on them, and subsequently they were changed to men of the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Were they changed at the Queen's request?
Mr. Stevens. That I could not say. I probably knew at the time; but I would not be sure. I think they were changed. They regarded her native guard as of no consequence whatever. The reason I had for raising the flag, I will give you in as condensed form as I have it, when you reach that.
The Chairman. I have not reached that. I am trying to find out what the situation was at the time. Was there any interruption of the relations between the Provisional Government and the American Government or between the Provisional Government and any foreign government during this period of time after the proclamation of the Provisional Government and up to the time of the raising the flag?
Mr. Stevens. I should say no interruptions; but I would have to give the facts, that you might understand my answer fully. That will enter right into the reasons for raising the flag. I will give those reasons very specifically.
The Chairman. There were no interruptions of the relations?
Mr. Stevens. Do you mean the diplomatic relations?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. Not so far as I know.
The Chairman. What Governments had recognized the Provisional Government before the time of the raising of this flag?
Mr. Stevens. Every one represented there.
The Chairman. Which were—--
Mr. Stevens. The English Government, the German Government,
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the Austro-Hungary the Portuguese, the Japanese. The Chinese are only represented by a commercial agent. I think he recognized the Provisional Government in some form.
The Chairman. You do not know?
Mr. Stevens. I think he did.
The Chairman. Did you have any official information as minister of the United States from these respective Governments that their representatives there had recognized this Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. It was published in the papers the next morning. I heard of it the night before.
The Chairman. I am not speaking of that; I am asking whether you had any official information from the officers of these respective Governments?
Mr. Stevens. They did not call upon me to notify me; but they authorized the publication of their recognition in the paper of the next morning.
The Chairman. Is there an official paper?
Mr. Stevens. There is a paper the royal Government had used, "The Bulletin," which is the English organ, and the Provisional Government used "The Daily Advertiser," and they published that in the Advertiser. And I think the Bulletin got it too.
The Chairman. Was it understood by you that the publications in this gazette were official ?
Mr. Stevens. I understood that they were duly signed by the officials, and I learned that evening they were recognized by all in thirty minutes except by the English minister; he did not do it until the next morning. But he got ahead of me in calling on the Provisional Government. I was too ill, and did not call for several days; and he called within forty minutes after they were constituted.
The Chairman. Did these foreign governments officially communicate their recognition to the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; and it was published in the papers the next morning. That was the way I got at it.
The Chairman. You say that the English minister---
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Wodehouse.
The Chairman. Was he the minister?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. You say he withheld his written recognition until the next morning?
Mr. Stevens. Until the Claudine sailed for Washington.
The Chairman. What time did you make official recognition of this Government.
Mr. Stevens. I could not say positively, because the legation was thronged all the afternoon, and I was sick on the couch; but probably not far from 5 o'clock. My wife and daughter think it was a little later.
The Chairman. What day?
Mr. Stevens. The day they were constituted—perhaps three hours after they were sworn in and took possession of the buildings and were conducting the Government.
The Chairman. You were at the legation?
Mr. Stevens. At the legation.
The Chairman. And lying sick on a couch?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. How did you get information that this Provisional Government had been established?
Mr. Stevens. There were messengers coming from both sides.
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The Chairman. I am speaking of official information from the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. I can not say now, because I received it in so many ways. I can say that the ministers of the Queen had access to me all that afternoon, and others, and it was borne to me in various ways.
The Chairman. What did you regard as the official information of the Government on which you, as the American minister, were authorized to act in recognition of that Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say; but there is probably a note on file in the legation in Honolulu; I presume there is—stating that they were constituted. But I learned it in very many ways outside of that. There was a complete want of government, an interregnum, from Saturday afternoon, and my purpose was to recognize the first real government that was constituted; and if Mr. Wilson had gone forward and shown any force and organized a government I should have recognized that.
The Chairman. You received a note informing you of the organization of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Probably I did; I can not swear to that.
The Chairman. You wrote a note?
Mr. Stevens. Oh, yes; I wrote a note.
The Chairman. When did you write that note?
Mr. Stevens. In the afternoon.
The Chairman. What time in the afternoon?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say. I got up off the couch---
The Chairman. About what time?
Mr. Stevens. I could not swear to that. I prepared a note before; had it in readiness, because it was open as any railroad meeting would be in your city or mine; and I probably got the note ready without signature beforehand.
Senator Gray. A note to whom?
The Chairman. To the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. I looked up the matter of form in the legation, and got it ready.
The Chairman. To whom did you send that note?
Mr. Stevens. My impression is I sent it by Mr. Pringle. I might have sent it by Mr. Carter. I had not been asleep for four nights; I could not sleep on the Boston, all this excitement going on, and about 1 o'clock I was violently attacked. I took my couch. A medical man would have said, "Don't speak to a man this afternoon;" but under the excitement they keep coming; I had no clerk, and my daughter— consequently, in this state of my health I could not stop to look at the clock when every man who came—the Queen's messenger this minute and another messenger another minute. I went over it, and I think, as I recall the incident, it was about 5 o'clock. Mrs. Stevens and my daughter afterward said they thought it was half past 5, because they knew when the messenger went.
The Chairman. During that afternoon, while you were still on the couch sick, as you say, some members of the recent cabinet of Liliuokalani came in to see you?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. I wish to know who they were?
Mr. Stevens. They were Mr. Peterson, Mr. Parker—the whole four. But I was too ill, so that I received them one at a time, and only two at all.
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The Chairman. You received only one at a time?
Mr. Stevens. I received two—Mr. Parker first. Mr. Parker was more of a gentleman, and he wanted to know if Mr. Peterson could come in. Mr. Peterson was the leader.
The Chairman. During your interviews with these two ex-ministers of Liliuokalani did they give you any intimation as to the proclamation of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Their only errand was this---
The Chairman. What did they say to you? Did they give you any intimation that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Not so far as I remember.
The Chairman. What did they communicate to you?
Mr. Stevens. I will make that clear. Before I had this violent attack, say about 1 o'clock, I received this note from the Queen asking me to come to the palace, and I received it about fifteen minutes before the time appointed. There were two reasons for not responding. I declined the Sunday before to go into a tripartite, especially with Mr. Wodehouse. After I received that note, probably forty-five minutes or an hour, these ministers arrived, and their message was this: whether I could not properly ask the aid of Capt. Wiltse's forces to sustain the Queen. Mr. Peterson went into a legal argument, while his associate, Mr. Parker, was silent. Mr. Parker said to Peterson: "You must make this very brief;" and the only answer I made was: "Gentlemen, these men were landed for one purpose only, a pacific purpose; I can not use this force for sustaining the Queen." Now, they say that they put the other alternative—"assist the Provisional Government." There was no alternative spoken of or hinted. I said: "These men were landed for a pacific purpose, and I can not use them to sustain the Queen."
The Chairman. A pacific purpose?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; what I have just stated is the substance of what occurred.
The Chairman. Was that the substance of what occurred?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. And that was argued by Mr. Peterson on a legal point. I ought to state the reason for that. In 1874 Kalakaua was elected, and the natives were opposed to it, as history will show. The American forces from the ship were landed to suppress the mob, and the suppression of that mob was practically the putting of Kalakaua on the throne. But that was not the specific intention; but, inasmuch as he had been elected and his opponents had control of the city and had driven the Legislature out, it resulted that way.
Now, in putting down the riot in 1874, which put Kalakaua on the throne, from that time on the Kalakaua family got the idea that the United States would do the same; that the minister was obliged to do it. I received formerly several times messengers from the Queen; whenever they called I would, as a matter of duty, use that force to sustain them, and in this belief Mr. Peterson made the argument that they were the legally constituted Government, and that I could properly do as he suggested—he knew that I did not claim to be a lawyer, and he thought he knew more about law than I did—that I could properly use the force. I made as brief an answer as possible—"that these men were on shore for a pacific purpose, and we can not take any part in any contest; can not use the force to sustain the Queen or anybody else."
The Chairman. Now, at that that time it seems, from what occurred and the argument that was addressed to you by these gentlemen, that
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the question arose as between the Provisional Government and the Queen's Government?
Mr. Stevens. His whole argument was on the point whether I could properly use the force. At the suggestion of Mr. Parker, because of my condition of health, he made it brief.
The Chairman. But you were simply contemplating the question at that time whether you could sustain the Queen's Government or the Provisional Government ?
Mr. Stevens. No; the other alternative was not put by him at all.
The Chairman. At the time that conversation occurred were you aware of the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Probably I was. That was in the course of two or three hours recognized. I can not recognize the precise hour at which they took possession of the Government building and issued their proclamation.
The Chairman. Did you at that time know that it related to a controversy between the Queen's Government and the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. I knew from the conversation that they called upon me from the Queen—to save her.
The Chairman. To save her against dethronement?
Mr. Stevens. Against anybody—that their only hope for possession of that Government by the Queen was by my assistance.
The Chairman. Was there any suggestion made by these ministers when they came to the legation that the Queen's person or the person of any member of her cabinet was in any danger?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. So that, what you had to say in regard to it had no reference to the preservation of the life or security of the Queen or her ministers?
Mr. Stevens. Nothing whatever.
The Chairman. But it had reference to whether the Government of the United States would recognize---
Mr. Stevens. Put her in possession of the Government which she had lost.
The Chairman. How long was it after that interview with the Queen's ministers before you sent this note of recognition by Mr. Pringle to the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. I could not tell.
The Chairman. About how long?
Mr. Stevens. I would suppose it might have been two hours; might have been three.
The Chairman. That is your recollection—two or three hours?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; two or three hours. Probably it might have been—most likely was, two hours and a half; but that I would not swear to—whether it was two, two forty-five or three, because I had no record or watch at the time.
The Chairman. On that day, which was Tuesday, had you visited the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. I did not leave the legation from Monday evening until several days after—remained constantly in the legation.
The Chairman. Had you any conferences with members of the Provisional Government during that interval and while you remained at the legation?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Had no conferences with any of them?
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Mr. Stevens. No. AS an individual, some member of the Provisional Government may have called. But the Provisional Government leaders were intelligent, and they would not embarrass me with questions I could not answer—they were better posted men than their opponents. They kept their plans from me for reasons of their own.
The Chairman. I suppose you are not speaking of the official communications between you and the members of the Provisional Government— that they did not make any official communication?
Mr. Stevens. I presume they sent a communication asking recognition, and I presume that note is at the legation in Honolulu.
The Chairman. Beside that?
Mr. Stevens. Beside that I did not see one of them—they did not call; they probably sent their messenger, because they kept coming to the legation, representative men on both sides, constantly, and it would be impossible to make a record of every one. The whole town had been in excitement for days.
The Chairman. Was it your purpose in anything you did, from the time you left the Boston on Saturday up to the time of your making an official recognition in writing, to use the forces or the flag or the authority of the United States Government for the purpose of dethroning the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest—absolute noninterference was my purpose.
The Chairman. Was it your policy in any of these things that you had done to aid any plan or purpose of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all. That was not the plan.
The Chairman. Since your residence in Hawaii as a minister have you personally—I do not speak of your ministerial character—favored the annexation of Hawaii to the United States? Have you been in favor of that movement?
Mr. Stevens. After I had been in Honolulu one year I came to the conclusion that the annexation of those islands was inevitable, or something else; that the then condition of things could not last very long, and therefore my official communications to our Government disclose just what my views were. But in my calculations for annexation I never supposed, nor was it expected by the friends of annexation, that it would be by revolution, but through negotiation, legislative action, and the assent of the Queen on the lines of the treaty of '54. That was the only plan thought of.
In that time I kept my own counsel, and nobody except the United States Government knew what my real view was. In that time I may have chatted with individuals and given an opinion when talking of the situation of the islands—with Judge Hartwell or Rev. Dr. Hyde, and I may have agreed with them that that would be the inevitable, sooner or later, because that had been the form of expression, as the records will show, for forty years. But that was merely an academic opinion privately expressed.
The Chairman. As a matter of interest to the people of Hawaii, and also the people of the United States and the Government of the United States, were your personal wishes or inclinations in favor of or against annexation?
Mr. Stevens. In the first twelve months I supposed something like a protectorate would be preferable.
The Chairman. After that what?
Mr. Stevens. I came to the conclusion that while a protectorate
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would be possible, annexation was the only logical and practical solution.
The Chairman. Did you favor it?
Mr. Stevens. Only as I reported to the Department.
The Chairman. I do not mean whether you advocated it, but whether, in your own mind, you favored it.
Mr. Stevens. In my own mind I came to the conclusion that annexation was better than protectorate, or something like what they have in Sweden and Norway. I know that there were some men when I first went there who have had the idea that it would be better to have the foreign relations managed at Washington and have an independent kingdom like Norway.
The Chairman. During this period of time in Hawaii, did you believe that it would be advantageous to the Government of the United States, in a commercial sense, to acquire the ownership of the islands?
Mr. Stevens. Most emphatically. I came to that conclusion after a study of the future of the Pacific.
The Chairman. You believed that the future of the islands lay in that direction?
Mr. Stevens. Exactly. I followed Mr. Seward for 25 years; I am a believer in his philosophy as to the future of America in the Pacific, and, of course, my investigations after I went to the islands confirmed me.
The Chairman. Having such an opinion and such a belief and such a trend of judgment about this important serious matter, have you in any way, at any time, or on any occasion employed your power as a minister of this Government for the purpose of promoting or accelerating that movement?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest, except in writing to Washington, and that was marked confidential. There I expressed my views of the situation. When I suggested a customs' union, I pointed out in that that the customs union had more difficulties than annexation, and that the protectorate system was a system which I could not see would work with the American system.
The Chairman. Was it your observation of the condition of feeling and sentiment amongst the Hawaiians, the native Kanaka population, that they felt friendly toward and grateful to what was termed the missionary element for their education and civilization in building up their institutions and towns and other things that have occurred, or were they possessed of a feeling of hostility toward the missionary element? By the missionary element I mean not all who are classed now as missionaries, but those men and their descendants who went to the islands for true missionary purposes?
Mr. Stevens. I would say in answer to that, that nearly all, if not all, the responsible natives of the islands (I mean the men of education and standing) are nearly all Americans, and the representative men would be the four members of the Legislature who resisted the threats and bribes in the struggle about the lottery bill, led by Mr. Kauhana, who had been a member of the Legislature for fifteen years. He is a man of character, and his three associates said, "The United States is our mother; let her take our children."
The Chairman. I want to know whether it was a custom amongst the Hawaiians with the white people there to celebrate our anniversaries, such as the Fourth of July?
Mr. Stevens. The 4th of July on all the four principal islands is celebrated with more uniformity and earnestness than in any part of the
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United States. I am familiar with the celebration of the 4th of July in my country fifty years ago, when they celebrated as they now do in Hawaii.
The Chairman. Is it regarded as a fete day?
Mr. Stevens. As a fete day.
The Chairman. How about the proclamations of Thanksgiving that go from the President out there?
Mr. Stevens. That is used in the churches, and much regarded, but not the same degree as the 4th of July; but it is still a very important day.
The Chairman. Is that regaded by the Kanaka population? Do they participate in the sentiment upon the request of our President?
Mr. Stevens. I think so.
The Chairman. Are you aware of the existence of a similar state of feeling on the part of the Hawaiian people, the Kanakas, toward any other foreign government?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Do you understand and do you believe and do you state, upon your understanding and belief, that there is an affectionate regard or sentiment on the part of the Kanaka population toward the people and Government of the United States?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; I will say the responsible portion of them.
The Chairman. How about the irresponsible, the ignorant people?
Mr. Stevens. The irresponsible, what we call the hoodlum—I use that term for convenience—are gathered in Honolulu, as they would be in any country, at the capital. That element is comparatively small in numbers, but it makes a good deal of noise, and is under the control of the white adventurers. And there is another element, which is quite numerous, and if they only get their point and things go on, they are satisfied.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the principal body of the Hawaiian people, who reside in the country.
Mr. Stevens. I would divide those in three classes: the first led by Mr. Kanhana and others like him. That makes the responsible and the religious element, led by the Americans. Then there would be the portion living in the country districts who do not care one way or the other.
The Chairman. Indifferent?
Mr. Stevens. Indifferent. If the demagogues were to go to them and say, "The Americans are going to take away your lands," they would get up a feeling, and they would all act at once. And then the hoodlum element—a few hundred dollars would buy them and use them, as the worst element in our cities.
The Chairman. Subject to be controlled, because they are purchaseable?
Mr. Stevens. Purchaseable. They would not do any very great harm, but they are corrupt.
The Chairman. Considering the condition that Honolulu is in, and considering all the facts that you have been commenting upon, what was your reason for requesting or directing the raising of the flag and the establishment of a protectorate in Honolulu?
Mr. Stevens. I have it here in writing; but I think I can condense it better.
Senator Frye. One moment before that question is answered, if the chairman please.
The Chairman. Yes.
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Senator Frye. You have been over the recognition of the Provisional Government and closed that chapter. In the recognition of the Provisional Government did you ask anything about the barracks and the station house?
Mr. Stevens. I did not go into the particulars.
Senator Frye. What importance on the question of the recognition of the Provisional Government did the barracks and the police station have?
Mr. Stevens. None whatever. As I have stated before, there was an absolute interregnum, and there was no effective force for the Queen at any time.
Senator Frye. In determining upon the question of recognition, did you take into consideration at all the surrender of the barracks or the police station?
Mr. Stevens. No.
Senator Frye. Capt. Wiltse is reported to have said that he would not recognize the Provisional Government until the barracks and police station had surrendered. Had Capt. Wiltse any authority in the premises, if he said so?
Mr. Stevens. I would say that he never had any such conversation with me, and I have no idea he said anything of the kind.
Senator Frye. Is not the question of recognition a question entirely and solely for the American minister?
Mr. Stevens. I would say so. So far as the American Government is concerned, absolutely and entirely.
The Chairman. Was that request of the Provisional Government made in writing?
Mr. Stevens. I think so.
The Chairman. Is it there?
Mr. Stevens. I think it is on file at the legation. In answer to the question of the chairman put a few moments ago I will proceed to state: These volunteer troops had been taken from their business for two weeks. The Japanese Government had a powerful ironclad that was soon expected. They had one ship there, but they had sent it off to Hilo, and of that visit to Hilo we got information, which I sent to the Department, that the Japanese were testing the sentiment of the men upon the plantations as to whether they would aid the Japanese. Now, right here, it is important that I should be specific. The Japanese Commissioner had but recently arrived. He came to me prior to my going to Hilo and prior to the fall of the Queen and said that he wanted the same rights of suffrage for the Japanese that other nationalities had. He wanted to get my encouragement, to find out what I was about. That was before I went to Hilo. Of course I had to be very diplomatic and did not make him any pledges or any signs.
At about the same time he had made this demand on the Queen's Government, which was before the overthrow, and which was followed up immediately on the Provisional Government—to give them the right of suffrage. On the island of Oahu, as the reports came to me, they had 700 or 800 Japanese who had been in the Japanese army. Information came to the Provisional Government and came to me that the adherents of the Queen, in a revolutionary attempt to replace her just at this time before the flag was put up, might call upon the Japanese laborers and residents, and that the Queen would promise them, for the sake of their aid, that they should have the right of suffrage. There was a good opportunity for the Japanese and the Queen's supporters. The commissioner had sent a request to Tokio by the Claudine, which
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I found out afterwards, following the Japanese training ship which had arrived from San Francisco, and in the meantime the training ship had gone up to Hilo. We found out from what appeared to be a reliable source that some political action in concert with natives was in view. There was no proof of that except as this messenger conveyed it to us in writing and the manner he had gained the information. That might not be so, but there were outward signs of it.
The Provisional Government felt, as I felt, if the Queen's adherents should make that promise, and they could get the aid of the 700 or 800 Japanese soldiers, a revolutionary attempt would be dangerous. In the meantime the English minister, who had always insisted upon a tripartite action in anything that took place in Honolulu, expected the arrival of a British ship. The Provisional Government got the information that the attempt would be made for two purposes: First, that those representing the Queen and Mr. Neumann would want the information to go to Washington that there was a chaotic condition of things in Hawaii, and that the Provisional Government had no real, stable, authority—that an outbreak, although it might and would be crushed out, would have a very bad effect.
Fear on the part of the mob of adventurers who had surrounded the Queen—fear of the use of the Japanese force that might be used, the fear of the pressure of the Japanese commissioner, with two ships at his command (one of them larger than the Boston, with the attitude of the British minister, with the ship he expected, all combined to make me yield to the request to put up the flag. And the understanding on their part was expressed in their note and was expressed in my answer when we put it up—"That this must only go to the extent of supporting the Government against these outside contingencies," both from the English vessel and Japanese, but much more from the Japanese, because he was thoroughly in earnest to get that right of suffrage for his thousands of Japanese. Now, we may have been unduly alarmed, but the Provisional Government was alarmed, and that was the state of the case.
It was specifically understood that there should be no interference with the internal affairs of Hawaii, and there was no period in which I was more absolutely unconnected with internal affairs than in that period when the flag was up.
The Chairman. Did you receive any official or other information prior to the time of the raising of this flag that any government represented in Hawaii was opposed to the project of annexation, which information had been submitted to the United States?
Mr. Stevens. Opposition from any Government? I had this information, that Mr. Wodehouse, when he found that the Provisional Government was in favor of annexation, thought they ought to submit it to popular vote, and they thought that was a very cool proposition for any English minister to make. He made that proposition very soon after he found out that they favored annexation, and I think sent a note to that effect to the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. You had that information?
Mr. Stevens. I had that positively from Mr. Dole himself, and other information. I had repeated interviews with the Japanese commissioner. He stated his point, and wanted me to assent to the idea that the Japanese should have the right to vote. I had in a formal, diplomatic way, given him to understand that that was beyond my province and responsibility.
The Chairman. At the time of the raising of the flag, as well as
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before, the Japanese commissioner insisted upon the suffrage proposition?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. And he furthermore said if we were to annex the islands he hoped the American Government would give the Japanese the same rights as Americans or Englishmen or Germans. And he was very earnest and very tenacious about it. And the sending of a great war vessel under the circumstances was the one that caused the most outside fear.
The Chairman. And those were the reasons?
Mr. Stevens. The fear of anarchy and the fear of the Japanese, and the fear that Mr. Wodehouse and the Japanese commissioner would insist upon the same right with dealing with the affairs that I had, which I knew my Government was opposed to.
The Chairman. Those were the reasons which influenced you to accept the proposition from the Provisional Government for a protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. It was a modified and strictly limited protectorate.
The Chairman. It is a protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. To the extent specified, yes.
The Chairman. After that flag was raised and that protectorate was declared, did you, as the American minister, or in any other capacity, take any control or direction of any of the affairs of the Provisional Government, or any control or direction of the people there in any way?
Mr. Stevens. Not in the remotest degree. For two reasons, if you will allow me to state the reasons.
The Chairman. Never mind the reasons. I can think of a dozen reasons why you would not want to do it. Did you intend it, or did the Hawaiian Provisional Government intend it, so far as you know, as an attempt on the part of the United States to establish the right of sovereignty over the islands of Hawaii—I mean this protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. No; I understood then, as I understand now, that that was to sustain the sovereignty of the Provisional Government— that their sovereignty was threatened under the circumstances.
The Chairman. To prevent other governments from coming in there to interfere?
Mr. Stevens. That is it exactly.
The Chairman. It was pending the protectorate that Mr. Blount arrived?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Had you, before Mr. Blount arrived, received information from Mr. Secretary Foster that your act in establishing that protectorate had been disavowed?
Mr. Stevens. No; I understood his note as I understand it now. It is in exact accordance with the little document I have just read. In the liability of its being misunderstood, he thought it best to enlarge upon it and define how far our limited protectorate could go. I so understood it at the time. Secretary Foster went on to decide what we could do and what we could not; and what we could do was what we did.
The Chairman. When he disavowed what seemed to be a protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; he defined how far our protectorate could go.
The Chairman. Then he disavowed what seemed to be a protectorate. We will take his own language as conveying his actual meaning. Did you understand that that disavowal reached the point or
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proposition that you were forbidden, as American minister, to preserve or protect the public peace?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all; but just the opposite, because the language of the dispatch is explicit on that point.
The Chairman. And it was for that reason you considered his disavowal comported with the purpose of raising the flag ?
Mr. Stevens. Precisely. Everything I had done was in accordance with his dispatch. President Dole was familiar with international law, as well as Mr. Foster and myself, and never thought of asking more than Secretary Foster's dispatch allows.
The Chairman. How long did you remain there after Mr. Blount arrived?
Mr. Stevens. I think he arrived the 28th of March, and I left the 24th of May.
The Chairman. Did Mr. Blount carry over with him the dispatch of Mr. Foster regarding the protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. No; Mr. Foster's dispatch came by telegram, and in due course of mail afterward.
The Chairman. So that Mr. Foster's dispatch, whatever it meant, had been received by you before Mr. Blount's arrival?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; I think thirty days before.
The Chairman. Did you think, from Mr. Foster's dispatch, that you should haul down the flag and order the troops to go on board ship?
Mr. Stevens. Not in the slightest.
The Chairman. Is there anything which you can state except what you have already stated, about the Japanese, and foreign interference— any turbulence or danger that would require you to keep that flag flying and keep the protectorate in authority?
Mr. Stevens. My judgment was for its retention until there was an order to the contrary. The same reason that caused me to raise it, in my mind, continued. I do not know of any other than those I have stated.
The Chairman. You have stated all the reasons that then induced you to put up the flag and all the reasons that induced you to maintain it and maintain the protectorate after you received Mr. Foster's dispatch?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; certainly. My documents explain why I would do that and not do otherwise when negotiations were pending.
The Chairman. In the course which you took in maintaining the protectorate and in maintaining the flag over Hawaiian soil, did you understand that you were violating in any sense any order of the United States Government given through the State Department?
Mr. Stevens. No. I stated in my dispatch the serious responsibility I was under; that there was a contingency I knew no other way to meet than the method in which I met it.
The Chairman. How long before you received that dispatch was it that Admiral Skerrett came?
Mr. Stevens. I can not recall.
The Chairman. But it was before you received that dispatch disavowing---
Mr. Stevens. I shall object to the term disavowal; I do not admit it was a disavowal.
The Chairman. I use the word disavowal.
Mr. Stevens. Admiral Skerrett might have arrived ten days or two weeks after. There might have been a day more or a day less, but
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it would not vary from several weeks between the arrival of Admiral Skerrett and the dispatch of Mr. Foster.
The Chairman. The flag was flying when Admiral Skerrett arrived.
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett make any objection to it?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Did he ever suggest to you that it was an improper attitude for the Government of the United States to maintain toward Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Or that he would refuse to maintain it with his troops on shore?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Did you have conferences with Admiral Skerrett?
Mr. Stevens. Not on that specific point.
The Chairman. Were you in association with him?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; constantly.
The Chairman. Did you converse about Hawaiian affairs.
Mr. Stevens. I think after Admiral Skerrett had been there a certain length of time he said he would rather a portion of the troops would be on board ship. We conferred with the Provisional Government, and we reduced the number all around.
The Chairman. The number was reduced under Admiral Skerrett's suggestion and order, and with your assent?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Where was Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. He had gone home. He remained thirty days after his time had expired.
The Chairman. He remained after the flag was raised?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. But Admiral Skerrett reduced the force on shore?
Mr. Stevens. After conference with me and the Provisional Government. We thought it was safe to do it.
The Chairman. That was while the flag was up?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett undertake to interfere with the existence of the protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. Not in the slightest. This was a mutual friendly arrangement all around; what the state of the case required—the reduction of the force.
The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett ever state to you before the arrival of Mr. Blount that he thought it his duty as the admiral in command to withdraw his entire force from the shore and haul down that flag?
Mr. Stevens. No; he never even spoke to me that it was bad policy to have it up—nothing of the kind. I think he had a captain who was there a while. I heard of his making that remark. But it was only a matter of chitchat. He did not agree with and could not get along with the missionary people, and he wanted to go with another class of people. I can not recall his name at this moment.
Senator Gray. Was he on Admiral Skerrett's ship?
Mr. Stevens. He was sent shortly up to Bering Sea.
Senator Gray. You might mention his name.
Mr. Stevens. I can not recall it.
The Chairman. He had formed and expressed an opinion, as you
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understood, contrary to the attitude of the Government of the United States at that time?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. And he thought that the whole thing was a mistake; but when he was conferred with by some of the citizens he denied it. So that I could not say what his real position was.
The Chairman. We do not want to go into that. When Mr. Blount arrived, did he communicate to you any of the special instructions that he had received?
Mr. Stevens. Not his instructions; but he gave me a copy of the instructions from Washington, by which his authority was paramount over mine, and that I should keep on with the ordinary duties of the legation. But he never showed me his instructions nor gave me a hint as to what they were.
The Chairman. You had only a conjecture as to what they might be?
Mr. Stevens. Only a conjecture.
The Chairman. Mr. Blount was cautious in withholding his instructions, was he? Did you ask to be informed of his mission there?
Mr. Stevens. Oh, no; I introduced him to the Provisional Government, and was courteous as I could be to him.
The Chairman. Did you demur, dissent, to his coming there as minister of the United States with authority paramount to your authority there?
Mr. Stevens. No. I kept that locked up in my breast.
The Chairman. So that, whatever his mission was, it was not a matter to arouse your antagonism?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest. On the other hand, I treated him with the utmost kindness. I knew that he came with a great deal of prejudice, and I was careful---
The Chairman. How do you know that he came with prejudice?
Mr. Stevens. By his conduct. It was very brusque with me in the start. It was brusque in his refusal to accept the offer of the American citizens that he should take a house rather than go the royalist hotel.
The Chairman. That offer was made by whom?
Mr. Stevens. That was a committee of American citizens. I can give you who they were and what they were.
The Chairman. Was it the committee of safety?
Mr. Stevens. They were not members of it. The chairman of it was Judge Hartwell, who had nothing to do with the revolution whatever, and the next member was Mr. Scott, a Kentucky gentleman, who has had charge of the high school for many years—not connected with the Government or even with politics.
The Chairman. How came the citizens to provide a house for Mr. Blount any more than for you as minister?
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that they knew that the Hawaiian Hotel was organized in the interest of the Queen's supporters and organized in a very corrupt way.
The Chairman. Was there no other hotel there except the one at which Mr. Blount stopped?
Mr. Stevens. That was the principal hotel. There were other good hotels.
Senator Gray. That was the principal hotel?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. There were other hotels.
Senator Gray. Mr. Blount says he went there because it was the leading hotel, and that he never saw its proprietor to speak to him for many weeks after he had been there, and he saw no men who were
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royalists, except they came for the purposes of examination. Do you know anything to the contrary?
Mr. Stevens. I know altogether to the contrary. The Hawaiian Hotel had been for many months as complete a lodge for all the Queen's supporters, to the extent that they watched every boarder who was brought there. The man who kept that hotel was of a firm that cheated the Government out of $80,000. One of the firm was sent to Washington as Kaiulani's counsel. The active manager of that hotel at the time is a graduate from the Oxford University, England. He was divorced from his wife in the United States. He wrote those vile letters in behalf of the Queen attacking me and Judge Dole.
Senator Gray. Do you know that Mr. Blount had any association with those people?
Mr. Stevens. That I can not swear to. I was giving the character of the hotel, the reasons why these citizens suggested that he go to a private house.
Senator Gray. Do you know that Mr. Blount associated with the people whom you have described on terms of intimacy or otherwise?
Mr. Stevens. I think it would be impossible for Mr. Blount to know, because they were strangers to him.
Senator Gray. Do you know that he did?
Mr. Stevens. I know that when I called at the cottage that they were generally there.
Senator Gray. Where?
Mr. Stevens. At the cottage where he stopped, close to the hotel. I found some of those parties were there.
Senator Gray. Who were some of those parties?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Peterson was one. You asked me why these citizens made this offer. It was because while he was at the hotel he would be under espionage of the royalists.
Senator Gray. Do you say that Mr. Blount when he arrived went to the Hawaiian Hotel, and he there associated intimately or otherwise with those objectionable characters?
Mr. Stevens. I do not believe that he did.
Senator Gray. I will ask you whether or not that hotel is where all American tourists and strangers would go?
Mr. Stevens. More likely to go.
Senator Gray. Did not the tourists all go to that hotel?
Mr. Stevens. More or less. But so soon as they had been there any length of time, they generally left it. A good many Americans left it because of its anti-American character.
The Chairman. Now, as I understand your statement, this body of citizens undertook to provide quarters for Mr. Blount in order to prevent him from falling under what they conceived to be and you conceived to be evil influences?
Mr. Stevens. I will state it my own way. These citizens were of the highest respectability. This lady offered it because it was more convenient to the legation, and where both parties would have access without espionage, as the American citizens knew that they could not go to the royalists hotel without espionage. And I had to caution Mr. Blount that his papers would be seen by the representatives of the royalists. I think he regarded that caution.
Senator Gray. Did he make any objection to accepting the hospitality of any one, or simply that he preferred to go to the public hotel where he could pay his own expenses?
Mr. Stevens. I think he said Mr. Mills had arranged to go to the hotel. At that time he did not mean anything out of the way.
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Senator Gray. I ask you if he did not mean what I have said, or indicate something of that meaning?
Mr. Stevens. I think he indicated to me that Mr. Mills had arranged for going to the hotel. I can not say that is the form of the statement, but that is the implication.
Senator Gray. That he refused the hospitality?
Mr. Stevens. That would not be a fair statement. They did not propose free hospitality. They simply said he might pay the same as would be charged at the hotel. I only took the message from them. They asked me to give the message. I do not know—it was arranged that they would be willing to furnish him accommodations at the same rate as at the hotel.
Senator Gray. Was anything said about "from nothing up"?
Mr. Stevens. Some other parties might have used that expression, but I was asked to make no such offer.
Senator Gray. Did anybody go out with you?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; this committee went out.
Senator Gray. Who were the committee—a committee of what?
Mr. Stevens. Committee of citizens. Judge Hartwell, Dr. McGrew, and Mr. Scott. Judge Hartwell has been one of the supreme judges, a leading lawyer.
Senator Gray. Was Judge Hartwell one of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. No; he had no connection with it. And Mr. Scott is the teacher of the high school, a man of very high standing, and has been there for years. He was for six years at the royal college in Japan.
Senator Gray. Was there any committee from the Annexation Club who went out, or communicated with Mr. Blount in regard to it?
Mr. Stevens. I think the three gentlemen already named were members of the Annexation Club. I am not sure that Judge Hartwell was. They took these gentlemen because they were disconnected with the Provisional Government and were American citizens. The Provisional Government had nothing to do with it and did not know of it.
Senator Gray. After Mr. Blount's arrival there, and after he was established at his headquarters, did he ask any information of you about the situation of affairs in Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Did you offer to communicate to him any information which you had in regard to the situation of affairs there?
Mr. Stevens. It was not possible for me to do so without being discourteous.
The Chairman. Did you ask him to have any conference about the condition of affairs in Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Did he ask you whether it would be politic or safe or unsafe to haul down the flag and order the troops on board ship?
Mr. Stevens. Not the least—not a word; never a hint of what he was going to do.
The Chairman. Did he ask you what your relations were to Hawaii and other foreign governments?
Mr. Stevens. Not the least. He did not ask me to do what is usual for a retiring minister to do—to go and introduce him to the foreign representatives. I do not think he meant any harm in that. I do not think he was posted as to diplomatic usage. But that is what custom requires.
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The Chairman. Did you in any way interfere in any investigation that he made while he was there?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Did you enter any protest or objection to his removing troops from the shore?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Or hauling down the flag?
Mr. Stevens. Not the least.
The Chairman. Did that act of removal, etc., produce any commotion in the community?
Mr. Stevens. An intense silent feeling.
The Chairman. I speak of outbreak or commotion?
Mr. Stevens. Just the opposite of that—intense silence. But in the homes of the families you would see the exhibition.
The Chairman. What is your information in regard to the power of Liliuokalani, as Queen of Hawaii, to organize and conduct any enterprise, political or military, for the purpose of displacing the Government that exists there now?
Mr. Stevens. I think she would have very little power. But I think there are parties who might in her name do it; but I do not think it probable.
The Chairman. Parties who might displace the existing Government?
Mr. Stevens. No; I do not say that. But I think it possible that an expedition organized in California or Vancouver might attempt it, if they could obtain the money to do it.
The Chairman. But I am speaking of the power of the Queen.
Mr. Stevens. Her own power—nil.
The Chairman. I understand you, then, that without assistance from foreign governments any enterprise of the character that I have just asked about would be a failure?
Mr. Stevens. An utter failure. There is not the least danger of any attempt being made except by outside aid. That is my opinion.
The Chairman. Suppose that Liliuokalani had the undivided support of the native born, of the Kanaka population, with all the resources at their command, do you believe that she would be powerful enough with that support to overturn the existing civil government in those islands?
Mr. Stevens. I think one-fourth of the force of the Provisional Government could resist all the native force on the islands.
The Chairman. Then your answer must be, she would not be powerful enough?
Mr. Stevens. Not powerful enough. Two hundred American soldiers could resist them all.
The Chairman. Do you consider the Hawaiian population, native-born Kanaka population, as being a warlike population?
Mr. Stevens. They are the reverse of that in every sense.
The Chairman. How would they compare with the American born?
Mr. Stevens. I should say that a native Kanaka force of 2,000, two hundred United States soldiers would more than equal.
The Chairman. So that you do not think the Provisional Government is in any danger from the Hawaiian population?
Mr. Stevens. Not the least. From the native population? It would be the whites from whom the organized opposition would come.
The Chairman. Did you ascertain before you left Hawaii, and after
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the declaration of the Provisional Government, that there was any white organization being attempted against the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. My information was to the effect that the same men who put the lottery bill through, what they called the lottery and opium men, had been acting together for a good while.
The Chairman. Did you hear of any attempt at organization amongst these, people, or any other white people, to overthrow or dislodge the Provisional Government, or impair it?
Mr. Stevens. Those rumors of attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government? They were constantly getting information of attempts to do it.
The Chairman. Attempts to do what, to form an organization?
Mr. Stevens. To catch them unawares—to surprise the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Did you understand from any information that you had—of course anything like a reliable character—that there existed an organization?
Mr. Stevens. I should say that my information is that there are two or three organizations, mainly political. They have one organization called the Native Hawaiians; they have another, with a native name.
The Chairman. Are they natives?
Mr. Stevens. They are natives. They have political organizations among themselves.
The Chairman. State any other.
Mr. Stevens. They had at one time what they called the "Liberty League"; but I think that is disbanded. Those cliques have run together; but the same men can extemporize an organization within a week; because they drift together as naturally as similar men in our cities.
The Chairman. I will try to get back to the question whether you know or had any information of the existence of an organization amongst the white people in Hawaii against the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. What was it?
Mr. Stevens. I have forgotten the name of it; I think it is "Liberty League." But they had so many names that I can not remember; but I think it was "Liberty League."
The Chairman. Who was the leader of that organization, if it had any?
Mr. Stevens. It was understood that Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson were in it.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the time that this Provisional Government was established.
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt that those things have varied so that there would be one clique in the League and then another clique.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the time of the organization of the Provisional Government, not any anterior time.
Mr. Stevens. Those since the Provisional Government was established would be the same as they had before.
The Chairman. Is there such an organization?
Mr. Stevens. There are several organizations of years' standing.
The Chairman. Is there now in existence, or was there at any time while you were in Hawaii, any political organization of white men for the purpose of antagonizing and breaking down that Provisional Government. Can you answer that?
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Mr. Stevens. I can give my opinion.
The Chairman. I do not want your naked opinion. I want your information.
Mr. Stevens. My information is that the men who controlled the Queen's Government mainly, and ever since she was in, have acted together so often that that is virtually an organization.
The Chairman. Do you understand that there is such an organization existing in Hawaii to-day?
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt that it exists to-day.
The Chairman. Do you know anything about it?
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt it does.
The Chairman. Have you any information about it?
Mr. Stevens. No; I see in Mr. Blount's report—--
The Chairman. I am not speaking of Mr. Blount's report.
Mr. Stevens. I knew it was when I left.
The Chairman. I want to get at the proposition whether or not there is any hostile opposition to the Provisional Government existing amongst the white people of Hawaii at this time, or was when you left there.
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt there is. I have no doubt the men who acted before are acting now.
The Chairman. I want your information, if you have any information about it.
Mr. Stevens. I have no information that an organization exists sincel left there, because that was six or eight months ago.
The Chairman. When you were there did it exist?
Mr. Stevens. It existed.
The Chairman. Who were the leaders of it?
Mr. Stevens. The reason I referred to Mr. Blount's report is this: You will find the committee, of which Mr. Cummings was one—I have understood that he was; he was one of the leading members. That was one organization. Then another organization is the one that Nawahi was at the head of. When I was there he was one of the leaders of a political organization under Kalakaua, and it is possibly in existence to-day, for it has been in existence for years.
The Chairman. I am trying to ask you of organizations formed for the purpose of opposing the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. I can not say that there is any such organization; I can only reason from cause to effect—that those organizations would be hostile to the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. You are not aware of the existence of any such organization now?
Mr. Stevens. No. In Mr. Blount's report I see he mentioned Mr. Bush and Mr. Nawahi. But I can not swear to it.
The Chairman. Now, what I want to get at is, whether among the white people resident in Hawaii, who are not American citizens or persons of American origin, there exists any opposition of an organized character, whether political or military, against the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. What exists to-day? I cannot testify to that.
The Chairman. Was there in your knowledge at the time you left there?
Mr. Stevens. Only as it appeared in the papers.
The Chairman. Did it appear?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. You will see it in Mr. Blount's report, and that
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is what I referred to. Mr. Cummings is in it, and Mr. Nawahi. It ran, to some degree, all over the islands. But I can not say that it exists to day.
The Chairman. I want to know now whether any of these foreign people who are not Americans had any organization or association, within your knowledge, to oppose the Provisional Government of Hawaii, with a view to diverting Hawaii from the control or influence of the United States, either in the conduct of its current affairs or in the ultimate purpose of annexation ?
Mr. Stevens. I will begin with the Portuguese first; I will take them seriatim.
The Chairman. No; answer the question.
Mr. Stevens. No, I could not give any information to which I could testify. If you want to know the attitude of these different populations I will give it to you.
The Chairman. I have understood that some Germans are for us and some against us?
Mr. Stevens. As you have asked the question, let me answer it in a way that will enlighten it.
Senator Gray. The question is, whether you have any knowledge or information of any such association or combination?
Mr. Stevens. I will begin with the Portuguese, which were far the more numerous Caucasian population there; the Germans and English were smaller in numbers. The Portuguese number from 9,000 to 10,000. They are nearly, if not quite, a unit for America and for annexation. Why is it so? The young men have been educated in American schools, which are as positive in their American character as you can find in any of our American cities. Nearly all these Portuguese came from the Azores and Madeira poor. They saw the energy and vim of the Americans, and are largely employed by Americans. Then there is some antagonism between the Portuguese and the natives. I have stated the principal causes, and the Portuguese are a unit with us. When you come to the Germans, a very large majority is with us, except such Germans as may (and they are not very many) gather around Claus Spreckels. I will mention two German houses, at the head of which are men who have been there a long time. Their children were born there, and they expect to die there. Both those houses, and they are heavy houses, are with America, just as the English merchant is in New York—they know that their business and their future interests are entirely with us. They all talk English, and they are like Americans.
Take the English. A majority of the English affiliate with us. Why? For the reason that they do all their business with California, Washington, and Oregon. They go to American schools, and many of them have married in American families. There is Mr. Davies. He is one of the heaviest merchants, but is opposed to us having Pearl Harbor, and is very hostile to American predominance in Hawaii. With the exception of what gathers around Mr. Davies and Mr. Wodehouse (which is a very marked minority of the English), the English are with us as much as the Portuguese. When you come to the Norwegians, whose number is small, you may say it is a unit for us. Reduce the opposition to the Provisional Government to the white population, and you have the men whom the lottery and opium rings have had in their power, and who will respond to the beat of the political drum. Any one familiar with the political organizations in the cities of the United States knows what that is.
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They have what is called the hoodlum element in Honolulu. Pay them and you will have them. But what are called the missionary people are not persons to bribe voters, and if a man were to throw in $50,000 to carry a project against the missionary element, he could buy up the hoodlums, just as they bought the votes in the Legislature with lottery stock, and those who would not have lottery stock got cash down.
The Chairman. You have made that statement. Do you know anything of the payment of lottery stock or money to carry through the lottery scheme?
Mr. Stevens. I will answer the best I can. The facts are as notorious as they would be in any American capital where anything of the kind had been going on for years. I will give you this fact, and I will give you the name. Mr. Emuleuth, who is a native of Ohio, but who has been out there fifteen years, an enterprising and respectable man so far as I know. He is a member if the Provisional Government. The day before the lottery cabinet was appointed, which must have been the day before the coming back of the Boston, Emuleuth went into a commercial house in Honolulu, and as he was going upstairs, he heard Peterson and Colburn talking. Peterson did not want to put Colburn in the cabinet. Colburn had been the man who raised the money; and Emuleuth heard this as he stopped on the stairs. Colburn wanted to go into the cabinet, and Peterson was trying to reason him out of going in. Peterson knew Colburn was a hard man to carry, and it ran in this way: "Peterson, I paid this money, and if you don't put me in the cabinet, I will join the other side and blow you to hell."
The Chairman. Emuleuth gave you this information?
Mr. Stevens. Emuleuth.
The Chairman. When ?
Mr. Stevens. He gave that to me some days after the overthrow of the Government.
The Chairman. When?
Mr. Stevens. A week or ten days after the overthrow; merely as a historical fact, he gave it to me.
The Chairman. Prior to the time of your leaving Honolulu on the Boston, to go down to Hilo, did you have any information or reason to suspect that such influences were to be employed in favor of either the lottery or opium bill?
Mr. Stevens. No; just as I stated in my opening, after the Wilcox and Jones defeat of the lottery bill and the opium bill, I thought the fate of those bills were settled, and the cabinet would be carried over for eighteen months.
The Chairman. What information you gathered from Emuleuth or any other source in regard to corruption in the Legislature to procure these votes of want of confidence in the ministry and for the lottery and opium bills was communicated to you after you returned?
Mr. Stevens. Yes, and as a matter of history. Colburn knew his power. Then Peterson said, "if we put you in, will you agree to the constitution which the Queen is going to promulgate?" Colburn was opposed to it, but he answered, "damn, it, Pete; whatever you sign I will sign." Emuleuth said, "those four men were going in that cabinet for sure." They laughed at him; but when the cabinet was constituted they went in.
The Chairman. You, as the American minister, were forming opinions upon the public situation there?
Mr. Stevens. Public situation.
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The Chairman. And you included, of course, the action of the Legislature upon these respective measures?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; I got that not by going to the Legislature, but from the best sources I could.
The Chairman. You received that information from those sources which you considered most reliable?
Mr. Stevens. Most reliable.
The Chairman. I want to know whether you formed the opinion as minister of the United States before you left Honolulu to go down to Hilo that, if such measures as the lottery or opium bill should pass, they would produce a commotion or revolution? Were you of that opinion before you left for Hilo?
Mr. Stevens. I considered that settled, or I should not have gone off. The repeated attempts and their failure, the petitions from all the islands, the opposition of the chamber of commerce, and the Queen's assurance to the ladies who called on her, satisfied me that they were dead.
The Chairman. If, before you left Honolulu to go down to Hilo, you had been informed that the Queen intended to promulgate a new constitution, reversing the constitution of '87 and restoring the ancient powers of the monarchy, would you have expected that to create a revolution?
Mr. Stevens. I could not expect otherwise. I knew it, but I had repeatedly said so in conversations with Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, and others—that whenever an attempt should be made to undo the action of 1887, by the Queen going back on her oath and promises, there would be an end of the monarchy forever.
The Chairman. Had you been possessed of any information that Liliuokalani, after the prorogation of the Legislature, would promulgate this new constitution upon her own autliority, would you have left Honolulu?
Mr. Stevens. No; I would have stayed there. I considered it settled when those four men went in, because of their character and their means, and the information that the Queen's favorite had reason to think he should remain marshal.
The Chairman. You speak of the Wilcox-Jones cabinet?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; I considered that those men would be the Government for the next eighteen months.
Senator Frye. When you went on board the ship to go down to Hilo, did you not have conversations with the officers of the ship, in which you expressed yourself as satisfied that peace was restored to Hawaii, and that it would continue until your term of office would expire, and that you could go home in comfort?
Mr. Stevens. I did.
Senator Frye. Was not that your belief?
Mr. Stevens. It was.
Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg in his testimony says that the overthrow of the monarchy could not have been accomplished had it not been the general understanding that the American minister would make use of the troops. In your opinion, did the American troops have any effect on the overthrow of the monarchy?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
Senator Frye. And whether the troops were on shore or not, your opinion is that the monarchy would have been overthrown?
Mr. Stevens. Certainly.
Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg also states that shortly after the
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committee of safety met, on the 16th of January, it decided that they were not ready for the landing of American troops; that a committee of three, with Mr. Thurston, went to the American legation and asked Mr. Stevens to delay landing the Boston's men, and that it was reported that Mr. Stevens said, "The troops will land at 5 o'clock, whether you are ready or not."
Mr. Stevens. I am sure that no such committee came; but the fact is, the troops were landed aside from any wishes of the committee of safety.
Senator Frye. William H. Cornwall testified---
Mr. Stevens. He was one of the new cabinet.
Senator Frye. He states that Ministers Parker and Peterson called upon Minister Stevens and gave him to understand that the Government was able to take care of the situation, and asked him to keep the troops on board.
Mr. Stevens. Not true.
Senator Frye. Did Ministers Parker and Peterson ever call upon you and inform you that the Queen's Government was able to take care of the situation, and ask you to keep the troops on board?
Mr. Stevens. No. You had better ask about Gov. Cleghorn's protest. A great deal of importance was given to the island governor's protesting after the troops were landed. Cleghorn, I have no doubt, under the inspiration of the English minister—if you will ask me the reasons, I will answer, but not now—came to me and wanted to know why I landed them. I stated that the circumstances were such that I was compelled to take the responsibility. I was very polite to him. I said to him, "I do not blame you for coming, and if I were in your place I would make the protest"; and I was just as courteous as I could be. He went home, and I have no doubt he consulted the English minister and had done so before coming to me.
Senator Davis. Did you tell Mr. Cleghorn then for what purpose you had landed those troops?
Mr. Stevens. Probably my remarks implied that it was the necessity of the case. As nearly as I can recollect I said this: "The situation is such that I felt it necessary to take the responsibility." I probably put it in that form. My reason for saying that Cleghorn came by the inspiration of the English minister is this: I knew for months dating back in our intercourse that whatever the English minister wanted Mr. Cleghorn to do he would do. He was a good-natured man, and entirely under Mr. Wodehouse's influence. The governorship was of no account; it was abolished in 1887, and they reestablished it in 1890 as a mere honorary office, because Cleghorn was married to the sister of the Queen.
Senator Frye. Cornwall stated that Mr. Hopkins insisted upon knowing whether or not you intended to recognize the lawful Government or the revolutionary Government, and that you said that you should recognize the Provisional Government, because they were in possession of the Government building, and that you intended to support them?
Mr. Stevens. I am very glad you asked that question. I had no conversation with Mr. Hopkins whatever. I did not even know him. Mr. Hopkins brought me a note, and I sent an answer.
Senator Frye. Did you say that to anybody?
Mr. Stevens. Never. I want to say that Mr. Hopkins brought the note—they said it was Hopkins; I never had any conversation with
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Hopkins at any time. After he had left the legation my daughter said it was Mr. Hopkins.
Senator Frye. John F. Colburn testified that Thurston had an interview with them (him and Peterson) January 15, at 6 o'clock a. m., Sunday, and desired him and Peterson to depose the Queen; that in the course of the conversation he said that he could inform us that Mr. Stevens had given the committee of safety the assurance that if we two signed a request to land the troops of the Boston, he would immediately comply and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work.
Mr. Stevens. Who put that question?
Senator Frye. John F. Colburn testifies that Thurston in an interview with him and Peterson said that Stevens had given the committee of safety the assurance that if we two (that is, Colburn and Peterson) would sign a request to land the troops of the Boston he would immediately comply and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work.
Mr. Stevens. Nothing of the kind; as perfectly romantic as if born of another age. I am sure Mr. Thurston never said anything about it; he is a man of too much sense.
Senator Frye. Mr. Colburn says further that immediately on the landing of the troops he and Parker had an interview with you.
Mr. Stevens. Parker is the one who came with Mr. Cleghorn to protest.
Senator Frye. And he says that he (Colburn) had an interview with you; that in the course of that interview you said that there were a number of women and old men in town besides children, who were alarmed at the rumors of a revolution, and you wanted to offer them protection; whereupon Colburn said, "You want to annex the country," and you replied, "No, those troops are ashore to preserve the Queen on the throne, you gentlemen in your office, and to offer protection to the community at large."
Mr. Stevens. That is absolute, pure fiction.
Senator Frye. Mr. Colburn says further: "We had under arms 600 men with rifles, 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 8 brass Austrian field cannon, and 2 Catling guns."
Mr. Stevens. Why did they not use them?
Senator Frye. Did they have such a force?
Mr. Stevens No; they would have used it on Sunday and Monday, if they had had any such force. You have to look at the facts. I have answered that before. There was a complete collapse of the Queen's Government from Saturday afternoon of January 14. There was only one attempt at an exhibition of authority, which was by a policeman attempting to prevent two men carrying arms and ammunition up to the Government building. They had two men only. That is the only resistance they dared to make. Wilson knew every step that was taken, knew that the Provisional Government was being organized, just as you gentlemen would know of a railroad meeting in your town.
The Chairman. If there had been any force of 600 men under arms and under the control of the Queen would you have known it?
Mr. Stevens. There was nothing of the kind, or I should have known it. The royalists party had two or three factions, one made up with the Robert Wilcox element. So far as it was possible for me to know—I used all the judgment and experience I had—I was kept posted of the purposes and intentions of the various organizations that were opposed to the Queen and those in her favor; and just as I have stated before,
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there were two distinctive parties amongst the natives about the Queen.
The Chairman. I wanted to know whether your sources of information and the diligence of your inquiries made in regard to the actual situation in the islands gave you an opportunity to know satisfactorily to yourself whether they had as many as 600 armed force, or whether they had any organization of a military character that was considered dangerous?
Mr. Stevens. My information was directly the contrary; the only force that I understood they had was the native police force under the marshal and the Queen's guard of 70, men made up of native boys, not equal to 10 white soldiers. Ten American soldiers were equivalent to the whole of them. They never made any resistance, and did not dare.
Senator Frye. The Queen's ministers delivered an address which is given by Mr. Blount in his report, in which they stated that Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson reported that a committee of safety had been formed at the house of Mr. L. A. Thurston and had made overtures to them to assist in dethroning the Queen, and they intended to go ahead, and that your assistance, together with that of the United States Government, had been guaranteed to them. Is there any truth in that?
Mr. Stevens. None; I never knew of it until I saw it in that report. I never heard of it before. I never heard of it until I saw it in that report, as also that other inquiry about my promising Soper. You might ask me if that is in there.
Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg further says that Mr. Soper was offered the position of commander-in-chief; that he hesitated to take it; that he and others went over to see you, and then came back, saying, "I understood them to say that Mr. Stevens had told them that if they would take possession of the Government building and read their proclamation, he would immediately recognize them and support them, or, failing to get the Government building, any building in Honolulu."
Mr. Stevens. I never heard anything about it until I saw it in Blount's report. It is pure fiction, absolute fiction, as well as that other statement that Soper wanted to take military command. I did not know that Soper was to have the military command until I saw his appointment in the newspapers. Soper never came to me to ask me anything about it. The first I knew of Soper being appointed to the command was one or two days afteward.
Senator Frye. Kaulukou in his affidavit says that Minister Stevens wrote a letter, which he gave to Charles L. Hopkins, in which he said he would back and help the Provisional Government and not her Majesty the Queen's Government.
Mr. Stevens. That is all fiction.
Senator Frye. Did anything like that ever occur?
Mr. Stevens. No. I maintained one fixed policy.
Senator Frye. And that was utter impartiality between the two?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. To the representations made to me before to have the men landed, my answer was always the same, "The emergency must be a striking one, and then only for the protection of life and property."
Senator Frye. Paul Neumann, in his testimony, says that on Tuesday, the 17th of January, Mr. Peterson and Mr. Parker, about 3 o'clock, informed him that Mr. Stevens had told them categorically that he would support with the United States forces a provisional government if such were proclaimed. Did you ever tell Peterson or Parker anything like that?
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Mr. Stevens. Nothing of the kind. The only interviews in which, as I have already stated, they asked my assistance to support the Queen; but they did not put the other alternative, because they would not insult me with that after I had refused the other. I said to them squarely that the troops were landed for a pacific purpose and could not take part in any contest.
Senator Frye. He also says that at a meeting at which J. O. Carter, Macfarlane, Widemann, and Damon were present, the statement was repeated that Mr. Stevens unqualifiedly stated that he would by force of arms sustain the Provisional Government. Did you say anything of the kind?
Mr. Stevens. No; just like the other.
Senator Frye. He also states that the U. S. legation had been at various times the meeting place of persons who had conspired to overthrow the Hawaiian Government.
Mr. Stevens. There never was any such meeting in the four years that I was there, at the legation. The people who had the entree of the legation and who dined there and had other attentions there were royalists quite as many as of their opponents. The dinner party spoken of was made up by my two parties; the Portuguese charge d'affaires made one; the French commissioner another; Judge Hartwell another; Mr. Thurston another, and, I think, one of the officers of the Boston, besides Capt. Wiltse. My daughter's conversation was with Mr. Thurston, and I talked with the Portuguese charge d'affaires. The meeting was of such a character that if we had wanted to talk politics we could not have done so.
Senator Frye. Mr. Charles T. Gulick testifies that the presence of the American troops and certain rumors with regard to the attitude of the American minister, caused the Hawaiian cabinet to confer with that official before taking action, and that they learned from him in writing that he recognized the Provisional Government and would support it with the United States troops. Was there anything of that kind?
Mr. Stevens. No. It was all done in the form that came from this note. The man Hopkins, whom I did not know, and my daughter happened to know, he returned, but did not have any conversation, did not speak to him, did not know him until that afternoon. My daughter happened to know him by sight. He never submitted me any question; he brought a note, and all he wanted was an answer. I think my daughter took the note out of his hand and put it in mine, if I remember correctly. I was sick at the time. Hopkins was one of those who had been engaged in the grossest maladministration.
Senator Frye. Mr. John Lot Kaulukou in his testimony says: "Next morning I read a letter from Minister Stevens in the newspaper. He said, 'I recognize the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, because it takes the palace, the station house, and the barracks. That is my reason why I recognize the Provisional Government.'" Did you write any such letter?
Mr. Stevens. No; the only one that I ever wrote on the subject is in that official pamphlet published by vote of the Senate last February. I never wrote any communication to any newspaper about it. Kaulukou is one of the most corrupt men in the country, formerly one of Kalakaua's ministers.
Senator Frye. He says further: "If Mr. Stevens had never sent any word of that kind, if he had never interfered, you would see these
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people cleaned out in fifteen or twenty minutes and the Queen remain on her throne till to-day." Did you interfere?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
Senator Frye. Do you think if the troops had been in the United States of America the Queen would have been on her throne to-day?
Mr. Stevens. If our troops had remained at Hilo, 260 miles from Honolulu, and had known nothing of what was going on, it would have been the same. The Wilcox Jones cabinet was composed of some of the best men in the islands. The men who were leading this revolution were irresistible; they had the complete command of the situation. Wilson knew that, and that is the reason why his associates did not arrest anybody.
Senator Frye. Do you know Dr. G. Trousseau?
Mr. Stevens. I do.
Senator Frye. Is he regarded in the Hawaiian Islands as a truthful man?
Mr. Stevens. He is so notoriously untruthful that any story going the round of the capital they would say "That is one of Trousseau's lies." He is an adventurer who came from Paris. He is a man of a good deal of genius; he practices medicine in some American families because of his genius; but there are physicans who have no affiliations with him, because he has not his diploma. He has already apologized to Judge Hartwell and others because of statements he made with respect to them that he thought would not come back to the islands.
Senator Frye. Trousseau in his statement says that Dole, Charles Carter, and W. H. Castle, and one or two others, naming them, were in the habit of meeting at your house, the house of the American minister, and conspiring for overturning the Queen. Is there any truth in that?
Mr. Stevens. Not a particle. One of the parties was Mr. Castle; he had not been at my house but once for a year. I got acquainted with him and his venerable father when I first came to Hawaii, and I wondered why he had not called upon me. William Castle had only stopped at our house once in the year. Mr. Dole and Mr. Thurston were men of too much sense to be willing to have a meeting at my house. Although I was intimate in Mr. Dole's family, I never got a hint from Mr. and Mrs. Dole that he was to go into the Provisional Government. He was a man of too much culture to embarrass me with the knowledge that he was to take part in the revolutionary movement. It is the fact that he left the bench to which he had been appointed, with his salary of $5,000 a year, purely as a sense of duty, to take the responsibilities of the position he now holds. He is delicate, not a strong man, and the pressure of responsibility and anxiety is liable to break him down.
The Chairman. Who comprised the supreme court at the time you left Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. At the time I left it was composed of Chief Justice Judd, who had been chief justice for nineteen years, and Judge Bickerton and Judge Frear. Judge Judd was educated in law at Harvard. Judge Bickerton is English.
The Chairman. After the revolution occurred there in the executive government, did that court continue to sit and discharge its functions?
Mr. Stevens. I so understood it; yes—right along. The Provisional Government interfered as little as possible with the statutes; they promptly repealed the lottery act and opium act, and I think that is
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about all they did. The courts went right on, stopping only a few days in the excitement.
The Chairman. Have you heard of any effort on the part of the Provisional Government or the Queen's Government, or the followers of the Queen or her cabinet, to deny the power and authority of the supreme court of Hawaii since the revolution?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Or any change in it?
Mr. Stevens. I have not. I know the constitution which it was intended to proclaim was intended to change the supreme court. I learned that when we had the conversation with Kalakaua before, and from other sources in the later case.
The Chairman. To hold for six years.
Mr. Stevens. And a final appeal from their judgment to the Queen.
The Chairman. I understand you to say, as a matter of fact, that since the Provisional Government was instituted there has been no one who has made any question of the authority of the supreme court and its power to go on and administer justice?
Mr. Stevens. I am not aware of anybody. There may be some lawyer.
The Chairman. The number of judges was reduced from five to three by an act of the Legislature ?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. So that as their terms expired there would be no reappointment until below the number of three?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; as one died they were able to reduce to three quite promptly.
The Chairman. Who took Judge Dole's place?
Mr. Stevens. Judge Frear.
The Chairman. Who appointed him?
Mr. Stevens. He was appointed since the Provisional Government was established. Mr. Dole resigned to take the place of President of the Provisional Government, and they filled his place by the appointment of Judge Frear.
Senator Frye. In the testimony of Mr. Sam Parker, pages 439 and 440, or in an interview with him, he produced a statement signed by A.B. Peterson, in which Mr. Peterson says: "On Sunday evening, January 15, at half past 7 o'clock, Samuel Parker, Her Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, and myself as attorney-general, called upon J. L. Stevens, American minister, at his residence, to talk over the situation." Did they call?
Mr. Stevens. They called Sunday evening. They did all the talking.
Senator Frye. He says, "Mr. Stevens stated that he desired to protect the Government and advised Her Majesty's Government not to resign, but said, in answer to a direct question put to him by me, that in case the Government called upon him for assistance he did not see how he could assist them as long as C. R. Wilson remained marshal of the Kingdom, terming Mr. Wilson a scoundrel."
Mr. Stevens. That is not true. I think there was some conversation that they made as to the embarrassment that Wilson was making as to the Queen's rule, because some of the Queen's supporters were as anxious to get rid of Mr. Wilson as were her opponents.
Senator Gray. Did you say that Wilson was a scoundrel?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember that I did.
Senator Frye. Did you give them as the cause of your opposition to Wilson that he had caused the arrest of your Chinese coachman?
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Mr. Stevens. No. Let me tell the truth about that Chinese story. I had three Chinese servants. The man who drove my carriage was a Chinaman, as you have to have all the servants of one nationality. This coachman was a faithful fellow. His friends had lost money by lottery gambling, which Wilson allowed to go on, and he complained without my knowledge, and Wilson's police arrested him for having in his possession a knife which cost 15 cents. All I did was to telephone to the police station. I never had any conversation with Wilson, and he was never in my house. I telephoned to the police station to send back my servant and send back the money which they had taken from him when they arrested him, which was promptly done.
Senator Frye. Peterson says he and Parker called on you again on Tuesday, January 17.
Mr. Stevens. That was in the afternoon.
Senator Frye. And that you promised that if a proclamation declaring a provisional government was issued, you, on behalf of your Government, would immediately recognize it and support it with the United States forces at your command.
Mr. Stevens. That is pure fiction. That is the afternoon I was sick upon the couch.
Senator Frye. He says that he asked you what action you would take if he called upon you for assistance, and that you said that in that case you could not come to the assistance of the Government; that he then asked what your action would be if they replaced the Government, and you replied that in that case you would interfere with the forces at your command.
Mr. Stevens. That is all fiction. His argument was that I could legally and properly use the force to sustain the Queen. I replied that the troops were landed for a pacific purpose, and could not interfere. Nothing was said about the other side. They did not have the impudence to ask me that, because they were courteous in their manner.
Senator Gray. Do you know Mr. Waterhouse?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Henry Waterhouse? There are several Waterhouses.
Senator Gray. The one who is a member of the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. That is Henry Waterhouse.
Senator Gray. He lived near you?
Mr. Stevens. Near me.
Senator Gray. Did you see him after you came ashore from the Boston on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. I do not recollect that I did.
Senator Gray. At any time that Saturday, Monday, or Tuesday?
Mr. Stevens. I have no remembrance; but if you want me to be more specific as to Mr. Waterhouse I would say in this way, not officially. It is rarely that we ever talked about politics at all. He was a gentleman who would not embarrass me, and he knew how cautious I was. He never conversed with me at all about the formation of the Provisional Government, and the first news that I had that any meeting was held in his house, the first hint, I found in Mr. Blount's report. Henry Waterhouse was a man of character; he respected me, and would not insult me by any such proposition as aiding the overthrow of the Queen.
Senator Gray. Did you ever during those four days, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, see at your house or elsewhere any of these gentlemen who were in the committee of safety, or were afterward in the Provisional Government?
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Mr. Stevens. The committee called and presented their document, which I have made of record among the documents.
Senator Gray. When did they call?
Mr. Stevens. I think they called right after the close of their mass-meeting.
Senator Gray. That was on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. Monday.
Senator Gray. Did you see any of them on Saturday or Monday?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember that I did. If I did, I saw them as individuals.
Senator Gray. I mean as individuals?
Mr. Stevens. I may have seen one or more of them; I can not say that I did. If I saw them, I saw them just as I did the other side. They had every access, both sides, to the legation; but the leaders of the Provisional Government were men of brains, and they did not embarrass me by coming there and letting me know their plans. And that is what I said of Mr. Dole, who is alleged to have conspired with me. He nor his wife never hinted to me his intention, and it was so of all the others.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Thurston call upon you during any of those four days?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Thurston, I think, called upon me once. Mr. Thurston was taken sick, if I remember aright, on Monday, after the mass meeting. I think he was sick and did not go out. I did not see him again until he left on the Claudine for Washington. I saw him for a few moments only before he went on board the Claudine.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Cooper during these days?
Mr. Stevens. Not at the legation.
Senator Gray. Or anywhere else?
Mr. Stevens. Nor anywhere else.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Cooper on board the Boston?
Mr. Stevens. No.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Castle on board the Boston?
Mr. Stevens. I did not. Mr. William R. Castle was a member of the committee of safety, and he called when they presented their request.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. W. O. Smith ?
Mr. Stevens. That is when they called and presented the request of the committee of safety. I think only the subcommittee of three called. Of course, there were so many who called during the three or four exciting days that I can not remember in each case who did call; I have to go on memory.
Senator Gray. Did you state to Mr. Thurston when he called, that the troops would have to be landed from the Boston?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all. My answer was the same—when the troops landed it would be for the purpose of protecting life and property.
Senator Gray. You say you made no statement to Mr. Thurston about landing troops?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember any. I may have stated, as I did to other gentlemen—that the troops might be landed. I used great caution in my language; and you may be quite sure of this, that I was quite as courteous to the royalist emmissaries as I was to the others. There was reason: Mr. Thurston and Mr. Dole and others were men of too much sense to embarrass me with improper questions.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Thurston state to you on that occasion that they had a proposition for establishing a provisional government?
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Mr. Stevens. No; it would have been absurd for him to have so stated. It was generally talked that the opponents of the Queen would form a new government.
Senator Gray. That they were going to establish a provisional government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. When the Queen failed on Saturday, at the churches and everywhere else they were talking over the situation, and what they would do. They called a mass meeting for Monday, and appointed a committee of safety and proposed to establish some form of government, and that was notorious, and they would not have to give me any special information.
Senator Gray. Whom did you get your information from; you say it was notorious?
Mr. Stevens. Such parties as would call there at the legation. Men and ladies called there from both sides.
Senator Gray. Did you state to Mr. Thurston on the occasion when you state he may have called—I think you said he did call?
Mr. Stevens. I think he called on Sunday. If he did he remained but a few minutes.
Senator Gray. Did you say to him when the Government was established and actually in the possession of the archives and buildings that you would recognize it?
Mr. Stevens. It was not necessary. He and those acting with him knew perfectly well that the de facto government would have to be recognized, and Judge Dole and Mr. Thurston understand international law and usage as well as any of us. Judge Dole was too intelligent to ask me what I would do in the contingency named.
Senator Gray. When did the communication come to you at the legation, asking you to land the troops?
Mr. Stevens. That came to me on Monday just after the mass meeting.
Senator Gray. Who brought it?
Mr. Stevens. It was this committee of safety; I presume it was only a part of them; I think there were three.
Senator Gray. The committee of safety was composed of 13 members?
Mr. Stevens. I think there was a subcommittee of three. Mr. Castle was one, Mr. Smith another; the third I can not recall.
Senator Gray. That was before you went on board the Boston?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. I could not state the precise hour—whether it was 3, or half-past 3, or 4.
Senator Gray. And immediately after you went on board the Boston and requested the landing of the troops?
Mr. Stevens. Very soon. And my note was drawn up before the committee called, and if it had not called I would have made the request.
Senator Gray. And you saw Capt. Wiltse that day?
Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse called at the legation probably nearly every day after we got back from Hilo.
Senator Gray. I understood you to say that you went on board the Boston some time about 4 o'clock, you could not be precise as to the time, but it was after you received this communication from the subcommittee of safety. Now, I understood you to say, that prior to your going on board the Boston that day you had a full conference with Capt. Wiltse?
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Mr. Stevens. No; I did not say that. I presume I had. I think he called there on Sunday.
Senator Gray. On that Saturday or Sunday, when you had this conference with Capt. Wiltse, was it arranged that he should land the troops upon your making the request?
Mr. Stevens. The understanding was, if I did make the request, the troops would be landed.
Senator Gray. What was necessary?
Mr. Stevens. If it became necessary to land, that I would have to make the request. That was the official way, and I had the legation records before me running back twenty-five years. They could not land until the request came from me.
Senator Gray. When you went out to the ship, Capt. Wiltse was not surprised to have you make this request, because you had arranged with him before for such a contingency?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all.
Senator Gray. But you handed him the paper which you took out with you?
Mr. Stevens. The official paper which had been used time after time by my predecessors.
Senator Gray. And you have already stated that the arrangements were made then and there between you for the landing of the troops.
Mr. Stevens. Only contingently—if landed at all the request had to come from me. And Capt. Wiltse knew that as well as I did.
Senator Gray. After you left the Boston, I understood the arrangement was made between you for landing the troops, and you understood they would carry their camp equipage with them, and it would not be necessary that you should provide quarters for them?
Mr. Stevens. It never entered my mind; I took it for granted without consultation that the marines had their own tents.
Senator Gray. And you were there informed that a hall would have to be provided?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; and maps for the city.
Senator Gray. And when you left the ship it was understood that the troops were to march out to Mr. Atherton's place?
Mr. Stevens. They were to do exactly as was done in 1889; march through the streets and get a lodging as soon as they could.
Senator Gray. Was it understood that they were to go to Mr. Atherton's when you left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember.
Senator Gray. Was Mr. Atherton talked about on the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I could not remember that; I think it was a mere casual idea—that Mr. Atherton had those extensive grounds, and was one of the leading American citizens, and they marched through the street to get grounds somewhere, and his grounds were large enough.
Senator Gray. Do you undertake to say it was not understood they were to go to Mr. Atherton's when they left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember. Whatever it was, it was a mere incident, and with no special relation to anything in view. They had to go somewhere and secure a hall.
Senator Gray. When you sent the note of recognition to the Provisional Government, to whom did you send it?
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt I sent it to the minister of foreign affairs. Mr. Dole, under their organization, was President and minister of foreign affairs. Of course, the official usage is to send such
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notes to the minister of foreign affairs. I have no doubt I sent it to the minister of foreign affairs. I presume I conformed to the custom.
The Chairman. Had you previously heard of the proclamation of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Gray. Had you a copy of that proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say.
Senator Gray. Had you read that proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say that I had.
Senator Gray. Could you say that you had not?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say that I had not.
Senator Gray. Was any proclamation sent to you?
Mr. Stevens. Things had to be done very rapidly that afternoon. I had no clerk and I was a sick man, and it was impossible for me to make notes. I have no doubt I received the proclamation.
Senator Gray. And you can not say one way or the other whether a copy of that proclamation was sent to you?
Mr. Stevens. I can not; I presume so. Mr. Pringle brought me information and so did Mr. Carter, and so did others. I had it in various ways.
Senator Gray. Were you aware when it was sent to you that the terms of the Provisional Government were not settled until there was annexation to the United States?
Mr. Stevens. I did not understand that.
Senator Gray. Were you aware that the proclamation was so made?
Mr. Stevens. I never heard of it?
Senator Gray. Never heard of the proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. I did not know that that was the limit of the Provisional Government until this controversy of Mr. Thurston and Mr. Gresham.
Senator Gray. When you were acting for the Government, you did not understand the terms in which the Government you were about to recognize had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. The only fact that I took under consideration was that it was a de facto Government, and if that de facto Government had proposed to annex to Mormondom I should have recognized it. I should have recognized it regardless of any ulterior purposes of that Government.
Senator Gray. In this important condition of affairs in Hawaii, you did not consider it necessary to examine the terms on which that Government was established?
Mr. Stevens. All I wanted to know was that it was a de facto Government, and that information I had.
Senator Gray. Where did you get it, except from the proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. From parties who came from the Government house and informed me, and I presume they sent a copy of the proclamation.
Senator Gray. Who were they?
Mr. Stevens. My impression is that Charles Carter was one and Mr. Pringle was another. Mr. Pringle was acting as my aid. Others gave me the information. Which one brought it first I could not swear. I think I first received the information from my daughter.
Senator Gray. What time in the afternoon did this fact come to your knowledge that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Probably—I can not say positively; I did not look at the watch—half past 2 or 3. It might have been earlier or a little later.
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Senator Gray. By whom did you send your note of recognition?
Mr. Stevens. That I can not say positively.
Senator Gray. Did you send it back by the messenger from the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. I sent it by some one whom I considered a reliable messenger.
Senator Gray. And you can not say who it was?
Mr. Stevens. No; I can not say that. It may have been Mr. Pringle, or it may have been one of the clerks in the foreign office.
Senator Gray. How soon after you were notified of the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed that you sent your note of recognition?
Mr. Stevens. That I could not swear positively. I put it on record. I think it was about 5 o'clock. Mrs. Stevens and my daughter think that when this gentleman, meaning Hopkins, called with the note from the Queen's recent ministers it was later. But not regarding that a vital point I put it down in the records about 5. And the fact that the chief justice called on me shortly and said that they had the rumor all through the streets that the American minister had refused to recognize the Provisional Government. He came to see if it were so, and it was about dusk when Judge Judd called, when I said to him I had just recognized. But I put it down as my opinion that it was about 5.
Senator Gray. You do not claim to be accurate about that?
Mr. Stevens. No; the official records will show that.
Senator Gray. Have you the official record?
Mr. Stevens. I think that is in Honolulu. I do not know that Mr. Blount has put that on paper. My wife and daughter afterward said they thought it was later.
Senator Gray. After the messenger who first came from the Provisional Government to notify you that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed, what other intelligence did you receive of its proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. Now, I have to answer that in the way I have already answered, that I considered that there was an absolute interregnum between the afternoon of the 14th and the establishment of the Provisional Government, and my relief from the situation was that there was a de facto Government. The moment I got information that a de facto Government was established and was master of the situation, master of the archives, I thought it was my duty to recognize it, and all the other foreign officials immediately did the same. And the English minister called on the Provisional Government in person before I did.
Senator Gray. Recognized it before you did?
Mr. Stevens. The English minister in person went before I did and offered his congratulations.
Senator Gray. Did you before that get your note?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say. All those members of the official corps knew the circumstances under which the Provisional Government had been constituted as well as I did.
Senator Gray. I understood you to say, in answer to that question as to whether you had any other information of the proclamation of the Provisional Government than the messenger conveyed to you, although not directly responsive, that it was not necessary, because it was thoroughly understood for the last two or three days there was an
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interregnum, and that any government or any proclamation of any set of people would constitute a de facto government.
Mr. Stevens. I did not say that. Let me answer it.
Senator Gray. What did you say when I asked you in regard to the fact that it was notorious that there was an interregnum and it was not necessary to have the information?
Mr. Stevens. I do not put it in that form. I say that the collapse of all government on the islands took place on the attempted coup d'etat of the Queen on the 14th, and from that time up to the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings the only government was the 1,000 citizens who called the mass meeting, and the presence of ship Boston in the harbor. I had got information that I deemed reliable that a government springing out of that condition of things had become a de facto government, and by the invariable usage of the world I was bound to recognize it.
Senator Gray. Then, I suppose, you give that answer as accounting for the fact that you did not need any other information than the first reliable information which you received that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. I had the most thorough information on that.
Senator Gray. I ask you what that was?
Mr. Stevens. I said before, probably by a note. But by various means I got that information perhaps twenty times within an hour.
Senator Gray. From whom?
Mr. Stevens. The parties who called.
Senator Gray. Who were the parties?
Mr. Stevens. I will give you one instance. Chief Justice Judd is one of the representative men of the islands. He came, I may say, at 5 or a little later, and he said the rumor had got on the street that I had not recognized the Provisional Government. I am sure during those hours there were many persons who called and talked of what had been done.
Senator Gray. Who were the many persons?
Mr. Stevens. I could not be positive.
Senator Gray. Who was one?
Mr. Stevens. I presume that Mr. Dole sent his clerk of the foreign office, and in addition to that Mr. Cooper, Carter, and Pringle, and I presume there were many other persons who told me.
Senator Gray. Were they sympathizers with the Provisional Government who told you?
Mr. Stevens. They were men who would give me absolute information.
Senator Gray. I ask if that was a fact?
Mr. Stevens. That was a fact.
Senator Gray. You were not out of your house?
Mr. Stevens. Not out of my house.
Senator Gray. And on this information that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed you sent the note?
Mr. Stevens. So soon as I had evidence of the fact.
Senator Gray. What fact?
Mr. Stevens. The fact that out of that interregnum had sprung a de facto government.
Senator Gray. The fact of its being a de facto government is a conclusion?
Mr. Stevens. Of which I had to be the judge.
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Senator Gray. Did you judge that that was the de facto Government upon the information that came to you that a Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Only in part. I judged it from the condition of the town and all the circumstances. I knew that the Provisional Government had been talked of for sixty hours, and I had it from many persons. I was living on the principal street, and they would hear it on the street and tell my daughter about it, and would come by in a carriage and tell me.
Senator Gray. Had you any knowledge of any other fact in regard to the transactions of that afternoon that bore upon the question at all, except the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. I knew the fact an hour and a half before. You will see how importantly this fact bears on the situation, the efforts of the Provisional Government to transfer the arms from the store, and the abortive attempt of one of Mr. Wilson's policemen to interfere, and that was all the resistance for sixty hours—--
Senator Gray. Who told you that?
Mr. Stevens. I learned it probably from twenty different sources. I heard the shot.
Senator Gray. Tell me the names of some who told you?
Mr. Stevens. I guess my own daughter told me first.
Senator Gray. Who told you afterward?
Mr. Stevens. That I could not tell, because events passing so rapidly like that, and a hundred men calling on me, it would be impossible to remember who the individual was. But there were many.
Senator Gray. Why did you not wait until the next day before you sent the note of recognition ?
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that a half century of the study of government on both continents and 13 years of diplomatic experience would have told me it was right.
Senator Gray. That was the result of your study?
Mr. Stevens. My study and experience would have told me so.
Senator Gray. And your study and experience told you that it was right to recognize that government within an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. I do not accept it in that form.
Senator Gray. I ask you as a matter of fact whether you did recognize it within an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. I do not think that material; probably within an hour and a half or two hours.
Senator Gray. Whether it is material or not, answer the question.
Mr. Stevens. I do not know the precise time by the clock.
Senator Gray. That is sufficient; you do not know the time; you can not say whether it was an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. It was probably inside of two hours.
Senator Gray. Were you well acquainted with Mr. Thurston?
Mr. Stevens. Pretty well acquainted with him, because he was a minister of the Government when I went to Honolulu.
Senator Gray. Are you well acquainted with W. O. Smith?
Mr. Stevens. Passably well. He lived near me, within half a mile. I never had much acquaintance with him; met him occasionally, and, as Americans, we went to the same church. In the course of a year he and his wife called at our house two or three times. Senator Gray. Did any of these gentlemen, Mr. Thurston, Mr.
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Smith—any of them connected with the committee on public safety— call upon you on Sunday?
Mr. Stevens. I have already stated that Mr. Thurston called a few minutes at my house Sunday. I would not know when a gentleman called on me whether he was on the committee of safety or not, because I would not know until I saw the list. On Sunday they had not been appointed.
Senator Gray. I say, not whom you knew were on the committee of safety, but whether any of these gentlemen whom you knew afterward were on the committee of safety.
Mr. Stevens. I have said that I think that Mr. Thurston called; stopped in five minutes, as he passed down, and I think Judge Hartwell called also. Others called of both parties during Sunday.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Damon call?
Mr. Stevens. I do not recollect Mr. Damon calling.
Senator Gray. What sort of a person is Mr. Damon?
Mr. Stevens. He is a man of the highest respectability.
Senator Gray. What is his business?
Mr. Stevens. He is a banker. Mr. Damon is the son of an American missionary, who went there forty years ago, and whom our Government recognized officially. He became a clerk to banker Bishop, and a great friend of the natives. He is an excellent financial manager, and largely increased the value of the property of two prominent natives. When the natives get into any financial trouble, Damon is the man they go to to get them out. He is a man of the highest character.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Damon and Mr. Thurston call on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. I have no reliable recollection in that regard. My acquaintance with Mr. Thurston grew out of the fact that he was minister of the interior for the first thirteen months of my residence in Honolulu. I knew him officially and privately, for he lived in the part of the city in which the legation is situated.
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES F. MORGAN.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
My name is James F. Morgan; I am 32 years old; was born in the city of New York of American parents; came here when I was about 2 years old; was educated and have lived here since; have been in business as auctioneer and commission merchant for about six years; I took the business of E. P. Adams, with whom I had been clerk for about ten years.
I have been a member of the advisory council of the Provisional Government from its formation, January 17, 1893. I have been closely interested in Hawaiian political affairs for many years, and have carefully watched the progress of events. I believe the Hawaiian monarchy came to an end at the time when it could no longer exist; it had survived its usefulness, and with the revolutionary acts of the Queen on January 14 matters culminated, and it was impossible to longer endure such a Government.
I was not a member of the committee of public safety, nor was I present at the meetings at W. O. Smith's office on the afternoon of the 14th; but I knew what was going on. After I was requested by the committee of public safety to become a member of the advisory council, and learning that it was the intention to seek annexation to the
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United States, believing that it was the only way to secure permanent and enduring peace and good government, I met with the members of the two councils at the office of W. O. Smith, on Tuesday. Sometime between half past 2 and 3, we went to the Government building, not armed. When we arrived we found only a few people present; our forces were not there when we arrived. Mr. Cooper read the proclamation; while it was being read, armed men commenced to come in, and in a few minutes there was at least a hundred, all armed and prepared.
Mr. C. McCarthy was there and said he was waiting for 100 armed men, who were to come and defend that building; he said if they had been on hand we would have been opposed and all shot down. We afterwards secured several thousand cartridges which had been stored in the building, in a preparation for the defense against us. Shortly after reading the proclamation we went into session for the purpose of immediately assuming the functions of Government. While we were in session Parker and Cormwell came up, and pretty soon the other two ministers. Before I went away Capt. Wiltse came in with his aids. They looked about and he said that Stevens had sent them to see whether we were actually in possession of the Government building, the Treasury, archives, etc. He was shown about the building.
Before I left I heard him say that we could not be recognized till we captured the barracks and station house. Up to that time and thereafter, I never have known anything about the United States troops supporting or assisting us. If there had been any such plan or expectation I am sure I should have heard it. I knew that the troops had landed, and supposed it was for the protection of women and children; I regarded that as necessary on account of the intense excitement which existed and had existed for several days. A very little thing would have caused an explosion. Shortly after the ministers came up from the station house I went off for a lot of arms and ammunition, which I had collected for the use of the Provisional Government.
When I got back to the Government building I believe the Queen's surrender had been received, and I heard a rumor that Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government, and thought it was started by some of our people to bear on the Queen's people in the station house and barracks to cause them to surrender. At any rate, they did surrender quite early in the evening.
After the commission went to Washington we continued to carry on the Government and could have continued so without any assistance, but there were rumors of uprisings, and a great many thought that if the United States flag was raised it would at any rate prevent bloodshed. This view prevailed against considerable opposition, and, the flag having been raised, there certainly has been no bloodshed.
When Blount arrived, the council learned that he had called on President Dole almost immediately and had stated to him that he must take down the flag for he could not continue negotiations while the flag was flying. This was done on the first of April. Shortly after the provisional council called on Commissioner Blount in a body. He received us courteously, and Mr. Damon, who acted as our spokesman, said that he would willingly give him all the information in our power. Mr. Blount replied that when he wanted any information he would send for us. Damon said that he could tell a good deal about the country, whereupon Mr. Blount slapped him on the shoulder and said: "I guess you're my man," and made an appointment for two or three
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days later. I never was called upon for any information, and saw no more of Commissioner Blount.
Mr. Fred Wundenburg said to me a day or two after the revolution, after Ashley's appointment as marshal, that on Saturday, January 14, he was made a committee to get arms and men, and that he ascertained that night that he could get over 200 armed and ready. He appeared to be angry that he was not made marshal, and seemed to think that such service demanded recognition. He said he had no further use for the Provisional Government from that time on.
While the Queen was attempting her revolutionary act on the 14th I met Marshal Wilson near the station house. He was dressed in his uniform. Said he was very much opposed to what she was doing. That if she did not desist he would go and shut her up in a room by herself. He also added that she was wild and angry, and would not listen to him; whereupon I said, thinking to test his sense of sincerity, and knowing that my suggestion, if followed, would probably bring her to terms: "You go right up to the Palace and tell her that if she does not stop at once and abandon that plan about a new constitution you will resign your position as marshal; and if she won't listen to you, resign then and there." Wilson did not appear to like that, and walked off, saying: "I guess I won't do that." One of the deputies standing near me said, very significantly, "Wilson is fooling you; he does not mean anything of that kind."
Jas F. Morgan
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson, Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R. CASTLE.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
My name is William R. Castle; I was born in Honolulu in March, 1849; my parents were American missionaries. My father arrived here in 1837 and still lives in Honolulu; he is the senior member of the mercantile house of Castle & Cooke. I have always resided in Honolulu, with the exception of two years spent at Oberlin College and five years in New York City, where I studied law and practiced for a short time. I returned to the Islands in 1876, at the request of King Kalakaua, as attorney-general. I have been more or less connected with Island politics ever since, though always unwillingly, as it has interfered with my business. Have been a member of the Legislature five sessions.
Until very recently I have constantly and consistently opposed annexation to the United States; I have a strong regard for the native people and have hoped that the native Government might continue, and it is only recently that I have felt compelled to change my views upon this subject. I do not think that it will ever be possible to have a government of security to person and property in Hawaii under the old forms. This conclusion has been reached very reluctantly, after closely watching political affairs since my return in 1876.
During the latter part of the legislative session of 1892 I felt certain that a climax must very soon be reached, and that some very radical change must take place in the Government, or that the monarchy must come to an end. Aside from conversation upon this subject with a
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few friends, and some speculation as to when a change might come, how it would be forced and who would do it, nothing was done; there was no organization, nor any plans made. During the last week of the Legislature the air was filled with rumors, and the prospect looked very dark. Still, nothing was done, and when the Queen, on the 14th of January, actually attempted her revolutionary act—so far as any preparation was concerned—we were actually taken by surprise.
I was intimately acquainted with Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, with both of whom I often talked over the political situation. We all felt that trouble was impending, but I do not think that anything was more strongly impressed upon my mind by what either of these men said than the thought that if trouble came and our rights, our liberties, and property were threatened, we must help ourselves, for we could have no outside help, unless, indeed, such things should occur as might ensue from a state of anarchy, when, as I understood, Americans might expect assistance to the extent of personal protection and the protection of property against mob violence. Knowing what a Hawaiian mob meant from the illustration given in 1874, considerable uneasiness was felt in Honolulu when the Boston, with Minister Stevens, left Honolulu a week or ten days before the prorogation of the Legislature, and her return was observed with great relief upon the morning of the 14th.
Several days before the prorogation, things were in a very precarious condition. Corruption was open and flagrant in the Legislature; the lottery and opium bills were suddenly taken up and passed, and the same combination immediately ousted the Wilcox cabinet, which was the only one since the session opened which had the entire confidence of the community. Upon this, the Reform members of the Legislature, by way of protest, hoping to prevent the obtaining of a quorum, with which any more outrageous legislation could be enacted, absented themselves from the House. Upon Saturday morning, however, the day set for the prorogation, they succeeded in getting a quorum, a new ministry was immediately anuounced, and the opium and lottery bills, to the consternation and surprise of the community, were returned signed.
After seeing personally what took place I returned to my business and remained at my office closely occupied until nearly 2 o'clock. As I was about to return to my home I heard that the Queen was trying to abrogate the constitution, and at once went to the street in front of the palace, where I could see what was going on. Natives were the favored ones, being allowed ingress and egress, and from them I learned what was taking place. I saw the Queen come out on the veranda and speak to the crowd of natives who assembled below. After speaking some little time a native came and told me that she had said that owing to unexpected opposition and difficulties over which she had no control she would not then promulgate the new constitution, but she stated that the matter was merely deferred for a few days.
Immediately after this I saw William White, the native member for Lahaina, come out of the palace, run part way down the steps where he stood, and began a loud and furious harangue. Twice I observed Maj. Boyd, who was in full uniform, come down the steps and, touching his shoulders, apparently say something to him, but he was furiously shaken off. Upon inquiry from another native who came out I learned that he was making a most incendiary speech; that he was saying that their hope of a new constitution was defeated by tne interference of whites, and he urged them to rush into the palace and kill
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such persons as were opposing this plan. I expected to see another such riot as that of 1874, but learned afterwards that someone else counseled them to wait a few days, when they would get all they desired.
Returning down town I went to the office of W. O. Smith, where an impromptu meeting of foreign residents had assembled. A paper was lying upon the table, which had been extensively signed, in which the signers pledged themselves to oppose to any extent the revolutionary plans of the Queen, and to sustain the cabinet, which was trying to fight her off. If I recollect right, Paul Neumann, Peterson, Colburn, and others who have subsequently come out strongly in favor of the Queen, were then present. I heard Colburn state the situation to the meeting, saying how the lives of members of the cabinet had been threatened in the palace on account of their opposition to the Queen's plans, and Mr. Colburn then called upon the community to support them in this opposition. We were not informed and did not then learn that the Queen had expressed surprise at Peterson's opposition, he having had a month to consider this proposed new constitution and not having made any objections.
The community was now thoroughly aroused; it was felt that life, property, and liberty were seriously imperiled, and the meeting immediately elected a chairman and secretary, and a committee of public safety of thirteen members was at once appointed, of which I was a member. Subcommittees were at once appointed, which went about their business immediately, and the meeting adjourned to meet at my house on Sunday morning. That evening a number of us met at Mr. Thurston's residence to talk over the situation and attempt to make some plans for a provisional government in case the radical measures of overthrowing the Queen should finally be deemed necessary as the only available course. During the evening Mr. Fred. Wundenburg came in and reported on what success he had met in a two or three hours' search for arms and men to oppose the Queen. So far as I can now recollect, he stated that he had not been able to find more than 60, although it was believed that a very much larger number could be obtained as soon as the community should know that it was required.
I think that after Mr. Wundenburg left a messenger came from the Drei Hundred, a well-known organization of Germans, offering the services of their men, numbering, to my recollection now, about 80, and their arms. The next morning the committee of public safety met at my residence and remained in session a considerable part of the day. It was finally decided that the proper method was to ascertain public feeling, for which purpose a mass meeting was called. We felt that if a representative meeting should demand the deposition of the Queen and the establishment of another government which the members of the meeting would back up, the time had come to make the attempt. The question was one of force sufficient to carry out the intention.
The meeting was called for Monday, and its voice was so unmistakable that preparations were concluded as rapidly as possible to take possession of the Government by force, establish a Provisional Government, and ask for annexation to the United States, which was also the almost unanimous desire of the meeting. From the close of the meeting till the final movement preparations were conducted openly and notoriously. The offer of arms, ammunition, and men came in from all sides; the thing lacking was a disciplined force, but there was no doubt as to the enthusiasm and determination of the respectable, conservative
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----60
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portion of the community to make an end of corrupt and misgovernment and get security and peace by good government.
During this period I saw Minister Stevens several times, also Capt. Wiltse, and conversed with them upon the situation. I stated freely that we proposed to fight for good government, and hoped that we should at least have the moral assistance of the United States by a recognition of the Provisional Government which was proposed to be established, but I have no hesitation in saying that we were given to understand clearly and definitely that the usual rule in such cases would be followed and that we could not be recognized unless we became in fact the Government of the country by taking possession of the seat of government, which I certainly understood to mean the various departments, including the treasury, the courts, and the archives of the Government. It was to this end that our efforts were directed and we expected a bloody fight to ensue when we went to the Government building.
According to my recollection now, the request to Minister Stevens to land United States marines was not thought of until Monday forenoon, when it was prepared in response to the request of numerous citizens of many nationalities, some of whom had a vivid recollection of the doings of the mob of 1874. They were people who thoroughly indorsed our course and believed that we would succeed, but who felt that while the attack was being made and the fight going on around the Government building, a brutal mob would, in all probability, be incited by the royalists to burn and destroy property, in the suburbs as well as in the business portions of the town and that outrages would be committed upon the persons of women and children. Threats of such violence were made, and certainly several members of the Legislature, if their words were to be believed, would not only incite, but lead on just such a mob.
The request was therefore made to Minister Stevens for exactly that kind of protection. It was put in writing, signed by all the Committee of Public Safety, and taken to Minister Stevens by Mr. Thurston and myself after the mass meeting. About 5 o'clock that evening troops were landed and disposed about the town where they could be most easily obtained should occasion require. Both Mr. Thurston and myself were ill with very severe colds, which in my case ran into an attack of asthma, and with Mr. Thurston into threatened pneumonia, which prevented our taking part in much which followed during the next twenty-four hours. Monday night was one of suspense and terror throughout the entire community. A riotous uprising of the mob element was feared at any moment; no confidence was felt in the ability or disposition of the Queen's Government to cope with the same. Two incendiary fires did, in fact, occur, but no outbreak happened.
It is my belief, which I think is shared by nearly every one, that the mere presence of United States troops exercised a restraining influence and prevented any riotous uprising. While the troops were landing and marching up Port street, I was in town and met Marshal C. B. Wilson, with several others, near the bank of Bishop & Co. Mr. Wilson quite sternly wanted to know what the troops were landed for. I told him exactly what had occurred, giving him the substance of the note to Minister Stevens, and stating that I believed the object for which the troops were landed would be strictly observed.
At this point I desire to state that if there had been any plan or conspiracy by which the United States troops were to land and assist the revolutionists in overturning the Government, I should most certainly
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have known it. There was no such plan, and I utterly repudiate the attempt to impugn the character and actions of both Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, and state here that it seemed to me at that time, and I believe now that they would have been perfectly justified in giving a quicker and more open support to the Provisional Government than was finally accorded by recognition, and that they still would have been within the requirements of international law upon that subject.
For a few moments on Tuesday evening between five and six o'clock I was able to go to the Government building, where I found the Provisional Government in full possession and exercising the functions of government. A military establishment was being rapidly perfected; there were hundreds of men under arms whose names were being enrolled in companies; patrols were already being set to guard the town, and there was every evidence of the Provisional Government's being in successful control. I inquired at once whether the United States minister had recognized the Provisional Government but was answered that such recognition had not yet been accorded.
The negotiations were going on at that time for the surrender of the barracks and station house, while a conference was held at the palace with the Queen. Going out of the building I saw that all was quiet at the Arion Hall; not a soldier being in sight excepting two or three sentries, who were pacing the yard. Indeed I saw nothing of United States troops after their landing on Monday night until my departure on the following Thursday morning with the annexation commission for Washington. The United States troops did not lift a finger to bring about the result. If the Queen's Government, the police department, thought they would be attacked by United States troops that certainly was their own concern, and nothing with which either the Provisional Government or the United States troops had anything to do.
When in the yard surrounding the Government building, somewhere between 5 and 6 in the evening, I met Capt. Wiltse and asked him with some surprise if they were not going to recognize the Provisional Government. I knew that we were in possession, and knowing the moral strength we should receive from such recognition and that we were certainly the de facto government, I felt that it might have been given sooner. Capt. Wiltse replied quickly: "Oh no, we can't recognize you until you are also in possession of the barracks and station house."
I returned from Washington on the 7th of April upon the same steamer which brought Mr. Charles Nordhoff to Honolulu. Mr. Blount was already here and the flag had already been lowered. Although there was some solicitude in town, I found everything orderly and quiet. Within a few days I called on Commissioner Blount and had a pleasant conversation with him. I informed him that I had an intimate knowledge of what had taken place, and believing that he desired to obtain only the facts and all the facts, should be happy to furnish him all the information in my power; and also put him in the way of receiving information on all subjects connected with the islands. Although I saw Commissioner Blount several times after this, up to the time of his departure, he has never accorded me an interview, nor has he asked for any statement in regard to the matter.
Owing to my intimate knowledge and acquaintance with the Hawaiian people, several deputations from other parts of the country came to me to procure interviews with Mr. Blount. I recollect particularly two instances in which I wrote a note, saying that the natives would like to interview him; that an interpreter would be furnished; that
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they were poor and wanted to return to their homes as soon as possible, and that a steamer would leave within three days after my note was dated, and requested an interview within such time. In each case, Mr. Blount fixed the interview after the departure of the steamer; in one case the natives remained at considerable expense, for another steamer did not go for ten days; in the other they were discontented and disgusted, and went home.
William R. Castle.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 5th day of December A. D., 1893.
[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD D. TENNEY.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
My name is Edward D. Tenney; I was born in the State of New York; I am 35 years of age; came to the Hawaiian Islands in 1877, and have lived here ever since. I am a member of the well-known mercantile house of Castle & Cooke; I am a member of the advisory council of the Provisional Government and have been such since the 17th of January, when the Government was proclaimed. Up to that time I have had nothing to do with Hawaiian politics, but have been a careful observer of the progress of events.
If we could have had good government I think the country would have been as well off, at least for the present, to have remained as it was, but the conviction has been growing upon me for several years that the Hawaiian monarchy could not last. It certainly had reached the end of its usefulness; corruption was rife and the Government was certainly upon the verge of financial disaster. The Queen made matters worse by her obstinate determination to assume despotic power and overthrow constitutional government, and I think that she is responsible for the overthrow of the monarchy and her own deposition.
I was present, a close observer of events, during January, 1893; had been at my business Saturday morning the 14th, but was at home most of the day. I heard from a passer-by of the Queen's attempt to abrogate the constitution. Drove into town very soon; found the general feeling was that the Queen had gone to a point where people could not yield any longer. There was a feeling of intense and feverish anxiety as to what might follow. It was so on Sunday and Monday; business was almost entirely suspended. It was very well known that men were preparing for action. In the afternoon all business was stopped and the community thronged en masse to the old rifles armory, where a most enthusiastic, but orderly and determined, meeting was held. All were serious; all in deep earnest. The purpose of the mass meeting, as it was there understood, was that the Queen must be deposed; that she had gone to a point where the community could no longer bear with her.
I knew nothing whatever of the plans which were being made; I had not consulted with any of the committee of safety. I had come to the conclusion that to insure safety, security to property, and good government, the form of Government must be changed; that night was one of intense excitement and uncertainty. There was great fear of what might happen; it was felt that if the mob element became aroused the Queen's Government would have no control whatever,
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and when it became known that United States troops were landed a feeling of security became general—among the women and children more particularly. The Queen's Government was very uncertain; they did not know where they stood, and I do not think they could have afforded protection.
The committee of safety proceeded openly. Its purpose was perfectly well known to dethrone the Queen and establish a new Government. It seemed to me certain that if the Queen's Government had felt themselves masters of the situation, they would have arrested the leaders, instead of which, the committee carried out its work at its own will. The next day, the 17th, there was the same feeling of unrest and uncertainty as to whether the Queen's Government would resist the new Government. About 11 o'clock in the morning, I was waited upon by a committee and asked if I would become one of the advisory council. All arrangements as I then understood were then completed.
I said that while I was somewhat in the dark, I believed the only way we could get settled government was to depose the Queen, and I consented. Nothing was said about Minister Stevens or of any support to be obtained from United States troops, nor had I heard any rumors of that kind. No doubt was felt that we could depose the Queen, and that under the prevailing conditions the new Government would be immediately recognized. At 1 p. m. I met the committee at W. O. Smith's office. The proclamation was read and agreed to and signed by all who were then present. About 2:30 we left for the Government building unarmed and walked up nearly all together. We asked for the ministers. There were none there; waited ten or fifteen minutes for some of them to appear.
There appearing no occasion for further delay, the proclamation was then read, no one being present but the executive and advisory councils, the committee on public safety, some Government clerks, and a few others. While the proclamation was being read, Col. Soper arrived, and it being deemed necessary that we have force at once I went to the armory on Beretania street, whereupon a force of armed men went there immediately. From that time on, dozens and scores of armed men poured in till the buildings and premises were filled to overflowing. I believe that before 5 p. m. 1,000 to 1,500 men were there, not all armed by any means, but asking for arms to support the Provisional Government. Several hundred were armed and all were determined to hold the position at any cost. As an evidence of the feeling of the community, I observed that many former supporters of the monarchy came in and joined us.
When we felt that we had force sufficient to hold our position, and that the monarchy was in fact overthrown, we being in possession of the headquarters and center of the Government, notes were sent to all the foreign ministers and consuls, stating the fact and asking for recognition as the de facto Government. I can not recollect whether, in fact, Stevens's recognition came in just before or just after the Queen's surrender. No one, at any rate, felt that there was any doubt that we were masters of the situation, and that no other government existed. As I recollect, before Stevens's recognition came, the order for the surrender of the station house and barracks had been received.
Although the United States troops were on shore absolutely none were seen, so far as I know. Arion Hall, where they were posted, faced a street opposite the Government building, but no troops were in sight, and they took absolutely no part at all. I recollect Capt. Wiltse came
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in with an aid and looked around, and he asked some questions as to the extent of our possession.
Martial law was immediately proclaimed by the Provisional Government, the town and surrounding country was at once divided into districts, our patrols were sent everywhere to maintain order and quell any possible disturbance. They were in possession of the entire town and surrounding country and maintained perfect order. As soon as it was known that the Provisional Government was established, suspense and anxiety subsided and everything settled down into a sense of security.
The United States flag was subsequently raised because it was thought that the mere act would operate to secure quiet and prevent bloodshed. The Provisional Government had no doubt of its ability to put down any revolt and maintain its position. Although there was some opposition, it was deemed best on the whole to ask for protection, and it was done.
Commissioner Blount arrived late in March, and pulled down the flag April 1. He wanted to do it the afternoon before, but it was deferred until the next day upon the Government's request to give time to have the town again patrolled and insure the maintenance of the peace. No disturbance followed, and the Government has been growing stronger and more secure every day since.
I called upon Commissioner Blount alone; was not with the advisory council when they called, but the commissioner knew that I Avas a member of the advisory council. Learning shortly after that he desired to see a sugar plantation, I was requested to take him to the Ewa plantation, of which our house are agents. I did so. Various matters were discussed, but no politics were talked of in any way. He has not asked me for any information at any time. I would have been glad to have furnished him with all in my power.
E.D. Tenney.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson, Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.
We the undersigned hereby upon oath depose and say:
That we are the persons appointed as a citizens' committee of safety, at Honolulu, in January last.
That neither prior to nor after our appointment as such committee, did we or either of us, individually or collectively, have any agreement or understanding, directly or indirectly, with the U. S. minister, Mr. Stevens, or Capt. Wiltse, that they or either of them would assist in the overthrow of the monarchy or the establishment of the Provisional Provisional Government.
That at no time, either before or after such appointment, did Mr Stevens ever recommend or urge us, or either of us, to dethrone the Queen or establish a Provisional Government. That at no time, either before or after such appointment, did Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse promise us, or either of us, that the United States troops would be used to assist in the overthrow of the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government, and such troops, in fact, were not so used.
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That at the time the committee addressed Mr. Stevens concerning the landing of the troops to maintain the peace the Queen's Government was utterly demoralized. The Queen had denounced her cabinet and they had publicly appealed to the citizens to support them in a forcible resistance to the Queen. The new Government had not been organized and the air was full of rumors and threats of violence and conflict. The presence of the troops was a strong feature in preventing the irresponsible and lawless element of all nationalities from outbreak, but was not asked nor used for the purpose of dethroning the Queen nor establishing the Provisional Government.
That the forces that rallied to the support of the Provisional Government were ample to overthrow the monarchy and establish the Provisional Government, and such action would have been taken by the committee regardless of the presence or absence of the American troops.
That the reason of the confidence of the committee m its ability to accomplish its object was that the same men who were supporting the movement had carried through a peaceful revolution in 1887 and suppressed an armed uprising in 1889. The armed supporters of the movement were not a disorganized body, as has been represented, but were composed largely of the volunteer white militia which was in existence and formed the effective strength in the conflicts of 1887 and 1889, and which, although disbanded by the Boyalist Government in 1890, had retained its organization, and turned out under the command of its old officers, constituting a well drilled, disciplined, and officered military force of men of high character and morale, with perfect confidence in themselves, and holding in contempt the courage and ability of those whom they have twice before overawed and defeated.
C.Bolte.
Ed. Suhr.
F.W. McChesney.
J.A. McCandless.
William O. Smith.
Wm. R. Castle.
Andrew Brown.
John Emmeluth.
W.C. Wilder.
Theodore F. Lansing.
Henry Waterhouse.
L.A. Thurston.
Subscribed and sworn before me this 4th day of January, A. D. 1894, by C. Bolte, Ed. Suhr, F. W. McChesney, William O. Smith, Wm. R. Castle, Andrew Brown, John Emmeluth, W. C. Wilder, Theodore F. Lansing, Henry Waterhouse, and L. A. Thurston, as a true and correct statement.
[SEAL.] Thos. W. Hobron.
Notary Public.
STATEMENT OF PERSONS PRESENT AT MEETING OF COMMITTEE OF SAFETY, JANUARY 16.
We the undersigned, hereby depose and say that we were present at the meeting of safety at the residence of Henry Waterhouse on the night of Monday, January 16, last.
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That at such meeting no suggestion was made nor expectation expressed that the United States troops would assist in the overthrow of the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government.
That at no time during such meeting did Mr. Soper or any other member thereof go to Mr. Stevens's house, nor did Mr. Soper or any other member of such meeting report that they had seen Mr. Stevens and that he had assured them of the support of the Boston's men.
That the statement of F. Wundenburg upon this subject and others, as published in connection with Mr. Blount's report, are misleading and untrue.
John H. Soper.
J.H. Fisher.
Theodore F. Lansing.
Henry Waterhouse.
William O. Smith.
John Emmeluth.
J.B. Castle.
F.W. McChesney.
Andrew Brown.
C. Bolte.
J.A. McCandless.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of January, A. D. 1894, by John H. Soper, J. H. Fisher, Theodore F. Lansing, Henry Waterhouse, William O. Smith, John Emmeluth, J. B. Castle, F. W. McChesney, Andrew Brown, and C. Bolte as a true and correct statement.
[SEAL.] Thos. W. Hobron,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK BROWN.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
Frank Brown, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that he has resided in the Hawaiian Islands for the past forty-seven years; that he was a member of the Legislature for many sessions; that he was in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17,1893; that the period from Saturday until the troops landed he considered an interregnum; that in his opinion there was no government during those days; that he considered the landing of the United States troops a very good thing to show that there was some protection against incendiarism and destruction of private property in case anything should happen; he was in the riot at the time of Kalakaua's election when troops were landed, and was not sure but there would be a repetition of the trouble at that time; that in his opinion there was much more cause for landing the troops in January, 1893, than there was in 1887, as upon the former occasion the city was thoroughly guarded by the respectable element of the community, whereas in January last no such preparation had been made.
Frank Brown.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
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AFFIDAVIT OF P. F. A. EHLERS.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
P.F.A. Ehlers, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that he was born in Germany; that he has resided in Honolulu since 1866; that he has a family, is a householder, and is engaged in business here; that he was in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 14-17, 1893; that he talked with people, heard rumors, and that there was a state of great excitement and alarm; that the presence of the United States forces when they landed was a good thing, and prevented possible lawlessness which would have resulted in loss of property and possibly life.
P.F.A. Ehlers
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF J. H. FISHER.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
Joseph Henry Fisher, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is 36 years of age, born in San Francisco, Cal., United States of America, and has lived in Honolulu since February, 1883, and has been since that date employed as teller in the bank of Bishop & Co. Is married and has a family. Is a property owner. Was captain of Company B, Honolulu Rifles, disbanded in August, 1890. That on the 14th day of January began to recruit ex-members of Company B and others to join in the movement for deposing Liliuokalani and forming a Provisional Government. Knew that other ex-captains of the Honolulu Rifles were doing the same. Compared notes with them and found nearly all of the old members very prompt in volunteering, and also many who were not formerly members. The roll of Company B on the evening of 16th January had the names of 45 volunteers; nearly all had arms and ammunition.
On that evening at a meeting of the committee of safety were organized as a battalion. Was appointed lieutenant-colonel. On the morning of the 17th January turned command of Company B over to Lieut. Potter. Orders were issued to assemble at the old armory promptly at 3 o'clock on afternoon of January 17. Matters were precipitated by the shot fired by Ordnance Officer Good on Fort street about 2:20 o'clock. Was at the armory immediately after, and at the request of the members of the new Government sent men as fast as they arrived in squads to the Government building, the first sent being Capt. Zeigler with about 36 men. Had not been told nor did not believe the United States marines would take part one way or another. This being the fourth time during his residence in Honolulu that he has taken up arms in defense of good government in the Hawaiian Islands.
J.H. Fisher.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2d day of January, A. D. 1894.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
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AFFIDAVIT OF F. J. LOWREY.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
F.J. Lowrey, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen; that he is married, and a householder in Honolulu, and has large business interests in the Hawaiian Islands; that he was present in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17, 1893; that on Monday, the 16th, there was a general dread of incendiarism, and precautions were taken by himself and others for the protection of property; the feeling was so high that it was liable to break out into lawlessness and violence at any moment; that when he heard of the landing of the United States forces it was a great relief.
F.J. Lowrey.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A.D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF C. B. RIPLEY.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
C.B. Ripley, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen, has a family, and is a householder in Honolulu; that he was present in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17, 1893; that in his opinion the landing of the United States forces was fully justified by the critical condition of affairs at that time, and unquestionably prevented riotous acts which would probably have resulted in loss of life and property.
C.B. Ripley.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF E. F. BISHOP.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolula, Oahu, ss:
E.F. Bishop, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he was born in the United States and has resided in Honolulu over ten years; that he is secretary of C. Brewer and Company, an Hawaiian corporation; that he is married and a householder in Honolulu; that he took no part in the revolution of January 17, 1893, and has since remained passive politically; that on the evening of Monday, January 16, he heard that the United States forces had landed at about 5 o'clock; he did not understand that they had landed for the purpose of taking any hand in the revolution, but for the purpose of protecting American life and property; that he believed that the landing of the forces for that purpose was justifiable, as there was a great deal of allayed excitement in Honolulu at the time: that during the same evening, at about 8 p. m., he was present with his father-in-law, J. S. Walker, when that gentleman received a note from J. L. Stevens, the American
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minister, asking for the use of Arion Hall as a shelter for the troops; that Mr. Walker immediately wrote a note informing the minister that the hall was leased to Mr. G. J. Waller, and dispatched this answer by the bearer who brought the minister's note.
E.F. Bishop.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th dav of December, A.D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF J. B. ATHERTON.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
J.B. Atherton, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen; that he has resided in Honolulu for many years, has a family, a home, and large business interests; that on Monday, January 16, as an American citizen he went to see Mr. Stevens, the American minister, at about 2 p. m., to suggest the landing of the Boston's forces for the protection of American life and property; was told by the minister that it was his intention to land the forces, and was promised a guard for his home and property if he wished; that this affiant was very apprehensive and did not know what might happen; that he was present and witnessed the riot in 1874 at the time of the election of Kalakaua, and knew what such a thing meant as soon as the natives should be aroused and incendiarism suggested to them; that in his opinion there was more reason for the landing of the troops in January, 1893, than in 1874.
J.B. Atherton,
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF W. L. WILCOX.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
W.L. Wilcox, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he was born in the Hawaiian Islands, and has resided here during his whole life; that he has acted as interpreter during very many sessions of the Legislature and is permanently employed as Hawaiian interpreter for the courts; that he is perfectly familiar with the native language, and during the three days from January 14 to January 17 circulated among the Hawaiian people in Honolulu; that particularly on the Monday before the landing of the troops threats were made by the natives that they would destroy property in Honolulu by burning; these threats he repeated to members of the committee of safety and others.
W.D. Wilcox
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. CARTER.
ONE INCIDENT IN THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION.
At the meeting of citizens on Saturday, January 14, in response to the call of the Queen's cabinet for help, the anxiety of persons near
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me and their requests for expression of their sentiments led me to ask Mr. Colburn, minister of the interior, at the close of his speech, what assurance there was that the constituted police and military forces would not make an attack? Whether the Queen's adherents would be removed from command of them? To this Mr. Colburn replied that as a cabinet minister he ought not to be asked to answer such a question in public, but that he could give assurances that a satisfactory settlement was even then being made. He then withdrew and called me to him—he was with Judge Hartwell—and to the best of my recollection one of them said in substance that the matter of which I had spoken was all right. A request to Mr. Stevens to land his forces had been prepared and was in Hartwell's hands to be delivered; that Mr. Stevens had consented to this for the purpose of defending the cabinet and the constitution against any possible aggression by the Queen. Later, Mr. Hartwell told me the paper had gone off for Mr. Peterson's signature and asked me to get it. I tried but failed to find Peterson.
I have since been told that Mr. Peterson still has the paper, and that for palpable reasons it was never shown to Mr. Blount.
The next morning the cabinet evaded all this and adhered to the Queen, and Mr. Stevens stated that he could not assist a counter revolution by the committee of safety.
The foregoing ought to explain the half truth upon which the old cabinet bases its charges against the American minister.
Charles L. Carter
Honolulu, January 2, 1893.
STATEMENT OF L. A. THURSTON, HAWAIIAN MINISTER, PUBLISHED NOVEMBER 21, 1893.
Washington, November 21.
"I am urged to make a statement for publication, setting forth the position and claims of the Hawaiian Government and making reply to charges contained in Mr. Blount's report.
"As I have received no official information that Mr. Blount has made a report, have not seen a copy of it, and do not know what it contains, except from reading newspaper abstractions therefrom, and am unaware of the present contentions of the U. S. Government concerning Hawaii, I am unable, at present, in the absence of such knowledge, to intelligently state what the position and claims of the Hawaiian Government are. It would, moreover, be contrary to diplomatic courtesy for me to publish a statement on such subject prior to informing the U. S. Government of the same.
"A large portion of the published extracts from Mr. Blount's report consists, however, of personal attacks upon me and those associated with me in the Provisional Government, impugning our veracity, good faith, and courage, and charging us with fraud and duplicity. I deem it proper, therefore, to make a personal reply to such charges, confining myself to statements of fact, of which, as a principal actor, I am prepared to testify to before any impartial tribunal.
"First, before stating such facts, I desire to call attention to Mr. Blount's method of constructing his report. Although he, in several places, states that I was the leader of the revolutionary movement, he has never asked me a question concerning the same, nor given me opportunity to make any statement, although I have at all times been
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ready and willing to do so. The same is true of a large number of other men who took a leading part in the movement of January last.
"In the second place his evidence consists exclusively of prepared affidavits or of answers to leading questions put by himself, at private interviews, no one else being present but the stenographer. In no instance has there been any cross-examination of witnesses or opportunity given to contradict or explain evidence given or present other evidence.
"A brief examination of the published portions of the report shows numerous incorrect statements. I shall endeavor for the present, however, to answer the more salient points only.
"First, Mr. Blount charges that the American troops were landed under a prearranged agreement with the committee of safety that they should so land and assist in the overthrow of the Queen. In reply thereto, I hereby state that at no time did Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse assure me or the committee of safety, or any subcommittee thereof, that the United States troops would assist in overthrowing the Queen or establishing the Provisional Government; and, as a matter of fact, they did not so assist. I can produce witnesses in support of this statement, of the highest responsibility, in overwhelming number, but Mr. Blount has rendered it unnecessary to do so. The statements of Mr. Wundenburg and Mr. Damon have been put forward as the strongest evidence in support of Mr. Blount's contention. In Mr. Wundenburg's statement he says that when the committee of safety told Mr. Stevens they were not ready to act, he replied: 'Gentlemen, the troops of the Boston will land at 5 o'clock whether you are ready or not.' The reason of this reply and the subsequent landing of the troops is manifest. The troops were landed to protect American citizens and property in the event of the impending and inevitable conflict between the Queen and the citizens, and not to cooperate with the committee in carrying out its plans. In fact, the troops did not cooperate with the committee, and the committee had no more knowledge than did the Queen's Government where the troops were going nor what they were going to do. The whole gist of Mr. Damon's long examination is likewise contained in his statement that when, after the organization and proclamation of the new Government, the request was made for the support of the United States troops it was refused, Commander Swinburne, the commanding officer, sending back word, 'Capt. Wiltse's orders are, "Remain passive.'"
"Second, Mr. Blount charges that the Queen had ample military force with which to have met the committee, and but for the support of the United States representatives and troops the establishment of the Provisional Government would have been impossible. In reply thereto I hereby state that, although the presence of the American troops had a quieting effect on the rough characters in the city and may have prevented some bloodshed, they were not essential to and did not assist in the overthrow of the Queen. The result of the movement would have been eventually the same if there had not been a marine within a thousand miles of Honolulu.
"In support of this statement I cite the following facts:
"1. The troops did not land till Monday night, the 16th of January, after the revolution had been in full progress since the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, during which time the committee of safety was openly organizing for the avowed purpose of overthrowing the Queen.
"2. There was absolutely no attempt at concealment from the Government of the objects and intentions of the committee.
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"3 . The Queen, her cabinet, and their supporters were utterly demoralized, suspicious of one another, and devoid of leadership.
"4. The committee of safety and their supporters were united; had ample force to execute their purpose; knew precisely what they wanted, and proceeded with intelligent deliberation, thoroughness, and confidence to do it.
"There is no conflict concerning the facts of the first proposition. It is admitted by all that the Queen began the revolution at noon on Saturday, the 14th, by attempting to promulgate a constitution; that such attempt was immediately followed by preparation on the part of the citizens for armed resistance, and that the United States troops landed at 5 o'clock Monday, the 16th.
"In support of the second proposition, that there was no concealment from the Government of the intentions of the committee, I submit the following:
"1. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, in reply to the request of the Queen's cabinet for advice as to what they had better do, the Queen then still insisting upon the proclamation of the constitution and supporting it by force, I advised them to declare the Queen in revolution and the throne vacant, and at their request and at the expressed approval of two of them and the tacit assent of the other two, then and there drew up a form of proclamation to that effect.
"2. At half past 4 in the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, at a meeting of about 200 citizens at the office of W. O. Smith, the Queen was denounced in the strongest terms, armed resistance and a counter revolution were openly advocated, and the Queen's minister of the interior, John Colburn, addressed the meeting, asking their armed support against the Queen. The Queen's attorney-general, Mr. Peterson, and her attorney, Paul Neuman, were both present taking part in the meeting. The committee of safety was publicly then and there named and proceeded forthwith to organize.
"3. At 6 o'clock on Sunday morning, the 15th, I told Mr. Peterson and Mr. Colburn, two members of the Queen's cabinet, that the committee intended to depose the Queen and establish a provisional government; that if they would take charge of the movement, well and good, otherwise the committee intended to take action on its own account. They ask for twenty-four hours in which to consider the matter. I declined to wait, stating to them that the committee intended to proceed forthwith.
"4. The committee met openly that morning at 10 o'clock, with the full knowledge of the Government of the place of its meeting. It remained in session during the greater part of the day, while several police kept watch of the building from the street.
"5. On Monday morning at 9 o'clock the committee, without attempt at concealment, met in my office, within 200 feet of the police station, Marshal Wilson's headquarters, where the entire police force was stationed. While the meeting was in progress Wilson came to the office and asked to speak to me privately, and we went into an adjoining room. Our conversation was, in substance, as follows:
"Wilson said: 'I want this meeting stopped,' referring to the mass meeting for that afternoon.
"I replied: 'It can't be stopped. It is too late.'
"He said: 'Can't this thing be fixed up in some way?'
"I replied: 'No, it can not. It has gone too far.'
"He said: 'The Queen has abandoned her new constitution idea.'
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"I replied: ' How do we know that she will not take it ap again as she said she would?'
"He said, 'I will guarantee that she will not, even if I have to lock her up in a room to keep her from doing it; and I'll do it, too, if necessary.'
"I replied : ' We are not willing to accept that guarantee as sufficient. This thing has gone on from bad to worse until we are not going to stand it any longer. We are going to take no chances in the matter, but settle it now, once and for all.'
"Wilson then left the office. He has since stated that he immediately reported to the cabinet and advised arresting the committee, but the cabinet was afraid and refused to allow it.
"6. At 2 o'clock on the afternoon of Monday, the 16th, a mass meeting of 3,000 unarmed men was held within a block of the palace. The meeting was addressed by a number of speakers, all denouncing the Queen. The meeting, with tremendous cheering and enthusiasm, unanimously adopted resolutions declaring the Queen to be in revolution, and authorizing the committee to proceed to do whatever was necessary. The police were present, but no attempt was made to interfere with the meeting or make any arrests. The meeting adjourned amid the most intense excitement, and the citizens dispersed throughout the town awaiting the further call of the committee. While this meeting had been in progress another was being held by the royalists in the streets, within a block of the armory, which adopted resolutions in support of the Queen.
"Never in the history of Hawaii has there been such a tense condition of mind or a more imminent expectation of bloodshed and conflict than there was immediately after the adjournment of these two radically opposed meetings. Mr. Blount's statement that the community was at peace and quiet is grossly inaccurate. It was at this juncture, two hours after the adjournment of the above meetings, that Capt. Wiltse and Mr. Stevens, acting upon their own responsibility and discretion, and irrespective of the request or actions of the committee, landed the troops, which were distributed in three parts of the city, instead of being massed at one point, as stated by Mr. Blount. The reason that the Queen's Government took no action against the committee, or its supporters, was that they were overwhelmed by the unanimous display of indignation and determination shown by the citizens, and were cowed into submission in the same manner that the King and his supporters were cowed under precisely similar circumstances by the same citizens in June, 1887.
"In support of the third proposition, that the Queen and her supporters were demoralized and devoid of leadership I submit the following:
"1. During the few weeks prior to the revolution Mr. Colburn, minister of the interior at the time of the revolution, had been one of the leaders of the political party opposed to myself, and he was bitterly hostile to me personally. My first intimation of the revolutionary intention of the Queen was at 10 o'clock on the morning of Saturday, the 14th, when Mr. Colburn came to me greatly excited. He told me of the Queen's intention to promulgate a new constitution, and asked my advice. I said to him: 'Why do you not go to the members of your own party?' He replied: 'I have no party. Those who have been our supporters are supporting the Queen. The down-town people [referring to the merchants] have got no use for me, and, unless the members of your party and other citizens will support us, we are going to resign right away.'
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"2. At 1 o'clock the same day I met all the members of the cabinet at the attorney-general's office. They had just come from an interview with the Queen, at which she had announced her intention of promulgating a constitution and demanded their support. They stated that she had threatened them with mob violence, whereupon they had immediately left the palace, each one going out by a separate entrance. While we were talking a messenger came from the Queen requesting them to immediately return to the palace. Peterson and Colburn positively refused to do so, stating that they did not consider their lives would be safe there. I shortly after left them and started down town. After I had gone about two blocks I was overtaken by a messenger from the cabinet asking me to return, which I did. They asked me to ascertain what support they could expect from citizens, and formally authorized me to state the condition of affairs to leading citizens and in their behalf to call for armed volunteers to resist the Queen. I immediately proceeded to comply with their request, and, with the assistance of others, within an hour or two thereafter about 80 leading citizens had signed a written agreement agreeing to support the cabinet against the Queen by force.
"3. Later the same afternoon Mr. Colburn informed me that they had finally gone to the palace and held a stormy interview with the Queen lasting for over two hours. He told me he had no confidence in his colleague, Mr. Peterson, who he believed was playing double with him, and told me to beware of telling Peterson anything further. As a reason for his distrust he said that he knew nothing of the intention to promulgate a constitution, but that, while they were discussing the matter with the Queen, she said, in reply to an objection made by Peterson: 'Why did you not make this objection before? You have had this constitution in your possession for a mouth and raised no objection to it.' Colburn said also that in reply to an objection made by Mr. Parker, minister of foreign affairs, she said: ' Why did you not tell me this last night when we were talking over the subject?' Colburn further stated to me that at a caucus of their party on the previous Friday night one of the members of the Legislature, Kaluna by name, had said that if he could establish the new constitution he would die happy if he could kill some other man before dying.
"4. The Queen was furiously angry at the refusal of the cabinet to join her in promulgating the constitution, and publicly denounced them therefor.
"5. When the Queen made announcement of her failure to promulgate the constitution, two of the leading royalist members of the Legislature, one in the throne room in the palace and one upon the steps of the building, addressed the assembled crowd, denounced the cabinet as traitors, and said that they wanted to shed blood. One of the committee included the Queen in his denunciations.
"6. During the entire time between noon of Saturday, the 14th, and the afternoon of Tuesday, the 17th, when the Provisional Government was proclaimed, the Queen's cabinet was without plan of action, and did practically nothing but rush about the city consulting with various foreign representatives or citizens of all parties as to what they had better do, begging the American minister for the support of the American troops against the committee of safety, and securing from the Queen a declaration that she would not again attempt to abrogate the constitution, which they hurried into print and distributed broadcast to try and appease the indignation of citizens and break up the proposed mass meeting.
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"In support of the fourth proposition that the committee and their supporters were united, had ample force to execute their purpose, and proceeded with deliberation and confidence to do so, I submit the following:
"An essential factor in judging whether the force of the committee was sufficient, and their confidence in themselves well founded, is to know what the same men under similar conditions have done upon previous occasions. Fortunately, there is no dispute as to the facts concerning two recent incidents in Hawaiian history in which the same parties who were brought into conflict in January, 1893, were arrayed against each other under similar circumstances:
"1 . In 1887 the King, by a manipulation of the electorate and the legislature, had encroached upon popular rights and obtained autocratic power over the people. In this course he was supported by practically the same persons who in January last, and now, constitute the Royalist party in Hawaii. The open bribery, corruption, and debauchery of the King and his supporters crystallized the opposition thereto into an organization of practically the same men who organized and now constitute the Provisional Government. Such organization was formed with the openly avowed intention of wresting from the King his autocratic powers or dethroning him. In preparation for the expected movement the King fortified the palace, loopholed its basement for sharpshooters, erected sandbag breastworks at the entrance of tbe building, mounted cannon and Gatling guns at all the approaches thereto, largely increased his regular military force, and defied the organization and public opinion.
The leaders of the revolutionary movement proceeded deliberately to collect such arms as were available and organized their plans. An executive committee of thirteen was appointed, who took entire control of the movement and called a mass meeting in the same building used for that purpose in January last. The King attempted to head off the meeting by sending a letter to it promising certain reforms. The letter had no effect. Resolutions were adopted denouncing the King and demanding the granting of a new constitution depriving the King of all personal power. The resolutions were forthwith presented to the King by the committee, who, unarmed and alone, proceeded direct from the meeting to the fortified palace with the ultimatum that he comply with the demands within twenty-four hours or take the consequences.
"The King was then in absolute control of the regular troops, the especial troops enlisted for the occasion, 4 companies of native militia, the police, all the artillery and Gatling guns, the government buildings, the palace, the barracks, and the station house, with full knowledge of, and weeks of preparation for, the action taken by the citizens. His military strength was greater and his control of the public buildings more complete than was that of the Queen in January last. He did not fire a shot; submitted to all demands; disbanded his troops and turned the whole control of the Government over to the revolutionary party, which, in consideration of his abject submission allowed him to continue on the throne in a figurehead capacity.
"2. In 1889, while the same men who now constitute the Provisional Government were in control of the King's Government, a conspiracy was organized among the royalist supporters by the King and Liliuokalani for the overthrow of the cabinet and the restoration of the old royal power and constitution. The conspirators took the cabinet by surprise, and on the night of July 29 took possession of the Government
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----61
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buildings and palace, and securing possession of all the artillery fortified the palace. The regular troops, by order of the King, refused to assist the cabinet, who called upon the white militia and white citizens for assistance. The call was promptly responded to. The revolutionists were protected by an 8-foot stone wall around the palace, and used artillery as well as rifles, while the cabinet supporters were armed with rilies alone. The fighting opened at 9 o'clock in the morning with less than 30 cabinet supporters in position in front of the palace, which number was later increased to about 500. The royalist revolutionists opened with a furious fire of both artillery and small arms. Within half an hour they were driven from their guns. Seven were killed and 12 wounded, and before dark all of them were dispersed or captured, while not one of the Cabinet supporters was injured.
"Such is the undisputed record of events upon two occasions when the royalists and the organizers of the Provisional Government have come into armed conflict when there has been no suggestion of support to either side by any outside power. Under these circumstances I submit that the burden of proof is upon those who claim that the leaders of the Provisional Government are cowards, or that they are incompetent to organize or successfully carry out a revolution against the royalists in Hawaii.
"It is unnecessary for me here to restate the details of the bitter constitutional conflict which had been carried on between the Queen and the Legislature during the seven months prior to January last, or to speak of the intense indignation existing among all classes of citizens by reason of the open and successful alliance of the Queen with the opium and lottery rings. The political liberties of the people had been trampled upon, and their moral sense shocked. It simply needed the added provocation of the arbitrary attempt to abrogate the constitution and disfranchise every white man in the country, to spontaneously crystallize opposition into a force that was irresistible.
"In reply to the sneer that the persons taking part in the movement were 'aliens,' I would say that every man of them was, by the laws of the country, a legal voter, whose right to the franchise was, by the proposed constitution, to be abrogated; a large proportion of them were born in the country, and almost without exception those who were not born there had lived there for years, owned property there, and had made it their home. They were the men who had built up the country commercially, agriculturally, financially, and politically, and created and made possible a civilized government therein. They were and are such men as to-day are the leading citizens of the most progressive communities of the United States, with interests as thoroughly identified with the interests of Hawaii as are the interests of native and foreign born citizens in similar communities in this country identified with it?"
Adjourned until Monday, the 22d instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
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Washington, D.C., Monday, January 22, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan), and Senators Gray, Butler and Frye, and Senators Daniel and Davis, of the full committee.
SWORN STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCANDLESS—Continued.
The Chairman. What connection had you with political movements in Hawaii, and when did you first become associated with any political movement in Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. My first connection was in 1887. During the winter of 1886 and 1887 there was organized, under the laws of the Kingdom, an organization called the Honolulu Rifles, and it suddenly became very popular with all the foreigners and whites of the islands. I joined that military organization, and continued to be a member of it until 1888, when I made a visit to the States.
The Chairman. Did you hold any office in that organization?
Mr. McCandless. I was nothing but a private. I was one of a committee of thirteen of the political organization.
The Chairman. At that time?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. What was the nature of that organization ?
Mr. McCandless. That was an organization to compel the King to grant a new constitution, or it was organized with the intention of forming a republic, making a republic—that is, deposing the King, making a republic with a view of annexing the islands to the United States.
The Chairman. Then why was not that purpose persisted in, or was it abandoned?
Mr. McCandless. It was persisted in that a great many people thought we should give the King one last show to redress the wrongs that he had committed, and take a great many of the prerogatives away from him, and perhaps he would do better. That spirit prevailed to such an extent that a mass meeting was called and strong resolutions were drawn up. They were made so strong that they did not think that any man of self-respect could accede to the demands of the resolutions, and so soon as he should refuse they would start the revolution.
The Chairman. How was that mass meeting as to numbers?
Mr. McCandless. The mass meeting of 1887 was a mass meeting of 1,200 people.
The Chairman. Of what class of people was that mass meeting composed?
Mr. McCandless. Of most of the white people of the Hawaiian Islands.
Senator Gray. Where did you go from to Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. West Virginia.
Senator Gray. Where were you born?
Mr. McCandless. In Pennsylvania. My father moved from Pennsylvania when I was a boy. I went to California and stayed there a year and a half, and went to the Hawaiian Islands in 1881.
The Chairman. Your business out there was sinking artesian wells?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did the King make concessions that reconciled this
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mass meeting or combination of citizens to his longer remaining on the throne?
Mr. McCandless. There was a committee of thirteen appointed at the mass meeting to wait on the King and present the resolutions to him, and he was given 24 hours to accede to the demands or take the consequences.
Senator Frye. And you were a member of that committee?
Mr. McCandless. No; I was of the executive committee. This was a committee appointed for the purpose of carrying the resolutions to the King.
The Chairman. Did the King accede to the demands?
Mr. McCandless. He did.
Senator Gray. Did he grant a new constitution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; he proclaimed the new constitution which we wrote out. I can tell the details of that.
Senator Frye. That was the constitution of 1887?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did the King proclaim that by his own authority?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did his cabinet join him in signing it?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you know whether the legislative assembly took any action in regard to that constitution?
Mr. McCandless. It was taken in this way—recognized as the law of the land, and that question was never raised.
The Chairman. The general grievances of which you have been speaking, I suppose, consisted of the King's connection with the opium bill?
Mr. McCandless. That was one.
The Chairman. What else?
Mr. McCandless. It got to that point that the Government did not exist for anything but to tax the people and give them no return for it. Money was squandered in different directions—it was squandered in an embassy to Russia to assist at the coronation of the Czar. Then there was a man-of-war bought by Kalakaua, in which there was a stealage of something like $10,000. This was common report in Honolulu.
The Chairman. That is the information upon which you were acting?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. Two of the ministers got $500 a month, but they actually only got $150 a month, and the remainder went to the King. The register of public documents, an office the same as our county recorders, whose office is carried on and supported by fees— in that office the King put a notorious man and entered into an agreement with him that he should have $150 a month and the balance of the fees to go to the King.
The Chairman. This is a general description of the nature of the abuses of which the people were complaining?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. How long was it after that reconciliation or restoration of confidence in Kalakaua that you remained in Honolula or in the islands?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, the revolution was the 30th day of June, 1887, and I remained there until the middle of July, 1888.
The Chairman. Where did you go then?
Mr. McCandless. I went over to the State of Washington and
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stayed there about a year. But my interests were the same in the islands.
The Chairman. And you returned to the islands?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. And remained there until when?
Mr. McCandless. The 1st day of June, last year.
The Chairman. Where was your place of residence on the islands?
Mr. McCandless. Honolulu.
The Chairman. Were you carrying on this business of sinking wells duning all this time?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. That was your vocation in this country?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you have many men in your employ?
Mr. McCandless. The business varies there. At times I had 30 or 40 men.
The Chairman. Were these wells sunk on private account or Government account?
Mr. McCandless. Mostly on private account.
The Chairman. Did the Government have any interests in any of them?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we have drilled wells for the Government.
The Chairman. Under contract?
Mr. McCandless. Under contract.
The Chairman. Between the period of the establishment of the constitution of 1887 and, I will say, within a year before this recent revolution, what was the state of the public mind, the public order, in Honolulu, I mean among the Hawaiian people?
Mr. McCandless. The state of the public mind from 1887 was that we had made a mistake, a serious one, that we had not carried out our intentions, because the King had no sooner proclaimed the new constitution than he began to reach out for his prerogatives, and it was a conflict from that day up to January, 1893, between the people and the sovereign.
The Chairman. During that period of time do you know of any movement to break down the constitution or of dethroning Liliuokalani or for the purpose of annexation to the United States?
Mr. McCandless. From that period up to the 14th of January of last year?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. McCandless. I do not; except the Ashford and Wilcox conspiracy.
The Chairman. If such an organization as that had existed in Hawaii would you necessarily have known it?
Mr. McCandless. I will state it this way: I was in the revolution of 1887, and was one of the executive committee. I was one of the committee of thirteen that made the constitution of 1887, and I was one of the committee of safety that was organized that afternoon from a large crowd, and I do not think anything of that kind could have been in existence in the Hawaiian Islands and I not know it.
The Chairman. So that your position was a prominent one in connection with this movement that you have been describing?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Now, at what time did you personally get the first information that Liliuokalani had discarded the constitution of 1887, or intended to do so?
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Mr. McCandless. So soon as she came on the throne, or so soon as the remains of Kalakua came back (of course that was the first information that we had of his death), rumors were circulated that she did not intend to, or would not, take the oath under the constitution of 1887. We had information that she hesitated, and that the chief justice urged her, and the friends urged her, to sign the constitution, and she did so with hesitancy. Then, probably in the fall of 1892, my brother came to me with the information that the Queen had a programme. This information came to him, I think, from Mr. Peterson, but I am not sure on that point—that is, her late attorney-general—that the programme was to give the opium to the Chinese, which would win the Chinese; to give the lottery to the gamblers, which would win the gamblers, and to grant a new constitution to the Hawaiiaus. All that was then left were the missionaries, who could go to Hades. That was the programme that was given to me in the fall of 1892. But we did not believe it. There were rumors of that kind constantly through the Legislature during the term of the Legislature of 1892. But anything aside from that—it came to me about half past 1 on Saturday afternoon, the 14th of January.
The Chairman. Do you recollect the month in which the Legislature met?
Mr. McCandless. On the 30th day of May.
The Chairman. And continued in session without interruption?
Mr. McCandless. Without interruption; yes.
The Chairman. Was that an exciting term of the Legislature?
Mr. McCandless. Very much.
The Chairman. And the public attention was brought to its proceedings?
Mr. McCandless. Constantly.
The Chairman. And it was during this session of the Legislature that you heard this rumor, that it was suggested that Liliuokalani intended to overthrow the constitution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. And you stated the information to be that she had in fact attempted or intended to make the attempt to overthrow the constitution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; on the 14th of January I was walking up Fort street and I met Mr. Hopper, a gentleman who has a large rice mill in the Hawaiian Islands and lives just adjoining the palace grounds. He said, "The Queen is up there attempting to promulgate a new constitution." I laughed at it, because she had won everything, and had appointed her own ministers and had control of everything for a year and a half.
The Chairman. And had passed the opium bill?
Mr. McCandless. Had passed the opium and lottery bills, and the ministry would do her bidding.
The Chairman. And you thought that was all she would do?
Mr. McCandless. I thought that was enough for her to do. He said, "You go into Spreckels' bank, and you will find out." I went into Mr. Spreckels' bank, to Mr. Spalding, and I said, "I understand that the Queen is giving us a new constitution." He said, "It is so; I have just come from there." I walked up to the corner of Fort and Merchant streets—that is probably the business center of Honolulu—and the people began to congregate immediately. In a little while the information began to come down from the palace, which was about three blocks from there, of how matters were progressing there. Finally
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the crowd grew to several hundred—of course this was all white people's business—and probably about 2 o'clock, or half past 2 o'clock, the information came down from the ministers to know what support they could get as against the Queen.
The Chairman. Who brought that information?
Mr. McCandless. I could not say; It was sent down by messenger.
The Chairman. Sent to whom?
Mr. McCandless. Just down town. They knew who the business men were and where they would be likely to be.
The Chairman. What did you say was the nature of the message which had been sent?
Mr. McCandless. To know what support the ministers could get from the white people as against the Queen. They went into the office----
The Chairman. Let me understand whether it was the common understanding of the crowd there that the ministers had made such a suggestion or such a request?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Then they went into the office?
Mr. McCandless. Went into the office of W. O. Smith. Someone took a piece of office paper, brown paper such as lawyers use, the size of a sheet of legal cap, and then wrote a heading in lead pencil stating that, "We hereby agree to stand by the ministers against the encroachments of the Queen"—something to that effect. It was only a line or two, and the people as they came in signed that.
The Chairman. About how many?
Mr. McCandless. There may not have been more than a hundred. That included most of the lawyers there. Paul Neumann----
The Chairman. Paul Neumann?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; and Mr. Cecil Brown, an Englishman, who was very much wrought up over the matter. There was scarcely anyone who entered the office, and whom I knew, but signed the paper.
The Chairman. DO you remember any person who refused to sign it?
Mr. McCandless. I do not.
The Chairman. Do you think there were as many as a hundred signatures to the paper?
Mr. McCandless. I should judge so.
The Chairman. What was done with that paper?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know.
The Chairman. Do you know who took charge of it?
Mr. McCandless. It was left on that desk. It was certainly there the next day. In fact, it was there Monday. Of course, the information kept coming down right along, and finally some of the ministers came down.
The Chairman. As I understand you, that was an enrollment of the citizens who were with these ministers in their antagonism to the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Well?
Mr. McCandless. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon two of the ministers came down.
The Chairman. What day?
Mr. McCandless. The same day, within an hour.
The Chairman. Do you mean Saturday or Monday?
Mr. McCandless. Saturday.
Senator Gray. Name the ministers.
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Mr. McCandless. Colburn and Peterson.
The Chairman. They came to Smith's office?
Mr. McCandless. Came down to Smith's office. By this time there were probably 700 or 800 people around there. Of course, there is a very complete system of telephone, and the news was telephoned all over the city. Mr. Colburn came in and someone said, "Make us a speech," and he said, "Do you want a speech?" and they said, "Yes; tell us the story." Mr. Colburn proceeded and told the story.
The Chairman. What position did he hold in Liliuokalani's cabinet at the time?
Mr. McCandless. Minister of the interior. They said: "Tell us the story." He said he had information that morning that the Queen intended to promulgate the new constitution. He said that he immediately carried the news to Judge Hartwell and Mr. Thurston. They had been political enemies, of course, and they had advised the ministers to resist—that is, to refuse to countersign the new constitution, and to do all they could with her to keep her from signing the new constitution. After the Legislature had been prorogued they proceeded to the palace, right across the street, and there she made the speech (which of course is a matter of history) to the effect that she proposed to give the people a new constitution. She asked the ministers to countersign it, and they refused to do so. Mr. Colburn told the story of her becoming very angry, and Mr. Peterson made the remark that the constitution was faulty in some respects, whereupon she replied: "You have had it in your posession for a month and you returned it without any comment, and I took it that it was all right."
The Chairman. That is what Mr. Colburn told the crowd?
Mr. McCandless. That is the speech that Mr. Colburn made to the crowd.
The Chairman. Well?
Mr. McCandless. He stated that they had escaped from there and thought that their lives were in danger; that she had sent for them again, and that at this time she had concluded not to promulgate the new constitution.
Senator Butler. Have you any information as to who it was prepared that constitution for the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. All the information is that she prepared it herself. It is a constitution taken from the constitution of Kamehameha V and some extracts from the constitution of 1887. We got information from Mr. Colburn and, probably, from Chief Justice Judd, who read it, and he noted some changes.
Senator Butler. You say it was claimed that she prepared that constitution herself?
Mr. McCandless. That is what she claimed since.
Senator Butler. Is she capable of writing such a constitution?
Mr. McCandless. She took the constitution of '87 and the constitution of Kamehameha V and prepared it. The constitution of 1887 is very much like the constitution of Kamehameha V, with some vital changes. We compared them.
The Chairman. I want to know what Mr. Colburn said to that crowd, and all that he said, as you remember it. I think where you paused in answer to the question of Senator Butler you were proceeding to state that Mr. Coiburn had said that the Queen had retracted her purpose of promulgating that constitution.
Mr. McCandless. For the time being.
The Chairman. Is that the way he stated it?
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Mr. McCandless. I think so.
The Chairman. Go on.
Mr. McCandless. In regard to Mr. Colburn. "Now," said he, "gentlemen, we want to know what support we can get as against the Queen, because she is apt to do this at any time."
The Chairman. That was in this public speech?
Mr. McCandless. That was in the public speech he was making. He said that the only reason she had desisted was that she was unable to get them to sign the constitution. She got it into her head that it would not be legal unless countersigned by the cabinet, and if she could get the cabinet to sign she felt that she had a legal constitution.
The Chairman. Did Colburn state that?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. That was the strange thing. It was said at the meeting that she did not believe that it would be valid without the signatures of the ministers.
The Chairman. Is that about all that Colburn said?
Mr. McCandless. All that I can remember. Of course, that is the substance.
The Chairman. Was any action taken by that crowd upon that statement made by Mr. Colburn or in consequence of it or immediately afterward ?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. What was it?
Mr. McCandless. Immediately someone—I can not say who it was—proposed that we must have a committee of public safety. It was in a room that was packed, a room a little larger than this and an outer room. The two rooms were packed and Mr. Cooper was seated at the desk. The paper was where the ministers were.
The Chairman. By what number had this paper been signed on Monday?
Mr. McCandless. This was all on Saturday.
The Chairman. Oh, yes; I beg pardon.
Mr. McCandless. Someone made the motion that there be a committee of safety appointed, and someone said, "Appoint Mr. Cooper chairman of the meeting and we will leave it to the chair to pick them out," and that was unanimously agreed to. It was just informal. There had been no organization before that; and in the presence of Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson, Paul Neumann—no, I would not say as to Neumann then; I do not think he was in; he had gone out—the committee of thirteen was picked out, and it was taken from that list of people in the immediate vicinity.
The Chairman. Who picked them out?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Cooper; but he was assisted by two or three gentlemen—suggestions made. The committee of thirteen was selected and someone suggested that they be made a committee of safety, and someone said, "Get out of here," and the rooms were immediately cleaned out, and we began to discuss the situation.
The Chairman. Were you one of the committee?
Mr. McCandless. I was.
The Chairman. Appointed in that way?
Mr. McCandless. Appointed in that way. I said, "I will carry my gun, but I wish to be excused."
The Chairman. You were not excused?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. And you went on the committee?
Mr. McCandless. Went on the committee.
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The Chairman. "What was the first thing the committee did after organization?
Mr. McCandless. The first thing? The doors were closed and some one said: "Gentlemen, we are brought face to face with this question. What shall we do?" And there was but one sentiment prevailed: "The Queen has violated the constitution, and we have to carry it to the end; we can not live in this country; we have to resist that or leave the country."
The Chairman. Whom did you select as chairman of that meeting?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Cooper.
The Chairman. Did you come to any resolution as to what you would do in the way of resisting?
Mr. McCandless. If you will allow me to go back just a little— a couple of hours.
Senator Butler. Did you keep any minutes of your proceedings?
Mr. McCandless. We did not care to keep any minutes then. We were going in to a ticklish business.
Senator Butler. You did not keep any minutes?
Mr. McCandless. I think there were some slight notes. The hardware stores closed at 1 o'clock; but about half past 2 o'clock they all opened again to deal out ammunition and guns to the people, to those who wanted to buy them. Cecil Brown, who had been in the Wilcox cabinet, come to me and said: "You can get all the ammunition you need, if you have not enough." He said: "I have just got my arms." We began to gather up arms and ammunition. I sent my brother to the country to catch a late afternoon train and bring up his arms and ammunition. He had a cattle ranch about 7 miles from town. He went down and returned to town about 7 o'clock with his gun and ammunition. So we began as early as that to prepare to resist; the conclusion was arrived at—of course, it did not come off immediately— at that meeting. It was half past 4 or 5 o'clock when the committee of safety was appointed, and we appointed a committee to see what arms we could get. We discussed the situation and decided that we would go right on now, if we had the entire support of the white population— that we would go ahead and proceed to organize a provisional government.
The Chairman. Was there any resolution for the purpose of ascertaining whether you had the support of the population?
Mr. McCandless. No; and the first meeting was the next morning.
The Chairman. Sunday morning?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Where did you meet then?
Mr. McCandless. At W. R. Castle's.
The Chairman. Was he a member of that committee?
Mr. McCandless. I am not sure about that; I think he was not.
The Chairman. He was a friend to the movement at all events?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. We held the meeting, and one of the first things we decided was to hold a mass meeting and ascertain whether the public of Honolulu was in accord with that sentiment. If it was, we would go ahead and perfect the organization in the meantime as much as possible, and if, at the mass meeting, the whites showed they were anything like they were in 1887, we would proceed with the revolution. The first thing we did at the mass meeting was to send one of the members to a printing office for the purpose of putting out posters immediately.
The Chairman. When was that called?
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Mr. McCandless. At half past 1 Monday, the 16th.
The Chairman. The meeting was determined on and the posters were ordered printed on Sunday?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; and posted that day.
Senator Gray. Posted on Sunday?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you appoint any committee or take any steps in regard to the number of persons who would go into that meeting, and the extent to which they were to be supplied with arms and ammunition?
Mr. McCandless. I will have to go back of that a little. On Saturday afternoon the old officers of the Honolulu Rifles were there among the first men, and they hunted up the rosters of 1887 and hunted up every man they could find, to see how he was fixed for arms and ammunition.
The Chairman. Had that organization been dissolved?
Mr. McCandless. It was dissolved in 1890. It consisted of four companies— a battallion. The old officers began to get the men together and hunt up the arms and ammunition. Aside from still continuing to discuss the situation, they came to the conclusion to call a mass meeting. I do not recall anything that we did there of the details, but discussed the situation generally.
The Chairman. Did you find the movement was a strong one, both to numbers and as to the supply of arms and ammunition?
Mr. McCandless. We found arms and ammunition enough.
The Chairman. How about the men?
Mr. McCandless. That was the question—could we get the men. That was still in the hands of the officers of the different companies that had been organized in 1887 and disbanded in 1890, and they were working on that right straight along.
The Chairman. A sort of recruiting service?
Mr. McCandless. Just a recruiting service that was started before the committee of safety was organized.
The Chairman. When did you become satisfied that you had enough of military strength, consisting of soldiers, arms, and ammunition, to warrant you in starting on the work of revolutionizing the Government?
Mr. McCandless. We were satisfied of that on Monday morning from the reports of the officers of the different companies, and we were satisfied in this way; almost every man we went to said, "What is this for; annexation, or is this a repetition of 1887?" That would be the first question asked us, or asked anyone who was recruiting or talking on the subject. We said, "Of course, there is but one answer to it— provisional government, annexation, and wipe the monarchy out;" and they said they would be with us. Many of us were there in 1887 and took the same stand.
The Chairman. Now, at what time did you first see the proclamation of Liliuokalani after she had receded from her purpose of establishing this new constitution?
Mr. McCandless. That was about 10 o'clock Monday morning, I think. No; I beg pardon; I saw that in the Government building; I saw that about 9 o'clock.
Senator Gray. Saw what?
Mr. McCandless. That she would not attempt to promulgate the new constitution.
Senator Davis. Was it signed?
Mr. McCandless. It was signed. I saw the document. That would be another story. I had business at the foreign office about 9 o'clock
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where all four of the ministers were present, and they showed us the original document signed by Liliuokalani and the ministers.
The Chairman. The four ministers of whom?
Mr. McCandless. The ministers of Liliuokalani.
The Chairman. Was that proclamation scattered around the city?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; broadcast.
The Chairman. Printed?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. It was by authority, then?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; by authority.
The Chairman. It was a paper printed, called "by authority"?
Mr. McCandless. That is what they put at the head.
The Chairman. To indicate its official character?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Notwithstanding that proclamation, your mass-meeting was held when?
Mr. McCandless. About half past 1.
The Chairman. What members assembled?
Mr. McCandless. Just similar to the mass meeting in 1887. There was not a business house in Honolulu that was not closed. All the business houses closed up and the heads of the firms came to the meeting; all factories stopped, all machine shops, all business stopped just as in 1887. There were some events that transpired on Monday morning, the 10th, before the mass meeting. Had we better finish those up?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. McCandless. We met first----
The Chairman. You mean the committee?
Mr. McCandless. On Monday morning the committee of safety met in Mr. Thurston's office. Just as I was going in Marshal Wilson came out of the room with Mr. Thurston. He took him into his private office, and they stayed there some minutes, and Mr. Thurston came back and reported what the conversation was between them. The report in regard to that was that Marshal Wilson said to Mr. Thurston, "Can't this thing be stopped?"
Senator Gray. What did he mean; the meeting?
Mr. McCandless. The movement; the revolution.
Senator Gray. Are you sure he meant the movement, or the meeting?
Mr. McCandless. I will state the whole thing and you will see he meant the movement. Thurston said, "I do not think it can." Marshal Wilson said, "Well, I will guarantee that she won't do that any more; if she attempts it I will lock her up before she can attempt anything again." Mr. Thurston said, "We can't stop on any such guarantee as that; it has gone too far now; we can't stop it." That is the substance of Mr. Thurston's statement to the committee of safety as to what occurred at his interview with Marshal Wilson. Of course, I can not give you the exact words now. Then there was a committee of three appointed from the committee of safety to go up and confer with the ministers. They had requested it in writing, the day before, in a letter to Mr. Thurston. They asked for a conference with the committee of safety, and William Wilder, F. W. McChesney, and myself constituted that committee. We were instructed to go and hear what they had to say, and say nothing. We went up to the Government building and the foreign office. They were all there. We were ushered in, and they were on the other side of the room. We were opposite to them. Finally there was a pause—one of the ministers said, "What is it, gentlemen?" And we said, "We have come up here to see you on
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account of the appointment you asked of Mr. Thurston." One of the ministers said, "We have decided that there is nothing to say, just now; the Queen has just signed a paper that she will not commit an act of this kind again, and agreed to abide by the constitution."
Senator Gray. That was Monday morning?
Mr. McCandless. Monday morning. Of course, we had nothing to say. McChesney said, "What is this mass meeting of yours?" They had gotten out posters late Sunday night.
The Chairman. To whom did he address that question?
Mr. McCandless. To the cabinet.
The Chairman. Name them.
Mr. McCandless. Colburn, Peterson, Parker, and Cornwall.
The Chairman. They were all present?
Mr. McCandless. All present—all four of them. They had gotten out posters calling a mass meeting of the people in Palace Square. McChesney said, "What did you call that meeting for?" Parker said, "To draw the crowd away from your meeting." That, I think, ended the interview. I do not remember anything else being said.
The Chairman. Was that a formal visit of the committee of safety to the Queen's cabinet?
Mr. McCandless. That was a formal visit of a committee of the committee of safety to the cabinet.
The Chairman. Where did it occur?
Mr. McCandless. In the foreign office of the Government building.
Senator Gray. Two members of the cabinet had been before the committee, and said they did not agree with the new constitution, and were at outs with the Queen. That is so?
Mr. McCandless. That is so—down at the public meeting. But there was at that time, as we afterward ascertained—did not know it then—a proclamation drawn up by the ministers, and it was even signed—I think drawn up and in their possession ready to be proclaimed at any time—declaring the Queen deposed and reorganizing the Government. This letter from the cabinet to Thurston, asking for the conference, was in regard to the ministers taking charge of the Government and deposing the Queen entirely, and their entering into the movement with us, we supporting them.
Senator Gray. The first movement was largely initiated by the support of these recalcitrant ministers of the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. I will put it the other way—they were the ones who initiated----
Senator Gray. I say the movement was initiated in support of the recalcitrant ministers against the Queen's proposition to proclaim a new constitution?
The Chairman. At their request.
Mr. McCandless. Yes; at their request.
The Chairman. You spoke of a proclamation drawn up and ready to be signed, or had been signed. What proclamation was that?
Mr. McCandless. That was the proclamation drawn up on Saturday afternoon.
The Chairman. By whom?
Mr. McCandless. I think by Judge Hartwell and Thurston, and probably W. O. Smith and the cabinet.
The Chairman. What cabinet?
Mr. McCandless. Peterson, Colburn, Parker, and Cornwall.
The Chairman. What was included in that proclamation?
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Mr. McCandless. Just declaring that the Queen had violated the constitution, and declaring the throne vacant.
The Chairman. Do you say that paper was signed by anybody?
Mr. McCandless. I understand it was signed by the ministers and ready to be proclaimed if the Queen resisted any further.
The Chairman. It was intended that, if the Queen insisted in going on with her revolutionary projects, the ministers would unite with Thurston and others in issuing a proclamation declaring the throne vacant?
Mr. McCandless. Deposing—declaring the throne vacant. I think that it is rather a mistake; it would be deposing her and wiping the government out of existence as a monarchy. It was together with a movement for annexation.
The Chairman. Why was not that proclamation issued?
Mr. McCandless. I will go back to Saturday afternoon at, say, half past 2 o'clock, when Mr. Neumann was present in W. O. Smith's office. The people began to gather in and get the information of the Queen's attempt to promulgate the new constitution. Then came the cry, "Now is the time to get rid of the whole thing." Neumann said, "Well, I don't know that I would go as far as that." I remember distinctly hearing Neumann make that remark.
Senator Gray. So far as what?
Mr. McCandless. Wiping out the whole monarchy. And on Saturday night—you must remember now that up to half past 1 Saturday afternoon the ministers and the element that promised support were political rivals, political opponents----
Senator Gray. You mean Saturday?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. The ministers on Sunday night had a meeting and came to the understanding that, as the Queen had receded from the position she had taken, their best plan was to try to stop this revolution if they could, at least throw cold water on it, and they still continue as ministers of the Queen.
The Chairman. You are now speaking of the Queen's ministers?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. On Sunday they were in communication with the committee of safety in regard to the next move, the proper move to make to stop the Queen in her mad career and to turn over the Government entirely. There were two communications on Sunday requesting a conference with the committee of safety, the time set being Monday morning at 9 o'clock.
The Chairman. Two communications to whom?
Mr. McCandless. From the ministers to the committee of safety; and it was for that reason that this committee was appointed that went up to the Government building to wait on the cabinet.
The Chairman. We are trying to find out why that proclamation, which you say was drawn, and which you say was signed by the ministers, was not issued.
Mr. McCandless. Simply because this element that had backed the Queen, had been her supporters from the time she had been on the throne, was against the white element of Honolulu. They had not been political friends, and if there was any way in which they could get out of it they would do it.
The Chairman. Is it your idea that they were then experimenting to see whether the safe side for them to take was the side of the monarchy or the side of the revolution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; that was the way it was Sunday; and the best information we had was that at their meeting Sunday, at which
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Macfarlane, Joe Carter, and Paul Neumann were present, they decided that their safest place was to go back on the side of the monarchy. Therefore, when the meeting took place Monday morning they had not anything to say. They had this proclamation of the Queen ready and showed us the original copy.
The Chairman. As I gather from your statement, your idea is that they had become convinced between Saturday and Monday that their personal interests lay in the direction of maintaining this Queen on the throne, and that they were attempting to get and did get from her a declaration that she would carry out the constitution of '87?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; and would not attempt to promulgate the new constitution again.
The Chairman. That was their attitude as you understood it?
Mr. McCandless. That was their attitude as I understood it.
The Chairman. Do you think you can be mistaken about that?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think I was. They met Saturday, asked for aid; we got together, gathered up arms and got recruits to support them, and by Monday morning they had issued this proclamation and posted notices for a counter mass meeting.
The Chairman. And that was after they had given their assent to the proclamation dethroning the Queen and abolishing the monarchy?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. You do not know whether it was signed?
Mr. McCandless. If I understood correctly, it was signed.
The Chairman. As I understand, the whole cabinet, with these two ministers, had given their assent to that?
Mr. McCandless. The whole cabinet had given their assent to that programme on Saturday afternoon. They were completely demoralized, because their lives were in danger.
Senator Frye. You said there were two or three things that you thought were important, and those you stated. Then you got down to the meetings on Monday morning. Now, go back.
The Chairman. I asked you what was done at the mass meeting held by the opponents of the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. All the business houses were shut up, and the whole white population of Honolulu came to the mass meeting.
The Chairman. Do you mean the male population?
Mr. McCandless. The male population; the women did not go, because they were in a terrible state at home.
The Chairman. State of apprehension?
Mr. McCandless. State of apprehension; because before this we had rumors that the half whites proposed to burn the town.
The Chairman. What numbers met there?
Mr. McCandless. I should judge from 1,000 to 1,200.
The Chairman. Were there any armed persons in the crowd?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not think there were, unless individuals with concealed arms.
The Chairman. Were the persons there in the habit of carrying concealed arms about them?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. On that occasion did you know that they were with arms concealed about their persons?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not recollect any one at the meeting.
The Chairman. Did they elect a chairman?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Who was it?
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Mr. McCandless. William C. Wilder.
The Chairman. Were speeches made?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. By whom?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know that I can give you the names; I have them here in this little pamphlet.
The Chairman. Have you an account of the proceedings of that meeting?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; I have a complete account here: "Two weeks of Hawaiian history, from January 14 to the 28th." One of the printing houses printed that. I have read it, and it is a very correct statement.
The Chairman. Are there any statements in that history that you object to as being untrue?
Mr. McCandless. I do not remember any. I have read it over several times.
The Chairman. The facts stated in that history came under your personal observation generally?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; as a general statement.
The Chairman. Are you willing to submit this as your statement of the facts that occurred during that time?
Mr. McCandless. I should not like do that now, without reading it over very carefully.
The Chairman. Were any resolutions adopted at that meeting?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. What were they?
Mr. McCandless. I can give them to you word for word out of that book.
The Chairman. Just read them.
Mr. McCandless. The resolutions are as follows:
"1. Whereas Her Majesty, Liliuokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally, and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;
"2. And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force; and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;
"3. And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful, and would lead to bloodshed and riot, and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;
"4. And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not now promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles, and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;
"5. And whereas at a public meeting of citizens, held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January, instant, a committee of thirteen, to be known as the 'committee of public safety,' was appointed to consider the situation, and to devise ways and means for the maint nance of the public peace and safety, and the preservation of life and property;
"6. And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this, mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such
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action, and has this day presented a report to such meeting, denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending to excite riot, and cause the loss of life and destruction of property:
"Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu, of all nationalities, and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters;
"And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action taken and report made by the said committee of safety; and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order, and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii."
The Chairman. Was that resolution adopted by the meeting?
Mr. McCandless. It was, unanimously.
The Chairman. Was there much enthusiasm exhibited on that occasion?
Mr. McCandless. A good deal. The speakers had all been instructed to be as moderate as possible, and every speaker—whenever there was any allusion to the intentions of the people, they just went wild.
The Chairman. At the time that meeting was being held another meeting was being held, as I understand, by the supporters of the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. What distance was there between the places of the meetings?
Mr. McCandless. Less than half a mile—third of a mile.
The Chairman. Did you visit the meeting in the palace grounds?
Mr. McCandless. Palace Square.
The Chairman. Yes; Palace Square.
Mr. McCandless. No; I did not.
The Chairman. After your meeting dispersed, the meeting of the opponents of the Queen, did the committee of safety reassemble?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Where did you meet?
Mr. McCandless. At W. O. Smith's office.
The Chairman. What steps did you take, if any, to carry out the resolutions which you have just read?
Mr. McCandless. We knew we had the support of the whole white population in the movement on foot. In the morning, at the morning meeting, before this mass meeting, we had drawn up a paper and asked the American minister to land troops to protect life and property.
Senator Gray. When was that?
Mr. McCandless. The Monday morning meeting.
The Chairman. Was that request communicated to the minister before the mass meeting was held?
Mr. McCandless. I believe so.
The Chairman. Do you know who communicated it to him?
Mr. McCandless. No; I could not state. After the mass meeting the information was that the troops were to be landed at 5 o'clock. There was a division in the committee as to whether it was wise for the troops to land then or not. Those who were thinking of their property and their families, and the families of the whole white community,
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----62
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were anxious that the troops should land on account of a fear that the city might be burned and looted, and knowing that the troops were ashore nothing of that kind would take place. On the other hand, there were other members of the committee who felt that if the troops came ashore it would make a changed condition, and we did not know just what the result would be.
The Chairman. Were they apprehensive that if the troops came ashore they would support the Queen, or what were they apprehensive about?
Mr. McCandless. We were absolutely ignorant on that point.
The Chairman. What was the apprehension with regard to the landing of the troops?
Mr. McCandless. We were making such rapid progress with our organization, and the other people so completely cowed, we thought probably it would precipitate a crisis so soon as the troops came ashore, and in a day or two we would be better prepared to resist it than then, and it was between those two ideas the committee was divided.
The Chairman. By precipitating a crisis did you think the troops would attack you?
Senator Frye. The Queen's troops, encouraged by the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. We did not know anything about that.
Senator Gray. Was anything said in your meeting on Saturday, after your committee of safety was formed and you had cleared the room, about Mr. Stevens and the United States ship Boston?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we talked that over.
Senator Gray. So soon as your committee was formed?
Mr. McCandless. Well, its was during the conversation.
The Chairman. On Saturday?
Senator Gray. Yes. Was anything said about the attitude of Mr. Stevens?
Mr. McCandless. It was talked of—what his attitude would be.
Senator Gray. Was anybody deputed to go and see him ?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; I think there was a committee of one or two appointed on Saturday afternoon to have a talk with him, to ascertain what his attitude would be in the then crisis.
Senator Gray. Did that committee report?
Mr. McCandless. The report was that there was no information; that he was entirely noncommittal.
Senator Gray. Who said that?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Thurston, I believe.
Senator Gray. But said he would protect life and property?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. He did not say he was noncommittal?
Mr. McCandless. Well, he was noncommittal as to contending forces; but would protect life and property.
Senator Gray. Was anything said by them that conveyed the idea to you that Mr. Stevens was hostile or indifferent to the movement ot the committee of safety, or was without sympathy for it?
Mr. McCandless. I think not.
Senator Gray. Anything at all?
Mr. McCandless. I think we felt this way, that without any encouragement from him we certainly had the sympathy of the American minister.
Senator Gray. That was the general feeling, was it not?
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Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. A committee was sent to Minister Stevens to request him not to land the troops then?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we did not feel certain that night, and thought we would get our strength better in a day or two.
Senator Gray. That the landing of the troops might bring on a crisis?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. If you were not as well prepared as you thought you would be later?
Mr. McCandless. No, sir.
The Chairman. Was there a request sent to Mr. Stevens not to land the troops?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Who composed that committee?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Thurston and W. O. Smith.
The Chairman. Did they report to the committee of safety?
Mr. McCandless. They did.
The Chairman. What was the report?
Mr. McCandless. The report was that Mr. Stevens said, owing to the unsettled state of affairs he was going to land troops.
Senator Frye. He would not change his purpose?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. You had previously asked Mr. Stevens to request the landing of the troops?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Had any troops landed at the time he announced his intention to have them landed notwithstanding your request?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. What time Monday afternoon was that?
Mr. McCandless. At the time of the meeting?
The Chairman. No; the time you got this report?
Mr. McCandless. Probably a quarter to 5, from half-past 4 to quarter of 5.
The Chairman. How long after this report was made of Mr. Stevens's refusal to prevent the landing of the troops before they were actually landed?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think it was over a half hour, perhaps three-quarters.
The Chairman. They must have been on their way to the shore at that time?
Mr. McCandless. I presume they were. I did not know.
The Chairman. Did the committee of safety, acting under the resolutions of which you have spoken, prepare any programme for the organization of the civil government?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. We began that. That was discussed hurriedly Saturday evening. It was more in detail on Sunday morning; but by Monday morning we had the plan completed.
The Chairman. Projected?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. After you got the indorsement of the mass meeting you proceeded to execute the programme which you had already agreed upon?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you at the meeting at Mr. Castle's on Sunday morning?
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Mr. McCandless. I was.
Senator Gray. By which was appointed the committee that waited on Minister Stevens and reported?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Who reported, Mr. Thurston?
Mr. McCandless. I think it was Mr. Thurston and Mr. Smith. They were the gentlemen who were appointed first.
Senator Gray. Do you recollect what they reported then at that meeting?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, they went to see what would be the probable attitude of the American minister in the case of our uprising.
Senator Gray. What did they report?
Mr. McCandless. They reported that Mr. Stevens, in regard to that point, was noncommittal.
Senator Gray. Did he not say he would land the troops at any moment to protect life and property?
Mr. McCandless. He did.
Senator Gray. Did he not say that he would recognize the Provisional Government or whatever government it might be?
Mr. McCandless. I think there was a report of that kind.
Senator Gray. That Stevens would recognize the Provisional Government when established?
Mr. McCandless. When there was any in existence.
Senator Gray. When it was in existence?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did the committee of safety select the officers of the Provisional Government?
Mr. McCandless. They did.
The Chairman. And selected Mr. Dole as President?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. I will tell the story of that. All that happened at the meeting at Mr. Waterhouse's----
Senator Gray. Monday evening?
Mr. McCandless. Monday evening. We were there until, perhaps, 11 or 12 o'clock.
The Chairman. What took place at the meeting at Mr. Waterhouse's house?
Mr. McCandless. At that meeting when we proceeded to appoint the members of the advisory council and the members of the executive council, we sent a committee of one, Mr. Bolte, to Judge Dole asking him if he would take the position of president of the Provisional Government. Mr. Dole, at that time Judge Dole, knew no more of the workings of the committee of safety than any other outsider, and Judge Dole gave Mr. Bolte no encouragement at all. But finally, after entreaties on the part of Mr. Bolte, he came and said he did not care about that at first; finally he said he would come to the meeting. Judge Dole came to the meeting, and of course we stated to him at the meeting that we desired him to become president of the Provisional Government which we were about to inaugurate. At first he declined entirely; that is, at first, he could not see his way clear. He finally made the statement, after talking quite a while, that he had not arrived at the conclusion yet that that was the only solution of the matter— that is, a provisional government looking to annexation. Then he was asked what his opinion was. He said, my opinion is—of course Llliuokalani is out of the question; she has started this revolution, and can not be trusted any longer—my opinion is that Kaiulani would be best for us; to have Kaiulani on the throne with a regency until she is of age.
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That was Judge Dole's statement to the meeting on Monday evening at 8 o'clock. That was argued with him, and finally before he left he agreed to take it under advisement and consult with his friends and let the committee know the next day.
Senator Gray. That was at Mr. Waterhouse's house Monday evening?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was anything said about Mr. Stevens then?
Mr. McCandless. I think so.
Senator Gray. Were the United States troops mentioned?
Mr. McCandless. We talked over everything.
Senator Gray. The attitude of the United States minister and the landing of the troops were talked over?
Mr. McCandless. We had a good deal of business on hand.
Senator Gray. You say you talked over everything, and that was talked over?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was any committee sent to Minister Stevens that evening?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I remember. No committee—I do not think there was. We also invited Mr. Cecil Brown there. Mr. Cecil Brown is an Englishman and has quite a large following there. We wanted him very much to be one of the new government, and, of course, he came there. The whole plan was laid before him, the intentions of the committee and the appointment of the Provisional Government, including the application for annexation to the United States. Mr. Wundenburg and I individually talked to Mr. Brown, perhaps a half hour, to convince him that he should see it in our light and come over and be one of the supporters. We retired from the room, went out on the veranda, and continued our entreaties with him to try to get him to come in the government, and, of course, we laid the whole matter before him. Finally he said to us, "Let me alone." Said he, "I will solve this for myself." He said, "If I decide not to become part of the government no one living will know that I was here," and after staying out there, probably an hour, he retired, and could not see his way clear to coming in there. Afterwards he became a member of the advisory council. As I stated, Judge Dole took it under consideration and went home. I think we selected most of the names of the Provisional Government. They had been selected up to that time. The first idea was to have 4 ministers and a President, but in picking out 5 men that we thought could agree, we found difficulties. In fact, we consulted Judge Dole in regard to that. So that we finally gave up the idea of 5, and came to the conclusion that we could find 4 men who could work very harmoniously in the government.
Senator Gray. Had Minister Stevens been advised of the project for a Provisional Government and annexation to the United States ?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether it was understood there that he knew what was going on?
Mr. McCandless. Well, everybody knew it.
Senator Gray. Did you not understand that he knew it; was not that your opinion?
Mr. McCandless. It would be my opinion that he would know.
Senator Gray. Do you not know now, and did you not know then, that he did understand it?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not know it.
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Senator Gray. It was not talked about?
Mr. McCandless. Oh, it was discussed, certainly.
Senator Gray. In what respect was it discussed?
Mr. McCandless. It was discussed in respect to what would be the attitude of the American minister.
Senator Gray. Was it thought his attitude would be sympathetic or unsympathetic?
Mr. McCandless. There were doubts about that.
Senator Gray. Were there any doubts that Mr. Stevens sympathized with the movement.
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you doubt it?
Mr. McCandless. It was doubted that much that we requested him, after we requested the troops to be landed, not to have them landed, for fear it would precipitate a crisis.
Senator Gray. Had you any doubt at that time in regard to Mr. Stevens's sympathies with this movement?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think there was any serious doubt in my mind about it, although I was one of the members who took the side that we would stand a better show on Monday afternoon not to have the troops landed.
Senator Gray. When did you want them landed?
Mr. McCandless. Well, I thought we had better be let alone. The idea prevailed that they had better be let alone, and when the crisis came he would land them himself.
Senator Gray. Then it was your idea it would be better not to have them landed? I see it stated here that the proposition of the committee was that they should be landed the next morning at 9 or 10 o'clock. When did you think they should be landed?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think there was a time stated. We thought it was better to let them stay there because the crisis would be precipitated.
Senator Daniel. What were you afraid of in that crisis?
Mr. McCandless. The Queen's forces.
Senator Daniel. That they would suppress the revolution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; might attempt it.
Senator Daniel. Do you think they could do it?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think so.
Senator Daniel. Did you then think so?
Mr. McCandless. We did not think so Monday morning. Minister Thurston defied Marshal Wilson in his interview with him.
Senator Frye. But as I understand you the uncertainty was as to what effect the landing of the troops would have; whether it would encourage the Queen's troops?
Mr. McCandless. We did not know what effect it would have— encouragement or otherwise.
Senator Frye. The landing of the troops the last time had put Kalakaua on the throne, had it not?
Mr. McCandless. Of course in 1889 the movement was an intrigue that both Kalakaua and Mrs. Dominis were in, and they were taken by complete surprise.
Senator Frye. The troops had the aid of the King, the existing Government?
Mr. McCandless. I can not say as to that.
Senator Frye. He remained on the throne, did he not?
Mr. McCandless. That movement in 1889 was not to put him on the throne; he was on the throne.
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Senator Gray. Had you not heard before the meeting on Monday evening, if not at that meeting, that Minister Stevens would land the troops to protect American life and property, and that he would recognize that Provisional Government so soon as it had possession of the Government building?
Mr. McCandless. That he would recognize the Provisional Government whenever it was a government.
Senator Gray. That he would consider the Government—put it that way—when it had possession of the Government building?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not think so.
Senator Gray. What did you understand?
Mr. McCandless. When we had the upper hand he would recognize us.
Senator Gray. What did you understand? Did you not suppose during Monday or Tuesday that the presence of the United States troops was the important factor one way or the other? or do you mean to say that you gave no account to it at all?
Mr. McCandless. I say it had its bearing. It stopped all ideas of riot and bloodshed.
Senator Gray. Did you not think it stopped all idea of your movement?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think so. Our movement was weaker Monday morning than Monday evening.
Senator Gray. Do you not think the landing of the United States troops stopped all idea of the movement?
Mr. McCandless. On their part?
Senator Gray. I am not talking from a standpoint one way or the other. It is quite possible from what you say if I had been there I would have been where you were. I am not criticising you. But as a matter of fact, looking at it, state, under the responsibilities you are under as a witness, if you did not believe that the idea of your movement was entirely dissipated by the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not think so.
Senator Gray. You think it would have been precisely as it was if there had been no troops there at that moment of time?
Mr. McCandless. If you take into consideration the movement of 1887, how we won then, and could have set up a government, and the whites taken by surprise in 1889, yet maintained their supremacy----
Senator Gray. You supported the existing government in 1887?
Mr. McCandless. We did not support them in 1887. Of course, there was a complete overthrow of the monarchy.
Senator Gray. Did it continue?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. In view of those facts—you were going on to say?
Mr. McCandless. In view of those facts we had the same amount of confidence that any man had who had been through the same thing, and there was no reason why we should not win again.
Senator Frye. You were going on to state how they formed this provisional government. You got the notice to Dole and notice to Cecil Brown and stated that they were awaiting replies.
Mr. McCandless. Of course Mr. Brown left. We did not expect him to go in after that. And then we began to pick out the members for the advisory council. I think we agreed that night on the executive council—the four ministers—and we selected most of the names for the advisory council. We probably stayed there until 11 or half past 11 o'clock, and then adjourned until the next morning.
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Senator Frye. Was that Monday night?
Mr. McCandless. That was Monday night. We met the next morning at Mr. Smith's office.
Senator Gray. That was Tuesday?
Mr. McCandless. Tuesday morning. By that time we had before us the programme for the Provisional Government, and Mr. Damon had been selected as one of the members of the advisory council. That morning he was at our meeting for the first time, and he made a statement to the committee that he had just come from the palace. He stated his interview with the Queen, and he stated that he said to Her Majesty, "On former occasions you have called on me for advice, and I now come unasked to give you some advice; you can take it or reject it just as you choose." He said, "Heretofore I have defended the monarchy, and thought it was possible to get along with it; but it has got to that point now, after your actions on Saturday, that I have to change my standard, and I have joined the forces who propose to annex these islands to the United States of America;" and he said, "It would be useless for you to resist; if you do there will be bloodshed and a great many killed; you will probably be killed, and we will win in the end, because we are determined to carry this through." She assured him that she would give up.
Senator Gray. Did he mention to the Queen the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. No; that was the statement made to the then committee of safety.
Senator Gray. Mr. Damon said he did mention to the Queen the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, I am giving you the substance.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether he mentioned the fact to her of the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. That may be so; I do not remember.
Senator Gray. Where did you get this information?
Mr. McCandless. From Mr. Damon, and Mr. Damon reported it. We were busy on the papers in connection with the Government, and probably about 10 or 11 o'clock I was informed—did not happen to be present—that Judge Dole had come in and announced that he had made up his mind, and had taken the position of president. I was out in the meantime recruiting; had been hunting up men; all around men were waiting for the word to fly to arms, and the time was set for 2 o'clock. It is well known; they knew it just as well as we did. I learned it afterwards that that was the time set for the overturn of the Government. At half past 1 we had finished everything; the proclamation was signed, and all the papers in relation to the Government were signed and delivered. There was nothing to do then but to get to the Government building and take it, and launch the new Government. About that time Judge Dole came to me and said, "McCandless, will you go and get the troops ready; we are ready;" and of course I said, "yes." So I started out. If I had a map I could show just exactly the course I took in getting to the Government building. I started from W. O. Smith's office, at the corner of Fort and Merchant streets. Just as I came out of the door a car was passing that went right past the armory on the corner of Beretania and Punchbowl streets, and of course that was our headquarters. That was where we had agreed upon to rally the troops before starting for the Government building. When I got to the corner of King and Fort streets the car was passing.
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The streets are very narrow at that point; there is only room for a carriage to pass. I heard a policeman's whistle. I ran to the rear end of the car, and found that John Goode had come out of E. O. Hall's with guns aud ammunition, and a policeman was trying to stop him. There was a dray that blocked the way, and the policeman was trying to get on the wagon. There is where I cried out to Goode to shoot, and he did. And I hollered for them to shut up their shops and get their guns, and they came right out lively. When I got to Beretania street I saw this first company making for the armory. They had been in the building from 6 o'clock in the morning. It was Ziegler's company, A. They started for the armory all together, with Winchesters and everything. When I got there I jumped off the car, and told them of the shooting of the policeman. They double-quicked to the armory, and Goode with his load of ammunition had gone up that street there, and along there down to the armory. [Indicating on diagram.] By this time our friends were arriving in all directions, coming in there single and double, with arms.
Senator Gray (indicating on the diagram). Is this a thickly settled part of the city?
Mr. McCandless. All this is a residence part.
Senator Gray. Thickly settled?
Mr. McCandless. Pretty thickly settled, grounds around—all these lots extending here for the next 5 miles, clear to Waikiki. Just as soon as there were enough arrived to take care of what we had collected, the wagonload, the first company was sent to the Government building with Capt. Zeigler. They marched down to this corner into the Government building yard. I stayed there [indicating on the diagram].
Senator Gray. Which front of the Government building was the proclamation read from?
Mr. McCandless. On the front steps of the Government building, facing the palace. I stayed there until the third company marched down. I came down with the third company. There were four companies and all the men conveyed the arms to the Government building. When I arrived there they had finished reading the proclamation. This is police headquarters, just a block from where we were, and all through these streets here were full of people—2,000 or 3,000 people in the streets. When that shot was fired the people left and came down town. They thought the war had commenced down there. Some one came to the committee of safety and reported that now was a good opportunity to go up; the streets were entirely bare going to the Government building, and they came out and marched up to the Government building a few minutes earlier than they would have done if there had been no firing of the shot.
Senator Frye. They got up there before the troops did?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. On that account the way was all open, and nothing to interfere.
Senator Frye. How many were there altogether?
Mr. McCandless. There were 18 altogether. I was one of them.
Senator Frye. Eighteen of what?
Mr. McCandless. The committee was composed of 13 members in the first place, and when the men were appointed it was found that there was some good man to come in, and it was increased to 14, and the 4 ministers were put in, which made 18.
Senator Frye. You went yourself where the military was?
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Mr. McCandless. Yes. And I think the other company marched up together.
Senator Frye. But you did not see them?
Mr. McCandless. I did not see them. I was sent off on other business. That is a statement up to the proclamation. When I got up to the Government building, just as fast as the men came in and the guns came in they were given to the men, and they organized the Provisional Government. They immediately wrote letters to all the foreign ministers there, stating that they had organized a government, and had charge of the public buildings and archives.
Senator Frye. Did you go into the councils of the Provisional Government, or stay in the military?
Mr. McCandless. I carried my gun up there, and I was sent for, and I went out of the ranks into where the councils were. I know the first gentleman who called there was Maj. Wodehouse, the English minister. When he came in President Dole was sitting at a table about the size of this, at one end of it, and the members of the council around through the room. Mr. Wodehouse came in on that side and came around to President Dole and shook hands. I did not hear what was said; but the statement of President Dole afterwards was that the minister hoped the Government would protect Englishmen— see that the English subject's property was not jeopardized. And the Japanese minister was right behind him. He came in and spoke to President Dole, and did not speak afterwards. Then he and Mr. Wodehouse went out.
Senator Frye. What time was that?
Mr. McCandless. That was probably 4 o'clock; I think a little later than that Mr. Pringle called; just came in, did not say anything, just looked around and left.
Senator Frye. When did you send a communication to Mr. Stevens that you had proclaimed your government?
Mr. McCandless. They were all sent together.
Senator Frye. When you sent the messages to the other ministers?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. That was between 2 and 3 o'clock.
Senator Frye. When did you get your answer from minister Stevens?
Mr. McCandless. I think it came from him about half-past 4.
Senator Frye. After the English minister and the Japanese minister had called?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Some others came?
Mr. McCandless. Those were the only two that came, Mr. Wodehouse and Mr. Fuge.
Senator Gray. Did any others come in?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Canavara came later.
Senator Frye. Who was he?
Mr. McCandless. The Portuguese minister.
Senator Gray. Do you recollect when the reception of the note of recognition from Minister Stevens was?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; I was there when it came.
Senator Gray. You can not fix the time?
Mr. McCandless. Things were in such confusion that I could not fix the time exactly; but it was 4 or half-past 4 that the note of recognition came.
Senator Gray. Had Capt. Wiltse been in?
Mr. McCandless. I am not sure whether he came.
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Senator Gray. Had Mr. Swinburne been in? Mr. McCandless. They were in during the evening before dark; I mean the afternoon.
Senator Gray. Were they there before or after you sent out the notices?
Mr. McCandless. After the notices; I do not think any before.
Senator Gray. Had you any conversation with them that afternoon?
Mr. McCandless. No; I was kept busy on military matters and was in and out of the building.
Senator Gray. Did you see any of the United States forces, bluejackets, whatever they were?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, I knew where they were.
Senator Gray. Did you see them?
Mr. McCandless. No; not that I remember.
Senator Gray. Did you see the sentries?
Mr. McCandless. I did not pass the gate, so, of course, I could not see the sentries.
Senator Gray. Where were you; in the foreign minister's office?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, if I had come out to the front of the building and looked directly to the left—no; I could not see the gate from there, I would have to step out into the yard to the side gate. That I could see, but the front gate I could not, because of the Music Hall.
Senator Gray. Were you in the ranks, or a private?
Mr. McCandless. I was in the ranks.
Senator Gray. You had no officers?
Mr. McCandless. We took the officers of '87.
Senator Gray. You had officers, then?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you have any military organization at the time you went there, or did you just go as you pleased?
Mr. McCandless. Oh, no; came up there organized.
Senator Gray. Did you have any communication, or any of the officers, with the commander of the U. S. troops?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not think there was any one who had communication with the officers of the U. S. troops.
Senator Gray. Did I interrupt you? You got where these ministers came in, and you knew of the note of recognition from Minister Stevens, and so on.
Mr. McCandless. Probably a little earlier than that, probably 3 o'clock or a little after, a deputy marshal was sent up from down at the police headquarters. He came in and asked that the ministers— our ministers—go down to the police station in order to see if we could not effect a compromise. That is the statement he made. He said he was authorized to make the statement. That, of course, was refused. He said: "There are some of the ministers who would be glad to come up, but they are afraid."
Senator Gray. That is, of the old ministers?
Mr. McCandless. The old ministers, the Queen's ministers. I think he said if a couple of gentlemen will come down, that will inspire confidence in our ministers, and they will come up. He went back with word that if they would come up there would be no harm done; they would be allowed to come and depart again; and so Mr. Parker—there were two of them came up; I am not sure which two; but I think it was Parker and Cornwall came up, and Mr. Parker came in as good
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natured as possible. He is a great big, good-natured Hawaiian. They had a little friendly chat.
Senator Gray. Do you mean a native?
Mr. McCandless. He is a native, a half white.
Senator Frye. About the color of the rest of them?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; about the color of the rest. He said: "Can't we fix this thing up? We don't want to be fighting you people." We told him that there could be no compromise. He said: "I wanted the others to come up with me, but they would not come; they were afraid." And I think he volunteered the statement that if we would send one or two men down it would inspire confidence in them. Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte accompanied them back to the police station. In a short time all the Queen's ministers came to the Government building, and on behalf of President Dole a demand was made on them for the surrender of the barracks and the surrender of the police station. They said they would go over and see Her Majesty, and that some one should accompany them. Mr. Damon accompanied them. The ministers went over to the palace and stayed there an hour—between an hour and an hour and a half. In the meantime we moved from the interior office and went to the finance office so that this front office might be turned over to the military; that is, the council did. Then Mr. Damon came back with some one representing the Queen. I think it was Parker. This protest was written out, and it was presented to Judge Dole, and he was asked to acknowledge the receipt of it. He acknowledged the receipt of the paper just as any officer or anyone would acknowledge the receipt of a paper.
Senator Gray. Who handed it to him?
Mr. McCandless. I cannot say whetherit was Parker or Mr. Damon.
Senator Gray. But you can say what was said when it was handed?
Mr. McCandless. That I can remember. The paper was handed to President Dole. He made a statement; said, "Here is a protest they want to file, and I do not see any objection to acknowledging the receipt of it."
Senator Gray. Did he say that?
Mr. McCandless. It was something to that effect. Of course, it is hard to remember the words in an exciting time like that, and a year ago. But he said, "I do not see any objection," or words to that effect
Senator Gray. You understood that there was some point made before about the reception of that protest by President Dole?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Do you say you can not recollect the words?
Mr. McCandless. I do not recollect the exact words. It is hard to do that. I have a pretty good memory, but it is hard to get those exact words; but they were just the words that "I do not know of any objection to acknowledging the receipt of this dispatch which is presented."
Senator Gray. He did receive it?
Mr. McCandless. Just indorsed it, and handed it back to them.
Senator Gray. He did receive it?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; and the paper was indorsed and handed back to Parker. He took it off. He wrote the words there, I do not remember what they were, just acknowledging service. Then it got to be pretty nearly 7 o'clock, dark, and they said that the police station was surrendered, and everything was surrendered, and they deputized Soper, who had been appointed commander-in chief, to go down and demand the surrender of the police station, and take it, and there were
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20 men deputized under Capt. Ziegler to accompany us. We marched down Merchant street.
Senator Gray. That was after the protest had come in?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you have an order from the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. No; we marched down and halted the troops in front of the post-office, in the line of Bethel street, probably within 75 feet of it. We, Col. Soper and I, had to force our way, the streets were jammed, and the troops were halted there. We marched forward into the station house and the marshal's office, and demanded the surrender. They had their Gatling gun and had commenced to take it apart to get it away. The doors were so narrow tbey could not get it from one part of the building to the other without taking it apart.
Senator Gray. Who was there?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Wilson.
Senator Gray. Was there any order from the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know that there was.
Senator Gray. Do you know of any order from the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Do you not know that Marshal Wilson received an order from the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. I do not; I never heard of it. He then invited us into the deputy marshal's office, and we talked over the details of the government, and he ordered the men to assemble below. It was just as strong there of liquor as any place I was ever in—to get up Dutch courage. They had a barrel down there.
Senator Gray. What sort of liquor did you drink?
Mr. McCandless. The natives prefer gin. We went down below in the back yard, and Marshal Wilson made a speech to the men and Col. Soper made one to them, and that ended the formal turning over of the station house to the Provisional Government. I then went out into the street and told Capt. Ziegler to march his men in. We marched them into one of the rooms, took charge of it, and went back.
Senator Gray. How many Gatling guns were there?
Mr. McCandless. One.
Senator Gray. How many cannon?
Mr. McCandless. The cannon were at the barracks.
Senator Gray. How many arms were there? Did you take any account of the arms delivered?
Mr. McCandless. There was not then; there was that night.
Senator Gray. You did not take any account?
Mr. McCandless. No. I went back to the Government building. In the first place Mr. Wundenburg had been selected to be put in charge of the station house; but Mr. Wundenburg protested against it, saying, "I have been a lifelong friend of Mr. Wilson, and it is pretty hard to go down there and ask him to surrender; you send Soper and McCandless to take charge of it, and when Wilson is gone I will go down." A brother of mine went down with Wundenburg and took charge of the station house, and they were in charge of it for several days.
Senator Gray. Where did you go when you went from the station house?
Mr. McCandless. Back to the Government building.
Senator Gray. Into the council room ?
Mr. McCandless. Into the council room.
Senator Gray. Do you know what time it was then ?
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Mr. McCandless. Eight o'clock, or half past 8.
Senator Gray. Did you see any United States troops then?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Did you go over there that evening at all?
Mr. McCandless. Went past.
Senator Gray. Did you have any communication with them at all?
Mr. McCandless. No, not any person.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether anybody furnished the United States troops with provisions that night?
Mr. McCandless. They had their own provisions.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether anybody connected with the city or Provisional Government, the committee of safety, furnished or caused to be furnished refreshments or provisions to the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I know.
Senator Gray. Either that night or the next morning?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; the next day, I believe, the ladies went down and got them coffee.
Senator Gray. Do you know of any man, not ladies, who interested himself in doing it?
Mr. McCandless. No. There may have been; I do not know.
Senator Gray. Have you heard of anyone?
Mr. McCandless. No; not on that point.
Senator Gray. Coffee was furnished them?
Mr. McCandless. I think it was.
Senator Gray. DO you know whether Mr. Carter had anything to do with it?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Do you know who dug that latrine that night?
Mr. McCandless. I heard afterwards.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether any of the committee of safety or anybody connected with the Provisional Government had anything to do with digging that latrine?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Do you know how long coffee was furnished them in the way you have described?
Mr. McCandless. For a day or so coffee was furnished them.
Senator Gray. By whom?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Knowltie.
Senator Gray. Who is he?
Mr. McCandless. He has an eating house down town.
Senator Gray. Do you know at whose instance?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; at the instance of the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. That was in addition to their rations?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was it not at the instance of the Provisional Government that that coffee was furnished on Wednesday morning?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know. I think the ladies furnished that.
Senator Gray. On Tuesday evening?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know of anything being done Tuesday evening.
Senator Gray. You were otherwise engaged?
Mr. McCandless. Otherwise engaged.
Senator Gray. You were not in the commissary business then?
Mr. McCandless. No; we had more serious business on hand, at
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least we thought we had when we got back to the Government building that evening. There was not much done except proceeding immediately to organize a commission and charter a steamer to send the commissioners to the United States to negotiate for annexation. That was done that night. I do not think we adjourned until 11 o'clock.
The Chairman. Who was in charge of the Treasury, the Hawaiian money, at the time this revolution took place?
Mr. McCandless. It was in the Government building.
The Chairman. Who had charge of it?
Mr. McCandless. George Smithies was in charge. He was the register of accounts.
The Chairman. Did he become a member of the Provisional Government?
Mr. McCandless. He was kept there, and within the last two months he has been dismissed.
The Chairman. Was there any actual capture of the money by the Provisional Government.
Mr. McCandless. The information was that they went up there to inquire for the ministers, the advisory and executive councils. Of course it merged right from the committee of safety into them. They asked for the Queen's ministers, and they were not in there, and they asked for the chief clerk, Mr. Hassinger, and demanded the keys, and they were turned over.
The Chairman. That carried with it the custody of the money?
Mr. McCandless. Yes, and of the Government departments—all the affairs of the Government.
The Chairman. Did the affairs move along as smoothly under the Provisional Government as they had before? I mean the ordinary routine of the Government?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we had taken the precaution to put men over the fire department.
The Chairman. I am not speaking about mob violence, but the civil government. Did it go on before?
Mr. McCandless. Yes, one of the first things was to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law. That was Tuesday evening.
The Chairman. Who did that?
Mr. McCandless. The Provisional Government.
The Chairman. By proclamation?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; by proclamation.
The Chairman. From that time and as long as you remained in Honolulu, was there any outbreak or any mob violence, or any assemblage of citizens that appeared to be riotous?
Mr. McCandless. No, wfth the exception of one night. One night, probably I can not give that night, it was after the Garnet, an English war ship, came in. The United States men had liberty and the Englishmen had liberty, and very late at night, 9 or 10 o'clock at night, the streets on which most of the saloons are, a great many half whites got around there and got to talking with these English sailors; got to patting them on the back and telling them to go for the Yankee sailors, and so the Englishmen attacked some of the Americans.
The Chairman. A sort of sailors' fight?
Mr. McCandless. I think there were some natives.
The Chairman. Was any force used to put down that fight?
Mr. McCandless. No; the native people are not a hard people to handle at all, and if the marshal had done his duty there would not have been much of that.
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Senator Gray. When was that?
Mr. McCandless. That was probably the middle of February. I can not say the date.
The Chairman. Who was the marshal?
Mr. McCandless. George Ashley. He was appointed and removed afterwards.
The Chairman. Was any force used to put down that riot?
Mr. McCandless. Oh, no; that was allowed just to quietly subside.
The Chairman. Was there any occasion since the establishment of the Provisional Government when there were any riots which rendered it necessary, or it appeared to be necessary, to put them down?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. The country has been in a peaceful state under the Provisional Government?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; there was only one thing they were afraid of, and that was incendiarism. Of course, we heard of that constantly— heard of it from the men it came from.
The Chairman. Threats of burnings?
Mr. McCandless. Threats of burnings.
The Chairman. After you had organized your force under Col. Soper on Tuesday the 17th, did you have any apprehension that Queen Liliuokalani could marshal a military force or armed citizens' force of sufficient magnitude and strength to reinstate her in her possession of the Government?
Mr. McCandless. No; but we did not take any chances on that— we continued to perfect our organization and to extend it so as to be ready for anything of that kind.
The Chairman. Taking all you know about the Hawaiian Islands and the native population and the warmth of the men who were engaged in and are now carrying on this Provisional Government, is it your opinion that Liliuokalani has any chance toward reinstating herself without the intervention of some foreign government?
Mr. McCandless. None whatever. She has not had from the first.
The Chairman. Did you regard the movement from the time it was inaugurated as one determined and resolute, or one that might give way to some counter movement on the Queen's part—some concessions on her part?
Mr. McCandless. There never was any such idea prevailed there that I know of. It was one of strict determination. We sent the commissioners to San Francisco. When we found that annexation had not taken place under Mr. Harrison's administration we felt that our interests were in just as good hands under President Cleveland. We did not see how the dial could be turned backward.
The Chairman. You say that annexation was the ultimate result of this revolution—that such was the belief of those who were engaged in it?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. You could not have gotten the men to take up arms otherwise. The whole object was annexation.
The Chairman. You spoke of that being the case the year before.
Mr. McCandless. That was only a stepping-stone—the annexation movement in '87.
The Chairman. Do you know whether the Kanaka population, the native population, sympathize in that sentiment?
Mr. McCandless. In '87 they did. Nearly the whole native population was on our side—sympathized with the movement. Of course there were none of them taken into the organization.
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The Chairman. Was that distinctively an annexation movement in'87?
Mr. McCandless. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. What change, if any, has occurred since that time?
Mr. McCandless. The natives were completely captured with the idea of the lottery being there, and that there would be no further trouble about having all the money they needed if they could get the lottery. They were carried away with that idea. The native is like an Indian; he will spend all the money he can get to gamble.
The Chairman. They are gamblers?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. What is their principal game, cards?
Mr. McCandless. They do not care for cards. They have a Chinese game there called "Paka Pia" and che-fah. There were as high as fifteen to twenty games running in the city at a time. That consisted of going in and buying the tickets, guessing a number or a word. It was a Chinese game, and they were very fond of it. It was a very common report that the marshal's office was receiving $500 a week to allow that game to continue—receiving the money from these different banks. The Chinese cook that I had at my place told me of it. The Chinese do not think anything of bribing, and the games are controlled by the Chinese. He said that the marshal got $500 a week and the deputy marshal so much, and the others still less, making about a thousand dollars a week that was paid.
The Chairman. This Hawaiian sympathy. Had that died out before the revolution?
Mr. McCandless. I think it had.
The Chairman. Among Kanakas.
Mr. McCandless. I think so, although the annexation question had not been discussed publicly until the last two or three years. It was discussed then publicly through the press and openly.
The Chairman. And that sentiment died out because they thought they could get the money under a separate government through lottery schemes and such like?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. I know the leaders of the last Legislature, among the natives, would pat their pockets, right in the legislative chamber, and say, "Here is what we are here for." It had gotten to that condition. I have seen that myself, right in the legislative hall.
The Chairman. By the members of the Legislature?
Mr. McCandless. By the members of the Legislature.
Senator Gray. The white members?
Mr. McCandless. The half-whites. It had gotten to that pass that it was just about as corrupt as it could be.
The Chairman. What time did you leave the islands to come over here?
Mr. McCandless. The 1st day of June.
The Chairman. Did you leave to come here to give your testimony?
Mr. McCandless. No. I have larger interests in the State of Washington than I have in the Hawaiian Islands. Like many people there, I come to the States to invest my money. I went to the State of Washington in 1886. My partner stayed there, and has been there ever since, and as I accumulate money I take it to the State of Washington.
The Chairman. Your visit to the United States is merely on business?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. I would not have come over except that I promised my family to come to the Fair.
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----63
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Senator Gray. Where is your family?
Mr. McCandless. I have two homes—one in Honolulu and the other in the State of Washington. I brought my family with me.
The Chairman. Your citizenship is in the United States?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; a citizen of both countries.
The Chairman. You are a citizen of the United States and vote under the Hawaiian constitution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. But your visit to the United States had no connection with the maintenance of the Provisional Government.
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. You had no political mission over here?
Mr. McCandless. No; just on my private affairs.
The Chairman. And you were summoned here from Seattle?
Mr. McCandless. No; Ellensburg is my home.
Senator Frye. As a member of the committee of safety did you expect at any time, from the commencement of the revolution down to its close, to receive any support whatever from the American minister or the troops of the Navy?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Frye. If the troops of the Navy had remained on board their ship, in your judgment, would it have made any difference in the result?
Mr. McCandless. None whatever; I do not think.
Senator Frye. Did Minister Stevens, or anybody else connected with the American Government, any officer on board the ship, or anybody in authority, convey to your committee of safety any assurances or intimations that the marines would aid the revolutionary movement?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I am aware of.
The Chairman. Have you any reason to believe that there was an understanding as to that?
Mr. McCandless. No. On the contrary, Mr. Stevens was, of course, noncommittal; said he would protect American lives and property— noncombatants.
Senator Frye. Did you know Mr. Stevens pretty well?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; well acquainted with him; met him several times in Honolulu, visited his family, and my family visited his family.
Senator Frye. Do you know what the estimate of his character was among the citizens there?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know of an American who was not proud of him as a citizen and as the American representative. I happened to have a conversation with him just the day before the flag was taken down; had business with him. I went up to call upon him to talk about some matters. That was the 31st day of March, 1 think. It was either that or the 30th. At all events it was the day before the flag was taken down. We talked of the situation some, and he stated that he was very well satisfied with everything as it was; and the flag was mentioned, I am quite sure it was, among other things, and he said the flag would never come down, and that afternoon or that day, at 11 o'clock, Mr. Blount called on President Dole and said he was going to take the flag down at 4 o'clock that afternoon. Of course, it was very much of a surprise; and it was agreed that the flag should comedown the next day.
Senator Frye. Were any demonstrations made at all in taking it down?
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Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Frye. What day did you leave the islands?
Mr. McCandless. The 1st day of June.
Senator Frye. The past June?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. What was the character of the members of the Provisional Government—high in that country?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; as I have stated before, the men who make up the advisory council are just such a class of men as make up the boards of trade and chambers of commerce where I have lived in the cities—men of character and standing in the community.
Senator Frye. In your judgment is there any danger that the royal party may recover the possession which it had and restore the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think there is any danger. There is only one element that is irreconcilable in the Hawaiian Islands, and that is the anti-American and the half whites.
Senator Frye. What is the trouble with the half whites?
Mr. McCandless. They, of course, believe themselves a good deal better than the natives, and they have been given a great many positions under the Government that it will be impossible for them to have with the white people controlling it. The part the full natives take in the Government, the positions they have they will continue to have— the Provisional Government have no quarrel with the Hawaiian people.
Senator Frye. Do you know what troops Marshal Wilson and the Queen had at the time you had this interview with Wilson?
Mr. McCandless. I think he was allowed 75 men. Those were not under Wilson; those were in the barracks. When we took charge of the station house I should judge there were 120 to 125 men.
Senator Frye. Were they policemen, or what?
Mr. McCandless. Policemen. And he said he had a good many extras in that night.
Senator Frye. From the time the Queen undertook to promulgate the new constitution up to the time of the establishment of the Provisional Government, was any police force on the streets preserving order?
Mr. McCandless. They were on the streets just as common as they were ordinarily.
Senator Frye. They were?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. Under the charge of Wilson?
Mr. McCandless. Under the command of Wilson.
Senator Frye. Did your committee of safety have any idea that in order to take control it was necessary to take those barracks where those 75 men were and the police station; did you have any such idea?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, we knew that there was no other armed resistance; and, of course, we were bound to take it.
Senator Frye. Did you not regard yourself as in full possession when you took possession of the Government building, the archives, treasury, and everything else?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we had the Government and all the departments of the Government.
Senator Frye. Had the men in charge of the Government buildings deserted? I mean the Queen's men.
Mr. McCandless. The ministers were absent when the committee
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of safety went there. When the committee went there they asked ton them, and they made the demand of the chief clerk----
Senator Frye. What was the danger to your committee of safety that made you call on Minister Stevens and ask him not to land the troops? What did you apprehend?
Mr. McCandless. We apprehended fire and the looting of the city. We heard those rumors right along.
Senator Frye. Incendiarism?
Mr. McCandless. Incendiarism; yes. There were two or three fires the very night that we took charge of the Government—two or three fires that they never accounted for.
Senator Frye. And that you apprehended from the lawless element and not the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. From the element that were her supporters.
Senator Gray. You knew you were going to make some trouble, did you not?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. Do you know why Arion Hall was selected?
Senator Gray. Of your own knowledge?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know of my own knowledge.
Senator Frye. Do you know of any other suitable place for the soldiers to be protected that night?
Mr. McCandless. That is the only reason for selecting that. I did not know of any suitable place. That is the only suitable place that they could get.
Senator Gray. Were you with Capt. Wiltse and Minister Stevens when they were selecting the place?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. You said you knew it was the only place they could get?
Mr. McCandless. Of course I knew; they marched out beyond the Government building; I saw them there myself, with stacked arms. They marched out King street until they got in front of Mr. Atherton's, that is a mile from the business center, and Mr. Atherton, I understood, invited them into his yard to get them out of the street.
Senator Gray. Did you see them out at Atherton's?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Did you go out with them?
Mr. McCandless. No. Senator Gray. You went out afterwards?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; I passed them afterwards, going home.
Senator Frye. Did the committee of safety have anything to do with making any request as to the placing of troops in Arion Hall?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Frye. When the Provisional Government took possession of the Government building, were there any American soldiers drawn up in sight of the Government building, in martial array?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I know of.
Senator Frye. When you went there was there any in sight?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Do you know where they were?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. Do you know of any interference on the part of the United States to help or hurt the Provisional Government's cause?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Frye. Or to help or hurt the Queen's cause?
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Mr. McCandless. No; it was one of strict neutrality.
Senator Frye. What was the understanding of the committee of safety—that these troops were to be absolutely impartial?
Mr. McCandless. Why, yes; that was all the information they had. They would not be anything else.
Senator Frye. You were there while Mr. Blount was there?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; for some time after he arrived.
Senator Frye. Did the various members of the committee of safety call on Mr. Blount with any communication?
Mr. McCandless. The committee of safety called on him—not the advisory council—called on him in a body to pay our respects to him, and he was informed there that any members of the committee of safety or advisory council were ready at any time to come before him.
Senator Frye. Were they invited?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I am aware of.
Senator Frye. You were not invited?
Mr. McCandless. I was not invited. The only one that I know of being invited before I left the islands was Mr. Bolte.
Senator Frye. What was he; a member ot the commitee of safety?
Mr. McCandless. He was a member of the committee of safety and member of the advisory council, and still of the advisory council.
Senator Frye. Is he an American?
Mr. McCandless. He is a German. He is at the head of the American house of Gimbaum & Co., of San Francisco.
Senator Frye. Do the Germans sympathize with you there?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. Almost unanimously?
Mr. McCandless. Almost unanimously. I do not know of a German in the Hawaiian Islands who was against the movement.
The Chairman. Claus Spreckels was?
Mr. McCandless. He was not there. But at the beginning Claus Spreckels was in favor of it.
Senator Gray. Do you know the fact of your own knowledge that when this committee, the members of the council, or any of them, called on Mr. Blount that he said it was a matter of extreme delicacy on his part to ask any of them to come before him to testify as to the strength or ability or authority of their own government, but he would be glad to hear them?
Mr. McCandless. I never heard that statement before. I called on him and Mr. Damon was the spokesman. After the assertion was made that any members of the advisory council, or the committee of safety, would be glad to call on him at any time, he said, "Mr. Damon, I want to have a talk with you one of these days." "Very well," said Mr. Damon, "I will be ready at any time."
Senator Gray. I wanted to know if you knew of Mr. Blount making that statement?
Mr. McCandless. No; I spoke to him and told him that I represented the younger element of Honolulu, and was there to assure him there were hundreds of young men in Honolulu who were prepared to call on him and make statements if he desired to have them, but they knew he was busy and did not care to call unless invited by Mr. Blount. That is the statement I made to him. He told me to thank the Americans for the offer, and that was all there was of that.
Senator Frye. Do you think of anything else you wish to state that you have not stated?
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The Chairman. You identify this book, Two Weeks of Hawaiian History, of which you spoke in your examination?
Mr. McCandless. I read the resolutions of that.
The Chairman. Now, this book you will take with you and examine carefully, and see if you have any statements to make to the contrary of anything therein contained, on your own knowledge or information.
SWORN STATEMENT OF DEWITT COFFMAN—Continued.
Senator Gray. Were you on duty on the Pensacola at Honolulu in the fall of 1891 and during January and February, 1892?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you frequently on shore?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. On the Pensacola?
Mr. Coffman. I served on both ships.
Senator Gray. Were you frequently on shore?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you mix with the people of Honolulu?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. So that your acquaintance with Honolulu was not confined to the few days that you were attached to the Boston, at the time of this revolution?
Mr. Coffman. I was there very nearly six months, the first time.
Senator Gray. After the passage of what was known here as the McKinley bill, the tariff bill of 1890, did you find from your contact with business people there that the prosperity of those islands had been affected by the provisions of that bill in regard to making sugar free in the United States?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; generally so.
Senator Gray. And was that very generally marked?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I have heard it stated that they thought the monetary trouble they were laboring under at the time was generally due to the fact that the United States Government, by the passage of the McKinley bill, had killed, to a certain extent, if not altogether, the sugar industry of the islands.
Senator Gray. Now, what I was going to ask you is, did that have its effect on annexation sentiment?
Mr. Coffman. I believe that is at the bottom of it.
Senator Gray. Did it, to your knowledge, have the effect of creating a sentiment of annexation?
Senator Frye. For or against it?
Senator Gray. Have you knowledge that it did create annexation sentiment?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you hear any persons who before that were opposed to it say they were in favor of it?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. You have already testified that you commanded one of the companies of the battalion that was landed on Monday, the 16th of January, 1893?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. You landed at the wharf. What did you do at the wharf, so soon as you got out of the boats ?
Mr. Coffman. So soon as we landed we formed our battalion.
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Senator Gray. Did you form immediately?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was it understood before you left the boat where you were to march?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I think our route of march was mapped out before we left the ship.
Senator Gray. Who piloted you, if anybody?
Mr. Coffman. When we got to the Government building, after detaching the marines, Mr. Hugh Gunn, I think, guided us to Mr. Atherton's place.
Senator Gray. What relation did he have to the Provisional Government, if any?
Mr. Coffman. He commanded a company of volunteer soldiers of the Provisional Government after that, and was known as one of the Provisional Government men or people.
Senator Gray. Was there, to your knowledge, any other building suitable for the use of the troops of the Boston than the opera house and Arion Hall?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where?
Mr. Coffman. On Nuuanu avenue, a little more than halfway between the United States consulate and the American minister's residence.
Senator Gray. What sort of building was that?
Mr. Coffman. It was a large three-story, brand-new hotel, and unoccupied.
Senator Gray. Do you know who owned it?
Mr. Coffman. Mr. John Thomas Waterhouse, who was present while our troops were standing in the street waiting to find out where Mr. Atherton's was.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether that building was obtainable?
Mr. Coffman. I have no doubt in the world that it was obtainable.
Senator Gray. Is that simply an opinion?
Mr. Coffman. That is my opinion.
Senator Gray. Did you hear Mr. Waterhouse say anything about it?
Mr. Coffman. I heard Mr. Waterhouse say that he was glad to see the troops, and marched down in front of us after we had halted. He said, "I am glad to see this," and passed on in front of our troops as much as to say he was glad to see our troops.
Senator Gray. He owned that hotel building?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Is the situation of that building in a more thickly built up part of the town?
Mr. Coffman. I can not say more thickly built up; but there are fine residences around there, and it is more accessible to the business portion.
Senator Gray. Was it nearer to what you considered the property of American citizens than Arion Hall?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. More so, or how?
Mr. Coffman. It was nearer to the residence portion, which was the part which would be attacked in any incendiary work to go on.
Senator Gray. Will you point on that map where it is?
Mr. Coffman. On Nuuana avenue.
Senator Gray. You say it is on Nuuana avenue, a little more than half way between the U. S. consulate and the U. S. legation?
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Mr. Coffman. Yes. (Indicating on diagram.) There is Nuuana avenue; that is the legation; it is about here-the house is not down here.
Senator Gray. It was a new and unoccupied building?
Mr. Coffman. It was a new and unoccupied building.
Senator Gray. Large enough to have accommodated your force?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did any one suggest the use of that building?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I did myself.
Senator Gray. Where and when?
Mr. Coffman. When the troops were drawn up; I think first when they were drawn up in the street, and certainly afterward, when we were waiting for a place to go.
Senator Gray. Whom did you suggest it to?
Mr. Coffman. To the officers in general. Mr. Swinburne was present when I spoke of that place as a good place.
Senator Gray. What was said, if anything, in reference to that?
Mr. Coffman. My impression was that they thought it was not as good a location as farther down town.
Senator Gray. You have spoken of Mr. Gunn and Mr. Waterhouse. After you landed did you see any others who were connected with the committee of safety or afterward with the Provisional Government?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Who was it?
Mr. Coffman. I remember Mr. Carter.
Senator Frye. Mr. Charles Carter?
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Charles Carter; yes. I remember Mr. Castle. I do not know what his first name is; he is a brother to the commissioner, a tall nervous man with a red beard, I remember. I do not believe I could call the names, because it is a question of testimony. Those men I was acquainted with; I knew who they were, and Mr. Gunn I knew pretty well.
Senator Gray. Was that at the landing place?
Mr. Coffman. No, up the street.
Senator Gray. What part of the street?
Mr. Coffman. It was first when we halted, and the second time while we were waiting to go to Mr. Atherton's when I saw Mr. Gunn, and later I saw Mr. Carter. I was informed that Mr. Carter had obtained Arion Hall for our barracks. I also saw Mr. Carter at Arion Hall that night, and to my mind he was the moving spirit for providing for the quarters of the troops and their comfort-little things as they needed, such as sinks or latrines for the men. And they hauled in their sand late at night. I am quite sure that Mr. Carter made the arrangements, or Mr. Swinburne and Mr. Carter spoke about the condition of the sinks for the men. In fact, there was only one sink.
Senator Gray. Did that continue until the next day?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Thoughtfulness for your comfort?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. By members of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; they were back and forth into the Government building. Our officers knew a great many of them, and they used to talk to a great many. They used to come to the fence and come to the gate, and I am quite sure that there were some of the officers who, while they did not allow persons to come into the grounds unless they were passed in by an officer, all of them were recognized by the officers and allowed to come and go back and forth.
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Senator Gray. Was anything said in your hearing by any of these people about expecting you over to the grounds of the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. The day they took possession was one of the first intimations, and caused me to commence to think-the fact that one of their men came over to our house, one of their officers or one of the sympathizers, and in conversation with other persons expressed surprise that our troops had not gone into the grounds of the Government building when they took possession.
Senator Frye. Who was that?
Mr. Coffman. I think it was Mr. Gunn, who commanded one of the volunteer companies.
Senator Gray. How long was this after the proclamation of the Provisional Government, if you can recollect?
Mr. Coffman. I do not think it could have been more than two hours, or perhaps not so long, or a little longer.
Senator Gray. Where were you when the Provisional Government was proclaimed from the front of the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. I was in the yard of Arion Hall, in command of my company.
Senator Gray. Could you see the proceedings from where you were?
Mr. Coffman. No.
Senator Frye. Which front did you understand afterwards was it that the proclamation was made from?
Mr. Coffman. From the front of the building.
Senator Frye. There is only one front?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; only one front.
Senator Frye. Which way does that face?
Mr. Coffman. It faces the palace.
Senator Frye. And not Arion Hall?
Mr. Coffman. No; the positions of the two buildings are like this [illustrating]. Arion Hall is there and the Government building there, with a narrow street between them.
Senator Gray. The proclamation was proclaimed from the north front of the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. I should say so; yes. That was the main entrance.
Senator Gray. Where were you when the proclamation was read?
Mr. Coffman. In here, at Arion Hall, back of the opera house.
Senator Gray. So that you could not see that?
Mr. Coffman. No.
Senator Gray. Were there any troops in here [indicating]?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; and perhaps Mr. Laird; I do not know whether he was here [indicating]. That is where the artillery were and that is where Mr. Young was [indicating].
Senator Gray. Does this recall to your recollection the position of the troops?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; my recollection of the troops is that they were a little differently arranged from that. I do not know; I may be mistaken on account of the points of the compass; but I think my company was drawn like this [indicating]. I think it stood here [indicating] and Mr. Young's right in here [indicating].
Senator Gray. That [indicating] would not indicate that the troops were along here?
Mr. Coffman. No; only here-sentries.
Senator Frye. The other officers testified that no troops were there but the sentries.
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Senator Gray. Where were the guns?
Mr. Coffman. My recollection is that one gun was here [indicating], pointed toward the building; the other gun here [indicating,] pointing out here. But my impression is that you can see the palace from this street here [indicating].
Senator Gray. Is this a street [indicating]?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; it comes out onto the street. There is a fence along there, where my men used to come from this yard here [indicating].
Senator Gray. Is there a gate at that point [indicating]?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. You say that the next day these gentlemen provided for your comfort-Mr. Carter and others who seemed to be of the Provisional Government.
Mr. Coffman. I got the impression that everybody seemed on our side of the question, seemed to be in sympathy with them, and seemed naturally to look to those people for anything that was wanted done, no matter what it was.
Senator Gray. You say that you were somewhat familiar with the people of that city and with the condition of things there. From your observation of matters about this time, and what you knew of those people, what is your military opinion as to whether that Provisional Government could have been established at that time in the way it was if the United States troops had not been landed in Honolulu?
Mr. Coffman. I do not think it would have been.
Senator Gray. Did or did not that seem to be the accepted opinion in Honolulu?
Senator Frye. Mr. Coffman has not laid the foundation for such an opinion as that.
Senator Gray. No; I freely confess that all this examination has been outside of the rules that govern the courts, but the latitude here is greater than in court practice. Still, I think that is a proper question. I will ask you if you had the opportunity, after as well as before you landed, in your contact with the people of Honolulu, to get an impression and form an opinion as to what their sentiments were in regard to the matter I have just mentioned?
Mr. Coffman. I think so.
Senator Gray. Did you meet the people?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where?
Mr. Coffman. At their private houses.
Senator Gray. Did you go to the club?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; and at the hotel and on the streets.
Senator Gray. Have you extensive acquaintances in Honolulu?
Mr. Coffman. I think I know almost everybody in Honolulu; while not intimately, I know them pretty well.
Senator Gray. Was the revolution and proclamation of the Provisional Government a topic of conversation?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; but not until after we landed.
Senator Gray. You heard it frequently spoken of?
Mr. Coffman. Very frequently.
Senator Gray. I will ask you whether you gathered from the opportunities which you have described a definite opinion as to what the impression was in regard to the matter which I have just asked you about?
Mr. Coffman. My opinion is that everybody believed that the entire
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American force and American minister were in accord and sympathy with the movement, and I do not think the movement would have been undertaken had they not thought so beforehand.
Senator Gray. Do you think that is the opinion?
Mr. Coffman. I think that is the opinion. If you say to them, "Would you have taken possession of that building had you not known that the sympathy of the United States troops and minister was with you," some of them will say, "Well, perhaps not: but they were there."
The Chairman. You say they would say that?
Mr. Coffman. I heard Mr. McCandless say so, and I heard Mr. Gunn.
Senator Gray. Have you heard other people say so?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I have heard other people say so; and in my mind I am thoroughly convinced that those men thought and felt if there was necessity our troops would aid them. I do not say they would have done so by firing or anything of that sort. At the time the thing came on me so suddenly I did not give it much attention; but after that time, after it simmered down, I came to that conclusion.
The Chairman. How could you aid them except by firing?
Mr. Coffman. The moral presence of the troops, which is very great on an occasion of that kind, and the position in which they were placed.
Senator Gray. Your position is, that while these troops were there to protect life and property there was a general impression in Honolulu that carried the purpose of their presence far beyond that.
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I believe that.
Senator Gray. I will ask you whether the people of the Queen's party did not to your knowledge generally (and if you do not know say you do not know) entertain the opinion that the presence of the United States troops was in sympathy with the movement?
Mr. Coffman. They did; and I have heard them say such things after the thing was over.
The Chairman. Did they include you amongst the sympathizers with the Provisional Government?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. Was that an improper estimate of your attitude?
Mr. Coffman. No.
The Chairman. You were in sympathy with them?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. I was there to do whatever I was ordered to do, so long as it was a legitimate order from my commanding officer, and if it was I would have carried it out.
The Chairman. After you had been there sometime you had the same feeling?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; right straight through.
The Chairman. So that you have been ready at any time heartily to enter into the movement to overthrow the Queen?
Mr. Coffman. I would have entered into any order that was given me properly.
The Chairman. I am talking of your preferences?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. While we have no sympathy with the Queen, I have contended with my shipmates that the manner in which it was done was the only question. That is the only question I ever brought up.
The Chairman. Did you express your views there as being favorable to annexation?
Mr. Coffman. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. You have expressed them openly?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; to everyone.
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The Chairman. And as being opposed to the Queen and her monarchy?
Mr. Coffman. As opposed to the Queen and her monarchy. That question never came up. I had no opinion of the old Queen, and I would be glad if she lost her place.
The Chairman. Do you think that a proper estimate to form of the Queen?
Mr. Coffman. I think it is, because I do not think, from what I have seen recently, that she is a fit person to have hold of the reins of the Government.
The Chairman. As an officer, and while you were there, did you form an opinion that the Queen was conducting a fair, honest, and reputable government?
Mr. Coffman. That is a question I did not form an opinion upon.
The Chairman. Did you have an opinion on the subject?
Mr. Coffman. No; not prior to this trouble.
The Chairman. I mean during the trouble?
Mr. Coffman. No; can not say that I had.
The Chairman. Upon what ground did you form the opinion that the Queen was not a proper person to be in charge of the government?
Mr. Coffman. In what I have seen later in the letter replying to Mr. Willis's question.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the time you were on shore as an officer of the Navy. I understood while you were there you gave expression to the opinion that the Queen was not a proper person to be at the head of the government.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Coffman give expression to that opinion?
Mr. Coffman. In fact, I can say that I said at times that she would not be restored.
The Chairman. Did you make use of that expression while you were there as an officer?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. Upon what did you base that opinion that the Queen could not be restored?
Mr. Coffman. I based it upon the rush with which it was carried on. That was before Mr. Blount came out there, before any investigation; what we saw from the press, that the President had negotiated the treaty and sent it into the Senate, and we saw the discussions in the Senate.
The Chairman. Was that an estimate of the Queen's power based on her want of military resources?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. I believe after her military resources were taken from her she did not have the means to procure them again; I do not mean money means, but that the Provisional Government would prevent her getting hold of the means for her restoration.
The Chairman. And that is the ground on which you base your opinion that the restoration of the monarchy was not likely to take place?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. Now, comparing the people there, the main supporters of the Queen as you knew them, with the main bodies of the citizens there engaged in this adverse movement, which would you say were the more intelligent and better class?
Mr. Coffman. I should say, as a man, those who are in the Provisional Government are much more intelligent, that is, much better educated, and I think that they have a greater number, a majority of those
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who are conceded to be the best people in the island; although I must say that there are men who are supporters of the Queen, and whom I know personally, whose integrity I believe as good as any man's in the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the general masses.
Mr. Coffman. Yes. The natives, you might say, are almost as a unit opposed to the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Without reference to whether they are property holders or not?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. It is a question of sentiment and devotion to their own institutions?
Mr. Coffman. A question of sentiment and devotion to their own institutions.
Senator Gray. I omitted to ask one question. Why were you of opinion that another place than Arion Hall or the Opera House should have been selected for the troops?
Mr. Coffman. For the reason that the Government building would be the point of attack, and that unless we were to be in the way of any firing that might be going on, it might be better to be placed at a point which I considered at that time needed more protection than any property around Arion Hall-that portion of the city which is the residence portion.
The Chairman. Were there any troops located in the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. There were none there when we went there.
The Chairman. No; I mean at the time you considered the controversy between the Hawaiians and the Provisional Government would involve, necessarily, the United States troops?
Mr. Coffman. Prior to that time I formed this opinion-prior to the time they went into the Government building, and I had it more strongly after they went in there.
The Chairman. Was there any garrison in the Government building at the time your troops were first stationed there?
Mr. Coffman. No.
The Chairman. Where was the garrison?
Mr. Coffman. There was none, except that of the Queen's troops, which was back of the palace.
The Chairman. Well, an attack by the populace upon the Provisional Government, or by the troops of the Provisional Government upon the Queen's forces, would have been made at the barracks where the forces were?
Mr. Coffman. No; I do not think they had any idea of attacking the Queen's people. I think they thought the Queen's people would attack them.
The Chairman. Suppose they had the idea of attacking the Queen's people, would they or not have made it at the barracks?
Mr. Coffman. I think they would have gone and taken possession of the Government building, feeling if any attack were to be made the Queen's people would make it.
The Chairman. From anything you saw there at that time, was there any demonstration on the part of the Queen's troops to indicate that they would make an attack upon the Government building or on any of the troops about the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. No; not that I saw.
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The Chairman. Then there was no danger of a collision that you could see?
Mr. Coffman. None, except that they had taken place there before.
The Chairman. You mean on former occasions, several years before?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; several years before.
The Chairman. The Government building was not a fortified place, was it?
Mr. Coffman. No.
The Chairman. Was it constructed of wood or brick?
Mr. Coffman. I think it is coral, and perhaps brick; not wood.
Senator Frye. What is the color of the coral?
Mr. Coffman. Light color; gray color.
Senator Frye. Does it harden?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. After you left Arion Hall was anything done for your comfort—after you went into Camp Boston?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. When did you go into Camp Boston?
Mr. Coffman. My recollection is that we remained three nights at Arion Hall, the 16th, 17th and 18th, and the forenoon of the 19th. When we went into Camp Boston we were furnished with beds, matresses, mosquito bars, and mosquito netting for the men, all furnished by the Provisional Government, which at that time had taken possession.
Senator Gray. Did they keep on furnishing you coffee?
Mr. Coffman. No; I do not think they did; I think a short time after that we got our own cooking arrangements and cooked our own provisions.
Senator Gray. How did you get these things; what was the mode?
Mr. Coffman. We had a lot of requisition blanks which were furnished to the camp, and the adjutant—of course, I do not refer to provisions, because when we got there we got our ship's cook—would make a requisition upon the commissary of the Provisional Government, Mr. Hall, and if not through him, Mr. McCandless, who was one of the military committee.
Senator Gray. Did you have sheds?
Mr. Coffman. There were wash sheds for the men to wash their clothing, an officers' kitchen built, and bunks afterward. Bunks were put in the guardroom for the men who remained on shore. My recollection is that was afterward.
The Chairman. You did not decline any of the hospitalities that were offered you?
Mr. Coffman. I never heard of it.
The Chairman. Had the same hospitalities been tendered by the Queen's government would they have been equally acceptable?
Mr. Coffman. I think I would have accepted.
The Chairman. Everything was fish that came to your net?
Mr. Coffman. I think so.
Senator Frye. Are mosquitoes plentiful on the islands?
Mr. Coffman. I did not sleep a wink that night.
Senator Frye. How many months of the year are they troublesome?
Mr. Coffman. The whole year round.
Adjourned until Thursday, the 25th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
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WASHINGTON, D. C, Thursday, January 25, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Gray and Frye.
Absent: Senators Butler and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF M. STALKER.
The Chairman. State your age and place of residence?
Mr. Stalker. I am 52 years of age and my residence is Ames, Iowa.
The Chairman. When did you last visit the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Stalker. I arrived in the Hawaiian Islands the 17th of December, 1892.
The Chairman. When did you come away from there?
Mr. Stalker. I left there the 1st day of February following.
The Chairman. Had you ever before that visited the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. What was your purpose in making that visit, generally speaking?
Mr. Stalker. I went simply for a pleasure trip, winter's outing, and to consider the customs of the people.
The Chairman. What is your profession?
Mr. Stalker. Professor in the Agricultural College of Iowa.
The Chairman. And it was an interest in your profession that led you to look up the habits and customs of the Hawaiian people?
Mr. Stalker. No; no connection with the college whatever.
The Chairman. Had you ever been there before?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. What islands did you visit?
Mr. Stalker. Oahu and Hawaii.
The Chairman. Oahu is the one upon which Honolulu is situated?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you go to Hilo?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you go out into the country?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Just visited the volcanoes, or make an exploration amongst the people?
Mr. Stalker. I saw comparatively little of the people on the islands. I was there several days and visited the people of Hilo and some of the prominent men of the town, and talked with them.
The Chairman. Did you make any examination of the homes and farms of the common people of Hawaii while you were out there?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; to rather a limited extent—made a number of short excursions from Honolulu and vicinity to some places more remote.
The Chairman. What opinion did you form of the native population of Hawaii, as to their docility, disposition to be quiet and good citizens?
Mr. Stalker. My estimation of them is that they are an exceptionally quiet, docile people.
The Chairman. You would not regard them then as being an aggressive military people, or aggressive in political efforts or ventures?
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Mr. Stalker. No; just the reverse of that condition I should say was true of them.
The Chairman. Do they seem to be a happy people at home?
Mr. Stalker. Quite so, I think.
The Chairman. Did you ascertain from your observations whether they were living in a comparative degree of comfort, as other persons in a similar situation in life in other countries?
Mr. Stalker. I think they are. It requires comparatively little in that country to make one reasonably comfortable.
The Chairman. Did they impress you as a misgoverned, depressed, and downcast people?
Mr. Stalker. No; I would not say that.
The Chairman. I suppose their holdings of land are quite limited, small?
Mr. Stalker. That is the result of my observation, that the holdings of a great majority of natives are comparatively small, although I think the aggregate number of holdings is a good deal larger than that of any other nationality.
The Chairman. Did those small holdings seem to be sufficient for the maintenance of the families who were residing upon them?
Mr. Stalker. They seemed to be.
The Chairman. To what do you attribute that they can live on so small an area of land?
Mr. Stalker. In the first place, as I have already stated, one can live in that country better than in an inclement country, such as ours, in clothing and houses, and, to some extent, food. The country is wonderfully productive in some of its vegetable growths. They have access to the sea, which is literally swarming with fish in addition to a small plat of ground to be cultivated in taro. It is possible to support a family in reasonably good condition off what would seem to be exceedingly slender opportunities in this country.
The Chairman. As a class, would you say the people are expert fishermen?
Mr. Stalker. I doubt whether my observation on that subject would make me a very good witness. I should say hardly, in a large sense, as their fishing is carried on for private purposes.
The Chairman. The native Kanaka depends upon his skill as a fisherman, rather than endeavoring to carry on any large enterprise?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I saw no enterprise like that carried on by the natives in a large way.
The Chairman. Were you in Honolulu in the latter part of the year 1892 and the first part of the year 1893?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. When did you get back to Honolulu from your visit down to Hawaii?
Mr. Stalker. I doubt whether I can give that date. I think I went down about the first of the year and was gone seven or eight days. I returned some days prior to the so-called revolution; the date I can not just recall.
The Chairman. When you returned to Honolulu, what would you say was the situation of the people there in respect to projected or contemplated legislation upon the subject of opium and the lottery; in a state of excitement or quietude?
Mr. Stalker. There was a good deal of excitement in the assembly; or, at least, a good deal of acrimonious discussion; I would not say intense excitement; I would say hot-blooded discussion.
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The Chairman. Did you hear the debates in the assembly, the Legislature?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Were the newspapers engaged in considering, discussing these questions?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; the newspapers were pretty actively interested in those topics.
The Chairman. How about the responsible citizens of Honolulu; were they also concerned in these matters?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I think they were.
The Chairman. Were you made aware while you were there of an alleged effort to press these bills through by getting a change in the ministry of the Queen so that she could get a ministry or cabinet to sign the bills with her on their passage?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; that charge was made in the public press. I had no other means of knowing; I had no private information on that subject.
The Chairman. Was that a subject of anxious discussion amongst the people of Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; there was a good deal of talk on that subject.
The Chairman. Were you there at the time the ministry was changed by a vote of want of confidence?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Did that change in the ministry produce any very decided impression upon the people?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say that I appreciated any marked change outside of the atmosphere about the Government building among the public officers, members of the assembly. They manifested a pretty high state of interest and some intensity of feeling on the subject. I can not say that I appreciated anything of the kind among the common people, especially on the streets.
The Chairman. Did you then have the impression that a change in the ministry and the passage of the opium and lottery bills would be likely to result in a revolution in the Government? I am speaking now of the time when the change took place.
Mr. Stalker. No; I am sure that did not manifest itself to my mind.
The Chairman. Did you hear of any association or conspiracy or any other voluntary combination of men in Honolulu at that time for the purpose of revolutionizing the Government, dethroning the Queen, and annexing the islands to the United States, in consequence of the passage of the opium bill and the lottery bill?
Mr. Stalker. No; I did not.
The Chairman. Was there any mob demonstration or military demonstration there to indicate that there was deep-seated or a violent state of feeling amongst the people in regard to these projected measures?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. When did you first become aware that a revolution was on foot in Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. If I remember correctly, it was on Monday, the 16th.
The Chairman. About what time?
Mr. Stalker. I attended a mass meeting at 2 o'clock in the afternoon and had some conversation with some citizens, I believe, earlier in the day, which led me to believe that there was an organized plan being developed to change the Government.
The Chairman. When you say "being developed," do you mean in process of development?
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----64
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Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. What was the first intimation you had, or first idea grasped by you, that that might result in a complete revolution of the Government?
Mr. Stalker. I think it was other than this. I had formed a conjecture of that kind a day or two earlier from some little matters that I had observed that I could not interpret the meaning of any other way. I refer now to the fact of being in one or two hardware stores in town and seeing----
Senator Gray. Was that on Monday?
Mr. Stalker. This was Monday, and possibly as early as Saturday observing some citizens getting fixed ammunition, cartridges—saw a number of citizens come in and rather quietly procure ammunition and go out with it.
The Chairman. Then you began to think that they would have use for that ammunition in some emeute or disturbance that was to take place?
Mr. Stalker. I began to regard that as a possibility. I knew nothing but what I saw, and began to wonder why there were so many citizens wanting fixed ammunition.
The Chairman. And it was not until Monday, if I gather your recollection about it, that you discovered there was an actual and combined movement in that direction?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. About how many persons do you think were at the meeting which you mentioned as having taken place in Honolulu on Monday?
Mr. Stalker. Twelve hundred or 1,400.
The Chairman. Did it seem to be an intense meeting in its exhibition of feeling?
Mr. Stalker. A good deal.
Senator Gray. You, yourself, were at the meeting?
Mr. Stalker Yes.
Senator Gray. There were other tourists, like yourself, who helped to make up that number?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I might say I saw people there from our hotel.
The Chairman. Speeches were made and resolutions adopted?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Were there demonstrations of applause and cheering about the meeting?
Mr. Stalker. Applause and cheering were pretty vociferous at the time the speeches became of a rather sensational and exciting nature.
The Chairman. You have seen assemblages of that kind—not that kind particularly, but many public assemblages—would you say from your observation that that was an enthusiastic and strongly exciting, intense meeting?
Mr. Stalker. I can hardly say that they were intensely excited. It was a pretty enthusiastic meeting; a good deal of vociferous cheering greeted the speakers, but there was no excitement, no disturbance.
The Chairman. Did the meeting impress you with the idea that there was a resolute purpose to carry out the end?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; it did.
The Chairman. What was that end, as you gathered it from the meeting; what was the purpose they had in view?
Mr. Stalker. I believed then, for the first time, certainly that a
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revolution was in contemplation, although that was disclaimed in the speaking.
The Chairman. In the speeches was it stated, or did you understand it to be advocated as an attitude of the meeting, that in the event they could get a guaranty of their constitutional rights they would not overthrow the Queen or revolutionize the Government?
Mr. Stalker. As I recall it there was no policy, no promise of anything outlined. It was rather a declamatory style of speaking, in which the existing Government was severely criticised, different speakers saying: "We are not here as revolutionists, but to talk about grievances." I can not recall a single speech where so much as a single word was said about changing the form of the Government. I can not recall anything of the kind.
The Chairman. And yet you were conscious all the time that that would be the result?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; when I went to my hotel immediately after the meeting I said to some of my friends, "There will be an attempt at revolution here inside of three days;" I was laughed at.
The Chairman. Suppose that the Hawaiian people had been left to settle this matter in their own way, without the intervention of the United States or any other country, could you state it as your opinion that the popular demonstration which you witnessed at that meeting and the persons who were engaged in it and the purposes which actuated them were sufficiently strong and the people were sufficiently powerful to carry their end against the real government? In other words, did you believe from all the surrounding circumstances that the revolution then inaugurated would be successful aside from the intervention of the United States?
Mr. Stalker. I am not prepared to say I believed the Hawaiian citizens who were most enthusiastic in this meeting would of themselves conduct a successful revolution; but I had been led to believe by some remarks of citizens that the men were coming from the Boston.
The Chairman. State what those remarks were, and who were the men who made them, and when they were made as well as you can remember.
Mr. Stalker. If I remember correctly, it was a friend of mine, a Mr. White, who was a member of the revolutionary party, a nice gentleman. He said to me on this day----
The Chairman. What day?
Mr. Stalker. I think this was Monday—"If you want to see some fun get up early to-morrow; there will be an end of Kanaka Government."
The Chairman. What time of day was that remark made to you?
Mr. Stalker. I have been trying to recall that, and I am not quite able to say whether this was in the forenoon or afternoon.
The Chairman. That was on Monday?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I am sure this was on Monday.
The Chairman. Where were you when Mr. White made that remark?
Mr. Stalker. I met him on the street.
The Chairman. Do you remember whether it was before or after the the mass meeting which you attended?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say as to that.
The Chairman. You have stated what he said. Have you stated all or is there something else you wish to add?
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Mr. Stalker. I think that is all I recall, anything like verbatim. He used those words.
The Chairman. After the mass meeting had passed, I will say the two mass meetings that occurred on Monday, was there a state of quietude in Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I think there was. When I left the meeting at the barracks, held by the supposed revolutionists, I went to the meeting held by the natives—that is, mostly native people who were in attendance at this meeting around at the Government building. I walked in and out of that crowd and through it, and I saw no disturbance.
Senator Gray. That was an open-air meeting?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; this was an open-air meeting. I saw no demonstration. I could not understand what they were talking about. I saw no violence, no demonstration. I walked about the streets afterward, and I saw no disturbance, heard no loud talking, nor anything to indicate violence—so far as a man could see on the surface------
The Chairman. On Monday evening and night was Honolulu in a condition of quietude, or one of excitement?
Mr. Stalker. I saw no excitement whatever.
The Chairman. About what time did the troops from the Boston come in that evening?
Mr. Stalker. Late in the afternoon, a little before sundown; I should think between 4 and 5 o'clock, as I recall it.
The Chairman. Did their appearance create any excitement amongst the population?
Mr. Stalker. Apparently not. There was quite a little talk about it. The question was very frequently asked: "Why are the Boston boys here?" Some of us walked over from the hotel, which was a block or two blocks away, heard their music, and saw the boys marched up the street.
The Chairman. Did the troops come with drums and fifes or with a brass band?
Mr. Stalker. They had a drum corps.
The Chairman. Did you witness anything of an exasperated or agitated feeling on the part of the natives as they were marching up through the streets?
Mr. Stalker. In their faces I think there was a good deal of intense excitement manifested. They were comparatively quiet. That seems to be their disposition. They stood around in considerable numbers. A few hundred of them were out there when the Boston boys came to a halt in front of the palace, standing on the sidewalks and in the streets. But there was very little conversation going on, even amongst them.
The Chairman. Was it a mixed assemblage of women and children?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Such as would attend a demonstration of that kind in towns here?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Was any clamor raised against them—hissing or resentment at their coming ashore?
Mr. Stalker. No; nothing that I could recognize as a hiss.
The Chairman. Did you witness any demonstration against the troops while they were ashore by any person of Hawaiian nativity?
Mr. Stalker. I did not.
The Chairman. You would say, I suppose, that their presence on the island was not a cause of national offense, so far as you could see?
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Mr. Stalker. It certainly did not manifest itself in the way of disorderly conduct if it was.
The Chairman. It was not such as would accompany the Britishert if they were to land in Baltimore without invitation from the Presidens of the United States?
Mr. Stalker. I think not.
Senator Gray. While you are on that subject of the landing of the troops, I will ask you a question. You have already said that (on Monday, I think it was) you heard expressions from a number of people that some revolution, indications of which you thought you had seen, would be supported by the troops from the Boston. When these troops landed did you gather from your contact with or observation of the people an impression as to how that landing was regarded, and what was the general opinion as to the purpose of that landing?
Mr. Stalker. The feeling, so far as I was able to judge of it, from conversations with the citizens, was that they would at least not be in the way of any revolutionary effort that might come on.
The Chairman. You mean the troops from the Boston would not be?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was that landing and the impression that it created, in your opinion, a discouragement of those who were in the contemplated revolution?
Mr. Stalker. It was not; most decidedly.
Senator Gray. Were you present when the troops landed from the boats?
Mr. Stalker. Not at the wharf; not at the landing.
Senator Gray. You first saw them as they passed your hotel?
Mr. Stalker. They did not pass immediately by the hotel, but two streets away. I saw them as they came up.
Senator Gray. Where was their first halt?
Mr. Stalker. Their first halt was in a sort of plaza, or broad street, near what they call the royal palace and Government building.
Senator Gray. How long did they halt?
Mr. Stalker. They were there several minutes. I should think they stood around there a quarter of an hour or more, possibly twice that long. Then they marched on past the palace down the street a few blocks beyond and turned into the grounds of a private citizen. A little later they marched back up the street to their same position, the palace being on the right side and the Government building on the left hand as they came back, and went into quarters for the night in a building that stands immediately at the end of the Government building and facing the palace on the opposite side of the street.
Senator Gray. That was Monday?
Mr. Stalker. Monday night. It was dark before all this was through with.
Senator Gray. Were you up there when they went into quarters?
Mr. Stalker. No; I was not there when they returned; this was after dark.
Senator Gray. Did you get up early the next morning, Tuesday, to see what the fun would be which Mr. White had predicted you would enjoy?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. What did you observe on Tuesday?
Mr. Stalker. I walked out to the corner of the palace grounds, a plot of land possibly of 20 acres, cornering on the hotel grounds. I walked along on the west side of the court over to the street where the
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troops were quartered, and walked along immediately in front of where they were quartered, and everything was perfectly quiet. It was just in the gray of the dawn. Everything was perfectly quiet there. There were a few guards on duty; that was all that was visible so far as the troops were concerned. I then walked quite around the palace ground and passed the quarters of the native troops, which were immediately on the opposite side of the palace grounds on which the men of the Boston were quartered. The two were on almost directly opposite sides of the palace. Everything was quiet in the palace grounds.
Senator Gray. Go on in your own way with the events of that day. This was pretty early in the morning; had you your breakfast?
Mr. Stalker. No; I went out pretty early in the morning; I went back to the hotel and had my breakfast as usual; a little later in the morning I went down town. The hotel is away from the business streets of the city, and I went down on the business streets and in some of the business places; dropped in where I had acquaintances and it was all as it had been—business houses were open, men were buying and selling. I saw no demonstration; heard nothing said of an excitable character. I went to the public library for a time and returned to the hotel for my dinner.
Senator Gray. About what time was this?
Mr. Stalker. This was possibly 1 o'clock, I should say; possibly a little after 1 o'clock when I came out from my dinner. I walked out from the dining hall on to a broad lani that runs around the three sides of the hotel; just as I came on to this veranda I heard a shot.
The Chairman. Was this Tuesday?
Mr. Stalker. It was Tuesday morning of which I was speaking. I heard a shot in the direction of the business part of the town. I stood waiting a moment to see whether it was a matter of any consequence. Possibly two or three minutes later a carriage came by at a very rapid pace, with a driver on the front seat and a man on the rear seat with a rifle. This was succeeded in pretty rapid succession by other carriages, being driven at a rapid rate, containing 1, 2, or 3 men with guns. These carriages were driven past the hotel in the opposite direction from the business portion of the city. These carriages came from the direction where the shot was fired, and came in front of the hotel. I walked down in front of the hotel, in the grounds, and asked a gentleman at the telephone station what this meant. He said, "The war has commenced; one man has been killed."
The Chairman. Who told you this?
Mr. Stalker. The man at the telephone station. He said that a policeman was shot. A number of carriages passed by in rapid succession, and occasionally a man on foot. I, with some friends, went to the top of the building, where there is a sort of outlook, an observatory. There is a view in every direction. We could see the palace grounds, the public building, and to some extent the town in other directions. We remained up there twenty minutes, probably thirty minutes; I could not tell the time exactly, and could see little or nothing that was indicative. So we came down, and I remarked to my friends, "Probably it will be uncomfortable for us on the front porch; we had better take the rear of the building if there is to be fighting on the campus." I thought I would go down and see if I could get some word from the seat of war. I walked past the side of the palace grounds and saw no excitement there until I came to the corner, came to the street that passes between the palace and the Government building. On going to the Government building I saw a crowd in the street, quite a
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number, and as soon as I reached a point of vantage where I could see well, I observed there were men inside the grounds with guns, and some few straggling citizens were in there unarmed. Guards were placed at the gates, and after that citizens were not allowed to go in without permission. About the time I arrived, or very soon after, a gentleman commenced reading a document which proved to be a revolutionary declaration and the announcement of the organization of a new government.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether he had commenced reading, or whether it was that you then first perceived that he was reading, and had been for a little while after you arrived?
Mr. Stalker. I did hot hear him reading on my arrival, and did not have the impression that he was reading at the time I arrived, though I did not get a good point of observation at once, and there was some confusion. I could not see very well, and I would not be positive whether the man was reading at the time I arrived or not; my impression is that he began reading after I arrived.
Senator Gray. How long did you stay in the vicinity of the Government building at your point of observation?
Mr. Stalker. I stayed there and thereabout for probably half an hour, possibly longer.
Senator Gray. On which front of the building were you?
Mr. Stalker. I was on the side facing the palace—the main entrance of the building.
Senator Gray. Were you down the street that separates the Government building from the building in which the United States troops were quartered?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; the Goverment building and the building in which the United States troops were located are separated by a narrow alley. It is not a public street; it is a very narrow way, and there is practically no travel along it.
Senator Gray. That is called Arion Hall?
Mr. Stalker. Arion Hall.
Senator Gray. How far is Arion Hall, or the ground on which it is situated, from the public building, as nearly as you can estimate?
Mr. Stalker. Simply a narrow roadway or alley between the two. There is room to drive a carriage between the fence inclosing the grounds of the public building and that of Arion Hall, and that is about all, as I remember.
Senator Gray. When you walked down there did you see the United States troops?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where were they?
Mr. Stalker. They were at the end of Arion Hall, in a little court or vacant piece of land.
Senator Gray. Outside the Government building?
Mr. Stalker. Outside the Government building.
Senator Gray. Drawn up in a line?
Mr. Stalker. I do not think they were when I saw them. I do not remember observing them when I walked up first. I think as I came away they were not in line. I would not be too positive about that.
Senator Gray. Did you see any of the officers or converse with them?
Mr. Stalker. At that time?
Senator Gray. Yes.
Mr. Stalker. I do not remember talking with any officer on that occasion.
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Senator Gray. Very well: state anything else that occurred in the sequence of events of that day in your observation?
Mr. Stalker. The Hawaiian flag was floating from the mast over on the palace.
The Chairman. On the palace?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; on the Queen's palace. And I observed couriers or orderlies going back and forth. I did not know the significance of it, but observed individuals go from one building to the other; they passed the guards at both places, came in and went out, and this sort of thing was kept up certainly for a half hour or longer without any visible change taking place anywhere.
The Chairman. By the palace do you mean Iolani Palace?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; that is the palace as distinguished from the Government building, where state business is transacted. After a little the flag on the palace came down, and there was a murmur through the crowd that the Queen had probably surrendered; that the flag was down. But a moment later it was pulled up again. It seems it was being adjusted. Then a cheer went through the crowd when the flag was pulled up; but a little later a native Hawaiian came out and lowered the flag, and pretty soon the word went through the crowd on the streets that the Queen had surrendered. A little later it was in print, what doubtless has been presented in evidence here a good many times, that the Queen had surrendered "To the superior military forces of the United States."
The Chairman. I would like you to give the day and the time of day exactly when that occurred.
Mr. Stalker. When the flag came down?
Senator Gray. Mr. Stalker has already said it was Tuesday, the 17th of January.
Mr. Stalker. Yes; Tuesday, the 17th. And this was late in the afternoon. I could not say what time of day it was. I believe it was between 3 and 4, possibly as late as 4 o'clock, though I would not be positive as to the time of day.
Senator Gray. Was it not as late as 5?
Mr. Stalker. That the flag came down?
Senator Gray. Yes.
Mr. Stalker. It might have been. Let me see. About 2 the ball really opened over there, and it might possibly have been as late as 5. I should say it was as late as 5 when the flag came down. There was a good deal of delay, parleying back and forth, until pretty well along in the afternoon.
Senator Gray. You were on the streets all this time, from the time you went up after dinner to the public building to the time of the events which you have described as coming under your observation; did you continue in the streets of Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. I was back and forth after getting some information. When I first went over I remained a time, half an hour, possibly longer than that, and then went back to the hotel to tell some of my friends there, who were in a pretty uneasy state of mind, what had occurred. I then came out on the street, and I was on the street during the afternoon and evening.
Senator Gray. Did you hear anything said during that afternoon and evening in regard to the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I heard frequent remarks about their presence.
Senator Gray. And the significance of their presence?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I believe I did.
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Senator Gray. What was it, as you understand it?
Mr. Stalker. This query came up, probably in some conversation with people sitting about in the hotel: "If the troops were there to protect property, why did they not protect that building, its offices and treasury, against parties who came there with arms in their hands, and nobody presumably knowing what they were going to do and what they were there for?"
The Chairman. To what offices do you refer?
Mr. Stalker. The permanent offices of the Hawaiian Government.
The Chairman. The Government building?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; the Government building generally.
Senator Gray. When you got back to the hotel after the proclamation of the new Government and the hauling down of the flag was everything quiet that evening?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Do you know what gave that sense of repose? I ask the question in this form: Was it confidence in this newly established Government and its ability to preserve order, or was it the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. Stalker. That I would not be able to answer. As I said before, I saw no street demonstration or acts of violence; nor did I hear threats during this time, either before or after.
The Chairman. You have been speaking about the impressions you derived from conversations you heard at the time you have indicated. Can you trace those conversations to any particular individuals—those remarks?
Mr. Stalker. I do not believe I can. A number of us was at the hotel, and a good many I did not know the names of. We engaged in miscellaneous conversation, and remarks were frequently made by persons whom I did not know.
The Chairman. Were these men who have any connection with the political movement there either for the Queen or against her?
Mr. Stalker. No, I think not; they were people who, like myself, were simply standing by.
The Chairman. Disinterested observers, or rather observers of matters with which they were not connected?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. I suppose it was very much as it would be with any other discussion of a current event by gentlemen looking on and observing without having any participation at all?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. You were not partisans of either party?
Mr. Stalker. No.
Senator Gray. On the next day what seemed to be the condition of things?
The Chairman. That would be Wednesday?
Senator Gray. Wednesday; yes.
Mr. Stalker. Matters were quiet. I was in and out of the hotel and on the streets around in front of the public buildings. I think on Wednesday I was in Mr. Severance's office. He was our consul at that time, and he gave me a pass or permit which entitled me to go to the building. I had been there a good many times; had a good many acquaintances in the office; and I went in and out and talked to them. I think it was next day that Mr. Severance gave me a pass.
Senator Gray. Did you hear any discussion of the events of the day before?
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Mr. Stalker. Comparatively little; there was no excitement on the street that I could detect.
Senator Gray. It was understood that the Queen had surrendered in the way you have described?
Mr. Stalker. Yes. The next morning these matters were all in the public prints, and her ukase, or whatever she termed it, was printed, and in the morning papers.
Senator Gray. Did you hear any talk of projects or schemes of resistance to the Provisional Government on that day, or shortly after?
Mr. Stalker. No; never while I was there did I hear anything to lead me to believe that there was any organized resistance in contemplation.
Senator Gray. Did you ever have any conversation with any of the officers of the Boston?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I met them frequently at different times on board the boat, and met them at the hotels.
Senator Gray. Did you have any discussion with any of them in regard to these events which had taken place?
Mr. Stalker. I talked with Capt. Wiltse about the subject.
Senator Gray. What was the tenor of your conversation, so far as it had reference to this matter?
Mr. Stalker. I remember on one occasion we were driving up from Waikiki, which is a suburb, bathing resort, and the conversation turned on this matter. I was interrogating Capt. Wiltse as to whether the United States troops had not participated in this matter to rather an unjustifiable extent.
The Chairman. Will you state just when that was?
Mr. Stalker. This was a few days after; I can not state the day.
The Chairman. After this Tuesday?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; after Tuesday—between that and the end of the month some time. I asked him this question, whether this was not a move to destroy the form of government that was the one preferred by the great mass of the people of the islands.
Senator Gray. With reference to the participation by the soldiers?
Mr. Stalker. With reference to their participation; as to whether our Government had not involved itself in what had been done. Capt. Wiltse made this remark to me: "All this talk about who has a right to vote and who has a right to govern in these islands is bosh; I do not care a cent about that; the only question is, does the United States want these islands? If it does, then take them." Those were his words.
Senator Gray. You say this was some days after the revolution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; some days.
Senator Gray. And after the circumstances which you have described?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was or was not the movement which you have already described, and which resulted in the surrender, such as it was, of the Queen and the establishment of the Provisional Government on the terms of the proclamation, an annexation movement to the United States, as distinguished, I mean, from an ordinary revolution having for its object the displacement of one government by another?
Mr. Stalker. I believe it was. Perhaps even a better form would be----
Senator Gray. State it in your own form.
Mr. Stalker. I believed it was.
Senator Gray. State in your own words what your belief was.
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Mr. Stalker. My belief was that it was a movement intended to end in the annexation of those islands to this country.
Senator Gray. By that you mean that was the purpose which animated those who acted in the revolution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you have any reason to know or believe that that movement was disconnected from any purpose on the part of the revolutionists to preserve and maintain their rights under the constitution of 1887?
Mr. Stalker. I did not believe the revolution was inaugurated for the purpose of securing their rights under that constitution.
The Chairman. You did not believe that?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. State the grounds of that belief.
Mr. Stalker. I believed it from this fact, that one of the first items of information that came to us after the downfall of the existing government was that a boat would be dispatched immediately to make a tender of these islands to this Government. That was early the next morning. That was a matter of conversation everywhere. On making inquiry, I went down to Mr. Severance's office to ascertain whether I could get a permit to go home on that boat. I had stayed a little longer than I had intended, on account of the exciting events there, and I wanted to come over on the Claudine at the time she sailed with the commissioners. Mr. Severance told me that I would not be able to get on board that boat; and it was evident the following day that the preparations were active for annexing these islands to the United States.
Senator Gray. You were stating, in answer to a question by the chairman, what the grounds of your belief were. You stated one fact. I will ask whether you had any grounds for it in what you heard from those who were active in the revolution that annexation was their object?
Mr. Stalker. Possibly simple disconnected remarks. I had no conversation with any active member of the revolutionary party containing statements to that effect; only incidental remarks dropped in my hearing, like these: "Soon we will all be Americans."
The Chairman. By whom were those incidental remarks dropped?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say. I remember hearing that remark dropped by some person. I believe I heard that remark, or similar remarks, in some of the crowds on the street, from men whom I would not know.
Senator Gray. English-speaking people—American people?
Mr. Stalker. Oh, yes; American people.
The Chairman. To get at the nature of the belief on which you were forming these opinions, I will ask you whether any person officially connected with the Queen or the revolution came to you to inform you of the nature of the affairs or the progress of the affairs that were expected?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. What you had learned was the common gossip on the street?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; that is where I gathered practically all my information.
Senator Gray. You were seeking information?
Mr. Stalker. I was seeking information. I was inquiring----
The Chairman. Did you gather from what you heard there and observed there in this way that these people who were promoting the
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revolution would not have been satisfied to have continued the monarchy if they could have felt assured of the preservation of the rights which they held under the constitution of '87?
Mr. Stalker. I certainly gathered the impression that they would not be satisfied with that.
The Chairman. From whom did you gather that impression, if you can state?
Mr. Stalker. I gathered that impression first from the speeches made at the mass meeting.
The Chairman. Were those speeches reported in the morning papers or the papers the next day?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Were they correctly reported?
Mr. Stalker. Measurably so.
The Chairman. Have you any fault to find with the report, or any amendment to make of it, according to your memory?
Mr. Stalker. Not specially. I would not make any criticism on the reports. I do not think they were verbatim reports in every respect; but there was nothing stated that would materially change the tone of the speeches.
The Chairman. What you are stating is the conviction that you derived from the speeches as they were delivered and reported?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. And I thought you said, remarks made in the meeting?
Mr. Stalker. And remarks made in the meeting, some of those in the form of speeches, and occasionally by individuals in the meeting responding. For instance, when Mr. Baldwin, I think, made use of this expression: "What we do ought to be done under the constitution," a number of individuals shouted "No;" and while that might point in the opposite direction from my interpretation—the general belief—the general impression that I would gather from the tenor of those speeches was that they were intending to form a new government if public sentiment would seem to justify the movement.
Senator Gray. Do you mean a form of government in favor of annexation?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. The speeches you refer to—those made to the audience—were very largely by men put up to speak?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. That is your conclusion?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. In regard to these incidental remarks in the audience, were they different from the resolutions adopted at the meeting?
Mr. Stalker. Simply cries of "No," when a speaker indicated cautious movement; but nothing in opposition to the resolution which was a resolution favoring the continuance of the committee of safety and expressing belief in their ability to look out for the interests of the people, or something to that effect.
The Chairman. Amongst those objections that you have been speaking about here, did you hear any cries or expressions to the effect that the Queen was not to be trusted; that she intended to overthrow the constitution?
Mr. Stalker. Nothing of that kind from the crowd, that I recall.
The Chairman. Well, from the speakers?
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Mr. Stalker. From the speakers; yes—that the Queen was revolutionary in her acts.
The Chairman. Did the crowd deny that?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. Did they not concur with the speakers on that proposition?
Mr. Stalker. They did. It would be my impression that they did.
The Chairman. So that, you would gather that the real pith of the movement was that they would no longer trust the Queen, because she had begun a revolution by overturning the constitution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; that was said, in effect, by the speakers.
The Chairman. Can you say, on the Tuesday or Wednesday that you have mentioned, that the appearance of the Hawaiian Kanaka population was that of a people resentful at the invasion of a hostile power, and were awed into submission by a display of military force?
Mr. Stalker. That would be my opinion.
The Chairman. Did you observe any evidences of resentment, and what were they, on the part of the Kanaka population at the appearance of the U.S. forces in Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. Have you in the first part of that question the expression "resentment?"
The Chairman. Resentful at the invasion of a hostile and foreign power?
Mr. Stalker. You had better agree on a way of stating that before it is taken down.
Senator Gray. State it in your own way; you have not answered the question.
The Chairman. Yes; state it in your own way.
Mr. Stalker. I believe that a large majority of the native Hawaiian population, so far as I was able to judge, was opposed to the action taken by the troops of the Boston, and regarded it as unfriendly toward their Government.
The Chairman. Can you state any fact that will go to support that conclusion—any expression from any native Kanaka, or any movement of the Kanaka population that will support that proposition?
Mr. Stalker. I would not be able to recall, probably, a statement of any native. There was a quiet, or rather sullen, expression on the faces of nearly all the native population, and a rather suppressed murmur in regard to the presence of these troops. But I can not recall any expression definitely used by individuals in the way of objection.
Senator Gray. I know the difficulty in stating an impression gathered as to the opinion of a large mass of people, of producing or reproducing individual expressions. But, to put the chairman's question in another form: Did you not receive this impression of which you speak from the deportment and conversation that you observed and felt, so to speak, all around you, and would not that support that opinion?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Will you state what that deportment and conversation were?
Mr. Stalker. I do recall, after thinking it over, a somewhat protracted conversation with one native who was a member of the assembly.
The Chairman. What is his name?
Mr. Stalker. A Mr. Bush. He was unstinted in his denunciation of the course pursued and of the purpose to overthrow the existing
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government and take away from them their independence, as he termed it, and annex the islands to this country. That was his statement of the case. And further, if I maybe permitted to say—as he is in some sense a representative man among them, a public man, at least—he voices this, coupled with the assertion that it was the opinion of an overwhelming majority of their own people.
The Chairman. How long had you known Mr. Bush?
Mr. Stalker. I had only seen him in the assembly as I had seen many others. I saw him probably within a day or two after I went over there first, and saw him almost every day while I was in Honolulu.
The Chairman. Was he opposing or favoring the lottery and opium bills?
Mr. Stalker. I think he was favorable to the bills.
The Chairman. Both bills?
Mr. Stalker. Certainly the lottery bill; I do not recall his action on the opium bill.
The Chairman. Do you remember the persons who were in Honolulu promoting the passage of that bill—I mean from abroad, foreigners?
Mr. Stalker. I simply had it from others, not from any acquaintance, that there were two Americans who were the particular promoters of the scheme.
The Chairman. Who were they?
Mr. Stalker. I do not recall their names; one was said to be from Chicago, the other from St. Louis. Their names I do not recall. I came over on the Australia in her February trip with one of the men in whose favor this grant was given. He was a man whose home, I think, is in the islands. He is a Scotchman.
The Chairman. What is his name?
Mr. Stalker. I have forgotten his name. I met him on board ship only, and his name at this moment has slipped my mind.
The Chairman. In his criticisms on the action of the Government, or upon the revolutionists in breaking down his lottery, was he earnest?
Mr. Stalker. No; I never heard him discuss that question further than this: We had a little talk about it one day, and he simply said that now he did not suppose that any thing would come of it. But he did not enter into any discussion of the merits or demerits of any of the parties engaged in this movement.
The Chairman. But that the revolution had crushed out his lottery?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; and that his lottery was dead. He gave me that impression.
The Chairman. Was there any other person in Hawaii whom you became acquainted with, and with whom you had conversation in the same line that you had with Mr. Bush?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I talked with other people who criticised these actions.
The Chairman. State who they were, if you please.
Mr. Stalker. I remember a conversation in the family of Mr. Walker.
The Chairman. Was he a member of the Legislature?
Mr. Stalker. He was president of the Assembly.
The Chairman. He was president at the time the vote of want of confidence in the Wilcox-Jones cabinet was expressed.
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. How did he vote on that?
Mr. Stalker. I do not know how he voted on that question.
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The Chairman. Do you not remember that he was opposed to the retention of the former cabinet and in favor of putting in the new lottery and opium cabinet?
Mr. Stalker. No; my impression is that he was on the other side of those questions; that is, opposed to the opium and lottery bills.
The Chairman. That is your impression?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. What did Mr. Walker have to say to you about the purpose of this revolutionary movement?
Mr. Stalker. It would be hard, if not possible, to separate just what Mr. Walker said from what was said by other parties, as there were a number of people in the house during the evening.
The Chairman. Was it at the entertainment?
Mr. Stalker. A few people; not a public entertainment. I was invited there to attend the meeting of probably none but members of his own household.
The Chairman. It was not a dinner party?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. The subject of Hawaiian politics was under discussion there?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. What did Mr: Walker say in his opinion was the real motive of this movement?
Mr. Stalker. The expression was freely indulged in that it was a movement to annex that country, to the United States and freely criticised as such.
The Chairman. Did Mr. Walker object to that?
Mr. Stalker. It was objected to; I am not able to fix upon Mr. Walker himself individual expressions as separate from other members of the household, where there were two or three grown sons and others. The action of the revolutionists was freely criticised, and the statement made that it was a few of the missionary stock that created the trouble.
The Chairman. What was said, if anything, about the Queen having made up her mind to overthrow the constitution of 1887 and substitute one of her own making in place of it?
Mr. Stalker. I do not remember any conversation on that phase of the subject.
The Chairman. That was a subject of general conversation in the community, was it not?
Mr. Stalker. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Can you account for its not being referred to on that occasion when you were discussing Hawaiian troubles?
Mr. Stalker. No; I can not. Let me see. Mr. Walker did criticise the action of the Queen in that particular.
The Chairman. What was his criticism?
Mr. Stalker. Simply that it was not warranted by law.
The Chairman. If not warranted by law, was it revolutionary, or in accordance with law?
Mr. Stalker. No; I do not remember his making a criticism or using the expression that it was revolutionary; do not remember that he did, though he indulged in some general criticism of the course pursued by the Queen.
The Chairman. Would you regard the overthrow of a constitution to which the Queen had made oath of allegiance and to which her title to the throne depended, and the substitution in place of that of a constitution of her own making, of her own will, which changed the
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rights and powers of the people of Hawaii, as being peaceful or revolutionary?
Mr. Stalker. Certainly revolutionary.
Senator Gray. I will ask you in that connection: Considering that revolutionary, would you consider the fact that no such proclamation of a change of constitution was actually declared, though intended to be declared, coupled with the fact that there was a declaration from the Queen that she had abandoned all idea of changing the constitution, except in accordance with its terms and requirements, revolutionary?
Mr. Stalker. The substitution of a constitution in any such way would be revolutionary.
Senator Gray. Read the question. The question was read as follows: "I will ask you in that connection: Considering that revolutionary, would you consider the fact that no such proclamation of a constitution was actually declared, though intended to be declared, coupled with the fact that there was a declaration from the Queen that she had abandoned all idea of changing the constitution, except in accordance with its terms and requirements, revolutionary?"
Mr. Stalker. That would admit of a doubt, at least of its being revolutionary.
Senator Gray. You are asked not a hypothetical question, but a question as to conduct that occurred. The Queen did, according to the evidence, announce her intention of proclaiming, on her own authority, a new constitution; but she never actually did it, but told those who wanted her to do it, and those of the population who were disposed to favor it, that she would defer it. She afterwards issued a proclamation to her people why she abandoned all idea of changing the constitution, except in accordance with its terms and requirements. Taking all that conduct together, do you consider it revolutionary?
Mr. Stalker. I should hardly think it was revolutionary.
The Chairman. The latter part of that question you certainly would not; that is, you came to the conclusion that the Queen intended to amend it in accordance with existing law?
Mr. Stalker. No; but to change it in accordance with existing law.
The Chairman. Take the first part of the question, with reference to the methods provided in the constitution of '87, by which the Queen assumed the right to declare the new constitution. Would you regard that revolutionary or a regular proceeding?
Senator Gray. That is, if she had proclaimed it?
The Chairman. I speak of her purpose.
Mr. Stalker. Can I answer that in my own way?
The Chairman. Yes; it is your own way we want; not anybody else's.
Mr. Stalker. The act of imposing a constitution in such a way would certainly be irregular and revolutionary; if she had it in mind to do that thing, but did not do it, in my mind it would not be revolutionary. Have I answered that question?
The Chairman. Yes. Suppose that the Queen had it in mind, and was prevented only by the fact of an opposing force which she was afraid would overturn her Government, would her motive and conduct be less revolutionary than they would have been had she gone on and accomplished it in the absence of such an opposing force?
Mr. Stalker. The motive might be; the conduct would not be.
Senator Gray. Are you aware that this constitution of 1887 that the Queen had sworn to support, had been proclaimed by the King in precisely
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the same way that the Queen proposed to proclaim the new constitution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Without any reference to the Legislative Assembly or to the people at large?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. You have already stated where you were from, and why you were out on those islands—that you had no interest politically, commercially or otherwise in those islands to affect your inclinations or feelings in regard to this matter?
Mr. Stalker. None whatever.
Senator Gray. You were not a partisan of either side?
Mr. Stalker. No.
Senator Gray. To what party do you belong in this country?
Mr. Stalker. I am a Republican.
Adjourned until to-morrow, the 26th instant, at 10 o'clock a.m.
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Washington, D. C, Friday, January 26, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senator Frye.
Absent: Senators Butler, Gray, and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF JOHN A. M'CANDLESS—Continued.
The Chairman. I have examined the paper you handed me, entitled Two Weeks of Hawaiian History, from January 14 to January 28, and I find that it is copied into Mr. Blount's report. Do you agree with the statements in that history as being substantially true?
Mr. McCandless. I do.
The Chairman. The proceedings of the meeting which you attended, the mass meeting, as therein set forth are true as therein stated?
Mr. McCandless. They are true, except as I have noted. There is a typographical error that makes it the 17th where it should be the 16th, and about there being 1,260 present by actual count.
The Chairman. How many do you think there were?
Mr. McCandless. My estimate is that there from 1,000 to 1,200. This account of the organization of the government I know to be correct.
The Chairman. Have you a list of the officers who were engaged in movements against the Queen's government?
Mr. McCandless. I have a list [producing paper.] That is a partial list of the military officers engaged against the Queen's Government, it being a list of the officers who were in the revolution of 1887.
The Chairman. Were they in that revolution as officers or privates?
Mr. McCandless. As officers. I have given their official standing from 1887 to 1890. In 1890 they were disbanded, and the same ones came on the 17th of January, 1893, in support of the revolution.
The paper submitted by Mr. McCandless is as follows:
S. Doc. 231, pt 6------ 65
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"EX-OFFICERS OF THE HONOLULU RlFLES IN 1887-'90 AND WHO WERE ACTIVELY CONNECTED WITH THE REVOLUTION OF JANUARY 17, 1893.
"G.F. McLeod, late adjutant; J.H. Fisher, late captain Company B; C.W. Ziegler, late captain Company A; H. Gunn, late captain of ordnance; J.M. Camara, late captain Company C; A. Gartenborg, late captain of ordnance; W.W. Hall, late captain and quartermaster; J.L. Tolbert, late first lieutenant Company A; G.C. Potter, late first lieutenant Company B; J.M. Vivas, late first lieutenant Company C; J. Asch, late second lieutenant Company A; I.A. Burget, late second lieutenant Company A; J.V. Simonsen, late second lieutenant Company A; T.E. Wall, late second lieutenant Company B; A.G. Silver, late second lieutenant Company C.
"In addition to this most of the noncommissioned officers were with us also."
The Chairman. On page 448 of Executive Document No. 47, House of Representatives, I observe the names of the officers of the Hawaiian Patriotic League; and these persons have also signed a statement which the President sent to the House of Representatives; which statement purports to express the opinions of 8,000 native Hawaiians in regard to the maintenance of the monarchy and annexation of the islands to the United States. I will ask you to state in respect to these persons what their standing is in Honolulu?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Cummings is a half-white, whose father left him very well off, and he has practically squandered the whole of the fortune. The next two, Joseph Nawhi and Bush, I would refer you to Minister Willis's report in regard to their characters.
Senator Frye. What does Minister Willis say of them?
Mr. McCandless. That they are men of no standing, and that Mr. Bush is of very bad reputation, which I know to be a fact. The others I know; they are men of no standing, and of bad reputation in the Hawaiian Islands.
Adjourned until Monday, the 29th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
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Washington, D. C, Monday, January 29,1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present, the chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, and Frye.
Absent, Senator Sherman.
Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, I move that the correspondence which has been submitted to Congress since the order under which this committee has been acting, and such as may be sent in before the committee shall have closed its investigation, shall be made a part of this record.
The Chairman. That is proper.
SW0RN STATEMENT OF WILLIAM S. BOWEN.
Senator Frye. State your business and residence?
Mr. Bowen. I am a journalist and reside in New York City.
Senator Frye. You are connected with what paper?
Mr. Bowen. The New York World.
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Senator Frye. Editorially?
Mr. Bowen. Mine is a peculiar, unique position. I am the confidential man to the proprietor of the World.
Senator Frye. Were you sent to the Hawaiian Islands at anytime?
Mr. Bowen. I was, last winter.
Senator Frye. At what time did you go?
Mr. Bowen. I sailed from San Francisco on the 31st of March.
Senator Frye. And arrived in the islands when?
Mr. Bowen. On the 7th of April.
Senator Frye. How long did you remain there?
Mr. Bowen. Until the 26th of April.
Senator Frye. What was the purpose of your visit to the islands?
Mr. Bowen. I was sent there by the World merely to study the situation and note the conditions prevailing there. My visit was hastened somewhat by the report that a special commissioner had gone to the islands. I followed him from San Francisco.
Senator Frye. Do you know what time Commissioner Blount arrived in the islands?
Mr. Bowen. About ten days before I did.
Senator Frye. Did you make, as yon were instructed to do, an examination into the condition of affairs of the islands at that time?
Mr. Bowen. I did. I did not stay so long as I had expected to do; but I made an examination to the best of my ability.
Senator Frye. Did you become acquainted with the members of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Bowen. I did.
Senator Frye. What kind of men did you find them to be?
Mr. Bowen. I found Mr. Dole, the President, to be a man of the highest character. In fact, I was surprised: I had a different impression before I went out to the islands. I found Mr. Dole and most of the members of the Provisional Government to be men who would compare favorably with the best of our public men—Mr. Dole, especially.
Senator Frye. Did you become acquainted with the Queen's special supporters?
Mr. Bowen. I did.
Senator Frye. What estimate did you form of them?
Mr. Bowen. With one or two exceptions, I found them to partake more of the Polynesian type than that of the Anglo Saxon. I found the Queen's principal adviser to be a man of mixed blood, an amiable, kindly gentleman, but like a child as compared with the others.
Senator Frye. Who was that?
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Sam Parker, a happy-go-lucky man, but one who was very kind to me.
Senator Frye. You may state generally what investigations you made there during the time you were present.
Mr. Bowen. The policy of the paper to which I am attached is one of investigation, with opposition to annexation. Of course, I wished to follow specially the policy of my paper. I had not been in the islands over twenty four hours before my personal sympathies tended toward the side of annexation. That is, I found a charming place, a beautiful island; I found a little city that compares favorably with any city in the United States, except in the Chinese quarters; I found electric lights, street cars, good police, and the telephone more used in proportion to the population than anywhere else in the world. I found a delightful society. I was entertained a good deal at dinners. The conventionalities of life are more strictly observed there than anywhere
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in the United States; that is, you see more people in evening dress than you do anywhere else in the United States, relatively. I found the gentlemen of the Provisional Government of high character, as I stated. I found churches there that reminded me of Massachusetts, in congregations and appearance of things. That made an impression on me in my sentiment, and led me to think that it would be an interesting portion of the United States. The climate is charming for women and children. It is not so tropical as in most of the tropics; it compares with Havana, but not so warm.
That is the sentimental side of my stay at Honolulu. On the other hand, I would state, I was confronted by an economic question on which my mind was not clear—the question of cooly labor. That was the contrary side which raised up when I thought of all the beauties of these islands, and I tried to be impartial.
Senator Frye. What was the result on your own mind of all your investigations?
Mr. Bowen. I have not settled the economic question. If the cooly question could be disposed of I think annexation would not be a difficult matter to determine. But I know that sugar is not grown without contract labor; and as cane sugar is the chief and almost main industry of those islands it is a question whether our American people would agree to the conditions that exist with regard to contract labor.
Senator Frye. Have you read Mr. Blount's report?
Mr. Bowen. I have.
Senator Frye. I have not the page; I do not know whether you have or not; but my recollection is that in that report Mr. Blount makes some allusions to you.
Mr. Bowen. He does.
Senator Frye. Do you know what they were?
Mr. Bowen. I have the report with me.
Senator Frye. Can you read the lines to which I refer?
Mr. Bowen. Yes.
- "No. 3.] Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 26,1893.
- "Sir: On the 7th instant the Alameda reached this place. Among its passengers were Dr. William Shaw Bowen and Mr. Harold M. Sewall. The San Francisco papers announced that they had refused to say that they were not joint commissioners with myself to Honolulu. The former represented himself to me as a correspondent of the New York World, and said he would be glad to give me any information he could gather here. Thinking it a mere matter of courtesy, I thanked him. On Sunday, the 16th instant, I was out walking and met him on the street, riding in a buggy. He left his buggy in the hands of his friend, Mr. Sewall, and joined me in a walk of some length. Before it was concluded he said to me that he and Paul Neumann were arranging a meeting between President Dole and the Queen, the object being to pay her a sum of money in consideration of her formal abdication of the throne and lending her influence to the Provisional Government with a view to annexation to the United States. He repeated this statement frequently, at intervals, to which I made no response.
- "Finally he asked me if I did not think it would simplify the situation very much here and facilitate annexation. Suspecting that my answer was designed to be used to induce the Queen to yield to solicitations to abdicate, I replied: 'I have nothing to say on this subject.' Dr.
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- Bowen said: 'I did not ask you officially, but simply in a private way.' I responded: 'I am here as a commissioner of the United States and must decline to converse with you on the subject.'
- "The next morning early I had an interview with President Dole. I told him that I had seen in the San Francisco newspapers intimations that Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall were here as representatives of the President of the United States; that the former told me that he had arranged to bring him and the Queen together on that morning; that I desired to say to him that neither Dr. Bowen nor Mr. Sewall, nor any other person was authorized to act for the Government in that or any other matter relating to the present condition of affairs in the islands save myself; that I did not know absolutely that these two gentlemen had claimed to have such authority. He replied that he had been informed that they were here representing the Government. He did not give his authority.
- "He said that there had been some approaches from the Queen's side with propositions of settlement; that he had responded: 'I will consider any reasonable proposition.'
- "I told him I would not permit the Government of the United States to be represented as having any wish in the matter of any negotiations between the Queen and the Provisional Government. He asked if I would be willing to authorize the statement that I believed it would simplify the situation. I replied that I was not willing to do this, that I was not here to interfere with the opinions of any class of persons.
- "Since this interview with President Dole I have heard that Dr. Bowen, when asked by newspaper people if he represented the President of the United States, declined to answer, saying that all would be revealed hereafter.
- "He is representing himself in various quarters as an intimate friend of the President. I can but think that these statements are made to create the impression that he is here authorized to bring about negotiations for a settlement between the Queen and the Provisional Government.
- "On the day before yesterday Dr. Bowen came over to my table to say that a meeting between the Queen and President Dole had occurred, and terms were agreed upon. I said I did not care for him to talk with me on that subject.
- "On the 21st instant Mr. Claus Spreckels called to see me. He said that he suspected there was an effort at negotiation between the Queen and the Provisional Government, and that he had urged the Queen to withdraw her power of attorney from Paul Neumann. I inclose herewith a copy of that power of attorney (inclosure No. 1) which Mr. Spreckels says was derived through the agency of Mr. Samuel Parker, the last secretary of foreign affairs. He told me that Paul Neumann would leave for Washington by the next steamer, under pretense that he was going to the United States and from there to Japan. How much or how little Mr. Spreckels knows about this matter I am unable to say, as I do not know how to estimate him, never having met him before. He promised to see me again before the mail leaves for the United States on next Wednesday, and give me such information as he could acquire in the meantime.
- "I believe that Dr. Bowen, Mr. Sewall, and Mr. Neumann have pretended that the two former knew the opinions of Mr. Cleveland, and assured the Queen that annexation would take place, and that she had better come to terms at once.
- "Mr. Neumann leaves here on the next steamer, probably with a
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- power to act for the Queen, with authority derived from her out of these circumstances."
Senator Frye. What have you to say in relation to that?
The Chairman. Mr. Bowen had better take it up in detail instead of making one sweeping remark about the whole of it.
Mr. Bowen. The first statement to which I wish to call attention is the one published in the San Francisco paper that Mr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall "refused to say that they were not joint commissioners with myself to Honolulu."
The Chairman. Will you allow me to ask who is Mr. Sewall?
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Sewall is the son of Mr. Arthur Sewall, of Maine.
Senator Gray. He was the late consul at Samoa?
Mr. Bowen. Yes. He is a shipbuilder of Bath. Mr. Sewall was in my company and was purely on a pleasure trip. He had considerable experience in Polynesia, and wanted to go to the islands for the sake of going.
Senator Frye. You may go on and make your statement.
Mr. Bowen. As I was leaving San Francisco, just as the steamer was shoving off, a young man came to me and said: "Are you going on a secret mission to the Hawaiian Islands?" I laughed and said, "If I were I would not admit it." Mr. Sewall did not speak. That was based on the fact that Mr. Sewall was going, he having been mixed up in the Samoan affair. The San Francisco Chronicle published the next morning a sensational report to the effect that Mr. Sewall and myself were going out to the islands on a special commission for the Government. It was stated that when I was approached I had declined to give any information. That paper followed on the next steamer to Honolulu, and was circulated there. I did not see it, did not know about it at the time, but it did circulate for a week before my attention was called to it. Mr. Blount became acquainted with it as soon as the paper arrived. Mr. Blount states that I called upon him and represented myself as a correspondent of the New York World, and that I would be willing to give him any information I could gather. In fact, I called on the Commissioner and informed him of my mission to the islands—that I was there as a correspondent to the New York World. Mr. Sewall did not appear in the matter. I went there with the news instinct of a developed journalist. I saw very little to write about the country; it had been covered. There were a great many correspondents there. I conceived the idea of obtaining some very important and very exclusive news. I studied the situation.
I knew before I left here that annexation was undoubtedly impracticable at present—I had very strong reasons for believing that. I always believed that the American people would not believe in the restoration of the Queen. I therefore saw a status quo condition there that I thought would continue, and that there was a fine field for making history. I was in company with Paul Neuman going out in the steamer and the Queen's commissioners were just returning from Washington. I became very intimate with them, especially Mr. Neuman. Mr. Neuman had the power of attorney from the Queen. I thought that I heard from authority which was entirely correct that the Queen had a disease of the heart. I had that from a professional source which it would be improper for me to mention; but it came from the best authority on the islands. I heard that she had a disease of the mitral valves of the heart, and that she was liable at any time to sudden death. I thought it was equitable that she should be taken care of. I am only explaining the motives which prompted me to do
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what I did. I thought it would be better if the Queen were taken care of. She was generous to her following, and there were many people depending upon her. That made an impression on me. I thought she should be taken care of.
One day while dining with Paul Neuman I said: "I think it would be a good thing if the Queen could be pensioned by the Provisional Government; it would make matters harmonious, relieve business, and make matters much simpler." I also said that I was aware that certain gentlemen in Washington were opposed to pensioning the Queen; that certain Senators raised that objection to the treaty that was brought from the islands because it recognized the principle of the right of a queen to a pension. There was one Senator, especially, from the South, who said, without discussing the treaty, that that was objectionable to him; that his people would object to it. I said, "If there is no annexation it is a serious question; if there is, the Queen should be taken care of." Neuman agreed with me. He was a strong friend of the Queen, disinterested and devoted. But he said it could not be done. I told him that I had become acquainted with the members of the Provisional Government who were high in authority, and I thought I would try to have it done. I had a conference with President Dole. He received me in his usual kindly manner, but he was very wary and noncommittal. Finally he said that he would consider any propositions coming from the Queen—would lay them before the executive council.
I saw Mr. Neuman again. There were several conferences. Mr. Dole said he would not make any propositions himself and asked me what I thought the pension ought to be. On the spur of the moment, not having considered the matter, I said I thought the Queen ought to get a very handsome pension out of the crown lands. I asked if there was any question about raising the money, and he said none whatever. He finally asked me to name the figures. He had the idea that the figures had been suggested. I said, "You ought to give $20,000 a year to furnish her followers with poi. That is the native dish. Mr. Dole said he would consider that question. I saw Mr. Neuman and he said he would see the Queen and Mr. Dole. He was to go to see Mr. Dole at his private house, but Mr. Neuman was taken ill and the meeting was deferred. The next time I saw him was at the Government house. The result was that Mr. Dole told Mr. Neuman that if the Queen would make such a proposition to him it would receive respectful attention and intimated that he thought it would be accepted. Mr. Neuman saw the Queen and told me that he thought it would be done; that the more he thought of it the more convinced he was that it would be better all around.
The question of annexation was not specially considered. I said to Mr. Dole, "If you could have annexation you would simplify the matter." I said to the other side, "I do not think you will get annexation, and at the same time I do not think you will get anything else;" but I said, "I think you ought to take care of the Queen." After I had the first meetings with Mr. Neuman and Mr. Dole, I thought I ought to tell Mr. Blount what I had done. I had no secret purpose; nothing in the world but my journalistic scheme. As he stated, I met Mr. Blount one day, got out of my carriage and joined him. We walked together for an hour and a half, and walked back to the city. He said, "Come with me to my cottage." We stood for some time on the piazza and discussed the thing at great length. Mr. Blount was noncommittal, but appeared very much interested, and when I left he told me he
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wished me to let him know what I did. He said nothing further to me about it, but went to the Queen and did as he stated in his report. I have no doubt whatever that if Mr. Blount had not prevented, and secondarily Mr. Claus Speckels, the agent for the sugar trust, that plan would have been carried out. I have no doubt of it in my own mind.
Mr. Blount specifies that I was there to facilitate annexation, and all the way through his statement regarding me asserts, or rather intimates, that I was conducting an annexation propaganda. That was a mistake entirely; I was not justified in doing anything of the kind. In the first kind, it would have been contrary to the policy of my paper, a thing which no one attached to the paper would feel at liberty to do; and, in the second place, my own mind was not clear on the subject. While sentimentally clear there were practical objections which I thought I saw. I had no purpose or interest in doing anything to bring about annexation.
The Chairman. Was this before Mr. Neuman had been to the United States.
Mr. Bowen. I had been with him and the commission. This was before the treaty. All my associates were royalists; at the islands I received more attention from the royalists than from members of the Provisional Government. These dinners and my predilections against annexation would have been naturally that way if I had been going for merely personal interest.
The Chairman. Have you seen the contents of the power of attorney held by Mr. Neuman?
Mr. Bowen. Yes, I have read it as published in Mr. Blount's report. If Mr. Blount had given me one hint that he regarded it as an impolitic course, that it was embarrassing to him, I would have dropped it. But he said nothing whatever, he simply listened at the first interview, and after that said he would let me know. The next day I reported progress to him, and he did not ask me not to tell him anything more about it. In the meantime he had been to the Queen, to Mr. Dole, and had done what he could to prevent the carrying out of the plan. Mr. Neuman had an interview with the Queen. She told him that she would do nothing more in the matter, and asked him to give back her power of attorney, and he tore it up in her presence. This was the 22d, that he tore up his power of attorney.
There is another matter to which I wish to call attention. Mr. Blount intimates, without specifically charging, that I represented myself and Mr. Sewall represented himself as acting for the Government here and that I represented myself to be a friend of the President. I did not go to anyone whatever and represent myself in any official capacity. Everybody knew that I was a journalist. A reporter called on me and he told everyone who I was. I informed a number of people that I had no official position there whatever. The first one was Mr. Wodehouse, the British minister. He asked me, and I informed him that I had no official position there. I informed the President of the Provisional Government and many others, including Mr. Hastings, who is here in Washington, formerly one of the Hawaiian legation. Honolulu is a hotbed of rumors. It is an isolated community. Really a little New England village is not to be compared with Honolulu, especially during these troubled times. Everyone was suspected of a motive, and there were all manner of rumors afloat regarding everybody. There was a rumor every day in regard to Mr. Blount and his actions, and this mysterious article appeared in the
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San Francisco Chronicle after I left there. That caused a good deal of gossip regarding my visit and that of Mr. Sewall.
Senator Gray. Feeling is pretty high there between the parties?
Mr. Bowen. Very bitter. Mr. Blount said I represented myself as a friend of the President. On a number of occasions I said I had the honor of Mr. Cleveland's acquaintance, and I was his friend. I was justified in doing so, because I took a very active part during his campaign. I furnished a good deal of political matter for the World, and it is conceded that the World did its share in supporting party politics. I acted for my paper according to its policy. I saw a good deal of Mr. Cleveland at the time of his nomination. Mr. Cleveland gave me a statement to print in the World, which was unique in its line. It was the day after his election. He endorsed the World and its course during the campaign and extended his thanks for it. No other paper had anything of the kind. That Mr. Cleveland gave to me. I was at Buzzard's Bay some time, and he showed me a good deal of favor. I performed a good many small services for him.
Senator Gray. When you said that you were President Cleveland's friend you meant in a personal way; not that you were representing him?
Mr. Bowen. Not by any means. I said that I was his friend and represented it that way. I am not a partisan at all. I felt very kindly toward the President, and as the World was very friendly toward him I was justified in saying what I did. I did not make any boasts of that; but in conversation in the islands I spoke of the fact that I was the President's friend.
Senator Frye. While you were there did Mr. Sewall take any part in the affair of representing himself as having anything to do in the matter?
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Blount's allegations against Mr. Sewall are absolutely false. We lived together in the grounds of the Hawaiian Hotel in a cottage. I did not take Mr. Sewall in my confidence in this matter; the affair was practically arranged before I hinted to him that it was going on. Mr. Sewall was a high-minded young man; he was devoting himself entirely to society; and without any motive I did not take him into my confidence. Mr. Sewall knew nothing whatever about this matter. The allegation against him was made of whole cloth, and there is no justification whatever for it. Mr. Blount's suspicions led him to make accusations that were not true.
Senator Gray. Mr. Sewall's name was coupled with yours in that article in the San Francisco paper, was it not?
Mr. Bowen. Yes. Undoubtedly he was the cause of the whole matter. The fact that he had been consul at Samoa was ground for the suspicion that we were out on a mission. Mr. Sewall had said nothing to anybody; he informed no one, and he certainly took no part in it. There is another allegation made there which I think is without foundation. He speaks of Mr. Neuman as being a plausible but very unscrupulous person.
Senator Gray. Mr. Blount says that is the impression he gathered. I think he modified that in another dispatch.
Mr. Bowen. I did not know of that.
Senator Gray. Mr. Blount in an early dispatch, in giving information that he thought proper to give to the State Department, spoke of Mr. Neuman, and said, from what he could gather, he was plausible but unscrupulous; but in another dispatch, after he had gathered
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further information, said that when he came to have further intercourse with the people he thought differently of Mr. Neuman.
Mr. Bowen. I am very glad he did. He was a devoted friend of the Queen.
Senator Frye. Then he would not have cheated her?
Mr. Bowen. No; he thought this the best plan. And if it had taken place, there would have been a saving of all the subsequent trouble.
Senator Frye. Is there anything else in the report to which you desire to call attention?
Mr. Bowen. Nothing, except to say that I did not represent myself as being there in a diplomatic capacity; that I was there simply as I have represented to this committee-as a journalist. Mr. Blount states that in his report. I was not conducting any annexation propaganda; I had no such purpose; and Mr. Sewall took no part in the matter, and knew practically nothing about it.
Senator Frye. Are there any facts connected with the affairs of the Hawaiian Islands which you desire to state?
Mr. Bowen. Only impressions. I was not there during the revolution. I was informed by numbers of the Provisional Government, in response to questions, that the American minister did not conspire to overthrow the Queen. I was informed that he did practically as he has stated in his own report. I was told so under certain circumstances and there was no reason for deceiving me.
Senator Frye. Did Paul Neuman make any claim that the minister interfered to destroy the royal government?
Mr. Bowen. He did not. Paul Neuman is a good-natured man, personally not prejudiced against anybody, that is, individuals; but he disliked the so-called "Missionary Party" there and the Annexation Party, and he included Mr. Stevens among them. Paul Neuman was always consistent. He was always a friend of the Queen, and he was head and shoulders intellectually above any others of her supporters. He was intelligent enough to form opinions during his stay here in Washington, and to see that there were great difficulties in the way of restoration; and while he did not commit himself to me on the subject, he thought that this course for pensioning the Queen would be the best for all concerned.
SWORN STATEMENT OF M. STALKER-Continued.
Senator Gray. You have already been sworn, and you have read over your testimony given the other day. Have you any special correction to make?
Mr. Stalker. No; nothing special.
Senator Gray. There was another point about which you spoke to me after having read over your testimony. It was in regard to a question that had been asked you, a point which you had touched upon, as to impressions which you derived from those who were supporters of the Provisional Government. In regard to the impression that prevailed with regard to the ability of the supporters of the Provisional Government to maintain themselves without the aid of the United States troops. Have you anything more to say on that subject?
Mr. Stalker. I did receive the impression from that source that the Provisional Government would not have been able to maintain
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itself and keep its supporters, or, rather, its defenders, together without the cooperation of the United States troops.
Senator Gray. Do you mean that you gathered that impression from those who were favorable to or supporters of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was the impression gathered that the movement they made depended on the presence of those troops for encouragement, morally or otherwise?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say that I was told that the original movement depended upon the presence of the troops, but rather their ability to maintain their hold without the presence of the troops after it had been acquired.
Senator Gray. It was with reference to that?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; with reference to that, especially.
Senator Gray. Is there any other point on which you wish to be more explicit?
Mr. Stalker. I might say that I received these statements definitely from one or two members of the Provisional Government, or, at least, active supporters and cooperators.
Senator Gray. Will you be good enough to state what opinion or impression you got when you went there as to the ability of the existing Government to maintain peace and order and protect life and property?
Mr. Stalker. I never heard that fact called in question.
Senator Gray. You mean the fact of the ability of the Government?
Mr. Stalker. The fact of the ability of the existing Government to maintain order and protect life and property. In fact, I have heard it repeated by citizens of the country, without respect entirely to their political affiliations, that there is no part of the civilized world where life and property were so secure as in that country.
Senator Gray. Would that tally with your own observation during the weeks that you were there before this revolution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I think it would.
Senator Gray. Was there any evidence of any disorder up to the landing of troops on that Monday, the 16th of January-any disorder or feeling of insecurity?
Mr. Stalker. None whatever that I observed.
Senator Frye. What are you professor of?
Mr. Stalker. I am professor of veterinary science.
Senator Frye. Veterinary surgeon?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Frye. Where did you live when you were in the islands?
Mr. Stalker. At the Hawaiian Hotel?
Senator Frye. That is the royalist hotel?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Frye. Did Mr. English live there at the same time?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Frye. Were you and Mr. English on intimate terms?
Mr. Stalker. No.
Senator Frye. You were not?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say that we were.
Senator Frye. Did you not have daily conversations with him?
Mr. Stalker. No.
Senator Frye. Did you not ultimately suggest to him that he come over and become a professor in the college where you were?
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Mr. Stalker. There was a party suggested it. I did not suggest to Mr. English, nor he to me, about coming here.
Senator Frye. Was anything said about Mr. English coming over and becoming a professor?
Mr. Stalker. We had some talk; yes-at least, I should say Mr. English made application to me with the view of securing a place; but I gave him no encouragement to think that he could secure a place.
Senator Frye. Did you state to anybody here that when you were at the Government buildings on the day that the proclamation was made you saw paraded in front of the Government buildings the American troops with their arms?
Mr. Stalker. I think not.
Senator Frye. Anything of that kind?
Mr. Stalker. I think not.
Senator Frye. Were you not informed that that statement could not be correct, because the testimony showed conclusively that the troops were back of Arion Hall, and were not in view of the Government Building?
Mr. Stalker. I think my testimony was to the effect that the troops were in line with their arms.
Senator Frye. I was not asking what you testified to. I asked you whether or not, previously to testifying before this committee, you stated to any one that our American troops were in front of the Government Building, drawn up in front of the Government Building with their guns, when the proclamation was being read?
Mr. Stalker. I did not.
Senator Frye. Anything of that kind?
Mr. Stalker. No; neither here nor elsewhere.
Senator Frye. And you were not told by anybody that that would not do, because the testimony showed that they were in the back yard of Arion Hall?
Mr. Stalker. No. Your statement is the first that I heard of any such suggestion.
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Washington, D. C., Tuesday, January 30,1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present. The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Gray and Frye.
Absent. Senators Butler and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF P. W. REEDER.
The Chairman. Where do you reside and what is your age?
Mr. Reeder. I am 68 years of age and I reside at Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
The Chairman. Have you been in the Hawaiian Islands recently??
Mr. Reeder. I have.
The Chairman. When was that?
Mr. Reeder. Last winter.
The Chairman. How long a time did you stay there? Why did you go and when did you come away?
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Mr. Reeder. I do not remember the dates; but it was during the months of November, December, January, and February.
The Chairman. Had you ever been there before?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. I suppose you were there as a tourist?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you spend much of your time in Honolulu or through the islands?
Mr. Reeder. Most of the time in Honolulu.
The Chairman. In what month did you get there?
Mr. Reeder. I was there fifteen weeks in all, not quite four months.
The Chairman. When you got there in November, did you ascertain or know whether there was any political excitement amongst the Hawaiian people?
Mr. Reeder. None that appeared on the surface.
The Chairman. Was there any question of grave importance politically that was under discussion among the people?
Mr. Reeder. There was not. When you went to the state house you could see there was friction between the parties.
The Chairman. What parties?
Mr. Reeder. They are divided there between what is called the native party and the missionary party. The missionary party now does not mean missionary per se-persons who go there to teach religion-but it is a party that has received that name because it is opposed to native rule.
The Chairman. Native rule or monarchical rule?
Mr. Reeder. That means native rule.
The Chairman. What particular measures were under discussion upon which these parties were divided?
Mr. Reeder. One thing which was in the Legislature there, and which gave rise to a good deal of ill feeling, was the discussion of the opium bill, and then the discussion of the lottery scheme. There were some men pushing their interests there-scheming for some sort of license to indulge in the practice of lottery.
The Chairman. Do you know who those men were-any of them?
Mr. Reeder. I did not know them; no. They were men, as I understand, from New Orleans.
The Chairman. Did you get the names of any of them?
Mr. Reeder. No, I did not.
The Chairman. But they were there for the purpose of pressing their plan for getting a charter, I suppose, for the lottery scheme?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you understand that it was a part of the scheme that had been conducted in New Orleans?
Mr. Reeder. I understood that they were there for that same purpose.
The Chairman. Did the subject lead to much discussion among the people?
Mr. Reeder. It did; yes.
The Chairman. Was it acrimonious?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Fierce, was it?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. Before the matter was adjusted finally the ladies thought they could intercept it between the time it passed the legislature and the time the signature was given by Liliuokalani, the Queen-thought they could intercept it by petition, and you could see by the
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tone of the people there that it had produced a good deal of violent feeling upon the part of those English-speaking people there.
The Chairman. They were opposed to it?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. How did the native Kanaka population seem to be disposed toward it?
Mr. Reeder. I could not understand very much about that, because I could not speak their language. But they quietly acquiesced in it.
The Chairman. I suppose they are a quiet kind of people?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Disposed to acquiesce in matters that they can not easily reverse or prevent?
Mr. Reeder. They would rather lie down and enjoy themselves under a tree than engage in any industry-as a rule.
The Chairman. They have not the energy or the scope of the Anglo-Saxon, the Frenchman, German, or Portuguese?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. Who, did you understand, was promoting this lottery scheme amongst the governing authorities there, the cabinet, the Queen, and any other persons?
Mr. Reeder. The native names there are so strange that I did not get the names, but I understood it was a good many of the house or the legislative body-the native men of the legislative body. I understood further that there was this about it: it was for the purpose of relieving themselves-creating a revenue-relieving themselves from debt and creating a source by which some money could be obtained. I believe that was the reason assigned by the Queen-that she had to have it to get more money.
The Chairman. On the part of the Queen you understood it to be a revenue measure?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you remember what offers they made-in order to induce the Government to grant the charter?
Mr. Reeder. No, I do not remember. I will say another thing in that connection. In the Legislature it was bandied back and forward among the natives that they had been bribed. There are two houses there, the house of commons or representatives and the house of nobles, and they would get into heated debates, and one would cast up to the other that they had received bribes.
The Chairman. Did they have an interpreter there?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. A native would make his speech in his native language and then the interpreter would repeat it in English.
The Chairman. Did you attend the meetings of this Legislative Assembly?
Mr. Reeder. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. You spoke of two Houses. You do not mean they were separate bodies?
Mr. Reeder. No; they all met together, but they were designated as such-House of Nobles and House of Representatives.
The Chairman. They sat together?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Were these accusations of bribery and corruption freely made in the House?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; especially when the debate would go along until it became heated.
The Chairman. So that the men who were resisting the grant of
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this concession to the lottery people were charging the other side with bribery and corruption, if I understand you?
Mr. Reeder. The natives would do it among themselves.
Senator Frye. Charge each other?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. But I understand the accusations came from those who were opposed to the granting of the lottery charter.
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. They charged that those persons who were promoting or advancing this lottery scheme were bribed?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; that was the charge.
The Chairman. Did those charges produce any collision amongst those people?
Mr. Reeder. No; not that I saw.
The Chairman. Was there much anger exhibited?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; a good deal.
The Chairman. How did you understand that the Queen and cabinet were disposed toward this lottery business?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know that I could give you an intelligent answer in regard to that.
The Chairman. I mean what you gathered from general reputation in the community. Was it understood that the Queen and her cabinet-I mean the first cabinet that was there while you were in the islands-or the later one?
Mr. Reeder. This came up for action in the last days of the Legislature. You see the council, the legislative body, sat from May for about eight or nine months, I guess, and this was during the time I was there, and I did not get there until November.
The Chairman. Did you find this subject rife when you got there?
Mr. Reeder. No; but it was soon developed.
The Chairman. And the movement was made in the Legislature?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you understand that the cabinet which was there when you got there-the Wilcox-Jones cabinet-was favorable to or opposing this lottery bill?
Mr. Reeder. I did not know about that. The trouble that arose about the Wilcox-Jones cabinet arose mainly from some other things.
The Chairman. What were they? Proceed and state those other things to which you refer.
Mr. Reeder. As I understand the history (and I learned it from them) there had been constant friction there over this thing which they had conceded in the constitution of 1887.
The Chairman. You do not mean that they had conceded the lottery?
Mr. Reeder. No; that lottery business was developed after I got there.
The Chairman. Go on and make your statement.
Mr. Reeder. Up to 1887 they had a constitution which granted to the kings (who were the five Kamehamehas and Lunalilo, who followed them) this thing that they had conceded, which was the appointing power of the house of nobles, which house of nobles represented one-third of the body. This body was, I think, about 52 members, and 17 of them belonged to the house of nobles. The King, Kalakaua, had surrendered that right. They made that elective-of the house of nobles 17 members were made elective by the people. But they had made another property qualification-I mean these two parties to the constitution-which was that any man who could prove that he had $600 income, either from his
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own personal efforts or something that grew out of some investment he made, could exercise the right of suffrage or could vote for a member of the house of nobles.
The Chairman. Did you find when you got to Honolulu that the question of returning to the old regime-the old method of appointing nobles-was one of the subjects under discussion by the people?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, sir; that was it.
The Chairman. Who was contending for that?
Mr. Reeder. The Queen and native party.
The Chairman. You speak of the native party. Do you mean all the natives?
Mr. Reeder. Let me explain that. The heads of the departments were Americans or the descendants of Americans, and their employes, as a rule, were natives.
The Chairman. You are speaking of the Queen's cabinet?
Mr. Reeder. No; I am speaking of the heads of the departments.
The Chairman. These were appointed by the Queen's administration?
Mr. Reeder. The heads of the departments?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Reeder. I do not know how they got their appointments.
The Chairman. They were not elected by the people?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. Therefore they must have been appointed by the Crown or the Legislature. I suppose they were appointed by the Crown.
Mr. Reeder. I do not know about that-how they received their appointments. The men who were in the employ were, as a rule, favorable to the Government; that is, the government which had found its authority in the constitution of 1887. Then you will find a good many Americans who were doing business in the city, and who, if they had clerks, as a rule those clerks would talk for the Government. That was the native part that was talking for the Government and that part of the natives. That is my experience.
The Chairman. I suppose you do not know, not being acquainted with any of the people, what was the sentiment among the common, ordinary Kanakas on that question?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; I do.
The Chairman. State how you found it.
Mr. Reeder. The larger body of the native people talked for native rule, and felt aggrieved because it had passed into the hands of the Americans. I had two sources of information: There was one place situated on the corner of Nuuanu avenue and Beretania street, which had been in the early years a place of resort for the Crown or Government. It was called Emma House or Emma Square. It is now occupied particularly as the headquarters of the common Kanakas. That is one of the places where I daily went. They keep a sort of reading room, and the natives would gather to discuss their affairs, and I could hear the sentiment there of a good deal of the middle or lower classes of Kanakas.
The Chairman. Did a good many of them assemble there?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; a good many.
The Chairman. Who spoke English?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; a good many who did. Then I made it a subject of inquiry; if any man was a prominent man, I asked what he said.
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The Chairman. What purpose had you in studying these problems of politics in Hawaii?
Mr. Reeder. That is one of the things I like, to find out what is going on.
The Chairman. Was that the purpose for which you were there?
Mr. Reeder. I write sometimes for the newspapers.
The Chairman. Are you a correspondent for a newspaper?
Mr. Reeder. I could not say that I was a hired correspondent; I wrote some articles and sent them home.
The Chairman. What paper did you send them to?
Mr. Reeder. I sent them to our papers. I am quite well acquainted with the people of the Cedar Rapids Republican and the Cedar Rapids Times.
The Chairman. Then you were gaining information for the purpose of being able to write those letters to the newspapers?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; I do not want to say that, but it was one of the things looked to.
The Chairman. But you had no connection politically with any thing in Hawaii?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. No business connection with anybody?
Mr. Reeder. No; not a thing above ground.
The Chairman. Simply a tourist looking over the country?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you think from the people you heard speaking at this meeting room which you have mentioned, and your imperfect knowledge of the Hawaiian tongue, you could gather the real sentiment of the Kanaka population on the subject of this lottery?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know whether I could say that much or not. I do not understand that the lottery business was extensively discussed amongst them-that is, the middle and lower classes.
The Chairman. Those you heard speak of it, were they in favor of or against the lottery?
Mr. Reeder. Some of them-they were divided; I think a good many of them were opposed to it.
The Chairman. I suppose it was really a question between public morality and governmental revenue?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; those were the points.
The Chairman. The white people, men of business and men of property, were opposed to using that scheme for the purpose of raising revenue?
Mr. Reeder. I think so; I think that was true.
The Chairman. On moral grounds?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you detect any other movement, or anything in what they did or said to indicate that they had any purpose of trying to deprive the Hawaiian people of any just right that they might wish to enjoy, and from which they might derive a profit; or were they really in good earnest in trying to preserve proper morality in the administration of Government?
Mr. Reeder. I had no reason to suspect that they were dishonest. I had no reason to suppose that they opposed the scheme of lottery on any other grounds than that. It might have been to the Government a source of revenue; but they opposed it somehow or other.
The Chairman. There was an opium bill pending before that Legislature while you were there?
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----66
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Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. What did you gather from common report and common rumor as to the purposes and provisions and characteristics of that bill?
Mr. Reeder. That followed very much the same train of thought. The people were divided on it for about the same reasons-for the same purposes on both sides.
The Chairman. I suppose the purpose of introducing opium there was to cater to the habits of the Chinese who were there?
Mr. Reeder. It was freely talked there that they would be great patrons. In fact, they had several places open then for the purpose of administering the drug.
The Chairman. Is there a Chinatown in Honolulu?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; distinctively so.
The Chairman. Like it is in San Francisco?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; the same as they have in San Francisco.
The Chairman. Are there many Chinese collected together in that part of the city of Honolulu?
Mr. Reeder. Pretty much all the Chinese there are in that part of the city.
The Chairman. Crowded together in that area [indicating on map]?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Have you been in Chinatown frequently?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, frequently.
The Chairman. What would you say as to the number of persons congregated there?
Mr. Reeder. It would be a mere guess, but I would say to you I suppose perhaps 3,000. That is the west there, and Chinatown proper is on the west side of Honolulu. There is one street there as a rule, which divides them. Of course there are persons scattered around one place or another who are Chinamen, but off in this direction toward the Kamehameha Museum----
The Chairman. Is that toward the east or west?
Mr. Reeder. Toward the west; it is west of Nuuanu avenue, principally along in this direction. They are from right back here where the ground falls off [indicating]. Then there is out here what is called the Insane Asylum. In this direction here there is a great scope of land which winds around what is called the Receiving Hospital, and all this here is covered with rice plantations and vegetable patches. That is largely made up of Chinese. This portion of the town-I do not know whether it comes up so far; I think it is one street west.
The Chairman. Then you would say that this portion of the town between Smith street and the western boundary of the town is occupied largely by Chinamen?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. Then in the town there is an area on Nuuanu avenue. This [indicating] is occupied by tailors, by shoemakers, by butchers, who cater to the wants of the people.
The Chairman. Of the Chinese?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; and all who choose to patronize them.
The Chairman. What do those Chinese in Honolulu seem to be principally engaged in for a living?
Mr. Reeder. The great body of the Chinese are out on the sugar plantations.
The Chairman. I speak of those in Honolulu.
Mr. Reeder. Those in Honolulu are engaged there in rice culture or as vegetable growers, and those that are right in the city proper are
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engaged in the tailoring business largely, and the shoemaking business. It is principally taken up by shoemakers and tailors and merchants and restaurant keepers.
The Chairman. They have little shops and stores?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. As a rule, are the Chinese people an orderly and well-behaved people?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Fond of gambling?
Mr. Reeder. Oh, yes; that is one of their industries.
The Chairman. Do they have opium joints amongst them?
Mr. Reeder. They have a few, but as a rule not public. It is not a business recognized there.
The Chairman. The law opposes it?
Mr. Reeder. I could not say that; I think likely-I do not know about that.
The Chairman. But it is a business not openly adopted?
Mr. Reeder. No; not on a front street. It is a place usually a little off, very small place. I understood that there were two or three of them in town.
The Chairman. In passing through Chinatown in Honolulu, did you gain the idea that the Chinese were contributing much to the moral support and advancement of Hawaii, or was the tendency the other way?
Mr. Reeder. I did not gather very much about it. They behave themselves. They are not very much in the police court, and they have not to be dealt with very much.
The Chairman. Do they take anything like an active, strong, prominent position like the white race in Honolulu?
Mr. Reeder. They do not.
The Chairman. They are there like they are everywhere else where they are assembled-where you have seen them in this hemisphere- people who seem to be devoting themselves to their own callings, indulging themselves in their habits of gambling and opium smoking, and such like?
Mr. Reeder.They are just like they are in San Francisco.
The Chairman. Are there any public moralities conducted amongst them?
Mr. Reeder. I could not answer that. I have no knowledge that I know of. I will say they have a joss house there, and then they have what is called a Young Men's Christian Association, and they make some effort of improving their people.
The Chairman. Would you think that the free introduction of opium amongst those people would create any insecurity as to the peace and order and proper government of the islands?
Mr. Reeder. The Chinese would be principally the patrons of such places. I do not know that that would create much disorder. They go to those places and have their smoke out and their debauch and then go away. After the debauch is over they go about their business on the street; there does not seem to be very much about it.
The Chairman. Do you think the better classes of Honolulu were putting themselves to unnecessary trouble in trying to prevent the introduction of opium into that city?
Mr. Reeder. No; I think it was pushed principally by the native men in that Legislative Assembly.
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The Chairman. You mean the measure to license the introduction of opium?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. It was done largely for revenue for the islands.
The Chairman. Did you gather from the people there that they thought that was a rather dangerous enterprise for the public morality and the maintenance of the law?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. The men who were opposed to it were opposed to it from those considerations.
The Chairman. Were they very earnest about it?
Mr. Reeder. They seemed to be. The ladies were more earnest than anybody else.
The Chairman. I suppose they were fearing the demoralization of their sons.
Mr. Reeder. I think that was amongst the things. They had a large petition. You could see by the names on it that they were Americans-at least, not Chinese.
The Chairman. Did you see any demonstration amongst what we call the white population in Hawaii-Americans, Germans, English or what not-that seemed to lead in the direction of the demoralization of those people or the imposing upon them of unjust or improper restrictions of law?
Mr. Reeder. I think I can say that I did see some things which I opposed very much all my life. For instance, there is this: there are a good many white men who are living there with Kanaka women to whom they are not married-a good many of them. But I do not know of any leading legislator or any leading man there who had his family with him who was addicted to this practice.
The Chairman. Can you say that any such irregularities of life as those to which you have alluded have received partial encouragement or even toleration on the part of what we call the white population?
Mr. Reeder. By a good many of the middle and lower classes. Do you consider that former question was answered? I would divide that question. Let it be read until I say stop.
The question was read as follows:
"Did you see any demonstration amongst what we call the white population in Hawaii-Americans, Germans, English, and what not-that seemed to lead in the direction of the demoralization of those people?"
Mr. Reeder. From that last sentence-"demoralization of those people." There are a good many men there living with Kanaka women to whom they are not married. Some of them were living there long enough to have families by them, and still recognize themselves as not married-and still recognize that the marriage vow was not obligatory upon them. That was true of a good many of the Chinese; they were living with the Kanaka women, and so were some of the Portuguese. I do not think these practices obtain amongst the better elements of the population of Honolulu, or that they were tolerated or encouraged by them.
The Chairman. In the discussions that you heard there among the people, do you remember whether the question came up as to the necessity of getting rid of the cabinet in order to be able to carry this opium bill and this lottery bill into effect?
Mr. Reeder. I do not think that there was. The main thing that they had there troubles on was another issue. The Queen was struggling to get the ascendency for the purpose of promoting these things-a return to the native rule, already explained.
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Senator Frye. That is, the Queen and her people were trying to get rid of the constitution of 1887, which imposed restrictions upon her and her cabinet?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was this opium bill and this lottery bill part of the campaign-to get the Kanaka population to do away with the constitution of 1887?
Mr. Reeder. I do not think they had any design of that kind. I think those two bills were for revenue. I think it was said by the Queen that she was embarrassed and the Government was embarrassed on account of its debt.
The Chairman. Did you understand that the debt was a very large one?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, it was large for that place. It amounted to almost $4,000,000-when pay day for the interest came it would amount to very nearly $4,000,000.
The Chairman. I suppose you are not familiar with the facts in regard to the burden of taxation in Hawaii, to know upon whom it falls?
Mr. Reeder. Fell upon the property.
The Chairman. Who owned the property-I mean, of course, the property that would yield revenue?
Mr. Reeder. I think there was a large amount gathered from the sugar plantations.
Senator Frye. The chairman asked who owned the property. Did not the white men own nine-tenths of it?
Mr. Reeder. I think so; yes, eight-tenths.
The Chairman. Do you know any Kanakas or half-whites who owned any large sugar estates?
Mr. Reeder. No; but there were men in business there who were half-whites, who owned stock in some of those companies.
The Chairman. But, if I gather your idea, the great burden of taxation rested upon white men who owned the property?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you see any disposition or detect any disposition amongst those people to do, or to attempt to do, anything else than protect themselves against unjust legislation, legislation that was wicked in its character, and that tended to break down the authority of law and good morals?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know that I could interpret the action of the white people as having anything to do especially in that direction.
The Chairman. Have you any personal knowledge of the facts that tended toward the recent revolution?
Mr. Reeder. I have some, gathered in the way that we have been talking about.
The Chairman. You were there an observer.
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Were you in the Legislature-I mean the hall where the Legislature sat-on the Saturday that it was prorogued by the Queen?
Mr. Reeder. I was not; no.
The Chairman. You were not there at that time?
Mr. Reeder. I was not there at 12 o'clock; no.
The Chairman. Did you go to the Government building that afternoon?
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Mr. Reeder. No; I was not in the Government building; I was there in the vicinity.
The Chairman. At what time did you first get the impression that the political movement that had been started in Hawaii or in Honolulu would result in dethroning the Queen and the establishment of a new government?
Mr. Reeder. I had no means of knowing. Things moved along pretty rapidly. I had no means of knowing when that point arrived-when she would be dethroned.
The Chairman. That does not answer my question. I want to know when you first heard the rumor that there was a movement on foot to dethrone the Queen.
Mr. Reeder. I absolutely did not get that impression until Tuesday; it did not develop itself until Tuesday, the 17th.
The Chairman. What was the information which you received on Tuesday, which you say led you to the conclusion that there was a revolution on foot which would result in dethroning the Queen?
Mr. Reeder. On Tuesday the proclamation for a new government was read.
The Chairman. Was that the first information that you had about it?
Mr. Reeder. I had been keeping track of it all along, but that was the first information that I secured that was evidence to me that the Queen was to be dethroned.
The Chairman. I suppose you would say that that was the first time you believed or felt that the movement was really a serious one?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; that was the first time.
The Chairman. Although, I believe from your statements, you bad heard some intimations of it or discussion about it?
Mr. Reeder. No; I heard no intimation.
The Chairman. Nothing at all?
Mr. Reeder. Nothing at all; because the meetings of the committee of safety were kept secret, and at that meeting on Monday afternoon at 2 o'clock there were certain speeches made in which there was not an intimation of any kind that I could gather that they were designing anything of that kind.
The Chairman. You heard those speeches?
Mr. Reeder. Not all of them.
The Chairman. You heard some?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you mix in the crowd?
Mr. Reeder. I was around and amongst the crowd.
The Chairman. How many English-speaking people did you hear converse?
Mr. Reeder. There were two meetings. You are speaking of the one conducted on the part of the revolutionists?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Reeder. They were pretty much all English-speaking people.
The Chairman. You did not gather, if I understand you correctly, at that meeting, from speeches or conversations that you heard in the crowd, that the movement to dethrone the Queen at the time of that meeting was a serious one?
Mr. Reeder. No; I did not gather that they had determined on that project at that time. In fact, there was nothing said of it in the seven speeches. After the seven speeches, all went along in the line of complaints.
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The Chairman. Of what?
Mr. Reeder. Complaints that the Government of the Queen was not a suitable Government; that she had been refusing all along to keep within bounds of the authority of the constitution.
The Chairman. Of the constitution of 1887?
Mr. Reeder. Of 1887-that there had been, I think they said, seven uprisings in five years of one kind or another-I could not particularize what they were, and that the Government was not a stable one; that she could not give one; that there was too much friction. That was the line of the speeches.
The Chairman. Did you hear any statements made by the speakers, or did the persons in the crowd make any, to the effect that the Queen had attempted to abrogate the constitution of 1887 and substitute for it one of her own ?
Mr. Reeder. I heard nothing except what grew out of the talk. She got up on the portico of Iolani palace----
The Chairman. You did not hear that; you were not there.
Mr. Reeder. You are speaking of what I know personally?
Senator Gray. And impressions that you gathered from actual contact with the people.
The Chairman. In this public meeting, in this crowd in which you mixed, did you hear any statement as to a matter of fact that the Queen had attempted to abrogate the constitution of 1887 and substitute for it one of her own getting up?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; that was the talk in that meeting-that was part of the complaint.
The Chairman. Was there any complaint in those speeches about the opium bill and the lottery bill?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, they were talked of, too.
The Chairman. Was anything said about voting out the cabinet?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, that was talked of, too. That was part of the complaint.
The Chairman. A sort of enumeration of grievances?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. The speeches were not very long. The whole meeting did not last to exceed an hour and a half. They opened at 2 o'clock and adjourned at a half after 3.
The Chairman. That was before you formed a definite conclusion that there was to be a revolution there?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. I was not informed that they were going to overturn the Government. On Tuesday afternoon I came to the conclusion that there was going to be something done. As I understood it, they read from the steps of the Government building this proclamation----
Senator Frye. Were you there?
Mr. Reeder. No; I was not right there.
The Chairman. Were you out in view of Iolani Palace at the time the Queen was up on the palace somewhere, the portico, and presented some constitution and made some speech to her people?
Mr. Reeder. I was near there, but I could not understand the language; she did not present a constitution; she made a speech.
The Chairman. Was there a large crowd about the Queen at that time?
Mr. Reeder. The crowd in both places seemed just about alike as to numbers.
The Chairman. I spoke of that occasion. Was there a large crowd about Iolani Palace at the time the Queen appeared on the portico-whatever you may call it?
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Mr. Reeder. I do not know what you call a large crowd. It is only a guess; there might have been 1,200 to 1,300 people there.
The Chairman. Did you see any military array, any troops drawn up in line under arms?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. Was the crowd to which the Queen was speaking excited?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know; they did not seem to be; there was a good deal of earnestness about it.
The Chairman. Did the Kanaka population exhibit any more excitement than the balance of the people?
Mr. Reeder. I did not see it. The truth of it was there was nothing but the Kanaka population there, I guess.
The Chairman. Have you any special knowledge about what occurred in Honolulu during the period of that revolution? I would like to know what you know about it; what your observations were.
Mr. Reeder. At between 2 and 3 o'clock on Tuesday afternoon the proclamation was read. Now I was not there at that, but I was out where I could see a good deal of a crowd. There was only a handful there, comparatively, to me. And then following that the marines came up and took their station near the premises, or near, between the two houses a little away from the gates. There were three roads that came up from the west end of the town, and is a pretty large three-cornered square, is there, and they took possession of the square-each of the three roads up into the city. That was on Monday.
Senator Gray. In the afternoon?
Mr. Reeder. Afternoon-close to 5 o'clock-late in the afternoon. They took their position there.
Senator Frye. You did not see any marines paraded on Tuesday?
Mr. Reeder. Tuesday?
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Reeder. They were there on the grounds.
Senator Frye. Did you see any marines paraded on Tuesday when the proclamation was read to take possession of the building?
Mr. Reeder. My memory is not clear on that point.
Senator Frye. Where did you see them?
Mr. Reeder. On the grounds; but I can not say that they paraded or not. They were right there on the grounds.
Senator Frye. What were they doing?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know whether I saw them paraded or not; but they were there.
The Chairman. That is the point in the case, whether you saw them paraded. I understood you to say that you did not witness the reading of the proclamation.
Mr. Reeder. I was not right there.
The Chairman. Where were you?
Mr. Reeder. I was not far away.
The Chairman. How far away?
Mr. Reeder. Right across the block-maybe two blocks.
The Chairman. Were you in full view of the audience-the crowd?
Mr. Reeder. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. At that particular time or before that time?
Mr. Reeder. Before what time?
The Chairman. Before the proclamation was read?
Senator Gray. On Tuesday?
The Chairman. At the time the proclamation establishing this Provisional
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Government was read, did you see any United States marines drawn up in line, armed, etc?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know whether I saw them right in arms, but they were there. I could see them. I was up a square or two. I could see them there before the Government house.
Senator Frye. How do you mean you saw them? Were they in line? Or do you mean to say you saw some straggling soldiers?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know whether they were in line, drilling.
The Chairman. In line of battle, drawn up ready to fight?
Mr. Reeder. I could not tell that; I saw them there.
Senator Gray. Do you know where the troops were quartered, in Arion Hall, a building back of the Opera House?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was it there you saw them?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; close in the vicinity of the Opera House.
Senator Gray. Were they not in the rear of Arion Hall, inside the fence?
Mr. Reeder. I saw them scattered all around the hall and near the opera house.
Senator Gray. Do you mean that the marines were out beside the Government building, where you could see them and anybody could see them?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; I saw them there. They were not in the grounds of the Government building.
Senator Gray. Quite a body of them?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did they have arms?
Mr. Reeder. I could not tell exactly whether they had their arms. I was within a block or so of them.
The Chairman. Pretty large crowd at the time that proclamation was being read?
Mr. Reeder. No; there were only a few.
Senator Gray. Did you see the troops when they were landed on Monday afternoon?
Mr. Reeder. I did not see them during the time they were landing; no.
Senator Gray. You saw them march through the streets?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you have any previous information that they were to land?
Mr. Reeder. No; I had not anything.
Senator Gray. You said the first you knew of any troops from the Boston being ashore was seeing them on the streets, marching?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. From what direction were they marching?
Mr. Reeder. They were marching up from where the Boston was landed, up through one of those streets.
Senator Gray. What was the public impression, so far as you were able to gather it? You were out there and in contact with the people, were you not?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. What impression did you gather as to the object of those troops landing; what was the popular impression?
Mr. Reeder. I did not know and do not know anybody else who did know. I was just waiting developments there and seeing what I could see.
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Senator Gray. What developments did you witness in that line as to the impression created by the presence of those troops-that they were there to support the Queen, or there to support the Provisional Government?
Mr. Reeder. I was just waiting to see what they would do, because I could not tell why they were there, and I did not know anybody who did know.
Senator Gray. And you did not gather any impression at all?
Mr. Reeder. Not that I know of.
Senator Gray. Have you any opinions, as a matter of fact, as to whether they had any influence upon the establishment of the Provisional Government, born from your observation there?
Senator Gray. What is it?
Mr. Reeder. I think that the Government-in those who were in power-it excited some fears that they were there for the purpose not to sustain the Government, but to help change it somehow or other.
Senator Gray. Not to sustain the existing Government?
Mr. Reeder. The Queen.
Senator Gray. Was that the impression that you gathered from your talk with the people?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. From what you saw and heard?
Mr. Reeder.Yes.
Senator Gray. That they were there to aid the change in the Government? That is the way you put it?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. Had you any interest, one way or the other?
Mr. Reeder. Not a bit of interest; not a cent's worth.
Senator Gray. You belonged to neither party?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Senator Gray. How long had you been on the islands?
Mr. Reeder. I had been there very close on to four months, and been among the people.
Senator Gray. Largely?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. You had been an interested observer of what was going on-it was interesting to you?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. You were alert-your mind was alert, to take in what was going on around you?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; that was it.
Senator Gray. What were you there for? Were you on business or on pleasure?
Mr. Reeder. I was there just as a tourist.
Senator Gray. There for your health?
Mr. Reeder. That was part of my business there. I had something in my throat and I thought it would boil it out.
Senator Gray. Was any of your family there with you?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Senator Gray. May I ask you, if you will not consider it an impertinent question, what your politics are?
Mr. Reeder. I am a Republican. I never had a thought of politics while there. I was an American citizen. I had no allegiance to one party or the other. I determined that I would not imperil my safety. I had no interest whether the Queen's Government should survive or the missionary party should succeed. I intended to pursue such a
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course as to have the protection of my Government in case the Government fell into the hands of either of those peoples. I knew if I joined a party and became interested in it and the party which I had joined was beaten, I would lose the protection of my Government.
Senator Gray. You did not want to join a party as a mere tourist there?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Senator Gray. You had no business in joining either party, had you?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Senator Gray. Did you have anything to do with the domestic affairs of those islands?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Adjourned until tomorrow, the 31st instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
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Washington, D. C., Wednesday, January 31,1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present. The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, Frye, and Sherman, and Senator Davis, of the full committee.
SWORN STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. MACARTHUR.
The Chairman. State your residence.
Mr. MacArthur. Troy, New York.
Senator Frye. What is your business?
Mr. MacArthur. I am the editor of the Troy Budget.
Senator Frye. Were you at any time in the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; the last of February, or early in March, 1893. I remained there about seven or eight weeks, I should say.
Senator Frye. What was your business there?
Mr. MacArthur. I went there to get rest, practically; but I found a state of things that very much interested me, and I investigated.
Senator Frye. You investigated the condition of affairs in the islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. I presume you gentlemen have a paper from me. I wrote considerably. I wrote an article which was published pretty widely. I was there when Mr. Blount was there, and I saw him frequently. His wife and mine were acquainted and went about a good deal together.
The Chairman. That is your paper, the one with the map in it?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. I could not cover as much ground as I wanted to because I found it of so much interest. I knew there was meat in it and I went right over it.
Senator Frye. Did you make a special business of investigating the condition of affairs in the islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Frye. And in the course of that investigation did you have communications with parties of both sides there, the royalists as well as the Provisional Government?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. All the time I was there the Provisional Government was in power. I did not report the result of my investigations to Mr. Blount. I did on one affair. He mentioned here that
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Dr. William Shaw Bowen, of New York, undertook to get the Queen to sell her rights and abdicate. I took a part in that affair, and I could tell the story. I did not reduce to writing the observations that I made while in the islands. I have written a good deal to my own paper. That (alluding to article in Troy Budget of Nov. 26, '93), is more of a statistical matter, showing the history of annexation and leaving out the rest. There are some statistics about the population, showing that just at that time they were saying that they should have a plebiscite there to justify annexation. I investigated that subject, and I found that there never had been one in territory annexed to the United States, and if there had been, the population would have voted it down in each case. We have never seen a case of that kind. Even in the annexation of Louisiana there were two riots against annexation. That annexation would have been beaten had you taken a vote of the population.
The Chairman. You are the editor of the Northern Budget?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. In the issue of November 26, 1893, you have presented some views about affairs in Hawaii. Those are the conclusions to which you sincerely arrived in your examination of the facts on the ground?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. I did not go into that part of it which would be more interesting to you. I found that the native population was somewhat against annexation. I never could get at the bottom cause of it; I think I did, however, get at what I thought were the bottom causes. It was the woman question-the color question. Some of the richest men in the islands had married natives. One, Mr. Bishop, of the State of New York.
The Chairman. You speak of white men?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes, white men-missionaries there. Of course the native population think it a great thing, an elevated thing, to marry their daughters to white people, and I found on investigating on the Island of Hawaii and on those of Lanai and Oahu that the report had been circulated all through the islands that among the people of the U.S. the men who married negroes were despised, and that they would lose their caste in Hawaii by marrying natives. It became a woman question to a great extent in the islands, and the women influence the men always. They thought their daughters ought to marry reputably, and they thought they would occupy the position that the negro does in the U.S. country in such cases.
Senator Frye. If the islands were annexed?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. That there would be a racial degradation?
Mr. MacArthur. Degradation. The women got hold of this question and went into every native household. When I got at the bottom of this matter, I found that every man, native, that I talked with, presented that phase of the subject to me. I made inquiries, and I found that this impression had been carefully circulated everywhere among these native people. I found it in the Island of Hawaii, the Island of Maui, and I found it in Honolulu. I naturally felt that they were a very clannish people. The chief justice told me that in every case in which a jury of native people was had, they never could convict a native-that they had to take this thing from the juries and from the examining boards, and segregate the lepers in these islands. In the criminal cases the chief justice told me, and two other judges told me also----
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The Chairman. What would you think of the political proposition of incorporating those people into our body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. I think it ought to be done, because you do not build America for a little time; you build for a century; and the time is not far distant when the Pacific coast will have six or eight millions of people, and the native Hawaii population would be entirely rubbed out, at the present percentage of decrease, somewhere between 1920 and, say, 1930.
The Chairman. For similar reasons would you also think that it would be better for our country that the Japanese and Chinese should be brought in freely and incorporated into our body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. Mr. Blount said to me, "What are these people going to do for laborers?"
The Chairman. I am not speaking of that; I am speaking of the social effect in the United States of incorporating the orientals into the social system, what we call the body politic, of the United States.
Mr. MacArthur. The Asiatics can not vote or become citizens under the Hawaiian constitution.
The Chairman. I am not speaking of that, but the effect of annexation, in your judgment, as to Asiatics?
Mr. MacArthur. It is not that, because they are a hardworking people. They earn their money, and they get what they consider wealth and return to their own countries. The exports from those islands are $115 for each man, woman, and child in the islands. There are no such exports in the world. I think it is a detriment to confine themselves exclusively to sugar.
The Chairman. Do you concur in the prevailing opinion that the Kanaka population of Hawaii is passing away-perishing?
Mr. MacArthur. At the rate of decrease that is now going on, or in the last decade, they will be entirely wiped out in 1930. It has been carefully calculated. You see there are only 34,000 natives, and there are 90,000 of population. Of that, perhaps 12,000 are Portuguese. The Portuguese and white men there in voting would outnumber the native population, that is, the native voting population-outnumber them in the property qualification.
The Chairman. You speak now of the constitution of 1887?
Mr. MacArthur. I am speaking of this present constitution, under which the house of nobles and house of representatives were elected. There is a much lower elective power for the house under the present Provisional Government.
The Chairman. You are speaking of the constitution which Liliuokalani tried to overthrow?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Davis. What kind of people are those Portuguese?
Mr. MacArthur. They are mostly from the Azores.
Senator Davis. We know where they are from, but how do they size up?
Mr. MacArthur. They are a civil, orderly people.
Senator Davis. Industrious?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Davis. Are they law-abiding?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes,
Senator Davis. Do their children go to school?
Mr. MacArthur. Oh, yes; there is compulsory education there for all classes.
Senator Davis. Do they have their own homes there, to some extent?
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Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Davis. Do you regard them as a progressive people?
Mr. MacArthur. I do. I regard them as the most progressive of all the three natives brought in there-Chinese, Portuguese, and Japanese.
Senator Davis. You do not classify them with the Asiatics?
Mr. MacArthur. No; not at all. They dress well; they have little gardens about their houses; they cultivate various things. The Azores is very similar to the climate of the Hawaiian Islands; it is the same class of soil-volcanic soil.
The Chairman. Did you understand from your examination of the condition of the Portuguese in Hawaii that their coming to the islands was a voluntary act on their part for the betterment of their fortunes?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; betterment of their fortunes.
The Chairman. Not compulsion?
Mr. MacArthur. No; they sent out agents. They wanted to advance the thing, partly Japanese, partly Chinese, and somebody went over and by arrangement brought these people there.
The Chairman. Not under the cooly system?
Mr. MacArthur. No; the people of the Azores are the most liberal-minded of any of the Portuguese.
Senator Davis. Do they have their wives with them?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; and children. They have brought their wives; they have little villages in Hawaii-the sugar companies build for them Japanese houses. They did not like these houses, so they went to work and made Japanese villages for them-little wicker things.
The Chairman. So that, I understand you, taking a general survey, the Kanaka population, the white population, and the Portuguese population, it would be a disastrous economic movement on the part of the United States to incorporate those people into our body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. No. But for the future the laws of the United States would prevent----
The Chairman. I was speaking of it as an economic question-whether you think it would be advantageous or disadvantageous to the United States to incorporate such a population as you have been describing into our body politic. Do you think it would be an advantage or a disadvantage?
Mr. MacArthur. I think it would be an advantage.
The Chairman. You do not include the Chinese in that statement?
Mr. MacArthur. No, not altogether. I think the Chinese are the worst population of all, perhaps.
The Chairman. Do they bring their families with them?
Mr. MacArthur. Not to a great extent.
The Chairman. Do they intermarry with the native women?
Mr. MacArthur. Not much. Some of the Japanese do, and I think some of the Portuguese.
The Chairman. They come there as denizens, and not to become citizens?
Mr. MacArthur. They cannot become citizens now.
The Chairman. I am speaking of their motives.
Mr. MacArthur. They come there to make money and go home.
The Chairman. This article which you published in your newspaper November 20,1893, seems to contain a statement of your views on a number of questions. I want to ask you whether you regard that as your sincere impression now?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
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The article is as follows.
"[From the New York Mail and Express.]
"INTRODUCTORY BY THE EDITOR OF THE MAIL AND EXPRESS.
"Hon. Charles L. Mac Arthur, the venerable editor of the Troy Northern Budget and formerly State Senator, has complied with a request of the Mail and Express for an article on Hawaii, the circumstances that led to the overthrow of the Queen, and the personnel of the Provisional Government.
"Mr. MacArthur went to Hawaii shortly after the revolution and enjoyed the same facilities for observation as Mr. Blount had. A graphic and entertaining writer, the veteran editor has made travel a habit for years, and when he wants to find facts or objects knows just where to look for them.
"IN HAWAII WHEN COMMISSIONER BLOUNT WAS THERE.
To the editor of the New York Mail and Express.
"Sir: You have asked me to write for your paper on the subject of the Hawaiian Islands, now an absorbing theme of public discussion. I premise by saying that I was in the islands with my wife the best part of last winter, for weeks at the same hotel in Honolulu with Commissioner Blount and his amiable lady, saw them daily, and had fairly as good opportunities as he had to get at the bottom facts of the situation, the same sources of information being open to me as to him. Besides, I had greatly the advantage of him in that I saw and conversed with all classes of people and got at their inner ideas, whereas his reticence repelled rather than invited free intercourse. It was unfortunate for the object of his mission that he remained secluded in his quarters most of the time, instead of going about with his eyes and ears open and bringing into requisition the Yankee habit of asking questions. It was also unfortunate that he did not visit the great coffee and sugar producing island of Hawaii, the largest of the group, which has an area seven times greater than that of Oahu, on which Honolulu is situated, and six times larger than Maui, the next largest, with double the production of sugar and other commercial products of any other island.
"As I understand it, Mr. Blount only visited the island of Maui outside of Oahu, and then only paid a visit to see the great Spreckels sugar plantation, the largest in the world, where he was, of course, handsomely entertained. What he should have done was to have visited the great island of Hawaii, the garden island of Kauai, and the island of Molokai, and have seen the conditions of these islands for himself, and have conversed with the leading men of all parties throughout the group, instead of shutting himself up like an oyster in Honolulu and getting most of his information at second hand. I do not, however, desire to make any adverse criticism on Mr. Commissioner Blount, at least until his report becomes public, for he is a very amiable and courteous gentleman, and all my intercourse with him was of the pleasantest character. But I can't help saying that a trained newspaper man would have bored into all the sources of information and have swept the field cleaner and more thoroughly in gathering material for a satisfactory report by the methods ordinarily in vogue with newspaper men than was possible by the methods and means adopted by the honorable chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the last Congress
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"ANNEXATION THE MORE DESIRABLE.
"On the assumption that the United States ultimately means to do anything with Hawaii other than to crush it or let it alone severely, there are two solutions of the question pending. One is annexation, the other a protectorate. Of the two, annexation is altogether the more desirable to both countries. The better way would be to provide for annexation on a plan similar to that by which Alaska was admitted. Hawaii does not ask to come in as a State until the islands have grown to somewhere near the stature, in population and importance, of a full-grown State. The older States, after the late experiences on the silver bill and in other respects, feel like going slow in admitting any new State with a population of, say, not more than 150,000, with two Senators, whose votes in the Senate would equal the votes of the New York Senators, who have a constituency back of them of now nearly 7,000,000, or would have as great a voice in the Senate as Pennsylvania with its more than 5,000,000, or Ohio and Illinois with their more than 3,000,000 of population each, or of five other States with more than 2,000,000 population each, or of eighteen other States with more than 1,000,000 population each, that would naturally object to admitting Hawaii as a State with two Senators, until she grows up to a stature more nearly approaching in population and resources the average size of all the States.
"The average population of these twenty-seven States is about 2,000,000 each, and the average population of many more than one-half of all the States is more than 1,000,000 each. These larger States will doubtless hereafter object to the admission of a new State that has not a population of at least a quarter of a million. That the islands once annexed as a Territory would speedly double in population and go on increasing at a rapid rate there can be no doubt. But for the present Hawaii, if annexed, should remain a Territory governed very much as Alaska is governed.
"NOT A SOUND OBJECTION.
"Senator Perkins, of California, and other Western Senators desire that the Hawaiian Islands should be acquired and annexed to California as a county with a county government. That proposition will do to think about, but is too large a question to be discussed here. Honolulu, as to location, is 2,100 miles from San Francisco. The argument is often used against annexation that the Hawaiian Islands are too far off and too far west to be annexed to this country. From the center of the American Union, now somewhere in the vicinity of Indianapolis, Hawaii is not so far off as portions of some of our Northwestern States, and is nearer than Alaska. Besides the Aleutian Islands, a part of Alaska, are more than 300 miles west of the parallel of the Hawaiian group. With fast railroads across the continent, and steamers that regularly make the trip from San Francisco to Honolulu in six days now, and could in four or five, the 'too far off' and 'too far west' objection don't count. Honolulu is in point of time no further from New York than Washington was from Boston when the Revolution broke out. As to a protectorate, Governor Marcy, when Secretary of State, was thoroughly in favor of annexing the Hawaiian Islands, and ably showed the utter absurdity and folly of the United States establishing a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands or any other territory. He said that a protectorate gave no sovereignty to the protector. The protected got the substance, while the protector got
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only the shadow-and paid all the costs. And he was right. It is notable that every American Secretary of State, including Bayard, who has written upon the subject, except Gresham, and every President down to Cleveland has favored the American acquisition of Hawaii.
"AREA AND POPULATION.
"The Hawaiian Islands have an area of 6,470 square miles-about the size of Connecticut. The population in 1890 was 89,990. Of this number the natives (of the Hawaiian race) counted only 34,436, being in a minority in the population amounting to 21,115. There were 6,186 half-castes. Counting all the natives and all the half-castes as native Hawaiians they still lack 4,373 of being half the population, and are outnumbered by what are classed 'foreigners,' by 8,746 in the population table. All Hawaiians born on any of the islands of foreign parents are classed as 'foreigners,' although native whites born on the soil were ignorantly styled as a class by Secretary Gresham as 'aliens.' These 'foreigners,' Hawaiian native born, number 7,495, are all whites and mostly the children of American missionaries. The other Americans not born there number 1,928, so that the American native-born Hawaiians, or those who have located there, in round numbers count up 9,500. Statistics show that about 91 per cent of all the business of Hawaii and a proportionate amount of all the private property should be classed as American.
"There were 27,661 Japanese and Chinese, mostly coolies, employed in sugar-making; also, besides nearly 9,000 Portuguese, mostly similarly employed. These latter, being white, are admitted to citizenship and may vote, while the Orientals are excluded from the ballot. The Portuguese are almost to a man annexationists, are American in sentiment, and have a representative in the executive and legislative body of the Provisional Government. All of the other 'foreigners' of Hawaii, exclusive of 588 Polynesians, number only 2,494, of whom 1,344 are Britons and 1,034 Germans. A majority of the Germans are for annexation-the Britons are not. The latter compose all the real substance among the white population opposed to annexation. It was this body of 20,596 white 'foreigners,' nearly all of whom are Hawaiian citizens under the law and belonging to the constitutional voting class, numbering about two-thirds as many as all the native Hawaiians, that the ex-Queen undertook to disfranchise and to deprive of their civil rights under the old constitution, by suddenly proclaiming a new constitution putting all the political power and rule in the islands in the hands of the natives, that caused the revolution in January last and the deposition of the Queen.
"A CORRUPT LEGISLATURE.
"The last Hawaiian Legislature was guilty of notorious bribery and corruption. It passed the odious lottery and opium bills, which were signed by the Queen. The Queen arbitrarily selected her cabinet in defiance of constitutional principles, and the new revolutionary government in justification of her overthrow made this assertion, which never has been and can not be truthfully controverted: 'Her Majesty proceeded on the last day of the session to arbitrarily arrogate to herself the right to promulgate a new constitution, which proposes among other things to disfranchise over one-fourth of the voters and the owners of nine-tenths of the private property of the Kingdom, to abolish the
S. Doc 231, pt 6----67
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Upper House of the Legislature and to substitute in place thereof an appointive one, to be appointed by the Sovereign.' Americans who are now shouting, 'home rule for Hawaiians' and demanding that the Provisional Government should be approved by a popular vote will do well to remember that the native Hawaiians are not by any means a majority of the population, and that the Queen sought to take the ballot from the hands of white men and confer it solely to her Kanaka brethren.
"NOT OF ROYAL BLOOD.
"It would be well for those to reflect who are now deploring the loss of the deposed Queen's rights to ascertain just what those rights are. She has not a drop of royal blood in her veins, and therefore does not get any of her pretended royal rights by descent. When Kamehameha V expired, December 11, 1872, the royal family became extinct. Then the system of election was resorted to to fill the throne. Lunalilo, one of the high chief class, was elected by a vote of the nobles and representatives. He died in 1874, and then a new election of the sovereign was held by the nobles and representatives. The general supposition was that Queen Emma, the widow of Kamehameha IV, would be elected, but when the election came off Kalakaua captured the Legislature and secured a majority, it was charged at the time, by unfair methods. Riots against Kalakaua followed, and he was only kept on the throne ultimately by the landing of an American force.
"When Kalakaua died, in 1891, he had no heir, and by his will he selected his sister, Liliuokalni, as his successor. Thus the right to the throne by inheritance or by an election was abandoned, and the Queen who was deposed last winter seemed to owe her elevation to the will of her brother, which mode of selection seems to have been acquiesced in at the time. Whether there was any law or change of constitution which authorized a childless sovereign to will away the throne to a relative or not, I do not know. Similarly, however, the deposed Queen has designated as her successor Kaiulani, the daughter of her sister, now 18 years of age, the daughter of Mr. Cleghorn, an Englishman who married one of Kalakaua's sisters and who held office under that King. Kaiulani is now being brought up in England, under the tutelage of Theophilus C. Davies, formerly English consul at Honolulu, and now in business there, and whose son is said to be engaged to marry Kaulani. She visited Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland last winter in company with Davies, and Mrs. Cleveland gave the incipient Queen distinguished consideration. Davies has lately had interviews with Cleveland and Gresham and has returned to Honolulu, proclaiming that Lil will be restored, and here's where 'the English of it' comes in.
"Perhaps one reason why women seem to be the favorite sex for sovereigns, in violation of the Salic law, is because the descent of property in Hawaii is through the female and not the male line. Kalakaua and his sister Lil were of what is known as the high chief class. Their blood was not, therefore, 'royal,' but, so far as inherited, of a very bad kind, for it is a historical fact that their grandfather was the first person ever executed in Hawaii for the murder of his wife.
"A DYING RACE.
"It seems absurd that an American statesman should be willing to commit the future destinies of Hawaii to the rule of the monarchy of a race rapidly dying out, rather than to the vigorous and progressive
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auspices of the American Republic. The native population of Hawaii fell off from 1866 from 57,125 to 31,446 in 1890-a loss of 22,679 in twenty-five years. At that rate of loss the whole native population of Hawaii will be wiped out completely early in the second quarter of the next century, so that the child may now be born who will live to see the entire extinction of the Hawaiian race. This is a startling fact. Yet it seems to be true that in a little more than a century since the discovery of the Hawaiian group by Capt. Cook the population has dwindled from 400,000 to less than one-eleventh of that number. I have not space to give the reasons for this decay of the race, one of the principal of which seems to lie in the fact that the native women generally lack the motherly instinct for the proper care of their children.
"A common custom among Hawaiian mothers is to give away their children at birth, some promising to give them away even before they are born. The mother, for this loss of her offspring, solaces herself often by adopting the child of some other woman as a household pet, after the manner of many American women who prefer pugs to progeny. It is certain that a newer and more virile race is shortly to entirely supersede the aboriginals on these islands. The evolution is now going on with startling rapidity.
"Now that the public lands are about exhausted in America and Hawaii lies contiguous to our own shores, shall the dominant race to be planted there be American or English, or shall the structure of the future be built on the basis of a race, as Cleveland proposes, who will sink out of sight among the 'lost tribes' early in the next century? Statesmen who are statesmen worthy of the name do not build the nation for a day, but for all time. In view of the fact that our Pacific coast will in the near future have a population of 10,000,000 of people, with a vast commerce over the Pacific Ocean, and that this commerce will require protection over that great sea, the reasons for annexation, now that the opportunity offers, are too obvious to need to be recounted here.
"A SETTLED POLICY.
"The students of American history know that in the United States annexation has been the settled policy always. The original American colonies numbered only eleven, including the three counties of Delaware, which were really a part of Pennsylvania, and the number of States remained at eleven for two or three years after the adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787. The number was swelled to thirteen in 1789 and 1790, when North Carolina and Rhode Island reluctantly came into the Union. The original colonies contained no more than 1,000,000 square miles of territory, a narrow strip of land stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Alleghenies in the West, to the Floridas and Louisiana in the south, and to the northward to Nova Scotia and Canada. All during our earlier history it was a struggle to annex new territory or to protect what we had. The real bottom bone of contention in the war with Great Britain in 1812 was as to which nation should hold the navigation arid mouth of the Mississippi River. In the present century we have made by purchase the following annexations, namely:
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In 1803, Louisiana cost |
$15,000,000 |
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In 1819, Florida |
5,000,000 |
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In 1848, California and New Mexico |
15,000,000 |
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In 1853, Arizona |
10,000,000 |
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In 1867, Alaska |
7,200,000 |
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| |
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Total cost of territory purchased |
52,200,000 |
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"The nation has repaid its entire cost of $52,000,000 for all the territory purchased in a single year by the product of the mines of California. Texas was annexed in 1845, not by purchase or treaty, but by a joint resolution of Congress. The acquisition of Louisiana and the Floridas more than doubled the original million square miles of territory on which the United States started into business; then Texas came in with 300,000 square miles more, next California and New Mexico with still a greater extent of territory, then Arizona in 1853 with a large slice more, and Alaska in 1867 with 500,000 more, so that now the original million of our area has been swelled by annexation to four times its first size, and, in fact, the center of the Republic has traveled west into the territory annexed.
"There has not been an annexation of territory made that has not added greatly to the material grandeur and to the prosperity of the whole United States, and it would now be difficult to find throughout all these broad realms a single American, not a crank, who wouldn't be willing we should go to war rather than any acre acquired should be wrested from us. The acquisition of territory by America is very much like the birth of children---- not always longed for by the parent or prospectively welcome to the family, but once they join the home circle they are valued above all price and are too precious to be bought with money. So would it be once that Hawaii became an American possession.
"NO PLEBISCITE OR VOTING ON ANNEXATION.
"It is claimed by some of the Clevelandites that Hawaii should not be annexed without a majority vote of the aboriginal natives, who are themselves a minority of the whole permanent inhabitants, in its favor. This is against all American precedent in annexations in this country, and generally in all practice throughout the world. The question of the annexation of any of the territory acquired by us was never submitted to a vote of the people of the country acquired in any case. It is probable that if the inhabitants had voted, including those of the aboriginal natives, the vote in each case would have been against annexation. The Indians in these countries would have been against annexation, and with their votes annexation would have been defeated. Even as it was the Louisiana acquisition was opposed strongly there, and serious riots in opposition resulted in New Orleans. In our acquisitions the government in control of the territory transferred arranged the terms of each transfer, and there was no popular vote on the subject.
"Those who controlled territory to transfer transferred it, as has been proposed in the case of Hawaii, and all such transfers have been approved as wise, popular, patriotic, and glorious by the American people. And as those who are represented in the Provisional Government now propose to cede Hawaii control and own nine-tenths of the business and private property of the islands and have shown their ability to sustain that Government against all opposition that can come from within the country, their right to act on the question is indisputable.
"WHAT THE MAP SHOWS.
"The accompanying map shows that Hawaii is the great crossing point in traversing the Pacific Ocean-the hub that sends out spokes to all other prominent points and ports of that greatest ocean of the world. All the steamer lines, other than coastwise, here cross and
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diverge to all points of the compass. It is the strategical and naval key to the whole Northern Pacific Ocean. All naval and military authorities concur in the statement that the strong nation that has power to hold Hawaii will have the dominion over this great sea and can control the vast commerce of the Pacific, for it is the gateway and toll gate of the water roads to China, Japan, the Indies, the Orient, as well as the focusing point of vessels bound to North and South America, to Australia, and to the innumerable groups of islands composing the Indian Ocean archipelago. Here are some ocean distances, in miles, from Honolulu to----
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"Thomas Hart Benton long ago declared that the dominion and empire of the world lay along the route to the Indies and with the country that controlled the commerce over it. This has been true ever since the discovery of America. The map shows that the mainland of Alaska is west of Honolulu, and the Aleutian Islands, a part of American territory in Alaska, are more than 300 miles west of the Hawaii's. With the laying of an ocean cable to Honolulu, which there is good assurance will be done by a British company very soon, and the completion of the Nicaragua canal, which is also sure to come later, the importance of the Hawaiian Islands will be vastly increased. Within five years after American annexation Honolulu would become the Hong Kong of the Pacific, with a population of at least 100,000, and the population of the whole group would be doubled with a steady increasing growth thereafter.
"The growing commerce of our Pacific coast with the Orient and elsewhere on that ocean will be immensely increased in the near future, and these American interests demand the acquisition of these islands for commerce in time of peace and for defense in time of war. It should be remembered that the United States are being builded for all time and not for a day. If the United States acquire these islands on the terms proffered by the Hawaiian Provisional Government, our Government would get $10,000,000 of actual value in property for nothing, besides the Pearl River coaling station on the same terms, which may be easily and cheaply fortified at small cost, so as to become a naval Gibraltar of the Pacific, strong enough to be held by our white squadron against any force likely ever to be brought against it. And there is no civilizing or Americanizing to be done to train the annexed people into accord with our institutions, for the white men now at the head of the Provisional Government are all of the best New England stock, as well as those who support it. All the executive heads of the Provisional Government, except one, are white men born on the soil of Hawaii, sons of American missionaries, who Christianized, civilized, and raised Hawaii from heathendom, although declared 'aliens' by Secretary Gresham.
"CLIMATE AND PRODUCTIONS.
"The islands have the finest climate in the world, and Hawaii has been justly styled the Paradise of the Pacific. It raises the products of the tropic and the temperate zones. It is the richest piece of cane
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sugar producing country in the world, as it may be seen from the fact that the average product of sugar in other countries is two tons to the acre, while in the islands it is four, and often eight tons in exceptional cases. Heretofore the annual exports of the islands for several years have been of the value of about $115 per each man, woman, and child in the whole country-a larger percentage to population than enjoyed by any other country in the world. This year the first six months customs statement shows that the average for the year in sugar exports alone will reach about $110 per head for each inhabitant-a large increase. Cane sugar is not raised here above the 1,500-foot level of the sea. Experiments that promise success are now being made in raising the red Australian cane above the 1,500-foot level. If the effort is successful the sugar crop will be vastly increased. Above that level is now raised as fine coffee as is produced in any country in the world. But coffee cultivation has not been pushed, sugar raising being more profitable.
"But with the advent of Yankee methods both the coffee, rice, and other products of the soil will be enormously increased. Hawaii is truly an exceedingly fertile land abounding in rich products. It only has to be "tickled with a hoe to laugh with a harvest." Do we want it? Well, the Americans ought to know enough to take a good thing when it is offered for nothing, and is needed for the purposes of commerce and protection. To reject annexation now, and to crush out by bayonets an American government over what is really only an outlying American colony, only to restore it to heathendom and the rule of the Kahunas, would be the greatest political crime and blunder that the Americans have committed in this century, only excepting the efforts of the rebels to destroy the Union. In this case the instrument of the crime employed by the administration is one who endeavored to pull down our flag and to put in its place that of the confederacy,-and one who has already pulled down the stars and stripes in Honolulu, and is now engaged in the anti-American effort to run up the Britishized flag of the heathen Queen in its place.
"COMMISSIONER BLOUNT'S REPORT.
"While I write Commissioner Blount's report has just been brought in. It seems to have fallen lifeless, limp, and dead upon the public as being anything like a true and living witness against annexation. As the late American minister, Mr. Stevens, promises to dissect Blount's cadaver, it is only fair that his scalpel shall have the first slash at it. I only say here that I do know that Blount's report is a wicked perversion of the facts, as I had the opportunity of gathering them in Honolulu before his arrival there and after. The story of a Stevens conspiracy is utterly absurd. The plain facts, briefly, are these: There was great excitement over the passage of the opium and lottery bills at the close of the legislative session, and the whole civilized and Christianized part of the community was up in arms against these measures, which had been bribed through the Legislature and mothered by the Queen.
"The Christian ladies of the city called on the Queen in the interests of morality, asking her not to sign these bills. The Queen promised not to do so, and asked the ladies to unite with her in prayer that God would give her strength to resist the temptation. They did so, and the whole city knew of it. Next morning the city was shocked to learn that she had played the hypocrite and signed the odious bills. A popular ferment ensued. On that day, when the session had closed finally,
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the community was still farther shocked when the Queen, on her own volition, without the consent of her cabinet, proclaimed a new constitution, cutting off the franchise of a large portion of the whites and practically handing over their liberties and properties to the tender mercies of the native Kanakas.
"This last straw broke the camel's back. The revolution instantly broke out, which resulted in the establishment of the Provisional Government. Mr. Stevens was absent, and had been for days previous, on board a United States war vessel, the Boston I think, which had gone on a cruise in the outer islands for target practice. Neither Stevens nor the United States cruiser arrived back in Honolulu until after the revolution had been under full head for fully forty-eight hours, and he and the officers of the vessel were in utter ignorance of what had happened until they landed. Then he and they acted promptly. That does not look much like a Stevens conspiracy. It was the fact that the Queen's party took advantage of his absence to establish a new constitution and to make a revolution of their own, and she lost her throne in the attempt."
The Chairman. When you were in Hawaii did you know Paul Neuman?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. What relation did he hold to Liliuokalani?
Mr. MacArthur. He was her attorney-held the power of attorney that he had here when he originally came.
The Chairman. The same as is printed in Mr. Blount's report?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. Were you personally acquainted with the Queen?
Mr. MacArthur. I met her in California. She was at the same house that I was. I knew her husband in California, and I should not have been able to see her but for a previous acquaintance. She was not receiving anybody.
The Chairman. What year was it that you first met the Queen?
Mr. MacArthur. I think it must have been in 1887. I was in California three or four times. I am not quite sure of the year; I think it was in 1887. The Queen's husband was over there trying to float some Government bonds.
The Chairman. That was before the Queen's accession to the throne?
Mr. MacArthur. Before her accession. She was Mrs. Dominis then?
The Chairman. Did you have with Mr. and Mrs. Dominis a personal acquaintance?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; to a limited extent. I spoke to them frequently at the hotel in California.
The Chairman. Did you have frequent conversations with her?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; some.
The Chairman. When you returned to Hawaii after this revolution had been inaugurated, did you see her again?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you have any conversation with her?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. On political topics?
Mr. MacArthur. Not very much; I did to a small extent.
The Chairman. I would like to know what you know in respect to Paul Neuman's authority to represent Liliuokalani, and of any overtures that were made by him, with her consent, or, as he asserted, with her consent, to surrender her crown to the Provisional Government,
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her royal authority, for a moneyed consideration. Give us your knowledge about that, and you can go on and state the whole affair in your own way.
Mr. MacArthur. I went to Mr. Dole. I had trouble in my own mind as to whether the Queen had not some personal rights in the crown lands, for the reason that the treasury department had never asked her to make a return on the income, which was about $75,000 a year, from these lands and which she had received, and as the treasury had never asked her for a return I thought she had an individual right in the lands. I said to the people, "She has individual rights, and you have not asked her to make a return to the treasury of what she has received and what she did not receive." The President explained it all to me, the grounds of it. When Mr. Neuman indicated that they were willing-I had made the suggestion and others had-that they ought to buy her out, pay her a definite sum, $25,000 or some other sum per year for her rights. Her rights had been shattered, but I thought they ought to pay for them, and so I went, in accordance with Mr. Neuman's suggestion, or by his consent, to see President Dole.
Mr. Neuman said he wanted to talk with President Dole about this matter, but he had not been there officially, and he could not go there publicly to his official place. I talked with Mr. Dole, and Mr. Dole said he could not officially do anything without consulting his executive committee, but he said he would be very happy to meet Mr. Neuman and see what they wanted-see if they could come to any terms about this thing by which the Queen would abdicate and surrender her rights. Then he said, "Where will Mr. Neuman like to meet me?" After we talked it over we thought Mr. Neuman would not be willing to come there publicly, and so it was suggested that Mr. Neuman could call on Mr. Dole at his house on a given evening and bring his daughter along.
The Chairman. Do you remember what evening that was?
Mr. MacArthur. I do not remember. And in accordance with that, Mr. Neuman and his daughter called, nominally for the daughter to see Mrs. Dole, so that it could not get out, if they made a call, they could say it was merely a social call, not an official call. Of course, I do not know what their conversation was; but Mr. Neuman, acting on that, called on the Queen. Mr. Dole and Mr. Neuman both impressed on me the importance of not having this thing get out, or the whole thing would go up in smoke. Mr. Neuman said he could bring this thing about if he could keep it from the Queen's retainers-her people. He said, "That is the difficulty about this thing." This matter went on for three or four days. Mr. Neuman saw the Queen and she agreed not to say anything about it, so Mr. Neuman tells me, and I got it from other sources there which I think are reliable. They came to some sort of understanding; I do not know what it was. They went so far as to say this woman would not live over three or four years; that she had some heart trouble; and if they gave her $25,000 a year it would not be for along time.
The Chairman. As an annuity?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; and Mr. Neuman said she assented to it, if she could satisfy one or two of her people.
The Chairman. From whom did you get the understanding that the Queen assented to it?
Mr. MacArthur. I got it from Mr. Neuman, who was her attorney, and others.
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The Chairman. Was any provision included in that proposed arrangement in favor of the Princess Kaiulani?
Mr. MacArthur. No; in fact, they were a little bit antagonistic.
The Chairman. Was Mr. Neuman acting as the agent of Kaiulani?
Mr. MacArthur. No; As I understand, he never was the agent of Kaiulani, but of Lilioukalani.
Senator Frye. The last 25 or 30 lines of this letter which you have put in as your testimony clearly ought not to come in as testimony, it being certain criticisms of political action. I want to ask you to leave that out.
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; I will leave it out.
The Chairman. You desire to leave out of your statement the last part of it, because it is mere comment?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; mere comment.
Senator Gray. When did you go to the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. MacArthur. It was early in March, I think. I went there two or three steamers before the one on which Mr. Blount went.
Senator Gray. You were there when Mr. Blount arrived?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where did you stop when you went there?
Mr. MacArthur. Both at the same hotel.
Senator Gray. You were stopping at that hotel when Mr. Blount arrived†?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. He had a cottage in the grounds.
Senator Gray. Is that the hotel where tourists are likely to stop?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. How long did you remain there?
Mr. MacArthur. Seven or eight weeks; I do not quite remember.
Senator Gray. Do you remember what day of the month you got back?
Mr. MacArthur. I got back home the 20th of May.
Senator Gray. Did you come straight back?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. It would take about two weeks direct travel to come from Hawaii to your home?
Mr. MacArthur. It takes six days by steamer from Honolulu to San Francisco and four or five days across the continent home.
Senator Gray. I understand your testimony to be that you were in the islands for your health?
Mr. MacArthur. I went there exclusively for leisure. I saw such a condition of things that I went to investigating.
Senator Gray. I understand from what you have just said, and that has not been made of record, that you believe in the general policy of the Nicaraguan Canal and the annexation of these islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. You are what may be called an annexationist?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Of course, you think that annexation would be for the benefit of the people of the United States?
Mr. MacArthur. I do, decidedly. I did not go there an annexationist; but when I found the conditions of things there, I changed my views about it.
Senator Gray. Had you been there before?
Mr. MacArthur. No.
Senator Gray. You had not been in the islands before?
Mr. MacArthur. No.
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Senator Gray. And you think that the treaty of annexation that was proposed to the Senate by the commissioners of the Hawaiian Islands and the Secretary of State and President, in January, 1893, would have been a good treaty to confirm?
Mr. MacArthur. So far as I understand it; I am not familiar with details of that treaty.
Senator Gray. You think it would be good to make those islands an integral part of the United States?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. And its people a part of the body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. I do. There may be a good deal in that question of annexation to California.
Senator Gray. Do you think it would be well to make it an integral part of the United States and the people a part of our body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. I do.
Senator Gray. Natives, Chinese, Portuguese, and Japanese?
Mr. MacArthur. Certainly the Portuguese.
Senator Gray. I said the Chinese.
Mr. MacArthur. Our Constitution is in the way of incorporating the Chinaman as a citizen.
Senator Gray. You think the Constitution of the United States prevents Chinamen from becoming citizens?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. And on that account you are quite willing that the people should become part of the body politic, believing that the Constitution would exclude the Chinamen?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; as citizens.
Senator Gray. And it was that view of the Constitution that caused you to make the answer you did?
Mr. MacArthur. I am not opposed to the Chinaman in California.
Senator Gray. Was the result of your observation there such as to bring you to the opinion that the Provisional Government fairly represented in the American fashion the people of those islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. You think it did? You think it was supported by a majority of the people of those islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Not by a majority of the natives.
Senator Gray. I am not speaking of separating the two classes, but of a majority of all the people of those islands, whites, natives, and all.
Mr. MacArthur. If they took a vote under the present voting system, under the constitution of 1887, with American interests there, and the Portuguese who may become citizens, and are practically citizens there now, they would get a majority.
Senator Gray. Now?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; now.
Senator Gray. Do you believe they would at the time the Provisional Government was established or within a few weeks thereafter?
Mr. MacArthur. I believe they would now.
Senator Gray. Do you extend that opinion?
Mr. MacArthur. That is the voting population. There is a property qualification for the house of representatives and a larger qualification for the house of nobles. Taken together, that vote, combined with the Portuguese and white population, they would secure a majority, because annexation sentiment has grown lately.
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Senator Gray. I am told that this article is to be incorporated as a part of your testimony.
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. I would like to omit that last part. I wind up with an allusion to Mr. Stevens.
Senator Gray. Did you meet Mr. Blount shortly after your arrival in the islands?
Mr. MacArthur. I was there when he arrived.
Senator Gray. Did you meet him?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you see him constantly?
Mr. MacArthur. Every day while I was there. I went down to Mauai, made excursions to the volcano and came back, and would see Mr. Blount every day while in Honolulu.
Senator Gray. You have already told me that you met Mr. Blount directly after his arrival, and boarded at his hotel, and that you saw him every day?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did he seem to you to be engaged in gathering information? I do not say from what source; I just say, did he seem to be about that business?
Mr. MacArthur. He was, so far as I could ascertain. Yes; he was in his cottage pretty nearly all the while; did not go out any; did not make excursions.
Senator Gray. But he seemed to be gathering information?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; that was about the purport of it.
Senator Gray. Did he seem to be honestly engaged in it?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; except that he would not see some men at first like Lobenstein, who had been a surveyor and knew all about the land system. After he saw him he said he was the best man he could get-have you any more such men?
Senator Gray. Did your observation of Mr. Blount during those weeks or months that you were on the islands give you any opinion as to the man's honesty or integrity?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; I thought he was honest.
Senator Gray. Did you think he was an upright man?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes, I do-ordinarily so.
Senator Gray. A gentleman?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. I mean in the wide, broad acceptation of that term?
Mr. MacArthur. Oh, yes.
Senator Gray. He did not, I assume from what you said, gather information in a way that would satisfy a newspaper man?
Mr. MacArthur. No; he did not.
Senator Gray. You believe, from what you have noticed of your profession, that the newspaper men have a faculty, trained or otherwise, superior to other men in getting facts?
Mr. MacArthur. It is the profession of their life; yes.
Senator Gray. And you do not think that Mr. Blount, from what you saw, was up to the standard as a newspaper gatherer of information?
Mr. MacArthur. No.
Senator Gray. I observe in your article, which I have in my hand and glanced at very hastily, you say, "It is claimed by some of the Clevelandites that Hawaii should not be annexed without a majority vote of the aboriginal natives, who are themselves a minority of the whole permanent inhabitants, in its favor." What Clevelandite, so-
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called, or other person, have you heard claim, or where have you seen in print, as you claim, that Hawaii ought not to be annexed without a majority vote of the native population?
Mr. MacArthur. The New York Times, The World, and the different administration papers that express their views, held that a vote should be taken on it.
Senator Gray. But there should not be a majority vote of the natives separated from all others?
Mr. MacArthur. I mean native whites as well as others. There is a large proportion of the population natives who are whites.
Senator Gray. Then you mean that those people contend that there should not be annexation without a vote of all the real population of those islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Frye. Of all who are to vote?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. That is not what I mean. The majority vote of all the inhabitants of those islands who belong there either as natives or as naturalized citizens? That is what you mean?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Then you say, "But that is against all American precedent in annexation and generally in all practice throughout the world?"
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Are you aware that Mr. Seward, when he was Secretary of State, declared in an official paper that? "A revolutionary government is not to be recognized until it is established by the great body of the population of the State it claims to govern?"
Mr. MacArthur. No, I do not know that. What I meant there was that there had never been a case of annexation in this country where the people had voted on it.
Senator Frye. That is, the annexed population?
Mr. MacArthur. The annexed population. If it had been, the annexation would have been repudiated in every case.
The Chairman. In the case of a plebiscite in Hawaii, where the population is homogeneous, there is not as much reason for having a plebiscite of our own people for the admission of those strangers as there would be of submitting to them in case they desired to come in?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes, in the case of Louisiana and the case of Texas, annexation would have been defeated if submitted to a vote of all the inhabitants there.
The Chairman. But in those cases the people were homogeneous with our race here.
Mr. MacArthur. As to whites that may be.
Senator Gray. There was no doubt in the case of Louisiana of the full authority of the French Government to make the cession?
Mr. MacArthur. Exactly. That is the ground I take on Hawaii. There were two riots in New Orleans against annexation to the United States, and they had to send troops to put them down. The government that is in power and possession has the right to make its treaty of annexation, and there never has been in the history of the country any precedent of its kind of a plebiscitum.
The Chairman. In the annexation of a country, merging its sovereignty into another, the question is a governmental question and not of the people concerned?
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Mr. MacArthur. Exactly; because the Government represents the people, as in the case of Texas.
The Chairman. I do not know that you remember, but it appears to me that at the time the treaty with Mexico was sent in by Mr. Triste, and submitted to the Senate of the United States, there was a motion made to submit the question of annexation to a plebiscite. I do not know that you remember that.
Mr. MacArthur. I do not.
Senator Gray. I will ask you whether you approved the pulling down of that flag by Admiral Skerrett?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes, because there was no protectorate over it. I prefer annexation to a protectorate. The latter gives no sovereignty; it simply protects, and nothing else.
The Chairman. I will ask you whether there exists in Honolulu a club in which men of different politics and different races and different nativity assemble?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. Mr. Cleghorn is the president of it. He is the father of Kaiulani.
The Chairman. Do gentlemen belonging to different political parties and elements meet there on terms of friendship and cordiality??
Mr. MacArthur. Entirely so. It is the most good-natured club you ever saw.
The Chairman. And there they discuss questions of annexation?
Mr. MacArthur. It is all good-natured.
The Chairman. They entertain discussions on that question?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. Having reference to prosperity, etc.
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. In those club meetings does good feeling prevail?
Mr. MacArthur. Certainly.
The Chairman. Will you say, as compared with like assemblages of gentlemen in the United States, there is any more feeling of friction or opinion there?
Mr. MacArthur. Not as much. There is less friction through all those islands than there is in any other country in the world that I ever saw.
The Chairman. You have traveled a good deal?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; all over the world.
The Chairman. And your attention has been drawn, of course, to the observation of such questions?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. They do not have any angry political discussions in the streets in Hawaii. They meet together, and they are the best-natured people in the world.
The Chairman. Political divisions do not enter into the social relations of the people?
Mr. MacArthur. No. In Hawaii the line of rank and descent was through the mother.
The Chairman. It is like it is among the Indian tribes of this country?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. That is the reason they prefer to have a Queen to a King.
To Stenographer: Senator Morgan directs that the following be added to my testimony.
C. L. MacArthur.
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Chairman. Anything else?
MacArthur. I have, by late steamer, reliable information that there is danger that the reciprocity treaty with the United States will be repealed unless the present tension is relieved. The imports from the United States under that treaty in 1892 amounted to $3,838,359.91. Nearly all this was admitted to Hawaii free, whereas as to other competing countries the Hawaiian tariff ranges from 10 to 25 per cent on such imports. With the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty goes the privilege of our acquiring the Pearl Lochs for a naval station.
There are 915,000 acres of crown lands. The rental from these is stated at about $75,000 annually. The Provisional Government has them now. In addition the other Government lands are 851,071 acres, valued at $1,729,700, on which there is a yearly rental paid to the Provisional Government from portions leased of $58,863.
SWORN STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL GEORGE BELKNAP.
The Chairman. What is your profession??
Mr. Belknap. I am a rear-admiral in the Navy, on the retired list.
The Chairman. We are interested to know, and I think the people of the United States are very much interested in knowing, whether the Hawaiian group of islands, with its base, and particularly Pearl Harbor, is of real importance to this country and its defense in a military and a naval sense; and, if you think it is, or if it is not, what are the general reasons on which you predict that opinion?
Mr. Belknap. I think it is a matter of prime importance to the people of the United States to acquire those islands. I think, in view of the present state of affairs, the coming growth of the population of the Pacific coast, and especially when the Nicaraguan Canal shall have been completed, that those islands will form the most important commercial and strategic point in the Pacific Ocean. I think it would be a suicidal policy on the part of the United States to allow Great Britain or any other European power to get any foothold on those islands.
The Chairman. That policy seems to have been anticipated on the part of the United States for perhaps forty or fifty years, so that the question would then arise, of course, whether it would be better for us in the sense of protecting our commerce and our coast to assume the control of the Hawaiian group of islands, in order that we might there establish our naval station and have in the middle of the Pacific Ocean a means of offense and defense against the fleets of Europe and Asia?
Mr. Belknap. I think we ought to assume control right away. And as to the fleets of Europe attacking those islands, I think they have their hands full in looking out for their own interests in other parts of the world.
The Chairman. You have been on the islands??
Mr. Belknap. Yes, I have been there twice.
The Chairman. And I suppose you have some acquaintance with Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Belknap. I never went to Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. Do you know where it is located?
Mr. Belknap. I know where it is located.
The Chairman. And its general character?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, sir.
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The Chairman. And you also have a general acquaintance with the Bay of Honolulu?
Mr. Belknap. Yes; in my judgment Honolulu is one of the easiest defended ports in the world. They talk about ships attacking that harbor, the fact is they can not do it successfully. A few heavy guns properly located would keep them away.
The Chairman. You speak of the rim of mountains back of Honolulu?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, Punch Bowl and other mountains back of Honolulu. It is constantly rising ground back of the city.
The Chairman. Do you think it would be feasible to establish batteries around on the reef in Honolulu Bay?
Mr. Belknap. No, it is not feasible. It is only a half mile from shore, and that would not be necessary.
The Chairman. With long-range artillery would we be able to give the harbor any perfect protection?
Mr. Belknap. Yes. They talk about long-range guns. It is all nonsense. They can not get the range on ship that they can on shore. I landed a force in Honolulu in 1874 and kept it there a week. That was when Kalakaua was elected King. If you will allow me I will tell you the circumstances.
The Chairman. I think that is what Senator Frye desires to examine you about. Proceed with your statement.
Mr. Belknap. I arrived there on the Tuscarora from San Diego. We had been engaged in making deep-sea soundings. We arrived at Honolulu on the 3d of February, 1874. As we went into the harbor we noticed a throng of people on the wharf and streets. As soon as the pilot came on board we learned that King Lunalilo had just died. It was too late to call on the minister that day, but at 10 o'clock the next morning I went on shore. The minister was then Mr. Henry A. Pierce.
The Chairman. From what State was he?
Mr. Belknap. Massachusetts. He had been in Honolulu for many years, and he made a fortune. He came back to the United States and lost it. Then Gen. Grant made him minister. Mr. Pierce told me that the Legislative Assembly would meet on the 12th of that month, and would elect a successor to King Lunalilo, he having died without designating his successor. It became necessary therefore under the constitution that the Legislature should elect the King. Mr. Pierce said there were two candidates in the field; one was David Kalakaua, the son of a high chief; the other a widow of Kamehameha IV-Queen Emma. There were large numbers of natives and a great body of Americans who favored Kalakaua as being the better person for American interests, while some of the natives, and particularly those belonging to the English church, and the greater part of the English people, headed by the British minister, wanted Queen Emma. Mr. Pierce said he thought there would be trouble, and wanted to know if I would land a force in case it were necessary to do so.
The Chairman. I want to ask right there whether or not there was a distinctive British influence in Hawaii, as there was an American interest, and were they controverting with each other for the real control of the politics of the islands?
Mr. Belknap. I think that was undoubtedly the case. Mr. Wodehouse, the British commissioner, was there. He is now the minister. He has been there for a number of years; I think he has been there over thirty years.
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The Chairman. So that the advocacy and promotion of British interests in Hawaii, you think, were as manifest as those of the American interests?
Mr. Belknap. Beyond a doubt. Wherever you find an American minister or consul in any part of the world attempting to further the interests of the United States the English always secretly undermine the efforts of the consul and minister. That has been my observation the world over.
Senator Butler. Do you think that proceeds from the English people realizing the fact that the commercial competition is to be between the two great nations?
Mr. Belknap. I think it does in a measure. If any American goes beyond a native of Great Britain, it is continually a thorn in the side of the English people.
Senator Frye. Now I will be pleased to have you go on with your statement.
Mr. Belknap. I told Mr. Pierce that I would do everything possible. I arranged that day a system of signals by which Mr. Pierce could signal to me on board the ship if he found it necessary.
The Chairman. Was there at that time any outbreak or riot?
Mr. Belknap. No.
The Chairman. Simply expectation?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. An outbreak liable to occur at any time?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. You made arrangements beforehand for the landing of the troops?
Mr. Belknap. Yes. There was a British man-of-war In the harbor, and we did not want him to get ahead of us. We arranged a system of signals with lanterns and rockets at night and a flag by day. On the morning of the meeting of the Legislature I determined to attend and witness the proceedings in company with the minister. Capt. Skerrett and I-Capt. Skerrett commanded the Portsmouth which arrived in Honolulu the morning after we did-went to the legislative hall. We staid there and saw the organization of the Assembly. As a ballot was about to take place we left the hall and remained outside. Perhaps in a quarter of an hour after that the voting was finished and the ballots were counted, and it was found that Kalakaua had received 39 votes and Queen Emma 6. Kalakaua was declared elected. As soon as this news was given outside of the court-house, where the Legislature was in session, the adherents of Queen Emma broke out into a riot. They rushed up the back way, through a door in the back, into the hall, or through the windows out into the legislative assembly and then began to club the members and senators, I do not know which, broke chairs, smashed tables and windows, and threw all they could lay their hands on out into the street. A large party of them assembled about Queen Emma's residence, and they were making threats to devastate the town.
While this riot was in progress I said to Mr. Pierce, "I had better land the force now." He said: "No; wait a little while." Finally, Mr. Bishop, who was prime minister, minister of foreign affairs under the King-elect, said to Mr. Pierce: "We would like to have the force landed now." So that I immediately sent a messenger down to the wharf where D. C. Murray lived, and had a signal run up. In about ten minutes our men were landed-180 men, seamen, officers, and
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marines, and they marched up to the court-house, formed a column in front of it, and sent one company up into the hall to clear it out.
Senator Frye. The legislative hall?
Mr. Belknap. The legislative hall-to clear it out. I think that in less than ten minutes after arriving on the scene of action everything was quiet there.
Senator Butler. Did that company meet with any resistance?
Mr. Belknap. No. The rioters had nothing but clubs to resist with, and they attempted no resistance. But the police of the Government had torn off their badges and some of them had joined the rioters, so that there was nothing to do but to land the troops to preserve order.
The Chairman. Was any force landed from any other ship?
Mr. Belknap. Capt. Ray, who was commanding Her Majesty's ship Tenedos, instead of staying in town that morning, went out horse riding, and his executive officer did not act at first upon the request of the British minister. They had no signals to send off to the ship to call the men on shore. But within half an hour after our men got on shore and the riot was quelled, the detachment from the Tenedos came marching up to the court-house.
Senator Butler. A detachment from the British ship?
Mr. Belknap. British ship. Mr. Pierce turned to Mr. Wodehouse and said, "You had better withdraw this force and send it up to Queen Emma's."
Senator Butler. Which force?
Mr. Belknap. The American minister said, "You had better advise your officers to go up to Queen Emma's house and disperse the crowd there." Capt. Ray did not get back into town until late in the afternoon. Some few months after he was relieved of the command of that ship, ordered home, and never had an hour's duty from that time forward.
Senator Frye. They did not like it that the Americans should get ahead of them?
Mr. Belknap. No, they did not. The Englishmen resident there in the islands were very much chagrined, particularly Mr. Wodehouse.
The Chairman. The riot was quelled?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. Peace restored?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. Order established?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. And Kalakaua was preserved on the throne?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Did you go there to establish him on the throne?
Mr. Belknap. No, but to preserve order.
Senator Frye. And his establishment on the throne was a mere incident.
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. If you had not gone on shore, would not Queen Emma's troops have routed them?
Mr. Belknap. I think they would; I think there is no question about it.
Senator Frye. What did you go on shore for?
Mr. Belknap. To preserve order and protect the American minister; preserve life and property of American residents. In my judgment it was necessary to land the force for such purpose; it was also in the interest of the United States that Kalakaua would rule in those islands,
S. Doc 231, pt 6----68
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instead of Queen Emma, because if she had been elected Queen her influence would have been thrown in favor of England.
Senator Frye. Still, as a United States naval officer, you did not think you had any right to take sides in the fight?
Mr. Belknap. No, none whatever.
Senator Frye. But if it resulted in the retention of Kalakaua you would congratulate the American people upon that fact?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Have you been in various other places where troops were landed?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Were they ever landed on the order of the minister?
Mr. Belknap. No. When I commanded the Asiatic squadron Mr. Swift said to me, "You would not obey my order to land troops?" I said, "No; I could not do that; it is against the regulations-we are ordered to maintain relations of the most cordial character with the ministers and consuls of the United States, and when they make requests we are obliged to consider them in all their light and bearings and govern ourselves accordingly." We are responsible for our acts to the Secretary of the Navy alone. That is the principle on which I acted in Honolulu.
Senator Butler. If you were to receive an order from the Secretary of the Navy to take an order from a minister would you obey him?
Mr. Belknap. The orders of the Secretary of the Navy are the orders of the President of the United States.
Senator Sherman. Does not the Secretary of the Navy always speak in the name of the President of the United States?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. I read from Article XVIII of the present Naval Regulations:
"The officer in command of a ship of war is not authorized to delegate his power, except for the carrying out of the details of the general duties to be performed by his authority. The command is his, and he can neither delegate the duties of it to another nor avoid its burdens, nor escape its responsibilities; and his 'aide or executive' in the exercise of the power given to him for 'executing the orders of the commanding officer,' must keep himself constantly informed of the commander's opinions and wishes thereon, and whenever, and as soon as he may be informed or is in doubt as to such opinion or wishes, he must remedy such defect by prompt and personal application, to the end that the authority of the captain may be used only to carry out his own views, and that he may not be, by its unwarranted exercise, in any measure relieved from his official responsibilities, which can neither be assumed by nor fall upon any other officer."
Do you understand those to be the present regulations?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Then----
"He shall preserve, so far as possible, the most cordial relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States in foreign countries, and extend to them the honors, salutes, and other official courtesies to which they are entitled by these regulations.
"He shall carefully and duly consider any request for service or other communication from any such representative.
"Although due weight should be given to the opinions and advice of such representatives, a commanding officer is solely and entirely
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responsible to his own immediate superior for all official acts in the administration of his command. ٭ ٭ ٭
"On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof."
Now, suppose you wore in command of a ship in the harbor of Honolulu, and. the Secretary of the Navy should send you an order to obey the order of William P. Frye, then a resident in Honolulu and not in the naval service, would you be obliged to obey any order of William P. Frye?
Mr. Belknap. No.
Senator Frye. Would not that order which had been sent to you to obey William P. Frye be illegal?
Mr. Belknap. I think it would be.
Senator Frye. Suppose you were there with a ship, and a man by the name of James H. Blount, whom you knew to be a commissioner appointed by the President of the United States to remain in those islands for certain purposes, should send you an order to land your troops for any purpose, would you, as a naval officer, feel under the slightest obligation to obey the order?
Mr. Belknap. I would first demand his authority for issuing any order of that sort.
Senator Frye. Suppose you should ask his authority, and he should read this to you:
- "Department of State,
- "Washington, March 11, 1893.
- "To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands and the protection of our citizens therein is paramount; in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn."
Suppose you should receive such an order as that from the Secretary of the Navy, would you feel bound to obey such order?
Mr. Belknap. I should think that was in direct violation of the Regulations of the U. S. Navy.
Senator Frye. Then----
- "March 11 1893.
- "Sir: This letter will be handed you by the Hon. James H. Blount, special commissioner by the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands. You will consult freely with Mr. Blount and will obey any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command. You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.
- "Hilary A. Herbert,
- "Secretary of the Navy.
- "Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
- "Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, etc."
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Suppose you, as commanding officer, had received from the Secretary of the Navy an order that you should obey the instructions and directions of a man by the name of James H. Blount, then temporarily a resident in the Islands of Hawaii and a commissioner on the part of the United States, would you then feel obliged to obey his instructions?
Mr. Belknap. What is a commissioner?
Senator Frye. He is nothing, in my opinion. Call him a minister plenipotentiary.
Senator Butler. Suppose, when you called upon Mr. Blount for a copy of his instructions he should give an authority from the President of the United States, who is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, would you then feel obliged to obey the order?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Suppose the authority from the President of the United States was an appointment as special commissioner for the purpose of making an investigation in the Hawaiian Islands, and the President of the United States should direct you by an order to obey the orders of this commissioner, would you feel obliged to do it?
Admiral Belknap. Yes, if it implies that Mr. Blount was to exercise paramount authority in naval matters; but the authority conferred upon him is qualified by the words "acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces," which I submit implies consultation and joint action of the parties concerned. If he should order me to make war upon the Government of those islands I should feel that I could not do it, for under the regulations I would have been held solely responsible for the act of war.
Senator Frye. Even with these instructions from the President of the United States, under the regulations of the Navy Department does not the responsibility still remain with the commanding officer?
Mr. Belknap. It does still remain.
Senator Frye. Is there any way of relieving the officer of that responsibility? If the President of the United States or the Secretary of the Navy were to send an order direct to you to land troops or refrain from landing troops that would relieve you from responsibility?
Mr. Belknap. That would relieve me.
Senator Frye. But sending an order to you to obey the instructions of somebody else can not change the responsibility from you to somebody else?
Mr. Belknap. No, not under the terms of the regulations.
Senator Butler. That proceeds upon the theory that no naval officer is bound to obey an illegal order, and he is the sole judge as to whether it is illegal?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, in so far as law and regulation covers the particular case.
Senator Frye. This is addressed to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.
- "Honolulu, March 31, 1893.
- "Sir: You are directed to haul down the United States ensign from the Government building, and to embark the troops now on the shore to the ship to which they belong. This will be executed at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of April.
- "I am, sir, your obedient servant,
- "James H. Blount,
- "Special Commissioner of the United States."
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Do you regard that as a legal order?
Mr. Belknap. I have been in the naval service nearly forty-seven years, and that is the most peremptory order I ever saw issued by anybody. If Mr. Blount wanted that done he might have requested the admiral to do it, after consultation with him. Such would have been the courteous and cooperative course.
Senator Frye. Do you think Mr. Blount had any right to give any such order?
Mr. Belknap. I do not think he had, at least in such peremptory terms. There was no cooperation there.
Senator Frye. And if the obeying of that order involved the taking of human life would you, as the commander of a ship, have obeyed it?
Mr. Belknap. No; because I would have been held responsible if anything happened. Such order would not have relieved me from the responsibility imposed upon me by the regulations.
Senator Frye. Notwithstanding the directions of the Secretary of the Navy, notwithstanding the instructions of the Secretary of State to Mr. Blount, notwithstanding Mr. Blount's direct order, under the Naval Regulations you would not be relieved from responsibility as a naval officer in command?
Mr. Belknap. I would not have been relieved, but I would have withdrawn that force if the minister wished it.
Senator Frye. I understand that. If there were no great responsibility, overwhelming responsibility, you would comply with the wishes of the minister just the same?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Now-----
- "U.S. Legation, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands,
- "January 16, 1893.
- "Sir: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the U. S. legation and the U. S. consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.
- "Yours, truly,
- "John L. Stevens,
- "Envoy Extraordinary, etc., of the United States.
- "To Capt. C. C. Wiltse."
Do you regard that as a perfectly legitimate request, and properly made?
Mr. Belknap. That is perfectly legitimate; a request I have had made to me a half dozen times during my service.
Senator Frye. That request does not compel you to land troops?
Mr. Belknap. It does not; it is a proper, legitimate, and courteous request from one official to another.
Senator Frye. You would learn, as a naval officer, all you could with regard to the existing conditions, and if, in your judgment, the safety of the legation and the consulate and the security of life and property were of such a character as to require the landing of troops, you would land them?
Mr. Belknap. Yes. It is the business of an officer to inform himself thoroughly before taking such grave action.
Senator Frye. But notwithstanding the fact that you had received that request, if you had determined from your own investigations,
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made through your own officers, that the landing of the troops was not necessary, you would not land them? In other words, the thing is still left entirely in your charge?
Mr. Belknap. Yes; but if I do not comply with the request and anything happened detrimental to the United States I am responsible. The regulations hold me to that.
Senator Butler. It has become a question of tweedledum and tweedledee between Mr. Blount and Mr. Stevens-one is a request and the other a command. Suppose Admiral Skerrett had declined, on his responsibility, to take down the flag and send his troops back on the ship, and anything had happened to the American legation and American life and property, Admiral Skerrett would have been responsible?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Would he not have been tried by a court-martial?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. And would he not have read the Naval Regulations, which are law, to determine whether he had obeyed the regulations?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Butler. The same responsibility rested on Admiral Skerrett in declining to obey the order as rested on him in obeying it-if anything had happened to American interests in Honolulu by the American troops remaining on shore, he would have been responsible. So that the responsibility is pretty well understood to be that an Army or Navy officer sent off on an expedition of that kind is vested with a certain amount of discretion?
Mr. Belknap. He is to determine in his own mind what the interests of the Government demand. During this last cruise I sent officers and men up to the capital of Korea, 40 miles from Chemulpo. I received a telegraphic order to cooperate with the minister, and when the minister sent to me for a force I dispatched it to him in conformity with the order of the Secretary of the Navy to cooperate with the minister.
Senator Butler. You did it on your own responsibility?
Mr. Belknap. On my own responsibility, in interpretation of the orders of the Secretary, the wishes of the minister, and of my own personal knowledge of Korean affairs.
Senator Frye. Before this order of the Secretary of the Navy, given to Admiral Skerrett to obey the orders of Mr. Blount, did you ever know of any such order?
Mr. Belknap. I never heard of it.
Senator Frye. Did you ever know of a minister or commissioner in a foreign country making such an order as Mr. James H. Blount made to Admiral Skerrett? I refer to the one I have just read.
Mr. Belknap. Never. As I said before, it is the most peremptory order I ever saw in print.
Senator Frye. The order of Capt. Wiltse to the officers who took the troops on shore is as follows:
"Sir: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order."
Now, I would like to ask you what are the rights of officers in command of ships in foreign countries touching the matter of preservation of public order? That part of Capt. Wiltse's order was not in response to the request of Mr. Stevens. He said nothing about public order;
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he adopts the old diplomatic form of expression, protection of life and property; whereas Capt. Wiltse in his order uses the additional expression, "assist in preserving public order." What do you understand to be the rights of a commanding officer with regard to preserving public order in foreign countries?
Mr. Belknap. All the foreign countries are not alike as regards the conduct of ships of war. There are small governments where the fleets would act differently from what they would in larger countries; but the landing of a force is a grave act and should always be well considered.
Senator Butler. And I suppose they are in large measure controlled by the treaty stipulations of those countries?
Mr. Belknap. In great measure; but in Honolulu there is not a street, there is not a precinct, there is not a corner of it where an American is not living or has not his business and property, and to protect that property it is necessary, in case of a riot, where the police can not control, to land a force from a ship.
Senator Frye. Then you would say that Capt. Wiltse, if in his judgment he thought there was liability of a riot and the likelihood of the destruction of American property, had a right to order his troops ashore, one of his purposes being to preserve public order?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, I would have done the same thing under the same circumstances.
Senator Frye. So that when you landed your troops in 1874, notwithstanding the fact you knew the result of landing those troops and interfering with that mob to preserve public order would result in the maintenance of King Kalakaua on the throne, you would have done what you did by way of landing the troops and putting down the riot?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. It is not for the officer or minister to take into consideration what would be the effect of such landings and putting down of riots; he is concerned simply in the fact that they are landed for the purpose of protecting life and property?
Senator Butler. That is true in time of peace, not in time of war?
Mr. Belknap. In time of war it would be a different question.
Senator Butler. For instance, you would not feel warranted in landing a force at Rio now?
Mr. Belknap. No, so far as I understand the situation at this distance.
Senator Butler. Mr. Frye asked you some questions with regard to the power of naval officers. Suppose you were in charge of the Charleston, we will say, at the port of Liverpool or Copenhagen, and you were ashore and a riot were about to break out, would you feel authorized to land a force to protect American property?
Mr. Belknap. No, unless the Government confessed its inability to afford protection.
Senator Butler. So that it is not universal?
Mr. Belknap. No.
Senator Frye. How about Panama?
Mr. Belknap. In Panama we have the right by treaty. I landed there myself.
Senator Butler. But it is not a universal rule?
Mr. Belknap. No.
Senator Butler. It is done in pursuance of some treaty stipulations between our Government and the government where the troops are landed.
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Mr. Belknap. Yes, for the protection of the treaty.
Senator Butler. Otherwise you would not think of doing such a thing?
Mr. Belknap. No such conditions could not exist there. When I was a midshipman on board the frigate Puritan, at Valparaiso, Chile, they held a presidential election in that country, and the party defeated in that election got up a revolution, and one afternoon we lauded the troops. We landed a force on that shore, and we remained on the wharf there several hours; the British ships did the same thing. We did not proceed up into town, but we were there for the purpose of protecting the consulate if necessary. In November, 1863, the Chinese at the Barrier Forts fired on our flag. They fired from two of four forts; we captured all those forts, blew them up, razed them to the ground, and retired.
Senator Butler. That was an act of war.
The Chairman. But the firing began the war.
Mr. Belknap. The commodore in command was commended by the Secretary of the Navy for such action.
Senator Butler. You would do that in Liverpool?
Mr. Belknap. Yes; if the flag was deliberately fired upon.
Senator Butler. If your flag were fired upon, you would not stop to consider the strength of the Government, but would fire in return?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. I have drawn up a question which, according to my view, presents the true relations of the commander of a ship in a port to the minister of the United States who may be resident there at the time. When a war ship of the United States is in a port where there is a civil commotion which threatens to become riotous, to endanger the treaty rights of the citizens of the United States, and the question arises whether it is proper to land troops to preserve order, is it not the right and duty of the minister of the United States to ascertain and determine whether the condition of the country is such as to require the landing of troops? In such a case, and as to the question whether the necessity for the landing of troops actually existed, you would feel bound, I suppose, if in command of a war ship of the United States, to respect and follow the request of the minister of the United States to land the troops?
Mr. Belknap. A minister of the United States, of course, has a perfect right to make any request of that sort of the commander of a ship, of a squadron, but it is the duty under the regulations of the Navy Department for the commanding officer of the ship to examine the matter himself and to decide for himself whether he ought to land the force or not, because the responsibility under the regulations of the Navy Department finally rests upon him. If any great mistake is made by which injury comes to the United States in their interests, or any citizen suffers harm through the action of a commander in chief or a commander of a vessel, he is responsible. On the contrary, if he make a mistake in landing the force he is also responsible under the regulations.
Senator Frye. In the recognition of a de facto government, to whom does the recognition belong-to the minister of the United States resident in such country or to the naval officer?
Mr. Belknap. It belongs to the minister.
Senator Frye.The naval officer has nothing to do with that question of recognition?
Mr. Belknap. Nothing to do with it. I was commander of the war
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ship Alaska when the minister of the United States in Peru, Mr. Christiancy, recognized a new government during the Chilean-Peruvian wars. That government was overthrown, and when Mr. Hurlbut became minister he recognized another government.
Senator Frye. You were there all the time?
Mr. Belknap. Yes. When I was at Honolulu in 1874 everything was at the lowest ebb; property was worth nothing, the people could hardly get along. But that fall of 1874 Kalakaua, accompanied by the American minister, Mr. Pierce, came the United States and a treaty of reciprocity was negotiated. From that moment an era of prosperity dawned upon those islands and trade there increased several hundred per cent. I think the 35,000,000 pounds of sugar exported from there in 1875 went up to 136,000,000 pounds in 1890; and the product of rice increased in the same proportion. In fact the United States made those islands what they are-gave them all their prosperity. The town of Honolulu is as much an American town as any town in this country. In 1882, when commanding the Alaska, I was sent in great haste to Honolulu from South America because troubles were apprehended there. The reciprocity treaty was about to expire, and many people there were afraid that the United States would not renew it. Furthermore, Kalakaua had gone into such extravagant expenditures that the people were getting restive under it. After being King for eight years he took the foolish notion into his head to be crowned, a ceremony carried out at enormous expense, and the taxpayers of the islands, a majority of whom were Americans, were stirred up over it and trouble was apprehended.
I arrived there early in September, 1882, and I stayed there two months. During that time there was a meeting of all the planters on the islands in a convention at Honolulu. There was considerable excitement, but finally, after some conferences with the Government, the convention adjourned and everything passed off quietly. There was no trouble; but at that time I was prepared to land a force in case of any outbreak. The English were very anxious to know what we were going to do. Mr. Wodehouse, the British commissioner, was there. One afternoon, or one morning, rather, Mr. Dagget, our minister, and myself got an invitation to dine on a British man-of-war which was in the harbor. We were somewhat surprised at that. When we went on board to dinner that evening we found Mr. Wodehouse there. During the dinner champagne flowed pretty freely. After the coffee and cigars were brought in Mr. Wodehouse attempted to find out what we were going to do there in a certain emergency. But they got no satisfaction; Mr. Dagget and I simply confined ourselves to general talk. I commanded at Mare Island from 1886 to 1889. That was during Mr. Cleveland's first administration. Grave troubles were apprehended at Honolulu at that time, and we kept our ships constantly there. One afternoon I received a confidential telegram from the Secretary of the Navy asking me if I could be ready at a moment's notice to go over to Honolulu. I telegraphed back "yes." Two or three days after that I got a telegram from the Secretary of the Navy saying that, after a consultation with Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, they had concluded to send an order over to the minister by a telegram through me, which I sent direct from the navy-yard to Honolulu.
Senator Frye. Do you know what the nature of that telegram was?
Mr. Belknap. I do not remember it, but it must be on file in the Navy Department. For the last ten years we have kept our ships in
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Honolulu all the time. Admiral Kimberly was there a solid year. Admiral Brown was there for more than a year, and for some reason or other our Government has been obliged to keep that port guarded by our ships of war. I take it that the interests of the United States have gotten so great that that was a necessary policy to pursue. Since the Canadian Pacific line has been opened (they have a line of steamers now from Vancouver to Australia and New Zealand, touching at Honolulu) it has become vastly more important for the interests of Great Britain to acquire those islands than it has ever been before. I believe today that the Canadian authorities are making every effort to divert trade from those islands to Canada.
Senator Frye. I suppose in landing troops for the preservation of American life and property you do not feel it incumbent upon you to wait until an outbreak has actually happened?
Mr. Belknap. Not always.
Senator Frye. If a certain thing is to happen which is likely to produce an outbreak, like an election, such as that of Kalakaua, you feel yourself at liberty to get ahead of that?
Mr. Belknap. That was what was done at Corea. There was no outbreak; but the minister requested the presence of the troops, and the King was afraid for his life.
Senator Frye. If you found that the Provisional Government on a certain day, say Monday, at 2, 3, or 5 o'clock, or at any time in the day, was going to take actual possession of the Queen's public buildings, and dethrone her absolutely, you would not deem it necessary to wait until that had taken place for the landing of the troops?
Mr. Belknap. No, not if convinced that riot would ensue.
Senator Frye. But owing to the liability of its taking place and the likelihood of a riot, you would land your troops?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, under the peculiar condition of affairs at the moment.
Senator Frye. What is your judgment as to what it would cost to fortify Honolulu?
Mr. Belknap. I have not any doubt that $5,000,000 would put Honolulu in a most perfect state of defense, with guns mounted in earthworks.
The Chairman. If you desired to control the Pacific Ocean, North Polynesia, in a military sense, either for an offensive or defensive operation in reference to the protection of the western coast of the United States, including Alaska, is there any place on that coast or elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean which you would consider so important to the United States as the Hawaiian group, if we had there a fortified port or naval station?
Mr. Belknap. I know of no point in the Pacific Ocean which we should hold as good as the Hawaiian Islands, especially Honolulu.
The Chairman. You think it would be a great national misfortune to have any other flag than ours put there?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, most emphatically.
The Chairman. Or if the flag of any foreign country should be put there would that alter your opinion as to the merit or value of the possession for the protection of our western coast and our commerce in the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Belknap. So long as there is no other flag there it is always an open question; it involves the liability of troublesome questions arising all the time. Our flag should be there, in my opinion.
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The Chairman. Suppose some foreign power should close the question by coming in and occupying the islands, if they saw fit to do it, as a base of operations against the United States, would you not consider that a great calamity to this country?
Mr. Belknap. A very great calamity. Great Britain now has Puget Sound, which she ought not to be permitted to hold a single day, in my judgment. Especially with the Nicaragua Canal Honolulu will be a port of call of all the ships in the Pacific Ocean.
The Chairman. Is it indispensable to have a port to recoal in the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, and Honolulu is a splendid harbor.
The Chairman. Well sheltered?
Mr. Belknap. Well sheltered. Another peculiarity of the Hawaiian Island is, the climate is so fine and equable, they have no violent storms, such as they usually have in the tropics. We ought to have our flag there, and we ought to have a cable connecting the islands with the United States.
The Chairman. In your survey for the route for the cable between San Diego and Honolulu, did you find any practical obstructions?
Mr. Belknap.No. We have made a closer survey since my survey and found that a cable can be very readily laid.
The Chairman. I am informed that you made a survey for a cable route also, extending from the coast of Japan in the direction of the United States along the Aleutian range?
Mr. Belknap.Yes.
The Chairman. State whether you found the route practicable for a cable.
Mr. Belknap. I found the route practicable, except the very deep water, which I think would be obviated by going a little further north.
The Chairman. A large part of that route would be on land if you chose to make it?
Mr. Belknap. It would be cheaper to have it in water.
The Chairman. Is that ocean troubled with icebergs to interfere with the laying of a cable?
Mr. Belknap. Not where you would lay the cable. I think possibly sometimes the Pacific mail steamers have encountered them, when they have gone north, in very high latitudes; but I have not seen icebergs in the Pacific Ocean except off Cape Horn.
The Chairman. Did you take the temperature of that ocean current?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. What would you say was the average temperature?
Mr. Belknap. It was 8° or 10° higher than the rest of the ocean, so far as I remember.
The Chairman. It is decidedly a warm current?
Mr. Belknap. Very warm current.
The Chairman. A heavy flow of water?
Mr. Belknap. Very heavy, similar to our Gulf Stream.
The Chairman. It is that current which keeps warm the coast of California and Oregon?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. And also keeps open Bering Straits?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. [exhibiting a newspaper article from the Boston Journal of December 20, 1893]. Is this a correct statement?
Mr. Belknap. (after examining). Yes.
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The statement is as follows:
- Rear-Admiral George E. Belknap writes to the Journal the following very interesting letter regarding Hawaiian matters:
- To the Editor of the Boston Journal:
- "The letter of ex-Minister P.C. Jones, of Hawaii, published in this morning's Journal, is in error in one point.
- "He says that 'in 1874 Minister Pierce ordered Capt. Belknap to land a force of marines at Honolulu, which was done.'
- "Mr. Pierce gave no order of that character, nor was he empowered to do so by the regulations controlling the intercourse of diplomatic and naval officers on foreign stations. The regulation governing the intercourse of naval commanders with ministers and consuls of the United States at that period was as follows: 'He (the naval commander) will duly consider such information as the ministers and consuls may give him relating to the interests of the United States, but he will not receive orders from them, and he will be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, in the first place, for his acts.'
- "But the undersigned was in thorough accord with Minister Pierce, and, at his request and that of the King-elect, landed the force of bluejackets and marines at Honolulu on the occasion referred to-12th February, 1874-suppressed the riot, restored order throughout the town, and occupied the most important points at that capital for several days, or until assured by the King's ministry that protection was no longer necessary.
- "This action was taken, first, for the protection of American citizens and their property; second, because it was deemed imperative for the conservation of the interests of the United States to take decisive action at the Hawaiian capital at such crucial time. The English party, as it was called, had worked and intrigued for the election of Queen Emma to fill the throne made vacant by the death of Lunalilo, while Kalakaua was the candidate favored by most of the Americans at the islands.
- "The party favoring the election of Emma were not content to abide the result of the election, for she having been defeated in the legislative assembly by a vote of 39 to 6 her partisans broke forth at once into riotous proceedings. The legislative hall was invaded, some of Kalakaua's adherents in the assembly were clubbed nearly to death, the furniture was destroyed, and the archives thrown into the street. Meanwhile the police had torn off their badges and mingled with the rioters, the Government troops could not be trusted, and the Government was powerless to act.
- "At such juncture the request was made to land the force. Trouble had been apprehended, and preconcerted signals had been arranged, and in fifteen minutes from the time the signal was made companies comprising 150 officers, seamen, and marines, together with a Gatling gun, were landed from the Tuscarora and Portsmouth and marched to the scene of action. At the head of the column was a sergeant of marines, whose great height and stalwart proportion seemed to impress the wondering Kanakas more than all the rest of the force. He was some 6 feet 9 inches in height and his imposing appearance on that occasion is among the notable traditions at Honolulu to this day.
- "The riot was soon suppressed and order restored. Half an hour after such action a detachment of blue jackets and redcoats was landed from H.B.M. ship Tenedos, but there was nothing left for such force to do. It has been asserted by some credulous people that Great Britain has no eye toward the Hawaiian group, but the English residents
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- at Honolulu were much chagrined at the tardy action of the Tenedos, and it is a significant fact that her commanding officer was soon relieved, ordered home, and never got another hour's duty from the admiralty. Comment is unnecessary."
- "Geo. E. Belknap.
- "Brookline, December 19, 1893."
Adjourned until to-morrow, the 31st instant, at 10 o'clock.
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SWORN STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS B. DELAMATER.
Senator Frye. Give your name, age, and residence?
Mr. Delamater. My name is Nicholas B. Delamater; I am 47; I live in Chicago, Ill., and I am a physician.
Senator Frye. Have you ever been in the Hawaiian Islands; if yes, when; how long were you there, and when did you leave?
Mr. Delamater. I went there in August, and left this last June.
Senator Frye. What was your business while in the islands?
Mr. Delamater. Rusticating.
Senator Frye. Did you become familiar with the islands and people while there?
Mr. Delamater. Somewhat.
Senator Frye. Did you, at the request of Senator Cullom, make a written statement of facts that came under your observation while in the islands just before and during the revolutionary proceedings in January, 1893?
Mr. Delamater. I did.
Senator Frye. I purpose reading that statement. During the reading, should you discover anything that you may desire to correct, you may do so:
- "There are vast possibilities waiting capital. The coffee industry can be increased more than a hundred fold; the rice, banana, cocoanut vastly increased. Pineapples will in a few years be a large export. They can be raised there with comparatively small capital and quick and large returns, of a very superior quality. Sugar lands enough, yet wild, to supply all comers for many years to come.
- "There is a very small fraction of the available lands under cultivation.
- "Heretofore everything has gone to sugar on account of the enormous profits in it, the average per acre being from 5 to 10 tons.
- "This country is destined to be a very rich one.
- "Now, as to the revolution."
The Chairman. What are the prospects of coffee culture in the Hawaiian group?
Mr. Delamater. I judge that they are very good. There are many quite good-sized plats there in between little mountain peaks where they can raise an exceedingly good coffee, and they raise a quality of coffee which one of my friends, a coffee man in Chicago, says is among the best of coffees in the world.
The Chairman. Is coffee an indigenous plant there?
Mr. Delamater. No; I think there is nothing indigenous among those things.
The Chairman. It is very much like California?
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Mr. Delamater. Very much like California. It is a volcanic structure altogether.
Senator Frye. I will continue the reading:
"During the legislative session preceding the same there was a constant conflict between the Queen and Legislature as to the cabinet.
"The Legislature was composed of twenty-four representatives, elected by citizens who could read and write, and who had an income of $250."
Mr. Delamater. I think I am correct with regard to the income; but that you have.
Senator Frye. You are not certain of it?
Mr. Delamater. Not exactly.
Senator Frye. Then you say:
"Twenty-four nobles, elected, by those with incomes of $600-these are annual incomes; and four cabinet ministers, appointed by the reigning monarch, subject to dismissal by vote of want of confidence by the Legislature."
Mr. Delamater. I do not know whether the four members of the cabinet are four members of the Legislature.
Senator Frye. Then:
"There was finally a cabinet appointed of leading men, nonpoliticans mainly, and the individuals composing it represented several millions of property."
Was that the Wilcox-Jones cabinet?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
The Chairman. I understand that those cabinet ministers became members of the Legislature ex-officio?
Mr. Delamater. Yes, ex officio.
The Chairman. It is not necessary, as in the Parliament of Great Britain, that they should be members of the legislature?
Mr. Delamater. No; ex officio they are members.
Senator Frye. You say: "Shortly after this every one seemed easy. The lottery bill had apparently dropped out of sight, the opium bill had been defeated, the U.S.S. Boston went away for a week's practice, Minister Stevens going upon her; several members of the Legislature went home. The last week of that session a vote of want of confidence was passed by purchase and bribery, a new cabinet, of very shady character, was appointed, the lottery and opium bills were then revived and passed by open purchase."
The Chairman. When you speak of purchase and bribery, do you mean that you have any personal knowledge of that fact?
Mr. Delamater. I saw a couple of men----
The Chairman. Perhaps you had better name them.
Mr. Delamater. I did not know the men. I was simply in the legislative hall, the Government building. I do not know their names, and I should not remember them had I heard them at the time.
The Chairman. Did they have open transactions of that sort?
Mr. Delamater. It was common report upon the street.
Senator Frye. I proceed: "There was no apparent attempt at concealment of the purchase of members of the Legislature. On a Saturday morning following the Queen prorogued the Legislature on notice from that body. She appeared in person in state and with her retinue. I was present. Her speech was one of peace and of the ordinary kind. Her guards, about 75 in number, marched over to the palace yard."
Mr. Delamater. I suppose you have a copy of that speech?
Senator Frye. Yes. "Right across the street, drawn up in line, a
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native society, according to prearrangement, immediately appeared and presented to the Queen a new constitution, demanding its immediate promulgation." Were these guards demanding its immediate promulgation?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Frye. You say: "She at once called on her cabinet to sign it. Part of them refused and went down town and notified the prominent and leading citizens."
Mr. Delamater. When I say they refused, I do not mean to say that I was in the room and saw them refuse.
The Chairman. That was the fact, as accepted by common understanding?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Frye. You go on to say: "Up to this time the plan of those who are now the Provisional Government was to get control through, constitutional measures and the ballot, by compelling the Queen to recognize the right of a majority of the Legislature to name the cabinet ministers. That is, that the Queen should call on a member of the majority to form a cabinet, whom she would appoint. The outlines of the new constitution, it is claimed, were such as to give the reigning monarch absolute power.
"Excitement ran very high. Threats were freely made against anyone interfering with her plans, both by herself and her adherents. The leading men and members of previously opposite parties at once united, and felt that life and property demanded immediate action, instead of ordinary political methods. The Boston, with Minister Stevens, came into port about this time in total ignorance of what had occurred. Up to this time I had not called on Mr. Stevens and did not know him by sight. Excitement ran high Saturday afternoon and evening and Sunday. Steps were immediately taken to organize a volunteer military force for protection of property, and to my certain knowledge a very respectable force, composed of leading and prominent men-merchants, capitalists, planters, lawyers, professional men of all kinds, and others-was organized before Monday. A signal was decided on that would call them together very quickly should any emergency arise. The leaders as yet had no plan, and did not know what to look for.
"On Monday afternoon two large mass meetings were held, one by the present Provisional Government people, and the other by the Royalists. I was at the Royalists' meeting. Excitement was at high tension, rumors of intention and threats of burning houses and stores were rife. I heard many Royalists say they desired Mr. Stevens to land troops from the Boston to save property. I also heard a number of quite prominent Royalists say they had asked Mr. Stevens to land troops to save property and prevent bloodshed. At 5 this Monday afternoon the troops were landed. Many of the radical hotheads were not in favor of landing the troops, feeling that they could overthrow the Queen, and realizing that if they were landed it would prevent a fight.
"I talked with a number of the leaders, and also with several very intimate friends, who were very near and supposed to be in the confidence of the leaders, among them being Dr. F. R. Day, the attending family physician of Chief Justice Judd; Vice-President Damson, Mr. W. R. Cassel, and five or six other members of the committee of safety, and who attended Mr. Thurston on the voyage, in company with the other commissioners, coming to present their case to the United States. Not one of the persons seemed to know what Minister Stevens would
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do. They all claimed that they could get no expression from him as to what course he would pursue in case of revolution further than that he would protect the lives and property of noncombatant American citizens.
"It seemed to be the general understanding that he would raise the American flag at some large and convenient place, declare it American territory, and proclaim that all desiring protection should go there.
"When the troops were landed the marines were stationed at the American legation and at the office of the consul-general. The sailor companies were marched down past the palace and Government building, and it was the intention to quarter them some considerable distance away, and, as I understand it, they were camped the first night. The next day an empty building was found near the Government building and palace, was secured, and they were quartered there.
Mr. Delamater. In talking to Dr. Day since I found that to be a fact.
Senator Frye. As a matter of fact you found out that they went into the building that night instead of the next day?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Frye. You go on to say:
"All Monday evening excitement was intense, and a large portion of the inhabitants kept watch all night for fear of fires, etc.
"The next morning, Tuesday, I learned that at some time during the day a signal would be given which would call the volunteers together at a building (really an open shed) near the palace, and that the committee of safety would take possession and declare monarchy at an end. I did not learn the time, and I am very sure the consul-general, Mr. Severance, did not get any information more than I did. I am also morally certain that no help was expected from the United States forces, and that they expected to fight a battle and win before Mr. Stevens would interfere. I know the general impression was that Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse would not interfere until they had positively placed themselves in position, and that they failed to get any encouragement from him, even as to interference, any further than that he would protect all noncombatant American citizens who should apply to him and go to a place designated by him.
"Of course I do not know as to absolute facts. I do not know that Mr. Stevens did not say he would, but I do know that the general impression among the prominent citizens was as stated above. And that the Dr. Day mentioned in a previous part of this letter, and who was a student of mine, afterwards my clinical assistant in my college work, and later my assistant in private practice, as close as he was to the Provisional Government leaders, had the same impression.
"That afternoon, Tuesday, I was driving in a buggy and came near what is known as the old armory, on Beretania street, I saw, all at once, men coming at full speed in all sorts of conveyances and on foot, in full run toward the armory. Every one carrying a gun, I concluded the signal had been given. I learned later that a wagon had started from a large wholesale hardware store down town loaded with ammunition to come to the armory, and that the Queen's police had stopped it, and being shot at by the driver, had run away. There were three policemen, and all ran. This was within a block of the police station, and the citizens had taken this shot as a signal and gathered at once. Inside of fifteen minutes there were in the neighborhood of 200 citizens-clerks, lawyers, doctors, merchants, and capitalists-each
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with a rifle and double belt of cartridges around them, formed in line and ready for action."
Mr. Delamater. It is possible that in writing a letter of that kind I may have overstated the number that got there in a few minutes. You know how that comes. But there was quite a number.
Senator Frye.You say:
"At the same time the Provisional Government, as represented by its committee, took occasion to reach the Government building, each from his own office and by the shortest route.
"When there, it is true, without any Provisional troops in sight, but knowing them to be so stationed as to be able to intercept the Queen's guards should they undertake resistance, and knowing that force to be more than double the entire forces of the Queen, and knowing them to be composed of men of standing and ability, they did, without the immediate presence of the troops, read the proclamation." I suppose the immediate presence of the troops meant the Provisional Government troops?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Frye. Then:
"I was there before it was entirely finished, and about the time they had finished reading the Provisional troops, in two companies, marched into the grounds, having met with no offer of resistance. They were immediately placed on guard duty and quartered in the Government building. The Queen's officers at once gave up possession. A communication was then sent to the Queen, and a demand made on her to abdicate, an offer of protection, and assurances of pecuniary assistance if she submitted to the new order of things. After some parley this she did." Now, let me ask you right there, when that proclamation was read were any United States troops in sight of the building?
Mr. Delamater. Yes, Arion Hall.
Senator Frye. Standing at the Government building, could you see the United States troops?
Mr. Delamater. I think you could; I am not sure about that. I was out in the yard of the Government building, and could see them.
Senator Frye. Could you see more than two sentries anywhere?
Mr. Delamater. There were no troops drawn up in line. From the yard I saw the troops leaning on the fence.
Senator Frye. They were inside the fence?
Mr. Delamater. Inside the fence and standing on the grass, looking on.
Senator Frye. But not outside at the Government building?
Mr. Delamater. No; not outside their own yard.
Senator Frye. You then say: "Of course I was not present at any of the interviews, but had information which to me was satisfactory that a demand was being made for the surrender of the palace, police station, and armory. I was at the police station and saw that the Provisional Government had placed it with a small force of the Queen's defenders in a state of siege, with ample force to capture it and a fixed determination to do so, and an hour later I was there again and found it in possession of the new Government. I then learned that Minister Stevens, after the Provisional Government had shown him that they were in actual possession of the Government building and all public offices and the police station and had the Queen's guards cooped in their own armory, recognized it as the de facto Government, and immediately a number of the representatives of other governments did the same. England and two or three others did not till the next day."
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----69
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Mr. Delamater. There is a little point there that might or might not be of use. The Queen's flag, the royal standard I saw lowered from the palace before Mr. Stevens recognized the new Government. I understood afterwards that it was raised again. But I saw it lowered at that time.
Senator Frye. You proceed to say:
"Now, of course Minister Stevens might have recognized it a half hour earlier than I know anything about. I was not a participant, and had no claim to inside information, but I was doing all I could to learn everything that was going on, and as the harmony of action and information seemed general, I felt that I had correct information as to the time and sequence of events. Of this I am sure, the Provisional Government would have succeeded if United States forces had been a thousand miles away. They had, from my own personal observation, a force more than double that of the Queen, and composed of such men as meant business. Among the privates who went on guard duty there was represented several million dollars.
"As to Mr. Blount, a commission of some kind was expected, and preparations made to give him a reception, which was nonpartisan. That is, both sides would take part. Of course, there was no certainty as to time of his arrival, no cable being connected with the islands. The vessel came and a committee having representatives of both sides went out to meet it. A large concourse of citizens of all classes turned out. A native society of women decorated with garlands of flowers; two bands, etc., were at the dock and waited hours after the vessel had anchored. Both sides were ready for a general nonpartisan and enthusiastic reception."
The Chairman. What do you mean by both sides?
Mr. Delamater. Royalists and annexationists.
Senator Frye. I read:
"Finally, word came that Mr. Blount declined the reception of any honors. He was landed and quartered himself at the Hawaiian Hotel, the most prominent hotel there. He was domiciled in one of the cottages and remained there during his stay in Honolulu.
"It was perhaps an unfortunate circumstance that this placed him in the midst of the most marked royalistic influences, but it can not be claimed, so far as I know, that he knew of this. He persistently declined to accept any hospitality from persons of either side so long as he was "special commissioner." This feature of his conduct was very marked, and while I have no fault to find with it, was carried, it seemed to me, to the extent of at least appearing like posing.
"He was soon known as the 'silent man,' as an 'interrogation point,' and various other appellations, because of his treatment of those with whom he came in contact. No one seemed able to get the slightest expression from him as to his opinion on the subject. He seemed ready to ask questions without limit, of those who called, and to listen in absolute silence to answers, and of course had his stenographer take all conversations. His wife was at once made much of, especially by the prominent American women. One little instance of his full consistency as to accepting hospitality: Mrs. Day had entertained Mrs. Blount in the way of private picnics, a lunch party, horseback rides, etc. One evening about dusk, Dr. and Mrs. Day drove to the Blount cottage in a two-seated surrey, to ask Mrs. Blount to take a little ride. Mr. Blount was on the sidewalk by the side of the carriage when Mrs. Blount got in and Dr. Day asked him to go. He declined on the ground he could not accept any hospitality from anyone.
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"As an evidence of his courtesy, he received a dispatch from Washington directing him to appear before the United States consul-general and take the oath of office as minister. The same dispatch had a clause stating that a successor to Mr. Severance would soon be sent on. Mr. Blount had received a good many favors from Mr. Severance. This part of the dispatch he folded under and concealed from Mr. Severance, when he appeared with the dispatch as a credential."
Mr. Delamater. Of course, I do not know that as a fact; but I got it from Mr. Severance.
Senator Frye. You say----
"And three days later, of his own motion, gave this to a Royalist paper officially, for publication."
Do you know that?
Mr. Delamater. Yes. I do not know that he gave it to the paper; it had it officially, and it was published.
Senator Frye. You go on to say:
"And three days later, of his own motion, gave this to a Royalist paper officially, for publication. His reason, as stated by himself, being that he was friendly to Mr. Severance, and could not bear to tell him personally."
"Within a week from his arrival the Royalists started the report that the Queen was to be restored, and several distinct days were set. My opinion at the time was that they started them without any foundation. They claimed to have assurances from Mr. Blount. I did not at the time believe he had given the slightest encouragement. I am sure the Provisional people felt the same way at this time, basing their belief on the utter impossibility of getting anything out of him on their part. The flag came down. Although Mr. Blount was at the house of Minister Stevens on the afternoon preceding, and after he had issued his order to the naval commander, he did not, I am certain, mention the matter to Minister Stevens, who first heard of it from Mr. Waterhouse, of the Provisionals, late in the evening.
"Up to this time I did not know Minister Stevens by sight. About this time a friend urged me to pay him a formal visit as the representative of my country, etc. I did so on his regular reception day, remained about ten minutes in general conversation, making no allusion to public affairs. I called on him once later. These are the only times I met him in the ten months I was there, and at neither time had any talk with him about affairs.
"A few days after my first call on Mr. Stevens I made a formal call on Mr. Blount as a representative of the President and presented my card, which gave my profession and my American residence. The call lasted not to exceed five minutes. No conversation on Hawaiian affairs was had, except he asked me what I thought would be the effect of lowering the flag and removing the troops. I said I thought it would prove that the Provisional Government was able to take care of themselves. I remained as long as it seemed there was occasion. I left with him my Honolulu address and telephone number, and remarked that if I could be of any service, would be pleased. My wife and Mrs. Blount met a good many times socially. My wife called on Mrs. Blount. This is the only time I met Mr. Blount.
"Within a week after his arrival the people began to wonder that he was not calling on the leading and prominent men."
Mr. Delamater. By calling on him, I do not mean to say that he was calling on him socially, but for information.
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Senator Frye. You then say:
"When he was made minister these same men, who belong to the class who rush forward and force service or information unasked, but who had called formerly and offered to be at his service whenever desired, were still wondering. Those men, like Chief Justice Judd, who was not an active partisan (in fact, many of the prominent men were uncertain whether he was not favorable to the Queen), found that information on vital points was not asked for.
"I formed and expressed the idea that the object was to make it appear that the Provisionals were able to care for themselves. This was quite strongly combated by many who began to feel that Mr. Blount was opposed to the Provisionals and favoring the Queen. And finally, before coming away, I was compelled to admit that Mr. Blount's conduct was certainly very singular; that he was not conducting his intercourse just as I would expect a gentleman to do, and that his treatment of Mr. Stevens seemed very ungentlemanly, to say the least. Mr. Stevens and I never mentioned his name in either of our conversations.
"For a long time there was no American flag at his headquarters, and, inasmuch as the Stars and Stripes were floating everywhere else in Honolulu, this became a subject of marked comment. Finally the wife of one of the naval officers bantered him pretty strongly on the subject, and offered to, and did, present him with a flag which was draped on his front porch. Later Mr. Blount issued, by publication in the press of the city, a proclamation defining the protection he was authorized to give American citizens. The last clause of this proclamation relating to the loss of all claim on the American minister for property, or family, as well as personal protection, by those who took active part in internal affairs of the country, while probably good law, seemed to me unwise, unnecessary, and not at all diplomatic. Its effect was to cause a great deal of uncertainty as to whether he was not contemplating at that moment, as the Royalists positively and confidently asserted, the immediate restoration of the Queen.
"In fact, Mr. Blount's course was such that, justly or unjustly, the Royalists were encouraged and the Provisionals were discouraged. "Whether the Royalists received from him information as to what was the final intention I do not know, but they guessed exceedingly well, for in April, May, and June I heard from the lips of Royalists there the most positive declarations that they knew that President Cleveland would do certain things. Those things the President has since done.
"As to the sentiment of the nation, Hawaiians of Hawaiian parents, the Queen is certainly not popular. There is, I believe, a much stronger feeling in favor of Princess Kaiulani. I talked with a large number of them who were decidedly in favor of annexation also.
"The royalist party there is not made up of or led by natives, but largely by English residents. The motive seems fairly clear. Mr. Davis has had complete control over Kaiulani and her education. The near approach of her reign would give him large advantages in a financial way. He would probably be in fact, if not in name, prime minister. He would have the placing of Government loans (probably) and the inside track in many contracts, etc. Then, socially, his family and that of Mr. Walker, his partner, who are the leaders of the English society, would be very close to the court social world. Mr. Cleghorn, the father of Kaiulani, is Scotch. A son of Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, is married to a half-sister of Kaiulani. When the native women undertook to have a large mass meeting and present to Mr. Blount a petition they split on the question whether it should be Lilioukalani or Kaiulani."
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The Chairman. Is this the gentleman who furnished those statistics?
Senator Frye. He has them all in there. My impression is that you have them in the record.
The Chairman. Dr. Delamater, where did you get these figures that you have in this statement?
Mr. Delamater. The most of them I got from the report of the board of education. They were issued by the Queen's Government there.
The Chairman. It is a compilation made by you?
Mr. Delamater. A compilation made by me.
The Chairman. From authentic papers?
Mr. Delamater. From the official report of the board of education.
Senator Gray. This is as full a statement as you could make of your observation there?
Mr. Delamater. Yes. I intended it to be as full a statement as I could make.
Senator Gray. When did you go to the islands?
Mr. Delamater. August, 1892.
Senator Gray. How long did you stay?
Mr. Delamater. Until June of this last year-1893.
Senator Gray. If not improper so to do, may I ask what was your object in going?
Mr. Delamater. I was there simply for recreation-a matter of health. I had, for twenty years, a professorship in a medical college, with a fair practice, and had become utterly tired out.
Senator Gray. That is the only object you had?
Mr. Delamater. Yes. You need not fear to ask me any question you may think proper.
Senator Gray. I wanted to know whether you were there in any matter concerning the islands. It was a private purpose for which you were there?
Mr. Delamater. Yes. I had no other interest there.
Senator Gray. I do not wish to know what the private purpose was. Had you any other interest there?
Mr. Delamater. None at all. The private purpose was only to regain my health.
Senator Gray. I can suppose you came in frequent contact with the Americans on those islands?
Mr. Delamater. I have not had any correspondence with any of the Americans since I came away.
Senator Gray. I mean while you were there.
Mr. Delamater. Oh, yes, we had a private boarding house, with an English family; so that I was in pretty close contact with the white people, both English and Americans.
Senator Gray. Was there any sentiment of annexation prevailing there during the few months you were there that you could discover?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Gray. Among what classes?
Mr. Delamater. Among the Americans.
Senator Gray. Among the Kanakas?
Mr. Delamater. I should say yes. It seemed to me, taking it under a form of government like that, the expressions in favor of annexation to this country were quite pronounced.
Senator Gray. General?
Mr. Delamater. I should say quite general. The object, it seemed to me, so far as I could judge, was mainly to get better commercial relations.
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Senator Gray. Were the Islands in a state of business depression while you were there, or otherwise?
Mr. Delamater. Business depression.
Senator Gray.To what was that attributed?
Mr. Delamater. To the McKinley bill.
Senator Gray. That that the McKinley bill made sugar free?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Gray. And deprived the grower of the advantage that he had when there was a tax?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Gray. And you say that the change in that condition of things was the principal cause of the business depression?
Mr. Delamater. Yes; I think so. Of course you know a doctor is not a business man, usually, and I just got a sort of impression.
Senator Gray. Were the sugar growers Annexationists, with the exception of Mr. Spreckles?
Mr. Delamater. I judge that before I came away they were. But I got the impression very strongly in my mind that the sugar growers were opposed to it at the start. I did not talk with a great many of them; but I got that impression at the start.
Senator Gray. What impression did you finally get?
Mr. Delamater. My final impression was, that, in common with others, they were in favor of it.
SWORN STATEMENT OF FRANCIS R. DAY.
Senator Frye. State your age and occupation.
Mr. Day. I am 34 years old and a practitioner of medicine.
Senator Frye. Where?
Mr. Day. My residence is Honolulu.
Senator Frye. How long have you been at Honolulu?
Mr. Day. I located there in the fall of 1887 and have been a resident ever since that time until last August. I left there for this country at that time.
Senator Frye. Were you there at the time Kalakaua was compelled to assent to the constitution of 1887?
Mr. Day. I was in the city at the time, but not a resident.
Senator Frye. Were you a witness to what took place then?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. Are you acquainted with the people of the islands?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Has your residence been all this time at Honolulu?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. I will bring you down now to the few weeks preceding what is known as the last revolution, and you may state what you saw going on, and what you knew in the Legislature and elsewhere.
Mr. Day. Politically there was a great deal of interest in the conflict which was going on in the Legislature for some few months before the revolution of January, 1893. The struggle seemed to be between the Queen and her supporters and the opposition, to establish a precedent which would make the sovereign appoint the cabinet from a majority of the Legislature-that is, by calling a leader of the majority of the Legislature, and he select his associates, and she confirm them; the Queen and her party, on the other hand, attempting to have the appointing power purely a personal prerogative of her own, ignoring, in
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other words, the majority of the Legislature and selecting whom she chose for the cabinet. The fight was a long and bitter one until, I think it was, in November, when she yielded to the opposition so far as to call a member of the opposition Mr. G. N. Wilcox to form her cabinet-known as the Wilcox cabinet. That cabinet was formed by the Legislature and was composed of Mr. Wilcox, Mr. P.C. Jones, Mr. Mark Robinson, and Cecil Brown, and practically, for the first time since the Legislature had convened some months before, they got down to a working basis and things went along smoothly until two or three days before the close of the Legislature, when the country was taken by surprise to find that the Wilcox cabinet had been put out by vote of want of confidence, and the appointment by the Queen of a cabinet on her old plan of simply personal authority. That cabinet was composed of Samuel Parker, W. H. Cornwell, J. F. Colburn, and A. P. Peterson, if I remember rightly.
That cabinet did not possess the confidence of the business community, and they were consequently disappointed at the selection. The following day, I think, the Legislature passed what was known as the lottery bill, legalizing the establishment of a lottery in Honolulu-a bill that had been brought before the Legislature in the earlier months of the session and had aroused a good deal of public opposition. The opposition was so strong that it was, for a time, at least, withdrawn or laid aside, and the community supposed for good. But it was rushed through the third reading and the Queen signed the bill, making it law, during the last days of the Legislature; I do not remember the exact date. The opium bill was passed in very much the same way, licensing the sale of opium. It is needless to say that the community was aroused almost to the point of desperation, certainly of the deepest indignation, over these rapidly succeeding acts of the Queen and her party.
On Saturday, the 14th of January, the Legislature was prorogued in the usual form, and immediately after that the Queen attempted to promulgate-or rather attempted to overthrow the existing constitution and promulgate a new one which made certain radical changes in the form of the Government.
Senator Frye. When the Jones-Wilcox cabinet was formed and the lottery and opium bills had been defeated, before the Boston left the harbor on the trip down to Hilo, had everything settled down to quiet?
Mr. Day. Everything was supposed to be settled when the Wilcox cabinet went into office and the machinery of Government was going on for the two months that they held office. Their dismissal, I think, on a vote of want of confidence was a complete surprise to the community.
Senator Frye. So that there was no expectation of any difficulty at the time the Boston left the harbor and went down to Hilo?
Mr. Day. None whatever.
Senator Frye.That was supposed to be settled for the next eighteen months-during the life of the Legislature?
Mr. Day.Yes.
Senator Frye. When the Boston left and there took place what you were going to state-the Queen attempted to form a new constitution?
Mr. Day. The news of that attempt spread through the community with great rapidity, and business men, property holders, professional men of the community, all felt that it meant a crisis in the country's history. The feeling was so intense that it was a spontaneous sentiment that something radical would have to be done. In a hurried way a number of business and professional men met at a central location in the city
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(W. O. Smith's office) to discuss the situation, and it was there decided that they should appoint a committee of thirteen (which has become a historical number in Hawaiian affairs), to devise ways and means of correcting what they considered abuses of the Crown, and to take such measures as they thought necessary for that purpose. The feeling in the community was one of unrest, and the most intense excitement prevailed during the day, the following day, and the Monday succeeding, and the Tuesday following the Monday. Nothing was accomplished, so far as I know, on Sunday; but Monday morning an announcement was made that there would be a mass meeting held in the afternoon by the citizens in favor of good government.
Senator Frye. Was that a public announcement?
Mr. Day. A public announcement; yes. Accordingly, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the meeting was held in the armory on Beretania street. That meeting was attended by the white men of the community, mostly of all classes and nationalities. There must have been, I should judge, 1,200 or 1,300 men there, and it was an exceedingly quiet meeting. You could tell by the expression of the men's faces that they understood that it was a matter of extreme importance and gravity which confronted them. At this meeting the speakers related the political history of the country for the last few months, and also a report of the committee was made, and speeches which incited the men to their duty as citizens who wanted to preserve their civil liberties. The action of the committee in calling the meeting was ratified, with only one dissenting voice, and also ordering the committee to go on still further and take such measures as they thought necessary for the maintenance of government and the protection of life and property. The meeting adjourned about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, everyone feeling that we were on the eve of a crisis. That evening the news came to me that the monarchy was to be abrogated and that there was to be the establishment of a a provisional form of government.
Senator Gray. When was that?
Mr. Day. That was Monday evening; and I think the word was passed around pretty generally among the supporters of the Reform party, as it was called. That evening about 5 o'clock troops from the Boston were landed, and a detachment was sent to the legation, the consulate, and Mr. Atherton's grounds on King street. The latter detachment was afterward removed to Arion Hall. That night I remember being aroused by the alarm of fire. It turned out to be a small affair, supposed to be of incendiary origin, on Emma Street.
Senator Gray. An outbuilding, was it not?
Mr. Day. That is my recollection-that it was an outbuilding. It was a small fire. On the following day we understood that at a given signal those who were in favor of the movement were to meet at the Honolulu Rifles' armory, and with arms, and proceed upon the Government building. I was returning from making a professional call shortly after 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and passed the armory. I saw the men collecting there----
Senator Gray. You say that they were notified. Were you one of those who were notified?
Mr. Day. No. I saw a friend coming toward the armory. I asked him what was the matter, and asked if the signal was given, and he said that Goode had shot a policeman and they were going to proceed at once; so I put my horse away and put my revolver in my pocket and hurried to the armory. I had planned myself, without discussing the matter with anyone, to do my duty as a professional man. I had provided
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surgical dressings in considerable quantity for the wounded and had taken my revolver to use simply in case of a conflict, which every one expected. I went to the armory. Men were collecting from all parts of the city, and I walked with them to the Government building. The grounds were then fairly well filled with men bearing arms and gathering crowds of people. I remained there an hour or more.
Senator Frye. When you got there what was going on?
Mr. Day. The troops were drawn up in line in front of the door.
Senator Frye. The Provisional Government troops?
Mr. Day. The troops of the Provisional Government. The men who had been collecting at the armory and walked over. They were drawn up in line around the main entrance of the building. I remained there an hour or more and learned that the proclamation abrogating the monarchy had been read, but I did not hear it; I was not in proper position to hear it. I then walked out the side entrance, saw the troops of the Boston in the yard of Arion Hall, not drawn up at all, not with their muskets in their hands-most of them leaning up against the fence, looking on at what was going on across the way.
Senator Gray. Did the troops have their muskets stacked?
Mr. Day. That is my recollection-that they were. They had a guard pacing before the gate, but they were simply there looking out-not under arms. I walked to the steps of the opera house, a short distance away, and stood there a short time. I saw a commotion in the crowd and they all looked toward the palace. I saw the royal standard come down from the flagstaff upon the palace. I asked some one who was standing near by what it meant. They did not know; neither did I. I had with me at that time Dr. Delamater. We were together. He was under my professional care and I thought it was not best for him to be there any longer, so I took him home. I think after that I went about my professional duties.
Senator Gray. Were you there, after this first hauling down of the Hawaiian flag, when it was hauled up again?
Mr. Day. I do not remember about that; it was about that time I left the opera house and took Dr. Delamater to his home.
Senator Frye. When you were at the Government building, at the time this proclamation was read, did you remain there until the Provisional Government men took possession of the Government building, the archives, and all that-went in and took possession?
Mr. Day.Yes.
Senator Frye. Were any U. S. marines around the Government building?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. None at all there while you were there?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. None in sight of the Government building except the two sentries?
Mr. Day. They were in the grounds of the building of Arion Hall, across the street from the Government building.
Senator Frye. Inside the fence?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Not out on the street?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Gray. What sort of fence?
Mr. Day. Picket fence.
Senator Frye. They were not out on the street?
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Mr. Day. No, not at all; except the sentry, who was pacing in front of the gate.
Senator Frye. During Monday your people feared there would be riots?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was that fear general?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. In your opinion was there danger to the American people and their property at that time?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was American property scattered all around in that section of the city?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Did you know how general the alarm was amongst the people at that time, on Monday? What were they afraid of principally?
Mr. Day. They were afraid of riots and incendiarism and conflict between the white men, who were determined to make a change, and the natives.
Senator Frye. Did you know Minister Stevens?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Well?
Mr. Day. I treated most of his family during the time he was there.
Senator Frye. Were you the physician for Chief-Justice Judd?
Mr. Day. Yes; I have treated nearly all his children and himself.
Senator Frye. Do you know whether or not there was any expectation on the part of the men who were engaged in behalf of the Provisional Government that Minister Stevens was going to have the troops help them?
Mr. Day. I had no such idea whatever. I supposed they were landed simply for the protection of American interests and under the excitement of the inevitable conflict that was coming.
Senator Frye. Did you expect the troops to take part in the conflict as between the Queen and the Provisional Government?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. Do you know what the Provisional Government expected-the leading men in the affair?
Mr. Day. I do not; I never heard that they did.
Senator Frye. Did the troops take any part?
Mr. Day. They did not.
Senator Frye. Do you know anything about what forces the Queen had on that Monday?
Mr. Day. I know that she had the Queen's guard and the police.
Senator Frye. The Queen's guard consisted of about 75 men and the police about 60?
Senator Gray. Ask Mr. Day how many they consisted of?
Senator Frye. Do you know how many they consisted of?
Mr. Day. The guard, I suppose, consisted of about 80 men, and the police? I do not remember the exact number-I suppose 65 or 75.
Senator Frye. Do you know what armed forces the Queen had on her part on Monday?
Mr. Day. I knew of none.
Senator Frye. Was there any fear on the part of the men of the Provisional Government of a conflict with the Queen's forces?
Mr. Day. They had no fear at all; they feared a conflict, but had no fear of the result.
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Senator Frye. So far as you know, if the Boston had been a thousand miles at sea would there have been a different result?
Mr. Day. There would have been no difference in the result, except, probably, it would have been wrought with blood.
Senator Frye. But as to who would win they had no question?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. Was there any fear among the Provisional Government's men of the Queen's Guard?
Mr. Day. I do not understand your question.
Senator Frye. Among the white men, the Provisional Government's men, was there any fear of the valor of the Queen's Guard?
Mr. Day. They expected they would fight, but they had no fear of them.
Senator Frye. They were native Hawaiians, were they not?
Mr. Day. Native Hawaiians.
Senator Frye. Is there much fighting material among the native Hawaiians?
Mr. Day. They are not a belligerent people.
Senator Frye. Quiet, good-natured people?
Mr. Day. They are.
Senator Frye. Were you in Honolulu during the Wilcox riot of 1889?
Mr. Day. I was in the islands; I was not in Honolulu just at that time. I had gone to Mauai just at the time that occurred.
Senator Frye. Were troops landed at that time?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. What is the character of these men who are now in control of the Government?
Mr. Day. They are the best men in the community.
Senator Frye. Compare favorably with men here?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Men of education, most of them?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Were you there when the flag was hauled down?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was there any commotion?
Mr. Day. None.
Senator Frye. In your opinion, can the Provisional Government maintain itself?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. The chief followers of the Queen are whom?
Mr. Day. Hawaiians and half-whites.
Senator Frye. Natives, you mean?
Mr. Day. Natives.
Senator Frye. Half-whites?
Mr. Day. Half-whites and a large proportion of English people.
Senator Frye. What kind of men were those whom the Queen put into her cabinet-Cornwell and Colburn?
Mr. Day. They were not men who commanded the confidence of the community.
Senator Gray. That is, of what you called the best men of the community; or do you mean the whole population?
Mr. Day. I should say that they did not command the confidence of a large majority of the white community.
Senator Gray. Were you in Honolulu when Mr. Blount was there?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you have any communications with him?
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Mr. Day. Only professionally.
Senator Gray. You did not appear before him as a witness?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Gray. What time did you leave the islands?
Mr. Day. The 8th of August. I left Honolulu on the same steamer that Mr. and Mrs. Blount came on.
Senator Gray. Came from there here; that is, to the United States?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Have you read Mr. Blount's report?
Mr. Day. No; extracts only.
Senator Frye. So far as you know anything about the affairs of the islands during this time, did Mr. Stevens have anything to do with this revolution?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. Did you attend Mr. Stevens?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Do you remember Mr. Stevens being sick during the time of the revolution?
Mr. Day. I do not remember. I did not attend him if he was sick during that time. I attended his daughters more than I did him, although that was some little time before that.
Senator Gray. You say you went to the Hawaiian Islands in 1887?
Mr. Day. Yes; to reside.
Senator Gray. And practice your profession?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Of what state are you a citizen?
Mr. Day. Illinois.
Senator Gray. Did you become a citizen of the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Day. I am a voter there.
Senator Gray. Are you a citizen?
Mr. Day. I do not know just what the laws are in that respect.
Senator Gray. Did you ever become naturalized?
Mr. Day. I did not take out naturalization papers.
Senator Gray. Do you still consider yourself a citizen of the United States?
Mr. Day. I believe that is a question that has not been decided.
Senator Gray. Do you consider yourself such?
Mr. Day. I call myself an American.
Senator Frye. You did not forswear your allegiance to the United States?
Mr. Day. I did not forswear my allegiance to the United States, but I did sign the constitution which requires a voter to support the constitution.
Senator Gray. Did you attend this meeting on Monday?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you a supporter of that meeting?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you there when the troops landed?
Mr. Day. I was in Honolulu.
Senator Gray. I mean in town.
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you see the troops?
Mr. Day. I saw them in the evening.
Senator Gray. You did not see them march up from the landing?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Gray. You were not present at the landing?
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Mr. Day. No; in driving about in the evening on my professional rounds I saw them.
Senator Gray. You spoke of being informed—notice was passed around on Monday evening that there was to be a movement to establish a provisional government. Did you get that notice?
Mr. Day. I got a statement.
Senator Gray. On information?
Mr. Day. Information; yes, sir. It should hardly be dignified as an official notice.
Senator Gray. Who informed you?
Mr. Day. Mr. George Smith.
Senator Gray. The person at whose office the meetings were held?
Mr. Day. No; he is a wholesale druggist there.
Senator Gray. Not the Mr. Smith who is a member of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Gray. Was Mr. George Smith a supporter of the movement?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Is he an American?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. How many Americans were on the committee of safety?
Mr. Day. I do not know; I will have to look over the list to tell you that.
Senator Gray. Henry A. Cooper?
Mr. Day. Do you mean by Americans the same as myself, born in the United States and living there under the laws and having sworn to support the Hawaiian constitution and abide by their laws?
Senator Gray. You may call it an American living there and in business there.
Mr. Day. I do not know how our statutes are; whether we are Americans.
Senator Gray. The same as yourself.
Mr. Day. Yes; Henry A. Cooper is an American, the same as I am.
Senator Gray. F. W. McChesney?
Mr. Day. American.
Senator Gray. W. C. Wilder?
Mr. Day. American.
Senator Gray. C. Bolte?
Mr. Day. German.
Senator Gray. Andrew Brown?
Mr. Day. Scotchman.
Senator Gray. William O. Smith?
Mr. Day. Hawaiian.
Senator Gray. Henry Waterhouse?
Mr. Day. English.
Senator Gray. Theodore F. Lansing?
Mr. Day. American.
Senator Gray. Edward Shur?
Mr. Day. German.
Senator Gray. L. A. Thurston?
Mr. Day. Hawaiian.
Senator Gray. That is, he was born there?
Mr. Day. A Hawaiian of American parentage.
Senator Gray. John Emmeluth?
Mr. Day. I think he is a German.
Senator Gray. W.R. Castle?
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Mr. Day. An Hawaiian.
Senator Gray. J. A. McCandless?
Mr. Day. An American.
Senator Gray. Were they all voters, the same as you?
Mr. Day. Yes; many of them are old residents of the country.
Senator Frye. Is there anything that occurs to you that you would like to state in connection with this matter? If there is anything that you know about the revolution that occurred about that time, and it is legitimate, you may state it.
Mr. Day. I would like to state my opinion, if you will allow me, about the landing of the American troops—my individual opinion.
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Day. It seemed to me as though it was the duty of the American minister, under the conditions, to land the troops for the protection of American property.
Senator Gray. And life?
Mr. Day. And the lives of women and children that might be sacrificed, perhaps. I think that duty devolved not only upon him, but upon all ministers there, to land troops for the protection of the citizens and their lives; but the Boston was the only ship in the waters at the time. The same thing has been done, during the last crisis by the British and Japanese, by landing troops from their ships.
Senator Frye. What do you call the last crisis?
Mr. Day. During the time when there was, apparently, danger of conflict between the Provisional Government and the royalists at an attempted restoration of the Queen.
Senator Gray. While you were there?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. That has been since the Provisional Government was established?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. After you left the islands?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. That is hearsay.
Senator Frye. Did most of the valuable property in Honolulu belong to men of American birth?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Do you know Mr. Thurston?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Have you seen him since you have been here?
Mr. Day. I saw him for a few minutes last evening.
Senator Frye. When did you arrive, yesterday?
Mr. Day. Last evening.
Senator Frye. Did you call on Mr. Thurston or did he call on you?
Mr. Day. I called on him.
Senator Frye. Was Dr. Delamater with you last evening when you called?
Mr. Day. Yes; Mr. Irwin, Dr. Delamater, and I called on Mr. Thurston. Mr. Thurston is an old patient of mine.
SWORN STATEMENT OF ROSWELL RANDALL HOES.
Senator Frye. Are you a chaplain in the Navy?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. Have you ever been in Honolulu?
Mr. Hoes. I have.
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Senator Frye. When and how long were you there?
Mr. Hoes. I reached Honolulu on the U. S. S. Pensacola September 25, 1891, and remained there until March 9, 1893.
The Chairman. Who was your captain?
Mr. Hoes. The commanding officer of the Pensacola was Capt. Albert Kautz, U. S. Navy.
Senator Frye. What were you doing there during that time?
Mr. Hoes. I went there as chaplain of the Pensacola, and, having considerable leisure, apart from my professional duties, I commenced a study of the history of the country, pursuing it as carefully and critically as the books and pamphlets at my command would permit.
The Chairman. Do you mean to say that you stayed ashore from 1891 to 1893?
Mr. Hoes. No; I will explain that. I was officially attached to the Pensacola while she remained in Hawaiian waters, and performed my duties accordingly; but, having considerable leisure at my disposal, as already said, I engaged in historical studies, and was instrumental, with Prof. Alexander, J. S. Emerson, and others, in organizing the Hawaiian Historical Society, and was officially connected with that organization until I left Honolulu. The Queen, subsequently hearing that I was so deeply interested in historical research, applied to Secretary Blaine, through Minister Stevens, for permission for me to remain in Honolulu after the Pensacola left, to prepare a bibliography of Hawaii, and also to examine and arrange the early archives of the Government, which were in a state of disgraceful confusion. I was subsequently detached and remained in Honolulu until the time stated.
The Chairman. If the Queen made that application of her own motion she could not have been a very ignorant woman?
Mr. Hoes. No one ever claimed that respecting the Queen. As a matter of fact, however, the Queen took this action upon the advice of Prof. Alexander, the recognized historian of the country, and of others who were interested in the history of Hawaii and the preservation of its early archives.
Senator Frye. Did you keep a scrapbook?
Mr. Hoes. I kept a scrapbook of the first days of the revolution. It was made up of all the cuttings relating in any way to the revolution, taken from the Advertiser, a supporter of the Provisional Government, and the Bulletin and Holomua, both of which then and subsequently advocated the cause of the Queen.
Senator Frye. In that scrap book does there appear the recognitions of the Provisional Government by the various governments represented in Honolulu?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. The letters of recognition sent by the various Governments represented in the Hawaiian Islands do not appear of record here, and I think they ought to come in. They are as follows:
- Consulate of Chile,
- Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, whereby I am informed, for reasons set forth, the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, the same being now in possession of Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request me to recognize the said Provisional Government
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- as the de facto Government on behalf of the Government of Chile, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- In response I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as my authority as consul for Chile may permit me to act for and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Chile in the premises. I have the honor to be, gentlemen,
- Your very obedient servant,
- F. A. Schaefer,
- Consul for Chile.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
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- Austro-Hungarian Consulate, Hawaiian Islands,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- To the Executive Council of the Provisional Government in Hawaii, Messrs. Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, and Willinm 0. Smith:
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to own receipt of your esteemed favor of yesterday's date, and hereby take much pleasure to recognize and acknowledge on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall do all in my power to further and support the same.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant.
- H. F. Glade,
- Austro-Hungarian Consul.
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- Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, informing me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated, and a Provisional Government established, and requesting me to recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- In answer, I have the honor to state that I comply with the above request, and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, within the scope of my authority.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
- H. RENJES,
- Consul for Mexico.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
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- Vice-Consulate of Russia,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Sirs: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of 17th inst., and in reply beg to inform you that I take pleasure to recognize the Provisional Government of Hawaii as defined in the proclamation inclosed in your letter, on behalf of the Government of Russia, and I shall afford to it my moral support as representative of the country last named.
- I have the honor to be, sirs, your most obedient servant,
- J. F. Hackfeld,
- Acting Vice-Consul.
- Messrs. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- William O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, Honolula.
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- Consulate of the Netherlands,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the communication of the executive council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands announcing the abrogation of the Hawaiian monarchy, of your possession of the Government, departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, as well as being in control of the city.
- Added to the above is your request for the official recognition of the existing de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which I have the honor to represent, and to give you the moral support of my Government.
- In reply I take pleasure in assuring the gentlemen of the executive council, that I cordially extend to them full assent to their claim for recognition, and of my intention to add such moral support as may come within the scope of my consular authority.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your very obedient servant,
- John H. Paty,
- Consul for the Netherlands.
- Messrs. S. B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council, Hawaiian Provisional Government, etc.
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- Imperial German Consulate,
- Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- To the Executive Council of the Provisional Government in Hawaii, Messrs. Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. 0. Smith:
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to own receipt of your esteemed favor of yesterday's date, and hereby take much pleasure to recognize and acknowledge on behalf of the Government of Germany the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall do all in my power to further and support the same.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,
- H. F. Glade,
- Imperial German Consul.
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----70
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- Kongl Swensta Och Worsta Konsulatet,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's communication of January 17 informing me that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and that a provisional Government has been established in Hawaii for reasons set forth in a proclamation, of which you sent me a copy; also that such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the governmental departmental buildings, the archives and the treasury, and is in control of the city.
- In reply to your request to recognize the Provisional Government and afford it the moral support of my Government, I beg to say that I do recognize it as the existing de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall report to my Government immediately.
- I have the honor to remain, your excellencies', your most obedient servant,
- H. W. Schmidt.
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- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to own the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, informing me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, and requesting me to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Spanish Government as the existing de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- In response, I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands within the scope of my authority.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,
- H. Renjes,
- Vice-Consul for Spain.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
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- His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Consulate-General,
- Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 19, 1893.
- Gentlemen: The receipt of your communication, dated the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of proclamation issued on the same day, informing me that for reasons set forth in said proclamation the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, which is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and requesting me on behalf of H. I. J. M.'s Government to recognize said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, pending the receipt
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- of instructions from H. I. J. M.'s Government, to whom advices of your action and of the position which I have taken in relation thereto have been despatched.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
- Suburo Fujii,
- Agent and Consul-General.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, Wm. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
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- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, whereby you inform me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, the same being now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request me to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Government of Italy as the existing de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- In response I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request, and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands so far as my authority as consul for Italy may permit me to act for and on behalf of His Italian Majesty's Government in the premises.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your very obedient servant,
- F. A. Schaefer,
- Consul for Italy.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
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- [Translation.]
- Consulate-General of Portugal in Hawaii,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Sir: You inform me by your letter of the 17th instant that, for the reason set forth in the proclamation which accompanies it, the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and that a Provisional Government, which has been established in its place, is at this moment in possession of the Government buildings and master of the capital. Under these circumstances I recognize the Provisional Government as being the de facto Government of Hawaii, and I hasten to submit the decision I have just taken to my Government.
- Accept, sir, the assurance of my very distinguished consideration.
- A. de Souza Canavarro,
- Consul-General and Charge d'Affaires of Portugal.
- Monsieur S. B. Dole,
- President of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government.
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- British Legation,
- Honolulu, January 19,1893.
- Gentlemen: The receipt of your communication of the 17th instant is acknowledged, together with a copy of the proclamation, informing me that for reasons set forth in said proclamation the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated, and a Provisional Government established, and whereby you ask me to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Government as the existing de facto Government, and to afford it the moral support of my Government.
- In reply, I beg to say that I recognize the Provisional Government as the existing de facto Government pending instructions from my Government.
- I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
- James H. Wodehouse,
- H. B. M.'s Minister Resident.
- To the Members of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu.
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- United States Legation,
- Honolulu, Hiwaiian Islands, January 17, 1893.
- A provisional government having been duly constituted in place of the recent Government of Queen Lilioukalani, and said Provisional Government being in full possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and in control of the capital of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby recognize said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
- John L. Stevens,
- Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.
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- Royal Danish Consulate,
- Honolulu, January 18,1893.
- Sirs: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, inclosing a copy of proclamation issued last evening, informing me, that for reasons set forth in said proclamation, the Hawaiian Monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, which is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and requesting me, on behalf of the Government of Denmark, to recognize said Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to accord to it the moral support of my Government.
- In reply, I have the honor to state that I hereby comply with the above request, recognizing the said Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, to the extent that my authority will allow me to act, pending a reply from my Government.
- I have the honor to be, sirs, yours, most obediently,
- E. C. MacFarlane,
- Acting Vice-Consul for Denmark.
- Messrs. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- William O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
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- Consulate of Belgium, January 18,1893.
- Sirs: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of 17th instant, and in reply beg to inform you that I take pleasure to recognize the Provisional Government of Hawaii as defined in the proclamation inclosed in your letter on behalf of the Government of Belgium, and I shall to it my moral support as representative of the country last named.
- I have the honor to be, sirs, your most obedient servant,
- J. Hackfeld,
- Consul.
- Messrs. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- William O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, Honolulu.
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- Chinese Commercial Agency,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: We have the honor to acknowledge a receipt of your circular letter of the 17th instant covering a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, whereby you inform us that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, the latter being now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request us to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Government of the Empire of China as the existing de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands and to afford to it the moral support of our Government.
- In answer we have the honor to say that we comply with your request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands so far as our authority as commercial agents of China may allow us to act for and on behalf of His Imperial Chinese Majesty's Government.
- We have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servants,
- Goo Kim,
- Chinese Commercial Agent.
- Wong Kwai,
- Assistant Chinese Commercial Agent.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- William O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
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- Office of the Peruvian Consulate,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your valued communication of the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of the proclamation then issued, wherein it is set forth that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established.
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- You request me to recognize said government on behalf of the Government of Peru as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- I have the honor to state, in reply, that I take pleasure in complying with your request, and I hereby recognize the said government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, in so far as my authority in the premises will permit.
- I have the honor to remain, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,
- Bruce Cartwright,
- Consul for Peru.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- Wm. O. Smith,
- Members of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
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- [Translation.]
- Consulate and Commissariat of France in Hawaii,
- Honolulu, January 18,1893.
- Sir: I have received the letter dated the 17th of this month by which you inform me that for the reasons indicated in the text of the proclamation which you handed to me on the same day, the members of the executive council, of which you are a part, have proclaimed, yesterday, the abrogation of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of a provisional government.
- In acknowledging the receipt of this communication I at once inform you that I have informed my Government of the events which have just taken place in this archipelago, adding that I recognize the actual condition of affairs pending instruction.
- Accept, sir, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration,
- Vizzavona.
- Monsieur Dole,
- President of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government, Honolulu.
Senator Gray. Were these printed contemporaneously with their recognition?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. If it is desired I can state a very interesting point that I happen to know from personal knowledge in regard to the English recognition.
The Chairman. We are trying to ascertain when it was.
Mr. Hoes. I was present in the room of the Provisional Government the first afternoon it was organized.
The Chairman. What date was that?
Mr. Hoes. Saturday being the 14th, that was the 17th, Tuesday.
Senator Gray. You were where?
Mr. Hoes. As I said, I was present in the room of the Provisional Government the afternoon it held its first meeting, and while I was there the English commissioner, Maj. Wodehouse, came into the room and had a whispered conversation with President Dole which could not be heard, at least by me, and I do not think by anyone except the President. A short time after that, probably within one hour, I had
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a short conversation with Maj. Wodehouse on the porch of the Government house in which he told me that he had recognized the Provisional Government. I suppose, of course, the inference was he had done it informally. I state this because there was a delay of twenty-four hours, or more, before he recognized the Government in writing. While his formal recognition was not made as early as those of the other representatives in Honolulu, he was in reality the first to recognize the new government, with the possible exception of the U.S. minister, Mr. Stevens.
Senator Frye. Were you there when Mr. Stevens sent in his recognition?
Mr. Hoes. I suppose I was, but I cannot swear positively as to that.
Senator Frye. But you think Mr. Wodehouse was the first one?
Mr. Hoes. I do not know whether he preceded or succeeded Mr. Stevens.
Senator Frye. What time was it that you were there and Mr. Wodehouse was there?
Mr. Hoes. If I were asked what time Mr. Wodehouse had the whispered conversation with Mr. Dole I could not swear to it, but I should venture to say not far from 4 o'clock—in fact, probably after 4 o'clock.
The Chairman. Will you allow me to inquire what sort of a man Mr. Dole is? Give your description as you understand him. I would like to know something about his character and temper.
Mr. Hoes. I am personally and intimately acquainted with President Dole. I regard him as mentally, morally, intellectually, and I may add, physically, one of the finest types of men I have ever met. He is broad minded; he is conservative; he is dispassionate; and I believe I state the opinion of most men in that country when I say that he is more highly looked up to and respected than any other man in public and political life in that country.
The Chairman. From your knowledge of his character and bearing, would you suppose that he would be engaged in a mere adventure for revolutionizing the country for the purpose of getting political power into his hands?
Mr. Hoes. I do not think that any such thought or suggestion could enter the mind of any man living in Honolulu or the Hawaiian kingdom.
The Chairman. As to Dole?
Mr. Hoes. As to President Dole.
Senator Frye. Were you there from the 1st of January, 1893, until after the revolution?
Mr. Hoes. I was.
Senator Frye. You may state, if you please, what you observed as taking place in the Legislature of the Hawaiian Islands during the month of December preceding the revolution.
Mr. Hoes. That is a pretty broad question. It was a continuous scene of disordry and disgracefulness.
Senator Frye. In what particular?
Mr. Hoes. Bribery, undignified wrangle, and a perpetual fight to upset one ministry and to replace it with another.
Senator Frye. What ministry were they undertaking to upset?
Mr. Hoes. I could not carry the names of the various ministers composing the several cabinets in my mind any more than I could the movements of the men in a game of chess.
Senator Frye. You know the Wilcox-Jones cabinet?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
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Senator Frye. That was composed of respectable men?
Mr. Hoes. Highly.
Senator Frye. Having the confidence of the people?
Mr. Hoes. Having the confidence of the better class of the people, but not having the confidence of the class of the people led by unscrupulous adventurers like C. W. Ashford and others like him, totally devoid of character.
Senator Frye. Was there an attempt being made to oust that cabinet?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
The Chairman. Were those attempts made for the purpose of personal aggrandizement of power or for questions that were up?
Mr. Hoes. My understanding was, and I think the understanding of most of the honest men there was, that it was a fight between so-called royal prerogative on the one hand and honest government on the other—a contest between the Queen and her desire for personal and autocratic power on the one hand, and the better and higher interests of the Hawaiian people on the other.
The Chairman. That is a very general statement and I want to inquire of you whether this political controversy had reference to any particular legislation or executive action in reference to changes in the constitution, or any other thing—whether there was any real question.
Mr. Hoes. I think at last it had primary reference to the passage of the so-called "lottery bill."
Senator Frye. Do you remember when the Boston left the harbor and went down to Hilo?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; very well.
Senator Frye. At that time the Jones-Wilcox cabinet was in power, was it not?
Mr. Hoes. It was.
Senator Frye. State whether or not at that time there was a feeling of security that it would remain in power and that the thing was settled.
Mr. Hoes. Yes; and I know, moreover, that it was the prevalent opinion among the best classes there that the lottery bill and lottery agitation would not be introduced again. It was the belief at that time that it had received its death blow at an earlier stage of the legislative proceedings, and, resting upon that belief, several of the legislators who would have voted against it, believing that all important legislation had already been transacted, left for their homes. This so weakened the numerical strength of the party of good order and the anti-lottery element in the legislature, that those who were in favor of the lottery saw that their chance had come, and, in the absence of the members referred to, and especially in the absence of the Boston and Mr. Stevens, the American minister, sprung the lottery bill very suddenly upon the legislature, and carried it through.
Senator Frye. And they overturned the Jones-Wilcox cabinet?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. I do not think I make any mistake in stating, in order to show with what haste the whole thing was managed, that the official announcement to the Legislature that the Queen had signed that lottery bill was made to the Legislature the very same morning that the Queen prorogued that body.
Senator Frye. So that when the Boston actually sailed there was a feeling of security that the conditions of peace were to last until the end of that Legislature?
Mr. Hoes. I believe that was the general feeling and belief.
Senator Frye. When the Boston sailed there commenced a struggle
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in the Legislature? Did that end in the enactment of the lottery and opium bills?
Mr. Hoes. It did of the lottery bill; I am not clear in my mind as to the opium bill, because everybody was so concerned in the fate of the lottery bill that its discussion overshadowed everything else.
Senator Frye. Did that not result in the displacement of the Jones-Wilcox cabinet?
Mr. Hoes. It did.
Senator Frye. Do you remember the return of the Boston on Saturday the 14th?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. Were you present and a spectator of most of the things that took place on the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of January, 1893?
Mr. Hoes. Most all of them.
Senator Frye. Will you state day after day what was going on?
The Chairman. Commencing, I suppose, with the arrival of the Boston in the port of Honolulu?
Mr. Hoes. When the Queen prorogued the Legislature I saw her leave the building in her state carriage and go to the palace. A few minutes subsequently I went home. Not long thereafter, I learned by telephone that the Queen had promulgated, or was about to promulgate, a new constitution. I went at once to the palace grounds, and found collected there a large crowd of natives listening to a harangue by a member of the late Legislature and friend of the Queen, named White, who spoke from the front steps of the palace. The action of the Queen created a great deal of excitement in the community—a suppressed, but at the same time a determined excitement.
The Chairman. State what came under your personal observation.
Mr. Hoes. The next day was Sunday. The excitement continued. Everyone wondered what was to come next, and what was to be done next. Monday came and a poster was seen upon the street.
Senator Frye. Was that the poster [exhibiting paper]?
Mr. Hoes. It was a poster similar to this. I got this from the printing office.
Senator Frye. How was it seen upon the streets? Was it posted?
Mr. Hoes. Posted about the streets.
The Chairman. You mean on the houses?
Mr. Hoes. Publicly posted, in the usual manner.
Senator Frye. Calling for a meeting on Monday afternoon?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. Shall I read this?
Senator Frye. You may.
Mr. Hoes. The poster is as follows:
- "Mass meeting. A mass meeting of citizens will be held at the Beretania Street armory on Monday, January 16, at 2 p.m., to consider the present critical situation. Let all business places be closed. Per order of committee of safety. Honolulu, January 14, 1893."
Senator Frye. Well?
Mr. Hoes. I attended the meeting at the armory Monday afternoon, January 16. I was told that it was a larger and more enthusiastic meeting than gathered in the same place at the time of the revolution of 1887. I am informed that it was the most enthusiastic and unanimous meeting—I mean unanimous in the sentiments which seemed to pervade the people—of any state or political meeting ever held in Honolulu. That meeting appointed a committee of safety.
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The Chairman. You say you were told that. What was your opinion?
Mr. Hoes. I was not there in 1887, and therefore have no opinion on that point.
The Chairman. What is your opinion about the enthusiasm and zeal and unanimity of feeling at the meeting you attended.
Mr. Hoes. I was told----
The Chairman. Not what you were told.
Mr. Hoes. The enthusiasm and zeal of the meeting were its most conspicuous characteristics, and there was absolute unanimity of word and action. The resolutions that were offered were unanimously passed. There was no unhealthful excitement displayed. The people were naturally somewhat excited, but they had great confidence in Mr. Thurston and others who composed the committee of safety. They placed discretionary power in the hands of that committee, and the meeting adjourned. If there had been any persons present at that meeting who desired to offer opinions adverse to those which had been expressed by the speakers, I believe they would have been allowed to do so. There were none such offered or suggested.
The Chairman. You believe that?
Mr. Hoes. I do; but of course I could not prove it. It would be only a matter of belief; but at all events no one offered to speak on the other side. The meeting adjourned and most of the crowd then poured down in front of the palace where they thought the meeting of natives in behalf of the Queen was in progress. I can not say what the feeling of that crowd was, or what their motive was in going around there, but I know what my own motive was—it was a feeling of curiosity and a desire to be present and see a row if there should be any, and I expected there would be one. I believe I had every reason to think so.
Senator Frye. When you got there what was going on?
Mr. Hoes. The meeting of natives had adjourned and the people had dispersed. I ought to go back and speak of something that occurred Monday morning. This meeting was held Monday afternoon, January 16. Monday morning a newspaper supplement appeared on the street, in the Hawaiian language, which was issued from the printing office of John E. Bush, and a copy of which you hold in your hand.
Senator Frye. Was that in the Hawaiian language?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Gray. When was that posted?
Mr. Hoes. It was not posted, it was handed around to the crowd by carriers.
Senator Gray. What day?
Mr. Hoes. The morning of the day this meeting was held at the armory—Monday, January 16.
Senator Gray. Can you translate that poster?
Mr. Hoes. No.
The Chairman. Do you know what printing office it was printed at?
Mr. Hoes. At Ka Leo O Ka Lahui printing office, I suppose. I wanted to speak of another point. It is in connection with the landing of the troops. The troops landed Monday. Monday night I heard an alarm of fire and I went to the fire.
Senator Gray. Were you keeping house?
Mr. Hoes. No. I kept house until my family returned to the United States, shortly before the revolution. There was an alarm of fire Monday night, and I went to the fire. It was one of two fires that occurred that night. I was informed that the natives and those who
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led them had said that in case of the dethronement of the Queen the conduit pipes of the city would be tampered with, and that prominent houses would be burned.
Senator Gray. Who informed you?
Mr. Hoes. That was current rumor in Honolulu about that time. There are some things concerning which I cannot speak from positive knowledge, but which were matters of popular rumor. But there was a feeling of fear prevalent; no one could tell what might be done, or what might not be done, by natives led on by white adventurers, who were aiming to excite the passions of the natives.
Senator Frye. There was a pervading fear that there would be trouble?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. There were, as I have said, two fires that night, one on Beretania street and another at Emma Square.
Senator Frye. Did you think that night that life and property were in danger?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was there a feeling during Monday that the lives and property of Americans would be in danger?
Mr. Hoes. There was a pervading fear of uncertainty. I believe that a great many people felt that their lives and property were in danger. After that meeting at the armory was held there was a feeling of insecurity. The meeting having placed broad discretionary powers into the hands of the committee of safety, the people awaited with patience and confidence the result of their deliberations. The next afternoon, Tuesday, came the reading of the proclamation dethroning the Queen and proclaiming the Provisional Government by the committee of safety. I was present at the Government house when the first troops of the Provisional Government filed in.
Senator Gray. The Government house?
Mr. Hoes. The Government house. A sturdy, determined-looking set of men filed in there with muskets and rifles.
Senator Gray. How many in the first squad?
Mr. Hoes. In the first squad that went in there might have been 25 and there might have been 50.
Senator Frye. Were you there when the proclamation was read?
Mr. Hoes. I think I must have been there between five and ten minutes afterward, not longer than that.
Senator Frye. Were many people in front of the Government buildings?
Mr. Hoes. Not many.
Senator Frye. Did the Provisional Government take possession of the public buildings?
Mr. Hoes. They had absolute possession at that time of what is called the Government building, containing the offices of administration.
Senator Frye. They immediately after that issued an "order," January 17, on Tuesday, calling for arms?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; I have one here.
Senator Frye. Did they issue that?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. Shall I read it?
Senator Frye. Yes.
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Mr. Hoes. It reads as follows:
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 17,1893.
- "PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
- {sc|Order No. 1.}}
- "All persons favorable to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government building and to furnish to the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control as soon as possible in order that efficient and complete protection of life and property and the public peace may immediately and efficiently be put into operation.
- "Sanford B. Dole,
- "J. A. King,
- "P. C. Jones,
- "William O. Smith,
- "Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
- "John Emmeluth,
- "Andrew Brown,
- "C. Bolte,
- "James F. Morgan,
- "Henry Waterhouse,
- "S. M. Damon,
- "W. G. Ashley,
- "E. D. Tenney,
- "F. W. McChesney,
- "W. C. Wilder,
- "Advisory Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands”
Senator Frye. Do you know how many troops the Provisional Government had at the time they took possession of the Government buildings?
Mr. Hoes. Do you mean before that night was over?
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Hoes. I do not know. I should say several hundred.
Senator Frye. Armed or otherwise?
Mr. Hoes. I think they were all armed. Among them were many of the best men in the community.
Senator Frye. Do you know how many they succeeded in getting under arms under that proclamation?
Mr. Hoes. I do not. I believe the number was increased steadily day by day, but to what extent I do not know.
Senator Frye. Going back to Monday. In your opinion was there such a condition of things existing in Honolulu at that time as to require the presence of the American troops from the Boston to protect American life and property?
Mr. Hoes. Most decidedly, in my opinion.
Senator Frye. During all those weeks of revolution, and after the United States troops had arrived, did those troops take any part in the conflict between the Queen and the Provisional Government?
Mr. Hoes. No, not to my knowledge.
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Senator Frye. Do you know whether during all that time of the days of the revolution the Provisional Government had any expectation of the assistance of the American troops?
Mr. Hoes. I never heard it suggested.
Senator Frye. In your opinion if the Boston had been a thousand miles at sea instead of in the harbor, would the Provisional Government have become a government at that time?
Mr. Hoes. I believe it would.
Senator Frye. In your opinion had it sufficient force to overcome all that the Queen could bring against it?
Mr. Hoes. I think it had sufficent moral force and physical force.
Senator Frye. Have you any doubt that the Provisional Government would have gone forward even in the absence of the Boston and the American troops?
Mr. Hoes. I think the sentiment of the people would have forced the issue at that time.
The Chairman. The sentiment in regard to what?
Mr. Hoes. The sentiment of the people as to their individual and collective rights.
The Chairman. Do you mean under the constitution?
Mr. Hoes. I mean under the higher constitution, the constitution of revolution.
Senator Frye. Did you have any conversation with any prominent Hawaiians in relation to the change of government?
Mr. Hoes. I mingled a good deal during the time I was in Honolulu among the common Hawaiian people and among the prominent Hawaiian people. I was constantly studying the historical side of the question, as well as contemporary opinion, and I was persistently trying to learn the views of the people. To answer your question more exactly, I did have conversation with prominent Hawaiians.
Senator Frye. Did you have any conversation with J. A. Kawainui?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. He was the editor of the most prominent newspaper in the Kingdom—the Kuakoa.
Senator Frye. When did you have that conversation?
Mr. Hoes. Shortly after the revolution.
Senator Frye. Will you please read it?
Mr. Hoes. Yes, sir. (Reading:)
- "The Kemehameha dynasty had a strong hold upon the native heart because of its noble ancestry, but Kalakaua and the late Queen, on account of their comparatively ignoble origin, did not command the respect due to genuine high chiefs. The corruption of Kalakaua and her late majesty have brought sore evils upon the Hawaiians. Then, too, certain designing foreigners have exercised a very pernicious political influence on the natives, and have sought to use them only for the accomplishment of their own ends. For my part I am tired of this state of things. What I want is good government. I do not care for a condition of affairs that is constantly shifting. We need a government that will be respected abroad and trusted at home. Either annexation to the United States or a protectorate. I prefer the former because of its greater stability. With annexation we should, of course, to a great degree enjoy the same condition of things that prevails in America. I have had enough of monarchy, and believe that the safety and prosperity of the country is dependent upon its annexation to the United States, and there are many of the intelligent native Hawaiians who agree with me in this opinion. The majority of my race are ignorant of what is really conducive to their best interests. It can not be a
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- matter of surprise that they look with fond recollections to the throne and the old institutions. The future seems so uncertain that they can not conceive what is in store for them, but when they find that they are treated justly under the new government, as they have been from the first day of its formation, and indorsed their attempts to effect organic union with the United States, they will quickly give it their confidence."
Senator Frye. Did you have an interview with Hon. A. Kahi?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. A prominent member of the last royal Hawaiian Legislature?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. Shall I read it?
Senator Frye. Yes.
- "I am 53 years old. During all these years I have lived under the Hawaiian monarchy, that is, under Kamehameha III, IV, and V, Lunalilo, Kalakaua, and the late Queen Liliuokalani. I was personally acquainted with all of these rulers, but it was not until the reign of Kalakaua that I commenced to take an active part in public life. I was perfectly familiar with the whole of that monarch's career. During the first half of his reign he conducted the Government with some regard to decency, but during the latter half the native Hawaiian people strongly objected to his actions. During the whole of this period the voice of the common people was never heard or felt in the Legislature. The King's henchmen and creatures were elected through the power and influence of the Crown for the sole purpose of carrying out the wishes of the King, in utter disregard of the desires and rights of the masses of the Hawaiian people. The common people had no show whatever at the elections. The Government officials were everywhere instructed to compel the people to elect the King's favorites. During these years many self-respecting Hawaiians resisted the encroachments of absolutism and made a desperate, but unavailing, fight against overwhelming odds. Kalakaua controlled every district justice, assessor, tax-collector, sheriff, and all other Government officials, and, through them, controlled the polls and drowned the voice of the people. The rule of the late Queen has been just as rotten and corrupt as that of her brother Kalakaua. The greatest mistake of her reign was the fact that she exceeded her brother in seeking and acting upon the advice of the most unwise and corrupt counselors, and it was this mistake on her part that cost her her throne. I stand for the rights of the people and not for the rights of any privileged person.
- "Monarchy is dead, and I am glad of it. I rejoice and am proud to support the Provisional Government, for it commands my perfect confidence, and I was the fifth person in the country to swear my alleigiance to it. What I desire is a firm and strong government, and I shall do everything to promote its stability. If we could have a stable republic, with President Dole at its head for four years, and his successor to hold office for the same length of time, it would be an ideal government, but if the present Provisional Government strongly advise annexation to the United States, as seems to be the fact, I shall heartily give it and the movement my support. My determination in this respect is fixed and unchangeable. There is no going backward; we must go forward. I believe that all those who will stop to think will agree with the views which I have expressed. I shall do everything in my power to show my constituents that these views are the only path to prosperity, and I believe that I shall succeed. The great mass of the Hawaiians are very poor, and some radical change must be made or they will be unable to obtain their means of livelihood.
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- There are foreign adventurers in this country, whose names I need not mention, who are cast down because by the recent change in public affairs they have lost the government pap. They are nothing but soreheads, and have grossly deceived and misled the native Hawaiians. Again, I say, I rejoice in the new order of things. I stated on the floor of the recent Legislature that the conduct of affairs under the late monarchy was thoroughly rotten. We have had quite enough of it, and it is my firm belief that the native Hawaiians will quickly recognize the recent government changes as a great blessing."
Mr. Hoes. I ought to say one word in connection with this.
Senator Gray. Were those notes made at the time of the conversation?
Mr. Hoes. That is what I was about to speak of. The fact is, Mr. Kauhi can not speak a word of English, yet this statement of his seems to read very smoothly. I had a friend with me when I called upon Mr. Kauhi, who understood the Hawaiian language as perfectly as he did the English. This friend talked to Kauhi, received his replies to his questions, and then communicated them to me in English. I took his statement home and wrote it out, and then took it to my friend and told him that I would not be satisfied with it until it was submitted to its author. I went back with my friend to Kauhi, who translated the statement to him, and Kauhi said it was correct.
Senator Frye. You stated you were studying the people for historical purposes?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; and also to learn contemporary opinion.
Senator Frye. Do you know R. W. Wilcox?
Mr. Hoes. Fairly well.
Senator Frye. Who is he?
Mr. Hoes. He is the man who figured so prominently and conspicuously in the revolution of 1887, and has mingled in politics more or less ever since, and was a member of the last Hawaiian Legislature.
Senator Frye. Do you know whether he was a witness before Mr. Blount or not?
Mr. Hoes. I do not know.
Senator Frye. Did you have an interview with Wilcox?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. Is this the interview? [Exhibiting the paper.]
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. You may state when that was.
Mr. Hoes. Shortly after the revolution.
- "INTERVIEW OF R. W. WILCOX WITH R. R. HOES, HONOLULU, JANUARY 27, 1893.
- "What are your views, Mr. Wilcox, in regard to the present situation in general?
- "Queen Liliuokalani brought these evils upon herself and the country both by her personal corruption, and that of her Government. She surrounded herself with bad advisers, and seemed determined to drive the nation to destruction. Good people had no influence over her whatever, for she indignantly refused to listen to them. I believe that if we can be annexed to the United States, the rights of all of our citizens, and especially those of the native Hawaiians, will be protected more carefully than they have ever been under the monarchy.
- "What, in your opinion, is the personal feeling of the native Hawaiian element in this community?
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- "My countrymen, with the exception of the most intelligent among them, do not understand much about these things. They need to be educated. They have so often been told by designing men that the United States was their enemy that they are naturally suspicious. Politicians who have sought to use the natives simply as so many tools have deceived them. When they understand from the lips of disinterested men and patriots what annexation means, and become acquainted with the benefits that it will bring them, they will be as much in favor of the movement as any of our other classes of citizens.
- "Does the present Provisional Government command the respect of the native Hawaiians?
- "They are naturally somewhat prejudiced against it, as monarchy is the only form of Government with which they are familiar, but this feeling will quickly wear away as the Hawaiians are led to see that the Government is friendly to them and their interests. They already have confidence in the integrity and patriotism of President Dole.
- "You advocated annexation to the United States, I believe, several months ago, in your newspaper, 'The Liberal?'
- "Yes, and I have repeatedly done so in public meetings held in this city.
- "How long do you think it would be after hoisting the American flag before the natives would be entirely reconciled?
- "Almost immediately.
- "Are you doing anything to instruct the natives so that they may have correct views in regard to these matters?
- "Yes; but I am compelled to move cautiously or I shall lose my influence over them. I believe I am doing a good work by constantly conversing with them on the subject. I have told my countrymen that the monarchy is gone forever, and when they ask me what is the best thing to follow it I tell them annexation, and I firmly believe that in a very short time every Hawaiian will be in favor of that step. The great thing is to keep them from being influenced by the arguments of designing men who pretend to be their friends, but who are really their enemies-men who will try and use them as tools to accomplish their own corrupt and selfish plans. We have had too much of this and it is high time to call for a halt.
- "Have you confidence in the integrity and patriotic intentions of the commission that has just been sent to Washington by the Provisional Government?
- "It is made up of good men, and I believe they will endeavor to do what is for the best interests of the country.
- "The above is correctly reported."
- "R .W. Wilcox."
Senator Frye. That is signed by Mr. Wilcox?
Mr. Hoes. Signed by him personally, and read to him carefully before he signed it.
The Chairman. By whom?
Mr. Hoes. By me.
Senator Frye. The day that the Government buildings were taken possession of by the Provisional Government and the proclamation was read were there any United States troops in front of the Government building?
Mr. Hoes. I did not see any.
Senator Frye. Do you know where they were at the time?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
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Senator Frye. Where were they?
Mr. Hoes. In Arion Hall.
Senator Frye. Back in the yard?
Mr. Hoes. I can not say.
Senator Frye. They were not in sight of the Government building?
Mr. Hoes. I am sure I would have seen them if they could be seen from the front of the Government building, but I saw none.
Senator Frye. Do you know anything that the United States did to help or hinder either side?
Mr. Hoes. No.
Senator Frye. Did you ever hear any complaint?
Mr. Hoes. I never did, except that it was charged in a general way by the newspapers that she had been dethroned by Mr. Stevens and the United States forces.
Senator Frye. The Royalist press?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Gray. And the Royalist people?
Mr. Hoes. I take it for granted that they made this charge, although I have no recollection of hearing any of them do so.
Senator Gray. You did not come in contact with them?
Mr. Hoes. Yes I did, I made it my study to associate with all classes.
Senator Gray. You did not come in contact with the Royalist people on that point?
Mr. Hoes. I have no recollection of that claim being put forward by them while I was there.
Senator Frye. Is this a copy of the act of the bill 185 granting a franchise to establish and maintain a lottery [exhibiting paper]?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; it is a copy of the original bill as introduced in the legislature. The bill referred to is as follows:
- No. 185 z.
- Introduced by______ .
- First reading,______day of______, 1892.
- Second reading, ______day of , ______1892.
- Third reading, ________day of , _____1892.
- AN ACT granting a franchise to establish and maintain a lottery.
- Be it enacted by the Queen and the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom:
- Section 1. The exclusive franchise is hereby granted to D.H. Cross, of Chicago, Illinois, United States of America; W.B. Davenport, of St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America, and John Phillips, J.J. Williams, and Dr. Gilbert Foote, of Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaiian Islands, and their successors and assigns, or such corporation as may hereafter be incorporated or organized by them, to establish and maintain a lottery and to sell lottery, policy, and combination tickets, devices, and certificates and fractional parts thereof at terms and prices in just proportion to the prizes to be drawn, and to insure perfect fairness and justice in the distribution of the prizes, for the term of twenty-five (25) years.
- Section 2. The majority of the said grantees, or if a corporation be formed, then a majority of the directors of said corporation shall be domiciled in Honolulu, and said business shall be conducted in the city
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----71
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- of Honolulu, on the island of Oahu, Hawaiian Islands, where all the drawings of said lottery shall take place.
- Section 3. The said grantees and their successors and assigns shall pay for said franchise to the Hawaiian Government the sum of five hundred thousand ($500,000) dollars each year, in quarterly installments, at the end of each quarter after the announcement of the first drawing; that is to say, on the 31st day of March, the 30th day of June, the 30th day of September, and the 31st day of December, of each year.
- Section 4. Said sum shall be devoted to the uses and purposes hereinafter set forth, and the minister of finance is hereby authorized to pay the same as herein provided, as long as the same is received for said franchise.
- First. Subsidy to be paid for an ocean cable between the port of Honolulu and a port on the North American Continent connecting with any American telegraph system, one hundred thousand ($100,000) dollars per annum. This subsidy shall be paid in quarterly installments in the manner in which it is received, to such company with which the Hawaiian Government may enter into a contract under Chapter LXX of the session laws of 1890, and to commence after the sending of the first message over such cable, and to continue as long as such cable is maintained in working order.
- Second. Subsidy to be paid for the construction and maintenance of a railroad around the island of Oahu, fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars per annum, to be paid to such company who may construct and maintain such railroad and during such time in which said railroad is kept in operation.
- Third. Subsidy to be paid for the construction and maintenance of a railroad from Hilo, Island of Hawaii, through the districts of Hilo and Hamakua, fifty-thousand ($50,000) dollars per annum, to be paid during such period during which said railroad is kept in operation.
- Fourth. For improving and maintaining the improvements of Honolulu Harbor, fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars per annum.
- Fifth. For roads, bridges, landings, and wharves in the Hawaiian Kingdom, one hundred and seventy-five thousand ($175,000) dollars per annum, to be apportioned as follows: Island of Oahu, fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars; Island of Hawaii, sixty thousand ($60,000) dollars; Island of Maui, forty thousand ($40,000) dollars; Island of Kauai, twenty-five thousand ($25,000) dollars.
- Sixth. For the encouragement of industries in the Hawaiian Kingdom, fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars per annum, to be disbursed as may be from time to time directed by the Legislature.
- Seventh. For the encouragement of tourist travel and immigration, twenty-five thousand ($25,000) dollars per annum, to be disbursed as may be from time to time directed by the Legislature.
- Eighth. If at any time during the existence of this franchise the provisions of the reciprocity treaty relating to Pearl Harbor should be abrogated, then the amounts mentioned in subdivisions fifth and seventh shall be used as a subsidy for the purpose of opening the harbor known as Pearl Harbor and erecting and maintaining dry docks and other improvements in said harbor.
- Ninth. If for any reason any of the above subsidies can not be applied to the purposes herein set forth, then the sums so set apart shall be used as from time to time the Legislature may direct.
- Section 5. The grantees and their successors and assigns shall be exempted from any and all taxes and license fees of any kind whatsoever upon or for said franchise, except the said sum of five hundred thousand ($500,000) dollars per annum, paid as aforesaid.
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- Section 6. The minister of the interior is hereby authorized to grant a charter of incorporation to the grantees of this franchise and their successors and assigns, in conformity with this act, and under the following conditions:
- First. The capital stock of such corporation shall be five million ($5,000,000) dollars, represented by fifty thousand (50,000) shares of stock of one hundred ($100) dollars each, par value, provided the said capital stock may be increased to ten million ($10,000,000) dollars, represented by one hundred thousand (100,000) shares of par value of one hundred ($100) dollars each share.
- Second. All powers of the corporation shall be vested in a board of directors to consist of five (5) persons, each of whom shall own at least five hundred (500) shares of the capital stock of the said corporation.
- Third. The corporation shall be empowered to sue and be sued, to plead and be impleaded, to appear in any court of record or justice, and to do any other lawful act, such as any person or persons might do for their own defense, interest, or safety, in its corporate name.
- Fourth. The president and secretary of the board of directors shall be the proper persons upon whom citations, notices, and other legal process shall be served.
- Fifth. The corporation shall furnish bonds to the minister of finance in the sum of one hundred and twenty-five thousand ($125,000) dollars as surety for the prompt and punctual payment of the sums and in the manner set forth in section 3 (three) of this act; which bond shall be filed at the time when the first drawing and distribution of prizes is announced.
- Sixth. The board of directors shall have power to establish as many agencies as may be necessary, and to appoint a president, superintendent, secretary and treasurer, and such clerks and agents as may be required, and may remove them at pleasure, fix salaries of all officers and employees of the corporation (except that of the commissioners appointed by the Queen, with the approval of the cabinet as hereinafter provided), and fix the amount of their respective bonds and sureties, and shall make and establish such rules and by-laws for the proper management and regulation of the affairs of the corporation as may be necessary and proper. A majority of the board of directors shall be necessary to constitute a quorum, and shall have power to remove any officer of the company. The board of directors shall have power to fill any vacancy that may occur by death, resignation, or removal.
- Seventh. At all meetings held for election of directors or for any other purpose, every stockholder whose name is entered upon the books of the company as such, and none other, shall be entitled, either directly or by proxy, to cast one vote for each share of capital stock held by him. All transfers of stock shall be made and entered on the books of the company.
- Eighth. The persons named in the first clause of this act shall be, and they are hereby, constituted the first board of directors, who shall at their first meeting appoint one of their number president, and the said board shall serve for two (2) years from the time this incorporation takes effect, and thereafter until their successors are elected and qualified, at the expiration of which term a meeting of the stockholders for the election of a board of directors shall be held on a day fixed for all elections thereafter. A two-thirds (2/3) vote shall be necessary to constitute an election, and if no election be held, the meeting will adjourn over one (1) year.
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- Ninth. There shall be two (2) commissioners appointed by the Queen with the approval of the cabinet, who shall hold office during the pleasure of the Queen and cabinet. The duties of said commissioners shall be to preside at all Lottery drawings and to superintend the same and secure perfect fairness in the allotment of prizes in each scheme. The salary of said commissioners shall be six thousand ($6,000) dollars per annum each, payable out of the treasury of the corporation in quarterly installments. The said commissioners shall not own or be interested in the capital stock of the said corporation, nor purchase nor own any ticket or tickets, devices, certificates, or fractional parts thereof.
- Tenth. All drawings of lotteries under this act shall be made public, admission free, and it shall be compulsory upon said company to hold annually twelve (12) regular drawings, and as many additional special drawings as the directors of said company may designate;
- Eleventh. The stockholders of the capital stock of the corporation shall be liable to the creditors of said corporation to the amount of the shares by them respectively held.
- Twelfth. The corporation shall present a full and accurate account or exhibit of the state of its affairs to the minister of the interior, on the first day of January of each and every year.
- Thirteenth. At the expiration of this franchise, three (3) commissioners shall be elected by the stockholders, whose duty it shall be to liquidate its affairs on such terms and in such manner as shall be determined by a majority vote as set forth in subdivision eight of section 6 (six) of this act.
- Section 7. Any person selling, offering or exposing for sale after the 31st day of December, 1892, any lottery or policy, or combination ticket or tickets, or devices or certificates or fractional parts thereof, except as authorized by this act, or in violation of this act, or in violation of the rights and privileges herein granted, shall be liable, upon conviction thereof to a fine not exceeding five thousand ($5,000) dollars, nor less than five hundred ($500) dollars for each and every offence, and all police and district courts of this Kingdom shall have jurisdiction in such cases.
- Section 8. The grantees of this franchise and their successors and assigns, shall have the right during the whole term of said franchise, to dispose of by lottery or a series of lotteries, any land, improved or unimproved, which said corporation may become possessed of by purchase or otherwise in the Hawaiian Islands, but such lands shall be disposed of by special drawings only, which shall be advertised as drawings for property.
- Section 9. The grantees of this franchise and their successors and assigns, are hereby given the right of uninterrupted passage through the mails of the Hawaiian postal system, of all written and printed matter relating to or connected with the business of said lottery upon paying current rates of postage therefor.
- Section 10. This act shall take effect from and after its approval, and all acts and parts of acts in conflict with the same are hereby repealed.
Senator Frye. Do you think that the Provisional Government would have succeeded in accomplishing its purpose of overthrowing the Queen and taking possession of the Government buildings if there had been no United States troops there?
Mr. Hoes. I have not the slightest doubt they would have done so. If they had not, others would have done it for them. But these are among the strongest men in the community, and in the whole country.
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Senator Frye. The Provisional Government was formed on the 17th of January, and you left the next March?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. What was the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands after the Provisional Government was formed?
Mr. Hoes. Absolute quietness.
Senator Frye. Any apparent unrest on the part of the opponents of it?
Mr. Hoes. None, except what was expressed in the Royalist paper, the Bulletin. The city was just as quiet as any country town in New England.
Senator Frye. Is that Government qualified to maintain itself?
Mr. Hoes. I am quite sure of it.
Senator Frye. Are you acquainted with the members of the committee of safety?
Mr. Hoes. Most of them. Of the 14 whose names are attached to the proclamation establishing the Provisional Government I am personally acquainted with all but 1.
Senator Frye. What is the character of these men?
Mr. Hoes. I believe they represent in every respect the best element in the country.
Senator Frye. Reliable men?
Mr. Hoes. I believe them all to be.
Senator Frye. Do you know Sam Parker, Colburn, and Cornwell?
Mr. Hoes. I know Sam Parker and I know Cornwell.
Senator Frye. Did you know our minister, Mr. Stevens?
Mr. Hoes. Very intimately.
Senator Frye. What was your estimate of him?
Mr. Hoes. I always regarded him as a remarkable man.
Senator Frye. As an honest man?
Mr. Hoes. As a conservative, honest, conscientious man; a man who never, under any circumstances, lost his head; a man who never acted under impulse. I sustained confidential relations with Mr. Stevens. I think I had his implicit confidence, and I know that he had mine.
Senator Frye. Did you ever learn from Mr. Stevens that he intended to interfere with the government of the Queen or the Provisional Government?
Mr. Hoes. I never learned it from him, and I flatter myself if he had told any of his associates of the fact he would have told me, because we often conversed confidentially about Hawaiian matters.
Senator Frye. In your opinion was the request made by the minister upon Capt. Wiltse to land the troops on Monday wise and discreet?
Mr. Hoes. I think it was.
Senator Frye. Were you there when Mr. Blount was there?
Mr. Hoes. No.
Senator Frye. You understand the purpose of this committee is to obtain whatever information it can, especially in reference to what took place after the revolution and the establishment of the Provisional Government. Can you think of anything you wish to say that will be information to the committee?
Mr. Hoes. I do not recall anything in particular.
Senator Gray. Where are you from, what State?
Mr. Hoes. New York.
Senator Gray. As I understand, you are a chaplain in the Navy.
Mr. Hoes. In the U. S. Navy.
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Senator Gray. You were on those islands, for the reasons that you have described, from what date?
Mr. Hoes. From the 25th of September, 1891, until the 9th of March, 1893.
Senator Gray. You were there long enough to become very well acquainted with the residents of the island and the people, as you have related?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you ever observe any considerable annexation sentiment before the emeute of January, 1893?
Mr. Hoes. I observed a very general opinion held by the prominent people there, that annexation was the ultimate solution of the Hawaiian question, but I did not observe any particular sentiment as to when that event would take place.
Senator Gray. Was that a growing sentiment among the American population, so called?
Mr. Hoes. I do not know whether it was growing; it seemed to be generally prevalent.
Senator Gray. I mean during the time you were there?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was it understood by you during the Saturday and Monday and Tuesday, which were the eventful ones in this revolution, there was a movement for annexation?
Mr. Hoes. I do not believe the people knew or cared what it was for, so long as it resulted in the establishment of good government. I believe the people reposed such absolute confidence in the committee of safety that they would follow them through fire and water.
Senator Gray. What people?
Mr. Hoes. I mean the people who desired law and order and good government.
Senator Gray. That is the portion that started the Provincial Government at the time?
Mr. Hoes. Yes, the portion that started it, and subsequently upheld it.
Senator Gray. Was it not a fact, in your own observation, that on Monday and Tuesday, particularly Tuesday, it was mooted about that this movement was an annexation movement as a fact?
Mr. Hoes. I have not any recollection that it was.
Senator Gray. One of the gentlemen who was a member of the committee of safety and was active in the military operations and has testified before the committee, in stirring up the people, as he was active in doing, he found that he could not do it until he told them it was for annexation to the United States. Have you any knowledge on that subject?
Mr. Hoes. I have no recollection of hearing that talked about at that time. The feeling of the people was simply as I have described it. It was such an intense desire to be rid of royalty, as it had existed and acted in Hawaii, that any solution would have been accepted if advocated by the committee of safety.
Senator Gray. Did you not understand that the proclamation of the Provisional Government declared that it would be established until annexation should be declared between the islands and the United States.
Mr. Hoes. I believe it was so expressed, but, I believe the meaning intended by that phrase----
Senator Gray. Do you not know that Mr. Thurston has always been an ardent annexationist??
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Mr. Hoes. I have heard Mr. Thurston make a great many addresses in the Legislature, but I never heard him use a phrase advocating annexation.
Senator Gray. Would you expect to hear him in the Legislature?
Mr. Hoes. The Legislature was made up of a band of honest men on one side, pitted against an unprincipled rabble on the other. Mr. Thurston was never afraid to express his honest convictions at any proper time, or in any fitting place, and, had he so chosen, he would nave been as willing to advocate annexation in the Legislature as upon the public rostrum.
Senator Gray. Did you expect him to advocate annexation in their Legislature?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; openly, at the proper time, had he seen fit.
Senator Gray. Why would he do it?
Mr. Hoes. I do not believe that those who might have been in favor of annexation thought the time was ripe for it. That leads me to say that, in my opinion, twenty-four hours, or even ten hours previous to the prorogation of that Legislature the idea of annexation as an event soon to be consummated never entered the head of any man composing the present Government and its band of officials, not even Thurston's.
Senator Gray. Many things that occurred within the course of the revolution, so called, so far as its time is concerned, but after the revolution, after the events commenced to shape themselves, did not you understand that annexation was a part of it?
Mr. Hoes. I did not until the proclamation was read by the Provisional Government.
Senator Gray. Were you present at the meetings of the committee of safety?
Mr. Hoes. Never.
Senator Gray. Were you not consulted by persons who were active in that revolution?
Mr. Hoes. What do you mean by consultation?
Senator Gray. As to their plans.
Mr. Hoes. No; I was in total ignorance of them.
Senator Gray. You were not in the movement?
Mr. Hoes. No.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Stevens during those three days?
Mr. Hoes. I am unable to say, but very likely I did.
Senator Gray. But you have no distinct recollection? You could not say that you saw him at that time?
Mr. Hoes. I could not swear to it.
Senator Gray. And you can not speak of your own knowledge of his conduct during the period of which I have been speaking-three days?
Mr. Hoes. No; if you mean personal knowledge-knowledge that I would derive from Mr. Stevens himself.
Senator Gray. What lawyers call personal knowledge.
Mr. Hoes. No.
Adjourned to meet on notice.
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Washington, D. C., Monday, February 5,1894.
Subcommittee met pursuant to notice.
Present the chairman (Senator Morgan), Senators Gray, Sherman, and Frye,
Absent, Senator Butler.
SWORN STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. SIMPSON.
The Chairman. When did you first visit the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Simpson. I went to Honolulu on the first ship which left San Francisco after the Presidential election, and was on the ship that carried the news that Mr. Cleveland had been elected. This was in 1892, and I must say that I never witnessed such a public demonstration as there was when the knowledge was given out that Mr. Cleveland was elected. The wish had been so general that he should be elected that of record there was not more than half a dozen wagers that the election would be otherwise. I never saw a community so bound up in the information which they hoped to receive, that Mr. Cleveland would be elected.
The Chairman. Was that common to all classes, natives as well as the white people?
Mr. Simpson. Natives, Germans, English, and Americans. They told me afterward that the oldest inhabitants never knew when the wharves had been so well filled with people as they were upon the arrival of that ship, expecting Mr. Cleveland's election. That impressed me as being a very clear idea of what they wanted down there.
The Chairman. Was there any satisfactory reason stated that was commonly accepted by this mass of people for their rejoicings at Mr. Cleveland's election?
Mr. Simpson. Yes; and it was acquiesced in by all classes. The people at that time believed that the action of the McKinley bill in placing sugar from all countries on the free list and placing a bounty of 2 cents a pound on American-grown sugar was an injustice to the sugar-raisers who are so much Americans that it practically meant all of them, and those who were not Americans secured their profits from the business by their proximity to the American market. They believed it was an injustice, for the reason that, in 1876, when the reciprocity treaty was concluded and put into effect between the United States and the Sandwich Islands, it had been done with the direct purpose of augmenting the sugar interests of the Americans living in the islands, and the best reasons that I could get for the same favor not being shown them when the McKinley bill was put into effect was that the matter had been overlooked by the framers of the bill.
The Chairman. What was the purpose of your visit to Hawaii?
Mr. Simpson. In July, 1892, having previously been in the commission business in Tacoma, it was brought to my attention that the bananas raised in the Hawaiian market would find a much better market in the Northwest if they were brought direct; that in handling the trade the principal profits were made by the San Francisco jobbers and consumed by the extra freights to such an extent that they had been getting their bananas to the Northwest from New Orleans by rail by the way of San Francisco. In looking up the matter, and having been commissioned by some of the business houses there to go to Honolulu and secure a cargo of bananas, I became interested in the subject. I looked the
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matter up carefully, and from the investigation I had given it I came to the conclusion that there was a splendid market for the merchants and farmers in the Hawaiian Islands. I found that nearly all the bananas that were raised were shipped to San Francisco and reshipped by the San Francisco trader with the Hawaiian Islands. So I collected considerable data, compiled it----
The Chairman. Were your observations confined to the banana trade?
Mr. Simpson. No; confined to all lines of trade. I immediately organized a company for the purpose of running a steamship from Tacoma, in the State of Washington, to Honolulu. When the organization of the company was completed the board of directors requested me to go to Honolulu to see what arrangements could be made for the steamship we hoped to place on the line. Prior to going to Honolulu I made a tour of the principal cities of the Northwest and received orders for 5,000 bunches of bananas per month.
The Chairman. You mean the American cities?
Mr. Simpson. The American cities in the Pacific northwest. That insured us a profitable cargo coming back. I based my calculations on the successful operations of the company with freight transportations, paying no attention to the passenger part of it, because that was not staple; you could not depend upon its being a regular thing. I collected data from the various manufacturers and farmers in the Pacific northwest, and went supplied with samples of all kinds and descriptions ready to do business with Honolulu. When I got there I immediately made myself known through letters of introduction from the chambers of commerce in Tacoma and Seattle and from the governor of the State and various others. A meeting of the chamber of commerce was arranged, and I appeared before those gentlemen and laid the matter before them. They thought quite favorably of it. The great trouble I had to work against the first week was their lack of knowledge of the Pacific northwest, but they became satisfied that they were buying goods in a market that had originated in our country. They entered with considerably spirit into the scheme. I established an agency with the house of C. Brewer & Co., the oldest house doing business in the islands. They were very enthusiastic over the matter.
The Chairman. I do not care about the present details of your business transaction. Did you find the commercial community of Honolulu aroused to an interest in your enterprise?
Mr. Simpson. Yes; and that interest was manifested in the orders that they gave me. They gave me an order for 1,250 tons of merchandise, consisting of oats, wheat, and barley.
The Chairman. Did you start your line in operation?
Mr. Simpson. No, sir.
The Chairman. What prevented it?
Mr. Simpson. The revolution prevented it.
The Chairman. To what revolution do you refer?
Mr. Simpson. The revolution of January 14 to 17, in Honolulu. I left the islands on the steamer prior to the revolution. At that time there was no intimation that any such thing would take place. For months the Legislature had been in session. I had become well acquainted with the leaders on both sides of the question, for the reason that I had made application to the Legislature for a subsidy.
The Chairman. Did you succeed in getting it?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. The subsidy consisting of $500 per trip, mail contract, remission of all port charges, light-house fees, free wharfage,
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free storage, and remission of all dues upon any goods which were transported to Honolulu for the use of our company. Just prior to the time I made my application Mr. Spreckles was engaged in the same thing. His subsidy was about to run out, and I was told that it cost him considerable money to get his subsidy through. I waited until he got his subsidy through, and I worked mine through on the proposition that what is good for the goose is good for the gander. So soon as the natives learned that I had no money-I was approached by some of them----
The Chairman. You speak of native members of the Legislature?
Mr. Simpson. Some of the native members.
The Chairman. Did you concede anything to them on that score? use any money?
Mr. Simpson. Not the slightest. All the money that was spent was on a prospectus in the American language and the Kanaka language.
The Chairman. Which cabinet signed your concession?
Mr. Simpson. It was known as the Wilcox-Jones cabinet. It consisted of Wilcox, P. C. Jones, and the minister of foreign affairs, a native, but in sympathy with the American movement. The Legislature granted my subsidy with not more than 3 votes against it, whereas Mr. Spreckels's subsidy carried quite a number of votes against it, from the fact that he did not see them all in the proper spirit. Before I went to the Hawaiian Islands the impression I had always had was that Mr. Spreckles controlled things down there. After I had been there a while I found that to be untrue. There were six business houses there, and they practically do all the business in the islands, with the exception of what local retail trade there is done outside of Honolulu. These six houses are either owners, part owners, managers, or agents for all of the sugar plantations and some of the other plantations in the islands. They practically control the entire business of the islands.
The Chairman. In that industry?
Mr. Simpson. Commercially.
The Chairman. You speak that broadly.
Mr. Simpson. I speak that quite broadly. They buy in the round lot for their own sailing vessels. They buy and sell the sugar and rice, and they supply the plantations with whatever they need and operate them, acting for resident and nonresident owners. I do not know that I can better explain my ideas of the situation politically as it stood than by giving you a small extract of an interview which was published in the Portland (Oregon) Telegram, January 15, 1893.
The Chairman. That was while the revolution was going on?
Mr. Simpson. While it was going on and before I returned to the islands, and prior to any information being received in this country.
- "POLITICAL MATTERS.
- "The Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom is composed of representatives and nobles, elected by the people, the representatives being in the same relative standing as our Representatives and the nobles taking the place of our Senators. They all sit together as a body of the whole, and it is a very interesting proceeding to see and hear them transact business, as all speeches delivered by natives and in the native language are immediately interpreted and repeated in English, and everything said by members who speak the English language is likewise interpreted into the native speech. The cabinet of the country
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- is appointed by the Queen, under the advisement of the leader of the party voting a 'lack of confidence' in the previous cabinet.
- "ANNEXATION QUESTION.
- "A great deal is heard there in reference to annexation to the United States. This agitation doubtless originates from the fact that prior to the passage of the McKinley bill Hawaiian sugar entered the ports of the United States free, while sugars from all other countries paid a duty. The McKinley bill placed the Hawaiian product on an equal basis with that of all other countries, and the American Government pays 2 cents per pound on its homegrown sugar. This the plantation owners of the Hawaiian Islands believe to be an injustice, and with good reason, as of the $36,000,000 assessed valuation of the property in the country American citizens own $22,000,000, or nearly two-thirds of the taxable property in the Kingdom. There is a great difference of opinion even among the American residents of the islands as to whether annexation would be the best method out of the difficulty or not.
- "Among other remedies they mention for placing them on their former footing is for the United States Government to cease the payment of a bounty on sugar grown in this country; or it to place a duty of 1 cent per pound on all other foreign sugars, admitting the Hawaiian product free, and the payment of a bounty of 1 cent per pound by this Government to the Hawaiian sugar planters. Of the foreign population of the Hawaiian Islands, after the Portuguese, the Americans predominate, with the Germans and English about evenly divided. The Germans as a rule take sides with the Americans in all commercial undertakings, while the English of course oppose the annexation of the island to the United States, and in support of their position argue that the natives would lose their identity in becoming suffragists of the American Government."
Now the data that I looked up, prior to the time that the company was organized, begun with the commercial beginning of the islands and extends up to the present time. It is historical, and shows the connected commercial workings of the islands from the time Capt. Cook landed there in 1778.
The Chairman. Before you go into that I would like to ask you something more about the political situation in Hawaii at the time you were there. What time did you leave the islands to go away?
Mr. Simpson. It was a few days before Christmas. I do not remember the date of the month. It was a few days before Christmas, 1892.
The Chairman. Was the subject of annexation, of which you spoke, a matter of much conversation among the people there at that time?
Mr. Simpson. It was.
Senator Sherman. A few days before Christmas, 1892, you left the islands?
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
The Chairman. That was the only visit you made to Hawaii?
Mr. Simpson. That was all. My visit was made for purely commercial enterprises. The only interest I had in getting acquainted with the people was to further the interests of my corporation. The people, as nearly as I can remember now, were in this condition: The Legislature had been in session a number of months longer than its ordinary term. The white members, composed principally of the wealthy citizens in the islands, were sacrificing their business and remaining
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in Honolulu in attendance upon the Legislature: It was a pecuniary loss to them, but they did it purely in a spirit of defense; that is to say, they expected some action of the Queen, through her henchmen in the Legislature, which would be detrimental to the business interests of the islands; just what it was they did not know. There was nobody there who was willing to say that annexation would likely take place within the near future. The general impression was that it was bound to come. They were to wait, but they feared some action of the Queen. They had no idea that the subject of a new constitution was under consideration. They had no idea that the Queen would be able to pass this opium bill. While, of course, that had been introduced in the Legislature, it had been side tracked. So long as these white members remained in Honolulu there was a feeling that the Queen could not carry it through.
The Chairman. Are the same remarks applicable to the lottery bill?
Mr. Simpson. And the lottery bill. But they finally stayed on so long that one after another would drop out, and very shortly the Queen had control of the legislature, and, as I am informed, she had these bills passed. The people went about their ordinary business. They did not disguise the annexation question, nor disguise any of the Queen's actions at all, but treated the thing as though she and the particular bill she desired to put through were standing menaces of their interests. I had several talks with Minister Stevens while I was there. Minister Stevens had been advocating the same principle of trade in Honolulu that I had been advocating in the Puget Sound region, and when he learned that I had, he very kindly called on me at the hotel and I returned his call. In the course of several conversations we became as intimate as persons might be under the circumstances. We talked principally as to the interests of the country in a commercial way. While we talked in a general way, I can not recall anything that Mr. Stevens said to me that I could construe as being in the light of anything more than a wish.
He told me that frankly and politely-made no bones about it-that the question of annexation was certainly a very live one there, and that it undoubtedly would become an issue sooner or later. He also told me that he did not express his opinion on the subject to anybody in Honolulu. That I remember distinctly. He told me that he could not do that, because it would give a wrong impression. He always stated that he took information from all classes, and I remember that some information he gave me appeared to me as though the thing must necessarily come up in some shape sooner or later. That was that in 1876, when the reciprocity treaty between this country and the Hawaiian Islands was first put into effect, the United States had practically exercised protection over these islands; that it was beyond any question not only the duty of the United States to exercise this protection at that time, but to continue to do it, on account of the monetary interests of its citizens. Mr. Stevens stated that the United States was the only country that had systematically kept a war ship there; that the British Government rarely had a ship there, and then only temporarily on its way to Australia.
The Chairman. I suppose you have stated as fully as you desire to do the political situation out there? Are there any other facts you wish to state?
Mr. Simpson. The natives did not seem to take any particular interest in the matter except that they felt that something ought to be done by the United States to relieve the sugar situation. They had no
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organized idea as to annexation or a protectorate or a better treaty, or anything of the sort, and they did not look to their own Government; they looked to the United States to relieve them. I guess that is about all I have to say on that subject.
The Chairman. Now, if you will, proceed to give the data which you say you have collected with respect to the commercial situation of Hawaii.
Mr. Simpson. Prior to the settlement of the white men in the islands, the native products were taro (or kalo), sweet potatoes, yams, sugar cane, bananas, calabash gourds, wauke (or paper mulberry), out of which they made their clothes; awa, from which they manufactured their drinks, and also a few hogs and fowls. At that time there was no circulating medium, the trade being carried on by barter. The natives were not an ingenious people, and the improvements they made were quite crude, but apparently carried on with very good judgment. They built extensive irrigation ditches, and leveled terraces, and worked their taro patches with very crude tools and implements. The first trade with the outside world was in January, 1778, when Cook traded them some nails and bits of iron for hogs, vegetables, fresh water, and wood. Portlock and Dixon were the first to recognize the commercial importance of the geographical location of the group in 1786, when they purposely made it a stopping place to replenish their ships. Portlock and Dixon were engaged in buying furs from Indians on the Northwest coast of America and selling them in the Canton market. This trade was augmented to a considerable extent.
In 1791 Capt. Kendrick, of Boston, in the sloop Lady Washington, left 3 sailors at Kauai to collect sandalwood and pearls against his return to England. This was the beginning of the sandalwood trade with China, which reached its height during the period of years covered from 1810 to 1825. Sandalwood was sold on board the vessels in the Hawaiian Islands at that time at $10 a picul, or 1351/2 pounds. The trade averaged $400,000 a year for some years. In 1835 the sandalwood trade had practically ended. Capt. Vancouver first gave the natives the slips and seed for raising orange trees and grapevines and many other subtropical plants, in 1792. The great bulk of marketable vegetation of the islands was not indigenous to the islands. Nearly everything they have there is brought from the different shores, in fact the way the city of Honolulu is located there is no foliage, except 15 or 20 cocoanut trees. Now it is a beautiful city of subtropical trees and foliage. In 1793 Vancouver returned from his trip to California and landed a bull, 5 cows, 3 sheep, the first of the kind placed on the islands. Horses were first taken to the islands in 1803 by Capt. Cleveland. Vancouver superintended the building of the first ship in 1794.
The Chairman. Where was that built?
Mr. Simpson. It was built at Lahawa.
The first organized effort for commercial relations with the United States was made when missionaries landed from New England in 1820. The first whaling ship arrived at Honolulu in 1820, to be soon followed by many others, and Hawaii was made a base of supplies. Much time was saved by ships engaged in whaling by taking their oil to Hawaii, transshipping it to New England, making necessary repairs, laying in supplies, and utilizing natives on their whaling voyages. The Hawaiian proved to be the best sailor obtainable. In 1826 it was estimated that 100 whaling ships annually were putting in at Honolulu, and each ship is said to have expended on an average the sum of $20,000 each, or about $2,000,000 a year. Recognizing the value of this growing traffic merchants
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established trading houses to gather in this important industry. The whaling trade continued to be the chief source of income to the islands for a number of years. In 1845 there were 500 whaling ships arrived there. In 1878 the whaling trade practically died out. Experiments were made in growing commodities, such as silk, cotton, wheat, sugar, coffee, but nothing of particular value was accomplished, except in raising coffee and sugar. The coffee culture increased rapidly and promised well until there came a drought in the years 1851-'52, which it was said caused a blight. That for a time ended the advancement of this industry.
The Chairman. Coffee, like the other plants you have been speaking of, was not indigenous?
Mr. Simpson. No. They have experimented in coffee for a number of years down there, and the trouble has been that the people who have been engaged in experimenting do not understand their business. They would start their trees at too low an altitude. Whenever they got above 2,000 or 2,500 feet they have had the best results. Now they are going into the matter to a greater extent than they have ever done before. They grow a splendid quality of coffee.
Senator Gray. Have they sufficient area at that altitude and higher to make it an important matter?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. Their area to a certain extent is limited, but there is a vast area that it will take a good many years to set out, especially the island of Hawaii, which has 4,500 square miles, and the greater portion of it is above 1,500 feet. The other islands are not, of course, so large.
Senator Gray. On what island is Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. Oahu.
Senator Gray. Do you know what the area of that island is?
Mr. Simpson. Six hundred square miles.
Senator Gray. Is that all?
Mr. Simpson. It is next to the largest inhabited island in the group. There are five principal islands.
Senator Gray. The city of Honolulu has the greater portion of the population?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. Coffee that they raise there has a splendid flavor, and in time is going to become a very profitable commodity. It is known as the Kona coffee on account of its being raised in a district by the name of Kona, and it has a flavor that resembles a mixture of Mocha and Java. It has never been gone into systematically, but they are going ahead with it now, and they will undoubtedly build up a great business there.
Senator Gray. Mr. Spalding, who was before us, expressed the opinion that it would not be a success there.
Mr. Simpson. That is the opinion of nearly everybody who lives there, but it is not borne out in experiments which have been made by men who understand coffee culture. It is a peculiar industry, and must be given careful attention, and the knowledge of years must be brought to it. The merchants of Honolulu net more money for the coffee that they sell in the San Francisco market grown on the island of Hawaii than for any coffee sold in the San Francisco market, and in spite of the fact that it is not prepared for market in what would be ordinarily termed a marketable condition; it is not separated. The good and the bad are all dumped into the same sack, and while I was there one house in Honolulu had quite a little stock of it, some 1,200 or 1,500 bags, and the proprietor had refused at Honolulu 25
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cents a pound for that coffee. Anyone who is posted in green coffees knows that that is a pretty good price placed at shipment.
The Chairman. Your inquiries into the industries of Hawaii were stimulated by the trade you were trying to establish between those islands and Puget Sound.
Mr. Simpson. I took up each article to see whether we could handle it, and also took up articles that promised well. In fact, when I returned to Tacoma I completed a good size coffee company to go into the culture of coffee there, but it was killed by the revolution. The sugar business is completely controlled by the American Sugar Refining Company.
The Chairman. You mean in San Francisco?
Mr. Simpson. No; I mean the sugar trust in the United States. The sugar trust now controls all the sugar refineries in San Francisco. Do you want me to give you some sugar data?
The Chairman. Not just now; you may proceed with your statement.
Mr. Simpson. The first plantation for sugar purposes was established in 1835 by Ladd & Co., Americans, and cane was raised in a small way for a number of years. They got quite a valuable charter from the Hawaiian Government. They claimed at that time it was procured for the purpose of selling the charter. It gave them the selection of a vast quantity of land for a nominal consideration. When gold was discovered in California a new market was opened up, and the trade of the islands had greatly increased up to the year 1893. When the gold fever was on in California they had very few supplies there, and the people of the Sandwich Islands went into the raising of commodities to a greater extent than they had before or since. For instance, they started flour mills and went into the raising of wheat on the islands. I do not believe any is raised now. In the fifties sugar sold up to 20 cents a pound in California, and later the acreage was considerably increased in the hope that a reciprocity treaty would be successfully negotiated with the United States. When the reciprocity treaty was finally signed and ratified in 1875-'76 the raising of sugar cane became the chief product of the island. The first commercial treaty that was ever negotiated with the United States was in 1826; the steam navigation between the islands in the group was first started in 1853; the first steamship line between San Francisco and the islands was established in 1870, a line running through to Australia.
The Chairman. Where do they get their coal for the operation of that steam intercommunication between the islands? I want to know whether it is imported.
Mr. Simpson. It is all imported.
The Chairman. And from what part of the earth particularly?
Mr. Simpson. Altogether you may say with one or two shipments of coal it has come from Newcastle in Australia.
The Chairman. Sydney?
Mr. Simpson. New South Wales. It is from the Newcastle mines of Australia. They call it Newcastle coal. It is a bituminous coal, and it costs them in Honolulu from $6.75 to $7.50, according to the cost of shipping from Australia.
The Chairman. Is there any wood or other substance in Hawaii that will be of use in steam navigation hereafter?
Mr. Simpson. No.
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The Chairman. So that their dependence for fuel for this purpose is upon foreign ports entirely.
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
The Chairman. They ought to make a good market for coal between Honolulu and Seattle?
Mr. Simpson. Do not say Seattle. That is the poorest coal on the Pacific coast.
Senator Gray. Have you good coal in the Northwest?
Mr. Simpson. Yes; we have good coal in the mines that have been worked a long while. Now, about the woods; the indigenous woods of the Hawaiian Islands number 150 kinds. The insects have done considerable damage to them; the most common is the borer, a species of bug. I may say right there, on account of the limited amount of wood on the islands the question of rain has become quite a serious matter. When hogs and cattle became so plentiful they were turned loose, and they rooted up the trees and roamed wild, and the greatest sport they get down there is hunting wild cattle. They have destroyed all the trees below 2,000 feet, and they passed laws while I was there prohibiting them cutting trees except for firewood.
The Chairman. When you say the cattle destroyed the trees you mean they ate the foliage and under plants?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. Of indigenous woods the most common are the Oahea.
The Chairman. I do not care to go into that wood subject. My question was about getting fuel for steam navigation in the islands.
Mr. Simpson. On Oahu is the best, at $13 per cord in 4-foot lengths. And right there I would state that I sold, strange as it may seem, quite a quantity of firewood. I have an order from one firm in Honolulu to fill up whatever space we had with firewood from Puget Sound.
The Chairman. You sold that to be delivered, but you never got a chance to deliver it?
Mr. Simpson. No.
The Chairman. Where did you get the data that you now hand me in relation to the commerce between the United States and Hawaii??
Mr. Simpson. From the annual reports of the collector-general of customs of the Hawaiian Islands, and from reports emanating from the Treasury Department of the United States. One verified the other.
The Chairman. Are you satisfied that the figures that are based upon that data are correct?
Mr. Simpson. I am. The figures are as follows: The total export and import trade of Hawaiian Islands from first year of official data recorded, 1855, to December 31,1892, amounts to $265,136,486, the imports being $98,981,325 and exports $166,155,251. This is with all countries. The first year in which there is a complete record of the business done between the United States and Hawaiian Islands was the year 1870. The total amount of merchandise and bullion exported to and imported from Hawaiian Islands from 1870 to 1892, inclusive, is valued at $203,145,447, divided as follows:
|
Exported to Hawaiian Islands. |
Imported from Hawaiian Islands. |
Total. | |
| Merchandise |
$55,183,611 |
$138,670,737 |
193,854,348 |
| Bullion |
8,108,508 |
1,182,591 |
9,291,099 |
|
|
|
| |
| Total |
63,292,119 |
139,853,328 |
203,145,447 |
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The above table gives some idea of the profit which has accrued to the American traders from the Hawaiian Islands traffic. The United States secured from the Hawaiian Islands during a period of twenty-two years----
|
Merchandise and bullion to the value of |
$139,853,238 |
|
For which they returned merchandise and bullion to the value of |
63,292,119 |
|
| |
|
Showing a balance of trade in favor of the United States of |
76,561,209 |
The reciprocity treaty went into effect in September, 1876. The net total excess of imports over exports of both merchandise and bullion up to 1877 was $3,139,997. By deducting this amount from the net balance of trade from 1876 to 1892 the amount derived, $73,421,212, represents the balance of trade in favor of American traders under the operation of the reciprocity treaty.
The foregoing figures show the difference in the volume of trade and the value of trade prior to and during the time of the operation of the treaty of reciprocity of 1876.
The Chairman. Does your table show whether there is any material falling off in the trade in consequence of the repeal of the tax on sugar?
Mr. Simpson. The figures do not show that conclusively, for this reason, that the season following the adoption of the McKinley bill the gross tonnage was increased very much, but the price was reduced for that reason. The actual figures show the production of sugar was much greater than it had been prior. Some new sugar plantations came into bearing that were not producing before.
The Chairman. Have the business enterprises with which you have been associated made any examination into steaming coals in what you call the northwestern Pacific, that is, along the line of the United States and the British Possessions on the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Simpson. I have In a general way. Of some particular kinds of coal I made a specific examination for the purpose of using them on our line of steamship.
The Chairman. Where was your line designed to run; from the United States to where?
Mr. Simpson. To points on Puget Sound; that is to say, Victoria, Seattle, and Tacoma.
The Chairman. Where did you expect to get your supply of fuel?
Mr. Simpson. It depended very largely on where we got the greatest amount of our freight. If we could get a sufficient quantity of freight to warrant us in going into Victoria to stop there, we would have to get coal from the Comax mines in California. If it were not advisable to go in there we proposed to get a quantity of coal in Roslyn in Washington, which is mined exclusively by the Northern Pacific. It is equal to any coal in the State of Washington; but the Vancouver coal is a little cheaper, from the fact that the Northern Pacific Railroad Company put an arbitrary rate on carrying coal to the seaboard, because they had to haul over the mountains.
The Chairman. What is the length of the haul to the sound?
Mr. Simpson. About 75 miles.
The Chairman. Is there no coal available on Puget Sound?
Mr. Simpson. That is the Roslyn coal.
The Chairman. Is there no coal on Puget Sound but that which is brought 70 or 75 miles by rail?
Mr. Simpson. Within 7 or 8 miles of the sound.
The Chairman. Is that good coal?
Mr. Simpson. It is fairly good coal, but not so good as Roslyn coal.
S. Doc. 281, pt 6----72
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The Chairman. Have they many open mines in the State of Washington?
Mr. Simpson. Quite a number; I should say in the neighborhood of 40 or 50. But there are not many of them that are worked. The fact is, the coal deposits are so great that it does not pay to work them, except they have a guaranteed channel for their trade. Nearly all the coal mines are owned or controlled by large corporations, such as the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, the Great Northern, and the Pacific Coast Steamship Company. They are large users of coal, and nearly all of them have gone into the coal business, because they wish to make the profit.
The Chairman. As the mines are worked deeper does the quality of the coal improve?
Mr. Simpson. That is the general belief. Of course, where coal deposits run, as you might say, along the surface, they do not increase; they are rarely worked; they do not bother with them.
The Chairman. What was to be the tonnage of the ships that you were to send out on this line?
Mr. Simpson. About 3,000 gross.
The Chairman. How much of that would be occupied in carrying fuel to and from Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. Do you mean for the use of the ship?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Simpson. We figured that we would put in 1,000 tons of coal.
The Chairman. That would leave how much room for freight-about 1,000 to 1,200 tons?
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
The Chairman. About one-half your cargo would consist of fuel for the ship?
Mr. Simpson. The size of ship we proposed to operate.
The Chairman. That would be still greater on a smaller ship?
Mr. Simpson. The proportion would be still greater.
The Chairman. So that, in making a voyage in a steamship from Puget Sound to Honolulu and return, you would make the calculation that one-half your space in going out to Honolulu and one-fourth of it returning would be occupied by fuel?
Mr. Simpson. In a general way; yes.
The Chairman. How would the cost of coal, if you had to purchase it in Honolulu, compare with what you would have to give for it, say, in Victoria?
Mr. Simpson. A good steam coal sold by the dealers in Honolulu would cost us $14 to $21 a ton, according to the man's ability to make a trade with those fellows. But that is a contingency we would not meet?
The Chairman. What did it cost in Victoria?
Mr. Simpson. The best coal that we could put on at Victoria would cost us $3.50 a ton.
The Chairman. In both cases do you mean on board ship?
Mr. Simpson. Alongside the ship, on a lighter. The Roslyn coal would cost us a trifle more than that; and there is another still nearer the coast, known as the South Prairie coal, which carries a high proportion of steam properties. But it is a small mine, and we could not probably get very much of it. If we could get any we would put that coal on board the ship from coal bunkers at about $3 a ton. Do you want the coal proposition of the Pacific Ocean?
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The Chairman. I want to know what acquaintance you have with steam communication between the eastern and western shores of the Pacific Ocean. I want to know generally what your acquaintance with the subject is.
Mr. Simpson. The way it is operated now is by two lines of ships from San Francisco to China and Japan, making Yokohama the port of entry, making one line from San Francisco to Australia, stopping at Honolulu, Samoa, Apia, New Zealand, and Sidney; and a line of ships to Vancouver, British Columbia, to China and Japan, operated by the Canadian Steamship Company, and also under subsidy from the English Government and Canadian Government-heavy subsidies, too-and a line of steamships from Tacoma to Yokohama and Hong Kong.
The Chairman. Have you ever had any business connection with any of the trans-Pacific lines?
Mr. Simpson. I have imported a few goods, but nothing of any importance. I have never been employed by any of them.
The Chairman. As a rule, what is the tonnage of ships that cross the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Simpson. Ships running from San Francisco to Yokahoma, on the Oriental and Occidental line, average from 4,000 to 5,000 gross tonnage. On the Pacific Mail, operating between the same points, they run from 3,000 to 5,000. On the Spreckles line, between San Francisco and Australia, they run about 5,000 tons, and they have one ship that runs only between San Francisco and Honolulu, 3,500 tons. One of the ships of the Canadian Pacific Railroad Company, operating between Vancouver, China, and Japan, the Empress of India, is about 14,000 gross tons, and the ships running between Vancouver and Australia on the Canadian Pacific line are about 5,000 gross tons, and those between Tacoma and China and Japan are from 3,000 tons to 5,500 tons.
The Chairman. Would all these ships on leaving the American coast take coal for the entire voyage across the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Simpson. That is according to circumstances. Possibly I can give you full information in reference to that subject. The ships running from San Francisco to Yokahoma, as a rule, only carry enough coal to take them to China and Japan, except the coal market in Yokahoma for Hong Kong is such as to to warrant them in carrying coal from San Francisco, provided they have plenty of space to carry it. They usually take from San Francisco a coal supply for twenty days. The ship going from San Francisco to Yokahoma takes about sixteen days out and about fourteen days to return, and they consume in round numbers from 40 to 50 tons of coal per day. That coal costs them in San Francisco from $6.50 to $7.50 per ton, and they purchase whichever coal is most advantageous to them in price and quality. Coal is taken to Australia from San Francisco, from England, and from the Pacific northwest coast. The prices are of various kinds, averaging about the same; that is, for some coals. Of course, cannel coal for stove or grate purposes from the English mines runs higher. The manner in which that coal is taken from San Francisco is by the operation of established lines of colliers between San Francisco and the mines of the Pacific northwest by ships going from England to San Francisco or points on the Pacific coast, bringing coal in ballast, and by ships carrying lumber from the Pacific northwest to Australia and securing a return cargo of coal.
The Chairman. Is that a large trade?
Mr. Simpson. Quite a large trade. It is very rarely that a ship finds
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it necessary, a steamship engaged in the transportation business, to stop at any way port for coal. It is very seldom that they do that now.
The Chairman. Does the course of a vessel from San Francisco to Yokohama take in Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. No; Honolulu does not lie in the direct course between San Francisco and Yokohama.
The Chairman. How far away is it?
Mr. Simpson. The Geodetic Survey people make it 952 miles.
The Chairman. How long would it take a steamer to make that distance, running at the ordinary rates at which they run in crossing the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Simpson. The ships now in that traffic, when they go into Honolulu, lose an average of about three to three and a half days. Now, there is a point that comes up right there.
The Chairman. You are speaking now of Yokohama and San Francisco?
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
The Chairman. Suppose it were between Hong Kong and San Francisco?
Mr. Simpson. Those lines do not go to Hong Kong.
The Chairman. I mean, suppose there were a line between San Francisco and Hong Kong, would not that go by Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. I am not sufficiently posted to say.
The Chairman. A steamship line from San Francisco to Australia, would go by the Sandwich Islands?
Mr. Simpson. It is in direct line.
The Chairman. So that a steamer going from Yokohama to San Francisco would have to leave its course about three days, if it had to go into Honolulu for refreshment, fuel, or anything else? That would be about the length of time?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. But it does not seem to me to be very much of a loss. The Pacific Mail Steamship Company and the Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company, operating between San Francisco and Yokohama, are operating on an agreement between them whereby the ship of one line stops in at Honolulu one month and one of the other line the next month. They have a schedule of a year at a time, and by stopping in at Honolulu they do not make any more trips. Consequently the pay roll goes on the same. In reference to the pay rolls there is less difference between the money spent for labor on board those ships running to China and Japan than there is on the ships running from the American coast to the other points in the Pacific Ocean, for the reason that they employ Chinese and Japanese laborers, and get them very much cheaper. The cost of labor is only 5 per cent less than it is upon ships operating in the Atlantic Ocean and employing English labor; so that, for that reason, they only lose what coal is actually necessary for them to buy in making the trip.
The Chairman. The point of my inquiry was in reference to the advantage of the Hawaiian Islands-of course, Honolulu in particular-as a resting place, place of refreshment, place of repairs in case of any disaster to ships crossing from any portion of the United States to any of the large cities of Asia they might choose to enter. That was the point of my question-what you have to say on that subject. If you have anything to add you may proceed to state it.
Mr. Simpson. There can be no question about the advantage of the Hawaiian Islands in the case either of disaster to ships or the use of the islands as a coaling station for the Navy of this country. In a
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commercial way the loss of the principal lines in running from the United States to the Orient is practically confined to the extra coal that they may consume in making the trip, which, on the line now in operation between San Francisco and Yokohama, would be in the neighborhood of $600 or $900. Of course, the lines running from points between Vancouver and Yokohama are of no benefit; but the running between Vancouver and Australia, or San Francisco and lines Australia, or Nicaragua and the Orient, are of inestimable value.
The Chairman. If the Hawaiian group of islands were in charge of some great and powerful maritime government, in your opinion would it become a central distributing point of the commerce of the Pacific Ocean in almost every direction-a point of interchange and distribution? Of course, the idea which is couched in my question means that under such conditions would it be likely that Honolulu or the Hawaiian Islands might become a great commercial center?
Mr. Simpson. From a commercial sense, strictly speaking, the Hawaiian Islands can hardly be a commercial distributing point except for the goods used within their own country. But in so far as the protection of commercial shipping is concerned, the islands are certainly of great importance. That is to say, the Hawaiian Kingdom possessed by any maritime power would give to the ships of that nation a particular advantage in times of peril.
The Chairman. What is the objection to productions of India and China and Japan meeting the productions of Mexico and the United States and British America for exchange at Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. That is a condition that more likely would have existed prior to 1850 than it is likely to exist there now, from the fact that in those days a line of clipper ships was in use, which made it advantageous for an interchange of commodities on through business. But now, with the railroad and steamship traffic, I can not see where it is going to be of any benefit to the commerce of the world, in a strictly commercial sense, in so far as making it a trading post is concerned.
The Chairman. You, therefore, assume that steam power is to supplant the sailing ship entirely?
Mr. Simpson. Certainly. In the days of sailing ships it was common to use that point as a base of supplies where ships were engaged in various kinds of traffic, as, witness the whaling trade. It was better to employ ships to transport the products which the whaling ships procured than it was to send those ships all the way around the Horn; it saved them considerable time for getting oil from the whale.
The Chairman. But transportation on sailing ships is cheaper than on steamers?
Mr. Simpson. That is true, of course, if limited to steady markets. But as that country stands there is no product that passes by that island, no two products, one growing in the Orient and one in the South American Continent, that are interchangeable as a common thing. The usual route of vessels engaged in that trade is, they start from England, go to Australia with commodities, and pick up a cargo there if possible. From there they go to some point on the Pacific coast, load a cargo, and return to the United Kingdom.
The Chairman. Perhaps I can illustrate my question to you better by supposing a case. Suppose you have your choice between sending a cargo of pig iron, hardware of the coarser kinds, heavier kinds, or steel bars for railways, or other material of that sort, on board a sailing ship or steamer?
Mr. Simpson. You mean commodities?
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The Chairman. Commodities, yes; which do not require too rapid transportation, but one that is cheap and safe, would you not prefer to ship your commodities on a sailing ship if you could save freight by doing so??
Mr. Simpson. Do you mean, if they were going to the Orient, to take them to Honolulu and then ship them to the Orient??
The Chairman. Or as a place of refreshment for ships?
Mr. Simpson. In that case it undoubtedly would be of great advantage.
The Chairman. I do not agree with your assumption that steam transportation or steam navigation is going to supplant the sail. I think it will be found, after a while, that the supply of coal is so limited, or the price will be so great, that for the heavier commodities it will not be used for transportation and sailing ships will come in vogue and be an important part of the commerce of the world.
Mr. Simpson. One reason why I take that ground is, when I was in Honolulu I saw a bill of lading issued by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company of goods shipped from London and routed across the Atlantic and the United States by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, and from San Francisco to Honolulu by steam navigation. Arbitrary rates exist across the American Continent and between San Francisco and Honolulu. The rate fluctuates on the Atlantic according to the displacement of cargo offered, and that transportation was 31 shillings and 6 pence. The same articles taken from New York City to Honolulu overland would cost us in American money $5.30. The same articles taken in a sailing vessel from London to Honolulu, occupying some eight months in time, (and it would be a good trip to make it in eight months), would cost $4.85, according to the then existing rate. Now, the persons shipping those goods preferred steam across the Atlantic and the American Continent, over a sailing vessel, from the fact that the money invested in the cargo in transit would be greater than the cheap rate on the return cargo from Honolulu, except the ship struck there in the sugar season, when they could get a return cargo to the Pacific coast. There would have to be that difference arranged for.
The Chairman. As a general proposition, I suppose, it is not to be disputed that over a long distance the transportation of heavy articles of commerce would be cheaper by sail than by steam?
Mr. Simpson. That was the generally accepted idea, except where you get cheap fuel. The resources of the Pacific Ocean for fuel are greater than on the Atlantic. They have three distinct bases of supply where there is an enormous amount of coal. I speak of the Japanese coal fields, the Australian coal fields, and the coal fields of the Northwestern Pacific coast. The Japanese coal fields and the Northwest Pacific Coast fields are almost inexhaustible. An enormous amount of coal can be produced there. The methods of handling in the Northwest Pacific coast are very crude in comparison with the manner the business is handled in well-settled and well-worked coal fields. It is so much in its infancy that it has hardly gone beyond its experimental stage.
The Chairman. As yet the real value of the coal out there is not known, and can not be known, until they go further down into the seam or vein?
Mr. Simpson. No. Known coal fields are so numerous and known deposits are so numerous at this time that it would be a waste of money to expend it in finding new fields.
The Chairman. You mean in our own country?
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Mr. Simpson. In the State of Washington, I know that to be true.
The Chairman. Give a general statement of the commercial relations between Hawaii and the United States.
Mr. Simpson. The Hawaiian Islands are to the Pacific Coast and to the country west of the Mississippi River what the West Indies are to the Atlantic and the country east of the Mississippi River. They raise and can raise the same products. They are at present nearly identical in formation, in methods, and manner of doing business, and of articles actually handled. There is, to my mind, no alternative for the United States except to provide conditions and manner of doing business with the Sandwich Islands, from the fact that the country west of the Missouri River is practically dependent upon those islands for the commodities which are raised in the islands, to procure them at anywhere near the price at which the same commodities are sold east of the Mississippi River. In the West Indies sugar, rice, and the fruit culture is in its infancy, but it will be augmented very fast. The principle article, sugar, is dependent upon the Pacific coast market, so called, and the Pacific coast is compelled to reciprocate. For this reason sugar raised in Cuba and refined in the Eastern part of the United States is compelled to pay too great a transportation fee to reach the markets of the Pacific coast. Were there no sugar raised in the Hawaiian Islands the sugar would be received from China and Japan rather than from Cuba, on account of this transportation. The sugar business is controlled by the American Sugar Trust, of which Spreckels and his interest are a part. During the winter of 1892-'93 contracts were made by the American Sugar Trust, through Spreckels as agent, for their product of sugar for five years. The stipulations of that contract are these:
The trust agrees to pay to the grower for sugar laid in San Francisco the same price, that Cuban sugar brings in New York City, less a quarter of a cent per pound. This quarter of a cent per pound difference is for the purpose, as claimed by the sugar trust people, to compensate them for the difference in freight that they would have to pay if they had to take Cuban sugar to the Pacific coast. It is simply a subterfuge for the purpose of obtaining the advantage of a quarter of a cent per pound. That contract also states that all sugar running in grade of 96 per cent saccharine shall pay a thirty-second of 1 cent per pound for each degree over 96 per cent saccharine, and a sixth of 1 per cent on each degree under 96 per cent saccharine. All the planters in the islands engaged in the sugar business have signed this contract from the fact that there is no other outlet. When I was in Honolulu in the winter of 1892 the growing price of sugar was about $90 per ton. The cause of that was that the previous crop of Cuban sugar had been practically a failure, and they were enabled to get a much better price than they are getting at present. The last quotations which I received from Honolulu they were paying for Hawaiian sugar laid in San Francisco 27/8, almost the lowest price it has ever reached, and which price does not pay even a small interest on the investment.
The rice business of the islands is carried on principally by the Chinese and Japanese. The rice they raise grades with what is known commercially as No. 1, or as good as any rice in the South Sea Islands or off South Carolina.
The Chairman. How is it raised?
Mr. Simpson. By irrigation; different from what it is in the fields in the South.
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The Chairman. You mean irrigation brought on the land by ditches?
Mr. Simpson. No; but they allow the water to stand until the crop ripens, then they draw it off. If they can not, the men go on and do it in rubber boots. Most of that rice is milled by one concern at Honolulu, and very little of it is shipped to the United States in the condition of what is known as paddy. It enters successfully in competition with Japanese and other Oriental rice on the Pacific coast, and very rarely does any rice from the Atlantic seaboard, South Carolina, or Louisiana reach the Pacific coast. I do not know of but one season where any was shipped there, and that was three years ago when there was an enormous crop in the South and they could not find a market.
The next interest of importance in the Hawaiian Islands is the banana business. In the Hawaiian Islands they are raised usually in very small patches by Chinese. They are handled through a middleman, and the cost on board ship at Honolulu is about 100 per cent more for bananas than it is in any of the West India countries. In 1892 there were $175,000 worth of bananas shipped from the Hawaiian Islands. Ten years before there were none. With the decline of the sugar products in the Hawaiian Islands the people have no alternative except to turn their attention to raising of coffee and fruits. It will require some years to bring coffee to a distinctively commercial point, as that requires a system of individuality which fruit does not need. However, experiments are now being made and organized plantations are going into the matter in a scientific way. The fruit culture in the islands will unquestionably take lead in the new departure for other goods to raise beside sugar and rice. That is from the fact that there is no other commodity they can raise and which will have so great and popular a market, particularly, as bananas.
To illustrate that, in 1882 there were 35,000 bunches of bananas landed at New York City. In 1891 there was an average of 35,000 bunches per day arrived in New York City. Today the banana in the New England States is the poor man's food. Down to eight years ago the banana was unknown except as a curiosity, and now they buy them by the carload. I am told that they affect the trade in flour, bacon, and other common foods of the people. One pound of bananas has as much nourishment in it as 4 pounds of bread. There is a great market west of the Missouri River, which is practically virgin, and the cost of raising bananas in the Hawaiian Islands will be undoubtedly decreased with the scientific growing of them, and the conditions are such that they can be transported to points east of the Pacific slope and west of the Missouri River as cheap as they can be brought from west of the Atlantic and east of the Mississippi. At present a bunch of bananas from Honolulu, sold in the markets of the Pacific Slope outside of San Francisco, will bring from $3 to $4.50.
The Chairman. Are not bananas raised abundantly and profitably in southern California?
Mr. Simpson. No; no more than they can be raised profitably in the southern part of Florida. I have seen them raised in Florida, but their growth was stunted. While they are in the same latitude that the Hawaiian Islands are the conditions seem to be different. The pineapple is another food which is being raised systematically, more so probably than bananas. They can raise and mature pineapples every month in the year. That is also true of bananas. It is different in the Hawaiian Islands from what is in any other portion of the world. This would insure a high price in the markets of the Pacific coast. In two months of the year, in August and September, the pineapples
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are an overproduction, and until a treaty is effected with the United States on a much broader plan than the one now in effect, the raising of these fruits, and especially pineapples, will not be so great a success. The present treaty with the United States admits comparatively a few of the Hawaiian articles into the United States and all of the articles produced and manufactured in the United States into Hawaii, with the possible exception of spirits and tobaccos.
Until a treaty is effected whereby manufactures of all descriptions and canned goods are placed on the free list from that country no marked improvement can be made. The general impression in the Hawaiian Islands when I was there was that when the treaty runs out in 1894, when canned goods in the Hawaiian Islands would certainly go on the free list, the effect would be to accelerate the trade to a greater extent than any other method that could be adopted. Strange as it may seem, the Hawaiian Islands are entirely dependent upon the Pacific coast for their supplies of every kind and description.
The Chairman. What do you mean by supplies? They do not depend upon the Pacific coast for taro?
Mr. Simpson. Of every class and description. That is to say, the chief subsistence are the articles which are procured from the Pacific coast. Of course, the most indigenous article of food the natives live on is what is commonly called poi, a pasty stuff that is made from taro and raw fish. But in spite of that fact, of the 92,000 people in all the islands, they are known as the greatest consumers per capita of any people in the world.
The Chairman. Do you mean of provisions?
Mr. Simpson. Of everything. There is more stuff bought and taken in there than in any other place in the world. To illustrate a little more fully, I will cite some of the articles which I sold while I was there. Brick, lime, apples, potatoes, butter, eggs, fire wood, beer, banana crates, flour, whole barley, rolled barley, chopped feed, cracked corn, bran, shorts, feed wheat, oats, timothy hay, wheat hay, alfalfa, carrots, mules, coal (steam and stove), plaster, shingles, salmon (canned and salted), coarse sand, wire nails, onions, sash, doors, and blinds, crackers, provisions, hardware, etc.
The Chairman. With what do they pay for all this?
Mr. Simpson. The manner of doing business in the Hawaiian Islands is, these principal houses pay cash for what they get; that is to say, nearly all of them carry their profits to San Francisco. One of the large houses showed me its books, disclosing that he had not, since he had been in business, had less than $34,000 of cash on deposit in San Francisco. Goods are paid for in cash in San Francisco when they go on board the ship and discounted.
The Chairman. Is the money actually shipped to San Francisco, or is there exchange?
Mr. Simpson. No; it is carried there.
The Chairman. How do they get hold of this money?
Mr. Simpson. The money that they get from the sale of sugar is deposited to the credit of these concerns in San Francisco, and they pay their bills in that manner.
The Chairman. Is there enough commerce in the Hawaiian Islands to enable them to become the largest consumers per capita in the world?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. The figures that I have heretofore submitted to you prove that assertion, showing that since the year 1870 there has
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been a profit to the traders in that business of about $76,000,000 in round figures.
The Chairman. If I comprehend your statement correctly the whole population of Hawaii is dependent for subsistence in every way upon the sugar crop?
Mr. Simpson. The sugar crop and the rice crop; they are the two principal crops.
The Chairman. Do they not raise cattle, hogs, and poultry?
Mr. Simpson. No; they are the most improvident people I have ever met with. I have never lived in the South, but in the West Indies and in the several countries where they have cheap labor they have utterly no idea of the value of money. I was standing on the corner talking to a contractor when a native laborer came up and asked for a position. The contractor and I were talking of the improvident character of the native Kanaka. The contractor asked him how much he wished for his work and the fellow said $50 a month. The contractor said, "Jack, I can not pay you that; I will give you $2 a week," and the Kanaka at once said, "When shall I go to work?" That is true, they have no idea or conception of the value of money.
The Chairman. You are now speaking of the very low classes?
Mr. Simpson. Of the natives.
The Chairman. They are not all that way; some of the natives are respectable people, having sense and character.
Mr. Simpson. I do not remember having met more than one or two full-blooded natives who were men of means. I do not wish to question their character, because they are the most honest people that I ever met. Of the so-called 35,000 natives in all the islands, as a matter of fact there are only about 6,000 who are full-blooded natives, the balance having a strain of various kinds of blood. Liliuokalani has a strain of negro blood, and is not a descendant of the ancient chiefs of the islands, as is generally supposed.
The Chairman. You think the mixing of the blood has improved the people?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. There are other articles which can be raised and manufactured with profit in the islands. For instance, common salt can be gathered at a very low price, and if the trade were entered into it could be sold at a very good profit.
The Chairman. There are none of the leading minerals-iron, copper, and lead?
Mr. Simpson. No; the soil is all disintegrated lava, and everything nearly requires irrigation.
Adjourned to meet on notice.
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Washington, D. C., Wednesday, February 7, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to notice.
Present: The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Sherman, Frye, and Senator Dolph of the full committee.
Absent: Senator Gray.
SWORN STATEMENT OF COMMANDER NICOLL LUDLOW.
The Chairman. At what time have you visited the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Ludlow. I have only been there once. I was commander of the Mohican. I arrived there on the 10th of February last and left there on the 1st of May.
The Chairman. What American ship did you find in port?
Mr. Ludlow. I found the Boston there. Subsequently the Alliance came in and reported. The Adams was sent down to take the place of the Mohican, and on her arrival I went north. The Mohican was Admiral Skerrett's flagship; I was his chief of staff during the time I remained there.
The Chairman. On your arrival at Honolulu, what did you find to be the condition of the community there as to quietude and regularity in the conduct of business?
Mr. Ludlow. I had never been there before, and I am not able to make any correct comparison of the affairs then with what they had been. But the people complained of hard times, as they began to do everywhere. Of course, business went on just the same; they did a good deal of talking; apparently they had not much else to do; stand around and talk on the streets and on the piazzas.
The Chairman. Were you around in the city much during the time you were there?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; I was ashore every day. I was brought in contact with everybody in town of every position. As the admiral's chief of staff, I returned a great many calls with him, and made a great many social calls.
The Chairman. Were you at that time aware of the existence of any organization for the purpose of overturning the Provisional Government?
Mr. Ludlow. None whatever, any more than, of course, the adherents of the Queen on one side and of the Provisional Government on the other; there was some talk. There was no conspiracy or fighting, simply talk. I have been around in different parts of the world, and I thought that Honolulu was as quiet a community as you could find; everybody's doors and windows were unlocked. It was so night and day; as quiet a community as exists on the face of the earth.
The Chairman. Would you describe it as a community satisfied with the existing government?
Mr. Ludlow. The Provisional Government?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Ludlow. A great many were dissatisfied with it; thought that it ought not to be there; thought that it was not the legitimate government of the islands.
The Chairman. Were they satisfied with the administration of the affairs of the Government?
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, yes; I heard nothing said about their honesty and proper administration of the affairs of the Government; never heard
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any question raised as to what disposition was made of the money and so on. The men who were in the Provisional Government were recognized as as good men as were in the islands.
The Chairman. Was there an established police force in the islands?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; rather an inefficient police force; never had a call for one while I was there. There were some scraps down in the lower part of the town among the sailors; but I never knew of a blow being struck except by two lawyers, who got into some dispute over some politics, when one struck the other over the face. That thing is all exaggerated about people being in a tremble. Ladies are traveling around in their carriages; and there is more exaggeration about fear there than any place I ever saw.
The Chairman. You saw no evidence at all of intense public anxiety?
Mr. Ludlow. No.
The Chairman. Did you have an opportunity to form an opinion of Mr. Dole and his cabinet in respect to their ability as men to conduct public affairs, and the manner in which they demeaned themselves in their positions?
Mr. Ludlow. I have met them all, and consider them all first-rate men-dignified, quiet, and little talk among them. They were inclined all the time to keep these people from talking. A few days after Mr. Blount arrived, and got the American flag down from off the Government building, he asked me what I thought of the state of public opinion; whether it was any quieter after the flag came down than before. I told him there was a change. I told him that it seemed to put the responsibility where it belonged, and the people seemed to go on about their business; there was not so much talk about it as there had been; they simply accepted the thing, while formerly, while our flag was flying, it made us responsible for everything that took place. We were responsible, in a measure. I was very much surprised to see that flag up there.
The Chairman. Did the Provisional Government make any habitual display of soldiery?
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, no. They were recruiting. I do not think at any time up to the time I left there they had to exceed a hundred men. And there was nobody who could drill them or get them in shape. They had to send to Cleveland, Ohio, to get uniforms.
The Chairman. Were they kept in barracks?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; they had two barracks, one was the Government building, that the Provisional Government occupied, south of it; then there was another old barracks, the artillery barracks, north of the Queen's palace. There may have been other posts. They had a review ground just opposite the Government building. I have seen them drill there.
The Chairman. What is your opinion of the advantage that the Hawaiian group of islands would be to the United States as a military base in time of war?
Mr. Ludlow. As a military base for a country like this it is too far away-2,000 and odd miles. If it were Great Britain, it would be another thing. But with a country like this, with our ideas of a standing army and a navy, an outpost 2,000 miles away would not be the thing.
The Chairman. Would that be the case with respect to Bermuda, if we owned that?
Mr. Ludlow. Bermuda is nearer, a day and a half sail of the port of New York; two days' sail, certainly.
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The Chairman. If you were stationed with a fleet at Honolulu, and the American coast were to be assailed by any great European power with steamships-and they would have to use that class of vessels to make anything like an effective assault-would you not consider that you had an advantage over an advancing or attacking power by having that position?
Mr. Ludlow. No. The Pacific is a very large ocean. You can not keep the track of your enemy on the ocean as you can on land; they could pass you, get in behind you, and you would never know it in the world.
The Chairman. In a naval engagement between the United States and any maritime power, say Great Britain, would it not be their first attempt to take those islands?
Mr. Ludlow. I think there is a treaty between France and Great Britain by which they will never acquire a foot of Hawaiian territory.
The Chairman. That is for civil administration. But in the event of war that would scarcely avail much in a country that wanted to go and establish itself in a military position?
Mr. Ludlow. Great Britain has a better place than that on our frontier.
The Chairman. Where is that?
Mr. Ludlow. Victoria. They have everything they want there.
The Chairman. Victoria, if I understand the geography, is open to a land attack by the United States.
Mr. Ludlow. Yes, but you have to embark your troops; it is an island.
The Chairman. Hardly.
Mr. Ludlow. Vancouvers Island.
The Chairman. You can get plenty of crossings so as to reach Vancouvers Island.
Mr. Ludlow. They keep a pretty good squadron there all the time.
The Chairman. You seem to think, though, in the event of a war with the United States, Great Britain would find it to her advantage, if she saw proper to do so, felt authorized to do so, to seize upon those islands for the purpose of establishing there a base of supplies to recruit her ships, and furnish them with coal and provisions and whatever she needed.
Mr. Ludlow. Undoubtedly they would if they thought it was to their advantage. I never knew Great Britain to hesitate with a question of that kind.
The Chairman. Did you examine Pearl Harbor while you were out there?
Mr. Ludlow. No; nothing more than the surveys. I kept pretty close to the ship. I did not know what would turn up, and if I was to put more men on shore I wanted to be there.
The Chairman. What would be your opinion, with the use of modern guns of high power, as to the ability of any power to control Honolulu by erecting fortifications upon the high lands around the bay and back of the bay to protect that harbor against the invasion of a fleet coming from the open ocean?
Mr. Ludlow. A fleet could shell the place to pieces. You could send a fleet there and could certainly destroy the place.
The Chairman. Could guns be placed around the heights surrounding the bay of Honolulu in such positions as to prevent a fleet coming near enough to Honolulu to shell it and destroy it?
Mr. Ludlow. No. Are you familiar with the harbor?
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The Chairman. I could not say that I am familiar.
Mr. Ludlow. There is a reef that runs around the island, and wherever there is a stream of fresh water coming down from the hill it cuts a channel-the coral will not grow, and that has left that little pocket in there. It is very small.
The Chairman. How many ships of war could harbor there?
Mr. Ludlow. There is not room enough for a ship to swing at anchor.
The Chairman. How far from the line of the bay are the elevations that surround Honolulu?
Mr. Ludlow. The first one is the hill called the Punch Bowl, an extinct volcano, that lies behind the town a mile and a quarter or a mile and a half from the water. It runs down to a flat plain on the edge of the water with this coral reef.
The Chairman. Could not guns be placed on the hills in such position and with such range as would enable those maintaining them there to keep a fleet off?
Mr. Ludlow. If the fleet fired to destroy the town, they would not pay much attention to the batteries up there. And it would not be a difficult matter to hit the town.
The Chairman. I suppose, therefore, you think that men-of-war that might be in the bay for repairs and for provisions or coal would not be made secure by fortifications around the harbor?
Mr. Ludlow. No; not for Honolulu. It would be a very great expense building forts outside. I do not think it could be done; it would not be practicable.
The Chairman. How would it be in Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Ludlow. There you have different conditions. The harbor is very deep inside and it runs a good ways back. I think it must run 5 or 6 miles back in toward the center of the island.
The Chairman. It also has tongues of land running out into it?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes-side bays. But most of it is quite deep, and that, with the range of modern artillery on board ship, make it pretty warm for anybody inside there.
The Chairman. It is what the naval officers would call a well-sheltered place?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes. There is a good deal of work to be done to make it available. My recollection is that something like a quarter to a half mile of excavations would be necessary. Whether that is sand or coral we do not know; there have not been any borings.
The Chairman. Suppose it is coral. Is that difficult to excavate under water?
Mr. Ludlow. No; not nowadays, with modern dredging.
The Chairman. And once excavated, it is easy to keep it open?
Mr. Ludlow. You can keep it open very readily, I think, as soon as they get the mouth of Honolulu Harbor cleared out. This plant belongs to the Government, and they are going to send it down to Pearl Harbor; that was the intention when I left there-to see if they can not deepen the mouth of it. There is one thing to be said about it, it would make another port there for the people of Honolulu and would throw out some of those who are in business, because it would make a better harbor than at Honolulu.
The Chairman. If you were putting the steamer Boston to sea for a voyage into the Pacific Ocean and back around Cape Horn, could you carry coal enough on the Boston to reach Australia and back to the mouth of the Chesapeake?
Mr. Ludlow. No.
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The Chairman. How far would you be able to steam with the coal you could carry on the Boston?
Mr. Ludlow. I never served on the Boston; I could only give you my impression. I do not think her steaming radius is over 3,500 miles. She is one of the old type of ships.
The Chairman. Take the best of modern ships-cruisers which have large capacity for carrying coal, and built purposely for that. What is the steaming radius of those ships?
Mr. Ludlow. Probably the steaming radius of the Columbia is the largest. My impression is that at her most economical speed she has something like 10,000 miles. The Philadelphia has probably 6,000 miles, and the San Francisco has probably 5,000.
The Chairman. That means 5,000 miles out and back?
Mr. Ludlow. Five thousand miles alone.
The Chairman. You could not take either of those ships from the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay around to San Francisco, and when you arrived there have them in fighting condition?
Mr. Ludlow. No; you would have to stop on the way.
The Chairman. Where would you stop?
Mr. Ludlow. In time of peace?
The Chairman. Any time.
Mr. Ludlow. We have any number of stations-a dozen or more coaling commercial stations all through the West Indies; Pernambuco, Brazil; Bahia, Rio Janeiro, Montevideo, and Sandy Point, Straits of Magellan, and Callao; and also Panama and Valparaiso.
The Chairman. At Valparaiso you would find coal?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; and at Callao.
The Chairman. In time of war you could not obtain coal supplies for the naval vessels?
Mr. Ludlow. I believe coal is contraband.
The Chairman. So that in time of war if you wanted to carry coal for the best cruiser you have from Chesapeake Bay to San Francisco, you would not find her in fighting trim when you got to San Francisco?
Mr. Ludlow. No.
The Chairman. Do you not think that under such circumstances it would be of advantage to the United States to have at some point in the Pacific, away from our coast, places where we have the right of control, and places where we could protect our coal supplies?
Mr. Ludlow. I see what you are leading up to. We could not reach Honolulu.
The Chairman. We could reach Samoa, could we not?
Mr. Ludlow. No.
The Chairman. Suppose we were already at Samoa and at Honolulu and had our supplies, and we had to combat with the ships that would come from the Mediterranean and around the Horn for the purpose of attacking the coast of California, which country would have the advantage in a military sense in such an arrangement as that?
Mr. Ludlow. Samoa would have to be counted out. It is over 6,000 miles from there, and we are 2,000 miles from Honolulu.
The Chairman. My question is that we are already in possession of Samoa and Honolulu, and we have sufficient coal there to supply any emergency whatever. Then the question would be, having the right to coal your ships at those points, and protecting them and protecting your depot of supplies, would you have an advantage over a maritime power that had to cross the Atlantic and come around the Horn, or
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had to go through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal for the purpose of attacking the coast of California?
Mr. Ludlow. There might be a slight advantage. But these other nations have all got nearer stations than that; the French and German as well as the English are in possession.
The Chairman. I suppose our Navy would not be of much use to us if we could not do more than to send our ships with coal enough to go out and fight and get back?
Mr. Ludlow. That is all we can do. We have made no effort to get any coaling station abroad.
The Chairman. As a naval officer, do you think it is a wise policy?
Mr. Ludlow. For this country, yes.
The Chairman. Then we do not need a Navy.
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, yes. You can not defend California with fortifications; you have to defend that place on the sea.
The Chairman. The high sea?
Mr. Ludlow. Outside of gunshot. The class of ships we have been building there are battle ships. We have a few cruisers, but not what we would call fighting ships.
The Chairman. Your idea, then, of the use of a navy would be that the best policy is to have strong ships, well-armed vessels, at the principal ports, where they could come inside, get their coal and provisions, and go outside and fight?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; and not to allow our territory to be hurt. It is not so much offense as defense.
The Chairman. When you get up in the country about Puget Sound where they have large military and naval establishments on Vancouver Island, or Victoria Island, wherever it is, you would find difficulty there unless you stationed your ships inside the sound?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; but we have some 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 men in the United States, and we could have 1,000,000 men over there in no time. They would lose that in thirty days.
The Chairman. That is to say, the land forces would go out?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; we could get them across.
The Chairman. In that case, then, your reliance would be upon the land forces and not upon the navy?
Mr. Ludlow. We would have to be there to see that they got there safely. They have to have vessel transportation.
The Chairman. You seem to think that we have little need of a navy, more modern fighting ships, except of the cruising class.
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, no; battle-ship class.
The Chairman. You prefer those?
Mr. Ludlow. We need them both. If a man has certain work to do he wants proper tools to work with. They work together.
The Chairman. Can you name the ports on the Atlantic where you think these battle ships should be stationed to meet the ships of another nation, say British ships?
Mr. Ludlow. You can count those ports very readily because the depth of water comes in. There are several ports on the coast of Maine. Portland is probably the principal one. There is another at Portsmouth, N. H., where we have a naval station. Then you come down, and, although Boston is not a safe port to get into under all the circumstances with a heavy-draft ship, yet it is of great importance that that port should be defended. Then there is New York, of course, and the mouth of the Delaware.
The Chairman. And Newport?
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Mr. Ludlow. Yes; you have Newport.
The Chairman. Any other places?
Mr. Ludlow. You could mention many harbors up there that have sufficient draft of water for these ships to enter, but other ports could be looked out for with lighter draft ships.
The Chairman. Going on the same principle you would have ships with sufficient power at the entrance of these principal bays on the Atlantic, the Gulf, and Pacific to fight foreign ships as they came in at each of these places?
Mr. Ludlow. They would have to be in a position to be easily gathered together.
The Chairman. Would it not be a little difficult to gather a fleet at particular points-say New York-to defend an attack by English vessels, if you had to bring them from the different ports of the Gulf and South Atlantic and Chesapeake, and so on, in order to meet a military or naval force from Great Britain?
Mr. Ludlow. You have got to move, no matter how the blow is to be struck.
The Chairman. It would be a risky operation?
Mr. Ludlow. Of course there would be some risk.
The Chairman. It would not be so much so if we owned the outside points, say the Bermudas?
Mr. Ludlow. They are near enough as an outpost, and sufficiently near to be supported.
The Chairman. As a naval defense you say that the Atlantic coast would not be so safe against the invasion of a foreign fleet without the possession of these different points that we are speaking of, as if we owned them?
Mr. Ludlow. It would be very much better if we owned them.
Senator Sherman. I would like to have you describe much more fully than has been done here the defense on Vancouver Island. I have been there, and know something about it, but I have not a knowledge of the geographical terms. What kind of fortifications or defenses have been established at Vancouver Island?
Mr. Ludlow. Not very many of them. They have been mounting some high-power modern guns there, I think not to exceed a half dozen, within the last two years. But they have a small naval station on a little harbor that they go into, and it has been principally directed to the defense of that.
Senator Sherman. How far is that from the city of Victoria?
Mr. Ludlow. It is 2 miles, or 2 1/2 miles as I remember it. I was there as a visitor only, a very short time.
Senator Sherman. Have the English any other fortifications or naval stations along the Pacific coast except that one? Is there any up in Canada, farther north?
Mr. Ludlow. No; that is the only one. They have their depot of supplies farther south, down to Coquimbo.
Senator Sherman. How far is Port Townsend from Victoria?
Mr. Ludlow. About 25 miles. You mean the strait where Puget Sound runs in?
Senator Sherman. Land to land-from Port Townsend across to the nearest land; in plain sight of it, is it?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Sherman. Do you think the channel is 10 miles?
Mr. Ludlow. Do you mean the strait?
Senator Sherman. Yes.
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----73
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Mr. Ludlow. Straight across is from 10 to 15 miles.
Senator Sherman. Your idea is that in case of war our forces could be thrown on the island, and they could practically occupy that island without regard to the Navy?
Mr. Ludlow. They have some ships there, and also naturally they would make the best fight they could. But they realize the fact that war without us would involve all they have to the north of us.
Senator Sherman. Still, there is no other preparation for defense, for any other fort on the island except that?
Mr. Ludlow. I never heard of any and do not believe there is.
Senator Sherman. Is there any difficulty in landing on the inside?
Mr. Ludlow. On the inside; no. There are abundant harbors on the West Pacific coast-some very fine harbors in there that have never been surveyed.
The Chairman. Have you mentioned the depot of supplies at Coquimbo?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; that is in Peru. That is the southern part of their squadron. They have a store ship there, and a direct line of steamers clear up to Callao.
The Chairman. Is it Coquimbo or the Esquimalt?
Mr. Ludlow. Esquimalt is fortified somewhat.
The Chairman. Land fortifications?
Mr. Ludlow. There are some land fortifications there, but not of very great importance. They have a dry dock and can do repairs there.
The Chairman. They have not built ships there yet?
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, no.
The Chairman. They have their coal supplies back on the island?
Mr. Ludlow. Their coal mines are the Nanaimo, which are on the east side of the island of Vancouver, about 60 or 70 miles north of Victoria; and, at Departure Bay, the Wellington mines; 50 miles north is the Comax mine. There is the greatest abundance of coal to the north end of the island; it is only a question of opening it up.
Senator Sherman. Does that coal go to San Francisco?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes. So far as I know, it is the only bituminous coal found on the west coast. The coal is of very excellent quality.
Senator Dolph. Are you acquainted with the coal industry in the State of Washington?
Mr. Ludlow. It is this way. For three years I was the lighthouse inspector at San Francisco, and in that position I had to buy a great deal of coal, and I tried all the coal from all the mines that I could find in the market in San Francisco.
Senator Dolph. How long ago was that?
Mr. Ludlow. That was in 1887, 1888, 1889, and 1890.
Senator Dolph. Are you familiar with the product from the Green River country, the mines opened by the Central and Southern Pacific?
Mr. Ludlow. In Wyoming?
Senator Dolph. No; in Washington.
Mr. Ludlow. The Green River in Washington? No; I have not seen those; I did not know there was any on the market.
Senator Dolph. Do you know the quality of the coal used by the Central and Southern Pacific from mines in Washington east of Tacoma and up in the Cascade Mountains?
Mr. Ludlow. I have not seen them. They get their coal from Coma Vein, Vancouvers Island. They own 30 per cent in those mines, and Dunsmores own 70.
Adjourned to meet on notice.
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Washington, D. C, Thursday, February 8,1894.=
The subcommittee met pursuant to notice.
Present: The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Gray and Frye. Absent: Senators Butler and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF NIC0LL LUDLOW-Continued.
Senator Gray. You have already been sworn?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. And you stated in your examination the other day that you went to the Sandwich Islands, in command of the Mohican, with Admiral Skerrett; that you arrived there on the 10th of February, and were there until when?
Mr. Ludlow. The 1st of May.
Senator Gray. You have already said that you were ashore nearly every day; that as Admiral Skerrett's chief of staff it was your duty to make a great many social and official calls; that you came in contact with the people of those islands, and that you were an interested observer of the condition of things obtaining there. That is so, is it not?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you, with reference to the revolution of January 17, 1893, form any opinion from these sources of observation and information as to whether or not that revolution would have been accomplished when it was accomplished and as it was accomplished if it had not been for the presence on shore of the United States troops??
Senator Frye. Do you consider that a legitimate question?
Senator Gray. I do.
The Chairman. I expect Mr. Ludlow had better answer that question.
Mr. Ludlow. I would like to call attention to a fact in the question.
The Chairman. State your opinion about it.
Mr. Ludlow. The troops were not on shore at the commencement of the revolution; that is, something had been done in the way of the revolution before the men got ashore.
The Chairman. You do not know that of your own knowledge?
Mr. Ludlow. No. The tenor of the Senator's question is what I heard and what I learned and saw.
The Chairman. I do not understand that you are asked for all you heard and learned; but the question is based upon a hypothesis.
Senator Gray. There is no hypothesis about the fact that the revolution, so-called, occurred on the 17th of January, and, when Capt. Ludlow arrived there, it was still a matter of exceeding and absorbing interest and a topic of conversation among those people. The captain was ashore and met all classes of people. I now ask him whether he formed any idea as to whether that revolution would have occurred as it did but for the presence of those United States troops?
The Chairman. State whether you think it would have occurred or not, and then you may give your sources of information.
Senator Gray. State categorically one way or the other.
The Chairman. It is a matter of opinion. You are asked to state whether you formed an opinion. Did you form an opinion about it?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
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The Chairman. Very good. State what it was.
Mr. Ludlow. My opinion is that the revolution would not have occurred in the way it did, and at the time it did, if the people who were the revolutionary party, had not been assured of the protection and assistance of the United States forces there.
The Chairman. Is that opinion of yours based upon what you heard said in and about Honolulu after you arrived there, or is it an independent opinion based upon what you suppose to be the facts as you derived them from the reports and publications and your own reflections?
Mr. Ludlow. It is an opinion that I formed after I had been there perhaps a week or two, sufficiently long to get acquainted with the people. I had never been there before. I could hear them talk, as they were all talking politics. I did not talk with them, but I heard what they said.
The Chairman. Is your opinion based upon what you heard said there?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; they were specially free in giving vent to it on both sides. Afterwards very little was said about it by the Queen's party, or Monarchists, as they are called.
Senator Gray. Did you meet Mr. Blount?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you ever hear him express an opinion one way or the other about the matter?
Mr. Ludlow. I never did. He was the most remarkably reticent man in that way that I ever encountered.
Senator Gray. Did you meet Minister Stevens?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you meet the members of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Ludlow. I met them all-all the principal people there; called on them officially and socially.
Senator Gray. On both sides?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; I tried not to have any politics of my own.
Senator Gray. You tried not to talk politics?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
The Chairman. Who among the supporters of the Queen's cause in Honolulu were you in the habit of associating with?
Mr. Ludlow. I can not say associations; simply calling officially and socially.
The Chairman. Well, calling on them?
Mr. Ludlow. I can look at a memorandum book and see the calls I made there. I did not have any intimacy with them at all.
The Chairman. I understand that. I simply want to know the names of the persons who were the supporters of the Queen's cause with whom you had social relations.
Mr. Ludlow. Mr. Robinson, the Queen's chamberlain, and wife, a very charming lady, a daughter of Mr. Cleghorn, and Mr. Cleghorn himself. When I arrived he was the governor of Oahu; afterward his title was abolished. But all these people made very little impression on me. I met Mr. and Mrs. Robinson; Mr. Neuman, who was the lawyer to the Queen, and his family. Those I saw the most of; perhaps called a half dozen times at Mr. Robinson's house and Mr. Neuman's house. I would go down in the evening and sit on the piazza with them. Mr. Neuman was not there most of the time, however. But
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I have a list of the people here, and mixed with them the monarchists, and so on.
The Chairman. Mr. Cleghorn married into the royal family, did he not?
Mr. Ludlow. He married the Princess Likelike.
The Chairman. Mr. Robinson was also connected by marriage with the royal family?
Mr. Ludlow. No; not with the royal family.
The Chairman. With a Hawaiian family?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes. Mr. Cleghorn's first wife was a Hawaiian woman, but not of the royal blood. After her death he married the Princess Likelike, and it is her daughter who is now in England, this princess.
The Chairman. Kaiulani?
Mr. Ludlow. Kaiulani, who comes after Liliuokalani.
Senator Gray. This is the book that you kept referring to memorandum book produced by Mr. Ludlow?
Mr. Ludlow.That is the book I kept. It is my duty to keep a memorandum of them.
Senator Gray. It is a pretty long list?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. It embraces members of the Provisional Government, I suppose?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; everyone. Castle is here, and the Macfarlanes. They, the Macfarlanes, are all monarchists. The fact is, the monarchists showed more taste in their intercourse with me and the other officers than the annexationists did, because the annexationists would insist on talking politics, especially the ladies. They, the monarchists, considered us as foreigners, treated us as foreigners. The other side did not treat us as foreigners, all the officials, judges-Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith----
Senator Gray. Did you visit Mr. Stevens's house regularly?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; called there at once on our arrival.
Senator Gray. When you arrived there on the 10th of February, the flag had been raised on the Government building, had it not?
Mr. Ludlow. We found the flag flying when we came in.
Senator Gray. After you had been there some time, as an officer of the Navy did you form any opinion as to the necessity or propriety of that flag being there. I suppose as such officer you were bound to consider matters of international propriety?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. What opinion did you form?
Mr. Ludlow. That the flag should never have been hoisted there; there was no authority for it.
Senator Gray. What did you think as to the propriety, if you formed an opinion in respect to that, of Mr. Blount's requesting Admiral Skerrett to have the flag hauled down?
Mr. Ludlow. I think it was a perfectly proper course to take; in fact, the only course to take.
The Chairman. Would you think that the hoisting of a flag on the invitation of a government for the protection of the peace of the country and its tranquillity was an act not to be performed by a naval officer in a foreign port?
Mr. Ludlow. There is no authority for that. We are authorized to defend American lives and property; we are intrenching on the prerogatives of Congress when we do that.
The Chairman. You can go ashore with your troops?
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Mr. Ludlow. Yes; when called upon.
The Chairman. Very good. When you go ashore do you take your flag?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
The Chairman. For what purpose?
Mr. Ludlow. As an insignia of who we are.
The Chairman. As an emblem of authority?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
The Chairman. Is there any difference between holding it on a pole in your hand, or hoisting it at a post?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; there is a difference.
The Chairman. What is the difference?
Mr. Ludlow. The difference in this case is that there was no post established where that flag was.
The Chairman. Where was it?
Mr. Ludlow. Over the Government building.
The Chairman. But the Hawaiian flag was with our flag?
Mr. Ludlow. No; the American flag was not hoisted until the Hawaiian flag was hauled down.
The Chairman. In that particular your testimony is different from that of other witnesses who have appeared here.
Mr. Ludlow. There was but one flag flying there. It was visible from the harbor. It was flying from the cupola-the steeple.
The Chairman. Was there a Hawaiian flag displayed about the Government building at the time the United States flag was there?
Mr. Ludlow. I did not see any.
The Chairman. Are you certain it was not so? A number of witnesses have testified it was so.
Mr. Ludlow. Then they had it hidden somewhere. It was not in a prominent place-that is, a prominent place, similar to the flag that is flying over the Senate wing of the Capitol.
The Chairman. Can you tell how many flags are flying on this Capitol now?
Mr. Ludlow. I suppose there are two.
The Chairman. Suppose you were told that there were four, would you not be surprised?
Mr. Ludlow. Two are all that I have noticed.
The Chairman. There are four, and you have noticed only two. When you were there in the Hawaiian Islands did you make the acquaintance, socially, of Mr. Wilson, the commander in chief of the police?
Mr. Ludlow. Mr. Wilson is out of office. I do not think I ever saw him.
The Chairman. You did not have any conversation with him about the state of affairs in Hawaii?
Mr. Ludlow. No. That was all in the hands of the United States diplomatic agents on shore. We had nothing whatever to do with that; we had to mind our own business.
Senator Frye. I desire to call attention to a very important communication from Mr. S.M. Castle, whom we all know as one of the best men in the Hawaiian Islands. It gives a brief history of the French and English attempts to take possession of those islands, and of the English hoisting a flag and its being lowered again. It is a very interesting document, and I think it ought to be incorporated in our record.
The Chairman. That order will be made.
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The document is as follows:
MEMORANDA AND REMINISCENCES OF INCIDENTS IN HAWAIIAN HISTORY, BY S.N. CASTLE.
As some of the incidents which I may mention are entirely personal, and the inquiry will naturally arise as to their credibility, it will not be thought egotistical or indelicate for me to speak first of myself, so that any person reading these memoranda can judge of their credibility. My circumstances have been favorable both for hearing and seeing and for acquiring information generally upon matters spoken of. In July, 1836, I received the appointment of secular or financial agent of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions for these islands. Sailing from Boston December, 1830, and arriving April 9, 1837, I was identified with the mission, whose temporal necessities I came to provide for, of course, and the nature of my work also identified me at once with the business community.
For fourteen years I was devoted solely to the work of my agency. At the end of this time, at the suggestion and by the wish of the American board, Mr. Cooke, my assistant in the agency, and myself established the mercantile house of Castle & Cooke, which has now been in operation for thirty-two years. I continued to act as agent for thirty-two years from the date of my appointment. Thus I have been identified with this business community for forty-six years. I think there are none remaining but myself of those who were prominent in business. One house remains, but with no original partner. I have been honored by my fellow residents with various honorary positions, as president of the Chamber of Commerce, etc., and also in other than business relations in the political, religious, and other organizations. The institutions of the country when I came here were in a formative state, and as I came in a responsible and fiduciary character it was natural that I should be sometimes consulted and my counsel sought in matters in which I was supposed to be more fully informed than those who, from their circumstances, had not had so good opportunities of information as I have enjoyed.
I was invited to honorable positions in the Government service which I declined, but did not hesitate to give my opinion when it was sought upon political, religious, or civil topics, and thus I became acquainted with many things of which I should have known nothing in other circumstances. My position as a privy counselor and noble has added to my opportunities of learning the political status of the country.
In forming my opinion of the purposes of France and Great Britain respecting these islands in the past, I have been influenced by the tendency of events as well as utterances, either oral or written, of both France and Great Britain for the last forty years. They have been particularly active in extending their colonial system among the islands of the Pacific, and their dealings with these islands as well as some utterances, have looked to the same result; while the relations of the United States have seemed to be more those of a guardian for its ward, though not unmingled with interest, for the great body of its commerce has always been American. But, aside from this, citizens of the United States have spent millions of money as well as years of weary labor in Christianizing and civilizing the people; in giving them a written language, and books, and schools, and churches, and laws, as well as a civil polity, in making them what they are; and her military and naval
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authorities and her statesmen declare the strategic position of the islands to be such that no other country should appropriate them, but American influence must be maintained paramount or they must take possession. Such remarks have been made to me personally by Gen. Schofield and different admirals. Gen. Schofield reiterates the same, with the reasons therefor, in a letter of December 30,1875, addressed to the Hon. J.K. Luttrell, M.C. Admiral Porter sustains these views in a letter to the Hon. Mr. Wood. The London Times says: "The maritime power that holds Pearl River Harbor and moors her fleet there holds the key of the North Pacific." Sir George Simpson says that "this archipelago is far more valuable on this account, that it neither is nor ever can be shared by a rival." Alexander Simpson says: "From the period of my first visit to the Sandwich Islands I became convinced of their value and importance and therefore desirous that they should form a British possession." Mr. Simpson says later: "I cannot but regret now seeing the undecided action of the British Government that some act on the part of Lord Geo. Paulet had not left any other conclusion open than that the dynasty of Kamehameha must cease to reign."
I have deemed the aggressions made by both British and French in former times to enforce demands having in my opinion but little foundation in justice, as part of a system of encroachment, having for its ultimate object the appropriation or possession of these islands.
Indeed it has been stated to me that the French consul said that had they, the French, supposed that the Government could have raised the $20,000 demanded, Capt. Laplace would have placed the sum so high that it could not have been raised, and he would have taken possession as at Tahiti. Shortly before the arrival of the Ambuscade in August, 1842, the French consul told a friend of mine that he had no complaints to make; everything was harmonious with the Government, but shortly the Ambuscade arrived, and the captain presented such a catalogue of inadmissible demands that it must have resulted in a cession had not Mr. Richards and Haalelio just sailed for the United States, England, and France to try to secure the acknowledgment of Hawaiian independence, and adjust any difficulties, if any were found to exist. Under these circumstances Capt. Malet consented to await the result of the mission.
Upon hearing of this, Admiral Richard Thomas, in command of the British Pacific squadron, lying at Valparaiso or Callao, dispatched Lord Geo. Paulet, with the frigate Carysfort, to Honolulu, to secure the settlement of any difficulties between the island Government and the British subjects. The Carysfort arrived on the 4th of February, 1843. On the 14th Lord Paulet presented demands to which the King yielded under protest. On the 20th the King visited the frigate and was received with royal honors, but the next day new demands were presented, amounting to $117,330.89. To satisfy these was beyond the King's power, and after some preliminary negotiations a temporary cessation was made on the 25th, and the administration was committed to two commissioners appointed by Lord Paulet and one by the King.
The French and English were no doubt determined to take and hold possession. They were playing against each other, and the islands were the stake.
Lieut. Frere, the head of the governing commission, told me that they saw the French were determined to have the islands, as they had taken possession of the Society and Marquesas, and they were determined to be beforehand with them. Britons sympathized with the feelings of Mr.
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Sympson, already quoted, and they expected the session would be permanent. This, I think, was the general expectation of others as well, and, as I believe, it would have been so had not Lord Paulet sent his dispatches directly to the home Government, instead of through the admiral, as the proper channel. When the admiral heard of the session he immediately sailed for Honolulu, where he arrived July 26, and, after some preliminary negotiations, on the 31st a force of British marines with 2 brass field pieces marched to the plain east of the town, with the admiral and King present, when the British flag was lowered and the Hawaiian hoisted and saluted by the marines. The admiral was offended with Lord Paulet, as I plainly perceived by remarks made to myself when spending an evening at my house; and my belief that the flag would not have been restored but for this informality rests partly on the past practice of the British, and the statement made to me by Mr. Richards that the Earl of Aberdeen, the foreign secretary, or Mr. Addington, the under secretary, told him that if Admiral Thomas had not restored the flag the British Government would not have done so, and until they heard this Mr. Richards could not negotiate.
The London Times of August 20 of the same year, in a semi-official article, says:
It obviously becomes the duty of our Government to secure, by the most positive formal pledges, both from France and America, that independence which we now propose to restore to the native princes.
On the 28th of November, 1843, France and Great Britain jointly engaged reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State, and never to take possession, neither directly or under the title of protectorate, nor under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.
In 1846 the French treaty was revised and the $25,000, taken away in 1839, returned in 1849. The French consul, Dillon, with Admiral Tromline, presented a new list of grievances and demands, which the Government could not concede, in consequence of which the admiral landed his force and took possession of the custom-house, treasury, and fort, and held possession three days. After spiking the guns and committing some depredations the force was again embarked and sailed away, taking with them the King's yacht and the consul and family. It was said that they ordered the governor to pull down the Hawaiian flag, which he refused to do, and that they did not do it themselves out of respect to the treaty of November 28, 1843. In 1851 Mr. Perrin, a new French commissioner, arrived, with similar complaints and making similar demands. After long negotiations neither party would yield enough to enable them to come to an understanding, and matters assumed so serious and threatening an aspect that the consul sent to the British commissioner to inquire if in case of necessity he would hoist the British flag and protect the islands. He felt himself precluded from doing so by the obligation of the joint treaty. The United States commissioner was then applied to and consented to do so. I was informed that the French commissioner learned this through the British commissioner, and though the demands were not withdrawn he ceased to press them. The United States were not a party to the treaty, but were the first to recognize the independence of the islands in a Presidential message to Congress December 31,1842.
The demands made were in the main untenable and the claims not well founded, and even when well founded were untenable, because the claimants had refused first to have the local authorities act upon them.
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By personal request of Admiral George Seymour and Gen. Miller, in company with Mr. Wylie and the Danish consul, I sat in arbitration and settlement of a number of these British claims in 1845, and no doubt satisfactory settlements would have been made by the constituted authorities had they been permitted to take their usual course. Of one large claim, Maj. Low, of the British army, said that in traveling through the islands he had not found one respectable man who believed it to be valid. But I have said enough to show why I thought that possession of the islands has entered into the wishes and plans of both the British and French in the past. I have no comments to make upon these plans. It is the practice of nations, and no doubt will continue to be so until causes of war are removed. The plea of necessity is used to justify it. The interests of the aggressing party require it. But no injustice is intended to individuals, and the general good is enhanced by it. So large numbers of good men felt when Great Britain occupied the Fijis and many other places. It meant safety to persons, stable government, civilization, Christianity, progress, and toleration. So also when the French occupied Algiers and other places, and so I think it will be better for the United States to extend its laws over all Indians in its territory, making them citizens and treating them as they do the white citizens. The case here is a little different, for under the auspices of a highly civilized nation the Hawaiians were making rapid progress in civilization. Safety and justice were as fully secured to all as they were anywhere else. If there were any preempted rights to the islands under any circumstances, it would seem to vest in those under whose auspices and at whose expense these improvements have taken place. And this is what had been done by the labors and at the expense of citizens of the United States. The complaint had been made to the British authorities that Americans, and particularly missionaries, were getting an undue influence and playing into the hands of the United States. Gen. William Miller, the British commissioner and consul-general with whom I had a very friendly acquaintance, invited me to listen to a letter from the Earl of Aberdeen, then the British foreign minister.
He wrote that complaints had been made to him of the undue influence of the missionaries, and the reply said that upon inquiry he could not find that they had acquired or used any influence which they were not legitimately entitled to. These complaints, by whomsoever made, were no doubt made to excite national jealousy and provoke national interference. Mr. Wylie, himself, a British subject, but Hawaiian foreign minister at that time, told me that all the interests of the islands by their local position would attach them to the United States if their independence should lapse, and that upon these views being communicated to Lord Clarendon, the then British foreign secretary, he wrote to the consul that Mr. Wylie was right; that by their adjacent position their interests called for their union to the States. The political question for the States would be: "Does our interest call for any such union or the maintenance of any such paramount influence as shall serve our purpose in case of war with any maritime power?" I have quoted both British and American views from their different standpoints, and I deduce French views from their course of action, and, in an account written by myself and published in the Hawaiian Spectator in October, 1839, giving an account of the French aggressions of July, 1839, I was sustained in my views of its character by a written request that sixteen of the commissioned officers of the United States East India squadron here in October, 1839, to reprint 1,000 copies of the account at their
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expense for gratuitous distribution, which I did, and an endorsement of my views by the Hon. Rufus Choate in the North American Review.
Mr. Jarves, the historian of Hawaii, says:
They hold the key of the Pacific Ocean, for no trade could prosper or even exist whilst a hostile power, possessing a powerful and active marine, should send out its cruisers to prey upon commerce; but once firmly established upon them it might put to defiance any means of attack which could be brought to bear against them. Hence the commercial countries have been jealous lest some of them should have a superior influence.
Mr. Seward, in a speech in the Senate on the subject of the commerce of the Pacific, says:
Who does not see that henceforth every year European commerce, European politics, European thought, European activities, although actually gaining greater force, and European connections, although becoming more intimate, will nevertheless ultimately sink in importance while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter?
President Lincoln said:
In every light in which the state of the Hawaiian Islands can be contemplated it is an object of profound interest for the United States. Virtually it was once a colony. It is now a near and immediate neighbor. It is a haven of shelter and refreshment for our merchants, fishermen, seamen, and other citizens, when on their lawful occasions they are navigating the Eastern seas and ocean. The people are free and its laws, languages, and religion are largely the fruit of our own teaching and example.
The minority report of the Committee on Ways and Means regarding the treaty says:
Much stress is laid in the report of the majority upon the importance to the United States of obtaining a foothold upon these islands in the interest of our Pacific commerce with the continent of Asia, and of our safety in case of future war with any great naval power.
The undersigned are not insensible to these considerations. No European power should be permitted to claim sovereignty of these islands or to gain such influence in them as to menace our security. To allow this would be contrary to the well established canons of American policy by nearly a century of traditions and the conceded maxims of international law. No European power can deny to us the peculiar right to exclude them from possessing what would be a standing menace of danger to us and the possession of which by us would be no menace of danger to them.
War we hope never to see, and shall bless the time, if we are permitted to see it, when the reign of peace and good will to men shall be universal everywhere. But while the state of men continues to make it wise, "In time of peace to prepare for war."
I think I have shown, by the events related as occurring within the last fifty years and quotations from competent naval, military, and civil authorities, that it is both wise and proper for the United States to seek and retain such paramount influence and control of the islands as will prevent their being used as a menace to them in case of war. It will be noted that the incidents narrated and the remarks quoted from writers and speakers were nearly all of them many years antecedent to the treaty, and could only have related to the intrinsic value of the islands for their location and capability of production, and it is now nearly seventy years, as I am informed, since President Monroe uttered his views on this subject.
I may remark that Kamehameha IV said to me, while yet heir apparent, that if the nation died out and its sovereignty passed away, as it seemed by the course of events must inevitably be the case, they should and would go to the States, and the question when was only a question of time. If the authorities could enforce neutrality against all belligerents their strategic positions would not be so important, but Template:1164-1165 Template:1166-1167 Template:1168-1169