Transcribed Morgan Report Part 3
Transcribed Morgan Report Part 2
|
|
|
Mr. McCandless. Colburn and Peterson.
The Chairman. They came to Smith's office?
Mr. McCandless. Came down to Smith's office. By this time there were probably 700 or 800 people around there. Of course, there is a very complete system of telephone, and the news was telephoned all over the city. Mr. Colburn came in and someone said, "Make us a speech," and he said, "Do you want a speech?" and they said, "Yes; tell us the story." Mr. Colburn proceeded and told the story.
The Chairman. What position did he hold in Liliuokalani's cabinet at the time?
Mr. McCandless. Minister of the interior. They said: "Tell us the story." He said he had information that morning that the Queen intended to promulgate the new constitution. He said that he immediately carried the news to Judge Hartwell and Mr. Thurston. They had been political enemies, of course, and they had advised the ministers to resist—that is, to refuse to countersign the new constitution, and to do all they could with her to keep her from signing the new constitution. After the Legislature had been prorogued they proceeded to the palace, right across the street, and there she made the speech (which of course is a matter of history) to the effect that she proposed to give the people a new constitution. She asked the ministers to countersign it, and they refused to do so. Mr. Colburn told the story of her becoming very angry, and Mr. Peterson made the remark that the constitution was faulty in some respects, whereupon she replied: "You have had it in your posession for a month and you returned it without any comment, and I took it that it was all right."
The Chairman. That is what Mr. Colburn told the crowd?
Mr. McCandless. That is the speech that Mr. Colburn made to the crowd.
The Chairman. Well?
Mr. McCandless. He stated that they had escaped from there and thought that their lives were in danger; that she had sent for them again, and that at this time she had concluded not to promulgate the new constitution.
Senator Butler. Have you any information as to who it was prepared that constitution for the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. All the information is that she prepared it herself. It is a constitution taken from the constitution of Kamehameha V and some extracts from the constitution of 1887. We got information from Mr. Colburn and, probably, from Chief Justice Judd, who read it, and he noted some changes.
Senator Butler. You say it was claimed that she prepared that constitution herself?
Mr. McCandless. That is what she claimed since.
Senator Butler. Is she capable of writing such a constitution?
Mr. McCandless. She took the constitution of '87 and the constitution of Kamehameha V and prepared it. The constitution of 1887 is very much like the constitution of Kamehameha V, with some vital changes. We compared them.
The Chairman. I want to know what Mr. Colburn said to that crowd, and all that he said, as you remember it. I think where you paused in answer to the question of Senator Butler you were proceeding to state that Mr. Coiburn had said that the Queen had retracted her purpose of promulgating that constitution.
Mr. McCandless. For the time being.
The Chairman. Is that the way he stated it?
|
Mr. McCandless. I think so.
The Chairman. Go on.
Mr. McCandless. In regard to Mr. Colburn. "Now," said he, "gentlemen, we want to know what support we can get as against the Queen, because she is apt to do this at any time."
The Chairman. That was in this public speech?
Mr. McCandless. That was in the public speech he was making. He said that the only reason she had desisted was that she was unable to get them to sign the constitution. She got it into her head that it would not be legal unless countersigned by the cabinet, and if she could get the cabinet to sign she felt that she had a legal constitution.
The Chairman. Did Colburn state that?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. That was the strange thing. It was said at the meeting that she did not believe that it would be valid without the signatures of the ministers.
The Chairman. Is that about all that Colburn said?
Mr. McCandless. All that I can remember. Of course, that is the substance.
The Chairman. Was any action taken by that crowd upon that statement made by Mr. Colburn or in consequence of it or immediately afterward ?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. What was it?
Mr. McCandless. Immediately someone—I can not say who it was—proposed that we must have a committee of public safety. It was in a room that was packed, a room a little larger than this and an outer room. The two rooms were packed and Mr. Cooper was seated at the desk. The paper was where the ministers were.
The Chairman. By what number had this paper been signed on Monday?
Mr. McCandless. This was all on Saturday.
The Chairman. Oh, yes; I beg pardon.
Mr. McCandless. Someone made the motion that there be a committee of safety appointed, and someone said, "Appoint Mr. Cooper chairman of the meeting and we will leave it to the chair to pick them out," and that was unanimously agreed to. It was just informal. There had been no organization before that; and in the presence of Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson, Paul Neumann—no, I would not say as to Neumann then; I do not think he was in; he had gone out—the committee of thirteen was picked out, and it was taken from that list of people in the immediate vicinity.
The Chairman. Who picked them out?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Cooper; but he was assisted by two or three gentlemen—suggestions made. The committee of thirteen was selected and someone suggested that they be made a committee of safety, and someone said, "Get out of here," and the rooms were immediately cleaned out, and we began to discuss the situation.
The Chairman. Were you one of the committee?
Mr. McCandless. I was.
The Chairman. Appointed in that way?
Mr. McCandless. Appointed in that way. I said, "I will carry my gun, but I wish to be excused."
The Chairman. You were not excused?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. And you went on the committee?
Mr. McCandless. Went on the committee.
|
The Chairman. "What was the first thing the committee did after organization?
Mr. McCandless. The first thing? The doors were closed and some one said: "Gentlemen, we are brought face to face with this question. What shall we do?" And there was but one sentiment prevailed: "The Queen has violated the constitution, and we have to carry it to the end; we can not live in this country; we have to resist that or leave the country."
The Chairman. Whom did you select as chairman of that meeting?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Cooper.
The Chairman. Did you come to any resolution as to what you would do in the way of resisting?
Mr. McCandless. If you will allow me to go back just a little— a couple of hours.
Senator Butler. Did you keep any minutes of your proceedings?
Mr. McCandless. We did not care to keep any minutes then. We were going in to a ticklish business.
Senator Butler. You did not keep any minutes?
Mr. McCandless. I think there were some slight notes. The hardware stores closed at 1 o'clock; but about half past 2 o'clock they all opened again to deal out ammunition and guns to the people, to those who wanted to buy them. Cecil Brown, who had been in the Wilcox cabinet, come to me and said: "You can get all the ammunition you need, if you have not enough." He said: "I have just got my arms." We began to gather up arms and ammunition. I sent my brother to the country to catch a late afternoon train and bring up his arms and ammunition. He had a cattle ranch about 7 miles from town. He went down and returned to town about 7 o'clock with his gun and ammunition. So we began as early as that to prepare to resist; the conclusion was arrived at—of course, it did not come off immediately— at that meeting. It was half past 4 or 5 o'clock when the committee of safety was appointed, and we appointed a committee to see what arms we could get. We discussed the situation and decided that we would go right on now, if we had the entire support of the white population— that we would go ahead and proceed to organize a provisional government.
The Chairman. Was there any resolution for the purpose of ascertaining whether you had the support of the population?
Mr. McCandless. No; and the first meeting was the next morning.
The Chairman. Sunday morning?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Where did you meet then?
Mr. McCandless. At W. R. Castle's.
The Chairman. Was he a member of that committee?
Mr. McCandless. I am not sure about that; I think he was not.
The Chairman. He was a friend to the movement at all events?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. We held the meeting, and one of the first things we decided was to hold a mass meeting and ascertain whether the public of Honolulu was in accord with that sentiment. If it was, we would go ahead and perfect the organization in the meantime as much as possible, and if, at the mass meeting, the whites showed they were anything like they were in 1887, we would proceed with the revolution. The first thing we did at the mass meeting was to send one of the members to a printing office for the purpose of putting out posters immediately.
The Chairman. When was that called?
|
Mr. McCandless. At half past 1 Monday, the 16th.
The Chairman. The meeting was determined on and the posters were ordered printed on Sunday?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; and posted that day.
Senator Gray. Posted on Sunday?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you appoint any committee or take any steps in regard to the number of persons who would go into that meeting, and the extent to which they were to be supplied with arms and ammunition?
Mr. McCandless. I will have to go back of that a little. On Saturday afternoon the old officers of the Honolulu Rifles were there among the first men, and they hunted up the rosters of 1887 and hunted up every man they could find, to see how he was fixed for arms and ammunition.
The Chairman. Had that organization been dissolved?
Mr. McCandless. It was dissolved in 1890. It consisted of four companies— a battallion. The old officers began to get the men together and hunt up the arms and ammunition. Aside from still continuing to discuss the situation, they came to the conclusion to call a mass meeting. I do not recall anything that we did there of the details, but discussed the situation generally.
The Chairman. Did you find the movement was a strong one, both to numbers and as to the supply of arms and ammunition?
Mr. McCandless. We found arms and ammunition enough.
The Chairman. How about the men?
Mr. McCandless. That was the question—could we get the men. That was still in the hands of the officers of the different companies that had been organized in 1887 and disbanded in 1890, and they were working on that right straight along.
The Chairman. A sort of recruiting service?
Mr. McCandless. Just a recruiting service that was started before the committee of safety was organized.
The Chairman. When did you become satisfied that you had enough of military strength, consisting of soldiers, arms, and ammunition, to warrant you in starting on the work of revolutionizing the Government?
Mr. McCandless. We were satisfied of that on Monday morning from the reports of the officers of the different companies, and we were satisfied in this way; almost every man we went to said, "What is this for; annexation, or is this a repetition of 1887?" That would be the first question asked us, or asked anyone who was recruiting or talking on the subject. We said, "Of course, there is but one answer to it— provisional government, annexation, and wipe the monarchy out;" and they said they would be with us. Many of us were there in 1887 and took the same stand.
The Chairman. Now, at what time did you first see the proclamation of Liliuokalani after she had receded from her purpose of establishing this new constitution?
Mr. McCandless. That was about 10 o'clock Monday morning, I think. No; I beg pardon; I saw that in the Government building; I saw that about 9 o'clock.
Senator Gray. Saw what?
Mr. McCandless. That she would not attempt to promulgate the new constitution.
Senator Davis. Was it signed?
Mr. McCandless. It was signed. I saw the document. That would be another story. I had business at the foreign office about 9 o'clock
|
where all four of the ministers were present, and they showed us the original document signed by Liliuokalani and the ministers.
The Chairman. The four ministers of whom?
Mr. McCandless. The ministers of Liliuokalani.
The Chairman. Was that proclamation scattered around the city?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; broadcast.
The Chairman. Printed?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. It was by authority, then?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; by authority.
The Chairman. It was a paper printed, called "by authority"?
Mr. McCandless. That is what they put at the head.
The Chairman. To indicate its official character?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Notwithstanding that proclamation, your mass-meeting was held when?
Mr. McCandless. About half past 1.
The Chairman. What members assembled?
Mr. McCandless. Just similar to the mass meeting in 1887. There was not a business house in Honolulu that was not closed. All the business houses closed up and the heads of the firms came to the meeting; all factories stopped, all machine shops, all business stopped just as in 1887. There were some events that transpired on Monday morning, the 10th, before the mass meeting. Had we better finish those up?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. McCandless. We met first----
The Chairman. You mean the committee?
Mr. McCandless. On Monday morning the committee of safety met in Mr. Thurston's office. Just as I was going in Marshal Wilson came out of the room with Mr. Thurston. He took him into his private office, and they stayed there some minutes, and Mr. Thurston came back and reported what the conversation was between them. The report in regard to that was that Marshal Wilson said to Mr. Thurston, "Can't this thing be stopped?"
Senator Gray. What did he mean; the meeting?
Mr. McCandless. The movement; the revolution.
Senator Gray. Are you sure he meant the movement, or the meeting?
Mr. McCandless. I will state the whole thing and you will see he meant the movement. Thurston said, "I do not think it can." Marshal Wilson said, "Well, I will guarantee that she won't do that any more; if she attempts it I will lock her up before she can attempt anything again." Mr. Thurston said, "We can't stop on any such guarantee as that; it has gone too far now; we can't stop it." That is the substance of Mr. Thurston's statement to the committee of safety as to what occurred at his interview with Marshal Wilson. Of course, I can not give you the exact words now. Then there was a committee of three appointed from the committee of safety to go up and confer with the ministers. They had requested it in writing, the day before, in a letter to Mr. Thurston. They asked for a conference with the committee of safety, and William Wilder, F. W. McChesney, and myself constituted that committee. We were instructed to go and hear what they had to say, and say nothing. We went up to the Government building and the foreign office. They were all there. We were ushered in, and they were on the other side of the room. We were opposite to them. Finally there was a pause—one of the ministers said, "What is it, gentlemen?" And we said, "We have come up here to see you on
|
account of the appointment you asked of Mr. Thurston." One of the ministers said, "We have decided that there is nothing to say, just now; the Queen has just signed a paper that she will not commit an act of this kind again, and agreed to abide by the constitution."
Senator Gray. That was Monday morning?
Mr. McCandless. Monday morning. Of course, we had nothing to say. McChesney said, "What is this mass meeting of yours?" They had gotten out posters late Sunday night.
The Chairman. To whom did he address that question?
Mr. McCandless. To the cabinet.
The Chairman. Name them.
Mr. McCandless. Colburn, Peterson, Parker, and Cornwall.
The Chairman. They were all present?
Mr. McCandless. All present—all four of them. They had gotten out posters calling a mass meeting of the people in Palace Square. McChesney said, "What did you call that meeting for?" Parker said, "To draw the crowd away from your meeting." That, I think, ended the interview. I do not remember anything else being said.
The Chairman. Was that a formal visit of the committee of safety to the Queen's cabinet?
Mr. McCandless. That was a formal visit of a committee of the committee of safety to the cabinet.
The Chairman. Where did it occur?
Mr. McCandless. In the foreign office of the Government building.
Senator Gray. Two members of the cabinet had been before the committee, and said they did not agree with the new constitution, and were at outs with the Queen. That is so?
Mr. McCandless. That is so—down at the public meeting. But there was at that time, as we afterward ascertained—did not know it then—a proclamation drawn up by the ministers, and it was even signed—I think drawn up and in their possession ready to be proclaimed at any time—declaring the Queen deposed and reorganizing the Government. This letter from the cabinet to Thurston, asking for the conference, was in regard to the ministers taking charge of the Government and deposing the Queen entirely, and their entering into the movement with us, we supporting them.
Senator Gray. The first movement was largely initiated by the support of these recalcitrant ministers of the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. I will put it the other way—they were the ones who initiated----
Senator Gray. I say the movement was initiated in support of the recalcitrant ministers against the Queen's proposition to proclaim a new constitution?
The Chairman. At their request.
Mr. McCandless. Yes; at their request.
The Chairman. You spoke of a proclamation drawn up and ready to be signed, or had been signed. What proclamation was that?
Mr. McCandless. That was the proclamation drawn up on Saturday afternoon.
The Chairman. By whom?
Mr. McCandless. I think by Judge Hartwell and Thurston, and probably W. O. Smith and the cabinet.
The Chairman. What cabinet?
Mr. McCandless. Peterson, Colburn, Parker, and Cornwall.
The Chairman. What was included in that proclamation?
|
Mr. McCandless. Just declaring that the Queen had violated the constitution, and declaring the throne vacant.
The Chairman. Do you say that paper was signed by anybody?
Mr. McCandless. I understand it was signed by the ministers and ready to be proclaimed if the Queen resisted any further.
The Chairman. It was intended that, if the Queen insisted in going on with her revolutionary projects, the ministers would unite with Thurston and others in issuing a proclamation declaring the throne vacant?
Mr. McCandless. Deposing—declaring the throne vacant. I think that it is rather a mistake; it would be deposing her and wiping the government out of existence as a monarchy. It was together with a movement for annexation.
The Chairman. Why was not that proclamation issued?
Mr. McCandless. I will go back to Saturday afternoon at, say, half past 2 o'clock, when Mr. Neumann was present in W. O. Smith's office. The people began to gather in and get the information of the Queen's attempt to promulgate the new constitution. Then came the cry, "Now is the time to get rid of the whole thing." Neumann said, "Well, I don't know that I would go as far as that." I remember distinctly hearing Neumann make that remark.
Senator Gray. So far as what?
Mr. McCandless. Wiping out the whole monarchy. And on Saturday night—you must remember now that up to half past 1 Saturday afternoon the ministers and the element that promised support were political rivals, political opponents----
Senator Gray. You mean Saturday?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. The ministers on Sunday night had a meeting and came to the understanding that, as the Queen had receded from the position she had taken, their best plan was to try to stop this revolution if they could, at least throw cold water on it, and they still continue as ministers of the Queen.
The Chairman. You are now speaking of the Queen's ministers?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. On Sunday they were in communication with the committee of safety in regard to the next move, the proper move to make to stop the Queen in her mad career and to turn over the Government entirely. There were two communications on Sunday requesting a conference with the committee of safety, the time set being Monday morning at 9 o'clock.
The Chairman. Two communications to whom?
Mr. McCandless. From the ministers to the committee of safety; and it was for that reason that this committee was appointed that went up to the Government building to wait on the cabinet.
The Chairman. We are trying to find out why that proclamation, which you say was drawn, and which you say was signed by the ministers, was not issued.
Mr. McCandless. Simply because this element that had backed the Queen, had been her supporters from the time she had been on the throne, was against the white element of Honolulu. They had not been political friends, and if there was any way in which they could get out of it they would do it.
The Chairman. Is it your idea that they were then experimenting to see whether the safe side for them to take was the side of the monarchy or the side of the revolution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; that was the way it was Sunday; and the best information we had was that at their meeting Sunday, at which
|
Macfarlane, Joe Carter, and Paul Neumann were present, they decided that their safest place was to go back on the side of the monarchy. Therefore, when the meeting took place Monday morning they had not anything to say. They had this proclamation of the Queen ready and showed us the original copy.
The Chairman. As I gather from your statement, your idea is that they had become convinced between Saturday and Monday that their personal interests lay in the direction of maintaining this Queen on the throne, and that they were attempting to get and did get from her a declaration that she would carry out the constitution of '87?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; and would not attempt to promulgate the new constitution again.
The Chairman. That was their attitude as you understood it?
Mr. McCandless. That was their attitude as I understood it.
The Chairman. Do you think you can be mistaken about that?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think I was. They met Saturday, asked for aid; we got together, gathered up arms and got recruits to support them, and by Monday morning they had issued this proclamation and posted notices for a counter mass meeting.
The Chairman. And that was after they had given their assent to the proclamation dethroning the Queen and abolishing the monarchy?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. You do not know whether it was signed?
Mr. McCandless. If I understood correctly, it was signed.
The Chairman. As I understand, the whole cabinet, with these two ministers, had given their assent to that?
Mr. McCandless. The whole cabinet had given their assent to that programme on Saturday afternoon. They were completely demoralized, because their lives were in danger.
Senator Frye. You said there were two or three things that you thought were important, and those you stated. Then you got down to the meetings on Monday morning. Now, go back.
The Chairman. I asked you what was done at the mass meeting held by the opponents of the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. All the business houses were shut up, and the whole white population of Honolulu came to the mass meeting.
The Chairman. Do you mean the male population?
Mr. McCandless. The male population; the women did not go, because they were in a terrible state at home.
The Chairman. State of apprehension?
Mr. McCandless. State of apprehension; because before this we had rumors that the half whites proposed to burn the town.
The Chairman. What numbers met there?
Mr. McCandless. I should judge from 1,000 to 1,200.
The Chairman. Were there any armed persons in the crowd?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not think there were, unless individuals with concealed arms.
The Chairman. Were the persons there in the habit of carrying concealed arms about them?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. On that occasion did you know that they were with arms concealed about their persons?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not recollect any one at the meeting.
The Chairman. Did they elect a chairman?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Who was it?
|
Mr. McCandless. William C. Wilder.
The Chairman. Were speeches made?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. By whom?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know that I can give you the names; I have them here in this little pamphlet.
The Chairman. Have you an account of the proceedings of that meeting?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; I have a complete account here: "Two weeks of Hawaiian history, from January 14 to the 28th." One of the printing houses printed that. I have read it, and it is a very correct statement.
The Chairman. Are there any statements in that history that you object to as being untrue?
Mr. McCandless. I do not remember any. I have read it over several times.
The Chairman. The facts stated in that history came under your personal observation generally?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; as a general statement.
The Chairman. Are you willing to submit this as your statement of the facts that occurred during that time?
Mr. McCandless. I should not like do that now, without reading it over very carefully.
The Chairman. Were any resolutions adopted at that meeting?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. What were they?
Mr. McCandless. I can give them to you word for word out of that book.
The Chairman. Just read them.
Mr. McCandless. The resolutions are as follows:
"1. Whereas Her Majesty, Liliuokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally, and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;
"2. And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force; and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;
"3. And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful, and would lead to bloodshed and riot, and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;
"4. And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not now promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles, and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;
"5. And whereas at a public meeting of citizens, held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January, instant, a committee of thirteen, to be known as the 'committee of public safety,' was appointed to consider the situation, and to devise ways and means for the maint nance of the public peace and safety, and the preservation of life and property;
"6. And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this, mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such
|
action, and has this day presented a report to such meeting, denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending to excite riot, and cause the loss of life and destruction of property:
"Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu, of all nationalities, and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters;
"And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action taken and report made by the said committee of safety; and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order, and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii."
The Chairman. Was that resolution adopted by the meeting?
Mr. McCandless. It was, unanimously.
The Chairman. Was there much enthusiasm exhibited on that occasion?
Mr. McCandless. A good deal. The speakers had all been instructed to be as moderate as possible, and every speaker—whenever there was any allusion to the intentions of the people, they just went wild.
The Chairman. At the time that meeting was being held another meeting was being held, as I understand, by the supporters of the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. What distance was there between the places of the meetings?
Mr. McCandless. Less than half a mile—third of a mile.
The Chairman. Did you visit the meeting in the palace grounds?
Mr. McCandless. Palace Square.
The Chairman. Yes; Palace Square.
Mr. McCandless. No; I did not.
The Chairman. After your meeting dispersed, the meeting of the opponents of the Queen, did the committee of safety reassemble?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Where did you meet?
Mr. McCandless. At W. O. Smith's office.
The Chairman. What steps did you take, if any, to carry out the resolutions which you have just read?
Mr. McCandless. We knew we had the support of the whole white population in the movement on foot. In the morning, at the morning meeting, before this mass meeting, we had drawn up a paper and asked the American minister to land troops to protect life and property.
Senator Gray. When was that?
Mr. McCandless. The Monday morning meeting.
The Chairman. Was that request communicated to the minister before the mass meeting was held?
Mr. McCandless. I believe so.
The Chairman. Do you know who communicated it to him?
Mr. McCandless. No; I could not state. After the mass meeting the information was that the troops were to be landed at 5 o'clock. There was a division in the committee as to whether it was wise for the troops to land then or not. Those who were thinking of their property and their families, and the families of the whole white community,
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----62
|
were anxious that the troops should land on account of a fear that the city might be burned and looted, and knowing that the troops were ashore nothing of that kind would take place. On the other hand, there were other members of the committee who felt that if the troops came ashore it would make a changed condition, and we did not know just what the result would be.
The Chairman. Were they apprehensive that if the troops came ashore they would support the Queen, or what were they apprehensive about?
Mr. McCandless. We were absolutely ignorant on that point.
The Chairman. What was the apprehension with regard to the landing of the troops?
Mr. McCandless. We were making such rapid progress with our organization, and the other people so completely cowed, we thought probably it would precipitate a crisis so soon as the troops came ashore, and in a day or two we would be better prepared to resist it than then, and it was between those two ideas the committee was divided.
The Chairman. By precipitating a crisis did you think the troops would attack you?
Senator Frye. The Queen's troops, encouraged by the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. We did not know anything about that.
Senator Gray. Was anything said in your meeting on Saturday, after your committee of safety was formed and you had cleared the room, about Mr. Stevens and the United States ship Boston?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we talked that over.
Senator Gray. So soon as your committee was formed?
Mr. McCandless. Well, its was during the conversation.
The Chairman. On Saturday?
Senator Gray. Yes. Was anything said about the attitude of Mr. Stevens?
Mr. McCandless. It was talked of—what his attitude would be.
Senator Gray. Was anybody deputed to go and see him ?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; I think there was a committee of one or two appointed on Saturday afternoon to have a talk with him, to ascertain what his attitude would be in the then crisis.
Senator Gray. Did that committee report?
Mr. McCandless. The report was that there was no information; that he was entirely noncommittal.
Senator Gray. Who said that?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Thurston, I believe.
Senator Gray. But said he would protect life and property?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. He did not say he was noncommittal?
Mr. McCandless. Well, he was noncommittal as to contending forces; but would protect life and property.
Senator Gray. Was anything said by them that conveyed the idea to you that Mr. Stevens was hostile or indifferent to the movement ot the committee of safety, or was without sympathy for it?
Mr. McCandless. I think not.
Senator Gray. Anything at all?
Mr. McCandless. I think we felt this way, that without any encouragement from him we certainly had the sympathy of the American minister.
Senator Gray. That was the general feeling, was it not?
|
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. A committee was sent to Minister Stevens to request him not to land the troops then?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we did not feel certain that night, and thought we would get our strength better in a day or two.
Senator Gray. That the landing of the troops might bring on a crisis?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. If you were not as well prepared as you thought you would be later?
Mr. McCandless. No, sir.
The Chairman. Was there a request sent to Mr. Stevens not to land the troops?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Who composed that committee?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Thurston and W. O. Smith.
The Chairman. Did they report to the committee of safety?
Mr. McCandless. They did.
The Chairman. What was the report?
Mr. McCandless. The report was that Mr. Stevens said, owing to the unsettled state of affairs he was going to land troops.
Senator Frye. He would not change his purpose?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. You had previously asked Mr. Stevens to request the landing of the troops?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Had any troops landed at the time he announced his intention to have them landed notwithstanding your request?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. What time Monday afternoon was that?
Mr. McCandless. At the time of the meeting?
The Chairman. No; the time you got this report?
Mr. McCandless. Probably a quarter to 5, from half-past 4 to quarter of 5.
The Chairman. How long after this report was made of Mr. Stevens's refusal to prevent the landing of the troops before they were actually landed?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think it was over a half hour, perhaps three-quarters.
The Chairman. They must have been on their way to the shore at that time?
Mr. McCandless. I presume they were. I did not know.
The Chairman. Did the committee of safety, acting under the resolutions of which you have spoken, prepare any programme for the organization of the civil government?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. We began that. That was discussed hurriedly Saturday evening. It was more in detail on Sunday morning; but by Monday morning we had the plan completed.
The Chairman. Projected?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. After you got the indorsement of the mass meeting you proceeded to execute the programme which you had already agreed upon?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you at the meeting at Mr. Castle's on Sunday morning?
|
Mr. McCandless. I was.
Senator Gray. By which was appointed the committee that waited on Minister Stevens and reported?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Who reported, Mr. Thurston?
Mr. McCandless. I think it was Mr. Thurston and Mr. Smith. They were the gentlemen who were appointed first.
Senator Gray. Do you recollect what they reported then at that meeting?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, they went to see what would be the probable attitude of the American minister in the case of our uprising.
Senator Gray. What did they report?
Mr. McCandless. They reported that Mr. Stevens, in regard to that point, was noncommittal.
Senator Gray. Did he not say he would land the troops at any moment to protect life and property?
Mr. McCandless. He did.
Senator Gray. Did he not say that he would recognize the Provisional Government or whatever government it might be?
Mr. McCandless. I think there was a report of that kind.
Senator Gray. That Stevens would recognize the Provisional Government when established?
Mr. McCandless. When there was any in existence.
Senator Gray. When it was in existence?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did the committee of safety select the officers of the Provisional Government?
Mr. McCandless. They did.
The Chairman. And selected Mr. Dole as President?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. I will tell the story of that. All that happened at the meeting at Mr. Waterhouse's----
Senator Gray. Monday evening?
Mr. McCandless. Monday evening. We were there until, perhaps, 11 or 12 o'clock.
The Chairman. What took place at the meeting at Mr. Waterhouse's house?
Mr. McCandless. At that meeting when we proceeded to appoint the members of the advisory council and the members of the executive council, we sent a committee of one, Mr. Bolte, to Judge Dole asking him if he would take the position of president of the Provisional Government. Mr. Dole, at that time Judge Dole, knew no more of the workings of the committee of safety than any other outsider, and Judge Dole gave Mr. Bolte no encouragement at all. But finally, after entreaties on the part of Mr. Bolte, he came and said he did not care about that at first; finally he said he would come to the meeting. Judge Dole came to the meeting, and of course we stated to him at the meeting that we desired him to become president of the Provisional Government which we were about to inaugurate. At first he declined entirely; that is, at first, he could not see his way clear. He finally made the statement, after talking quite a while, that he had not arrived at the conclusion yet that that was the only solution of the matter— that is, a provisional government looking to annexation. Then he was asked what his opinion was. He said, my opinion is—of course Llliuokalani is out of the question; she has started this revolution, and can not be trusted any longer—my opinion is that Kaiulani would be best for us; to have Kaiulani on the throne with a regency until she is of age.
|
That was Judge Dole's statement to the meeting on Monday evening at 8 o'clock. That was argued with him, and finally before he left he agreed to take it under advisement and consult with his friends and let the committee know the next day.
Senator Gray. That was at Mr. Waterhouse's house Monday evening?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was anything said about Mr. Stevens then?
Mr. McCandless. I think so.
Senator Gray. Were the United States troops mentioned?
Mr. McCandless. We talked over everything.
Senator Gray. The attitude of the United States minister and the landing of the troops were talked over?
Mr. McCandless. We had a good deal of business on hand.
Senator Gray. You say you talked over everything, and that was talked over?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was any committee sent to Minister Stevens that evening?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I remember. No committee—I do not think there was. We also invited Mr. Cecil Brown there. Mr. Cecil Brown is an Englishman and has quite a large following there. We wanted him very much to be one of the new government, and, of course, he came there. The whole plan was laid before him, the intentions of the committee and the appointment of the Provisional Government, including the application for annexation to the United States. Mr. Wundenburg and I individually talked to Mr. Brown, perhaps a half hour, to convince him that he should see it in our light and come over and be one of the supporters. We retired from the room, went out on the veranda, and continued our entreaties with him to try to get him to come in the government, and, of course, we laid the whole matter before him. Finally he said to us, "Let me alone." Said he, "I will solve this for myself." He said, "If I decide not to become part of the government no one living will know that I was here," and after staying out there, probably an hour, he retired, and could not see his way clear to coming in there. Afterwards he became a member of the advisory council. As I stated, Judge Dole took it under consideration and went home. I think we selected most of the names of the Provisional Government. They had been selected up to that time. The first idea was to have 4 ministers and a President, but in picking out 5 men that we thought could agree, we found difficulties. In fact, we consulted Judge Dole in regard to that. So that we finally gave up the idea of 5, and came to the conclusion that we could find 4 men who could work very harmoniously in the government.
Senator Gray. Had Minister Stevens been advised of the project for a Provisional Government and annexation to the United States ?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether it was understood there that he knew what was going on?
Mr. McCandless. Well, everybody knew it.
Senator Gray. Did you not understand that he knew it; was not that your opinion?
Mr. McCandless. It would be my opinion that he would know.
Senator Gray. Do you not know now, and did you not know then, that he did understand it?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not know it.
|
Senator Gray. It was not talked about?
Mr. McCandless. Oh, it was discussed, certainly.
Senator Gray. In what respect was it discussed?
Mr. McCandless. It was discussed in respect to what would be the attitude of the American minister.
Senator Gray. Was it thought his attitude would be sympathetic or unsympathetic?
Mr. McCandless. There were doubts about that.
Senator Gray. Were there any doubts that Mr. Stevens sympathized with the movement.
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you doubt it?
Mr. McCandless. It was doubted that much that we requested him, after we requested the troops to be landed, not to have them landed, for fear it would precipitate a crisis.
Senator Gray. Had you any doubt at that time in regard to Mr. Stevens's sympathies with this movement?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think there was any serious doubt in my mind about it, although I was one of the members who took the side that we would stand a better show on Monday afternoon not to have the troops landed.
Senator Gray. When did you want them landed?
Mr. McCandless. Well, I thought we had better be let alone. The idea prevailed that they had better be let alone, and when the crisis came he would land them himself.
Senator Gray. Then it was your idea it would be better not to have them landed? I see it stated here that the proposition of the committee was that they should be landed the next morning at 9 or 10 o'clock. When did you think they should be landed?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think there was a time stated. We thought it was better to let them stay there because the crisis would be precipitated.
Senator Daniel. What were you afraid of in that crisis?
Mr. McCandless. The Queen's forces.
Senator Daniel. That they would suppress the revolution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; might attempt it.
Senator Daniel. Do you think they could do it?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think so.
Senator Daniel. Did you then think so?
Mr. McCandless. We did not think so Monday morning. Minister Thurston defied Marshal Wilson in his interview with him.
Senator Frye. But as I understand you the uncertainty was as to what effect the landing of the troops would have; whether it would encourage the Queen's troops?
Mr. McCandless. We did not know what effect it would have— encouragement or otherwise.
Senator Frye. The landing of the troops the last time had put Kalakaua on the throne, had it not?
Mr. McCandless. Of course in 1889 the movement was an intrigue that both Kalakaua and Mrs. Dominis were in, and they were taken by complete surprise.
Senator Frye. The troops had the aid of the King, the existing Government?
Mr. McCandless. I can not say as to that.
Senator Frye. He remained on the throne, did he not?
Mr. McCandless. That movement in 1889 was not to put him on the throne; he was on the throne.
|
Senator Gray. Had you not heard before the meeting on Monday evening, if not at that meeting, that Minister Stevens would land the troops to protect American life and property, and that he would recognize that Provisional Government so soon as it had possession of the Government building?
Mr. McCandless. That he would recognize the Provisional Government whenever it was a government.
Senator Gray. That he would consider the Government—put it that way—when it had possession of the Government building?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not think so.
Senator Gray. What did you understand?
Mr. McCandless. When we had the upper hand he would recognize us.
Senator Gray. What did you understand? Did you not suppose during Monday or Tuesday that the presence of the United States troops was the important factor one way or the other? or do you mean to say that you gave no account to it at all?
Mr. McCandless. I say it had its bearing. It stopped all ideas of riot and bloodshed.
Senator Gray. Did you not think it stopped all idea of your movement?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think so. Our movement was weaker Monday morning than Monday evening.
Senator Gray. Do you not think the landing of the United States troops stopped all idea of the movement?
Mr. McCandless. On their part?
Senator Gray. I am not talking from a standpoint one way or the other. It is quite possible from what you say if I had been there I would have been where you were. I am not criticising you. But as a matter of fact, looking at it, state, under the responsibilities you are under as a witness, if you did not believe that the idea of your movement was entirely dissipated by the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not think so.
Senator Gray. You think it would have been precisely as it was if there had been no troops there at that moment of time?
Mr. McCandless. If you take into consideration the movement of 1887, how we won then, and could have set up a government, and the whites taken by surprise in 1889, yet maintained their supremacy----
Senator Gray. You supported the existing government in 1887?
Mr. McCandless. We did not support them in 1887. Of course, there was a complete overthrow of the monarchy.
Senator Gray. Did it continue?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. In view of those facts—you were going on to say?
Mr. McCandless. In view of those facts we had the same amount of confidence that any man had who had been through the same thing, and there was no reason why we should not win again.
Senator Frye. You were going on to state how they formed this provisional government. You got the notice to Dole and notice to Cecil Brown and stated that they were awaiting replies.
Mr. McCandless. Of course Mr. Brown left. We did not expect him to go in after that. And then we began to pick out the members for the advisory council. I think we agreed that night on the executive council—the four ministers—and we selected most of the names for the advisory council. We probably stayed there until 11 or half past 11 o'clock, and then adjourned until the next morning.
|
Senator Frye. Was that Monday night?
Mr. McCandless. That was Monday night. We met the next morning at Mr. Smith's office.
Senator Gray. That was Tuesday?
Mr. McCandless. Tuesday morning. By that time we had before us the programme for the Provisional Government, and Mr. Damon had been selected as one of the members of the advisory council. That morning he was at our meeting for the first time, and he made a statement to the committee that he had just come from the palace. He stated his interview with the Queen, and he stated that he said to Her Majesty, "On former occasions you have called on me for advice, and I now come unasked to give you some advice; you can take it or reject it just as you choose." He said, "Heretofore I have defended the monarchy, and thought it was possible to get along with it; but it has got to that point now, after your actions on Saturday, that I have to change my standard, and I have joined the forces who propose to annex these islands to the United States of America;" and he said, "It would be useless for you to resist; if you do there will be bloodshed and a great many killed; you will probably be killed, and we will win in the end, because we are determined to carry this through." She assured him that she would give up.
Senator Gray. Did he mention to the Queen the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. No; that was the statement made to the then committee of safety.
Senator Gray. Mr. Damon said he did mention to the Queen the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, I am giving you the substance.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether he mentioned the fact to her of the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. That may be so; I do not remember.
Senator Gray. Where did you get this information?
Mr. McCandless. From Mr. Damon, and Mr. Damon reported it. We were busy on the papers in connection with the Government, and probably about 10 or 11 o'clock I was informed—did not happen to be present—that Judge Dole had come in and announced that he had made up his mind, and had taken the position of president. I was out in the meantime recruiting; had been hunting up men; all around men were waiting for the word to fly to arms, and the time was set for 2 o'clock. It is well known; they knew it just as well as we did. I learned it afterwards that that was the time set for the overturn of the Government. At half past 1 we had finished everything; the proclamation was signed, and all the papers in relation to the Government were signed and delivered. There was nothing to do then but to get to the Government building and take it, and launch the new Government. About that time Judge Dole came to me and said, "McCandless, will you go and get the troops ready; we are ready;" and of course I said, "yes." So I started out. If I had a map I could show just exactly the course I took in getting to the Government building. I started from W. O. Smith's office, at the corner of Fort and Merchant streets. Just as I came out of the door a car was passing that went right past the armory on the corner of Beretania and Punchbowl streets, and of course that was our headquarters. That was where we had agreed upon to rally the troops before starting for the Government building. When I got to the corner of King and Fort streets the car was passing.
|
The streets are very narrow at that point; there is only room for a carriage to pass. I heard a policeman's whistle. I ran to the rear end of the car, and found that John Goode had come out of E. O. Hall's with guns aud ammunition, and a policeman was trying to stop him. There was a dray that blocked the way, and the policeman was trying to get on the wagon. There is where I cried out to Goode to shoot, and he did. And I hollered for them to shut up their shops and get their guns, and they came right out lively. When I got to Beretania street I saw this first company making for the armory. They had been in the building from 6 o'clock in the morning. It was Ziegler's company, A. They started for the armory all together, with Winchesters and everything. When I got there I jumped off the car, and told them of the shooting of the policeman. They double-quicked to the armory, and Goode with his load of ammunition had gone up that street there, and along there down to the armory. [Indicating on diagram.] By this time our friends were arriving in all directions, coming in there single and double, with arms.
Senator Gray (indicating on the diagram). Is this a thickly settled part of the city?
Mr. McCandless. All this is a residence part.
Senator Gray. Thickly settled?
Mr. McCandless. Pretty thickly settled, grounds around—all these lots extending here for the next 5 miles, clear to Waikiki. Just as soon as there were enough arrived to take care of what we had collected, the wagonload, the first company was sent to the Government building with Capt. Zeigler. They marched down to this corner into the Government building yard. I stayed there [indicating on the diagram].
Senator Gray. Which front of the Government building was the proclamation read from?
Mr. McCandless. On the front steps of the Government building, facing the palace. I stayed there until the third company marched down. I came down with the third company. There were four companies and all the men conveyed the arms to the Government building. When I arrived there they had finished reading the proclamation. This is police headquarters, just a block from where we were, and all through these streets here were full of people—2,000 or 3,000 people in the streets. When that shot was fired the people left and came down town. They thought the war had commenced down there. Some one came to the committee of safety and reported that now was a good opportunity to go up; the streets were entirely bare going to the Government building, and they came out and marched up to the Government building a few minutes earlier than they would have done if there had been no firing of the shot.
Senator Frye. They got up there before the troops did?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. On that account the way was all open, and nothing to interfere.
Senator Frye. How many were there altogether?
Mr. McCandless. There were 18 altogether. I was one of them.
Senator Frye. Eighteen of what?
Mr. McCandless. The committee was composed of 13 members in the first place, and when the men were appointed it was found that there was some good man to come in, and it was increased to 14, and the 4 ministers were put in, which made 18.
Senator Frye. You went yourself where the military was?
|
Mr. McCandless. Yes. And I think the other company marched up together.
Senator Frye. But you did not see them?
Mr. McCandless. I did not see them. I was sent off on other business. That is a statement up to the proclamation. When I got up to the Government building, just as fast as the men came in and the guns came in they were given to the men, and they organized the Provisional Government. They immediately wrote letters to all the foreign ministers there, stating that they had organized a government, and had charge of the public buildings and archives.
Senator Frye. Did you go into the councils of the Provisional Government, or stay in the military?
Mr. McCandless. I carried my gun up there, and I was sent for, and I went out of the ranks into where the councils were. I know the first gentleman who called there was Maj. Wodehouse, the English minister. When he came in President Dole was sitting at a table about the size of this, at one end of it, and the members of the council around through the room. Mr. Wodehouse came in on that side and came around to President Dole and shook hands. I did not hear what was said; but the statement of President Dole afterwards was that the minister hoped the Government would protect Englishmen— see that the English subject's property was not jeopardized. And the Japanese minister was right behind him. He came in and spoke to President Dole, and did not speak afterwards. Then he and Mr. Wodehouse went out.
Senator Frye. What time was that?
Mr. McCandless. That was probably 4 o'clock; I think a little later than that Mr. Pringle called; just came in, did not say anything, just looked around and left.
Senator Frye. When did you send a communication to Mr. Stevens that you had proclaimed your government?
Mr. McCandless. They were all sent together.
Senator Frye. When you sent the messages to the other ministers?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. That was between 2 and 3 o'clock.
Senator Frye. When did you get your answer from minister Stevens?
Mr. McCandless. I think it came from him about half-past 4.
Senator Frye. After the English minister and the Japanese minister had called?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Some others came?
Mr. McCandless. Those were the only two that came, Mr. Wodehouse and Mr. Fuge.
Senator Gray. Did any others come in?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Canavara came later.
Senator Frye. Who was he?
Mr. McCandless. The Portuguese minister.
Senator Gray. Do you recollect when the reception of the note of recognition from Minister Stevens was?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; I was there when it came.
Senator Gray. You can not fix the time?
Mr. McCandless. Things were in such confusion that I could not fix the time exactly; but it was 4 or half-past 4 that the note of recognition came.
Senator Gray. Had Capt. Wiltse been in?
Mr. McCandless. I am not sure whether he came.
|
Senator Gray. Had Mr. Swinburne been in? Mr. McCandless. They were in during the evening before dark; I mean the afternoon.
Senator Gray. Were they there before or after you sent out the notices?
Mr. McCandless. After the notices; I do not think any before.
Senator Gray. Had you any conversation with them that afternoon?
Mr. McCandless. No; I was kept busy on military matters and was in and out of the building.
Senator Gray. Did you see any of the United States forces, bluejackets, whatever they were?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, I knew where they were.
Senator Gray. Did you see them?
Mr. McCandless. No; not that I remember.
Senator Gray. Did you see the sentries?
Mr. McCandless. I did not pass the gate, so, of course, I could not see the sentries.
Senator Gray. Where were you; in the foreign minister's office?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, if I had come out to the front of the building and looked directly to the left—no; I could not see the gate from there, I would have to step out into the yard to the side gate. That I could see, but the front gate I could not, because of the Music Hall.
Senator Gray. Were you in the ranks, or a private?
Mr. McCandless. I was in the ranks.
Senator Gray. You had no officers?
Mr. McCandless. We took the officers of '87.
Senator Gray. You had officers, then?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you have any military organization at the time you went there, or did you just go as you pleased?
Mr. McCandless. Oh, no; came up there organized.
Senator Gray. Did you have any communication, or any of the officers, with the commander of the U. S. troops?
Mr. McCandless. No; I do not think there was any one who had communication with the officers of the U. S. troops.
Senator Gray. Did I interrupt you? You got where these ministers came in, and you knew of the note of recognition from Minister Stevens, and so on.
Mr. McCandless. Probably a little earlier than that, probably 3 o'clock or a little after, a deputy marshal was sent up from down at the police headquarters. He came in and asked that the ministers— our ministers—go down to the police station in order to see if we could not effect a compromise. That is the statement he made. He said he was authorized to make the statement. That, of course, was refused. He said: "There are some of the ministers who would be glad to come up, but they are afraid."
Senator Gray. That is, of the old ministers?
Mr. McCandless. The old ministers, the Queen's ministers. I think he said if a couple of gentlemen will come down, that will inspire confidence in our ministers, and they will come up. He went back with word that if they would come up there would be no harm done; they would be allowed to come and depart again; and so Mr. Parker—there were two of them came up; I am not sure which two; but I think it was Parker and Cornwall came up, and Mr. Parker came in as good
|
natured as possible. He is a great big, good-natured Hawaiian. They had a little friendly chat.
Senator Gray. Do you mean a native?
Mr. McCandless. He is a native, a half white.
Senator Frye. About the color of the rest of them?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; about the color of the rest. He said: "Can't we fix this thing up? We don't want to be fighting you people." We told him that there could be no compromise. He said: "I wanted the others to come up with me, but they would not come; they were afraid." And I think he volunteered the statement that if we would send one or two men down it would inspire confidence in them. Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte accompanied them back to the police station. In a short time all the Queen's ministers came to the Government building, and on behalf of President Dole a demand was made on them for the surrender of the barracks and the surrender of the police station. They said they would go over and see Her Majesty, and that some one should accompany them. Mr. Damon accompanied them. The ministers went over to the palace and stayed there an hour—between an hour and an hour and a half. In the meantime we moved from the interior office and went to the finance office so that this front office might be turned over to the military; that is, the council did. Then Mr. Damon came back with some one representing the Queen. I think it was Parker. This protest was written out, and it was presented to Judge Dole, and he was asked to acknowledge the receipt of it. He acknowledged the receipt of the paper just as any officer or anyone would acknowledge the receipt of a paper.
Senator Gray. Who handed it to him?
Mr. McCandless. I cannot say whetherit was Parker or Mr. Damon.
Senator Gray. But you can say what was said when it was handed?
Mr. McCandless. That I can remember. The paper was handed to President Dole. He made a statement; said, "Here is a protest they want to file, and I do not see any objection to acknowledging the receipt of it."
Senator Gray. Did he say that?
Mr. McCandless. It was something to that effect. Of course, it is hard to remember the words in an exciting time like that, and a year ago. But he said, "I do not see any objection," or words to that effect
Senator Gray. You understood that there was some point made before about the reception of that protest by President Dole?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Do you say you can not recollect the words?
Mr. McCandless. I do not recollect the exact words. It is hard to do that. I have a pretty good memory, but it is hard to get those exact words; but they were just the words that "I do not know of any objection to acknowledging the receipt of this dispatch which is presented."
Senator Gray. He did receive it?
Mr. McCandless. Just indorsed it, and handed it back to them.
Senator Gray. He did receive it?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; and the paper was indorsed and handed back to Parker. He took it off. He wrote the words there, I do not remember what they were, just acknowledging service. Then it got to be pretty nearly 7 o'clock, dark, and they said that the police station was surrendered, and everything was surrendered, and they deputized Soper, who had been appointed commander-in chief, to go down and demand the surrender of the police station, and take it, and there were
|
20 men deputized under Capt. Ziegler to accompany us. We marched down Merchant street.
Senator Gray. That was after the protest had come in?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you have an order from the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. No; we marched down and halted the troops in front of the post-office, in the line of Bethel street, probably within 75 feet of it. We, Col. Soper and I, had to force our way, the streets were jammed, and the troops were halted there. We marched forward into the station house and the marshal's office, and demanded the surrender. They had their Gatling gun and had commenced to take it apart to get it away. The doors were so narrow tbey could not get it from one part of the building to the other without taking it apart.
Senator Gray. Who was there?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Wilson.
Senator Gray. Was there any order from the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know that there was.
Senator Gray. Do you know of any order from the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Do you not know that Marshal Wilson received an order from the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. I do not; I never heard of it. He then invited us into the deputy marshal's office, and we talked over the details of the government, and he ordered the men to assemble below. It was just as strong there of liquor as any place I was ever in—to get up Dutch courage. They had a barrel down there.
Senator Gray. What sort of liquor did you drink?
Mr. McCandless. The natives prefer gin. We went down below in the back yard, and Marshal Wilson made a speech to the men and Col. Soper made one to them, and that ended the formal turning over of the station house to the Provisional Government. I then went out into the street and told Capt. Ziegler to march his men in. We marched them into one of the rooms, took charge of it, and went back.
Senator Gray. How many Gatling guns were there?
Mr. McCandless. One.
Senator Gray. How many cannon?
Mr. McCandless. The cannon were at the barracks.
Senator Gray. How many arms were there? Did you take any account of the arms delivered?
Mr. McCandless. There was not then; there was that night.
Senator Gray. You did not take any account?
Mr. McCandless. No. I went back to the Government building. In the first place Mr. Wundenburg had been selected to be put in charge of the station house; but Mr. Wundenburg protested against it, saying, "I have been a lifelong friend of Mr. Wilson, and it is pretty hard to go down there and ask him to surrender; you send Soper and McCandless to take charge of it, and when Wilson is gone I will go down." A brother of mine went down with Wundenburg and took charge of the station house, and they were in charge of it for several days.
Senator Gray. Where did you go when you went from the station house?
Mr. McCandless. Back to the Government building.
Senator Gray. Into the council room ?
Mr. McCandless. Into the council room.
Senator Gray. Do you know what time it was then ?
|
Mr. McCandless. Eight o'clock, or half past 8.
Senator Gray. Did you see any United States troops then?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Did you go over there that evening at all?
Mr. McCandless. Went past.
Senator Gray. Did you have any communication with them at all?
Mr. McCandless. No, not any person.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether anybody furnished the United States troops with provisions that night?
Mr. McCandless. They had their own provisions.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether anybody connected with the city or Provisional Government, the committee of safety, furnished or caused to be furnished refreshments or provisions to the United States troops?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I know.
Senator Gray. Either that night or the next morning?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; the next day, I believe, the ladies went down and got them coffee.
Senator Gray. Do you know of any man, not ladies, who interested himself in doing it?
Mr. McCandless. No. There may have been; I do not know.
Senator Gray. Have you heard of anyone?
Mr. McCandless. No; not on that point.
Senator Gray. Coffee was furnished them?
Mr. McCandless. I think it was.
Senator Gray. DO you know whether Mr. Carter had anything to do with it?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Do you know who dug that latrine that night?
Mr. McCandless. I heard afterwards.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether any of the committee of safety or anybody connected with the Provisional Government had anything to do with digging that latrine?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Do you know how long coffee was furnished them in the way you have described?
Mr. McCandless. For a day or so coffee was furnished them.
Senator Gray. By whom?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Knowltie.
Senator Gray. Who is he?
Mr. McCandless. He has an eating house down town.
Senator Gray. Do you know at whose instance?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; at the instance of the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. That was in addition to their rations?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was it not at the instance of the Provisional Government that that coffee was furnished on Wednesday morning?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know. I think the ladies furnished that.
Senator Gray. On Tuesday evening?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know of anything being done Tuesday evening.
Senator Gray. You were otherwise engaged?
Mr. McCandless. Otherwise engaged.
Senator Gray. You were not in the commissary business then?
Mr. McCandless. No; we had more serious business on hand, at
|
least we thought we had when we got back to the Government building that evening. There was not much done except proceeding immediately to organize a commission and charter a steamer to send the commissioners to the United States to negotiate for annexation. That was done that night. I do not think we adjourned until 11 o'clock.
The Chairman. Who was in charge of the Treasury, the Hawaiian money, at the time this revolution took place?
Mr. McCandless. It was in the Government building.
The Chairman. Who had charge of it?
Mr. McCandless. George Smithies was in charge. He was the register of accounts.
The Chairman. Did he become a member of the Provisional Government?
Mr. McCandless. He was kept there, and within the last two months he has been dismissed.
The Chairman. Was there any actual capture of the money by the Provisional Government.
Mr. McCandless. The information was that they went up there to inquire for the ministers, the advisory and executive councils. Of course it merged right from the committee of safety into them. They asked for the Queen's ministers, and they were not in there, and they asked for the chief clerk, Mr. Hassinger, and demanded the keys, and they were turned over.
The Chairman. That carried with it the custody of the money?
Mr. McCandless. Yes, and of the Government departments—all the affairs of the Government.
The Chairman. Did the affairs move along as smoothly under the Provisional Government as they had before? I mean the ordinary routine of the Government?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we had taken the precaution to put men over the fire department.
The Chairman. I am not speaking about mob violence, but the civil government. Did it go on before?
Mr. McCandless. Yes, one of the first things was to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law. That was Tuesday evening.
The Chairman. Who did that?
Mr. McCandless. The Provisional Government.
The Chairman. By proclamation?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; by proclamation.
The Chairman. From that time and as long as you remained in Honolulu, was there any outbreak or any mob violence, or any assemblage of citizens that appeared to be riotous?
Mr. McCandless. No, wfth the exception of one night. One night, probably I can not give that night, it was after the Garnet, an English war ship, came in. The United States men had liberty and the Englishmen had liberty, and very late at night, 9 or 10 o'clock at night, the streets on which most of the saloons are, a great many half whites got around there and got to talking with these English sailors; got to patting them on the back and telling them to go for the Yankee sailors, and so the Englishmen attacked some of the Americans.
The Chairman. A sort of sailors' fight?
Mr. McCandless. I think there were some natives.
The Chairman. Was any force used to put down that fight?
Mr. McCandless. No; the native people are not a hard people to handle at all, and if the marshal had done his duty there would not have been much of that.
|
Senator Gray. When was that?
Mr. McCandless. That was probably the middle of February. I can not say the date.
The Chairman. Who was the marshal?
Mr. McCandless. George Ashley. He was appointed and removed afterwards.
The Chairman. Was any force used to put down that riot?
Mr. McCandless. Oh, no; that was allowed just to quietly subside.
The Chairman. Was there any occasion since the establishment of the Provisional Government when there were any riots which rendered it necessary, or it appeared to be necessary, to put them down?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. The country has been in a peaceful state under the Provisional Government?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; there was only one thing they were afraid of, and that was incendiarism. Of course, we heard of that constantly— heard of it from the men it came from.
The Chairman. Threats of burnings?
Mr. McCandless. Threats of burnings.
The Chairman. After you had organized your force under Col. Soper on Tuesday the 17th, did you have any apprehension that Queen Liliuokalani could marshal a military force or armed citizens' force of sufficient magnitude and strength to reinstate her in her possession of the Government?
Mr. McCandless. No; but we did not take any chances on that— we continued to perfect our organization and to extend it so as to be ready for anything of that kind.
The Chairman. Taking all you know about the Hawaiian Islands and the native population and the warmth of the men who were engaged in and are now carrying on this Provisional Government, is it your opinion that Liliuokalani has any chance toward reinstating herself without the intervention of some foreign government?
Mr. McCandless. None whatever. She has not had from the first.
The Chairman. Did you regard the movement from the time it was inaugurated as one determined and resolute, or one that might give way to some counter movement on the Queen's part—some concessions on her part?
Mr. McCandless. There never was any such idea prevailed there that I know of. It was one of strict determination. We sent the commissioners to San Francisco. When we found that annexation had not taken place under Mr. Harrison's administration we felt that our interests were in just as good hands under President Cleveland. We did not see how the dial could be turned backward.
The Chairman. You say that annexation was the ultimate result of this revolution—that such was the belief of those who were engaged in it?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. You could not have gotten the men to take up arms otherwise. The whole object was annexation.
The Chairman. You spoke of that being the case the year before.
Mr. McCandless. That was only a stepping-stone—the annexation movement in '87.
The Chairman. Do you know whether the Kanaka population, the native population, sympathize in that sentiment?
Mr. McCandless. In '87 they did. Nearly the whole native population was on our side—sympathized with the movement. Of course there were none of them taken into the organization.
|
The Chairman. Was that distinctively an annexation movement in'87?
Mr. McCandless. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. What change, if any, has occurred since that time?
Mr. McCandless. The natives were completely captured with the idea of the lottery being there, and that there would be no further trouble about having all the money they needed if they could get the lottery. They were carried away with that idea. The native is like an Indian; he will spend all the money he can get to gamble.
The Chairman. They are gamblers?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Gray. What is their principal game, cards?
Mr. McCandless. They do not care for cards. They have a Chinese game there called "Paka Pia" and che-fah. There were as high as fifteen to twenty games running in the city at a time. That consisted of going in and buying the tickets, guessing a number or a word. It was a Chinese game, and they were very fond of it. It was a very common report that the marshal's office was receiving $500 a week to allow that game to continue—receiving the money from these different banks. The Chinese cook that I had at my place told me of it. The Chinese do not think anything of bribing, and the games are controlled by the Chinese. He said that the marshal got $500 a week and the deputy marshal so much, and the others still less, making about a thousand dollars a week that was paid.
The Chairman. This Hawaiian sympathy. Had that died out before the revolution?
Mr. McCandless. I think it had.
The Chairman. Among Kanakas.
Mr. McCandless. I think so, although the annexation question had not been discussed publicly until the last two or three years. It was discussed then publicly through the press and openly.
The Chairman. And that sentiment died out because they thought they could get the money under a separate government through lottery schemes and such like?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. I know the leaders of the last Legislature, among the natives, would pat their pockets, right in the legislative chamber, and say, "Here is what we are here for." It had gotten to that condition. I have seen that myself, right in the legislative hall.
The Chairman. By the members of the Legislature?
Mr. McCandless. By the members of the Legislature.
Senator Gray. The white members?
Mr. McCandless. The half-whites. It had gotten to that pass that it was just about as corrupt as it could be.
The Chairman. What time did you leave the islands to come over here?
Mr. McCandless. The 1st day of June.
The Chairman. Did you leave to come here to give your testimony?
Mr. McCandless. No. I have larger interests in the State of Washington than I have in the Hawaiian Islands. Like many people there, I come to the States to invest my money. I went to the State of Washington in 1886. My partner stayed there, and has been there ever since, and as I accumulate money I take it to the State of Washington.
The Chairman. Your visit to the United States is merely on business?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. I would not have come over except that I promised my family to come to the Fair.
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----63
|
Senator Gray. Where is your family?
Mr. McCandless. I have two homes—one in Honolulu and the other in the State of Washington. I brought my family with me.
The Chairman. Your citizenship is in the United States?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; a citizen of both countries.
The Chairman. You are a citizen of the United States and vote under the Hawaiian constitution?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. But your visit to the United States had no connection with the maintenance of the Provisional Government.
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. You had no political mission over here?
Mr. McCandless. No; just on my private affairs.
The Chairman. And you were summoned here from Seattle?
Mr. McCandless. No; Ellensburg is my home.
Senator Frye. As a member of the committee of safety did you expect at any time, from the commencement of the revolution down to its close, to receive any support whatever from the American minister or the troops of the Navy?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Frye. If the troops of the Navy had remained on board their ship, in your judgment, would it have made any difference in the result?
Mr. McCandless. None whatever; I do not think.
Senator Frye. Did Minister Stevens, or anybody else connected with the American Government, any officer on board the ship, or anybody in authority, convey to your committee of safety any assurances or intimations that the marines would aid the revolutionary movement?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I am aware of.
The Chairman. Have you any reason to believe that there was an understanding as to that?
Mr. McCandless. No. On the contrary, Mr. Stevens was, of course, noncommittal; said he would protect American lives and property— noncombatants.
Senator Frye. Did you know Mr. Stevens pretty well?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; well acquainted with him; met him several times in Honolulu, visited his family, and my family visited his family.
Senator Frye. Do you know what the estimate of his character was among the citizens there?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know of an American who was not proud of him as a citizen and as the American representative. I happened to have a conversation with him just the day before the flag was taken down; had business with him. I went up to call upon him to talk about some matters. That was the 31st day of March, 1 think. It was either that or the 30th. At all events it was the day before the flag was taken down. We talked of the situation some, and he stated that he was very well satisfied with everything as it was; and the flag was mentioned, I am quite sure it was, among other things, and he said the flag would never come down, and that afternoon or that day, at 11 o'clock, Mr. Blount called on President Dole and said he was going to take the flag down at 4 o'clock that afternoon. Of course, it was very much of a surprise; and it was agreed that the flag should comedown the next day.
Senator Frye. Were any demonstrations made at all in taking it down?
|
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Frye. What day did you leave the islands?
Mr. McCandless. The 1st day of June.
Senator Frye. The past June?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. What was the character of the members of the Provisional Government—high in that country?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; as I have stated before, the men who make up the advisory council are just such a class of men as make up the boards of trade and chambers of commerce where I have lived in the cities—men of character and standing in the community.
Senator Frye. In your judgment is there any danger that the royal party may recover the possession which it had and restore the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. I do not think there is any danger. There is only one element that is irreconcilable in the Hawaiian Islands, and that is the anti-American and the half whites.
Senator Frye. What is the trouble with the half whites?
Mr. McCandless. They, of course, believe themselves a good deal better than the natives, and they have been given a great many positions under the Government that it will be impossible for them to have with the white people controlling it. The part the full natives take in the Government, the positions they have they will continue to have— the Provisional Government have no quarrel with the Hawaiian people.
Senator Frye. Do you know what troops Marshal Wilson and the Queen had at the time you had this interview with Wilson?
Mr. McCandless. I think he was allowed 75 men. Those were not under Wilson; those were in the barracks. When we took charge of the station house I should judge there were 120 to 125 men.
Senator Frye. Were they policemen, or what?
Mr. McCandless. Policemen. And he said he had a good many extras in that night.
Senator Frye. From the time the Queen undertook to promulgate the new constitution up to the time of the establishment of the Provisional Government, was any police force on the streets preserving order?
Mr. McCandless. They were on the streets just as common as they were ordinarily.
Senator Frye. They were?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. Under the charge of Wilson?
Mr. McCandless. Under the command of Wilson.
Senator Frye. Did your committee of safety have any idea that in order to take control it was necessary to take those barracks where those 75 men were and the police station; did you have any such idea?
Mr. McCandless. Of course, we knew that there was no other armed resistance; and, of course, we were bound to take it.
Senator Frye. Did you not regard yourself as in full possession when you took possession of the Government building, the archives, treasury, and everything else?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; we had the Government and all the departments of the Government.
Senator Frye. Had the men in charge of the Government buildings deserted? I mean the Queen's men.
Mr. McCandless. The ministers were absent when the committee
|
of safety went there. When the committee went there they asked ton them, and they made the demand of the chief clerk----
Senator Frye. What was the danger to your committee of safety that made you call on Minister Stevens and ask him not to land the troops? What did you apprehend?
Mr. McCandless. We apprehended fire and the looting of the city. We heard those rumors right along.
Senator Frye. Incendiarism?
Mr. McCandless. Incendiarism; yes. There were two or three fires the very night that we took charge of the Government—two or three fires that they never accounted for.
Senator Frye. And that you apprehended from the lawless element and not the Queen?
Mr. McCandless. From the element that were her supporters.
Senator Gray. You knew you were going to make some trouble, did you not?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. Do you know why Arion Hall was selected?
Senator Gray. Of your own knowledge?
Mr. McCandless. I do not know of my own knowledge.
Senator Frye. Do you know of any other suitable place for the soldiers to be protected that night?
Mr. McCandless. That is the only reason for selecting that. I did not know of any suitable place. That is the only suitable place that they could get.
Senator Gray. Were you with Capt. Wiltse and Minister Stevens when they were selecting the place?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. You said you knew it was the only place they could get?
Mr. McCandless. Of course I knew; they marched out beyond the Government building; I saw them there myself, with stacked arms. They marched out King street until they got in front of Mr. Atherton's, that is a mile from the business center, and Mr. Atherton, I understood, invited them into his yard to get them out of the street.
Senator Gray. Did you see them out at Atherton's?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Did you go out with them?
Mr. McCandless. No. Senator Gray. You went out afterwards?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; I passed them afterwards, going home.
Senator Frye. Did the committee of safety have anything to do with making any request as to the placing of troops in Arion Hall?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Frye. When the Provisional Government took possession of the Government building, were there any American soldiers drawn up in sight of the Government building, in martial array?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I know of.
Senator Frye. When you went there was there any in sight?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Gray. Do you know where they were?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. Do you know of any interference on the part of the United States to help or hurt the Provisional Government's cause?
Mr. McCandless. No.
Senator Frye. Or to help or hurt the Queen's cause?
|
Mr. McCandless. No; it was one of strict neutrality.
Senator Frye. What was the understanding of the committee of safety—that these troops were to be absolutely impartial?
Mr. McCandless. Why, yes; that was all the information they had. They would not be anything else.
Senator Frye. You were there while Mr. Blount was there?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; for some time after he arrived.
Senator Frye. Did the various members of the committee of safety call on Mr. Blount with any communication?
Mr. McCandless. The committee of safety called on him—not the advisory council—called on him in a body to pay our respects to him, and he was informed there that any members of the committee of safety or advisory council were ready at any time to come before him.
Senator Frye. Were they invited?
Mr. McCandless. Not that I am aware of.
Senator Frye. You were not invited?
Mr. McCandless. I was not invited. The only one that I know of being invited before I left the islands was Mr. Bolte.
Senator Frye. What was he; a member ot the commitee of safety?
Mr. McCandless. He was a member of the committee of safety and member of the advisory council, and still of the advisory council.
Senator Frye. Is he an American?
Mr. McCandless. He is a German. He is at the head of the American house of Gimbaum & Co., of San Francisco.
Senator Frye. Do the Germans sympathize with you there?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
Senator Frye. Almost unanimously?
Mr. McCandless. Almost unanimously. I do not know of a German in the Hawaiian Islands who was against the movement.
The Chairman. Claus Spreckels was?
Mr. McCandless. He was not there. But at the beginning Claus Spreckels was in favor of it.
Senator Gray. Do you know the fact of your own knowledge that when this committee, the members of the council, or any of them, called on Mr. Blount that he said it was a matter of extreme delicacy on his part to ask any of them to come before him to testify as to the strength or ability or authority of their own government, but he would be glad to hear them?
Mr. McCandless. I never heard that statement before. I called on him and Mr. Damon was the spokesman. After the assertion was made that any members of the advisory council, or the committee of safety, would be glad to call on him at any time, he said, "Mr. Damon, I want to have a talk with you one of these days." "Very well," said Mr. Damon, "I will be ready at any time."
Senator Gray. I wanted to know if you knew of Mr. Blount making that statement?
Mr. McCandless. No; I spoke to him and told him that I represented the younger element of Honolulu, and was there to assure him there were hundreds of young men in Honolulu who were prepared to call on him and make statements if he desired to have them, but they knew he was busy and did not care to call unless invited by Mr. Blount. That is the statement I made to him. He told me to thank the Americans for the offer, and that was all there was of that.
Senator Frye. Do you think of anything else you wish to state that you have not stated?
|
The Chairman. You identify this book, Two Weeks of Hawaiian History, of which you spoke in your examination?
Mr. McCandless. I read the resolutions of that.
The Chairman. Now, this book you will take with you and examine carefully, and see if you have any statements to make to the contrary of anything therein contained, on your own knowledge or information.
SWORN STATEMENT OF DEWITT COFFMAN—Continued.
Senator Gray. Were you on duty on the Pensacola at Honolulu in the fall of 1891 and during January and February, 1892?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you frequently on shore?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. On the Pensacola?
Mr. Coffman. I served on both ships.
Senator Gray. Were you frequently on shore?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you mix with the people of Honolulu?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. So that your acquaintance with Honolulu was not confined to the few days that you were attached to the Boston, at the time of this revolution?
Mr. Coffman. I was there very nearly six months, the first time.
Senator Gray. After the passage of what was known here as the McKinley bill, the tariff bill of 1890, did you find from your contact with business people there that the prosperity of those islands had been affected by the provisions of that bill in regard to making sugar free in the United States?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; generally so.
Senator Gray. And was that very generally marked?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I have heard it stated that they thought the monetary trouble they were laboring under at the time was generally due to the fact that the United States Government, by the passage of the McKinley bill, had killed, to a certain extent, if not altogether, the sugar industry of the islands.
Senator Gray. Now, what I was going to ask you is, did that have its effect on annexation sentiment?
Mr. Coffman. I believe that is at the bottom of it.
Senator Gray. Did it, to your knowledge, have the effect of creating a sentiment of annexation?
Senator Frye. For or against it?
Senator Gray. Have you knowledge that it did create annexation sentiment?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you hear any persons who before that were opposed to it say they were in favor of it?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. You have already testified that you commanded one of the companies of the battalion that was landed on Monday, the 16th of January, 1893?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. You landed at the wharf. What did you do at the wharf, so soon as you got out of the boats ?
Mr. Coffman. So soon as we landed we formed our battalion.
|
Senator Gray. Did you form immediately?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was it understood before you left the boat where you were to march?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I think our route of march was mapped out before we left the ship.
Senator Gray. Who piloted you, if anybody?
Mr. Coffman. When we got to the Government building, after detaching the marines, Mr. Hugh Gunn, I think, guided us to Mr. Atherton's place.
Senator Gray. What relation did he have to the Provisional Government, if any?
Mr. Coffman. He commanded a company of volunteer soldiers of the Provisional Government after that, and was known as one of the Provisional Government men or people.
Senator Gray. Was there, to your knowledge, any other building suitable for the use of the troops of the Boston than the opera house and Arion Hall?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where?
Mr. Coffman. On Nuuanu avenue, a little more than halfway between the United States consulate and the American minister's residence.
Senator Gray. What sort of building was that?
Mr. Coffman. It was a large three-story, brand-new hotel, and unoccupied.
Senator Gray. Do you know who owned it?
Mr. Coffman. Mr. John Thomas Waterhouse, who was present while our troops were standing in the street waiting to find out where Mr. Atherton's was.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether that building was obtainable?
Mr. Coffman. I have no doubt in the world that it was obtainable.
Senator Gray. Is that simply an opinion?
Mr. Coffman. That is my opinion.
Senator Gray. Did you hear Mr. Waterhouse say anything about it?
Mr. Coffman. I heard Mr. Waterhouse say that he was glad to see the troops, and marched down in front of us after we had halted. He said, "I am glad to see this," and passed on in front of our troops as much as to say he was glad to see our troops.
Senator Gray. He owned that hotel building?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Is the situation of that building in a more thickly built up part of the town?
Mr. Coffman. I can not say more thickly built up; but there are fine residences around there, and it is more accessible to the business portion.
Senator Gray. Was it nearer to what you considered the property of American citizens than Arion Hall?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. More so, or how?
Mr. Coffman. It was nearer to the residence portion, which was the part which would be attacked in any incendiary work to go on.
Senator Gray. Will you point on that map where it is?
Mr. Coffman. On Nuuana avenue.
Senator Gray. You say it is on Nuuana avenue, a little more than half way between the U. S. consulate and the U. S. legation?
|
Mr. Coffman. Yes. (Indicating on diagram.) There is Nuuana avenue; that is the legation; it is about here-the house is not down here.
Senator Gray. It was a new and unoccupied building?
Mr. Coffman. It was a new and unoccupied building.
Senator Gray. Large enough to have accommodated your force?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did any one suggest the use of that building?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I did myself.
Senator Gray. Where and when?
Mr. Coffman. When the troops were drawn up; I think first when they were drawn up in the street, and certainly afterward, when we were waiting for a place to go.
Senator Gray. Whom did you suggest it to?
Mr. Coffman. To the officers in general. Mr. Swinburne was present when I spoke of that place as a good place.
Senator Gray. What was said, if anything, in reference to that?
Mr. Coffman. My impression was that they thought it was not as good a location as farther down town.
Senator Gray. You have spoken of Mr. Gunn and Mr. Waterhouse. After you landed did you see any others who were connected with the committee of safety or afterward with the Provisional Government?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Who was it?
Mr. Coffman. I remember Mr. Carter.
Senator Frye. Mr. Charles Carter?
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Charles Carter; yes. I remember Mr. Castle. I do not know what his first name is; he is a brother to the commissioner, a tall nervous man with a red beard, I remember. I do not believe I could call the names, because it is a question of testimony. Those men I was acquainted with; I knew who they were, and Mr. Gunn I knew pretty well.
Senator Gray. Was that at the landing place?
Mr. Coffman. No, up the street.
Senator Gray. What part of the street?
Mr. Coffman. It was first when we halted, and the second time while we were waiting to go to Mr. Atherton's when I saw Mr. Gunn, and later I saw Mr. Carter. I was informed that Mr. Carter had obtained Arion Hall for our barracks. I also saw Mr. Carter at Arion Hall that night, and to my mind he was the moving spirit for providing for the quarters of the troops and their comfort-little things as they needed, such as sinks or latrines for the men. And they hauled in their sand late at night. I am quite sure that Mr. Carter made the arrangements, or Mr. Swinburne and Mr. Carter spoke about the condition of the sinks for the men. In fact, there was only one sink.
Senator Gray. Did that continue until the next day?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Thoughtfulness for your comfort?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. By members of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; they were back and forth into the Government building. Our officers knew a great many of them, and they used to talk to a great many. They used to come to the fence and come to the gate, and I am quite sure that there were some of the officers who, while they did not allow persons to come into the grounds unless they were passed in by an officer, all of them were recognized by the officers and allowed to come and go back and forth.
|
Senator Gray. Was anything said in your hearing by any of these people about expecting you over to the grounds of the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. The day they took possession was one of the first intimations, and caused me to commence to think-the fact that one of their men came over to our house, one of their officers or one of the sympathizers, and in conversation with other persons expressed surprise that our troops had not gone into the grounds of the Government building when they took possession.
Senator Frye. Who was that?
Mr. Coffman. I think it was Mr. Gunn, who commanded one of the volunteer companies.
Senator Gray. How long was this after the proclamation of the Provisional Government, if you can recollect?
Mr. Coffman. I do not think it could have been more than two hours, or perhaps not so long, or a little longer.
Senator Gray. Where were you when the Provisional Government was proclaimed from the front of the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. I was in the yard of Arion Hall, in command of my company.
Senator Gray. Could you see the proceedings from where you were?
Mr. Coffman. No.
Senator Frye. Which front did you understand afterwards was it that the proclamation was made from?
Mr. Coffman. From the front of the building.
Senator Frye. There is only one front?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; only one front.
Senator Frye. Which way does that face?
Mr. Coffman. It faces the palace.
Senator Frye. And not Arion Hall?
Mr. Coffman. No; the positions of the two buildings are like this [illustrating]. Arion Hall is there and the Government building there, with a narrow street between them.
Senator Gray. The proclamation was proclaimed from the north front of the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. I should say so; yes. That was the main entrance.
Senator Gray. Where were you when the proclamation was read?
Mr. Coffman. In here, at Arion Hall, back of the opera house.
Senator Gray. So that you could not see that?
Mr. Coffman. No.
Senator Gray. Were there any troops in here [indicating]?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; and perhaps Mr. Laird; I do not know whether he was here [indicating]. That is where the artillery were and that is where Mr. Young was [indicating].
Senator Gray. Does this recall to your recollection the position of the troops?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; my recollection of the troops is that they were a little differently arranged from that. I do not know; I may be mistaken on account of the points of the compass; but I think my company was drawn like this [indicating]. I think it stood here [indicating] and Mr. Young's right in here [indicating].
Senator Gray. That [indicating] would not indicate that the troops were along here?
Mr. Coffman. No; only here-sentries.
Senator Frye. The other officers testified that no troops were there but the sentries.
|
Senator Gray. Where were the guns?
Mr. Coffman. My recollection is that one gun was here [indicating], pointed toward the building; the other gun here [indicating,] pointing out here. But my impression is that you can see the palace from this street here [indicating].
Senator Gray. Is this a street [indicating]?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; it comes out onto the street. There is a fence along there, where my men used to come from this yard here [indicating].
Senator Gray. Is there a gate at that point [indicating]?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. You say that the next day these gentlemen provided for your comfort-Mr. Carter and others who seemed to be of the Provisional Government.
Mr. Coffman. I got the impression that everybody seemed on our side of the question, seemed to be in sympathy with them, and seemed naturally to look to those people for anything that was wanted done, no matter what it was.
Senator Gray. You say that you were somewhat familiar with the people of that city and with the condition of things there. From your observation of matters about this time, and what you knew of those people, what is your military opinion as to whether that Provisional Government could have been established at that time in the way it was if the United States troops had not been landed in Honolulu?
Mr. Coffman. I do not think it would have been.
Senator Gray. Did or did not that seem to be the accepted opinion in Honolulu?
Senator Frye. Mr. Coffman has not laid the foundation for such an opinion as that.
Senator Gray. No; I freely confess that all this examination has been outside of the rules that govern the courts, but the latitude here is greater than in court practice. Still, I think that is a proper question. I will ask you if you had the opportunity, after as well as before you landed, in your contact with the people of Honolulu, to get an impression and form an opinion as to what their sentiments were in regard to the matter I have just mentioned?
Mr. Coffman. I think so.
Senator Gray. Did you meet the people?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where?
Mr. Coffman. At their private houses.
Senator Gray. Did you go to the club?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; and at the hotel and on the streets.
Senator Gray. Have you extensive acquaintances in Honolulu?
Mr. Coffman. I think I know almost everybody in Honolulu; while not intimately, I know them pretty well.
Senator Gray. Was the revolution and proclamation of the Provisional Government a topic of conversation?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; but not until after we landed.
Senator Gray. You heard it frequently spoken of?
Mr. Coffman. Very frequently.
Senator Gray. I will ask you whether you gathered from the opportunities which you have described a definite opinion as to what the impression was in regard to the matter which I have just asked you about?
Mr. Coffman. My opinion is that everybody believed that the entire
|
American force and American minister were in accord and sympathy with the movement, and I do not think the movement would have been undertaken had they not thought so beforehand.
Senator Gray. Do you think that is the opinion?
Mr. Coffman. I think that is the opinion. If you say to them, "Would you have taken possession of that building had you not known that the sympathy of the United States troops and minister was with you," some of them will say, "Well, perhaps not: but they were there."
The Chairman. You say they would say that?
Mr. Coffman. I heard Mr. McCandless say so, and I heard Mr. Gunn.
Senator Gray. Have you heard other people say so?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I have heard other people say so; and in my mind I am thoroughly convinced that those men thought and felt if there was necessity our troops would aid them. I do not say they would have done so by firing or anything of that sort. At the time the thing came on me so suddenly I did not give it much attention; but after that time, after it simmered down, I came to that conclusion.
The Chairman. How could you aid them except by firing?
Mr. Coffman. The moral presence of the troops, which is very great on an occasion of that kind, and the position in which they were placed.
Senator Gray. Your position is, that while these troops were there to protect life and property there was a general impression in Honolulu that carried the purpose of their presence far beyond that.
Mr. Coffman. Yes; I believe that.
Senator Gray. I will ask you whether the people of the Queen's party did not to your knowledge generally (and if you do not know say you do not know) entertain the opinion that the presence of the United States troops was in sympathy with the movement?
Mr. Coffman. They did; and I have heard them say such things after the thing was over.
The Chairman. Did they include you amongst the sympathizers with the Provisional Government?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. Was that an improper estimate of your attitude?
Mr. Coffman. No.
The Chairman. You were in sympathy with them?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. I was there to do whatever I was ordered to do, so long as it was a legitimate order from my commanding officer, and if it was I would have carried it out.
The Chairman. After you had been there sometime you had the same feeling?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; right straight through.
The Chairman. So that you have been ready at any time heartily to enter into the movement to overthrow the Queen?
Mr. Coffman. I would have entered into any order that was given me properly.
The Chairman. I am talking of your preferences?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. While we have no sympathy with the Queen, I have contended with my shipmates that the manner in which it was done was the only question. That is the only question I ever brought up.
The Chairman. Did you express your views there as being favorable to annexation?
Mr. Coffman. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. You have expressed them openly?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; to everyone.
|
The Chairman. And as being opposed to the Queen and her monarchy?
Mr. Coffman. As opposed to the Queen and her monarchy. That question never came up. I had no opinion of the old Queen, and I would be glad if she lost her place.
The Chairman. Do you think that a proper estimate to form of the Queen?
Mr. Coffman. I think it is, because I do not think, from what I have seen recently, that she is a fit person to have hold of the reins of the Government.
The Chairman. As an officer, and while you were there, did you form an opinion that the Queen was conducting a fair, honest, and reputable government?
Mr. Coffman. That is a question I did not form an opinion upon.
The Chairman. Did you have an opinion on the subject?
Mr. Coffman. No; not prior to this trouble.
The Chairman. I mean during the trouble?
Mr. Coffman. No; can not say that I had.
The Chairman. Upon what ground did you form the opinion that the Queen was not a proper person to be in charge of the government?
Mr. Coffman. In what I have seen later in the letter replying to Mr. Willis's question.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the time you were on shore as an officer of the Navy. I understood while you were there you gave expression to the opinion that the Queen was not a proper person to be at the head of the government.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Coffman give expression to that opinion?
Mr. Coffman. In fact, I can say that I said at times that she would not be restored.
The Chairman. Did you make use of that expression while you were there as an officer?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. Upon what did you base that opinion that the Queen could not be restored?
Mr. Coffman. I based it upon the rush with which it was carried on. That was before Mr. Blount came out there, before any investigation; what we saw from the press, that the President had negotiated the treaty and sent it into the Senate, and we saw the discussions in the Senate.
The Chairman. Was that an estimate of the Queen's power based on her want of military resources?
Mr. Coffman. Yes. I believe after her military resources were taken from her she did not have the means to procure them again; I do not mean money means, but that the Provisional Government would prevent her getting hold of the means for her restoration.
The Chairman. And that is the ground on which you base your opinion that the restoration of the monarchy was not likely to take place?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. Now, comparing the people there, the main supporters of the Queen as you knew them, with the main bodies of the citizens there engaged in this adverse movement, which would you say were the more intelligent and better class?
Mr. Coffman. I should say, as a man, those who are in the Provisional Government are much more intelligent, that is, much better educated, and I think that they have a greater number, a majority of those
|
who are conceded to be the best people in the island; although I must say that there are men who are supporters of the Queen, and whom I know personally, whose integrity I believe as good as any man's in the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the general masses.
Mr. Coffman. Yes. The natives, you might say, are almost as a unit opposed to the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Without reference to whether they are property holders or not?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
The Chairman. It is a question of sentiment and devotion to their own institutions?
Mr. Coffman. A question of sentiment and devotion to their own institutions.
Senator Gray. I omitted to ask one question. Why were you of opinion that another place than Arion Hall or the Opera House should have been selected for the troops?
Mr. Coffman. For the reason that the Government building would be the point of attack, and that unless we were to be in the way of any firing that might be going on, it might be better to be placed at a point which I considered at that time needed more protection than any property around Arion Hall-that portion of the city which is the residence portion.
The Chairman. Were there any troops located in the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. There were none there when we went there.
The Chairman. No; I mean at the time you considered the controversy between the Hawaiians and the Provisional Government would involve, necessarily, the United States troops?
Mr. Coffman. Prior to that time I formed this opinion-prior to the time they went into the Government building, and I had it more strongly after they went in there.
The Chairman. Was there any garrison in the Government building at the time your troops were first stationed there?
Mr. Coffman. No.
The Chairman. Where was the garrison?
Mr. Coffman. There was none, except that of the Queen's troops, which was back of the palace.
The Chairman. Well, an attack by the populace upon the Provisional Government, or by the troops of the Provisional Government upon the Queen's forces, would have been made at the barracks where the forces were?
Mr. Coffman. No; I do not think they had any idea of attacking the Queen's people. I think they thought the Queen's people would attack them.
The Chairman. Suppose they had the idea of attacking the Queen's people, would they or not have made it at the barracks?
Mr. Coffman. I think they would have gone and taken possession of the Government building, feeling if any attack were to be made the Queen's people would make it.
The Chairman. From anything you saw there at that time, was there any demonstration on the part of the Queen's troops to indicate that they would make an attack upon the Government building or on any of the troops about the Government building?
Mr. Coffman. No; not that I saw.
|
The Chairman. Then there was no danger of a collision that you could see?
Mr. Coffman. None, except that they had taken place there before.
The Chairman. You mean on former occasions, several years before?
Mr. Coffman. Yes; several years before.
The Chairman. The Government building was not a fortified place, was it?
Mr. Coffman. No.
The Chairman. Was it constructed of wood or brick?
Mr. Coffman. I think it is coral, and perhaps brick; not wood.
Senator Frye. What is the color of the coral?
Mr. Coffman. Light color; gray color.
Senator Frye. Does it harden?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. After you left Arion Hall was anything done for your comfort—after you went into Camp Boston?
Mr. Coffman. Yes.
Senator Gray. When did you go into Camp Boston?
Mr. Coffman. My recollection is that we remained three nights at Arion Hall, the 16th, 17th and 18th, and the forenoon of the 19th. When we went into Camp Boston we were furnished with beds, matresses, mosquito bars, and mosquito netting for the men, all furnished by the Provisional Government, which at that time had taken possession.
Senator Gray. Did they keep on furnishing you coffee?
Mr. Coffman. No; I do not think they did; I think a short time after that we got our own cooking arrangements and cooked our own provisions.
Senator Gray. How did you get these things; what was the mode?
Mr. Coffman. We had a lot of requisition blanks which were furnished to the camp, and the adjutant—of course, I do not refer to provisions, because when we got there we got our ship's cook—would make a requisition upon the commissary of the Provisional Government, Mr. Hall, and if not through him, Mr. McCandless, who was one of the military committee.
Senator Gray. Did you have sheds?
Mr. Coffman. There were wash sheds for the men to wash their clothing, an officers' kitchen built, and bunks afterward. Bunks were put in the guardroom for the men who remained on shore. My recollection is that was afterward.
The Chairman. You did not decline any of the hospitalities that were offered you?
Mr. Coffman. I never heard of it.
The Chairman. Had the same hospitalities been tendered by the Queen's government would they have been equally acceptable?
Mr. Coffman. I think I would have accepted.
The Chairman. Everything was fish that came to your net?
Mr. Coffman. I think so.
Senator Frye. Are mosquitoes plentiful on the islands?
Mr. Coffman. I did not sleep a wink that night.
Senator Frye. How many months of the year are they troublesome?
Mr. Coffman. The whole year round.
Adjourned until Thursday, the 25th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
|
WASHINGTON, D. C, Thursday, January 25, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Gray and Frye.
Absent: Senators Butler and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF M. STALKER.
The Chairman. State your age and place of residence?
Mr. Stalker. I am 52 years of age and my residence is Ames, Iowa.
The Chairman. When did you last visit the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Stalker. I arrived in the Hawaiian Islands the 17th of December, 1892.
The Chairman. When did you come away from there?
Mr. Stalker. I left there the 1st day of February following.
The Chairman. Had you ever before that visited the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. What was your purpose in making that visit, generally speaking?
Mr. Stalker. I went simply for a pleasure trip, winter's outing, and to consider the customs of the people.
The Chairman. What is your profession?
Mr. Stalker. Professor in the Agricultural College of Iowa.
The Chairman. And it was an interest in your profession that led you to look up the habits and customs of the Hawaiian people?
Mr. Stalker. No; no connection with the college whatever.
The Chairman. Had you ever been there before?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. What islands did you visit?
Mr. Stalker. Oahu and Hawaii.
The Chairman. Oahu is the one upon which Honolulu is situated?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you go to Hilo?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you go out into the country?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Just visited the volcanoes, or make an exploration amongst the people?
Mr. Stalker. I saw comparatively little of the people on the islands. I was there several days and visited the people of Hilo and some of the prominent men of the town, and talked with them.
The Chairman. Did you make any examination of the homes and farms of the common people of Hawaii while you were out there?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; to rather a limited extent—made a number of short excursions from Honolulu and vicinity to some places more remote.
The Chairman. What opinion did you form of the native population of Hawaii, as to their docility, disposition to be quiet and good citizens?
Mr. Stalker. My estimation of them is that they are an exceptionally quiet, docile people.
The Chairman. You would not regard them then as being an aggressive military people, or aggressive in political efforts or ventures?
|
Mr. Stalker. No; just the reverse of that condition I should say was true of them.
The Chairman. Do they seem to be a happy people at home?
Mr. Stalker. Quite so, I think.
The Chairman. Did you ascertain from your observations whether they were living in a comparative degree of comfort, as other persons in a similar situation in life in other countries?
Mr. Stalker. I think they are. It requires comparatively little in that country to make one reasonably comfortable.
The Chairman. Did they impress you as a misgoverned, depressed, and downcast people?
Mr. Stalker. No; I would not say that.
The Chairman. I suppose their holdings of land are quite limited, small?
Mr. Stalker. That is the result of my observation, that the holdings of a great majority of natives are comparatively small, although I think the aggregate number of holdings is a good deal larger than that of any other nationality.
The Chairman. Did those small holdings seem to be sufficient for the maintenance of the families who were residing upon them?
Mr. Stalker. They seemed to be.
The Chairman. To what do you attribute that they can live on so small an area of land?
Mr. Stalker. In the first place, as I have already stated, one can live in that country better than in an inclement country, such as ours, in clothing and houses, and, to some extent, food. The country is wonderfully productive in some of its vegetable growths. They have access to the sea, which is literally swarming with fish in addition to a small plat of ground to be cultivated in taro. It is possible to support a family in reasonably good condition off what would seem to be exceedingly slender opportunities in this country.
The Chairman. As a class, would you say the people are expert fishermen?
Mr. Stalker. I doubt whether my observation on that subject would make me a very good witness. I should say hardly, in a large sense, as their fishing is carried on for private purposes.
The Chairman. The native Kanaka depends upon his skill as a fisherman, rather than endeavoring to carry on any large enterprise?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I saw no enterprise like that carried on by the natives in a large way.
The Chairman. Were you in Honolulu in the latter part of the year 1892 and the first part of the year 1893?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. When did you get back to Honolulu from your visit down to Hawaii?
Mr. Stalker. I doubt whether I can give that date. I think I went down about the first of the year and was gone seven or eight days. I returned some days prior to the so-called revolution; the date I can not just recall.
The Chairman. When you returned to Honolulu, what would you say was the situation of the people there in respect to projected or contemplated legislation upon the subject of opium and the lottery; in a state of excitement or quietude?
Mr. Stalker. There was a good deal of excitement in the assembly; or, at least, a good deal of acrimonious discussion; I would not say intense excitement; I would say hot-blooded discussion.
|
The Chairman. Did you hear the debates in the assembly, the Legislature?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Were the newspapers engaged in considering, discussing these questions?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; the newspapers were pretty actively interested in those topics.
The Chairman. How about the responsible citizens of Honolulu; were they also concerned in these matters?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I think they were.
The Chairman. Were you made aware while you were there of an alleged effort to press these bills through by getting a change in the ministry of the Queen so that she could get a ministry or cabinet to sign the bills with her on their passage?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; that charge was made in the public press. I had no other means of knowing; I had no private information on that subject.
The Chairman. Was that a subject of anxious discussion amongst the people of Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; there was a good deal of talk on that subject.
The Chairman. Were you there at the time the ministry was changed by a vote of want of confidence?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Did that change in the ministry produce any very decided impression upon the people?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say that I appreciated any marked change outside of the atmosphere about the Government building among the public officers, members of the assembly. They manifested a pretty high state of interest and some intensity of feeling on the subject. I can not say that I appreciated anything of the kind among the common people, especially on the streets.
The Chairman. Did you then have the impression that a change in the ministry and the passage of the opium and lottery bills would be likely to result in a revolution in the Government? I am speaking now of the time when the change took place.
Mr. Stalker. No; I am sure that did not manifest itself to my mind.
The Chairman. Did you hear of any association or conspiracy or any other voluntary combination of men in Honolulu at that time for the purpose of revolutionizing the Government, dethroning the Queen, and annexing the islands to the United States, in consequence of the passage of the opium bill and the lottery bill?
Mr. Stalker. No; I did not.
The Chairman. Was there any mob demonstration or military demonstration there to indicate that there was deep-seated or a violent state of feeling amongst the people in regard to these projected measures?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. When did you first become aware that a revolution was on foot in Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. If I remember correctly, it was on Monday, the 16th.
The Chairman. About what time?
Mr. Stalker. I attended a mass meeting at 2 o'clock in the afternoon and had some conversation with some citizens, I believe, earlier in the day, which led me to believe that there was an organized plan being developed to change the Government.
The Chairman. When you say "being developed," do you mean in process of development?
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----64
|
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. What was the first intimation you had, or first idea grasped by you, that that might result in a complete revolution of the Government?
Mr. Stalker. I think it was other than this. I had formed a conjecture of that kind a day or two earlier from some little matters that I had observed that I could not interpret the meaning of any other way. I refer now to the fact of being in one or two hardware stores in town and seeing----
Senator Gray. Was that on Monday?
Mr. Stalker. This was Monday, and possibly as early as Saturday observing some citizens getting fixed ammunition, cartridges—saw a number of citizens come in and rather quietly procure ammunition and go out with it.
The Chairman. Then you began to think that they would have use for that ammunition in some emeute or disturbance that was to take place?
Mr. Stalker. I began to regard that as a possibility. I knew nothing but what I saw, and began to wonder why there were so many citizens wanting fixed ammunition.
The Chairman. And it was not until Monday, if I gather your recollection about it, that you discovered there was an actual and combined movement in that direction?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. About how many persons do you think were at the meeting which you mentioned as having taken place in Honolulu on Monday?
Mr. Stalker. Twelve hundred or 1,400.
The Chairman. Did it seem to be an intense meeting in its exhibition of feeling?
Mr. Stalker. A good deal.
Senator Gray. You, yourself, were at the meeting?
Mr. Stalker Yes.
Senator Gray. There were other tourists, like yourself, who helped to make up that number?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I might say I saw people there from our hotel.
The Chairman. Speeches were made and resolutions adopted?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Were there demonstrations of applause and cheering about the meeting?
Mr. Stalker. Applause and cheering were pretty vociferous at the time the speeches became of a rather sensational and exciting nature.
The Chairman. You have seen assemblages of that kind—not that kind particularly, but many public assemblages—would you say from your observation that that was an enthusiastic and strongly exciting, intense meeting?
Mr. Stalker. I can hardly say that they were intensely excited. It was a pretty enthusiastic meeting; a good deal of vociferous cheering greeted the speakers, but there was no excitement, no disturbance.
The Chairman. Did the meeting impress you with the idea that there was a resolute purpose to carry out the end?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; it did.
The Chairman. What was that end, as you gathered it from the meeting; what was the purpose they had in view?
Mr. Stalker. I believed then, for the first time, certainly that a
|
revolution was in contemplation, although that was disclaimed in the speaking.
The Chairman. In the speeches was it stated, or did you understand it to be advocated as an attitude of the meeting, that in the event they could get a guaranty of their constitutional rights they would not overthrow the Queen or revolutionize the Government?
Mr. Stalker. As I recall it there was no policy, no promise of anything outlined. It was rather a declamatory style of speaking, in which the existing Government was severely criticised, different speakers saying: "We are not here as revolutionists, but to talk about grievances." I can not recall a single speech where so much as a single word was said about changing the form of the Government. I can not recall anything of the kind.
The Chairman. And yet you were conscious all the time that that would be the result?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; when I went to my hotel immediately after the meeting I said to some of my friends, "There will be an attempt at revolution here inside of three days;" I was laughed at.
The Chairman. Suppose that the Hawaiian people had been left to settle this matter in their own way, without the intervention of the United States or any other country, could you state it as your opinion that the popular demonstration which you witnessed at that meeting and the persons who were engaged in it and the purposes which actuated them were sufficiently strong and the people were sufficiently powerful to carry their end against the real government? In other words, did you believe from all the surrounding circumstances that the revolution then inaugurated would be successful aside from the intervention of the United States?
Mr. Stalker. I am not prepared to say I believed the Hawaiian citizens who were most enthusiastic in this meeting would of themselves conduct a successful revolution; but I had been led to believe by some remarks of citizens that the men were coming from the Boston.
The Chairman. State what those remarks were, and who were the men who made them, and when they were made as well as you can remember.
Mr. Stalker. If I remember correctly, it was a friend of mine, a Mr. White, who was a member of the revolutionary party, a nice gentleman. He said to me on this day----
The Chairman. What day?
Mr. Stalker. I think this was Monday—"If you want to see some fun get up early to-morrow; there will be an end of Kanaka Government."
The Chairman. What time of day was that remark made to you?
Mr. Stalker. I have been trying to recall that, and I am not quite able to say whether this was in the forenoon or afternoon.
The Chairman. That was on Monday?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I am sure this was on Monday.
The Chairman. Where were you when Mr. White made that remark?
Mr. Stalker. I met him on the street.
The Chairman. Do you remember whether it was before or after the the mass meeting which you attended?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say as to that.
The Chairman. You have stated what he said. Have you stated all or is there something else you wish to add?
|
Mr. Stalker. I think that is all I recall, anything like verbatim. He used those words.
The Chairman. After the mass meeting had passed, I will say the two mass meetings that occurred on Monday, was there a state of quietude in Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I think there was. When I left the meeting at the barracks, held by the supposed revolutionists, I went to the meeting held by the natives—that is, mostly native people who were in attendance at this meeting around at the Government building. I walked in and out of that crowd and through it, and I saw no disturbance.
Senator Gray. That was an open-air meeting?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; this was an open-air meeting. I saw no demonstration. I could not understand what they were talking about. I saw no violence, no demonstration. I walked about the streets afterward, and I saw no disturbance, heard no loud talking, nor anything to indicate violence—so far as a man could see on the surface------
The Chairman. On Monday evening and night was Honolulu in a condition of quietude, or one of excitement?
Mr. Stalker. I saw no excitement whatever.
The Chairman. About what time did the troops from the Boston come in that evening?
Mr. Stalker. Late in the afternoon, a little before sundown; I should think between 4 and 5 o'clock, as I recall it.
The Chairman. Did their appearance create any excitement amongst the population?
Mr. Stalker. Apparently not. There was quite a little talk about it. The question was very frequently asked: "Why are the Boston boys here?" Some of us walked over from the hotel, which was a block or two blocks away, heard their music, and saw the boys marched up the street.
The Chairman. Did the troops come with drums and fifes or with a brass band?
Mr. Stalker. They had a drum corps.
The Chairman. Did you witness anything of an exasperated or agitated feeling on the part of the natives as they were marching up through the streets?
Mr. Stalker. In their faces I think there was a good deal of intense excitement manifested. They were comparatively quiet. That seems to be their disposition. They stood around in considerable numbers. A few hundred of them were out there when the Boston boys came to a halt in front of the palace, standing on the sidewalks and in the streets. But there was very little conversation going on, even amongst them.
The Chairman. Was it a mixed assemblage of women and children?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Such as would attend a demonstration of that kind in towns here?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Was any clamor raised against them—hissing or resentment at their coming ashore?
Mr. Stalker. No; nothing that I could recognize as a hiss.
The Chairman. Did you witness any demonstration against the troops while they were ashore by any person of Hawaiian nativity?
Mr. Stalker. I did not.
The Chairman. You would say, I suppose, that their presence on the island was not a cause of national offense, so far as you could see?
|
Mr. Stalker. It certainly did not manifest itself in the way of disorderly conduct if it was.
The Chairman. It was not such as would accompany the Britishert if they were to land in Baltimore without invitation from the Presidens of the United States?
Mr. Stalker. I think not.
Senator Gray. While you are on that subject of the landing of the troops, I will ask you a question. You have already said that (on Monday, I think it was) you heard expressions from a number of people that some revolution, indications of which you thought you had seen, would be supported by the troops from the Boston. When these troops landed did you gather from your contact with or observation of the people an impression as to how that landing was regarded, and what was the general opinion as to the purpose of that landing?
Mr. Stalker. The feeling, so far as I was able to judge of it, from conversations with the citizens, was that they would at least not be in the way of any revolutionary effort that might come on.
The Chairman. You mean the troops from the Boston would not be?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was that landing and the impression that it created, in your opinion, a discouragement of those who were in the contemplated revolution?
Mr. Stalker. It was not; most decidedly.
Senator Gray. Were you present when the troops landed from the boats?
Mr. Stalker. Not at the wharf; not at the landing.
Senator Gray. You first saw them as they passed your hotel?
Mr. Stalker. They did not pass immediately by the hotel, but two streets away. I saw them as they came up.
Senator Gray. Where was their first halt?
Mr. Stalker. Their first halt was in a sort of plaza, or broad street, near what they call the royal palace and Government building.
Senator Gray. How long did they halt?
Mr. Stalker. They were there several minutes. I should think they stood around there a quarter of an hour or more, possibly twice that long. Then they marched on past the palace down the street a few blocks beyond and turned into the grounds of a private citizen. A little later they marched back up the street to their same position, the palace being on the right side and the Government building on the left hand as they came back, and went into quarters for the night in a building that stands immediately at the end of the Government building and facing the palace on the opposite side of the street.
Senator Gray. That was Monday?
Mr. Stalker. Monday night. It was dark before all this was through with.
Senator Gray. Were you up there when they went into quarters?
Mr. Stalker. No; I was not there when they returned; this was after dark.
Senator Gray. Did you get up early the next morning, Tuesday, to see what the fun would be which Mr. White had predicted you would enjoy?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. What did you observe on Tuesday?
Mr. Stalker. I walked out to the corner of the palace grounds, a plot of land possibly of 20 acres, cornering on the hotel grounds. I walked along on the west side of the court over to the street where the
|
troops were quartered, and walked along immediately in front of where they were quartered, and everything was perfectly quiet. It was just in the gray of the dawn. Everything was perfectly quiet there. There were a few guards on duty; that was all that was visible so far as the troops were concerned. I then walked quite around the palace ground and passed the quarters of the native troops, which were immediately on the opposite side of the palace grounds on which the men of the Boston were quartered. The two were on almost directly opposite sides of the palace. Everything was quiet in the palace grounds.
Senator Gray. Go on in your own way with the events of that day. This was pretty early in the morning; had you your breakfast?
Mr. Stalker. No; I went out pretty early in the morning; I went back to the hotel and had my breakfast as usual; a little later in the morning I went down town. The hotel is away from the business streets of the city, and I went down on the business streets and in some of the business places; dropped in where I had acquaintances and it was all as it had been—business houses were open, men were buying and selling. I saw no demonstration; heard nothing said of an excitable character. I went to the public library for a time and returned to the hotel for my dinner.
Senator Gray. About what time was this?
Mr. Stalker. This was possibly 1 o'clock, I should say; possibly a little after 1 o'clock when I came out from my dinner. I walked out from the dining hall on to a broad lani that runs around the three sides of the hotel; just as I came on to this veranda I heard a shot.
The Chairman. Was this Tuesday?
Mr. Stalker. It was Tuesday morning of which I was speaking. I heard a shot in the direction of the business part of the town. I stood waiting a moment to see whether it was a matter of any consequence. Possibly two or three minutes later a carriage came by at a very rapid pace, with a driver on the front seat and a man on the rear seat with a rifle. This was succeeded in pretty rapid succession by other carriages, being driven at a rapid rate, containing 1, 2, or 3 men with guns. These carriages were driven past the hotel in the opposite direction from the business portion of the city. These carriages came from the direction where the shot was fired, and came in front of the hotel. I walked down in front of the hotel, in the grounds, and asked a gentleman at the telephone station what this meant. He said, "The war has commenced; one man has been killed."
The Chairman. Who told you this?
Mr. Stalker. The man at the telephone station. He said that a policeman was shot. A number of carriages passed by in rapid succession, and occasionally a man on foot. I, with some friends, went to the top of the building, where there is a sort of outlook, an observatory. There is a view in every direction. We could see the palace grounds, the public building, and to some extent the town in other directions. We remained up there twenty minutes, probably thirty minutes; I could not tell the time exactly, and could see little or nothing that was indicative. So we came down, and I remarked to my friends, "Probably it will be uncomfortable for us on the front porch; we had better take the rear of the building if there is to be fighting on the campus." I thought I would go down and see if I could get some word from the seat of war. I walked past the side of the palace grounds and saw no excitement there until I came to the corner, came to the street that passes between the palace and the Government building. On going to the Government building I saw a crowd in the street, quite a
|
number, and as soon as I reached a point of vantage where I could see well, I observed there were men inside the grounds with guns, and some few straggling citizens were in there unarmed. Guards were placed at the gates, and after that citizens were not allowed to go in without permission. About the time I arrived, or very soon after, a gentleman commenced reading a document which proved to be a revolutionary declaration and the announcement of the organization of a new government.
Senator Gray. Do you know whether he had commenced reading, or whether it was that you then first perceived that he was reading, and had been for a little while after you arrived?
Mr. Stalker. I did hot hear him reading on my arrival, and did not have the impression that he was reading at the time I arrived, though I did not get a good point of observation at once, and there was some confusion. I could not see very well, and I would not be positive whether the man was reading at the time I arrived or not; my impression is that he began reading after I arrived.
Senator Gray. How long did you stay in the vicinity of the Government building at your point of observation?
Mr. Stalker. I stayed there and thereabout for probably half an hour, possibly longer.
Senator Gray. On which front of the building were you?
Mr. Stalker. I was on the side facing the palace—the main entrance of the building.
Senator Gray. Were you down the street that separates the Government building from the building in which the United States troops were quartered?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; the Goverment building and the building in which the United States troops were located are separated by a narrow alley. It is not a public street; it is a very narrow way, and there is practically no travel along it.
Senator Gray. That is called Arion Hall?
Mr. Stalker. Arion Hall.
Senator Gray. How far is Arion Hall, or the ground on which it is situated, from the public building, as nearly as you can estimate?
Mr. Stalker. Simply a narrow roadway or alley between the two. There is room to drive a carriage between the fence inclosing the grounds of the public building and that of Arion Hall, and that is about all, as I remember.
Senator Gray. When you walked down there did you see the United States troops?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where were they?
Mr. Stalker. They were at the end of Arion Hall, in a little court or vacant piece of land.
Senator Gray. Outside the Government building?
Mr. Stalker. Outside the Government building.
Senator Gray. Drawn up in a line?
Mr. Stalker. I do not think they were when I saw them. I do not remember observing them when I walked up first. I think as I came away they were not in line. I would not be too positive about that.
Senator Gray. Did you see any of the officers or converse with them?
Mr. Stalker. At that time?
Senator Gray. Yes.
Mr. Stalker. I do not remember talking with any officer on that occasion.
|
Senator Gray. Very well: state anything else that occurred in the sequence of events of that day in your observation?
Mr. Stalker. The Hawaiian flag was floating from the mast over on the palace.
The Chairman. On the palace?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; on the Queen's palace. And I observed couriers or orderlies going back and forth. I did not know the significance of it, but observed individuals go from one building to the other; they passed the guards at both places, came in and went out, and this sort of thing was kept up certainly for a half hour or longer without any visible change taking place anywhere.
The Chairman. By the palace do you mean Iolani Palace?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; that is the palace as distinguished from the Government building, where state business is transacted. After a little the flag on the palace came down, and there was a murmur through the crowd that the Queen had probably surrendered; that the flag was down. But a moment later it was pulled up again. It seems it was being adjusted. Then a cheer went through the crowd when the flag was pulled up; but a little later a native Hawaiian came out and lowered the flag, and pretty soon the word went through the crowd on the streets that the Queen had surrendered. A little later it was in print, what doubtless has been presented in evidence here a good many times, that the Queen had surrendered "To the superior military forces of the United States."
The Chairman. I would like you to give the day and the time of day exactly when that occurred.
Mr. Stalker. When the flag came down?
Senator Gray. Mr. Stalker has already said it was Tuesday, the 17th of January.
Mr. Stalker. Yes; Tuesday, the 17th. And this was late in the afternoon. I could not say what time of day it was. I believe it was between 3 and 4, possibly as late as 4 o'clock, though I would not be positive as to the time of day.
Senator Gray. Was it not as late as 5?
Mr. Stalker. That the flag came down?
Senator Gray. Yes.
Mr. Stalker. It might have been. Let me see. About 2 the ball really opened over there, and it might possibly have been as late as 5. I should say it was as late as 5 when the flag came down. There was a good deal of delay, parleying back and forth, until pretty well along in the afternoon.
Senator Gray. You were on the streets all this time, from the time you went up after dinner to the public building to the time of the events which you have described as coming under your observation; did you continue in the streets of Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. I was back and forth after getting some information. When I first went over I remained a time, half an hour, possibly longer than that, and then went back to the hotel to tell some of my friends there, who were in a pretty uneasy state of mind, what had occurred. I then came out on the street, and I was on the street during the afternoon and evening.
Senator Gray. Did you hear anything said during that afternoon and evening in regard to the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I heard frequent remarks about their presence.
Senator Gray. And the significance of their presence?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I believe I did.
|
Senator Gray. What was it, as you understand it?
Mr. Stalker. This query came up, probably in some conversation with people sitting about in the hotel: "If the troops were there to protect property, why did they not protect that building, its offices and treasury, against parties who came there with arms in their hands, and nobody presumably knowing what they were going to do and what they were there for?"
The Chairman. To what offices do you refer?
Mr. Stalker. The permanent offices of the Hawaiian Government.
The Chairman. The Government building?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; the Government building generally.
Senator Gray. When you got back to the hotel after the proclamation of the new Government and the hauling down of the flag was everything quiet that evening?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Do you know what gave that sense of repose? I ask the question in this form: Was it confidence in this newly established Government and its ability to preserve order, or was it the presence of the United States troops?
Mr. Stalker. That I would not be able to answer. As I said before, I saw no street demonstration or acts of violence; nor did I hear threats during this time, either before or after.
The Chairman. You have been speaking about the impressions you derived from conversations you heard at the time you have indicated. Can you trace those conversations to any particular individuals—those remarks?
Mr. Stalker. I do not believe I can. A number of us was at the hotel, and a good many I did not know the names of. We engaged in miscellaneous conversation, and remarks were frequently made by persons whom I did not know.
The Chairman. Were these men who have any connection with the political movement there either for the Queen or against her?
Mr. Stalker. No, I think not; they were people who, like myself, were simply standing by.
The Chairman. Disinterested observers, or rather observers of matters with which they were not connected?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. I suppose it was very much as it would be with any other discussion of a current event by gentlemen looking on and observing without having any participation at all?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. You were not partisans of either party?
Mr. Stalker. No.
Senator Gray. On the next day what seemed to be the condition of things?
The Chairman. That would be Wednesday?
Senator Gray. Wednesday; yes.
Mr. Stalker. Matters were quiet. I was in and out of the hotel and on the streets around in front of the public buildings. I think on Wednesday I was in Mr. Severance's office. He was our consul at that time, and he gave me a pass or permit which entitled me to go to the building. I had been there a good many times; had a good many acquaintances in the office; and I went in and out and talked to them. I think it was next day that Mr. Severance gave me a pass.
Senator Gray. Did you hear any discussion of the events of the day before?
|
Mr. Stalker. Comparatively little; there was no excitement on the street that I could detect.
Senator Gray. It was understood that the Queen had surrendered in the way you have described?
Mr. Stalker. Yes. The next morning these matters were all in the public prints, and her ukase, or whatever she termed it, was printed, and in the morning papers.
Senator Gray. Did you hear any talk of projects or schemes of resistance to the Provisional Government on that day, or shortly after?
Mr. Stalker. No; never while I was there did I hear anything to lead me to believe that there was any organized resistance in contemplation.
Senator Gray. Did you ever have any conversation with any of the officers of the Boston?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I met them frequently at different times on board the boat, and met them at the hotels.
Senator Gray. Did you have any discussion with any of them in regard to these events which had taken place?
Mr. Stalker. I talked with Capt. Wiltse about the subject.
Senator Gray. What was the tenor of your conversation, so far as it had reference to this matter?
Mr. Stalker. I remember on one occasion we were driving up from Waikiki, which is a suburb, bathing resort, and the conversation turned on this matter. I was interrogating Capt. Wiltse as to whether the United States troops had not participated in this matter to rather an unjustifiable extent.
The Chairman. Will you state just when that was?
Mr. Stalker. This was a few days after; I can not state the day.
The Chairman. After this Tuesday?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; after Tuesday—between that and the end of the month some time. I asked him this question, whether this was not a move to destroy the form of government that was the one preferred by the great mass of the people of the islands.
Senator Gray. With reference to the participation by the soldiers?
Mr. Stalker. With reference to their participation; as to whether our Government had not involved itself in what had been done. Capt. Wiltse made this remark to me: "All this talk about who has a right to vote and who has a right to govern in these islands is bosh; I do not care a cent about that; the only question is, does the United States want these islands? If it does, then take them." Those were his words.
Senator Gray. You say this was some days after the revolution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; some days.
Senator Gray. And after the circumstances which you have described?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was or was not the movement which you have already described, and which resulted in the surrender, such as it was, of the Queen and the establishment of the Provisional Government on the terms of the proclamation, an annexation movement to the United States, as distinguished, I mean, from an ordinary revolution having for its object the displacement of one government by another?
Mr. Stalker. I believe it was. Perhaps even a better form would be----
Senator Gray. State it in your own form.
Mr. Stalker. I believed it was.
Senator Gray. State in your own words what your belief was.
|
Mr. Stalker. My belief was that it was a movement intended to end in the annexation of those islands to this country.
Senator Gray. By that you mean that was the purpose which animated those who acted in the revolution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you have any reason to know or believe that that movement was disconnected from any purpose on the part of the revolutionists to preserve and maintain their rights under the constitution of 1887?
Mr. Stalker. I did not believe the revolution was inaugurated for the purpose of securing their rights under that constitution.
The Chairman. You did not believe that?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. State the grounds of that belief.
Mr. Stalker. I believed it from this fact, that one of the first items of information that came to us after the downfall of the existing government was that a boat would be dispatched immediately to make a tender of these islands to this Government. That was early the next morning. That was a matter of conversation everywhere. On making inquiry, I went down to Mr. Severance's office to ascertain whether I could get a permit to go home on that boat. I had stayed a little longer than I had intended, on account of the exciting events there, and I wanted to come over on the Claudine at the time she sailed with the commissioners. Mr. Severance told me that I would not be able to get on board that boat; and it was evident the following day that the preparations were active for annexing these islands to the United States.
Senator Gray. You were stating, in answer to a question by the chairman, what the grounds of your belief were. You stated one fact. I will ask whether you had any grounds for it in what you heard from those who were active in the revolution that annexation was their object?
Mr. Stalker. Possibly simple disconnected remarks. I had no conversation with any active member of the revolutionary party containing statements to that effect; only incidental remarks dropped in my hearing, like these: "Soon we will all be Americans."
The Chairman. By whom were those incidental remarks dropped?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say. I remember hearing that remark dropped by some person. I believe I heard that remark, or similar remarks, in some of the crowds on the street, from men whom I would not know.
Senator Gray. English-speaking people—American people?
Mr. Stalker. Oh, yes; American people.
The Chairman. To get at the nature of the belief on which you were forming these opinions, I will ask you whether any person officially connected with the Queen or the revolution came to you to inform you of the nature of the affairs or the progress of the affairs that were expected?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. What you had learned was the common gossip on the street?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; that is where I gathered practically all my information.
Senator Gray. You were seeking information?
Mr. Stalker. I was seeking information. I was inquiring----
The Chairman. Did you gather from what you heard there and observed there in this way that these people who were promoting the
|
revolution would not have been satisfied to have continued the monarchy if they could have felt assured of the preservation of the rights which they held under the constitution of '87?
Mr. Stalker. I certainly gathered the impression that they would not be satisfied with that.
The Chairman. From whom did you gather that impression, if you can state?
Mr. Stalker. I gathered that impression first from the speeches made at the mass meeting.
The Chairman. Were those speeches reported in the morning papers or the papers the next day?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Were they correctly reported?
Mr. Stalker. Measurably so.
The Chairman. Have you any fault to find with the report, or any amendment to make of it, according to your memory?
Mr. Stalker. Not specially. I would not make any criticism on the reports. I do not think they were verbatim reports in every respect; but there was nothing stated that would materially change the tone of the speeches.
The Chairman. What you are stating is the conviction that you derived from the speeches as they were delivered and reported?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. And I thought you said, remarks made in the meeting?
Mr. Stalker. And remarks made in the meeting, some of those in the form of speeches, and occasionally by individuals in the meeting responding. For instance, when Mr. Baldwin, I think, made use of this expression: "What we do ought to be done under the constitution," a number of individuals shouted "No;" and while that might point in the opposite direction from my interpretation—the general belief—the general impression that I would gather from the tenor of those speeches was that they were intending to form a new government if public sentiment would seem to justify the movement.
Senator Gray. Do you mean a form of government in favor of annexation?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. The speeches you refer to—those made to the audience—were very largely by men put up to speak?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. That is your conclusion?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. In regard to these incidental remarks in the audience, were they different from the resolutions adopted at the meeting?
Mr. Stalker. Simply cries of "No," when a speaker indicated cautious movement; but nothing in opposition to the resolution which was a resolution favoring the continuance of the committee of safety and expressing belief in their ability to look out for the interests of the people, or something to that effect.
The Chairman. Amongst those objections that you have been speaking about here, did you hear any cries or expressions to the effect that the Queen was not to be trusted; that she intended to overthrow the constitution?
Mr. Stalker. Nothing of that kind from the crowd, that I recall.
The Chairman. Well, from the speakers?
|
Mr. Stalker. From the speakers; yes—that the Queen was revolutionary in her acts.
The Chairman. Did the crowd deny that?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. Did they not concur with the speakers on that proposition?
Mr. Stalker. They did. It would be my impression that they did.
The Chairman. So that, you would gather that the real pith of the movement was that they would no longer trust the Queen, because she had begun a revolution by overturning the constitution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; that was said, in effect, by the speakers.
The Chairman. Can you say, on the Tuesday or Wednesday that you have mentioned, that the appearance of the Hawaiian Kanaka population was that of a people resentful at the invasion of a hostile power, and were awed into submission by a display of military force?
Mr. Stalker. That would be my opinion.
The Chairman. Did you observe any evidences of resentment, and what were they, on the part of the Kanaka population at the appearance of the U.S. forces in Honolulu?
Mr. Stalker. Have you in the first part of that question the expression "resentment?"
The Chairman. Resentful at the invasion of a hostile and foreign power?
Mr. Stalker. You had better agree on a way of stating that before it is taken down.
Senator Gray. State it in your own way; you have not answered the question.
The Chairman. Yes; state it in your own way.
Mr. Stalker. I believe that a large majority of the native Hawaiian population, so far as I was able to judge, was opposed to the action taken by the troops of the Boston, and regarded it as unfriendly toward their Government.
The Chairman. Can you state any fact that will go to support that conclusion—any expression from any native Kanaka, or any movement of the Kanaka population that will support that proposition?
Mr. Stalker. I would not be able to recall, probably, a statement of any native. There was a quiet, or rather sullen, expression on the faces of nearly all the native population, and a rather suppressed murmur in regard to the presence of these troops. But I can not recall any expression definitely used by individuals in the way of objection.
Senator Gray. I know the difficulty in stating an impression gathered as to the opinion of a large mass of people, of producing or reproducing individual expressions. But, to put the chairman's question in another form: Did you not receive this impression of which you speak from the deportment and conversation that you observed and felt, so to speak, all around you, and would not that support that opinion?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. Will you state what that deportment and conversation were?
Mr. Stalker. I do recall, after thinking it over, a somewhat protracted conversation with one native who was a member of the assembly.
The Chairman. What is his name?
Mr. Stalker. A Mr. Bush. He was unstinted in his denunciation of the course pursued and of the purpose to overthrow the existing
|
government and take away from them their independence, as he termed it, and annex the islands to this country. That was his statement of the case. And further, if I maybe permitted to say—as he is in some sense a representative man among them, a public man, at least—he voices this, coupled with the assertion that it was the opinion of an overwhelming majority of their own people.
The Chairman. How long had you known Mr. Bush?
Mr. Stalker. I had only seen him in the assembly as I had seen many others. I saw him probably within a day or two after I went over there first, and saw him almost every day while I was in Honolulu.
The Chairman. Was he opposing or favoring the lottery and opium bills?
Mr. Stalker. I think he was favorable to the bills.
The Chairman. Both bills?
Mr. Stalker. Certainly the lottery bill; I do not recall his action on the opium bill.
The Chairman. Do you remember the persons who were in Honolulu promoting the passage of that bill—I mean from abroad, foreigners?
Mr. Stalker. I simply had it from others, not from any acquaintance, that there were two Americans who were the particular promoters of the scheme.
The Chairman. Who were they?
Mr. Stalker. I do not recall their names; one was said to be from Chicago, the other from St. Louis. Their names I do not recall. I came over on the Australia in her February trip with one of the men in whose favor this grant was given. He was a man whose home, I think, is in the islands. He is a Scotchman.
The Chairman. What is his name?
Mr. Stalker. I have forgotten his name. I met him on board ship only, and his name at this moment has slipped my mind.
The Chairman. In his criticisms on the action of the Government, or upon the revolutionists in breaking down his lottery, was he earnest?
Mr. Stalker. No; I never heard him discuss that question further than this: We had a little talk about it one day, and he simply said that now he did not suppose that any thing would come of it. But he did not enter into any discussion of the merits or demerits of any of the parties engaged in this movement.
The Chairman. But that the revolution had crushed out his lottery?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; and that his lottery was dead. He gave me that impression.
The Chairman. Was there any other person in Hawaii whom you became acquainted with, and with whom you had conversation in the same line that you had with Mr. Bush?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I talked with other people who criticised these actions.
The Chairman. State who they were, if you please.
Mr. Stalker. I remember a conversation in the family of Mr. Walker.
The Chairman. Was he a member of the Legislature?
Mr. Stalker. He was president of the Assembly.
The Chairman. He was president at the time the vote of want of confidence in the Wilcox-Jones cabinet was expressed.
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. How did he vote on that?
Mr. Stalker. I do not know how he voted on that question.
|
The Chairman. Do you not remember that he was opposed to the retention of the former cabinet and in favor of putting in the new lottery and opium cabinet?
Mr. Stalker. No; my impression is that he was on the other side of those questions; that is, opposed to the opium and lottery bills.
The Chairman. That is your impression?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. What did Mr. Walker have to say to you about the purpose of this revolutionary movement?
Mr. Stalker. It would be hard, if not possible, to separate just what Mr. Walker said from what was said by other parties, as there were a number of people in the house during the evening.
The Chairman. Was it at the entertainment?
Mr. Stalker. A few people; not a public entertainment. I was invited there to attend the meeting of probably none but members of his own household.
The Chairman. It was not a dinner party?
Mr. Stalker. No.
The Chairman. The subject of Hawaiian politics was under discussion there?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
The Chairman. What did Mr: Walker say in his opinion was the real motive of this movement?
Mr. Stalker. The expression was freely indulged in that it was a movement to annex that country, to the United States and freely criticised as such.
The Chairman. Did Mr. Walker object to that?
Mr. Stalker. It was objected to; I am not able to fix upon Mr. Walker himself individual expressions as separate from other members of the household, where there were two or three grown sons and others. The action of the revolutionists was freely criticised, and the statement made that it was a few of the missionary stock that created the trouble.
The Chairman. What was said, if anything, about the Queen having made up her mind to overthrow the constitution of 1887 and substitute one of her own making in place of it?
Mr. Stalker. I do not remember any conversation on that phase of the subject.
The Chairman. That was a subject of general conversation in the community, was it not?
Mr. Stalker. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Can you account for its not being referred to on that occasion when you were discussing Hawaiian troubles?
Mr. Stalker. No; I can not. Let me see. Mr. Walker did criticise the action of the Queen in that particular.
The Chairman. What was his criticism?
Mr. Stalker. Simply that it was not warranted by law.
The Chairman. If not warranted by law, was it revolutionary, or in accordance with law?
Mr. Stalker. No; I do not remember his making a criticism or using the expression that it was revolutionary; do not remember that he did, though he indulged in some general criticism of the course pursued by the Queen.
The Chairman. Would you regard the overthrow of a constitution to which the Queen had made oath of allegiance and to which her title to the throne depended, and the substitution in place of that of a constitution of her own making, of her own will, which changed the
|
rights and powers of the people of Hawaii, as being peaceful or revolutionary?
Mr. Stalker. Certainly revolutionary.
Senator Gray. I will ask you in that connection: Considering that revolutionary, would you consider the fact that no such proclamation of a change of constitution was actually declared, though intended to be declared, coupled with the fact that there was a declaration from the Queen that she had abandoned all idea of changing the constitution, except in accordance with its terms and requirements, revolutionary?
Mr. Stalker. The substitution of a constitution in any such way would be revolutionary.
Senator Gray. Read the question. The question was read as follows: "I will ask you in that connection: Considering that revolutionary, would you consider the fact that no such proclamation of a constitution was actually declared, though intended to be declared, coupled with the fact that there was a declaration from the Queen that she had abandoned all idea of changing the constitution, except in accordance with its terms and requirements, revolutionary?"
Mr. Stalker. That would admit of a doubt, at least of its being revolutionary.
Senator Gray. You are asked not a hypothetical question, but a question as to conduct that occurred. The Queen did, according to the evidence, announce her intention of proclaiming, on her own authority, a new constitution; but she never actually did it, but told those who wanted her to do it, and those of the population who were disposed to favor it, that she would defer it. She afterwards issued a proclamation to her people why she abandoned all idea of changing the constitution, except in accordance with its terms and requirements. Taking all that conduct together, do you consider it revolutionary?
Mr. Stalker. I should hardly think it was revolutionary.
The Chairman. The latter part of that question you certainly would not; that is, you came to the conclusion that the Queen intended to amend it in accordance with existing law?
Mr. Stalker. No; but to change it in accordance with existing law.
The Chairman. Take the first part of the question, with reference to the methods provided in the constitution of '87, by which the Queen assumed the right to declare the new constitution. Would you regard that revolutionary or a regular proceeding?
Senator Gray. That is, if she had proclaimed it?
The Chairman. I speak of her purpose.
Mr. Stalker. Can I answer that in my own way?
The Chairman. Yes; it is your own way we want; not anybody else's.
Mr. Stalker. The act of imposing a constitution in such a way would certainly be irregular and revolutionary; if she had it in mind to do that thing, but did not do it, in my mind it would not be revolutionary. Have I answered that question?
The Chairman. Yes. Suppose that the Queen had it in mind, and was prevented only by the fact of an opposing force which she was afraid would overturn her Government, would her motive and conduct be less revolutionary than they would have been had she gone on and accomplished it in the absence of such an opposing force?
Mr. Stalker. The motive might be; the conduct would not be.
Senator Gray. Are you aware that this constitution of 1887 that the Queen had sworn to support, had been proclaimed by the King in precisely
|
the same way that the Queen proposed to proclaim the new constitution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Without any reference to the Legislative Assembly or to the people at large?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. You have already stated where you were from, and why you were out on those islands—that you had no interest politically, commercially or otherwise in those islands to affect your inclinations or feelings in regard to this matter?
Mr. Stalker. None whatever.
Senator Gray. You were not a partisan of either side?
Mr. Stalker. No.
Senator Gray. To what party do you belong in this country?
Mr. Stalker. I am a Republican.
Adjourned until to-morrow, the 26th instant, at 10 o'clock a.m.
|
|
Washington, D. C, Friday, January 26, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senator Frye.
Absent: Senators Butler, Gray, and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF JOHN A. M'CANDLESS—Continued.
The Chairman. I have examined the paper you handed me, entitled Two Weeks of Hawaiian History, from January 14 to January 28, and I find that it is copied into Mr. Blount's report. Do you agree with the statements in that history as being substantially true?
Mr. McCandless. I do.
The Chairman. The proceedings of the meeting which you attended, the mass meeting, as therein set forth are true as therein stated?
Mr. McCandless. They are true, except as I have noted. There is a typographical error that makes it the 17th where it should be the 16th, and about there being 1,260 present by actual count.
The Chairman. How many do you think there were?
Mr. McCandless. My estimate is that there from 1,000 to 1,200. This account of the organization of the government I know to be correct.
The Chairman. Have you a list of the officers who were engaged in movements against the Queen's government?
Mr. McCandless. I have a list [producing paper.] That is a partial list of the military officers engaged against the Queen's Government, it being a list of the officers who were in the revolution of 1887.
The Chairman. Were they in that revolution as officers or privates?
Mr. McCandless. As officers. I have given their official standing from 1887 to 1890. In 1890 they were disbanded, and the same ones came on the 17th of January, 1893, in support of the revolution.
The paper submitted by Mr. McCandless is as follows:
S. Doc. 231, pt 6------ 65
|
"EX-OFFICERS OF THE HONOLULU RlFLES IN 1887-'90 AND WHO WERE ACTIVELY CONNECTED WITH THE REVOLUTION OF JANUARY 17, 1893.
"G.F. McLeod, late adjutant; J.H. Fisher, late captain Company B; C.W. Ziegler, late captain Company A; H. Gunn, late captain of ordnance; J.M. Camara, late captain Company C; A. Gartenborg, late captain of ordnance; W.W. Hall, late captain and quartermaster; J.L. Tolbert, late first lieutenant Company A; G.C. Potter, late first lieutenant Company B; J.M. Vivas, late first lieutenant Company C; J. Asch, late second lieutenant Company A; I.A. Burget, late second lieutenant Company A; J.V. Simonsen, late second lieutenant Company A; T.E. Wall, late second lieutenant Company B; A.G. Silver, late second lieutenant Company C.
"In addition to this most of the noncommissioned officers were with us also."
The Chairman. On page 448 of Executive Document No. 47, House of Representatives, I observe the names of the officers of the Hawaiian Patriotic League; and these persons have also signed a statement which the President sent to the House of Representatives; which statement purports to express the opinions of 8,000 native Hawaiians in regard to the maintenance of the monarchy and annexation of the islands to the United States. I will ask you to state in respect to these persons what their standing is in Honolulu?
Mr. McCandless. Mr. Cummings is a half-white, whose father left him very well off, and he has practically squandered the whole of the fortune. The next two, Joseph Nawhi and Bush, I would refer you to Minister Willis's report in regard to their characters.
Senator Frye. What does Minister Willis say of them?
Mr. McCandless. That they are men of no standing, and that Mr. Bush is of very bad reputation, which I know to be a fact. The others I know; they are men of no standing, and of bad reputation in the Hawaiian Islands.
Adjourned until Monday, the 29th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
|
|
Washington, D. C, Monday, January 29,1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present, the chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, and Frye.
Absent, Senator Sherman.
Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, I move that the correspondence which has been submitted to Congress since the order under which this committee has been acting, and such as may be sent in before the committee shall have closed its investigation, shall be made a part of this record.
The Chairman. That is proper.
SW0RN STATEMENT OF WILLIAM S. BOWEN.
Senator Frye. State your business and residence?
Mr. Bowen. I am a journalist and reside in New York City.
Senator Frye. You are connected with what paper?
Mr. Bowen. The New York World.
|
Senator Frye. Editorially?
Mr. Bowen. Mine is a peculiar, unique position. I am the confidential man to the proprietor of the World.
Senator Frye. Were you sent to the Hawaiian Islands at anytime?
Mr. Bowen. I was, last winter.
Senator Frye. At what time did you go?
Mr. Bowen. I sailed from San Francisco on the 31st of March.
Senator Frye. And arrived in the islands when?
Mr. Bowen. On the 7th of April.
Senator Frye. How long did you remain there?
Mr. Bowen. Until the 26th of April.
Senator Frye. What was the purpose of your visit to the islands?
Mr. Bowen. I was sent there by the World merely to study the situation and note the conditions prevailing there. My visit was hastened somewhat by the report that a special commissioner had gone to the islands. I followed him from San Francisco.
Senator Frye. Do you know what time Commissioner Blount arrived in the islands?
Mr. Bowen. About ten days before I did.
Senator Frye. Did you make, as yon were instructed to do, an examination into the condition of affairs of the islands at that time?
Mr. Bowen. I did. I did not stay so long as I had expected to do; but I made an examination to the best of my ability.
Senator Frye. Did you become acquainted with the members of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Bowen. I did.
Senator Frye. What kind of men did you find them to be?
Mr. Bowen. I found Mr. Dole, the President, to be a man of the highest character. In fact, I was surprised: I had a different impression before I went out to the islands. I found Mr. Dole and most of the members of the Provisional Government to be men who would compare favorably with the best of our public men—Mr. Dole, especially.
Senator Frye. Did you become acquainted with the Queen's special supporters?
Mr. Bowen. I did.
Senator Frye. What estimate did you form of them?
Mr. Bowen. With one or two exceptions, I found them to partake more of the Polynesian type than that of the Anglo Saxon. I found the Queen's principal adviser to be a man of mixed blood, an amiable, kindly gentleman, but like a child as compared with the others.
Senator Frye. Who was that?
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Sam Parker, a happy-go-lucky man, but one who was very kind to me.
Senator Frye. You may state generally what investigations you made there during the time you were present.
Mr. Bowen. The policy of the paper to which I am attached is one of investigation, with opposition to annexation. Of course, I wished to follow specially the policy of my paper. I had not been in the islands over twenty four hours before my personal sympathies tended toward the side of annexation. That is, I found a charming place, a beautiful island; I found a little city that compares favorably with any city in the United States, except in the Chinese quarters; I found electric lights, street cars, good police, and the telephone more used in proportion to the population than anywhere else in the world. I found a delightful society. I was entertained a good deal at dinners. The conventionalities of life are more strictly observed there than anywhere
|
in the United States; that is, you see more people in evening dress than you do anywhere else in the United States, relatively. I found the gentlemen of the Provisional Government of high character, as I stated. I found churches there that reminded me of Massachusetts, in congregations and appearance of things. That made an impression on me in my sentiment, and led me to think that it would be an interesting portion of the United States. The climate is charming for women and children. It is not so tropical as in most of the tropics; it compares with Havana, but not so warm.
That is the sentimental side of my stay at Honolulu. On the other hand, I would state, I was confronted by an economic question on which my mind was not clear—the question of cooly labor. That was the contrary side which raised up when I thought of all the beauties of these islands, and I tried to be impartial.
Senator Frye. What was the result on your own mind of all your investigations?
Mr. Bowen. I have not settled the economic question. If the cooly question could be disposed of I think annexation would not be a difficult matter to determine. But I know that sugar is not grown without contract labor; and as cane sugar is the chief and almost main industry of those islands it is a question whether our American people would agree to the conditions that exist with regard to contract labor.
Senator Frye. Have you read Mr. Blount's report?
Mr. Bowen. I have.
Senator Frye. I have not the page; I do not know whether you have or not; but my recollection is that in that report Mr. Blount makes some allusions to you.
Mr. Bowen. He does.
Senator Frye. Do you know what they were?
Mr. Bowen. I have the report with me.
Senator Frye. Can you read the lines to which I refer?
Mr. Bowen. Yes.
- "No. 3.] Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 26,1893.
- "Sir: On the 7th instant the Alameda reached this place. Among its passengers were Dr. William Shaw Bowen and Mr. Harold M. Sewall. The San Francisco papers announced that they had refused to say that they were not joint commissioners with myself to Honolulu. The former represented himself to me as a correspondent of the New York World, and said he would be glad to give me any information he could gather here. Thinking it a mere matter of courtesy, I thanked him. On Sunday, the 16th instant, I was out walking and met him on the street, riding in a buggy. He left his buggy in the hands of his friend, Mr. Sewall, and joined me in a walk of some length. Before it was concluded he said to me that he and Paul Neumann were arranging a meeting between President Dole and the Queen, the object being to pay her a sum of money in consideration of her formal abdication of the throne and lending her influence to the Provisional Government with a view to annexation to the United States. He repeated this statement frequently, at intervals, to which I made no response.
- "Finally he asked me if I did not think it would simplify the situation very much here and facilitate annexation. Suspecting that my answer was designed to be used to induce the Queen to yield to solicitations to abdicate, I replied: 'I have nothing to say on this subject.' Dr.
|
- Bowen said: 'I did not ask you officially, but simply in a private way.' I responded: 'I am here as a commissioner of the United States and must decline to converse with you on the subject.'
- "The next morning early I had an interview with President Dole. I told him that I had seen in the San Francisco newspapers intimations that Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall were here as representatives of the President of the United States; that the former told me that he had arranged to bring him and the Queen together on that morning; that I desired to say to him that neither Dr. Bowen nor Mr. Sewall, nor any other person was authorized to act for the Government in that or any other matter relating to the present condition of affairs in the islands save myself; that I did not know absolutely that these two gentlemen had claimed to have such authority. He replied that he had been informed that they were here representing the Government. He did not give his authority.
- "He said that there had been some approaches from the Queen's side with propositions of settlement; that he had responded: 'I will consider any reasonable proposition.'
- "I told him I would not permit the Government of the United States to be represented as having any wish in the matter of any negotiations between the Queen and the Provisional Government. He asked if I would be willing to authorize the statement that I believed it would simplify the situation. I replied that I was not willing to do this, that I was not here to interfere with the opinions of any class of persons.
- "Since this interview with President Dole I have heard that Dr. Bowen, when asked by newspaper people if he represented the President of the United States, declined to answer, saying that all would be revealed hereafter.
- "He is representing himself in various quarters as an intimate friend of the President. I can but think that these statements are made to create the impression that he is here authorized to bring about negotiations for a settlement between the Queen and the Provisional Government.
- "On the day before yesterday Dr. Bowen came over to my table to say that a meeting between the Queen and President Dole had occurred, and terms were agreed upon. I said I did not care for him to talk with me on that subject.
- "On the 21st instant Mr. Claus Spreckels called to see me. He said that he suspected there was an effort at negotiation between the Queen and the Provisional Government, and that he had urged the Queen to withdraw her power of attorney from Paul Neumann. I inclose herewith a copy of that power of attorney (inclosure No. 1) which Mr. Spreckels says was derived through the agency of Mr. Samuel Parker, the last secretary of foreign affairs. He told me that Paul Neumann would leave for Washington by the next steamer, under pretense that he was going to the United States and from there to Japan. How much or how little Mr. Spreckels knows about this matter I am unable to say, as I do not know how to estimate him, never having met him before. He promised to see me again before the mail leaves for the United States on next Wednesday, and give me such information as he could acquire in the meantime.
- "I believe that Dr. Bowen, Mr. Sewall, and Mr. Neumann have pretended that the two former knew the opinions of Mr. Cleveland, and assured the Queen that annexation would take place, and that she had better come to terms at once.
- "Mr. Neumann leaves here on the next steamer, probably with a
|
- power to act for the Queen, with authority derived from her out of these circumstances."
Senator Frye. What have you to say in relation to that?
The Chairman. Mr. Bowen had better take it up in detail instead of making one sweeping remark about the whole of it.
Mr. Bowen. The first statement to which I wish to call attention is the one published in the San Francisco paper that Mr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall "refused to say that they were not joint commissioners with myself to Honolulu."
The Chairman. Will you allow me to ask who is Mr. Sewall?
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Sewall is the son of Mr. Arthur Sewall, of Maine.
Senator Gray. He was the late consul at Samoa?
Mr. Bowen. Yes. He is a shipbuilder of Bath. Mr. Sewall was in my company and was purely on a pleasure trip. He had considerable experience in Polynesia, and wanted to go to the islands for the sake of going.
Senator Frye. You may go on and make your statement.
Mr. Bowen. As I was leaving San Francisco, just as the steamer was shoving off, a young man came to me and said: "Are you going on a secret mission to the Hawaiian Islands?" I laughed and said, "If I were I would not admit it." Mr. Sewall did not speak. That was based on the fact that Mr. Sewall was going, he having been mixed up in the Samoan affair. The San Francisco Chronicle published the next morning a sensational report to the effect that Mr. Sewall and myself were going out to the islands on a special commission for the Government. It was stated that when I was approached I had declined to give any information. That paper followed on the next steamer to Honolulu, and was circulated there. I did not see it, did not know about it at the time, but it did circulate for a week before my attention was called to it. Mr. Blount became acquainted with it as soon as the paper arrived. Mr. Blount states that I called upon him and represented myself as a correspondent of the New York World, and that I would be willing to give him any information I could gather. In fact, I called on the Commissioner and informed him of my mission to the islands—that I was there as a correspondent to the New York World. Mr. Sewall did not appear in the matter. I went there with the news instinct of a developed journalist. I saw very little to write about the country; it had been covered. There were a great many correspondents there. I conceived the idea of obtaining some very important and very exclusive news. I studied the situation.
I knew before I left here that annexation was undoubtedly impracticable at present—I had very strong reasons for believing that. I always believed that the American people would not believe in the restoration of the Queen. I therefore saw a status quo condition there that I thought would continue, and that there was a fine field for making history. I was in company with Paul Neuman going out in the steamer and the Queen's commissioners were just returning from Washington. I became very intimate with them, especially Mr. Neuman. Mr. Neuman had the power of attorney from the Queen. I thought that I heard from authority which was entirely correct that the Queen had a disease of the heart. I had that from a professional source which it would be improper for me to mention; but it came from the best authority on the islands. I heard that she had a disease of the mitral valves of the heart, and that she was liable at any time to sudden death. I thought it was equitable that she should be taken care of. I am only explaining the motives which prompted me to do
|
what I did. I thought it would be better if the Queen were taken care of. She was generous to her following, and there were many people depending upon her. That made an impression on me. I thought she should be taken care of.
One day while dining with Paul Neuman I said: "I think it would be a good thing if the Queen could be pensioned by the Provisional Government; it would make matters harmonious, relieve business, and make matters much simpler." I also said that I was aware that certain gentlemen in Washington were opposed to pensioning the Queen; that certain Senators raised that objection to the treaty that was brought from the islands because it recognized the principle of the right of a queen to a pension. There was one Senator, especially, from the South, who said, without discussing the treaty, that that was objectionable to him; that his people would object to it. I said, "If there is no annexation it is a serious question; if there is, the Queen should be taken care of." Neuman agreed with me. He was a strong friend of the Queen, disinterested and devoted. But he said it could not be done. I told him that I had become acquainted with the members of the Provisional Government who were high in authority, and I thought I would try to have it done. I had a conference with President Dole. He received me in his usual kindly manner, but he was very wary and noncommittal. Finally he said that he would consider any propositions coming from the Queen—would lay them before the executive council.
I saw Mr. Neuman again. There were several conferences. Mr. Dole said he would not make any propositions himself and asked me what I thought the pension ought to be. On the spur of the moment, not having considered the matter, I said I thought the Queen ought to get a very handsome pension out of the crown lands. I asked if there was any question about raising the money, and he said none whatever. He finally asked me to name the figures. He had the idea that the figures had been suggested. I said, "You ought to give $20,000 a year to furnish her followers with poi. That is the native dish. Mr. Dole said he would consider that question. I saw Mr. Neuman and he said he would see the Queen and Mr. Dole. He was to go to see Mr. Dole at his private house, but Mr. Neuman was taken ill and the meeting was deferred. The next time I saw him was at the Government house. The result was that Mr. Dole told Mr. Neuman that if the Queen would make such a proposition to him it would receive respectful attention and intimated that he thought it would be accepted. Mr. Neuman saw the Queen and told me that he thought it would be done; that the more he thought of it the more convinced he was that it would be better all around.
The question of annexation was not specially considered. I said to Mr. Dole, "If you could have annexation you would simplify the matter." I said to the other side, "I do not think you will get annexation, and at the same time I do not think you will get anything else;" but I said, "I think you ought to take care of the Queen." After I had the first meetings with Mr. Neuman and Mr. Dole, I thought I ought to tell Mr. Blount what I had done. I had no secret purpose; nothing in the world but my journalistic scheme. As he stated, I met Mr. Blount one day, got out of my carriage and joined him. We walked together for an hour and a half, and walked back to the city. He said, "Come with me to my cottage." We stood for some time on the piazza and discussed the thing at great length. Mr. Blount was noncommittal, but appeared very much interested, and when I left he told me he
|
wished me to let him know what I did. He said nothing further to me about it, but went to the Queen and did as he stated in his report. I have no doubt whatever that if Mr. Blount had not prevented, and secondarily Mr. Claus Speckels, the agent for the sugar trust, that plan would have been carried out. I have no doubt of it in my own mind.
Mr. Blount specifies that I was there to facilitate annexation, and all the way through his statement regarding me asserts, or rather intimates, that I was conducting an annexation propaganda. That was a mistake entirely; I was not justified in doing anything of the kind. In the first kind, it would have been contrary to the policy of my paper, a thing which no one attached to the paper would feel at liberty to do; and, in the second place, my own mind was not clear on the subject. While sentimentally clear there were practical objections which I thought I saw. I had no purpose or interest in doing anything to bring about annexation.
The Chairman. Was this before Mr. Neuman had been to the United States.
Mr. Bowen. I had been with him and the commission. This was before the treaty. All my associates were royalists; at the islands I received more attention from the royalists than from members of the Provisional Government. These dinners and my predilections against annexation would have been naturally that way if I had been going for merely personal interest.
The Chairman. Have you seen the contents of the power of attorney held by Mr. Neuman?
Mr. Bowen. Yes, I have read it as published in Mr. Blount's report. If Mr. Blount had given me one hint that he regarded it as an impolitic course, that it was embarrassing to him, I would have dropped it. But he said nothing whatever, he simply listened at the first interview, and after that said he would let me know. The next day I reported progress to him, and he did not ask me not to tell him anything more about it. In the meantime he had been to the Queen, to Mr. Dole, and had done what he could to prevent the carrying out of the plan. Mr. Neuman had an interview with the Queen. She told him that she would do nothing more in the matter, and asked him to give back her power of attorney, and he tore it up in her presence. This was the 22d, that he tore up his power of attorney.
There is another matter to which I wish to call attention. Mr. Blount intimates, without specifically charging, that I represented myself and Mr. Sewall represented himself as acting for the Government here and that I represented myself to be a friend of the President. I did not go to anyone whatever and represent myself in any official capacity. Everybody knew that I was a journalist. A reporter called on me and he told everyone who I was. I informed a number of people that I had no official position there whatever. The first one was Mr. Wodehouse, the British minister. He asked me, and I informed him that I had no official position there. I informed the President of the Provisional Government and many others, including Mr. Hastings, who is here in Washington, formerly one of the Hawaiian legation. Honolulu is a hotbed of rumors. It is an isolated community. Really a little New England village is not to be compared with Honolulu, especially during these troubled times. Everyone was suspected of a motive, and there were all manner of rumors afloat regarding everybody. There was a rumor every day in regard to Mr. Blount and his actions, and this mysterious article appeared in the
|
San Francisco Chronicle after I left there. That caused a good deal of gossip regarding my visit and that of Mr. Sewall.
Senator Gray. Feeling is pretty high there between the parties?
Mr. Bowen. Very bitter. Mr. Blount said I represented myself as a friend of the President. On a number of occasions I said I had the honor of Mr. Cleveland's acquaintance, and I was his friend. I was justified in doing so, because I took a very active part during his campaign. I furnished a good deal of political matter for the World, and it is conceded that the World did its share in supporting party politics. I acted for my paper according to its policy. I saw a good deal of Mr. Cleveland at the time of his nomination. Mr. Cleveland gave me a statement to print in the World, which was unique in its line. It was the day after his election. He endorsed the World and its course during the campaign and extended his thanks for it. No other paper had anything of the kind. That Mr. Cleveland gave to me. I was at Buzzard's Bay some time, and he showed me a good deal of favor. I performed a good many small services for him.
Senator Gray. When you said that you were President Cleveland's friend you meant in a personal way; not that you were representing him?
Mr. Bowen. Not by any means. I said that I was his friend and represented it that way. I am not a partisan at all. I felt very kindly toward the President, and as the World was very friendly toward him I was justified in saying what I did. I did not make any boasts of that; but in conversation in the islands I spoke of the fact that I was the President's friend.
Senator Frye. While you were there did Mr. Sewall take any part in the affair of representing himself as having anything to do in the matter?
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Blount's allegations against Mr. Sewall are absolutely false. We lived together in the grounds of the Hawaiian Hotel in a cottage. I did not take Mr. Sewall in my confidence in this matter; the affair was practically arranged before I hinted to him that it was going on. Mr. Sewall was a high-minded young man; he was devoting himself entirely to society; and without any motive I did not take him into my confidence. Mr. Sewall knew nothing whatever about this matter. The allegation against him was made of whole cloth, and there is no justification whatever for it. Mr. Blount's suspicions led him to make accusations that were not true.
Senator Gray. Mr. Sewall's name was coupled with yours in that article in the San Francisco paper, was it not?
Mr. Bowen. Yes. Undoubtedly he was the cause of the whole matter. The fact that he had been consul at Samoa was ground for the suspicion that we were out on a mission. Mr. Sewall had said nothing to anybody; he informed no one, and he certainly took no part in it. There is another allegation made there which I think is without foundation. He speaks of Mr. Neuman as being a plausible but very unscrupulous person.
Senator Gray. Mr. Blount says that is the impression he gathered. I think he modified that in another dispatch.
Mr. Bowen. I did not know of that.
Senator Gray. Mr. Blount in an early dispatch, in giving information that he thought proper to give to the State Department, spoke of Mr. Neuman, and said, from what he could gather, he was plausible but unscrupulous; but in another dispatch, after he had gathered
|
further information, said that when he came to have further intercourse with the people he thought differently of Mr. Neuman.
Mr. Bowen. I am very glad he did. He was a devoted friend of the Queen.
Senator Frye. Then he would not have cheated her?
Mr. Bowen. No; he thought this the best plan. And if it had taken place, there would have been a saving of all the subsequent trouble.
Senator Frye. Is there anything else in the report to which you desire to call attention?
Mr. Bowen. Nothing, except to say that I did not represent myself as being there in a diplomatic capacity; that I was there simply as I have represented to this committee-as a journalist. Mr. Blount states that in his report. I was not conducting any annexation propaganda; I had no such purpose; and Mr. Sewall took no part in the matter, and knew practically nothing about it.
Senator Frye. Are there any facts connected with the affairs of the Hawaiian Islands which you desire to state?
Mr. Bowen. Only impressions. I was not there during the revolution. I was informed by numbers of the Provisional Government, in response to questions, that the American minister did not conspire to overthrow the Queen. I was informed that he did practically as he has stated in his own report. I was told so under certain circumstances and there was no reason for deceiving me.
Senator Frye. Did Paul Neuman make any claim that the minister interfered to destroy the royal government?
Mr. Bowen. He did not. Paul Neuman is a good-natured man, personally not prejudiced against anybody, that is, individuals; but he disliked the so-called "Missionary Party" there and the Annexation Party, and he included Mr. Stevens among them. Paul Neuman was always consistent. He was always a friend of the Queen, and he was head and shoulders intellectually above any others of her supporters. He was intelligent enough to form opinions during his stay here in Washington, and to see that there were great difficulties in the way of restoration; and while he did not commit himself to me on the subject, he thought that this course for pensioning the Queen would be the best for all concerned.
SWORN STATEMENT OF M. STALKER-Continued.
Senator Gray. You have already been sworn, and you have read over your testimony given the other day. Have you any special correction to make?
Mr. Stalker. No; nothing special.
Senator Gray. There was another point about which you spoke to me after having read over your testimony. It was in regard to a question that had been asked you, a point which you had touched upon, as to impressions which you derived from those who were supporters of the Provisional Government. In regard to the impression that prevailed with regard to the ability of the supporters of the Provisional Government to maintain themselves without the aid of the United States troops. Have you anything more to say on that subject?
Mr. Stalker. I did receive the impression from that source that the Provisional Government would not have been able to maintain
|
itself and keep its supporters, or, rather, its defenders, together without the cooperation of the United States troops.
Senator Gray. Do you mean that you gathered that impression from those who were favorable to or supporters of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was the impression gathered that the movement they made depended on the presence of those troops for encouragement, morally or otherwise?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say that I was told that the original movement depended upon the presence of the troops, but rather their ability to maintain their hold without the presence of the troops after it had been acquired.
Senator Gray. It was with reference to that?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; with reference to that, especially.
Senator Gray. Is there any other point on which you wish to be more explicit?
Mr. Stalker. I might say that I received these statements definitely from one or two members of the Provisional Government, or, at least, active supporters and cooperators.
Senator Gray. Will you be good enough to state what opinion or impression you got when you went there as to the ability of the existing Government to maintain peace and order and protect life and property?
Mr. Stalker. I never heard that fact called in question.
Senator Gray. You mean the fact of the ability of the Government?
Mr. Stalker. The fact of the ability of the existing Government to maintain order and protect life and property. In fact, I have heard it repeated by citizens of the country, without respect entirely to their political affiliations, that there is no part of the civilized world where life and property were so secure as in that country.
Senator Gray. Would that tally with your own observation during the weeks that you were there before this revolution?
Mr. Stalker. Yes; I think it would.
Senator Gray. Was there any evidence of any disorder up to the landing of troops on that Monday, the 16th of January-any disorder or feeling of insecurity?
Mr. Stalker. None whatever that I observed.
Senator Frye. What are you professor of?
Mr. Stalker. I am professor of veterinary science.
Senator Frye. Veterinary surgeon?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Frye. Where did you live when you were in the islands?
Mr. Stalker. At the Hawaiian Hotel?
Senator Frye. That is the royalist hotel?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Frye. Did Mr. English live there at the same time?
Mr. Stalker. Yes.
Senator Frye. Were you and Mr. English on intimate terms?
Mr. Stalker. No.
Senator Frye. You were not?
Mr. Stalker. I can not say that we were.
Senator Frye. Did you not have daily conversations with him?
Mr. Stalker. No.
Senator Frye. Did you not ultimately suggest to him that he come over and become a professor in the college where you were?
|
Mr. Stalker. There was a party suggested it. I did not suggest to Mr. English, nor he to me, about coming here.
Senator Frye. Was anything said about Mr. English coming over and becoming a professor?
Mr. Stalker. We had some talk; yes-at least, I should say Mr. English made application to me with the view of securing a place; but I gave him no encouragement to think that he could secure a place.
Senator Frye. Did you state to anybody here that when you were at the Government buildings on the day that the proclamation was made you saw paraded in front of the Government buildings the American troops with their arms?
Mr. Stalker. I think not.
Senator Frye. Anything of that kind?
Mr. Stalker. I think not.
Senator Frye. Were you not informed that that statement could not be correct, because the testimony showed conclusively that the troops were back of Arion Hall, and were not in view of the Government Building?
Mr. Stalker. I think my testimony was to the effect that the troops were in line with their arms.
Senator Frye. I was not asking what you testified to. I asked you whether or not, previously to testifying before this committee, you stated to any one that our American troops were in front of the Government Building, drawn up in front of the Government Building with their guns, when the proclamation was being read?
Mr. Stalker. I did not.
Senator Frye. Anything of that kind?
Mr. Stalker. No; neither here nor elsewhere.
Senator Frye. And you were not told by anybody that that would not do, because the testimony showed that they were in the back yard of Arion Hall?
Mr. Stalker. No. Your statement is the first that I heard of any such suggestion.
|
|
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, January 30,1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present. The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Gray and Frye.
Absent. Senators Butler and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF P. W. REEDER.
The Chairman. Where do you reside and what is your age?
Mr. Reeder. I am 68 years of age and I reside at Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
The Chairman. Have you been in the Hawaiian Islands recently??
Mr. Reeder. I have.
The Chairman. When was that?
Mr. Reeder. Last winter.
The Chairman. How long a time did you stay there? Why did you go and when did you come away?
|
Mr. Reeder. I do not remember the dates; but it was during the months of November, December, January, and February.
The Chairman. Had you ever been there before?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. I suppose you were there as a tourist?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you spend much of your time in Honolulu or through the islands?
Mr. Reeder. Most of the time in Honolulu.
The Chairman. In what month did you get there?
Mr. Reeder. I was there fifteen weeks in all, not quite four months.
The Chairman. When you got there in November, did you ascertain or know whether there was any political excitement amongst the Hawaiian people?
Mr. Reeder. None that appeared on the surface.
The Chairman. Was there any question of grave importance politically that was under discussion among the people?
Mr. Reeder. There was not. When you went to the state house you could see there was friction between the parties.
The Chairman. What parties?
Mr. Reeder. They are divided there between what is called the native party and the missionary party. The missionary party now does not mean missionary per se-persons who go there to teach religion-but it is a party that has received that name because it is opposed to native rule.
The Chairman. Native rule or monarchical rule?
Mr. Reeder. That means native rule.
The Chairman. What particular measures were under discussion upon which these parties were divided?
Mr. Reeder. One thing which was in the Legislature there, and which gave rise to a good deal of ill feeling, was the discussion of the opium bill, and then the discussion of the lottery scheme. There were some men pushing their interests there-scheming for some sort of license to indulge in the practice of lottery.
The Chairman. Do you know who those men were-any of them?
Mr. Reeder. I did not know them; no. They were men, as I understand, from New Orleans.
The Chairman. Did you get the names of any of them?
Mr. Reeder. No, I did not.
The Chairman. But they were there for the purpose of pressing their plan for getting a charter, I suppose, for the lottery scheme?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you understand that it was a part of the scheme that had been conducted in New Orleans?
Mr. Reeder. I understood that they were there for that same purpose.
The Chairman. Did the subject lead to much discussion among the people?
Mr. Reeder. It did; yes.
The Chairman. Was it acrimonious?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Fierce, was it?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. Before the matter was adjusted finally the ladies thought they could intercept it between the time it passed the legislature and the time the signature was given by Liliuokalani, the Queen-thought they could intercept it by petition, and you could see by the
|
tone of the people there that it had produced a good deal of violent feeling upon the part of those English-speaking people there.
The Chairman. They were opposed to it?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. How did the native Kanaka population seem to be disposed toward it?
Mr. Reeder. I could not understand very much about that, because I could not speak their language. But they quietly acquiesced in it.
The Chairman. I suppose they are a quiet kind of people?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Disposed to acquiesce in matters that they can not easily reverse or prevent?
Mr. Reeder. They would rather lie down and enjoy themselves under a tree than engage in any industry-as a rule.
The Chairman. They have not the energy or the scope of the Anglo-Saxon, the Frenchman, German, or Portuguese?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. Who, did you understand, was promoting this lottery scheme amongst the governing authorities there, the cabinet, the Queen, and any other persons?
Mr. Reeder. The native names there are so strange that I did not get the names, but I understood it was a good many of the house or the legislative body-the native men of the legislative body. I understood further that there was this about it: it was for the purpose of relieving themselves-creating a revenue-relieving themselves from debt and creating a source by which some money could be obtained. I believe that was the reason assigned by the Queen-that she had to have it to get more money.
The Chairman. On the part of the Queen you understood it to be a revenue measure?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you remember what offers they made-in order to induce the Government to grant the charter?
Mr. Reeder. No, I do not remember. I will say another thing in that connection. In the Legislature it was bandied back and forward among the natives that they had been bribed. There are two houses there, the house of commons or representatives and the house of nobles, and they would get into heated debates, and one would cast up to the other that they had received bribes.
The Chairman. Did they have an interpreter there?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. A native would make his speech in his native language and then the interpreter would repeat it in English.
The Chairman. Did you attend the meetings of this Legislative Assembly?
Mr. Reeder. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. You spoke of two Houses. You do not mean they were separate bodies?
Mr. Reeder. No; they all met together, but they were designated as such-House of Nobles and House of Representatives.
The Chairman. They sat together?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Were these accusations of bribery and corruption freely made in the House?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; especially when the debate would go along until it became heated.
The Chairman. So that the men who were resisting the grant of
|
this concession to the lottery people were charging the other side with bribery and corruption, if I understand you?
Mr. Reeder. The natives would do it among themselves.
Senator Frye. Charge each other?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. But I understand the accusations came from those who were opposed to the granting of the lottery charter.
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. They charged that those persons who were promoting or advancing this lottery scheme were bribed?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; that was the charge.
The Chairman. Did those charges produce any collision amongst those people?
Mr. Reeder. No; not that I saw.
The Chairman. Was there much anger exhibited?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; a good deal.
The Chairman. How did you understand that the Queen and cabinet were disposed toward this lottery business?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know that I could give you an intelligent answer in regard to that.
The Chairman. I mean what you gathered from general reputation in the community. Was it understood that the Queen and her cabinet-I mean the first cabinet that was there while you were in the islands-or the later one?
Mr. Reeder. This came up for action in the last days of the Legislature. You see the council, the legislative body, sat from May for about eight or nine months, I guess, and this was during the time I was there, and I did not get there until November.
The Chairman. Did you find this subject rife when you got there?
Mr. Reeder. No; but it was soon developed.
The Chairman. And the movement was made in the Legislature?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you understand that the cabinet which was there when you got there-the Wilcox-Jones cabinet-was favorable to or opposing this lottery bill?
Mr. Reeder. I did not know about that. The trouble that arose about the Wilcox-Jones cabinet arose mainly from some other things.
The Chairman. What were they? Proceed and state those other things to which you refer.
Mr. Reeder. As I understand the history (and I learned it from them) there had been constant friction there over this thing which they had conceded in the constitution of 1887.
The Chairman. You do not mean that they had conceded the lottery?
Mr. Reeder. No; that lottery business was developed after I got there.
The Chairman. Go on and make your statement.
Mr. Reeder. Up to 1887 they had a constitution which granted to the kings (who were the five Kamehamehas and Lunalilo, who followed them) this thing that they had conceded, which was the appointing power of the house of nobles, which house of nobles represented one-third of the body. This body was, I think, about 52 members, and 17 of them belonged to the house of nobles. The King, Kalakaua, had surrendered that right. They made that elective-of the house of nobles 17 members were made elective by the people. But they had made another property qualification-I mean these two parties to the constitution-which was that any man who could prove that he had $600 income, either from his
|
own personal efforts or something that grew out of some investment he made, could exercise the right of suffrage or could vote for a member of the house of nobles.
The Chairman. Did you find when you got to Honolulu that the question of returning to the old regime-the old method of appointing nobles-was one of the subjects under discussion by the people?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, sir; that was it.
The Chairman. Who was contending for that?
Mr. Reeder. The Queen and native party.
The Chairman. You speak of the native party. Do you mean all the natives?
Mr. Reeder. Let me explain that. The heads of the departments were Americans or the descendants of Americans, and their employes, as a rule, were natives.
The Chairman. You are speaking of the Queen's cabinet?
Mr. Reeder. No; I am speaking of the heads of the departments.
The Chairman. These were appointed by the Queen's administration?
Mr. Reeder. The heads of the departments?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Reeder. I do not know how they got their appointments.
The Chairman. They were not elected by the people?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. Therefore they must have been appointed by the Crown or the Legislature. I suppose they were appointed by the Crown.
Mr. Reeder. I do not know about that-how they received their appointments. The men who were in the employ were, as a rule, favorable to the Government; that is, the government which had found its authority in the constitution of 1887. Then you will find a good many Americans who were doing business in the city, and who, if they had clerks, as a rule those clerks would talk for the Government. That was the native part that was talking for the Government and that part of the natives. That is my experience.
The Chairman. I suppose you do not know, not being acquainted with any of the people, what was the sentiment among the common, ordinary Kanakas on that question?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; I do.
The Chairman. State how you found it.
Mr. Reeder. The larger body of the native people talked for native rule, and felt aggrieved because it had passed into the hands of the Americans. I had two sources of information: There was one place situated on the corner of Nuuanu avenue and Beretania street, which had been in the early years a place of resort for the Crown or Government. It was called Emma House or Emma Square. It is now occupied particularly as the headquarters of the common Kanakas. That is one of the places where I daily went. They keep a sort of reading room, and the natives would gather to discuss their affairs, and I could hear the sentiment there of a good deal of the middle or lower classes of Kanakas.
The Chairman. Did a good many of them assemble there?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; a good many.
The Chairman. Who spoke English?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; a good many who did. Then I made it a subject of inquiry; if any man was a prominent man, I asked what he said.
|
The Chairman. What purpose had you in studying these problems of politics in Hawaii?
Mr. Reeder. That is one of the things I like, to find out what is going on.
The Chairman. Was that the purpose for which you were there?
Mr. Reeder. I write sometimes for the newspapers.
The Chairman. Are you a correspondent for a newspaper?
Mr. Reeder. I could not say that I was a hired correspondent; I wrote some articles and sent them home.
The Chairman. What paper did you send them to?
Mr. Reeder. I sent them to our papers. I am quite well acquainted with the people of the Cedar Rapids Republican and the Cedar Rapids Times.
The Chairman. Then you were gaining information for the purpose of being able to write those letters to the newspapers?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; I do not want to say that, but it was one of the things looked to.
The Chairman. But you had no connection politically with any thing in Hawaii?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. No business connection with anybody?
Mr. Reeder. No; not a thing above ground.
The Chairman. Simply a tourist looking over the country?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you think from the people you heard speaking at this meeting room which you have mentioned, and your imperfect knowledge of the Hawaiian tongue, you could gather the real sentiment of the Kanaka population on the subject of this lottery?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know whether I could say that much or not. I do not understand that the lottery business was extensively discussed amongst them-that is, the middle and lower classes.
The Chairman. Those you heard speak of it, were they in favor of or against the lottery?
Mr. Reeder. Some of them-they were divided; I think a good many of them were opposed to it.
The Chairman. I suppose it was really a question between public morality and governmental revenue?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; those were the points.
The Chairman. The white people, men of business and men of property, were opposed to using that scheme for the purpose of raising revenue?
Mr. Reeder. I think so; I think that was true.
The Chairman. On moral grounds?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you detect any other movement, or anything in what they did or said to indicate that they had any purpose of trying to deprive the Hawaiian people of any just right that they might wish to enjoy, and from which they might derive a profit; or were they really in good earnest in trying to preserve proper morality in the administration of Government?
Mr. Reeder. I had no reason to suspect that they were dishonest. I had no reason to suppose that they opposed the scheme of lottery on any other grounds than that. It might have been to the Government a source of revenue; but they opposed it somehow or other.
The Chairman. There was an opium bill pending before that Legislature while you were there?
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----66
|
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. What did you gather from common report and common rumor as to the purposes and provisions and characteristics of that bill?
Mr. Reeder. That followed very much the same train of thought. The people were divided on it for about the same reasons-for the same purposes on both sides.
The Chairman. I suppose the purpose of introducing opium there was to cater to the habits of the Chinese who were there?
Mr. Reeder. It was freely talked there that they would be great patrons. In fact, they had several places open then for the purpose of administering the drug.
The Chairman. Is there a Chinatown in Honolulu?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; distinctively so.
The Chairman. Like it is in San Francisco?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; the same as they have in San Francisco.
The Chairman. Are there many Chinese collected together in that part of the city of Honolulu?
Mr. Reeder. Pretty much all the Chinese there are in that part of the city.
The Chairman. Crowded together in that area [indicating on map]?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Have you been in Chinatown frequently?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, frequently.
The Chairman. What would you say as to the number of persons congregated there?
Mr. Reeder. It would be a mere guess, but I would say to you I suppose perhaps 3,000. That is the west there, and Chinatown proper is on the west side of Honolulu. There is one street there as a rule, which divides them. Of course there are persons scattered around one place or another who are Chinamen, but off in this direction toward the Kamehameha Museum----
The Chairman. Is that toward the east or west?
Mr. Reeder. Toward the west; it is west of Nuuanu avenue, principally along in this direction. They are from right back here where the ground falls off [indicating]. Then there is out here what is called the Insane Asylum. In this direction here there is a great scope of land which winds around what is called the Receiving Hospital, and all this here is covered with rice plantations and vegetable patches. That is largely made up of Chinese. This portion of the town-I do not know whether it comes up so far; I think it is one street west.
The Chairman. Then you would say that this portion of the town between Smith street and the western boundary of the town is occupied largely by Chinamen?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. Then in the town there is an area on Nuuanu avenue. This [indicating] is occupied by tailors, by shoemakers, by butchers, who cater to the wants of the people.
The Chairman. Of the Chinese?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; and all who choose to patronize them.
The Chairman. What do those Chinese in Honolulu seem to be principally engaged in for a living?
Mr. Reeder. The great body of the Chinese are out on the sugar plantations.
The Chairman. I speak of those in Honolulu.
Mr. Reeder. Those in Honolulu are engaged there in rice culture or as vegetable growers, and those that are right in the city proper are
|
engaged in the tailoring business largely, and the shoemaking business. It is principally taken up by shoemakers and tailors and merchants and restaurant keepers.
The Chairman. They have little shops and stores?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. As a rule, are the Chinese people an orderly and well-behaved people?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Fond of gambling?
Mr. Reeder. Oh, yes; that is one of their industries.
The Chairman. Do they have opium joints amongst them?
Mr. Reeder. They have a few, but as a rule not public. It is not a business recognized there.
The Chairman. The law opposes it?
Mr. Reeder. I could not say that; I think likely-I do not know about that.
The Chairman. But it is a business not openly adopted?
Mr. Reeder. No; not on a front street. It is a place usually a little off, very small place. I understood that there were two or three of them in town.
The Chairman. In passing through Chinatown in Honolulu, did you gain the idea that the Chinese were contributing much to the moral support and advancement of Hawaii, or was the tendency the other way?
Mr. Reeder. I did not gather very much about it. They behave themselves. They are not very much in the police court, and they have not to be dealt with very much.
The Chairman. Do they take anything like an active, strong, prominent position like the white race in Honolulu?
Mr. Reeder. They do not.
The Chairman. They are there like they are everywhere else where they are assembled-where you have seen them in this hemisphere- people who seem to be devoting themselves to their own callings, indulging themselves in their habits of gambling and opium smoking, and such like?
Mr. Reeder.They are just like they are in San Francisco.
The Chairman. Are there any public moralities conducted amongst them?
Mr. Reeder. I could not answer that. I have no knowledge that I know of. I will say they have a joss house there, and then they have what is called a Young Men's Christian Association, and they make some effort of improving their people.
The Chairman. Would you think that the free introduction of opium amongst those people would create any insecurity as to the peace and order and proper government of the islands?
Mr. Reeder. The Chinese would be principally the patrons of such places. I do not know that that would create much disorder. They go to those places and have their smoke out and their debauch and then go away. After the debauch is over they go about their business on the street; there does not seem to be very much about it.
The Chairman. Do you think the better classes of Honolulu were putting themselves to unnecessary trouble in trying to prevent the introduction of opium into that city?
Mr. Reeder. No; I think it was pushed principally by the native men in that Legislative Assembly.
|
The Chairman. You mean the measure to license the introduction of opium?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. It was done largely for revenue for the islands.
The Chairman. Did you gather from the people there that they thought that was a rather dangerous enterprise for the public morality and the maintenance of the law?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. The men who were opposed to it were opposed to it from those considerations.
The Chairman. Were they very earnest about it?
Mr. Reeder. They seemed to be. The ladies were more earnest than anybody else.
The Chairman. I suppose they were fearing the demoralization of their sons.
Mr. Reeder. I think that was amongst the things. They had a large petition. You could see by the names on it that they were Americans-at least, not Chinese.
The Chairman. Did you see any demonstration amongst what we call the white population in Hawaii-Americans, Germans, English or what not-that seemed to lead in the direction of the demoralization of those people or the imposing upon them of unjust or improper restrictions of law?
Mr. Reeder. I think I can say that I did see some things which I opposed very much all my life. For instance, there is this: there are a good many white men who are living there with Kanaka women to whom they are not married-a good many of them. But I do not know of any leading legislator or any leading man there who had his family with him who was addicted to this practice.
The Chairman. Can you say that any such irregularities of life as those to which you have alluded have received partial encouragement or even toleration on the part of what we call the white population?
Mr. Reeder. By a good many of the middle and lower classes. Do you consider that former question was answered? I would divide that question. Let it be read until I say stop.
The question was read as follows:
"Did you see any demonstration amongst what we call the white population in Hawaii-Americans, Germans, English, and what not-that seemed to lead in the direction of the demoralization of those people?"
Mr. Reeder. From that last sentence-"demoralization of those people." There are a good many men there living with Kanaka women to whom they are not married. Some of them were living there long enough to have families by them, and still recognize themselves as not married-and still recognize that the marriage vow was not obligatory upon them. That was true of a good many of the Chinese; they were living with the Kanaka women, and so were some of the Portuguese. I do not think these practices obtain amongst the better elements of the population of Honolulu, or that they were tolerated or encouraged by them.
The Chairman. In the discussions that you heard there among the people, do you remember whether the question came up as to the necessity of getting rid of the cabinet in order to be able to carry this opium bill and this lottery bill into effect?
Mr. Reeder. I do not think that there was. The main thing that they had there troubles on was another issue. The Queen was struggling to get the ascendency for the purpose of promoting these things-a return to the native rule, already explained.
|
Senator Frye. That is, the Queen and her people were trying to get rid of the constitution of 1887, which imposed restrictions upon her and her cabinet?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was this opium bill and this lottery bill part of the campaign-to get the Kanaka population to do away with the constitution of 1887?
Mr. Reeder. I do not think they had any design of that kind. I think those two bills were for revenue. I think it was said by the Queen that she was embarrassed and the Government was embarrassed on account of its debt.
The Chairman. Did you understand that the debt was a very large one?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, it was large for that place. It amounted to almost $4,000,000-when pay day for the interest came it would amount to very nearly $4,000,000.
The Chairman. I suppose you are not familiar with the facts in regard to the burden of taxation in Hawaii, to know upon whom it falls?
Mr. Reeder. Fell upon the property.
The Chairman. Who owned the property-I mean, of course, the property that would yield revenue?
Mr. Reeder. I think there was a large amount gathered from the sugar plantations.
Senator Frye. The chairman asked who owned the property. Did not the white men own nine-tenths of it?
Mr. Reeder. I think so; yes, eight-tenths.
The Chairman. Do you know any Kanakas or half-whites who owned any large sugar estates?
Mr. Reeder. No; but there were men in business there who were half-whites, who owned stock in some of those companies.
The Chairman. But, if I gather your idea, the great burden of taxation rested upon white men who owned the property?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you see any disposition or detect any disposition amongst those people to do, or to attempt to do, anything else than protect themselves against unjust legislation, legislation that was wicked in its character, and that tended to break down the authority of law and good morals?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know that I could interpret the action of the white people as having anything to do especially in that direction.
The Chairman. Have you any personal knowledge of the facts that tended toward the recent revolution?
Mr. Reeder. I have some, gathered in the way that we have been talking about.
The Chairman. You were there an observer.
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Were you in the Legislature-I mean the hall where the Legislature sat-on the Saturday that it was prorogued by the Queen?
Mr. Reeder. I was not; no.
The Chairman. You were not there at that time?
Mr. Reeder. I was not there at 12 o'clock; no.
The Chairman. Did you go to the Government building that afternoon?
|
Mr. Reeder. No; I was not in the Government building; I was there in the vicinity.
The Chairman. At what time did you first get the impression that the political movement that had been started in Hawaii or in Honolulu would result in dethroning the Queen and the establishment of a new government?
Mr. Reeder. I had no means of knowing. Things moved along pretty rapidly. I had no means of knowing when that point arrived-when she would be dethroned.
The Chairman. That does not answer my question. I want to know when you first heard the rumor that there was a movement on foot to dethrone the Queen.
Mr. Reeder. I absolutely did not get that impression until Tuesday; it did not develop itself until Tuesday, the 17th.
The Chairman. What was the information which you received on Tuesday, which you say led you to the conclusion that there was a revolution on foot which would result in dethroning the Queen?
Mr. Reeder. On Tuesday the proclamation for a new government was read.
The Chairman. Was that the first information that you had about it?
Mr. Reeder. I had been keeping track of it all along, but that was the first information that I secured that was evidence to me that the Queen was to be dethroned.
The Chairman. I suppose you would say that that was the first time you believed or felt that the movement was really a serious one?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; that was the first time.
The Chairman. Although, I believe from your statements, you bad heard some intimations of it or discussion about it?
Mr. Reeder. No; I heard no intimation.
The Chairman. Nothing at all?
Mr. Reeder. Nothing at all; because the meetings of the committee of safety were kept secret, and at that meeting on Monday afternoon at 2 o'clock there were certain speeches made in which there was not an intimation of any kind that I could gather that they were designing anything of that kind.
The Chairman. You heard those speeches?
Mr. Reeder. Not all of them.
The Chairman. You heard some?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you mix in the crowd?
Mr. Reeder. I was around and amongst the crowd.
The Chairman. How many English-speaking people did you hear converse?
Mr. Reeder. There were two meetings. You are speaking of the one conducted on the part of the revolutionists?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Reeder. They were pretty much all English-speaking people.
The Chairman. You did not gather, if I understand you correctly, at that meeting, from speeches or conversations that you heard in the crowd, that the movement to dethrone the Queen at the time of that meeting was a serious one?
Mr. Reeder. No; I did not gather that they had determined on that project at that time. In fact, there was nothing said of it in the seven speeches. After the seven speeches, all went along in the line of complaints.
|
The Chairman. Of what?
Mr. Reeder. Complaints that the Government of the Queen was not a suitable Government; that she had been refusing all along to keep within bounds of the authority of the constitution.
The Chairman. Of the constitution of 1887?
Mr. Reeder. Of 1887-that there had been, I think they said, seven uprisings in five years of one kind or another-I could not particularize what they were, and that the Government was not a stable one; that she could not give one; that there was too much friction. That was the line of the speeches.
The Chairman. Did you hear any statements made by the speakers, or did the persons in the crowd make any, to the effect that the Queen had attempted to abrogate the constitution of 1887 and substitute for it one of her own ?
Mr. Reeder. I heard nothing except what grew out of the talk. She got up on the portico of Iolani palace----
The Chairman. You did not hear that; you were not there.
Mr. Reeder. You are speaking of what I know personally?
Senator Gray. And impressions that you gathered from actual contact with the people.
The Chairman. In this public meeting, in this crowd in which you mixed, did you hear any statement as to a matter of fact that the Queen had attempted to abrogate the constitution of 1887 and substitute for it one of her own getting up?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; that was the talk in that meeting-that was part of the complaint.
The Chairman. Was there any complaint in those speeches about the opium bill and the lottery bill?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, they were talked of, too.
The Chairman. Was anything said about voting out the cabinet?
Mr. Reeder. Yes, that was talked of, too. That was part of the complaint.
The Chairman. A sort of enumeration of grievances?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. The speeches were not very long. The whole meeting did not last to exceed an hour and a half. They opened at 2 o'clock and adjourned at a half after 3.
The Chairman. That was before you formed a definite conclusion that there was to be a revolution there?
Mr. Reeder. Yes. I was not informed that they were going to overturn the Government. On Tuesday afternoon I came to the conclusion that there was going to be something done. As I understood it, they read from the steps of the Government building this proclamation----
Senator Frye. Were you there?
Mr. Reeder. No; I was not right there.
The Chairman. Were you out in view of Iolani Palace at the time the Queen was up on the palace somewhere, the portico, and presented some constitution and made some speech to her people?
Mr. Reeder. I was near there, but I could not understand the language; she did not present a constitution; she made a speech.
The Chairman. Was there a large crowd about the Queen at that time?
Mr. Reeder. The crowd in both places seemed just about alike as to numbers.
The Chairman. I spoke of that occasion. Was there a large crowd about Iolani Palace at the time the Queen appeared on the portico-whatever you may call it?
|
Mr. Reeder. I do not know what you call a large crowd. It is only a guess; there might have been 1,200 to 1,300 people there.
The Chairman. Did you see any military array, any troops drawn up in line under arms?
Mr. Reeder. No.
The Chairman. Was the crowd to which the Queen was speaking excited?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know; they did not seem to be; there was a good deal of earnestness about it.
The Chairman. Did the Kanaka population exhibit any more excitement than the balance of the people?
Mr. Reeder. I did not see it. The truth of it was there was nothing but the Kanaka population there, I guess.
The Chairman. Have you any special knowledge about what occurred in Honolulu during the period of that revolution? I would like to know what you know about it; what your observations were.
Mr. Reeder. At between 2 and 3 o'clock on Tuesday afternoon the proclamation was read. Now I was not there at that, but I was out where I could see a good deal of a crowd. There was only a handful there, comparatively, to me. And then following that the marines came up and took their station near the premises, or near, between the two houses a little away from the gates. There were three roads that came up from the west end of the town, and is a pretty large three-cornered square, is there, and they took possession of the square-each of the three roads up into the city. That was on Monday.
Senator Gray. In the afternoon?
Mr. Reeder. Afternoon-close to 5 o'clock-late in the afternoon. They took their position there.
Senator Frye. You did not see any marines paraded on Tuesday?
Mr. Reeder. Tuesday?
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Reeder. They were there on the grounds.
Senator Frye. Did you see any marines paraded on Tuesday when the proclamation was read to take possession of the building?
Mr. Reeder. My memory is not clear on that point.
Senator Frye. Where did you see them?
Mr. Reeder. On the grounds; but I can not say that they paraded or not. They were right there on the grounds.
Senator Frye. What were they doing?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know whether I saw them paraded or not; but they were there.
The Chairman. That is the point in the case, whether you saw them paraded. I understood you to say that you did not witness the reading of the proclamation.
Mr. Reeder. I was not right there.
The Chairman. Where were you?
Mr. Reeder. I was not far away.
The Chairman. How far away?
Mr. Reeder. Right across the block-maybe two blocks.
The Chairman. Were you in full view of the audience-the crowd?
Mr. Reeder. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. At that particular time or before that time?
Mr. Reeder. Before what time?
The Chairman. Before the proclamation was read?
Senator Gray. On Tuesday?
The Chairman. At the time the proclamation establishing this Provisional
|
Government was read, did you see any United States marines drawn up in line, armed, etc?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know whether I saw them right in arms, but they were there. I could see them. I was up a square or two. I could see them there before the Government house.
Senator Frye. How do you mean you saw them? Were they in line? Or do you mean to say you saw some straggling soldiers?
Mr. Reeder. I do not know whether they were in line, drilling.
The Chairman. In line of battle, drawn up ready to fight?
Mr. Reeder. I could not tell that; I saw them there.
Senator Gray. Do you know where the troops were quartered, in Arion Hall, a building back of the Opera House?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was it there you saw them?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; close in the vicinity of the Opera House.
Senator Gray. Were they not in the rear of Arion Hall, inside the fence?
Mr. Reeder. I saw them scattered all around the hall and near the opera house.
Senator Gray. Do you mean that the marines were out beside the Government building, where you could see them and anybody could see them?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; I saw them there. They were not in the grounds of the Government building.
Senator Gray. Quite a body of them?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did they have arms?
Mr. Reeder. I could not tell exactly whether they had their arms. I was within a block or so of them.
The Chairman. Pretty large crowd at the time that proclamation was being read?
Mr. Reeder. No; there were only a few.
Senator Gray. Did you see the troops when they were landed on Monday afternoon?
Mr. Reeder. I did not see them during the time they were landing; no.
Senator Gray. You saw them march through the streets?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you have any previous information that they were to land?
Mr. Reeder. No; I had not anything.
Senator Gray. You said the first you knew of any troops from the Boston being ashore was seeing them on the streets, marching?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. From what direction were they marching?
Mr. Reeder. They were marching up from where the Boston was landed, up through one of those streets.
Senator Gray. What was the public impression, so far as you were able to gather it? You were out there and in contact with the people, were you not?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. What impression did you gather as to the object of those troops landing; what was the popular impression?
Mr. Reeder. I did not know and do not know anybody else who did know. I was just waiting developments there and seeing what I could see.
|
Senator Gray. What developments did you witness in that line as to the impression created by the presence of those troops-that they were there to support the Queen, or there to support the Provisional Government?
Mr. Reeder. I was just waiting to see what they would do, because I could not tell why they were there, and I did not know anybody who did know.
Senator Gray. And you did not gather any impression at all?
Mr. Reeder. Not that I know of.
Senator Gray. Have you any opinions, as a matter of fact, as to whether they had any influence upon the establishment of the Provisional Government, born from your observation there?
Senator Gray. What is it?
Mr. Reeder. I think that the Government-in those who were in power-it excited some fears that they were there for the purpose not to sustain the Government, but to help change it somehow or other.
Senator Gray. Not to sustain the existing Government?
Mr. Reeder. The Queen.
Senator Gray. Was that the impression that you gathered from your talk with the people?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. From what you saw and heard?
Mr. Reeder.Yes.
Senator Gray. That they were there to aid the change in the Government? That is the way you put it?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. Had you any interest, one way or the other?
Mr. Reeder. Not a bit of interest; not a cent's worth.
Senator Gray. You belonged to neither party?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Senator Gray. How long had you been on the islands?
Mr. Reeder. I had been there very close on to four months, and been among the people.
Senator Gray. Largely?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. You had been an interested observer of what was going on-it was interesting to you?
Mr. Reeder. Yes.
Senator Gray. You were alert-your mind was alert, to take in what was going on around you?
Mr. Reeder. Yes; that was it.
Senator Gray. What were you there for? Were you on business or on pleasure?
Mr. Reeder. I was there just as a tourist.
Senator Gray. There for your health?
Mr. Reeder. That was part of my business there. I had something in my throat and I thought it would boil it out.
Senator Gray. Was any of your family there with you?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Senator Gray. May I ask you, if you will not consider it an impertinent question, what your politics are?
Mr. Reeder. I am a Republican. I never had a thought of politics while there. I was an American citizen. I had no allegiance to one party or the other. I determined that I would not imperil my safety. I had no interest whether the Queen's Government should survive or the missionary party should succeed. I intended to pursue such a
|
course as to have the protection of my Government in case the Government fell into the hands of either of those peoples. I knew if I joined a party and became interested in it and the party which I had joined was beaten, I would lose the protection of my Government.
Senator Gray. You did not want to join a party as a mere tourist there?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Senator Gray. You had no business in joining either party, had you?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Senator Gray. Did you have anything to do with the domestic affairs of those islands?
Mr. Reeder. No.
Adjourned until tomorrow, the 31st instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
|
|
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, January 31,1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present. The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, Frye, and Sherman, and Senator Davis, of the full committee.
SWORN STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. MACARTHUR.
The Chairman. State your residence.
Mr. MacArthur. Troy, New York.
Senator Frye. What is your business?
Mr. MacArthur. I am the editor of the Troy Budget.
Senator Frye. Were you at any time in the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; the last of February, or early in March, 1893. I remained there about seven or eight weeks, I should say.
Senator Frye. What was your business there?
Mr. MacArthur. I went there to get rest, practically; but I found a state of things that very much interested me, and I investigated.
Senator Frye. You investigated the condition of affairs in the islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. I presume you gentlemen have a paper from me. I wrote considerably. I wrote an article which was published pretty widely. I was there when Mr. Blount was there, and I saw him frequently. His wife and mine were acquainted and went about a good deal together.
The Chairman. That is your paper, the one with the map in it?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. I could not cover as much ground as I wanted to because I found it of so much interest. I knew there was meat in it and I went right over it.
Senator Frye. Did you make a special business of investigating the condition of affairs in the islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Frye. And in the course of that investigation did you have communications with parties of both sides there, the royalists as well as the Provisional Government?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. All the time I was there the Provisional Government was in power. I did not report the result of my investigations to Mr. Blount. I did on one affair. He mentioned here that
|
Dr. William Shaw Bowen, of New York, undertook to get the Queen to sell her rights and abdicate. I took a part in that affair, and I could tell the story. I did not reduce to writing the observations that I made while in the islands. I have written a good deal to my own paper. That (alluding to article in Troy Budget of Nov. 26, '93), is more of a statistical matter, showing the history of annexation and leaving out the rest. There are some statistics about the population, showing that just at that time they were saying that they should have a plebiscite there to justify annexation. I investigated that subject, and I found that there never had been one in territory annexed to the United States, and if there had been, the population would have voted it down in each case. We have never seen a case of that kind. Even in the annexation of Louisiana there were two riots against annexation. That annexation would have been beaten had you taken a vote of the population.
The Chairman. You are the editor of the Northern Budget?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. In the issue of November 26, 1893, you have presented some views about affairs in Hawaii. Those are the conclusions to which you sincerely arrived in your examination of the facts on the ground?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. I did not go into that part of it which would be more interesting to you. I found that the native population was somewhat against annexation. I never could get at the bottom cause of it; I think I did, however, get at what I thought were the bottom causes. It was the woman question-the color question. Some of the richest men in the islands had married natives. One, Mr. Bishop, of the State of New York.
The Chairman. You speak of white men?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes, white men-missionaries there. Of course the native population think it a great thing, an elevated thing, to marry their daughters to white people, and I found on investigating on the Island of Hawaii and on those of Lanai and Oahu that the report had been circulated all through the islands that among the people of the U.S. the men who married negroes were despised, and that they would lose their caste in Hawaii by marrying natives. It became a woman question to a great extent in the islands, and the women influence the men always. They thought their daughters ought to marry reputably, and they thought they would occupy the position that the negro does in the U.S. country in such cases.
Senator Frye. If the islands were annexed?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. That there would be a racial degradation?
Mr. MacArthur. Degradation. The women got hold of this question and went into every native household. When I got at the bottom of this matter, I found that every man, native, that I talked with, presented that phase of the subject to me. I made inquiries, and I found that this impression had been carefully circulated everywhere among these native people. I found it in the Island of Hawaii, the Island of Maui, and I found it in Honolulu. I naturally felt that they were a very clannish people. The chief justice told me that in every case in which a jury of native people was had, they never could convict a native-that they had to take this thing from the juries and from the examining boards, and segregate the lepers in these islands. In the criminal cases the chief justice told me, and two other judges told me also----
|
The Chairman. What would you think of the political proposition of incorporating those people into our body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. I think it ought to be done, because you do not build America for a little time; you build for a century; and the time is not far distant when the Pacific coast will have six or eight millions of people, and the native Hawaii population would be entirely rubbed out, at the present percentage of decrease, somewhere between 1920 and, say, 1930.
The Chairman. For similar reasons would you also think that it would be better for our country that the Japanese and Chinese should be brought in freely and incorporated into our body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. Mr. Blount said to me, "What are these people going to do for laborers?"
The Chairman. I am not speaking of that; I am speaking of the social effect in the United States of incorporating the orientals into the social system, what we call the body politic, of the United States.
Mr. MacArthur. The Asiatics can not vote or become citizens under the Hawaiian constitution.
The Chairman. I am not speaking of that, but the effect of annexation, in your judgment, as to Asiatics?
Mr. MacArthur. It is not that, because they are a hardworking people. They earn their money, and they get what they consider wealth and return to their own countries. The exports from those islands are $115 for each man, woman, and child in the islands. There are no such exports in the world. I think it is a detriment to confine themselves exclusively to sugar.
The Chairman. Do you concur in the prevailing opinion that the Kanaka population of Hawaii is passing away-perishing?
Mr. MacArthur. At the rate of decrease that is now going on, or in the last decade, they will be entirely wiped out in 1930. It has been carefully calculated. You see there are only 34,000 natives, and there are 90,000 of population. Of that, perhaps 12,000 are Portuguese. The Portuguese and white men there in voting would outnumber the native population, that is, the native voting population-outnumber them in the property qualification.
The Chairman. You speak now of the constitution of 1887?
Mr. MacArthur. I am speaking of this present constitution, under which the house of nobles and house of representatives were elected. There is a much lower elective power for the house under the present Provisional Government.
The Chairman. You are speaking of the constitution which Liliuokalani tried to overthrow?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Davis. What kind of people are those Portuguese?
Mr. MacArthur. They are mostly from the Azores.
Senator Davis. We know where they are from, but how do they size up?
Mr. MacArthur. They are a civil, orderly people.
Senator Davis. Industrious?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Davis. Are they law-abiding?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes,
Senator Davis. Do their children go to school?
Mr. MacArthur. Oh, yes; there is compulsory education there for all classes.
Senator Davis. Do they have their own homes there, to some extent?
|
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Davis. Do you regard them as a progressive people?
Mr. MacArthur. I do. I regard them as the most progressive of all the three natives brought in there-Chinese, Portuguese, and Japanese.
Senator Davis. You do not classify them with the Asiatics?
Mr. MacArthur. No; not at all. They dress well; they have little gardens about their houses; they cultivate various things. The Azores is very similar to the climate of the Hawaiian Islands; it is the same class of soil-volcanic soil.
The Chairman. Did you understand from your examination of the condition of the Portuguese in Hawaii that their coming to the islands was a voluntary act on their part for the betterment of their fortunes?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; betterment of their fortunes.
The Chairman. Not compulsion?
Mr. MacArthur. No; they sent out agents. They wanted to advance the thing, partly Japanese, partly Chinese, and somebody went over and by arrangement brought these people there.
The Chairman. Not under the cooly system?
Mr. MacArthur. No; the people of the Azores are the most liberal-minded of any of the Portuguese.
Senator Davis. Do they have their wives with them?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; and children. They have brought their wives; they have little villages in Hawaii-the sugar companies build for them Japanese houses. They did not like these houses, so they went to work and made Japanese villages for them-little wicker things.
The Chairman. So that, I understand you, taking a general survey, the Kanaka population, the white population, and the Portuguese population, it would be a disastrous economic movement on the part of the United States to incorporate those people into our body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. No. But for the future the laws of the United States would prevent----
The Chairman. I was speaking of it as an economic question-whether you think it would be advantageous or disadvantageous to the United States to incorporate such a population as you have been describing into our body politic. Do you think it would be an advantage or a disadvantage?
Mr. MacArthur. I think it would be an advantage.
The Chairman. You do not include the Chinese in that statement?
Mr. MacArthur. No, not altogether. I think the Chinese are the worst population of all, perhaps.
The Chairman. Do they bring their families with them?
Mr. MacArthur. Not to a great extent.
The Chairman. Do they intermarry with the native women?
Mr. MacArthur. Not much. Some of the Japanese do, and I think some of the Portuguese.
The Chairman. They come there as denizens, and not to become citizens?
Mr. MacArthur. They cannot become citizens now.
The Chairman. I am speaking of their motives.
Mr. MacArthur. They come there to make money and go home.
The Chairman. This article which you published in your newspaper November 20,1893, seems to contain a statement of your views on a number of questions. I want to ask you whether you regard that as your sincere impression now?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
|
The article is as follows.
"[From the New York Mail and Express.]
"INTRODUCTORY BY THE EDITOR OF THE MAIL AND EXPRESS.
"Hon. Charles L. Mac Arthur, the venerable editor of the Troy Northern Budget and formerly State Senator, has complied with a request of the Mail and Express for an article on Hawaii, the circumstances that led to the overthrow of the Queen, and the personnel of the Provisional Government.
"Mr. MacArthur went to Hawaii shortly after the revolution and enjoyed the same facilities for observation as Mr. Blount had. A graphic and entertaining writer, the veteran editor has made travel a habit for years, and when he wants to find facts or objects knows just where to look for them.
"IN HAWAII WHEN COMMISSIONER BLOUNT WAS THERE.
To the editor of the New York Mail and Express.
"Sir: You have asked me to write for your paper on the subject of the Hawaiian Islands, now an absorbing theme of public discussion. I premise by saying that I was in the islands with my wife the best part of last winter, for weeks at the same hotel in Honolulu with Commissioner Blount and his amiable lady, saw them daily, and had fairly as good opportunities as he had to get at the bottom facts of the situation, the same sources of information being open to me as to him. Besides, I had greatly the advantage of him in that I saw and conversed with all classes of people and got at their inner ideas, whereas his reticence repelled rather than invited free intercourse. It was unfortunate for the object of his mission that he remained secluded in his quarters most of the time, instead of going about with his eyes and ears open and bringing into requisition the Yankee habit of asking questions. It was also unfortunate that he did not visit the great coffee and sugar producing island of Hawaii, the largest of the group, which has an area seven times greater than that of Oahu, on which Honolulu is situated, and six times larger than Maui, the next largest, with double the production of sugar and other commercial products of any other island.
"As I understand it, Mr. Blount only visited the island of Maui outside of Oahu, and then only paid a visit to see the great Spreckels sugar plantation, the largest in the world, where he was, of course, handsomely entertained. What he should have done was to have visited the great island of Hawaii, the garden island of Kauai, and the island of Molokai, and have seen the conditions of these islands for himself, and have conversed with the leading men of all parties throughout the group, instead of shutting himself up like an oyster in Honolulu and getting most of his information at second hand. I do not, however, desire to make any adverse criticism on Mr. Commissioner Blount, at least until his report becomes public, for he is a very amiable and courteous gentleman, and all my intercourse with him was of the pleasantest character. But I can't help saying that a trained newspaper man would have bored into all the sources of information and have swept the field cleaner and more thoroughly in gathering material for a satisfactory report by the methods ordinarily in vogue with newspaper men than was possible by the methods and means adopted by the honorable chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the last Congress
|
"ANNEXATION THE MORE DESIRABLE.
"On the assumption that the United States ultimately means to do anything with Hawaii other than to crush it or let it alone severely, there are two solutions of the question pending. One is annexation, the other a protectorate. Of the two, annexation is altogether the more desirable to both countries. The better way would be to provide for annexation on a plan similar to that by which Alaska was admitted. Hawaii does not ask to come in as a State until the islands have grown to somewhere near the stature, in population and importance, of a full-grown State. The older States, after the late experiences on the silver bill and in other respects, feel like going slow in admitting any new State with a population of, say, not more than 150,000, with two Senators, whose votes in the Senate would equal the votes of the New York Senators, who have a constituency back of them of now nearly 7,000,000, or would have as great a voice in the Senate as Pennsylvania with its more than 5,000,000, or Ohio and Illinois with their more than 3,000,000 of population each, or of five other States with more than 2,000,000 population each, or of eighteen other States with more than 1,000,000 population each, that would naturally object to admitting Hawaii as a State with two Senators, until she grows up to a stature more nearly approaching in population and resources the average size of all the States.
"The average population of these twenty-seven States is about 2,000,000 each, and the average population of many more than one-half of all the States is more than 1,000,000 each. These larger States will doubtless hereafter object to the admission of a new State that has not a population of at least a quarter of a million. That the islands once annexed as a Territory would speedly double in population and go on increasing at a rapid rate there can be no doubt. But for the present Hawaii, if annexed, should remain a Territory governed very much as Alaska is governed.
"NOT A SOUND OBJECTION.
"Senator Perkins, of California, and other Western Senators desire that the Hawaiian Islands should be acquired and annexed to California as a county with a county government. That proposition will do to think about, but is too large a question to be discussed here. Honolulu, as to location, is 2,100 miles from San Francisco. The argument is often used against annexation that the Hawaiian Islands are too far off and too far west to be annexed to this country. From the center of the American Union, now somewhere in the vicinity of Indianapolis, Hawaii is not so far off as portions of some of our Northwestern States, and is nearer than Alaska. Besides the Aleutian Islands, a part of Alaska, are more than 300 miles west of the parallel of the Hawaiian group. With fast railroads across the continent, and steamers that regularly make the trip from San Francisco to Honolulu in six days now, and could in four or five, the 'too far off' and 'too far west' objection don't count. Honolulu is in point of time no further from New York than Washington was from Boston when the Revolution broke out. As to a protectorate, Governor Marcy, when Secretary of State, was thoroughly in favor of annexing the Hawaiian Islands, and ably showed the utter absurdity and folly of the United States establishing a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands or any other territory. He said that a protectorate gave no sovereignty to the protector. The protected got the substance, while the protector got
|
only the shadow-and paid all the costs. And he was right. It is notable that every American Secretary of State, including Bayard, who has written upon the subject, except Gresham, and every President down to Cleveland has favored the American acquisition of Hawaii.
"AREA AND POPULATION.
"The Hawaiian Islands have an area of 6,470 square miles-about the size of Connecticut. The population in 1890 was 89,990. Of this number the natives (of the Hawaiian race) counted only 34,436, being in a minority in the population amounting to 21,115. There were 6,186 half-castes. Counting all the natives and all the half-castes as native Hawaiians they still lack 4,373 of being half the population, and are outnumbered by what are classed 'foreigners,' by 8,746 in the population table. All Hawaiians born on any of the islands of foreign parents are classed as 'foreigners,' although native whites born on the soil were ignorantly styled as a class by Secretary Gresham as 'aliens.' These 'foreigners,' Hawaiian native born, number 7,495, are all whites and mostly the children of American missionaries. The other Americans not born there number 1,928, so that the American native-born Hawaiians, or those who have located there, in round numbers count up 9,500. Statistics show that about 91 per cent of all the business of Hawaii and a proportionate amount of all the private property should be classed as American.
"There were 27,661 Japanese and Chinese, mostly coolies, employed in sugar-making; also, besides nearly 9,000 Portuguese, mostly similarly employed. These latter, being white, are admitted to citizenship and may vote, while the Orientals are excluded from the ballot. The Portuguese are almost to a man annexationists, are American in sentiment, and have a representative in the executive and legislative body of the Provisional Government. All of the other 'foreigners' of Hawaii, exclusive of 588 Polynesians, number only 2,494, of whom 1,344 are Britons and 1,034 Germans. A majority of the Germans are for annexation-the Britons are not. The latter compose all the real substance among the white population opposed to annexation. It was this body of 20,596 white 'foreigners,' nearly all of whom are Hawaiian citizens under the law and belonging to the constitutional voting class, numbering about two-thirds as many as all the native Hawaiians, that the ex-Queen undertook to disfranchise and to deprive of their civil rights under the old constitution, by suddenly proclaiming a new constitution putting all the political power and rule in the islands in the hands of the natives, that caused the revolution in January last and the deposition of the Queen.
"A CORRUPT LEGISLATURE.
"The last Hawaiian Legislature was guilty of notorious bribery and corruption. It passed the odious lottery and opium bills, which were signed by the Queen. The Queen arbitrarily selected her cabinet in defiance of constitutional principles, and the new revolutionary government in justification of her overthrow made this assertion, which never has been and can not be truthfully controverted: 'Her Majesty proceeded on the last day of the session to arbitrarily arrogate to herself the right to promulgate a new constitution, which proposes among other things to disfranchise over one-fourth of the voters and the owners of nine-tenths of the private property of the Kingdom, to abolish the
S. Doc 231, pt 6----67
|
Upper House of the Legislature and to substitute in place thereof an appointive one, to be appointed by the Sovereign.' Americans who are now shouting, 'home rule for Hawaiians' and demanding that the Provisional Government should be approved by a popular vote will do well to remember that the native Hawaiians are not by any means a majority of the population, and that the Queen sought to take the ballot from the hands of white men and confer it solely to her Kanaka brethren.
"NOT OF ROYAL BLOOD.
"It would be well for those to reflect who are now deploring the loss of the deposed Queen's rights to ascertain just what those rights are. She has not a drop of royal blood in her veins, and therefore does not get any of her pretended royal rights by descent. When Kamehameha V expired, December 11, 1872, the royal family became extinct. Then the system of election was resorted to to fill the throne. Lunalilo, one of the high chief class, was elected by a vote of the nobles and representatives. He died in 1874, and then a new election of the sovereign was held by the nobles and representatives. The general supposition was that Queen Emma, the widow of Kamehameha IV, would be elected, but when the election came off Kalakaua captured the Legislature and secured a majority, it was charged at the time, by unfair methods. Riots against Kalakaua followed, and he was only kept on the throne ultimately by the landing of an American force.
"When Kalakaua died, in 1891, he had no heir, and by his will he selected his sister, Liliuokalni, as his successor. Thus the right to the throne by inheritance or by an election was abandoned, and the Queen who was deposed last winter seemed to owe her elevation to the will of her brother, which mode of selection seems to have been acquiesced in at the time. Whether there was any law or change of constitution which authorized a childless sovereign to will away the throne to a relative or not, I do not know. Similarly, however, the deposed Queen has designated as her successor Kaiulani, the daughter of her sister, now 18 years of age, the daughter of Mr. Cleghorn, an Englishman who married one of Kalakaua's sisters and who held office under that King. Kaiulani is now being brought up in England, under the tutelage of Theophilus C. Davies, formerly English consul at Honolulu, and now in business there, and whose son is said to be engaged to marry Kaulani. She visited Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland last winter in company with Davies, and Mrs. Cleveland gave the incipient Queen distinguished consideration. Davies has lately had interviews with Cleveland and Gresham and has returned to Honolulu, proclaiming that Lil will be restored, and here's where 'the English of it' comes in.
"Perhaps one reason why women seem to be the favorite sex for sovereigns, in violation of the Salic law, is because the descent of property in Hawaii is through the female and not the male line. Kalakaua and his sister Lil were of what is known as the high chief class. Their blood was not, therefore, 'royal,' but, so far as inherited, of a very bad kind, for it is a historical fact that their grandfather was the first person ever executed in Hawaii for the murder of his wife.
"A DYING RACE.
"It seems absurd that an American statesman should be willing to commit the future destinies of Hawaii to the rule of the monarchy of a race rapidly dying out, rather than to the vigorous and progressive
|
auspices of the American Republic. The native population of Hawaii fell off from 1866 from 57,125 to 31,446 in 1890-a loss of 22,679 in twenty-five years. At that rate of loss the whole native population of Hawaii will be wiped out completely early in the second quarter of the next century, so that the child may now be born who will live to see the entire extinction of the Hawaiian race. This is a startling fact. Yet it seems to be true that in a little more than a century since the discovery of the Hawaiian group by Capt. Cook the population has dwindled from 400,000 to less than one-eleventh of that number. I have not space to give the reasons for this decay of the race, one of the principal of which seems to lie in the fact that the native women generally lack the motherly instinct for the proper care of their children.
"A common custom among Hawaiian mothers is to give away their children at birth, some promising to give them away even before they are born. The mother, for this loss of her offspring, solaces herself often by adopting the child of some other woman as a household pet, after the manner of many American women who prefer pugs to progeny. It is certain that a newer and more virile race is shortly to entirely supersede the aboriginals on these islands. The evolution is now going on with startling rapidity.
"Now that the public lands are about exhausted in America and Hawaii lies contiguous to our own shores, shall the dominant race to be planted there be American or English, or shall the structure of the future be built on the basis of a race, as Cleveland proposes, who will sink out of sight among the 'lost tribes' early in the next century? Statesmen who are statesmen worthy of the name do not build the nation for a day, but for all time. In view of the fact that our Pacific coast will in the near future have a population of 10,000,000 of people, with a vast commerce over the Pacific Ocean, and that this commerce will require protection over that great sea, the reasons for annexation, now that the opportunity offers, are too obvious to need to be recounted here.
"A SETTLED POLICY.
"The students of American history know that in the United States annexation has been the settled policy always. The original American colonies numbered only eleven, including the three counties of Delaware, which were really a part of Pennsylvania, and the number of States remained at eleven for two or three years after the adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787. The number was swelled to thirteen in 1789 and 1790, when North Carolina and Rhode Island reluctantly came into the Union. The original colonies contained no more than 1,000,000 square miles of territory, a narrow strip of land stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Alleghenies in the West, to the Floridas and Louisiana in the south, and to the northward to Nova Scotia and Canada. All during our earlier history it was a struggle to annex new territory or to protect what we had. The real bottom bone of contention in the war with Great Britain in 1812 was as to which nation should hold the navigation arid mouth of the Mississippi River. In the present century we have made by purchase the following annexations, namely:
|
In 1803, Louisiana cost |
$15,000,000 |
|
In 1819, Florida |
5,000,000 |
|
In 1848, California and New Mexico |
15,000,000 |
|
In 1853, Arizona |
10,000,000 |
|
In 1867, Alaska |
7,200,000 |
|
| |
|
Total cost of territory purchased |
52,200,000 |
|
"The nation has repaid its entire cost of $52,000,000 for all the territory purchased in a single year by the product of the mines of California. Texas was annexed in 1845, not by purchase or treaty, but by a joint resolution of Congress. The acquisition of Louisiana and the Floridas more than doubled the original million square miles of territory on which the United States started into business; then Texas came in with 300,000 square miles more, next California and New Mexico with still a greater extent of territory, then Arizona in 1853 with a large slice more, and Alaska in 1867 with 500,000 more, so that now the original million of our area has been swelled by annexation to four times its first size, and, in fact, the center of the Republic has traveled west into the territory annexed.
"There has not been an annexation of territory made that has not added greatly to the material grandeur and to the prosperity of the whole United States, and it would now be difficult to find throughout all these broad realms a single American, not a crank, who wouldn't be willing we should go to war rather than any acre acquired should be wrested from us. The acquisition of territory by America is very much like the birth of children---- not always longed for by the parent or prospectively welcome to the family, but once they join the home circle they are valued above all price and are too precious to be bought with money. So would it be once that Hawaii became an American possession.
"NO PLEBISCITE OR VOTING ON ANNEXATION.
"It is claimed by some of the Clevelandites that Hawaii should not be annexed without a majority vote of the aboriginal natives, who are themselves a minority of the whole permanent inhabitants, in its favor. This is against all American precedent in annexations in this country, and generally in all practice throughout the world. The question of the annexation of any of the territory acquired by us was never submitted to a vote of the people of the country acquired in any case. It is probable that if the inhabitants had voted, including those of the aboriginal natives, the vote in each case would have been against annexation. The Indians in these countries would have been against annexation, and with their votes annexation would have been defeated. Even as it was the Louisiana acquisition was opposed strongly there, and serious riots in opposition resulted in New Orleans. In our acquisitions the government in control of the territory transferred arranged the terms of each transfer, and there was no popular vote on the subject.
"Those who controlled territory to transfer transferred it, as has been proposed in the case of Hawaii, and all such transfers have been approved as wise, popular, patriotic, and glorious by the American people. And as those who are represented in the Provisional Government now propose to cede Hawaii control and own nine-tenths of the business and private property of the islands and have shown their ability to sustain that Government against all opposition that can come from within the country, their right to act on the question is indisputable.
"WHAT THE MAP SHOWS.
"The accompanying map shows that Hawaii is the great crossing point in traversing the Pacific Ocean-the hub that sends out spokes to all other prominent points and ports of that greatest ocean of the world. All the steamer lines, other than coastwise, here cross and
|
diverge to all points of the compass. It is the strategical and naval key to the whole Northern Pacific Ocean. All naval and military authorities concur in the statement that the strong nation that has power to hold Hawaii will have the dominion over this great sea and can control the vast commerce of the Pacific, for it is the gateway and toll gate of the water roads to China, Japan, the Indies, the Orient, as well as the focusing point of vessels bound to North and South America, to Australia, and to the innumerable groups of islands composing the Indian Ocean archipelago. Here are some ocean distances, in miles, from Honolulu to----
|
|
"Thomas Hart Benton long ago declared that the dominion and empire of the world lay along the route to the Indies and with the country that controlled the commerce over it. This has been true ever since the discovery of America. The map shows that the mainland of Alaska is west of Honolulu, and the Aleutian Islands, a part of American territory in Alaska, are more than 300 miles west of the Hawaii's. With the laying of an ocean cable to Honolulu, which there is good assurance will be done by a British company very soon, and the completion of the Nicaragua canal, which is also sure to come later, the importance of the Hawaiian Islands will be vastly increased. Within five years after American annexation Honolulu would become the Hong Kong of the Pacific, with a population of at least 100,000, and the population of the whole group would be doubled with a steady increasing growth thereafter.
"The growing commerce of our Pacific coast with the Orient and elsewhere on that ocean will be immensely increased in the near future, and these American interests demand the acquisition of these islands for commerce in time of peace and for defense in time of war. It should be remembered that the United States are being builded for all time and not for a day. If the United States acquire these islands on the terms proffered by the Hawaiian Provisional Government, our Government would get $10,000,000 of actual value in property for nothing, besides the Pearl River coaling station on the same terms, which may be easily and cheaply fortified at small cost, so as to become a naval Gibraltar of the Pacific, strong enough to be held by our white squadron against any force likely ever to be brought against it. And there is no civilizing or Americanizing to be done to train the annexed people into accord with our institutions, for the white men now at the head of the Provisional Government are all of the best New England stock, as well as those who support it. All the executive heads of the Provisional Government, except one, are white men born on the soil of Hawaii, sons of American missionaries, who Christianized, civilized, and raised Hawaii from heathendom, although declared 'aliens' by Secretary Gresham.
"CLIMATE AND PRODUCTIONS.
"The islands have the finest climate in the world, and Hawaii has been justly styled the Paradise of the Pacific. It raises the products of the tropic and the temperate zones. It is the richest piece of cane
|
sugar producing country in the world, as it may be seen from the fact that the average product of sugar in other countries is two tons to the acre, while in the islands it is four, and often eight tons in exceptional cases. Heretofore the annual exports of the islands for several years have been of the value of about $115 per each man, woman, and child in the whole country-a larger percentage to population than enjoyed by any other country in the world. This year the first six months customs statement shows that the average for the year in sugar exports alone will reach about $110 per head for each inhabitant-a large increase. Cane sugar is not raised here above the 1,500-foot level of the sea. Experiments that promise success are now being made in raising the red Australian cane above the 1,500-foot level. If the effort is successful the sugar crop will be vastly increased. Above that level is now raised as fine coffee as is produced in any country in the world. But coffee cultivation has not been pushed, sugar raising being more profitable.
"But with the advent of Yankee methods both the coffee, rice, and other products of the soil will be enormously increased. Hawaii is truly an exceedingly fertile land abounding in rich products. It only has to be "tickled with a hoe to laugh with a harvest." Do we want it? Well, the Americans ought to know enough to take a good thing when it is offered for nothing, and is needed for the purposes of commerce and protection. To reject annexation now, and to crush out by bayonets an American government over what is really only an outlying American colony, only to restore it to heathendom and the rule of the Kahunas, would be the greatest political crime and blunder that the Americans have committed in this century, only excepting the efforts of the rebels to destroy the Union. In this case the instrument of the crime employed by the administration is one who endeavored to pull down our flag and to put in its place that of the confederacy,-and one who has already pulled down the stars and stripes in Honolulu, and is now engaged in the anti-American effort to run up the Britishized flag of the heathen Queen in its place.
"COMMISSIONER BLOUNT'S REPORT.
"While I write Commissioner Blount's report has just been brought in. It seems to have fallen lifeless, limp, and dead upon the public as being anything like a true and living witness against annexation. As the late American minister, Mr. Stevens, promises to dissect Blount's cadaver, it is only fair that his scalpel shall have the first slash at it. I only say here that I do know that Blount's report is a wicked perversion of the facts, as I had the opportunity of gathering them in Honolulu before his arrival there and after. The story of a Stevens conspiracy is utterly absurd. The plain facts, briefly, are these: There was great excitement over the passage of the opium and lottery bills at the close of the legislative session, and the whole civilized and Christianized part of the community was up in arms against these measures, which had been bribed through the Legislature and mothered by the Queen.
"The Christian ladies of the city called on the Queen in the interests of morality, asking her not to sign these bills. The Queen promised not to do so, and asked the ladies to unite with her in prayer that God would give her strength to resist the temptation. They did so, and the whole city knew of it. Next morning the city was shocked to learn that she had played the hypocrite and signed the odious bills. A popular ferment ensued. On that day, when the session had closed finally,
|
the community was still farther shocked when the Queen, on her own volition, without the consent of her cabinet, proclaimed a new constitution, cutting off the franchise of a large portion of the whites and practically handing over their liberties and properties to the tender mercies of the native Kanakas.
"This last straw broke the camel's back. The revolution instantly broke out, which resulted in the establishment of the Provisional Government. Mr. Stevens was absent, and had been for days previous, on board a United States war vessel, the Boston I think, which had gone on a cruise in the outer islands for target practice. Neither Stevens nor the United States cruiser arrived back in Honolulu until after the revolution had been under full head for fully forty-eight hours, and he and the officers of the vessel were in utter ignorance of what had happened until they landed. Then he and they acted promptly. That does not look much like a Stevens conspiracy. It was the fact that the Queen's party took advantage of his absence to establish a new constitution and to make a revolution of their own, and she lost her throne in the attempt."
The Chairman. When you were in Hawaii did you know Paul Neuman?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. What relation did he hold to Liliuokalani?
Mr. MacArthur. He was her attorney-held the power of attorney that he had here when he originally came.
The Chairman. The same as is printed in Mr. Blount's report?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. Were you personally acquainted with the Queen?
Mr. MacArthur. I met her in California. She was at the same house that I was. I knew her husband in California, and I should not have been able to see her but for a previous acquaintance. She was not receiving anybody.
The Chairman. What year was it that you first met the Queen?
Mr. MacArthur. I think it must have been in 1887. I was in California three or four times. I am not quite sure of the year; I think it was in 1887. The Queen's husband was over there trying to float some Government bonds.
The Chairman. That was before the Queen's accession to the throne?
Mr. MacArthur. Before her accession. She was Mrs. Dominis then?
The Chairman. Did you have with Mr. and Mrs. Dominis a personal acquaintance?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; to a limited extent. I spoke to them frequently at the hotel in California.
The Chairman. Did you have frequent conversations with her?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; some.
The Chairman. When you returned to Hawaii after this revolution had been inaugurated, did you see her again?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you have any conversation with her?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. On political topics?
Mr. MacArthur. Not very much; I did to a small extent.
The Chairman. I would like to know what you know in respect to Paul Neuman's authority to represent Liliuokalani, and of any overtures that were made by him, with her consent, or, as he asserted, with her consent, to surrender her crown to the Provisional Government,
|
her royal authority, for a moneyed consideration. Give us your knowledge about that, and you can go on and state the whole affair in your own way.
Mr. MacArthur. I went to Mr. Dole. I had trouble in my own mind as to whether the Queen had not some personal rights in the crown lands, for the reason that the treasury department had never asked her to make a return on the income, which was about $75,000 a year, from these lands and which she had received, and as the treasury had never asked her for a return I thought she had an individual right in the lands. I said to the people, "She has individual rights, and you have not asked her to make a return to the treasury of what she has received and what she did not receive." The President explained it all to me, the grounds of it. When Mr. Neuman indicated that they were willing-I had made the suggestion and others had-that they ought to buy her out, pay her a definite sum, $25,000 or some other sum per year for her rights. Her rights had been shattered, but I thought they ought to pay for them, and so I went, in accordance with Mr. Neuman's suggestion, or by his consent, to see President Dole.
Mr. Neuman said he wanted to talk with President Dole about this matter, but he had not been there officially, and he could not go there publicly to his official place. I talked with Mr. Dole, and Mr. Dole said he could not officially do anything without consulting his executive committee, but he said he would be very happy to meet Mr. Neuman and see what they wanted-see if they could come to any terms about this thing by which the Queen would abdicate and surrender her rights. Then he said, "Where will Mr. Neuman like to meet me?" After we talked it over we thought Mr. Neuman would not be willing to come there publicly, and so it was suggested that Mr. Neuman could call on Mr. Dole at his house on a given evening and bring his daughter along.
The Chairman. Do you remember what evening that was?
Mr. MacArthur. I do not remember. And in accordance with that, Mr. Neuman and his daughter called, nominally for the daughter to see Mrs. Dole, so that it could not get out, if they made a call, they could say it was merely a social call, not an official call. Of course, I do not know what their conversation was; but Mr. Neuman, acting on that, called on the Queen. Mr. Dole and Mr. Neuman both impressed on me the importance of not having this thing get out, or the whole thing would go up in smoke. Mr. Neuman said he could bring this thing about if he could keep it from the Queen's retainers-her people. He said, "That is the difficulty about this thing." This matter went on for three or four days. Mr. Neuman saw the Queen and she agreed not to say anything about it, so Mr. Neuman tells me, and I got it from other sources there which I think are reliable. They came to some sort of understanding; I do not know what it was. They went so far as to say this woman would not live over three or four years; that she had some heart trouble; and if they gave her $25,000 a year it would not be for along time.
The Chairman. As an annuity?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; and Mr. Neuman said she assented to it, if she could satisfy one or two of her people.
The Chairman. From whom did you get the understanding that the Queen assented to it?
Mr. MacArthur. I got it from Mr. Neuman, who was her attorney, and others.
|
The Chairman. Was any provision included in that proposed arrangement in favor of the Princess Kaiulani?
Mr. MacArthur. No; in fact, they were a little bit antagonistic.
The Chairman. Was Mr. Neuman acting as the agent of Kaiulani?
Mr. MacArthur. No; As I understand, he never was the agent of Kaiulani, but of Lilioukalani.
Senator Frye. The last 25 or 30 lines of this letter which you have put in as your testimony clearly ought not to come in as testimony, it being certain criticisms of political action. I want to ask you to leave that out.
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; I will leave it out.
The Chairman. You desire to leave out of your statement the last part of it, because it is mere comment?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; mere comment.
Senator Gray. When did you go to the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. MacArthur. It was early in March, I think. I went there two or three steamers before the one on which Mr. Blount went.
Senator Gray. You were there when Mr. Blount arrived?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Where did you stop when you went there?
Mr. MacArthur. Both at the same hotel.
Senator Gray. You were stopping at that hotel when Mr. Blount arrived†?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. He had a cottage in the grounds.
Senator Gray. Is that the hotel where tourists are likely to stop?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. How long did you remain there?
Mr. MacArthur. Seven or eight weeks; I do not quite remember.
Senator Gray. Do you remember what day of the month you got back?
Mr. MacArthur. I got back home the 20th of May.
Senator Gray. Did you come straight back?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. It would take about two weeks direct travel to come from Hawaii to your home?
Mr. MacArthur. It takes six days by steamer from Honolulu to San Francisco and four or five days across the continent home.
Senator Gray. I understand your testimony to be that you were in the islands for your health?
Mr. MacArthur. I went there exclusively for leisure. I saw such a condition of things that I went to investigating.
Senator Gray. I understand from what you have just said, and that has not been made of record, that you believe in the general policy of the Nicaraguan Canal and the annexation of these islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. You are what may be called an annexationist?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Of course, you think that annexation would be for the benefit of the people of the United States?
Mr. MacArthur. I do, decidedly. I did not go there an annexationist; but when I found the conditions of things there, I changed my views about it.
Senator Gray. Had you been there before?
Mr. MacArthur. No.
Senator Gray. You had not been in the islands before?
Mr. MacArthur. No.
|
Senator Gray. And you think that the treaty of annexation that was proposed to the Senate by the commissioners of the Hawaiian Islands and the Secretary of State and President, in January, 1893, would have been a good treaty to confirm?
Mr. MacArthur. So far as I understand it; I am not familiar with details of that treaty.
Senator Gray. You think it would be good to make those islands an integral part of the United States?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. And its people a part of the body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. I do. There may be a good deal in that question of annexation to California.
Senator Gray. Do you think it would be well to make it an integral part of the United States and the people a part of our body politic?
Mr. MacArthur. I do.
Senator Gray. Natives, Chinese, Portuguese, and Japanese?
Mr. MacArthur. Certainly the Portuguese.
Senator Gray. I said the Chinese.
Mr. MacArthur. Our Constitution is in the way of incorporating the Chinaman as a citizen.
Senator Gray. You think the Constitution of the United States prevents Chinamen from becoming citizens?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. And on that account you are quite willing that the people should become part of the body politic, believing that the Constitution would exclude the Chinamen?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; as citizens.
Senator Gray. And it was that view of the Constitution that caused you to make the answer you did?
Mr. MacArthur. I am not opposed to the Chinaman in California.
Senator Gray. Was the result of your observation there such as to bring you to the opinion that the Provisional Government fairly represented in the American fashion the people of those islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. You think it did? You think it was supported by a majority of the people of those islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Not by a majority of the natives.
Senator Gray. I am not speaking of separating the two classes, but of a majority of all the people of those islands, whites, natives, and all.
Mr. MacArthur. If they took a vote under the present voting system, under the constitution of 1887, with American interests there, and the Portuguese who may become citizens, and are practically citizens there now, they would get a majority.
Senator Gray. Now?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; now.
Senator Gray. Do you believe they would at the time the Provisional Government was established or within a few weeks thereafter?
Mr. MacArthur. I believe they would now.
Senator Gray. Do you extend that opinion?
Mr. MacArthur. That is the voting population. There is a property qualification for the house of representatives and a larger qualification for the house of nobles. Taken together, that vote, combined with the Portuguese and white population, they would secure a majority, because annexation sentiment has grown lately.
|
Senator Gray. I am told that this article is to be incorporated as a part of your testimony.
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. I would like to omit that last part. I wind up with an allusion to Mr. Stevens.
Senator Gray. Did you meet Mr. Blount shortly after your arrival in the islands?
Mr. MacArthur. I was there when he arrived.
Senator Gray. Did you meet him?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you see him constantly?
Mr. MacArthur. Every day while I was there. I went down to Mauai, made excursions to the volcano and came back, and would see Mr. Blount every day while in Honolulu.
Senator Gray. You have already told me that you met Mr. Blount directly after his arrival, and boarded at his hotel, and that you saw him every day?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did he seem to you to be engaged in gathering information? I do not say from what source; I just say, did he seem to be about that business?
Mr. MacArthur. He was, so far as I could ascertain. Yes; he was in his cottage pretty nearly all the while; did not go out any; did not make excursions.
Senator Gray. But he seemed to be gathering information?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; that was about the purport of it.
Senator Gray. Did he seem to be honestly engaged in it?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; except that he would not see some men at first like Lobenstein, who had been a surveyor and knew all about the land system. After he saw him he said he was the best man he could get-have you any more such men?
Senator Gray. Did your observation of Mr. Blount during those weeks or months that you were on the islands give you any opinion as to the man's honesty or integrity?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; I thought he was honest.
Senator Gray. Did you think he was an upright man?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes, I do-ordinarily so.
Senator Gray. A gentleman?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. I mean in the wide, broad acceptation of that term?
Mr. MacArthur. Oh, yes.
Senator Gray. He did not, I assume from what you said, gather information in a way that would satisfy a newspaper man?
Mr. MacArthur. No; he did not.
Senator Gray. You believe, from what you have noticed of your profession, that the newspaper men have a faculty, trained or otherwise, superior to other men in getting facts?
Mr. MacArthur. It is the profession of their life; yes.
Senator Gray. And you do not think that Mr. Blount, from what you saw, was up to the standard as a newspaper gatherer of information?
Mr. MacArthur. No.
Senator Gray. I observe in your article, which I have in my hand and glanced at very hastily, you say, "It is claimed by some of the Clevelandites that Hawaii should not be annexed without a majority vote of the aboriginal natives, who are themselves a minority of the whole permanent inhabitants, in its favor." What Clevelandite, so-
|
called, or other person, have you heard claim, or where have you seen in print, as you claim, that Hawaii ought not to be annexed without a majority vote of the native population?
Mr. MacArthur. The New York Times, The World, and the different administration papers that express their views, held that a vote should be taken on it.
Senator Gray. But there should not be a majority vote of the natives separated from all others?
Mr. MacArthur. I mean native whites as well as others. There is a large proportion of the population natives who are whites.
Senator Gray. Then you mean that those people contend that there should not be annexation without a vote of all the real population of those islands?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Frye. Of all who are to vote?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. That is not what I mean. The majority vote of all the inhabitants of those islands who belong there either as natives or as naturalized citizens? That is what you mean?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Then you say, "But that is against all American precedent in annexation and generally in all practice throughout the world?"
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
Senator Gray. Are you aware that Mr. Seward, when he was Secretary of State, declared in an official paper that? "A revolutionary government is not to be recognized until it is established by the great body of the population of the State it claims to govern?"
Mr. MacArthur. No, I do not know that. What I meant there was that there had never been a case of annexation in this country where the people had voted on it.
Senator Frye. That is, the annexed population?
Mr. MacArthur. The annexed population. If it had been, the annexation would have been repudiated in every case.
The Chairman. In the case of a plebiscite in Hawaii, where the population is homogeneous, there is not as much reason for having a plebiscite of our own people for the admission of those strangers as there would be of submitting to them in case they desired to come in?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes, in the case of Louisiana and the case of Texas, annexation would have been defeated if submitted to a vote of all the inhabitants there.
The Chairman. But in those cases the people were homogeneous with our race here.
Mr. MacArthur. As to whites that may be.
Senator Gray. There was no doubt in the case of Louisiana of the full authority of the French Government to make the cession?
Mr. MacArthur. Exactly. That is the ground I take on Hawaii. There were two riots in New Orleans against annexation to the United States, and they had to send troops to put them down. The government that is in power and possession has the right to make its treaty of annexation, and there never has been in the history of the country any precedent of its kind of a plebiscitum.
The Chairman. In the annexation of a country, merging its sovereignty into another, the question is a governmental question and not of the people concerned?
|
Mr. MacArthur. Exactly; because the Government represents the people, as in the case of Texas.
The Chairman. I do not know that you remember, but it appears to me that at the time the treaty with Mexico was sent in by Mr. Triste, and submitted to the Senate of the United States, there was a motion made to submit the question of annexation to a plebiscite. I do not know that you remember that.
Mr. MacArthur. I do not.
Senator Gray. I will ask you whether you approved the pulling down of that flag by Admiral Skerrett?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes, because there was no protectorate over it. I prefer annexation to a protectorate. The latter gives no sovereignty; it simply protects, and nothing else.
The Chairman. I will ask you whether there exists in Honolulu a club in which men of different politics and different races and different nativity assemble?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. Mr. Cleghorn is the president of it. He is the father of Kaiulani.
The Chairman. Do gentlemen belonging to different political parties and elements meet there on terms of friendship and cordiality??
Mr. MacArthur. Entirely so. It is the most good-natured club you ever saw.
The Chairman. And there they discuss questions of annexation?
Mr. MacArthur. It is all good-natured.
The Chairman. They entertain discussions on that question?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. Having reference to prosperity, etc.
Mr. MacArthur. Yes.
The Chairman. In those club meetings does good feeling prevail?
Mr. MacArthur. Certainly.
The Chairman. Will you say, as compared with like assemblages of gentlemen in the United States, there is any more feeling of friction or opinion there?
Mr. MacArthur. Not as much. There is less friction through all those islands than there is in any other country in the world that I ever saw.
The Chairman. You have traveled a good deal?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes; all over the world.
The Chairman. And your attention has been drawn, of course, to the observation of such questions?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. They do not have any angry political discussions in the streets in Hawaii. They meet together, and they are the best-natured people in the world.
The Chairman. Political divisions do not enter into the social relations of the people?
Mr. MacArthur. No. In Hawaii the line of rank and descent was through the mother.
The Chairman. It is like it is among the Indian tribes of this country?
Mr. MacArthur. Yes. That is the reason they prefer to have a Queen to a King.
To Stenographer: Senator Morgan directs that the following be added to my testimony.
C. L. MacArthur.
|
Chairman. Anything else?
MacArthur. I have, by late steamer, reliable information that there is danger that the reciprocity treaty with the United States will be repealed unless the present tension is relieved. The imports from the United States under that treaty in 1892 amounted to $3,838,359.91. Nearly all this was admitted to Hawaii free, whereas as to other competing countries the Hawaiian tariff ranges from 10 to 25 per cent on such imports. With the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty goes the privilege of our acquiring the Pearl Lochs for a naval station.
There are 915,000 acres of crown lands. The rental from these is stated at about $75,000 annually. The Provisional Government has them now. In addition the other Government lands are 851,071 acres, valued at $1,729,700, on which there is a yearly rental paid to the Provisional Government from portions leased of $58,863.
SWORN STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL GEORGE BELKNAP.
The Chairman. What is your profession??
Mr. Belknap. I am a rear-admiral in the Navy, on the retired list.
The Chairman. We are interested to know, and I think the people of the United States are very much interested in knowing, whether the Hawaiian group of islands, with its base, and particularly Pearl Harbor, is of real importance to this country and its defense in a military and a naval sense; and, if you think it is, or if it is not, what are the general reasons on which you predict that opinion?
Mr. Belknap. I think it is a matter of prime importance to the people of the United States to acquire those islands. I think, in view of the present state of affairs, the coming growth of the population of the Pacific coast, and especially when the Nicaraguan Canal shall have been completed, that those islands will form the most important commercial and strategic point in the Pacific Ocean. I think it would be a suicidal policy on the part of the United States to allow Great Britain or any other European power to get any foothold on those islands.
The Chairman. That policy seems to have been anticipated on the part of the United States for perhaps forty or fifty years, so that the question would then arise, of course, whether it would be better for us in the sense of protecting our commerce and our coast to assume the control of the Hawaiian group of islands, in order that we might there establish our naval station and have in the middle of the Pacific Ocean a means of offense and defense against the fleets of Europe and Asia?
Mr. Belknap. I think we ought to assume control right away. And as to the fleets of Europe attacking those islands, I think they have their hands full in looking out for their own interests in other parts of the world.
The Chairman. You have been on the islands??
Mr. Belknap. Yes, I have been there twice.
The Chairman. And I suppose you have some acquaintance with Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Belknap. I never went to Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. Do you know where it is located?
Mr. Belknap. I know where it is located.
The Chairman. And its general character?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, sir.
|
The Chairman. And you also have a general acquaintance with the Bay of Honolulu?
Mr. Belknap. Yes; in my judgment Honolulu is one of the easiest defended ports in the world. They talk about ships attacking that harbor, the fact is they can not do it successfully. A few heavy guns properly located would keep them away.
The Chairman. You speak of the rim of mountains back of Honolulu?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, Punch Bowl and other mountains back of Honolulu. It is constantly rising ground back of the city.
The Chairman. Do you think it would be feasible to establish batteries around on the reef in Honolulu Bay?
Mr. Belknap. No, it is not feasible. It is only a half mile from shore, and that would not be necessary.
The Chairman. With long-range artillery would we be able to give the harbor any perfect protection?
Mr. Belknap. Yes. They talk about long-range guns. It is all nonsense. They can not get the range on ship that they can on shore. I landed a force in Honolulu in 1874 and kept it there a week. That was when Kalakaua was elected King. If you will allow me I will tell you the circumstances.
The Chairman. I think that is what Senator Frye desires to examine you about. Proceed with your statement.
Mr. Belknap. I arrived there on the Tuscarora from San Diego. We had been engaged in making deep-sea soundings. We arrived at Honolulu on the 3d of February, 1874. As we went into the harbor we noticed a throng of people on the wharf and streets. As soon as the pilot came on board we learned that King Lunalilo had just died. It was too late to call on the minister that day, but at 10 o'clock the next morning I went on shore. The minister was then Mr. Henry A. Pierce.
The Chairman. From what State was he?
Mr. Belknap. Massachusetts. He had been in Honolulu for many years, and he made a fortune. He came back to the United States and lost it. Then Gen. Grant made him minister. Mr. Pierce told me that the Legislative Assembly would meet on the 12th of that month, and would elect a successor to King Lunalilo, he having died without designating his successor. It became necessary therefore under the constitution that the Legislature should elect the King. Mr. Pierce said there were two candidates in the field; one was David Kalakaua, the son of a high chief; the other a widow of Kamehameha IV-Queen Emma. There were large numbers of natives and a great body of Americans who favored Kalakaua as being the better person for American interests, while some of the natives, and particularly those belonging to the English church, and the greater part of the English people, headed by the British minister, wanted Queen Emma. Mr. Pierce said he thought there would be trouble, and wanted to know if I would land a force in case it were necessary to do so.
The Chairman. I want to ask right there whether or not there was a distinctive British influence in Hawaii, as there was an American interest, and were they controverting with each other for the real control of the politics of the islands?
Mr. Belknap. I think that was undoubtedly the case. Mr. Wodehouse, the British commissioner, was there. He is now the minister. He has been there for a number of years; I think he has been there over thirty years.
|
The Chairman. So that the advocacy and promotion of British interests in Hawaii, you think, were as manifest as those of the American interests?
Mr. Belknap. Beyond a doubt. Wherever you find an American minister or consul in any part of the world attempting to further the interests of the United States the English always secretly undermine the efforts of the consul and minister. That has been my observation the world over.
Senator Butler. Do you think that proceeds from the English people realizing the fact that the commercial competition is to be between the two great nations?
Mr. Belknap. I think it does in a measure. If any American goes beyond a native of Great Britain, it is continually a thorn in the side of the English people.
Senator Frye. Now I will be pleased to have you go on with your statement.
Mr. Belknap. I told Mr. Pierce that I would do everything possible. I arranged that day a system of signals by which Mr. Pierce could signal to me on board the ship if he found it necessary.
The Chairman. Was there at that time any outbreak or riot?
Mr. Belknap. No.
The Chairman. Simply expectation?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. An outbreak liable to occur at any time?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. You made arrangements beforehand for the landing of the troops?
Mr. Belknap. Yes. There was a British man-of-war In the harbor, and we did not want him to get ahead of us. We arranged a system of signals with lanterns and rockets at night and a flag by day. On the morning of the meeting of the Legislature I determined to attend and witness the proceedings in company with the minister. Capt. Skerrett and I-Capt. Skerrett commanded the Portsmouth which arrived in Honolulu the morning after we did-went to the legislative hall. We staid there and saw the organization of the Assembly. As a ballot was about to take place we left the hall and remained outside. Perhaps in a quarter of an hour after that the voting was finished and the ballots were counted, and it was found that Kalakaua had received 39 votes and Queen Emma 6. Kalakaua was declared elected. As soon as this news was given outside of the court-house, where the Legislature was in session, the adherents of Queen Emma broke out into a riot. They rushed up the back way, through a door in the back, into the hall, or through the windows out into the legislative assembly and then began to club the members and senators, I do not know which, broke chairs, smashed tables and windows, and threw all they could lay their hands on out into the street. A large party of them assembled about Queen Emma's residence, and they were making threats to devastate the town.
While this riot was in progress I said to Mr. Pierce, "I had better land the force now." He said: "No; wait a little while." Finally, Mr. Bishop, who was prime minister, minister of foreign affairs under the King-elect, said to Mr. Pierce: "We would like to have the force landed now." So that I immediately sent a messenger down to the wharf where D. C. Murray lived, and had a signal run up. In about ten minutes our men were landed-180 men, seamen, officers, and
|
marines, and they marched up to the court-house, formed a column in front of it, and sent one company up into the hall to clear it out.
Senator Frye. The legislative hall?
Mr. Belknap. The legislative hall-to clear it out. I think that in less than ten minutes after arriving on the scene of action everything was quiet there.
Senator Butler. Did that company meet with any resistance?
Mr. Belknap. No. The rioters had nothing but clubs to resist with, and they attempted no resistance. But the police of the Government had torn off their badges and some of them had joined the rioters, so that there was nothing to do but to land the troops to preserve order.
The Chairman. Was any force landed from any other ship?
Mr. Belknap. Capt. Ray, who was commanding Her Majesty's ship Tenedos, instead of staying in town that morning, went out horse riding, and his executive officer did not act at first upon the request of the British minister. They had no signals to send off to the ship to call the men on shore. But within half an hour after our men got on shore and the riot was quelled, the detachment from the Tenedos came marching up to the court-house.
Senator Butler. A detachment from the British ship?
Mr. Belknap. British ship. Mr. Pierce turned to Mr. Wodehouse and said, "You had better withdraw this force and send it up to Queen Emma's."
Senator Butler. Which force?
Mr. Belknap. The American minister said, "You had better advise your officers to go up to Queen Emma's house and disperse the crowd there." Capt. Ray did not get back into town until late in the afternoon. Some few months after he was relieved of the command of that ship, ordered home, and never had an hour's duty from that time forward.
Senator Frye. They did not like it that the Americans should get ahead of them?
Mr. Belknap. No, they did not. The Englishmen resident there in the islands were very much chagrined, particularly Mr. Wodehouse.
The Chairman. The riot was quelled?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. Peace restored?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. Order established?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. And Kalakaua was preserved on the throne?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Did you go there to establish him on the throne?
Mr. Belknap. No, but to preserve order.
Senator Frye. And his establishment on the throne was a mere incident.
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. If you had not gone on shore, would not Queen Emma's troops have routed them?
Mr. Belknap. I think they would; I think there is no question about it.
Senator Frye. What did you go on shore for?
Mr. Belknap. To preserve order and protect the American minister; preserve life and property of American residents. In my judgment it was necessary to land the force for such purpose; it was also in the interest of the United States that Kalakaua would rule in those islands,
S. Doc 231, pt 6----68
|
instead of Queen Emma, because if she had been elected Queen her influence would have been thrown in favor of England.
Senator Frye. Still, as a United States naval officer, you did not think you had any right to take sides in the fight?
Mr. Belknap. No, none whatever.
Senator Frye. But if it resulted in the retention of Kalakaua you would congratulate the American people upon that fact?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Have you been in various other places where troops were landed?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Were they ever landed on the order of the minister?
Mr. Belknap. No. When I commanded the Asiatic squadron Mr. Swift said to me, "You would not obey my order to land troops?" I said, "No; I could not do that; it is against the regulations-we are ordered to maintain relations of the most cordial character with the ministers and consuls of the United States, and when they make requests we are obliged to consider them in all their light and bearings and govern ourselves accordingly." We are responsible for our acts to the Secretary of the Navy alone. That is the principle on which I acted in Honolulu.
Senator Butler. If you were to receive an order from the Secretary of the Navy to take an order from a minister would you obey him?
Mr. Belknap. The orders of the Secretary of the Navy are the orders of the President of the United States.
Senator Sherman. Does not the Secretary of the Navy always speak in the name of the President of the United States?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. I read from Article XVIII of the present Naval Regulations:
"The officer in command of a ship of war is not authorized to delegate his power, except for the carrying out of the details of the general duties to be performed by his authority. The command is his, and he can neither delegate the duties of it to another nor avoid its burdens, nor escape its responsibilities; and his 'aide or executive' in the exercise of the power given to him for 'executing the orders of the commanding officer,' must keep himself constantly informed of the commander's opinions and wishes thereon, and whenever, and as soon as he may be informed or is in doubt as to such opinion or wishes, he must remedy such defect by prompt and personal application, to the end that the authority of the captain may be used only to carry out his own views, and that he may not be, by its unwarranted exercise, in any measure relieved from his official responsibilities, which can neither be assumed by nor fall upon any other officer."
Do you understand those to be the present regulations?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Then----
"He shall preserve, so far as possible, the most cordial relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States in foreign countries, and extend to them the honors, salutes, and other official courtesies to which they are entitled by these regulations.
"He shall carefully and duly consider any request for service or other communication from any such representative.
"Although due weight should be given to the opinions and advice of such representatives, a commanding officer is solely and entirely
|
responsible to his own immediate superior for all official acts in the administration of his command. ٭ ٭ ٭
"On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof."
Now, suppose you wore in command of a ship in the harbor of Honolulu, and. the Secretary of the Navy should send you an order to obey the order of William P. Frye, then a resident in Honolulu and not in the naval service, would you be obliged to obey any order of William P. Frye?
Mr. Belknap. No.
Senator Frye. Would not that order which had been sent to you to obey William P. Frye be illegal?
Mr. Belknap. I think it would be.
Senator Frye. Suppose you were there with a ship, and a man by the name of James H. Blount, whom you knew to be a commissioner appointed by the President of the United States to remain in those islands for certain purposes, should send you an order to land your troops for any purpose, would you, as a naval officer, feel under the slightest obligation to obey the order?
Mr. Belknap. I would first demand his authority for issuing any order of that sort.
Senator Frye. Suppose you should ask his authority, and he should read this to you:
- "Department of State,
- "Washington, March 11, 1893.
- "To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands and the protection of our citizens therein is paramount; in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn."
Suppose you should receive such an order as that from the Secretary of the Navy, would you feel bound to obey such order?
Mr. Belknap. I should think that was in direct violation of the Regulations of the U. S. Navy.
Senator Frye. Then----
- "March 11 1893.
- "Sir: This letter will be handed you by the Hon. James H. Blount, special commissioner by the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands. You will consult freely with Mr. Blount and will obey any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command. You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.
- "Hilary A. Herbert,
- "Secretary of the Navy.
- "Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
- "Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, etc."
|
Suppose you, as commanding officer, had received from the Secretary of the Navy an order that you should obey the instructions and directions of a man by the name of James H. Blount, then temporarily a resident in the Islands of Hawaii and a commissioner on the part of the United States, would you then feel obliged to obey his instructions?
Mr. Belknap. What is a commissioner?
Senator Frye. He is nothing, in my opinion. Call him a minister plenipotentiary.
Senator Butler. Suppose, when you called upon Mr. Blount for a copy of his instructions he should give an authority from the President of the United States, who is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, would you then feel obliged to obey the order?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Suppose the authority from the President of the United States was an appointment as special commissioner for the purpose of making an investigation in the Hawaiian Islands, and the President of the United States should direct you by an order to obey the orders of this commissioner, would you feel obliged to do it?
Admiral Belknap. Yes, if it implies that Mr. Blount was to exercise paramount authority in naval matters; but the authority conferred upon him is qualified by the words "acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces," which I submit implies consultation and joint action of the parties concerned. If he should order me to make war upon the Government of those islands I should feel that I could not do it, for under the regulations I would have been held solely responsible for the act of war.
Senator Frye. Even with these instructions from the President of the United States, under the regulations of the Navy Department does not the responsibility still remain with the commanding officer?
Mr. Belknap. It does still remain.
Senator Frye. Is there any way of relieving the officer of that responsibility? If the President of the United States or the Secretary of the Navy were to send an order direct to you to land troops or refrain from landing troops that would relieve you from responsibility?
Mr. Belknap. That would relieve me.
Senator Frye. But sending an order to you to obey the instructions of somebody else can not change the responsibility from you to somebody else?
Mr. Belknap. No, not under the terms of the regulations.
Senator Butler. That proceeds upon the theory that no naval officer is bound to obey an illegal order, and he is the sole judge as to whether it is illegal?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, in so far as law and regulation covers the particular case.
Senator Frye. This is addressed to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.
- "Honolulu, March 31, 1893.
- "Sir: You are directed to haul down the United States ensign from the Government building, and to embark the troops now on the shore to the ship to which they belong. This will be executed at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of April.
- "I am, sir, your obedient servant,
- "James H. Blount,
- "Special Commissioner of the United States."
|
Do you regard that as a legal order?
Mr. Belknap. I have been in the naval service nearly forty-seven years, and that is the most peremptory order I ever saw issued by anybody. If Mr. Blount wanted that done he might have requested the admiral to do it, after consultation with him. Such would have been the courteous and cooperative course.
Senator Frye. Do you think Mr. Blount had any right to give any such order?
Mr. Belknap. I do not think he had, at least in such peremptory terms. There was no cooperation there.
Senator Frye. And if the obeying of that order involved the taking of human life would you, as the commander of a ship, have obeyed it?
Mr. Belknap. No; because I would have been held responsible if anything happened. Such order would not have relieved me from the responsibility imposed upon me by the regulations.
Senator Frye. Notwithstanding the directions of the Secretary of the Navy, notwithstanding the instructions of the Secretary of State to Mr. Blount, notwithstanding Mr. Blount's direct order, under the Naval Regulations you would not be relieved from responsibility as a naval officer in command?
Mr. Belknap. I would not have been relieved, but I would have withdrawn that force if the minister wished it.
Senator Frye. I understand that. If there were no great responsibility, overwhelming responsibility, you would comply with the wishes of the minister just the same?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Now-----
- "U.S. Legation, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands,
- "January 16, 1893.
- "Sir: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the U. S. legation and the U. S. consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.
- "Yours, truly,
- "John L. Stevens,
- "Envoy Extraordinary, etc., of the United States.
- "To Capt. C. C. Wiltse."
Do you regard that as a perfectly legitimate request, and properly made?
Mr. Belknap. That is perfectly legitimate; a request I have had made to me a half dozen times during my service.
Senator Frye. That request does not compel you to land troops?
Mr. Belknap. It does not; it is a proper, legitimate, and courteous request from one official to another.
Senator Frye. You would learn, as a naval officer, all you could with regard to the existing conditions, and if, in your judgment, the safety of the legation and the consulate and the security of life and property were of such a character as to require the landing of troops, you would land them?
Mr. Belknap. Yes. It is the business of an officer to inform himself thoroughly before taking such grave action.
Senator Frye. But notwithstanding the fact that you had received that request, if you had determined from your own investigations,
|
made through your own officers, that the landing of the troops was not necessary, you would not land them? In other words, the thing is still left entirely in your charge?
Mr. Belknap. Yes; but if I do not comply with the request and anything happened detrimental to the United States I am responsible. The regulations hold me to that.
Senator Butler. It has become a question of tweedledum and tweedledee between Mr. Blount and Mr. Stevens-one is a request and the other a command. Suppose Admiral Skerrett had declined, on his responsibility, to take down the flag and send his troops back on the ship, and anything had happened to the American legation and American life and property, Admiral Skerrett would have been responsible?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. Would he not have been tried by a court-martial?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. And would he not have read the Naval Regulations, which are law, to determine whether he had obeyed the regulations?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Butler. The same responsibility rested on Admiral Skerrett in declining to obey the order as rested on him in obeying it-if anything had happened to American interests in Honolulu by the American troops remaining on shore, he would have been responsible. So that the responsibility is pretty well understood to be that an Army or Navy officer sent off on an expedition of that kind is vested with a certain amount of discretion?
Mr. Belknap. He is to determine in his own mind what the interests of the Government demand. During this last cruise I sent officers and men up to the capital of Korea, 40 miles from Chemulpo. I received a telegraphic order to cooperate with the minister, and when the minister sent to me for a force I dispatched it to him in conformity with the order of the Secretary of the Navy to cooperate with the minister.
Senator Butler. You did it on your own responsibility?
Mr. Belknap. On my own responsibility, in interpretation of the orders of the Secretary, the wishes of the minister, and of my own personal knowledge of Korean affairs.
Senator Frye. Before this order of the Secretary of the Navy, given to Admiral Skerrett to obey the orders of Mr. Blount, did you ever know of any such order?
Mr. Belknap. I never heard of it.
Senator Frye. Did you ever know of a minister or commissioner in a foreign country making such an order as Mr. James H. Blount made to Admiral Skerrett? I refer to the one I have just read.
Mr. Belknap. Never. As I said before, it is the most peremptory order I ever saw in print.
Senator Frye. The order of Capt. Wiltse to the officers who took the troops on shore is as follows:
"Sir: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order."
Now, I would like to ask you what are the rights of officers in command of ships in foreign countries touching the matter of preservation of public order? That part of Capt. Wiltse's order was not in response to the request of Mr. Stevens. He said nothing about public order;
|
he adopts the old diplomatic form of expression, protection of life and property; whereas Capt. Wiltse in his order uses the additional expression, "assist in preserving public order." What do you understand to be the rights of a commanding officer with regard to preserving public order in foreign countries?
Mr. Belknap. All the foreign countries are not alike as regards the conduct of ships of war. There are small governments where the fleets would act differently from what they would in larger countries; but the landing of a force is a grave act and should always be well considered.
Senator Butler. And I suppose they are in large measure controlled by the treaty stipulations of those countries?
Mr. Belknap. In great measure; but in Honolulu there is not a street, there is not a precinct, there is not a corner of it where an American is not living or has not his business and property, and to protect that property it is necessary, in case of a riot, where the police can not control, to land a force from a ship.
Senator Frye. Then you would say that Capt. Wiltse, if in his judgment he thought there was liability of a riot and the likelihood of the destruction of American property, had a right to order his troops ashore, one of his purposes being to preserve public order?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, I would have done the same thing under the same circumstances.
Senator Frye. So that when you landed your troops in 1874, notwithstanding the fact you knew the result of landing those troops and interfering with that mob to preserve public order would result in the maintenance of King Kalakaua on the throne, you would have done what you did by way of landing the troops and putting down the riot?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
Senator Frye. It is not for the officer or minister to take into consideration what would be the effect of such landings and putting down of riots; he is concerned simply in the fact that they are landed for the purpose of protecting life and property?
Senator Butler. That is true in time of peace, not in time of war?
Mr. Belknap. In time of war it would be a different question.
Senator Butler. For instance, you would not feel warranted in landing a force at Rio now?
Mr. Belknap. No, so far as I understand the situation at this distance.
Senator Butler. Mr. Frye asked you some questions with regard to the power of naval officers. Suppose you were in charge of the Charleston, we will say, at the port of Liverpool or Copenhagen, and you were ashore and a riot were about to break out, would you feel authorized to land a force to protect American property?
Mr. Belknap. No, unless the Government confessed its inability to afford protection.
Senator Butler. So that it is not universal?
Mr. Belknap. No.
Senator Frye. How about Panama?
Mr. Belknap. In Panama we have the right by treaty. I landed there myself.
Senator Butler. But it is not a universal rule?
Mr. Belknap. No.
Senator Butler. It is done in pursuance of some treaty stipulations between our Government and the government where the troops are landed.
|
Mr. Belknap. Yes, for the protection of the treaty.
Senator Butler. Otherwise you would not think of doing such a thing?
Mr. Belknap. No such conditions could not exist there. When I was a midshipman on board the frigate Puritan, at Valparaiso, Chile, they held a presidential election in that country, and the party defeated in that election got up a revolution, and one afternoon we lauded the troops. We landed a force on that shore, and we remained on the wharf there several hours; the British ships did the same thing. We did not proceed up into town, but we were there for the purpose of protecting the consulate if necessary. In November, 1863, the Chinese at the Barrier Forts fired on our flag. They fired from two of four forts; we captured all those forts, blew them up, razed them to the ground, and retired.
Senator Butler. That was an act of war.
The Chairman. But the firing began the war.
Mr. Belknap. The commodore in command was commended by the Secretary of the Navy for such action.
Senator Butler. You would do that in Liverpool?
Mr. Belknap. Yes; if the flag was deliberately fired upon.
Senator Butler. If your flag were fired upon, you would not stop to consider the strength of the Government, but would fire in return?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. I have drawn up a question which, according to my view, presents the true relations of the commander of a ship in a port to the minister of the United States who may be resident there at the time. When a war ship of the United States is in a port where there is a civil commotion which threatens to become riotous, to endanger the treaty rights of the citizens of the United States, and the question arises whether it is proper to land troops to preserve order, is it not the right and duty of the minister of the United States to ascertain and determine whether the condition of the country is such as to require the landing of troops? In such a case, and as to the question whether the necessity for the landing of troops actually existed, you would feel bound, I suppose, if in command of a war ship of the United States, to respect and follow the request of the minister of the United States to land the troops?
Mr. Belknap. A minister of the United States, of course, has a perfect right to make any request of that sort of the commander of a ship, of a squadron, but it is the duty under the regulations of the Navy Department for the commanding officer of the ship to examine the matter himself and to decide for himself whether he ought to land the force or not, because the responsibility under the regulations of the Navy Department finally rests upon him. If any great mistake is made by which injury comes to the United States in their interests, or any citizen suffers harm through the action of a commander in chief or a commander of a vessel, he is responsible. On the contrary, if he make a mistake in landing the force he is also responsible under the regulations.
Senator Frye. In the recognition of a de facto government, to whom does the recognition belong-to the minister of the United States resident in such country or to the naval officer?
Mr. Belknap. It belongs to the minister.
Senator Frye.The naval officer has nothing to do with that question of recognition?
Mr. Belknap. Nothing to do with it. I was commander of the war
|
ship Alaska when the minister of the United States in Peru, Mr. Christiancy, recognized a new government during the Chilean-Peruvian wars. That government was overthrown, and when Mr. Hurlbut became minister he recognized another government.
Senator Frye. You were there all the time?
Mr. Belknap. Yes. When I was at Honolulu in 1874 everything was at the lowest ebb; property was worth nothing, the people could hardly get along. But that fall of 1874 Kalakaua, accompanied by the American minister, Mr. Pierce, came the United States and a treaty of reciprocity was negotiated. From that moment an era of prosperity dawned upon those islands and trade there increased several hundred per cent. I think the 35,000,000 pounds of sugar exported from there in 1875 went up to 136,000,000 pounds in 1890; and the product of rice increased in the same proportion. In fact the United States made those islands what they are-gave them all their prosperity. The town of Honolulu is as much an American town as any town in this country. In 1882, when commanding the Alaska, I was sent in great haste to Honolulu from South America because troubles were apprehended there. The reciprocity treaty was about to expire, and many people there were afraid that the United States would not renew it. Furthermore, Kalakaua had gone into such extravagant expenditures that the people were getting restive under it. After being King for eight years he took the foolish notion into his head to be crowned, a ceremony carried out at enormous expense, and the taxpayers of the islands, a majority of whom were Americans, were stirred up over it and trouble was apprehended.
I arrived there early in September, 1882, and I stayed there two months. During that time there was a meeting of all the planters on the islands in a convention at Honolulu. There was considerable excitement, but finally, after some conferences with the Government, the convention adjourned and everything passed off quietly. There was no trouble; but at that time I was prepared to land a force in case of any outbreak. The English were very anxious to know what we were going to do. Mr. Wodehouse, the British commissioner, was there. One afternoon, or one morning, rather, Mr. Dagget, our minister, and myself got an invitation to dine on a British man-of-war which was in the harbor. We were somewhat surprised at that. When we went on board to dinner that evening we found Mr. Wodehouse there. During the dinner champagne flowed pretty freely. After the coffee and cigars were brought in Mr. Wodehouse attempted to find out what we were going to do there in a certain emergency. But they got no satisfaction; Mr. Dagget and I simply confined ourselves to general talk. I commanded at Mare Island from 1886 to 1889. That was during Mr. Cleveland's first administration. Grave troubles were apprehended at Honolulu at that time, and we kept our ships constantly there. One afternoon I received a confidential telegram from the Secretary of the Navy asking me if I could be ready at a moment's notice to go over to Honolulu. I telegraphed back "yes." Two or three days after that I got a telegram from the Secretary of the Navy saying that, after a consultation with Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, they had concluded to send an order over to the minister by a telegram through me, which I sent direct from the navy-yard to Honolulu.
Senator Frye. Do you know what the nature of that telegram was?
Mr. Belknap. I do not remember it, but it must be on file in the Navy Department. For the last ten years we have kept our ships in
|
Honolulu all the time. Admiral Kimberly was there a solid year. Admiral Brown was there for more than a year, and for some reason or other our Government has been obliged to keep that port guarded by our ships of war. I take it that the interests of the United States have gotten so great that that was a necessary policy to pursue. Since the Canadian Pacific line has been opened (they have a line of steamers now from Vancouver to Australia and New Zealand, touching at Honolulu) it has become vastly more important for the interests of Great Britain to acquire those islands than it has ever been before. I believe today that the Canadian authorities are making every effort to divert trade from those islands to Canada.
Senator Frye. I suppose in landing troops for the preservation of American life and property you do not feel it incumbent upon you to wait until an outbreak has actually happened?
Mr. Belknap. Not always.
Senator Frye. If a certain thing is to happen which is likely to produce an outbreak, like an election, such as that of Kalakaua, you feel yourself at liberty to get ahead of that?
Mr. Belknap. That was what was done at Corea. There was no outbreak; but the minister requested the presence of the troops, and the King was afraid for his life.
Senator Frye. If you found that the Provisional Government on a certain day, say Monday, at 2, 3, or 5 o'clock, or at any time in the day, was going to take actual possession of the Queen's public buildings, and dethrone her absolutely, you would not deem it necessary to wait until that had taken place for the landing of the troops?
Mr. Belknap. No, not if convinced that riot would ensue.
Senator Frye. But owing to the liability of its taking place and the likelihood of a riot, you would land your troops?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, under the peculiar condition of affairs at the moment.
Senator Frye. What is your judgment as to what it would cost to fortify Honolulu?
Mr. Belknap. I have not any doubt that $5,000,000 would put Honolulu in a most perfect state of defense, with guns mounted in earthworks.
The Chairman. If you desired to control the Pacific Ocean, North Polynesia, in a military sense, either for an offensive or defensive operation in reference to the protection of the western coast of the United States, including Alaska, is there any place on that coast or elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean which you would consider so important to the United States as the Hawaiian group, if we had there a fortified port or naval station?
Mr. Belknap. I know of no point in the Pacific Ocean which we should hold as good as the Hawaiian Islands, especially Honolulu.
The Chairman. You think it would be a great national misfortune to have any other flag than ours put there?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, most emphatically.
The Chairman. Or if the flag of any foreign country should be put there would that alter your opinion as to the merit or value of the possession for the protection of our western coast and our commerce in the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Belknap. So long as there is no other flag there it is always an open question; it involves the liability of troublesome questions arising all the time. Our flag should be there, in my opinion.
|
The Chairman. Suppose some foreign power should close the question by coming in and occupying the islands, if they saw fit to do it, as a base of operations against the United States, would you not consider that a great calamity to this country?
Mr. Belknap. A very great calamity. Great Britain now has Puget Sound, which she ought not to be permitted to hold a single day, in my judgment. Especially with the Nicaragua Canal Honolulu will be a port of call of all the ships in the Pacific Ocean.
The Chairman. Is it indispensable to have a port to recoal in the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Belknap. Yes, and Honolulu is a splendid harbor.
The Chairman. Well sheltered?
Mr. Belknap. Well sheltered. Another peculiarity of the Hawaiian Island is, the climate is so fine and equable, they have no violent storms, such as they usually have in the tropics. We ought to have our flag there, and we ought to have a cable connecting the islands with the United States.
The Chairman. In your survey for the route for the cable between San Diego and Honolulu, did you find any practical obstructions?
Mr. Belknap.No. We have made a closer survey since my survey and found that a cable can be very readily laid.
The Chairman. I am informed that you made a survey for a cable route also, extending from the coast of Japan in the direction of the United States along the Aleutian range?
Mr. Belknap.Yes.
The Chairman. State whether you found the route practicable for a cable.
Mr. Belknap. I found the route practicable, except the very deep water, which I think would be obviated by going a little further north.
The Chairman. A large part of that route would be on land if you chose to make it?
Mr. Belknap. It would be cheaper to have it in water.
The Chairman. Is that ocean troubled with icebergs to interfere with the laying of a cable?
Mr. Belknap. Not where you would lay the cable. I think possibly sometimes the Pacific mail steamers have encountered them, when they have gone north, in very high latitudes; but I have not seen icebergs in the Pacific Ocean except off Cape Horn.
The Chairman. Did you take the temperature of that ocean current?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. What would you say was the average temperature?
Mr. Belknap. It was 8° or 10° higher than the rest of the ocean, so far as I remember.
The Chairman. It is decidedly a warm current?
Mr. Belknap. Very warm current.
The Chairman. A heavy flow of water?
Mr. Belknap. Very heavy, similar to our Gulf Stream.
The Chairman. It is that current which keeps warm the coast of California and Oregon?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. And also keeps open Bering Straits?
Mr. Belknap. Yes.
The Chairman. [exhibiting a newspaper article from the Boston Journal of December 20, 1893]. Is this a correct statement?
Mr. Belknap. (after examining). Yes.
|
The statement is as follows:
- Rear-Admiral George E. Belknap writes to the Journal the following very interesting letter regarding Hawaiian matters:
- To the Editor of the Boston Journal:
- "The letter of ex-Minister P.C. Jones, of Hawaii, published in this morning's Journal, is in error in one point.
- "He says that 'in 1874 Minister Pierce ordered Capt. Belknap to land a force of marines at Honolulu, which was done.'
- "Mr. Pierce gave no order of that character, nor was he empowered to do so by the regulations controlling the intercourse of diplomatic and naval officers on foreign stations. The regulation governing the intercourse of naval commanders with ministers and consuls of the United States at that period was as follows: 'He (the naval commander) will duly consider such information as the ministers and consuls may give him relating to the interests of the United States, but he will not receive orders from them, and he will be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, in the first place, for his acts.'
- "But the undersigned was in thorough accord with Minister Pierce, and, at his request and that of the King-elect, landed the force of bluejackets and marines at Honolulu on the occasion referred to-12th February, 1874-suppressed the riot, restored order throughout the town, and occupied the most important points at that capital for several days, or until assured by the King's ministry that protection was no longer necessary.
- "This action was taken, first, for the protection of American citizens and their property; second, because it was deemed imperative for the conservation of the interests of the United States to take decisive action at the Hawaiian capital at such crucial time. The English party, as it was called, had worked and intrigued for the election of Queen Emma to fill the throne made vacant by the death of Lunalilo, while Kalakaua was the candidate favored by most of the Americans at the islands.
- "The party favoring the election of Emma were not content to abide the result of the election, for she having been defeated in the legislative assembly by a vote of 39 to 6 her partisans broke forth at once into riotous proceedings. The legislative hall was invaded, some of Kalakaua's adherents in the assembly were clubbed nearly to death, the furniture was destroyed, and the archives thrown into the street. Meanwhile the police had torn off their badges and mingled with the rioters, the Government troops could not be trusted, and the Government was powerless to act.
- "At such juncture the request was made to land the force. Trouble had been apprehended, and preconcerted signals had been arranged, and in fifteen minutes from the time the signal was made companies comprising 150 officers, seamen, and marines, together with a Gatling gun, were landed from the Tuscarora and Portsmouth and marched to the scene of action. At the head of the column was a sergeant of marines, whose great height and stalwart proportion seemed to impress the wondering Kanakas more than all the rest of the force. He was some 6 feet 9 inches in height and his imposing appearance on that occasion is among the notable traditions at Honolulu to this day.
- "The riot was soon suppressed and order restored. Half an hour after such action a detachment of blue jackets and redcoats was landed from H.B.M. ship Tenedos, but there was nothing left for such force to do. It has been asserted by some credulous people that Great Britain has no eye toward the Hawaiian group, but the English residents
|
- at Honolulu were much chagrined at the tardy action of the Tenedos, and it is a significant fact that her commanding officer was soon relieved, ordered home, and never got another hour's duty from the admiralty. Comment is unnecessary."
- "Geo. E. Belknap.
- "Brookline, December 19, 1893."
Adjourned until to-morrow, the 31st instant, at 10 o'clock.
|
|
SWORN STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS B. DELAMATER.
Senator Frye. Give your name, age, and residence?
Mr. Delamater. My name is Nicholas B. Delamater; I am 47; I live in Chicago, Ill., and I am a physician.
Senator Frye. Have you ever been in the Hawaiian Islands; if yes, when; how long were you there, and when did you leave?
Mr. Delamater. I went there in August, and left this last June.
Senator Frye. What was your business while in the islands?
Mr. Delamater. Rusticating.
Senator Frye. Did you become familiar with the islands and people while there?
Mr. Delamater. Somewhat.
Senator Frye. Did you, at the request of Senator Cullom, make a written statement of facts that came under your observation while in the islands just before and during the revolutionary proceedings in January, 1893?
Mr. Delamater. I did.
Senator Frye. I purpose reading that statement. During the reading, should you discover anything that you may desire to correct, you may do so:
- "There are vast possibilities waiting capital. The coffee industry can be increased more than a hundred fold; the rice, banana, cocoanut vastly increased. Pineapples will in a few years be a large export. They can be raised there with comparatively small capital and quick and large returns, of a very superior quality. Sugar lands enough, yet wild, to supply all comers for many years to come.
- "There is a very small fraction of the available lands under cultivation.
- "Heretofore everything has gone to sugar on account of the enormous profits in it, the average per acre being from 5 to 10 tons.
- "This country is destined to be a very rich one.
- "Now, as to the revolution."
The Chairman. What are the prospects of coffee culture in the Hawaiian group?
Mr. Delamater. I judge that they are very good. There are many quite good-sized plats there in between little mountain peaks where they can raise an exceedingly good coffee, and they raise a quality of coffee which one of my friends, a coffee man in Chicago, says is among the best of coffees in the world.
The Chairman. Is coffee an indigenous plant there?
Mr. Delamater. No; I think there is nothing indigenous among those things.
The Chairman. It is very much like California?
|
Mr. Delamater. Very much like California. It is a volcanic structure altogether.
Senator Frye. I will continue the reading:
"During the legislative session preceding the same there was a constant conflict between the Queen and Legislature as to the cabinet.
"The Legislature was composed of twenty-four representatives, elected by citizens who could read and write, and who had an income of $250."
Mr. Delamater. I think I am correct with regard to the income; but that you have.
Senator Frye. You are not certain of it?
Mr. Delamater. Not exactly.
Senator Frye. Then you say:
"Twenty-four nobles, elected, by those with incomes of $600-these are annual incomes; and four cabinet ministers, appointed by the reigning monarch, subject to dismissal by vote of want of confidence by the Legislature."
Mr. Delamater. I do not know whether the four members of the cabinet are four members of the Legislature.
Senator Frye. Then:
"There was finally a cabinet appointed of leading men, nonpoliticans mainly, and the individuals composing it represented several millions of property."
Was that the Wilcox-Jones cabinet?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
The Chairman. I understand that those cabinet ministers became members of the Legislature ex-officio?
Mr. Delamater. Yes, ex officio.
The Chairman. It is not necessary, as in the Parliament of Great Britain, that they should be members of the legislature?
Mr. Delamater. No; ex officio they are members.
Senator Frye. You say: "Shortly after this every one seemed easy. The lottery bill had apparently dropped out of sight, the opium bill had been defeated, the U.S.S. Boston went away for a week's practice, Minister Stevens going upon her; several members of the Legislature went home. The last week of that session a vote of want of confidence was passed by purchase and bribery, a new cabinet, of very shady character, was appointed, the lottery and opium bills were then revived and passed by open purchase."
The Chairman. When you speak of purchase and bribery, do you mean that you have any personal knowledge of that fact?
Mr. Delamater. I saw a couple of men----
The Chairman. Perhaps you had better name them.
Mr. Delamater. I did not know the men. I was simply in the legislative hall, the Government building. I do not know their names, and I should not remember them had I heard them at the time.
The Chairman. Did they have open transactions of that sort?
Mr. Delamater. It was common report upon the street.
Senator Frye. I proceed: "There was no apparent attempt at concealment of the purchase of members of the Legislature. On a Saturday morning following the Queen prorogued the Legislature on notice from that body. She appeared in person in state and with her retinue. I was present. Her speech was one of peace and of the ordinary kind. Her guards, about 75 in number, marched over to the palace yard."
Mr. Delamater. I suppose you have a copy of that speech?
Senator Frye. Yes. "Right across the street, drawn up in line, a
|
native society, according to prearrangement, immediately appeared and presented to the Queen a new constitution, demanding its immediate promulgation." Were these guards demanding its immediate promulgation?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Frye. You say: "She at once called on her cabinet to sign it. Part of them refused and went down town and notified the prominent and leading citizens."
Mr. Delamater. When I say they refused, I do not mean to say that I was in the room and saw them refuse.
The Chairman. That was the fact, as accepted by common understanding?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Frye. You go on to say: "Up to this time the plan of those who are now the Provisional Government was to get control through, constitutional measures and the ballot, by compelling the Queen to recognize the right of a majority of the Legislature to name the cabinet ministers. That is, that the Queen should call on a member of the majority to form a cabinet, whom she would appoint. The outlines of the new constitution, it is claimed, were such as to give the reigning monarch absolute power.
"Excitement ran very high. Threats were freely made against anyone interfering with her plans, both by herself and her adherents. The leading men and members of previously opposite parties at once united, and felt that life and property demanded immediate action, instead of ordinary political methods. The Boston, with Minister Stevens, came into port about this time in total ignorance of what had occurred. Up to this time I had not called on Mr. Stevens and did not know him by sight. Excitement ran high Saturday afternoon and evening and Sunday. Steps were immediately taken to organize a volunteer military force for protection of property, and to my certain knowledge a very respectable force, composed of leading and prominent men-merchants, capitalists, planters, lawyers, professional men of all kinds, and others-was organized before Monday. A signal was decided on that would call them together very quickly should any emergency arise. The leaders as yet had no plan, and did not know what to look for.
"On Monday afternoon two large mass meetings were held, one by the present Provisional Government people, and the other by the Royalists. I was at the Royalists' meeting. Excitement was at high tension, rumors of intention and threats of burning houses and stores were rife. I heard many Royalists say they desired Mr. Stevens to land troops from the Boston to save property. I also heard a number of quite prominent Royalists say they had asked Mr. Stevens to land troops to save property and prevent bloodshed. At 5 this Monday afternoon the troops were landed. Many of the radical hotheads were not in favor of landing the troops, feeling that they could overthrow the Queen, and realizing that if they were landed it would prevent a fight.
"I talked with a number of the leaders, and also with several very intimate friends, who were very near and supposed to be in the confidence of the leaders, among them being Dr. F. R. Day, the attending family physician of Chief Justice Judd; Vice-President Damson, Mr. W. R. Cassel, and five or six other members of the committee of safety, and who attended Mr. Thurston on the voyage, in company with the other commissioners, coming to present their case to the United States. Not one of the persons seemed to know what Minister Stevens would
|
do. They all claimed that they could get no expression from him as to what course he would pursue in case of revolution further than that he would protect the lives and property of noncombatant American citizens.
"It seemed to be the general understanding that he would raise the American flag at some large and convenient place, declare it American territory, and proclaim that all desiring protection should go there.
"When the troops were landed the marines were stationed at the American legation and at the office of the consul-general. The sailor companies were marched down past the palace and Government building, and it was the intention to quarter them some considerable distance away, and, as I understand it, they were camped the first night. The next day an empty building was found near the Government building and palace, was secured, and they were quartered there.
Mr. Delamater. In talking to Dr. Day since I found that to be a fact.
Senator Frye. As a matter of fact you found out that they went into the building that night instead of the next day?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Frye. You go on to say:
"All Monday evening excitement was intense, and a large portion of the inhabitants kept watch all night for fear of fires, etc.
"The next morning, Tuesday, I learned that at some time during the day a signal would be given which would call the volunteers together at a building (really an open shed) near the palace, and that the committee of safety would take possession and declare monarchy at an end. I did not learn the time, and I am very sure the consul-general, Mr. Severance, did not get any information more than I did. I am also morally certain that no help was expected from the United States forces, and that they expected to fight a battle and win before Mr. Stevens would interfere. I know the general impression was that Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse would not interfere until they had positively placed themselves in position, and that they failed to get any encouragement from him, even as to interference, any further than that he would protect all noncombatant American citizens who should apply to him and go to a place designated by him.
"Of course I do not know as to absolute facts. I do not know that Mr. Stevens did not say he would, but I do know that the general impression among the prominent citizens was as stated above. And that the Dr. Day mentioned in a previous part of this letter, and who was a student of mine, afterwards my clinical assistant in my college work, and later my assistant in private practice, as close as he was to the Provisional Government leaders, had the same impression.
"That afternoon, Tuesday, I was driving in a buggy and came near what is known as the old armory, on Beretania street, I saw, all at once, men coming at full speed in all sorts of conveyances and on foot, in full run toward the armory. Every one carrying a gun, I concluded the signal had been given. I learned later that a wagon had started from a large wholesale hardware store down town loaded with ammunition to come to the armory, and that the Queen's police had stopped it, and being shot at by the driver, had run away. There were three policemen, and all ran. This was within a block of the police station, and the citizens had taken this shot as a signal and gathered at once. Inside of fifteen minutes there were in the neighborhood of 200 citizens-clerks, lawyers, doctors, merchants, and capitalists-each
|
with a rifle and double belt of cartridges around them, formed in line and ready for action."
Mr. Delamater. It is possible that in writing a letter of that kind I may have overstated the number that got there in a few minutes. You know how that comes. But there was quite a number.
Senator Frye.You say:
"At the same time the Provisional Government, as represented by its committee, took occasion to reach the Government building, each from his own office and by the shortest route.
"When there, it is true, without any Provisional troops in sight, but knowing them to be so stationed as to be able to intercept the Queen's guards should they undertake resistance, and knowing that force to be more than double the entire forces of the Queen, and knowing them to be composed of men of standing and ability, they did, without the immediate presence of the troops, read the proclamation." I suppose the immediate presence of the troops meant the Provisional Government troops?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Frye. Then:
"I was there before it was entirely finished, and about the time they had finished reading the Provisional troops, in two companies, marched into the grounds, having met with no offer of resistance. They were immediately placed on guard duty and quartered in the Government building. The Queen's officers at once gave up possession. A communication was then sent to the Queen, and a demand made on her to abdicate, an offer of protection, and assurances of pecuniary assistance if she submitted to the new order of things. After some parley this she did." Now, let me ask you right there, when that proclamation was read were any United States troops in sight of the building?
Mr. Delamater. Yes, Arion Hall.
Senator Frye. Standing at the Government building, could you see the United States troops?
Mr. Delamater. I think you could; I am not sure about that. I was out in the yard of the Government building, and could see them.
Senator Frye. Could you see more than two sentries anywhere?
Mr. Delamater. There were no troops drawn up in line. From the yard I saw the troops leaning on the fence.
Senator Frye. They were inside the fence?
Mr. Delamater. Inside the fence and standing on the grass, looking on.
Senator Frye. But not outside at the Government building?
Mr. Delamater. No; not outside their own yard.
Senator Frye. You then say: "Of course I was not present at any of the interviews, but had information which to me was satisfactory that a demand was being made for the surrender of the palace, police station, and armory. I was at the police station and saw that the Provisional Government had placed it with a small force of the Queen's defenders in a state of siege, with ample force to capture it and a fixed determination to do so, and an hour later I was there again and found it in possession of the new Government. I then learned that Minister Stevens, after the Provisional Government had shown him that they were in actual possession of the Government building and all public offices and the police station and had the Queen's guards cooped in their own armory, recognized it as the de facto Government, and immediately a number of the representatives of other governments did the same. England and two or three others did not till the next day."
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----69
|
Mr. Delamater. There is a little point there that might or might not be of use. The Queen's flag, the royal standard I saw lowered from the palace before Mr. Stevens recognized the new Government. I understood afterwards that it was raised again. But I saw it lowered at that time.
Senator Frye. You proceed to say:
"Now, of course Minister Stevens might have recognized it a half hour earlier than I know anything about. I was not a participant, and had no claim to inside information, but I was doing all I could to learn everything that was going on, and as the harmony of action and information seemed general, I felt that I had correct information as to the time and sequence of events. Of this I am sure, the Provisional Government would have succeeded if United States forces had been a thousand miles away. They had, from my own personal observation, a force more than double that of the Queen, and composed of such men as meant business. Among the privates who went on guard duty there was represented several million dollars.
"As to Mr. Blount, a commission of some kind was expected, and preparations made to give him a reception, which was nonpartisan. That is, both sides would take part. Of course, there was no certainty as to time of his arrival, no cable being connected with the islands. The vessel came and a committee having representatives of both sides went out to meet it. A large concourse of citizens of all classes turned out. A native society of women decorated with garlands of flowers; two bands, etc., were at the dock and waited hours after the vessel had anchored. Both sides were ready for a general nonpartisan and enthusiastic reception."
The Chairman. What do you mean by both sides?
Mr. Delamater. Royalists and annexationists.
Senator Frye. I read:
"Finally, word came that Mr. Blount declined the reception of any honors. He was landed and quartered himself at the Hawaiian Hotel, the most prominent hotel there. He was domiciled in one of the cottages and remained there during his stay in Honolulu.
"It was perhaps an unfortunate circumstance that this placed him in the midst of the most marked royalistic influences, but it can not be claimed, so far as I know, that he knew of this. He persistently declined to accept any hospitality from persons of either side so long as he was "special commissioner." This feature of his conduct was very marked, and while I have no fault to find with it, was carried, it seemed to me, to the extent of at least appearing like posing.
"He was soon known as the 'silent man,' as an 'interrogation point,' and various other appellations, because of his treatment of those with whom he came in contact. No one seemed able to get the slightest expression from him as to his opinion on the subject. He seemed ready to ask questions without limit, of those who called, and to listen in absolute silence to answers, and of course had his stenographer take all conversations. His wife was at once made much of, especially by the prominent American women. One little instance of his full consistency as to accepting hospitality: Mrs. Day had entertained Mrs. Blount in the way of private picnics, a lunch party, horseback rides, etc. One evening about dusk, Dr. and Mrs. Day drove to the Blount cottage in a two-seated surrey, to ask Mrs. Blount to take a little ride. Mr. Blount was on the sidewalk by the side of the carriage when Mrs. Blount got in and Dr. Day asked him to go. He declined on the ground he could not accept any hospitality from anyone.
|
"As an evidence of his courtesy, he received a dispatch from Washington directing him to appear before the United States consul-general and take the oath of office as minister. The same dispatch had a clause stating that a successor to Mr. Severance would soon be sent on. Mr. Blount had received a good many favors from Mr. Severance. This part of the dispatch he folded under and concealed from Mr. Severance, when he appeared with the dispatch as a credential."
Mr. Delamater. Of course, I do not know that as a fact; but I got it from Mr. Severance.
Senator Frye. You say----
"And three days later, of his own motion, gave this to a Royalist paper officially, for publication."
Do you know that?
Mr. Delamater. Yes. I do not know that he gave it to the paper; it had it officially, and it was published.
Senator Frye. You go on to say:
"And three days later, of his own motion, gave this to a Royalist paper officially, for publication. His reason, as stated by himself, being that he was friendly to Mr. Severance, and could not bear to tell him personally."
"Within a week from his arrival the Royalists started the report that the Queen was to be restored, and several distinct days were set. My opinion at the time was that they started them without any foundation. They claimed to have assurances from Mr. Blount. I did not at the time believe he had given the slightest encouragement. I am sure the Provisional people felt the same way at this time, basing their belief on the utter impossibility of getting anything out of him on their part. The flag came down. Although Mr. Blount was at the house of Minister Stevens on the afternoon preceding, and after he had issued his order to the naval commander, he did not, I am certain, mention the matter to Minister Stevens, who first heard of it from Mr. Waterhouse, of the Provisionals, late in the evening.
"Up to this time I did not know Minister Stevens by sight. About this time a friend urged me to pay him a formal visit as the representative of my country, etc. I did so on his regular reception day, remained about ten minutes in general conversation, making no allusion to public affairs. I called on him once later. These are the only times I met him in the ten months I was there, and at neither time had any talk with him about affairs.
"A few days after my first call on Mr. Stevens I made a formal call on Mr. Blount as a representative of the President and presented my card, which gave my profession and my American residence. The call lasted not to exceed five minutes. No conversation on Hawaiian affairs was had, except he asked me what I thought would be the effect of lowering the flag and removing the troops. I said I thought it would prove that the Provisional Government was able to take care of themselves. I remained as long as it seemed there was occasion. I left with him my Honolulu address and telephone number, and remarked that if I could be of any service, would be pleased. My wife and Mrs. Blount met a good many times socially. My wife called on Mrs. Blount. This is the only time I met Mr. Blount.
"Within a week after his arrival the people began to wonder that he was not calling on the leading and prominent men."
Mr. Delamater. By calling on him, I do not mean to say that he was calling on him socially, but for information.
|
Senator Frye. You then say:
"When he was made minister these same men, who belong to the class who rush forward and force service or information unasked, but who had called formerly and offered to be at his service whenever desired, were still wondering. Those men, like Chief Justice Judd, who was not an active partisan (in fact, many of the prominent men were uncertain whether he was not favorable to the Queen), found that information on vital points was not asked for.
"I formed and expressed the idea that the object was to make it appear that the Provisionals were able to care for themselves. This was quite strongly combated by many who began to feel that Mr. Blount was opposed to the Provisionals and favoring the Queen. And finally, before coming away, I was compelled to admit that Mr. Blount's conduct was certainly very singular; that he was not conducting his intercourse just as I would expect a gentleman to do, and that his treatment of Mr. Stevens seemed very ungentlemanly, to say the least. Mr. Stevens and I never mentioned his name in either of our conversations.
"For a long time there was no American flag at his headquarters, and, inasmuch as the Stars and Stripes were floating everywhere else in Honolulu, this became a subject of marked comment. Finally the wife of one of the naval officers bantered him pretty strongly on the subject, and offered to, and did, present him with a flag which was draped on his front porch. Later Mr. Blount issued, by publication in the press of the city, a proclamation defining the protection he was authorized to give American citizens. The last clause of this proclamation relating to the loss of all claim on the American minister for property, or family, as well as personal protection, by those who took active part in internal affairs of the country, while probably good law, seemed to me unwise, unnecessary, and not at all diplomatic. Its effect was to cause a great deal of uncertainty as to whether he was not contemplating at that moment, as the Royalists positively and confidently asserted, the immediate restoration of the Queen.
"In fact, Mr. Blount's course was such that, justly or unjustly, the Royalists were encouraged and the Provisionals were discouraged. "Whether the Royalists received from him information as to what was the final intention I do not know, but they guessed exceedingly well, for in April, May, and June I heard from the lips of Royalists there the most positive declarations that they knew that President Cleveland would do certain things. Those things the President has since done.
"As to the sentiment of the nation, Hawaiians of Hawaiian parents, the Queen is certainly not popular. There is, I believe, a much stronger feeling in favor of Princess Kaiulani. I talked with a large number of them who were decidedly in favor of annexation also.
"The royalist party there is not made up of or led by natives, but largely by English residents. The motive seems fairly clear. Mr. Davis has had complete control over Kaiulani and her education. The near approach of her reign would give him large advantages in a financial way. He would probably be in fact, if not in name, prime minister. He would have the placing of Government loans (probably) and the inside track in many contracts, etc. Then, socially, his family and that of Mr. Walker, his partner, who are the leaders of the English society, would be very close to the court social world. Mr. Cleghorn, the father of Kaiulani, is Scotch. A son of Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, is married to a half-sister of Kaiulani. When the native women undertook to have a large mass meeting and present to Mr. Blount a petition they split on the question whether it should be Lilioukalani or Kaiulani."
|
The Chairman. Is this the gentleman who furnished those statistics?
Senator Frye. He has them all in there. My impression is that you have them in the record.
The Chairman. Dr. Delamater, where did you get these figures that you have in this statement?
Mr. Delamater. The most of them I got from the report of the board of education. They were issued by the Queen's Government there.
The Chairman. It is a compilation made by you?
Mr. Delamater. A compilation made by me.
The Chairman. From authentic papers?
Mr. Delamater. From the official report of the board of education.
Senator Gray. This is as full a statement as you could make of your observation there?
Mr. Delamater. Yes. I intended it to be as full a statement as I could make.
Senator Gray. When did you go to the islands?
Mr. Delamater. August, 1892.
Senator Gray. How long did you stay?
Mr. Delamater. Until June of this last year-1893.
Senator Gray. If not improper so to do, may I ask what was your object in going?
Mr. Delamater. I was there simply for recreation-a matter of health. I had, for twenty years, a professorship in a medical college, with a fair practice, and had become utterly tired out.
Senator Gray. That is the only object you had?
Mr. Delamater. Yes. You need not fear to ask me any question you may think proper.
Senator Gray. I wanted to know whether you were there in any matter concerning the islands. It was a private purpose for which you were there?
Mr. Delamater. Yes. I had no other interest there.
Senator Gray. I do not wish to know what the private purpose was. Had you any other interest there?
Mr. Delamater. None at all. The private purpose was only to regain my health.
Senator Gray. I can suppose you came in frequent contact with the Americans on those islands?
Mr. Delamater. I have not had any correspondence with any of the Americans since I came away.
Senator Gray. I mean while you were there.
Mr. Delamater. Oh, yes, we had a private boarding house, with an English family; so that I was in pretty close contact with the white people, both English and Americans.
Senator Gray. Was there any sentiment of annexation prevailing there during the few months you were there that you could discover?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Gray. Among what classes?
Mr. Delamater. Among the Americans.
Senator Gray. Among the Kanakas?
Mr. Delamater. I should say yes. It seemed to me, taking it under a form of government like that, the expressions in favor of annexation to this country were quite pronounced.
Senator Gray. General?
Mr. Delamater. I should say quite general. The object, it seemed to me, so far as I could judge, was mainly to get better commercial relations.
|
Senator Gray. Were the Islands in a state of business depression while you were there, or otherwise?
Mr. Delamater. Business depression.
Senator Gray.To what was that attributed?
Mr. Delamater. To the McKinley bill.
Senator Gray. That that the McKinley bill made sugar free?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Gray. And deprived the grower of the advantage that he had when there was a tax?
Mr. Delamater. Yes.
Senator Gray. And you say that the change in that condition of things was the principal cause of the business depression?
Mr. Delamater. Yes; I think so. Of course you know a doctor is not a business man, usually, and I just got a sort of impression.
Senator Gray. Were the sugar growers Annexationists, with the exception of Mr. Spreckles?
Mr. Delamater. I judge that before I came away they were. But I got the impression very strongly in my mind that the sugar growers were opposed to it at the start. I did not talk with a great many of them; but I got that impression at the start.
Senator Gray. What impression did you finally get?
Mr. Delamater. My final impression was, that, in common with others, they were in favor of it.
SWORN STATEMENT OF FRANCIS R. DAY.
Senator Frye. State your age and occupation.
Mr. Day. I am 34 years old and a practitioner of medicine.
Senator Frye. Where?
Mr. Day. My residence is Honolulu.
Senator Frye. How long have you been at Honolulu?
Mr. Day. I located there in the fall of 1887 and have been a resident ever since that time until last August. I left there for this country at that time.
Senator Frye. Were you there at the time Kalakaua was compelled to assent to the constitution of 1887?
Mr. Day. I was in the city at the time, but not a resident.
Senator Frye. Were you a witness to what took place then?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. Are you acquainted with the people of the islands?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Has your residence been all this time at Honolulu?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. I will bring you down now to the few weeks preceding what is known as the last revolution, and you may state what you saw going on, and what you knew in the Legislature and elsewhere.
Mr. Day. Politically there was a great deal of interest in the conflict which was going on in the Legislature for some few months before the revolution of January, 1893. The struggle seemed to be between the Queen and her supporters and the opposition, to establish a precedent which would make the sovereign appoint the cabinet from a majority of the Legislature-that is, by calling a leader of the majority of the Legislature, and he select his associates, and she confirm them; the Queen and her party, on the other hand, attempting to have the appointing power purely a personal prerogative of her own, ignoring, in
|
other words, the majority of the Legislature and selecting whom she chose for the cabinet. The fight was a long and bitter one until, I think it was, in November, when she yielded to the opposition so far as to call a member of the opposition Mr. G. N. Wilcox to form her cabinet-known as the Wilcox cabinet. That cabinet was formed by the Legislature and was composed of Mr. Wilcox, Mr. P.C. Jones, Mr. Mark Robinson, and Cecil Brown, and practically, for the first time since the Legislature had convened some months before, they got down to a working basis and things went along smoothly until two or three days before the close of the Legislature, when the country was taken by surprise to find that the Wilcox cabinet had been put out by vote of want of confidence, and the appointment by the Queen of a cabinet on her old plan of simply personal authority. That cabinet was composed of Samuel Parker, W. H. Cornwell, J. F. Colburn, and A. P. Peterson, if I remember rightly.
That cabinet did not possess the confidence of the business community, and they were consequently disappointed at the selection. The following day, I think, the Legislature passed what was known as the lottery bill, legalizing the establishment of a lottery in Honolulu-a bill that had been brought before the Legislature in the earlier months of the session and had aroused a good deal of public opposition. The opposition was so strong that it was, for a time, at least, withdrawn or laid aside, and the community supposed for good. But it was rushed through the third reading and the Queen signed the bill, making it law, during the last days of the Legislature; I do not remember the exact date. The opium bill was passed in very much the same way, licensing the sale of opium. It is needless to say that the community was aroused almost to the point of desperation, certainly of the deepest indignation, over these rapidly succeeding acts of the Queen and her party.
On Saturday, the 14th of January, the Legislature was prorogued in the usual form, and immediately after that the Queen attempted to promulgate-or rather attempted to overthrow the existing constitution and promulgate a new one which made certain radical changes in the form of the Government.
Senator Frye. When the Jones-Wilcox cabinet was formed and the lottery and opium bills had been defeated, before the Boston left the harbor on the trip down to Hilo, had everything settled down to quiet?
Mr. Day. Everything was supposed to be settled when the Wilcox cabinet went into office and the machinery of Government was going on for the two months that they held office. Their dismissal, I think, on a vote of want of confidence was a complete surprise to the community.
Senator Frye. So that there was no expectation of any difficulty at the time the Boston left the harbor and went down to Hilo?
Mr. Day. None whatever.
Senator Frye.That was supposed to be settled for the next eighteen months-during the life of the Legislature?
Mr. Day.Yes.
Senator Frye. When the Boston left and there took place what you were going to state-the Queen attempted to form a new constitution?
Mr. Day. The news of that attempt spread through the community with great rapidity, and business men, property holders, professional men of the community, all felt that it meant a crisis in the country's history. The feeling was so intense that it was a spontaneous sentiment that something radical would have to be done. In a hurried way a number of business and professional men met at a central location in the city
|
(W. O. Smith's office) to discuss the situation, and it was there decided that they should appoint a committee of thirteen (which has become a historical number in Hawaiian affairs), to devise ways and means of correcting what they considered abuses of the Crown, and to take such measures as they thought necessary for that purpose. The feeling in the community was one of unrest, and the most intense excitement prevailed during the day, the following day, and the Monday succeeding, and the Tuesday following the Monday. Nothing was accomplished, so far as I know, on Sunday; but Monday morning an announcement was made that there would be a mass meeting held in the afternoon by the citizens in favor of good government.
Senator Frye. Was that a public announcement?
Mr. Day. A public announcement; yes. Accordingly, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the meeting was held in the armory on Beretania street. That meeting was attended by the white men of the community, mostly of all classes and nationalities. There must have been, I should judge, 1,200 or 1,300 men there, and it was an exceedingly quiet meeting. You could tell by the expression of the men's faces that they understood that it was a matter of extreme importance and gravity which confronted them. At this meeting the speakers related the political history of the country for the last few months, and also a report of the committee was made, and speeches which incited the men to their duty as citizens who wanted to preserve their civil liberties. The action of the committee in calling the meeting was ratified, with only one dissenting voice, and also ordering the committee to go on still further and take such measures as they thought necessary for the maintenance of government and the protection of life and property. The meeting adjourned about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, everyone feeling that we were on the eve of a crisis. That evening the news came to me that the monarchy was to be abrogated and that there was to be the establishment of a a provisional form of government.
Senator Gray. When was that?
Mr. Day. That was Monday evening; and I think the word was passed around pretty generally among the supporters of the Reform party, as it was called. That evening about 5 o'clock troops from the Boston were landed, and a detachment was sent to the legation, the consulate, and Mr. Atherton's grounds on King street. The latter detachment was afterward removed to Arion Hall. That night I remember being aroused by the alarm of fire. It turned out to be a small affair, supposed to be of incendiary origin, on Emma Street.
Senator Gray. An outbuilding, was it not?
Mr. Day. That is my recollection-that it was an outbuilding. It was a small fire. On the following day we understood that at a given signal those who were in favor of the movement were to meet at the Honolulu Rifles' armory, and with arms, and proceed upon the Government building. I was returning from making a professional call shortly after 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and passed the armory. I saw the men collecting there----
Senator Gray. You say that they were notified. Were you one of those who were notified?
Mr. Day. No. I saw a friend coming toward the armory. I asked him what was the matter, and asked if the signal was given, and he said that Goode had shot a policeman and they were going to proceed at once; so I put my horse away and put my revolver in my pocket and hurried to the armory. I had planned myself, without discussing the matter with anyone, to do my duty as a professional man. I had provided
|
surgical dressings in considerable quantity for the wounded and had taken my revolver to use simply in case of a conflict, which every one expected. I went to the armory. Men were collecting from all parts of the city, and I walked with them to the Government building. The grounds were then fairly well filled with men bearing arms and gathering crowds of people. I remained there an hour or more.
Senator Frye. When you got there what was going on?
Mr. Day. The troops were drawn up in line in front of the door.
Senator Frye. The Provisional Government troops?
Mr. Day. The troops of the Provisional Government. The men who had been collecting at the armory and walked over. They were drawn up in line around the main entrance of the building. I remained there an hour or more and learned that the proclamation abrogating the monarchy had been read, but I did not hear it; I was not in proper position to hear it. I then walked out the side entrance, saw the troops of the Boston in the yard of Arion Hall, not drawn up at all, not with their muskets in their hands-most of them leaning up against the fence, looking on at what was going on across the way.
Senator Gray. Did the troops have their muskets stacked?
Mr. Day. That is my recollection-that they were. They had a guard pacing before the gate, but they were simply there looking out-not under arms. I walked to the steps of the opera house, a short distance away, and stood there a short time. I saw a commotion in the crowd and they all looked toward the palace. I saw the royal standard come down from the flagstaff upon the palace. I asked some one who was standing near by what it meant. They did not know; neither did I. I had with me at that time Dr. Delamater. We were together. He was under my professional care and I thought it was not best for him to be there any longer, so I took him home. I think after that I went about my professional duties.
Senator Gray. Were you there, after this first hauling down of the Hawaiian flag, when it was hauled up again?
Mr. Day. I do not remember about that; it was about that time I left the opera house and took Dr. Delamater to his home.
Senator Frye. When you were at the Government building, at the time this proclamation was read, did you remain there until the Provisional Government men took possession of the Government building, the archives, and all that-went in and took possession?
Mr. Day.Yes.
Senator Frye. Were any U. S. marines around the Government building?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. None at all there while you were there?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. None in sight of the Government building except the two sentries?
Mr. Day. They were in the grounds of the building of Arion Hall, across the street from the Government building.
Senator Frye. Inside the fence?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Not out on the street?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Gray. What sort of fence?
Mr. Day. Picket fence.
Senator Frye. They were not out on the street?
|
Mr. Day. No, not at all; except the sentry, who was pacing in front of the gate.
Senator Frye. During Monday your people feared there would be riots?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was that fear general?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. In your opinion was there danger to the American people and their property at that time?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was American property scattered all around in that section of the city?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Did you know how general the alarm was amongst the people at that time, on Monday? What were they afraid of principally?
Mr. Day. They were afraid of riots and incendiarism and conflict between the white men, who were determined to make a change, and the natives.
Senator Frye. Did you know Minister Stevens?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Well?
Mr. Day. I treated most of his family during the time he was there.
Senator Frye. Were you the physician for Chief-Justice Judd?
Mr. Day. Yes; I have treated nearly all his children and himself.
Senator Frye. Do you know whether or not there was any expectation on the part of the men who were engaged in behalf of the Provisional Government that Minister Stevens was going to have the troops help them?
Mr. Day. I had no such idea whatever. I supposed they were landed simply for the protection of American interests and under the excitement of the inevitable conflict that was coming.
Senator Frye. Did you expect the troops to take part in the conflict as between the Queen and the Provisional Government?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. Do you know what the Provisional Government expected-the leading men in the affair?
Mr. Day. I do not; I never heard that they did.
Senator Frye. Did the troops take any part?
Mr. Day. They did not.
Senator Frye. Do you know anything about what forces the Queen had on that Monday?
Mr. Day. I know that she had the Queen's guard and the police.
Senator Frye. The Queen's guard consisted of about 75 men and the police about 60?
Senator Gray. Ask Mr. Day how many they consisted of?
Senator Frye. Do you know how many they consisted of?
Mr. Day. The guard, I suppose, consisted of about 80 men, and the police? I do not remember the exact number-I suppose 65 or 75.
Senator Frye. Do you know what armed forces the Queen had on her part on Monday?
Mr. Day. I knew of none.
Senator Frye. Was there any fear on the part of the men of the Provisional Government of a conflict with the Queen's forces?
Mr. Day. They had no fear at all; they feared a conflict, but had no fear of the result.
|
Senator Frye. So far as you know, if the Boston had been a thousand miles at sea would there have been a different result?
Mr. Day. There would have been no difference in the result, except, probably, it would have been wrought with blood.
Senator Frye. But as to who would win they had no question?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. Was there any fear among the Provisional Government's men of the Queen's Guard?
Mr. Day. I do not understand your question.
Senator Frye. Among the white men, the Provisional Government's men, was there any fear of the valor of the Queen's Guard?
Mr. Day. They expected they would fight, but they had no fear of them.
Senator Frye. They were native Hawaiians, were they not?
Mr. Day. Native Hawaiians.
Senator Frye. Is there much fighting material among the native Hawaiians?
Mr. Day. They are not a belligerent people.
Senator Frye. Quiet, good-natured people?
Mr. Day. They are.
Senator Frye. Were you in Honolulu during the Wilcox riot of 1889?
Mr. Day. I was in the islands; I was not in Honolulu just at that time. I had gone to Mauai just at the time that occurred.
Senator Frye. Were troops landed at that time?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. What is the character of these men who are now in control of the Government?
Mr. Day. They are the best men in the community.
Senator Frye. Compare favorably with men here?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Men of education, most of them?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Were you there when the flag was hauled down?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was there any commotion?
Mr. Day. None.
Senator Frye. In your opinion, can the Provisional Government maintain itself?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. The chief followers of the Queen are whom?
Mr. Day. Hawaiians and half-whites.
Senator Frye. Natives, you mean?
Mr. Day. Natives.
Senator Frye. Half-whites?
Mr. Day. Half-whites and a large proportion of English people.
Senator Frye. What kind of men were those whom the Queen put into her cabinet-Cornwell and Colburn?
Mr. Day. They were not men who commanded the confidence of the community.
Senator Gray. That is, of what you called the best men of the community; or do you mean the whole population?
Mr. Day. I should say that they did not command the confidence of a large majority of the white community.
Senator Gray. Were you in Honolulu when Mr. Blount was there?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you have any communications with him?
|
Mr. Day. Only professionally.
Senator Gray. You did not appear before him as a witness?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Gray. What time did you leave the islands?
Mr. Day. The 8th of August. I left Honolulu on the same steamer that Mr. and Mrs. Blount came on.
Senator Gray. Came from there here; that is, to the United States?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Have you read Mr. Blount's report?
Mr. Day. No; extracts only.
Senator Frye. So far as you know anything about the affairs of the islands during this time, did Mr. Stevens have anything to do with this revolution?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. Did you attend Mr. Stevens?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Frye. Do you remember Mr. Stevens being sick during the time of the revolution?
Mr. Day. I do not remember. I did not attend him if he was sick during that time. I attended his daughters more than I did him, although that was some little time before that.
Senator Gray. You say you went to the Hawaiian Islands in 1887?
Mr. Day. Yes; to reside.
Senator Gray. And practice your profession?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Of what state are you a citizen?
Mr. Day. Illinois.
Senator Gray. Did you become a citizen of the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Day. I am a voter there.
Senator Gray. Are you a citizen?
Mr. Day. I do not know just what the laws are in that respect.
Senator Gray. Did you ever become naturalized?
Mr. Day. I did not take out naturalization papers.
Senator Gray. Do you still consider yourself a citizen of the United States?
Mr. Day. I believe that is a question that has not been decided.
Senator Gray. Do you consider yourself such?
Mr. Day. I call myself an American.
Senator Frye. You did not forswear your allegiance to the United States?
Mr. Day. I did not forswear my allegiance to the United States, but I did sign the constitution which requires a voter to support the constitution.
Senator Gray. Did you attend this meeting on Monday?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you a supporter of that meeting?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Were you there when the troops landed?
Mr. Day. I was in Honolulu.
Senator Gray. I mean in town.
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you see the troops?
Mr. Day. I saw them in the evening.
Senator Gray. You did not see them march up from the landing?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Gray. You were not present at the landing?
|
Mr. Day. No; in driving about in the evening on my professional rounds I saw them.
Senator Gray. You spoke of being informed—notice was passed around on Monday evening that there was to be a movement to establish a provisional government. Did you get that notice?
Mr. Day. I got a statement.
Senator Gray. On information?
Mr. Day. Information; yes, sir. It should hardly be dignified as an official notice.
Senator Gray. Who informed you?
Mr. Day. Mr. George Smith.
Senator Gray. The person at whose office the meetings were held?
Mr. Day. No; he is a wholesale druggist there.
Senator Gray. Not the Mr. Smith who is a member of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Gray. Was Mr. George Smith a supporter of the movement?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Is he an American?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. How many Americans were on the committee of safety?
Mr. Day. I do not know; I will have to look over the list to tell you that.
Senator Gray. Henry A. Cooper?
Mr. Day. Do you mean by Americans the same as myself, born in the United States and living there under the laws and having sworn to support the Hawaiian constitution and abide by their laws?
Senator Gray. You may call it an American living there and in business there.
Mr. Day. I do not know how our statutes are; whether we are Americans.
Senator Gray. The same as yourself.
Mr. Day. Yes; Henry A. Cooper is an American, the same as I am.
Senator Gray. F. W. McChesney?
Mr. Day. American.
Senator Gray. W. C. Wilder?
Mr. Day. American.
Senator Gray. C. Bolte?
Mr. Day. German.
Senator Gray. Andrew Brown?
Mr. Day. Scotchman.
Senator Gray. William O. Smith?
Mr. Day. Hawaiian.
Senator Gray. Henry Waterhouse?
Mr. Day. English.
Senator Gray. Theodore F. Lansing?
Mr. Day. American.
Senator Gray. Edward Shur?
Mr. Day. German.
Senator Gray. L. A. Thurston?
Mr. Day. Hawaiian.
Senator Gray. That is, he was born there?
Mr. Day. A Hawaiian of American parentage.
Senator Gray. John Emmeluth?
Mr. Day. I think he is a German.
Senator Gray. W.R. Castle?
|
Mr. Day. An Hawaiian.
Senator Gray. J. A. McCandless?
Mr. Day. An American.
Senator Gray. Were they all voters, the same as you?
Mr. Day. Yes; many of them are old residents of the country.
Senator Frye. Is there anything that occurs to you that you would like to state in connection with this matter? If there is anything that you know about the revolution that occurred about that time, and it is legitimate, you may state it.
Mr. Day. I would like to state my opinion, if you will allow me, about the landing of the American troops—my individual opinion.
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Day. It seemed to me as though it was the duty of the American minister, under the conditions, to land the troops for the protection of American property.
Senator Gray. And life?
Mr. Day. And the lives of women and children that might be sacrificed, perhaps. I think that duty devolved not only upon him, but upon all ministers there, to land troops for the protection of the citizens and their lives; but the Boston was the only ship in the waters at the time. The same thing has been done, during the last crisis by the British and Japanese, by landing troops from their ships.
Senator Frye. What do you call the last crisis?
Mr. Day. During the time when there was, apparently, danger of conflict between the Provisional Government and the royalists at an attempted restoration of the Queen.
Senator Gray. While you were there?
Mr. Day. No.
Senator Frye. That has been since the Provisional Government was established?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. After you left the islands?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. That is hearsay.
Senator Frye. Did most of the valuable property in Honolulu belong to men of American birth?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Do you know Mr. Thurston?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Senator Gray. Have you seen him since you have been here?
Mr. Day. I saw him for a few minutes last evening.
Senator Frye. When did you arrive, yesterday?
Mr. Day. Last evening.
Senator Frye. Did you call on Mr. Thurston or did he call on you?
Mr. Day. I called on him.
Senator Frye. Was Dr. Delamater with you last evening when you called?
Mr. Day. Yes; Mr. Irwin, Dr. Delamater, and I called on Mr. Thurston. Mr. Thurston is an old patient of mine.
SWORN STATEMENT OF ROSWELL RANDALL HOES.
Senator Frye. Are you a chaplain in the Navy?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. Have you ever been in Honolulu?
Mr. Hoes. I have.
|
Senator Frye. When and how long were you there?
Mr. Hoes. I reached Honolulu on the U. S. S. Pensacola September 25, 1891, and remained there until March 9, 1893.
The Chairman. Who was your captain?
Mr. Hoes. The commanding officer of the Pensacola was Capt. Albert Kautz, U. S. Navy.
Senator Frye. What were you doing there during that time?
Mr. Hoes. I went there as chaplain of the Pensacola, and, having considerable leisure, apart from my professional duties, I commenced a study of the history of the country, pursuing it as carefully and critically as the books and pamphlets at my command would permit.
The Chairman. Do you mean to say that you stayed ashore from 1891 to 1893?
Mr. Hoes. No; I will explain that. I was officially attached to the Pensacola while she remained in Hawaiian waters, and performed my duties accordingly; but, having considerable leisure at my disposal, as already said, I engaged in historical studies, and was instrumental, with Prof. Alexander, J. S. Emerson, and others, in organizing the Hawaiian Historical Society, and was officially connected with that organization until I left Honolulu. The Queen, subsequently hearing that I was so deeply interested in historical research, applied to Secretary Blaine, through Minister Stevens, for permission for me to remain in Honolulu after the Pensacola left, to prepare a bibliography of Hawaii, and also to examine and arrange the early archives of the Government, which were in a state of disgraceful confusion. I was subsequently detached and remained in Honolulu until the time stated.
The Chairman. If the Queen made that application of her own motion she could not have been a very ignorant woman?
Mr. Hoes. No one ever claimed that respecting the Queen. As a matter of fact, however, the Queen took this action upon the advice of Prof. Alexander, the recognized historian of the country, and of others who were interested in the history of Hawaii and the preservation of its early archives.
Senator Frye. Did you keep a scrapbook?
Mr. Hoes. I kept a scrapbook of the first days of the revolution. It was made up of all the cuttings relating in any way to the revolution, taken from the Advertiser, a supporter of the Provisional Government, and the Bulletin and Holomua, both of which then and subsequently advocated the cause of the Queen.
Senator Frye. In that scrap book does there appear the recognitions of the Provisional Government by the various governments represented in Honolulu?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. The letters of recognition sent by the various Governments represented in the Hawaiian Islands do not appear of record here, and I think they ought to come in. They are as follows:
- Consulate of Chile,
- Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, whereby I am informed, for reasons set forth, the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, the same being now in possession of Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request me to recognize the said Provisional Government
|
- as the de facto Government on behalf of the Government of Chile, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- In response I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as my authority as consul for Chile may permit me to act for and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Chile in the premises. I have the honor to be, gentlemen,
- Your very obedient servant,
- F. A. Schaefer,
- Consul for Chile.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
|
|
- Austro-Hungarian Consulate, Hawaiian Islands,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- To the Executive Council of the Provisional Government in Hawaii, Messrs. Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, and Willinm 0. Smith:
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to own receipt of your esteemed favor of yesterday's date, and hereby take much pleasure to recognize and acknowledge on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall do all in my power to further and support the same.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant.
- H. F. Glade,
- Austro-Hungarian Consul.
|
|
- Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, informing me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated, and a Provisional Government established, and requesting me to recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- In answer, I have the honor to state that I comply with the above request, and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, within the scope of my authority.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
- H. RENJES,
- Consul for Mexico.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
|
- Vice-Consulate of Russia,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Sirs: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of 17th inst., and in reply beg to inform you that I take pleasure to recognize the Provisional Government of Hawaii as defined in the proclamation inclosed in your letter, on behalf of the Government of Russia, and I shall afford to it my moral support as representative of the country last named.
- I have the honor to be, sirs, your most obedient servant,
- J. F. Hackfeld,
- Acting Vice-Consul.
- Messrs. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- William O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, Honolula.
|
|
- Consulate of the Netherlands,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the communication of the executive council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands announcing the abrogation of the Hawaiian monarchy, of your possession of the Government, departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, as well as being in control of the city.
- Added to the above is your request for the official recognition of the existing de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which I have the honor to represent, and to give you the moral support of my Government.
- In reply I take pleasure in assuring the gentlemen of the executive council, that I cordially extend to them full assent to their claim for recognition, and of my intention to add such moral support as may come within the scope of my consular authority.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your very obedient servant,
- John H. Paty,
- Consul for the Netherlands.
- Messrs. S. B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council, Hawaiian Provisional Government, etc.
|
|
- Imperial German Consulate,
- Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- To the Executive Council of the Provisional Government in Hawaii, Messrs. Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. 0. Smith:
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to own receipt of your esteemed favor of yesterday's date, and hereby take much pleasure to recognize and acknowledge on behalf of the Government of Germany the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall do all in my power to further and support the same.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,
- H. F. Glade,
- Imperial German Consul.
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----70
|
- Kongl Swensta Och Worsta Konsulatet,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's communication of January 17 informing me that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and that a provisional Government has been established in Hawaii for reasons set forth in a proclamation, of which you sent me a copy; also that such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the governmental departmental buildings, the archives and the treasury, and is in control of the city.
- In reply to your request to recognize the Provisional Government and afford it the moral support of my Government, I beg to say that I do recognize it as the existing de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall report to my Government immediately.
- I have the honor to remain, your excellencies', your most obedient servant,
- H. W. Schmidt.
|
|
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to own the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, informing me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, and requesting me to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Spanish Government as the existing de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- In response, I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands within the scope of my authority.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,
- H. Renjes,
- Vice-Consul for Spain.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
|
|
- His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Consulate-General,
- Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 19, 1893.
- Gentlemen: The receipt of your communication, dated the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of proclamation issued on the same day, informing me that for reasons set forth in said proclamation the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, which is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and requesting me on behalf of H. I. J. M.'s Government to recognize said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, pending the receipt
|
- of instructions from H. I. J. M.'s Government, to whom advices of your action and of the position which I have taken in relation thereto have been despatched.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
- Suburo Fujii,
- Agent and Consul-General.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, Wm. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
|
|
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, whereby you inform me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, the same being now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request me to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Government of Italy as the existing de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- In response I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request, and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands so far as my authority as consul for Italy may permit me to act for and on behalf of His Italian Majesty's Government in the premises.
- I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your very obedient servant,
- F. A. Schaefer,
- Consul for Italy.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
|
|
- [Translation.]
- Consulate-General of Portugal in Hawaii,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Sir: You inform me by your letter of the 17th instant that, for the reason set forth in the proclamation which accompanies it, the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and that a Provisional Government, which has been established in its place, is at this moment in possession of the Government buildings and master of the capital. Under these circumstances I recognize the Provisional Government as being the de facto Government of Hawaii, and I hasten to submit the decision I have just taken to my Government.
- Accept, sir, the assurance of my very distinguished consideration.
- A. de Souza Canavarro,
- Consul-General and Charge d'Affaires of Portugal.
- Monsieur S. B. Dole,
- President of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government.
|
- British Legation,
- Honolulu, January 19,1893.
- Gentlemen: The receipt of your communication of the 17th instant is acknowledged, together with a copy of the proclamation, informing me that for reasons set forth in said proclamation the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated, and a Provisional Government established, and whereby you ask me to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Government as the existing de facto Government, and to afford it the moral support of my Government.
- In reply, I beg to say that I recognize the Provisional Government as the existing de facto Government pending instructions from my Government.
- I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
- James H. Wodehouse,
- H. B. M.'s Minister Resident.
- To the Members of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu.
|
|
- United States Legation,
- Honolulu, Hiwaiian Islands, January 17, 1893.
- A provisional government having been duly constituted in place of the recent Government of Queen Lilioukalani, and said Provisional Government being in full possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and in control of the capital of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby recognize said Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
- John L. Stevens,
- Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.
|
|
- Royal Danish Consulate,
- Honolulu, January 18,1893.
- Sirs: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, inclosing a copy of proclamation issued last evening, informing me, that for reasons set forth in said proclamation, the Hawaiian Monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, which is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and requesting me, on behalf of the Government of Denmark, to recognize said Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to accord to it the moral support of my Government.
- In reply, I have the honor to state that I hereby comply with the above request, recognizing the said Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, to the extent that my authority will allow me to act, pending a reply from my Government.
- I have the honor to be, sirs, yours, most obediently,
- E. C. MacFarlane,
- Acting Vice-Consul for Denmark.
- Messrs. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- William O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
|
- Consulate of Belgium, January 18,1893.
- Sirs: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of 17th instant, and in reply beg to inform you that I take pleasure to recognize the Provisional Government of Hawaii as defined in the proclamation inclosed in your letter on behalf of the Government of Belgium, and I shall to it my moral support as representative of the country last named.
- I have the honor to be, sirs, your most obedient servant,
- J. Hackfeld,
- Consul.
- Messrs. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- William O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, Honolulu.
|
|
- Chinese Commercial Agency,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: We have the honor to acknowledge a receipt of your circular letter of the 17th instant covering a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, whereby you inform us that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, the latter being now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request us to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Government of the Empire of China as the existing de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands and to afford to it the moral support of our Government.
- In answer we have the honor to say that we comply with your request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands so far as our authority as commercial agents of China may allow us to act for and on behalf of His Imperial Chinese Majesty's Government.
- We have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servants,
- Goo Kim,
- Chinese Commercial Agent.
- Wong Kwai,
- Assistant Chinese Commercial Agent.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- William O. Smith,
- Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
|
|
- Office of the Peruvian Consulate,
- Honolulu, January 18, 1893.
- Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your valued communication of the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of the proclamation then issued, wherein it is set forth that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established.
|
- You request me to recognize said government on behalf of the Government of Peru as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.
- I have the honor to state, in reply, that I take pleasure in complying with your request, and I hereby recognize the said government as the de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands, in so far as my authority in the premises will permit.
- I have the honor to remain, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,
- Bruce Cartwright,
- Consul for Peru.
- Hons. Sanford B. Dole,
- J. A. King,
- P. C. Jones,
- Wm. O. Smith,
- Members of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
|
|
- [Translation.]
- Consulate and Commissariat of France in Hawaii,
- Honolulu, January 18,1893.
- Sir: I have received the letter dated the 17th of this month by which you inform me that for the reasons indicated in the text of the proclamation which you handed to me on the same day, the members of the executive council, of which you are a part, have proclaimed, yesterday, the abrogation of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of a provisional government.
- In acknowledging the receipt of this communication I at once inform you that I have informed my Government of the events which have just taken place in this archipelago, adding that I recognize the actual condition of affairs pending instruction.
- Accept, sir, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration,
- Vizzavona.
- Monsieur Dole,
- President of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government, Honolulu.
Senator Gray. Were these printed contemporaneously with their recognition?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. If it is desired I can state a very interesting point that I happen to know from personal knowledge in regard to the English recognition.
The Chairman. We are trying to ascertain when it was.
Mr. Hoes. I was present in the room of the Provisional Government the first afternoon it was organized.
The Chairman. What date was that?
Mr. Hoes. Saturday being the 14th, that was the 17th, Tuesday.
Senator Gray. You were where?
Mr. Hoes. As I said, I was present in the room of the Provisional Government the afternoon it held its first meeting, and while I was there the English commissioner, Maj. Wodehouse, came into the room and had a whispered conversation with President Dole which could not be heard, at least by me, and I do not think by anyone except the President. A short time after that, probably within one hour, I had
|
a short conversation with Maj. Wodehouse on the porch of the Government house in which he told me that he had recognized the Provisional Government. I suppose, of course, the inference was he had done it informally. I state this because there was a delay of twenty-four hours, or more, before he recognized the Government in writing. While his formal recognition was not made as early as those of the other representatives in Honolulu, he was in reality the first to recognize the new government, with the possible exception of the U.S. minister, Mr. Stevens.
Senator Frye. Were you there when Mr. Stevens sent in his recognition?
Mr. Hoes. I suppose I was, but I cannot swear positively as to that.
Senator Frye. But you think Mr. Wodehouse was the first one?
Mr. Hoes. I do not know whether he preceded or succeeded Mr. Stevens.
Senator Frye. What time was it that you were there and Mr. Wodehouse was there?
Mr. Hoes. If I were asked what time Mr. Wodehouse had the whispered conversation with Mr. Dole I could not swear to it, but I should venture to say not far from 4 o'clock—in fact, probably after 4 o'clock.
The Chairman. Will you allow me to inquire what sort of a man Mr. Dole is? Give your description as you understand him. I would like to know something about his character and temper.
Mr. Hoes. I am personally and intimately acquainted with President Dole. I regard him as mentally, morally, intellectually, and I may add, physically, one of the finest types of men I have ever met. He is broad minded; he is conservative; he is dispassionate; and I believe I state the opinion of most men in that country when I say that he is more highly looked up to and respected than any other man in public and political life in that country.
The Chairman. From your knowledge of his character and bearing, would you suppose that he would be engaged in a mere adventure for revolutionizing the country for the purpose of getting political power into his hands?
Mr. Hoes. I do not think that any such thought or suggestion could enter the mind of any man living in Honolulu or the Hawaiian kingdom.
The Chairman. As to Dole?
Mr. Hoes. As to President Dole.
Senator Frye. Were you there from the 1st of January, 1893, until after the revolution?
Mr. Hoes. I was.
Senator Frye. You may state, if you please, what you observed as taking place in the Legislature of the Hawaiian Islands during the month of December preceding the revolution.
Mr. Hoes. That is a pretty broad question. It was a continuous scene of disordry and disgracefulness.
Senator Frye. In what particular?
Mr. Hoes. Bribery, undignified wrangle, and a perpetual fight to upset one ministry and to replace it with another.
Senator Frye. What ministry were they undertaking to upset?
Mr. Hoes. I could not carry the names of the various ministers composing the several cabinets in my mind any more than I could the movements of the men in a game of chess.
Senator Frye. You know the Wilcox-Jones cabinet?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
|
Senator Frye. That was composed of respectable men?
Mr. Hoes. Highly.
Senator Frye. Having the confidence of the people?
Mr. Hoes. Having the confidence of the better class of the people, but not having the confidence of the class of the people led by unscrupulous adventurers like C. W. Ashford and others like him, totally devoid of character.
Senator Frye. Was there an attempt being made to oust that cabinet?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
The Chairman. Were those attempts made for the purpose of personal aggrandizement of power or for questions that were up?
Mr. Hoes. My understanding was, and I think the understanding of most of the honest men there was, that it was a fight between so-called royal prerogative on the one hand and honest government on the other—a contest between the Queen and her desire for personal and autocratic power on the one hand, and the better and higher interests of the Hawaiian people on the other.
The Chairman. That is a very general statement and I want to inquire of you whether this political controversy had reference to any particular legislation or executive action in reference to changes in the constitution, or any other thing—whether there was any real question.
Mr. Hoes. I think at last it had primary reference to the passage of the so-called "lottery bill."
Senator Frye. Do you remember when the Boston left the harbor and went down to Hilo?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; very well.
Senator Frye. At that time the Jones-Wilcox cabinet was in power, was it not?
Mr. Hoes. It was.
Senator Frye. State whether or not at that time there was a feeling of security that it would remain in power and that the thing was settled.
Mr. Hoes. Yes; and I know, moreover, that it was the prevalent opinion among the best classes there that the lottery bill and lottery agitation would not be introduced again. It was the belief at that time that it had received its death blow at an earlier stage of the legislative proceedings, and, resting upon that belief, several of the legislators who would have voted against it, believing that all important legislation had already been transacted, left for their homes. This so weakened the numerical strength of the party of good order and the anti-lottery element in the legislature, that those who were in favor of the lottery saw that their chance had come, and, in the absence of the members referred to, and especially in the absence of the Boston and Mr. Stevens, the American minister, sprung the lottery bill very suddenly upon the legislature, and carried it through.
Senator Frye. And they overturned the Jones-Wilcox cabinet?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. I do not think I make any mistake in stating, in order to show with what haste the whole thing was managed, that the official announcement to the Legislature that the Queen had signed that lottery bill was made to the Legislature the very same morning that the Queen prorogued that body.
Senator Frye. So that when the Boston actually sailed there was a feeling of security that the conditions of peace were to last until the end of that Legislature?
Mr. Hoes. I believe that was the general feeling and belief.
Senator Frye. When the Boston sailed there commenced a struggle
|
in the Legislature? Did that end in the enactment of the lottery and opium bills?
Mr. Hoes. It did of the lottery bill; I am not clear in my mind as to the opium bill, because everybody was so concerned in the fate of the lottery bill that its discussion overshadowed everything else.
Senator Frye. Did that not result in the displacement of the Jones-Wilcox cabinet?
Mr. Hoes. It did.
Senator Frye. Do you remember the return of the Boston on Saturday the 14th?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. Were you present and a spectator of most of the things that took place on the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of January, 1893?
Mr. Hoes. Most all of them.
Senator Frye. Will you state day after day what was going on?
The Chairman. Commencing, I suppose, with the arrival of the Boston in the port of Honolulu?
Mr. Hoes. When the Queen prorogued the Legislature I saw her leave the building in her state carriage and go to the palace. A few minutes subsequently I went home. Not long thereafter, I learned by telephone that the Queen had promulgated, or was about to promulgate, a new constitution. I went at once to the palace grounds, and found collected there a large crowd of natives listening to a harangue by a member of the late Legislature and friend of the Queen, named White, who spoke from the front steps of the palace. The action of the Queen created a great deal of excitement in the community—a suppressed, but at the same time a determined excitement.
The Chairman. State what came under your personal observation.
Mr. Hoes. The next day was Sunday. The excitement continued. Everyone wondered what was to come next, and what was to be done next. Monday came and a poster was seen upon the street.
Senator Frye. Was that the poster [exhibiting paper]?
Mr. Hoes. It was a poster similar to this. I got this from the printing office.
Senator Frye. How was it seen upon the streets? Was it posted?
Mr. Hoes. Posted about the streets.
The Chairman. You mean on the houses?
Mr. Hoes. Publicly posted, in the usual manner.
Senator Frye. Calling for a meeting on Monday afternoon?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. Shall I read this?
Senator Frye. You may.
Mr. Hoes. The poster is as follows:
- "Mass meeting. A mass meeting of citizens will be held at the Beretania Street armory on Monday, January 16, at 2 p.m., to consider the present critical situation. Let all business places be closed. Per order of committee of safety. Honolulu, January 14, 1893."
Senator Frye. Well?
Mr. Hoes. I attended the meeting at the armory Monday afternoon, January 16. I was told that it was a larger and more enthusiastic meeting than gathered in the same place at the time of the revolution of 1887. I am informed that it was the most enthusiastic and unanimous meeting—I mean unanimous in the sentiments which seemed to pervade the people—of any state or political meeting ever held in Honolulu. That meeting appointed a committee of safety.
|
The Chairman. You say you were told that. What was your opinion?
Mr. Hoes. I was not there in 1887, and therefore have no opinion on that point.
The Chairman. What is your opinion about the enthusiasm and zeal and unanimity of feeling at the meeting you attended.
Mr. Hoes. I was told----
The Chairman. Not what you were told.
Mr. Hoes. The enthusiasm and zeal of the meeting were its most conspicuous characteristics, and there was absolute unanimity of word and action. The resolutions that were offered were unanimously passed. There was no unhealthful excitement displayed. The people were naturally somewhat excited, but they had great confidence in Mr. Thurston and others who composed the committee of safety. They placed discretionary power in the hands of that committee, and the meeting adjourned. If there had been any persons present at that meeting who desired to offer opinions adverse to those which had been expressed by the speakers, I believe they would have been allowed to do so. There were none such offered or suggested.
The Chairman. You believe that?
Mr. Hoes. I do; but of course I could not prove it. It would be only a matter of belief; but at all events no one offered to speak on the other side. The meeting adjourned and most of the crowd then poured down in front of the palace where they thought the meeting of natives in behalf of the Queen was in progress. I can not say what the feeling of that crowd was, or what their motive was in going around there, but I know what my own motive was—it was a feeling of curiosity and a desire to be present and see a row if there should be any, and I expected there would be one. I believe I had every reason to think so.
Senator Frye. When you got there what was going on?
Mr. Hoes. The meeting of natives had adjourned and the people had dispersed. I ought to go back and speak of something that occurred Monday morning. This meeting was held Monday afternoon, January 16. Monday morning a newspaper supplement appeared on the street, in the Hawaiian language, which was issued from the printing office of John E. Bush, and a copy of which you hold in your hand.
Senator Frye. Was that in the Hawaiian language?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Gray. When was that posted?
Mr. Hoes. It was not posted, it was handed around to the crowd by carriers.
Senator Gray. What day?
Mr. Hoes. The morning of the day this meeting was held at the armory—Monday, January 16.
Senator Gray. Can you translate that poster?
Mr. Hoes. No.
The Chairman. Do you know what printing office it was printed at?
Mr. Hoes. At Ka Leo O Ka Lahui printing office, I suppose. I wanted to speak of another point. It is in connection with the landing of the troops. The troops landed Monday. Monday night I heard an alarm of fire and I went to the fire.
Senator Gray. Were you keeping house?
Mr. Hoes. No. I kept house until my family returned to the United States, shortly before the revolution. There was an alarm of fire Monday night, and I went to the fire. It was one of two fires that occurred that night. I was informed that the natives and those who
|
led them had said that in case of the dethronement of the Queen the conduit pipes of the city would be tampered with, and that prominent houses would be burned.
Senator Gray. Who informed you?
Mr. Hoes. That was current rumor in Honolulu about that time. There are some things concerning which I cannot speak from positive knowledge, but which were matters of popular rumor. But there was a feeling of fear prevalent; no one could tell what might be done, or what might not be done, by natives led on by white adventurers, who were aiming to excite the passions of the natives.
Senator Frye. There was a pervading fear that there would be trouble?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. There were, as I have said, two fires that night, one on Beretania street and another at Emma Square.
Senator Frye. Did you think that night that life and property were in danger?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. Was there a feeling during Monday that the lives and property of Americans would be in danger?
Mr. Hoes. There was a pervading fear of uncertainty. I believe that a great many people felt that their lives and property were in danger. After that meeting at the armory was held there was a feeling of insecurity. The meeting having placed broad discretionary powers into the hands of the committee of safety, the people awaited with patience and confidence the result of their deliberations. The next afternoon, Tuesday, came the reading of the proclamation dethroning the Queen and proclaiming the Provisional Government by the committee of safety. I was present at the Government house when the first troops of the Provisional Government filed in.
Senator Gray. The Government house?
Mr. Hoes. The Government house. A sturdy, determined-looking set of men filed in there with muskets and rifles.
Senator Gray. How many in the first squad?
Mr. Hoes. In the first squad that went in there might have been 25 and there might have been 50.
Senator Frye. Were you there when the proclamation was read?
Mr. Hoes. I think I must have been there between five and ten minutes afterward, not longer than that.
Senator Frye. Were many people in front of the Government buildings?
Mr. Hoes. Not many.
Senator Frye. Did the Provisional Government take possession of the public buildings?
Mr. Hoes. They had absolute possession at that time of what is called the Government building, containing the offices of administration.
Senator Frye. They immediately after that issued an "order," January 17, on Tuesday, calling for arms?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; I have one here.
Senator Frye. Did they issue that?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. Shall I read it?
Senator Frye. Yes.
|
Mr. Hoes. It reads as follows:
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 17,1893.
- "PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
- {sc|Order No. 1.}}
- "All persons favorable to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government building and to furnish to the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control as soon as possible in order that efficient and complete protection of life and property and the public peace may immediately and efficiently be put into operation.
- "Sanford B. Dole,
- "J. A. King,
- "P. C. Jones,
- "William O. Smith,
- "Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
- "John Emmeluth,
- "Andrew Brown,
- "C. Bolte,
- "James F. Morgan,
- "Henry Waterhouse,
- "S. M. Damon,
- "W. G. Ashley,
- "E. D. Tenney,
- "F. W. McChesney,
- "W. C. Wilder,
- "Advisory Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands”
Senator Frye. Do you know how many troops the Provisional Government had at the time they took possession of the Government buildings?
Mr. Hoes. Do you mean before that night was over?
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Hoes. I do not know. I should say several hundred.
Senator Frye. Armed or otherwise?
Mr. Hoes. I think they were all armed. Among them were many of the best men in the community.
Senator Frye. Do you know how many they succeeded in getting under arms under that proclamation?
Mr. Hoes. I do not. I believe the number was increased steadily day by day, but to what extent I do not know.
Senator Frye. Going back to Monday. In your opinion was there such a condition of things existing in Honolulu at that time as to require the presence of the American troops from the Boston to protect American life and property?
Mr. Hoes. Most decidedly, in my opinion.
Senator Frye. During all those weeks of revolution, and after the United States troops had arrived, did those troops take any part in the conflict between the Queen and the Provisional Government?
Mr. Hoes. No, not to my knowledge.
|
Senator Frye. Do you know whether during all that time of the days of the revolution the Provisional Government had any expectation of the assistance of the American troops?
Mr. Hoes. I never heard it suggested.
Senator Frye. In your opinion if the Boston had been a thousand miles at sea instead of in the harbor, would the Provisional Government have become a government at that time?
Mr. Hoes. I believe it would.
Senator Frye. In your opinion had it sufficient force to overcome all that the Queen could bring against it?
Mr. Hoes. I think it had sufficent moral force and physical force.
Senator Frye. Have you any doubt that the Provisional Government would have gone forward even in the absence of the Boston and the American troops?
Mr. Hoes. I think the sentiment of the people would have forced the issue at that time.
The Chairman. The sentiment in regard to what?
Mr. Hoes. The sentiment of the people as to their individual and collective rights.
The Chairman. Do you mean under the constitution?
Mr. Hoes. I mean under the higher constitution, the constitution of revolution.
Senator Frye. Did you have any conversation with any prominent Hawaiians in relation to the change of government?
Mr. Hoes. I mingled a good deal during the time I was in Honolulu among the common Hawaiian people and among the prominent Hawaiian people. I was constantly studying the historical side of the question, as well as contemporary opinion, and I was persistently trying to learn the views of the people. To answer your question more exactly, I did have conversation with prominent Hawaiians.
Senator Frye. Did you have any conversation with J. A. Kawainui?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. He was the editor of the most prominent newspaper in the Kingdom—the Kuakoa.
Senator Frye. When did you have that conversation?
Mr. Hoes. Shortly after the revolution.
Senator Frye. Will you please read it?
Mr. Hoes. Yes, sir. (Reading:)
- "The Kemehameha dynasty had a strong hold upon the native heart because of its noble ancestry, but Kalakaua and the late Queen, on account of their comparatively ignoble origin, did not command the respect due to genuine high chiefs. The corruption of Kalakaua and her late majesty have brought sore evils upon the Hawaiians. Then, too, certain designing foreigners have exercised a very pernicious political influence on the natives, and have sought to use them only for the accomplishment of their own ends. For my part I am tired of this state of things. What I want is good government. I do not care for a condition of affairs that is constantly shifting. We need a government that will be respected abroad and trusted at home. Either annexation to the United States or a protectorate. I prefer the former because of its greater stability. With annexation we should, of course, to a great degree enjoy the same condition of things that prevails in America. I have had enough of monarchy, and believe that the safety and prosperity of the country is dependent upon its annexation to the United States, and there are many of the intelligent native Hawaiians who agree with me in this opinion. The majority of my race are ignorant of what is really conducive to their best interests. It can not be a
|
- matter of surprise that they look with fond recollections to the throne and the old institutions. The future seems so uncertain that they can not conceive what is in store for them, but when they find that they are treated justly under the new government, as they have been from the first day of its formation, and indorsed their attempts to effect organic union with the United States, they will quickly give it their confidence."
Senator Frye. Did you have an interview with Hon. A. Kahi?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. A prominent member of the last royal Hawaiian Legislature?
Mr. Hoes. Yes. Shall I read it?
Senator Frye. Yes.
- "I am 53 years old. During all these years I have lived under the Hawaiian monarchy, that is, under Kamehameha III, IV, and V, Lunalilo, Kalakaua, and the late Queen Liliuokalani. I was personally acquainted with all of these rulers, but it was not until the reign of Kalakaua that I commenced to take an active part in public life. I was perfectly familiar with the whole of that monarch's career. During the first half of his reign he conducted the Government with some regard to decency, but during the latter half the native Hawaiian people strongly objected to his actions. During the whole of this period the voice of the common people was never heard or felt in the Legislature. The King's henchmen and creatures were elected through the power and influence of the Crown for the sole purpose of carrying out the wishes of the King, in utter disregard of the desires and rights of the masses of the Hawaiian people. The common people had no show whatever at the elections. The Government officials were everywhere instructed to compel the people to elect the King's favorites. During these years many self-respecting Hawaiians resisted the encroachments of absolutism and made a desperate, but unavailing, fight against overwhelming odds. Kalakaua controlled every district justice, assessor, tax-collector, sheriff, and all other Government officials, and, through them, controlled the polls and drowned the voice of the people. The rule of the late Queen has been just as rotten and corrupt as that of her brother Kalakaua. The greatest mistake of her reign was the fact that she exceeded her brother in seeking and acting upon the advice of the most unwise and corrupt counselors, and it was this mistake on her part that cost her her throne. I stand for the rights of the people and not for the rights of any privileged person.
- "Monarchy is dead, and I am glad of it. I rejoice and am proud to support the Provisional Government, for it commands my perfect confidence, and I was the fifth person in the country to swear my alleigiance to it. What I desire is a firm and strong government, and I shall do everything to promote its stability. If we could have a stable republic, with President Dole at its head for four years, and his successor to hold office for the same length of time, it would be an ideal government, but if the present Provisional Government strongly advise annexation to the United States, as seems to be the fact, I shall heartily give it and the movement my support. My determination in this respect is fixed and unchangeable. There is no going backward; we must go forward. I believe that all those who will stop to think will agree with the views which I have expressed. I shall do everything in my power to show my constituents that these views are the only path to prosperity, and I believe that I shall succeed. The great mass of the Hawaiians are very poor, and some radical change must be made or they will be unable to obtain their means of livelihood.
|
- There are foreign adventurers in this country, whose names I need not mention, who are cast down because by the recent change in public affairs they have lost the government pap. They are nothing but soreheads, and have grossly deceived and misled the native Hawaiians. Again, I say, I rejoice in the new order of things. I stated on the floor of the recent Legislature that the conduct of affairs under the late monarchy was thoroughly rotten. We have had quite enough of it, and it is my firm belief that the native Hawaiians will quickly recognize the recent government changes as a great blessing."
Mr. Hoes. I ought to say one word in connection with this.
Senator Gray. Were those notes made at the time of the conversation?
Mr. Hoes. That is what I was about to speak of. The fact is, Mr. Kauhi can not speak a word of English, yet this statement of his seems to read very smoothly. I had a friend with me when I called upon Mr. Kauhi, who understood the Hawaiian language as perfectly as he did the English. This friend talked to Kauhi, received his replies to his questions, and then communicated them to me in English. I took his statement home and wrote it out, and then took it to my friend and told him that I would not be satisfied with it until it was submitted to its author. I went back with my friend to Kauhi, who translated the statement to him, and Kauhi said it was correct.
Senator Frye. You stated you were studying the people for historical purposes?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; and also to learn contemporary opinion.
Senator Frye. Do you know R. W. Wilcox?
Mr. Hoes. Fairly well.
Senator Frye. Who is he?
Mr. Hoes. He is the man who figured so prominently and conspicuously in the revolution of 1887, and has mingled in politics more or less ever since, and was a member of the last Hawaiian Legislature.
Senator Frye. Do you know whether he was a witness before Mr. Blount or not?
Mr. Hoes. I do not know.
Senator Frye. Did you have an interview with Wilcox?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. Is this the interview? [Exhibiting the paper.]
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. You may state when that was.
Mr. Hoes. Shortly after the revolution.
- "INTERVIEW OF R. W. WILCOX WITH R. R. HOES, HONOLULU, JANUARY 27, 1893.
- "What are your views, Mr. Wilcox, in regard to the present situation in general?
- "Queen Liliuokalani brought these evils upon herself and the country both by her personal corruption, and that of her Government. She surrounded herself with bad advisers, and seemed determined to drive the nation to destruction. Good people had no influence over her whatever, for she indignantly refused to listen to them. I believe that if we can be annexed to the United States, the rights of all of our citizens, and especially those of the native Hawaiians, will be protected more carefully than they have ever been under the monarchy.
- "What, in your opinion, is the personal feeling of the native Hawaiian element in this community?
|
- "My countrymen, with the exception of the most intelligent among them, do not understand much about these things. They need to be educated. They have so often been told by designing men that the United States was their enemy that they are naturally suspicious. Politicians who have sought to use the natives simply as so many tools have deceived them. When they understand from the lips of disinterested men and patriots what annexation means, and become acquainted with the benefits that it will bring them, they will be as much in favor of the movement as any of our other classes of citizens.
- "Does the present Provisional Government command the respect of the native Hawaiians?
- "They are naturally somewhat prejudiced against it, as monarchy is the only form of Government with which they are familiar, but this feeling will quickly wear away as the Hawaiians are led to see that the Government is friendly to them and their interests. They already have confidence in the integrity and patriotism of President Dole.
- "You advocated annexation to the United States, I believe, several months ago, in your newspaper, 'The Liberal?'
- "Yes, and I have repeatedly done so in public meetings held in this city.
- "How long do you think it would be after hoisting the American flag before the natives would be entirely reconciled?
- "Almost immediately.
- "Are you doing anything to instruct the natives so that they may have correct views in regard to these matters?
- "Yes; but I am compelled to move cautiously or I shall lose my influence over them. I believe I am doing a good work by constantly conversing with them on the subject. I have told my countrymen that the monarchy is gone forever, and when they ask me what is the best thing to follow it I tell them annexation, and I firmly believe that in a very short time every Hawaiian will be in favor of that step. The great thing is to keep them from being influenced by the arguments of designing men who pretend to be their friends, but who are really their enemies-men who will try and use them as tools to accomplish their own corrupt and selfish plans. We have had too much of this and it is high time to call for a halt.
- "Have you confidence in the integrity and patriotic intentions of the commission that has just been sent to Washington by the Provisional Government?
- "It is made up of good men, and I believe they will endeavor to do what is for the best interests of the country.
- "The above is correctly reported."
- "R .W. Wilcox."
Senator Frye. That is signed by Mr. Wilcox?
Mr. Hoes. Signed by him personally, and read to him carefully before he signed it.
The Chairman. By whom?
Mr. Hoes. By me.
Senator Frye. The day that the Government buildings were taken possession of by the Provisional Government and the proclamation was read were there any United States troops in front of the Government building?
Mr. Hoes. I did not see any.
Senator Frye. Do you know where they were at the time?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
|
Senator Frye. Where were they?
Mr. Hoes. In Arion Hall.
Senator Frye. Back in the yard?
Mr. Hoes. I can not say.
Senator Frye. They were not in sight of the Government building?
Mr. Hoes. I am sure I would have seen them if they could be seen from the front of the Government building, but I saw none.
Senator Frye. Do you know anything that the United States did to help or hinder either side?
Mr. Hoes. No.
Senator Frye. Did you ever hear any complaint?
Mr. Hoes. I never did, except that it was charged in a general way by the newspapers that she had been dethroned by Mr. Stevens and the United States forces.
Senator Frye. The Royalist press?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Gray. And the Royalist people?
Mr. Hoes. I take it for granted that they made this charge, although I have no recollection of hearing any of them do so.
Senator Gray. You did not come in contact with them?
Mr. Hoes. Yes I did, I made it my study to associate with all classes.
Senator Gray. You did not come in contact with the Royalist people on that point?
Mr. Hoes. I have no recollection of that claim being put forward by them while I was there.
Senator Frye. Is this a copy of the act of the bill 185 granting a franchise to establish and maintain a lottery [exhibiting paper]?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; it is a copy of the original bill as introduced in the legislature. The bill referred to is as follows:
- No. 185 z.
- Introduced by______ .
- First reading,______day of______, 1892.
- Second reading, ______day of , ______1892.
- Third reading, ________day of , _____1892.
- AN ACT granting a franchise to establish and maintain a lottery.
- Be it enacted by the Queen and the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom:
- Section 1. The exclusive franchise is hereby granted to D.H. Cross, of Chicago, Illinois, United States of America; W.B. Davenport, of St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America, and John Phillips, J.J. Williams, and Dr. Gilbert Foote, of Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaiian Islands, and their successors and assigns, or such corporation as may hereafter be incorporated or organized by them, to establish and maintain a lottery and to sell lottery, policy, and combination tickets, devices, and certificates and fractional parts thereof at terms and prices in just proportion to the prizes to be drawn, and to insure perfect fairness and justice in the distribution of the prizes, for the term of twenty-five (25) years.
- Section 2. The majority of the said grantees, or if a corporation be formed, then a majority of the directors of said corporation shall be domiciled in Honolulu, and said business shall be conducted in the city
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----71
|
- of Honolulu, on the island of Oahu, Hawaiian Islands, where all the drawings of said lottery shall take place.
- Section 3. The said grantees and their successors and assigns shall pay for said franchise to the Hawaiian Government the sum of five hundred thousand ($500,000) dollars each year, in quarterly installments, at the end of each quarter after the announcement of the first drawing; that is to say, on the 31st day of March, the 30th day of June, the 30th day of September, and the 31st day of December, of each year.
- Section 4. Said sum shall be devoted to the uses and purposes hereinafter set forth, and the minister of finance is hereby authorized to pay the same as herein provided, as long as the same is received for said franchise.
- First. Subsidy to be paid for an ocean cable between the port of Honolulu and a port on the North American Continent connecting with any American telegraph system, one hundred thousand ($100,000) dollars per annum. This subsidy shall be paid in quarterly installments in the manner in which it is received, to such company with which the Hawaiian Government may enter into a contract under Chapter LXX of the session laws of 1890, and to commence after the sending of the first message over such cable, and to continue as long as such cable is maintained in working order.
- Second. Subsidy to be paid for the construction and maintenance of a railroad around the island of Oahu, fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars per annum, to be paid to such company who may construct and maintain such railroad and during such time in which said railroad is kept in operation.
- Third. Subsidy to be paid for the construction and maintenance of a railroad from Hilo, Island of Hawaii, through the districts of Hilo and Hamakua, fifty-thousand ($50,000) dollars per annum, to be paid during such period during which said railroad is kept in operation.
- Fourth. For improving and maintaining the improvements of Honolulu Harbor, fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars per annum.
- Fifth. For roads, bridges, landings, and wharves in the Hawaiian Kingdom, one hundred and seventy-five thousand ($175,000) dollars per annum, to be apportioned as follows: Island of Oahu, fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars; Island of Hawaii, sixty thousand ($60,000) dollars; Island of Maui, forty thousand ($40,000) dollars; Island of Kauai, twenty-five thousand ($25,000) dollars.
- Sixth. For the encouragement of industries in the Hawaiian Kingdom, fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars per annum, to be disbursed as may be from time to time directed by the Legislature.
- Seventh. For the encouragement of tourist travel and immigration, twenty-five thousand ($25,000) dollars per annum, to be disbursed as may be from time to time directed by the Legislature.
- Eighth. If at any time during the existence of this franchise the provisions of the reciprocity treaty relating to Pearl Harbor should be abrogated, then the amounts mentioned in subdivisions fifth and seventh shall be used as a subsidy for the purpose of opening the harbor known as Pearl Harbor and erecting and maintaining dry docks and other improvements in said harbor.
- Ninth. If for any reason any of the above subsidies can not be applied to the purposes herein set forth, then the sums so set apart shall be used as from time to time the Legislature may direct.
- Section 5. The grantees and their successors and assigns shall be exempted from any and all taxes and license fees of any kind whatsoever upon or for said franchise, except the said sum of five hundred thousand ($500,000) dollars per annum, paid as aforesaid.
|
- Section 6. The minister of the interior is hereby authorized to grant a charter of incorporation to the grantees of this franchise and their successors and assigns, in conformity with this act, and under the following conditions:
- First. The capital stock of such corporation shall be five million ($5,000,000) dollars, represented by fifty thousand (50,000) shares of stock of one hundred ($100) dollars each, par value, provided the said capital stock may be increased to ten million ($10,000,000) dollars, represented by one hundred thousand (100,000) shares of par value of one hundred ($100) dollars each share.
- Second. All powers of the corporation shall be vested in a board of directors to consist of five (5) persons, each of whom shall own at least five hundred (500) shares of the capital stock of the said corporation.
- Third. The corporation shall be empowered to sue and be sued, to plead and be impleaded, to appear in any court of record or justice, and to do any other lawful act, such as any person or persons might do for their own defense, interest, or safety, in its corporate name.
- Fourth. The president and secretary of the board of directors shall be the proper persons upon whom citations, notices, and other legal process shall be served.
- Fifth. The corporation shall furnish bonds to the minister of finance in the sum of one hundred and twenty-five thousand ($125,000) dollars as surety for the prompt and punctual payment of the sums and in the manner set forth in section 3 (three) of this act; which bond shall be filed at the time when the first drawing and distribution of prizes is announced.
- Sixth. The board of directors shall have power to establish as many agencies as may be necessary, and to appoint a president, superintendent, secretary and treasurer, and such clerks and agents as may be required, and may remove them at pleasure, fix salaries of all officers and employees of the corporation (except that of the commissioners appointed by the Queen, with the approval of the cabinet as hereinafter provided), and fix the amount of their respective bonds and sureties, and shall make and establish such rules and by-laws for the proper management and regulation of the affairs of the corporation as may be necessary and proper. A majority of the board of directors shall be necessary to constitute a quorum, and shall have power to remove any officer of the company. The board of directors shall have power to fill any vacancy that may occur by death, resignation, or removal.
- Seventh. At all meetings held for election of directors or for any other purpose, every stockholder whose name is entered upon the books of the company as such, and none other, shall be entitled, either directly or by proxy, to cast one vote for each share of capital stock held by him. All transfers of stock shall be made and entered on the books of the company.
- Eighth. The persons named in the first clause of this act shall be, and they are hereby, constituted the first board of directors, who shall at their first meeting appoint one of their number president, and the said board shall serve for two (2) years from the time this incorporation takes effect, and thereafter until their successors are elected and qualified, at the expiration of which term a meeting of the stockholders for the election of a board of directors shall be held on a day fixed for all elections thereafter. A two-thirds (2/3) vote shall be necessary to constitute an election, and if no election be held, the meeting will adjourn over one (1) year.
|
- Ninth. There shall be two (2) commissioners appointed by the Queen with the approval of the cabinet, who shall hold office during the pleasure of the Queen and cabinet. The duties of said commissioners shall be to preside at all Lottery drawings and to superintend the same and secure perfect fairness in the allotment of prizes in each scheme. The salary of said commissioners shall be six thousand ($6,000) dollars per annum each, payable out of the treasury of the corporation in quarterly installments. The said commissioners shall not own or be interested in the capital stock of the said corporation, nor purchase nor own any ticket or tickets, devices, certificates, or fractional parts thereof.
- Tenth. All drawings of lotteries under this act shall be made public, admission free, and it shall be compulsory upon said company to hold annually twelve (12) regular drawings, and as many additional special drawings as the directors of said company may designate;
- Eleventh. The stockholders of the capital stock of the corporation shall be liable to the creditors of said corporation to the amount of the shares by them respectively held.
- Twelfth. The corporation shall present a full and accurate account or exhibit of the state of its affairs to the minister of the interior, on the first day of January of each and every year.
- Thirteenth. At the expiration of this franchise, three (3) commissioners shall be elected by the stockholders, whose duty it shall be to liquidate its affairs on such terms and in such manner as shall be determined by a majority vote as set forth in subdivision eight of section 6 (six) of this act.
- Section 7. Any person selling, offering or exposing for sale after the 31st day of December, 1892, any lottery or policy, or combination ticket or tickets, or devices or certificates or fractional parts thereof, except as authorized by this act, or in violation of this act, or in violation of the rights and privileges herein granted, shall be liable, upon conviction thereof to a fine not exceeding five thousand ($5,000) dollars, nor less than five hundred ($500) dollars for each and every offence, and all police and district courts of this Kingdom shall have jurisdiction in such cases.
- Section 8. The grantees of this franchise and their successors and assigns, shall have the right during the whole term of said franchise, to dispose of by lottery or a series of lotteries, any land, improved or unimproved, which said corporation may become possessed of by purchase or otherwise in the Hawaiian Islands, but such lands shall be disposed of by special drawings only, which shall be advertised as drawings for property.
- Section 9. The grantees of this franchise and their successors and assigns, are hereby given the right of uninterrupted passage through the mails of the Hawaiian postal system, of all written and printed matter relating to or connected with the business of said lottery upon paying current rates of postage therefor.
- Section 10. This act shall take effect from and after its approval, and all acts and parts of acts in conflict with the same are hereby repealed.
Senator Frye. Do you think that the Provisional Government would have succeeded in accomplishing its purpose of overthrowing the Queen and taking possession of the Government buildings if there had been no United States troops there?
Mr. Hoes. I have not the slightest doubt they would have done so. If they had not, others would have done it for them. But these are among the strongest men in the community, and in the whole country.
|
Senator Frye. The Provisional Government was formed on the 17th of January, and you left the next March?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Frye. What was the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands after the Provisional Government was formed?
Mr. Hoes. Absolute quietness.
Senator Frye. Any apparent unrest on the part of the opponents of it?
Mr. Hoes. None, except what was expressed in the Royalist paper, the Bulletin. The city was just as quiet as any country town in New England.
Senator Frye. Is that Government qualified to maintain itself?
Mr. Hoes. I am quite sure of it.
Senator Frye. Are you acquainted with the members of the committee of safety?
Mr. Hoes. Most of them. Of the 14 whose names are attached to the proclamation establishing the Provisional Government I am personally acquainted with all but 1.
Senator Frye. What is the character of these men?
Mr. Hoes. I believe they represent in every respect the best element in the country.
Senator Frye. Reliable men?
Mr. Hoes. I believe them all to be.
Senator Frye. Do you know Sam Parker, Colburn, and Cornwell?
Mr. Hoes. I know Sam Parker and I know Cornwell.
Senator Frye. Did you know our minister, Mr. Stevens?
Mr. Hoes. Very intimately.
Senator Frye. What was your estimate of him?
Mr. Hoes. I always regarded him as a remarkable man.
Senator Frye. As an honest man?
Mr. Hoes. As a conservative, honest, conscientious man; a man who never, under any circumstances, lost his head; a man who never acted under impulse. I sustained confidential relations with Mr. Stevens. I think I had his implicit confidence, and I know that he had mine.
Senator Frye. Did you ever learn from Mr. Stevens that he intended to interfere with the government of the Queen or the Provisional Government?
Mr. Hoes. I never learned it from him, and I flatter myself if he had told any of his associates of the fact he would have told me, because we often conversed confidentially about Hawaiian matters.
Senator Frye. In your opinion was the request made by the minister upon Capt. Wiltse to land the troops on Monday wise and discreet?
Mr. Hoes. I think it was.
Senator Frye. Were you there when Mr. Blount was there?
Mr. Hoes. No.
Senator Frye. You understand the purpose of this committee is to obtain whatever information it can, especially in reference to what took place after the revolution and the establishment of the Provisional Government. Can you think of anything you wish to say that will be information to the committee?
Mr. Hoes. I do not recall anything in particular.
Senator Gray. Where are you from, what State?
Mr. Hoes. New York.
Senator Gray. As I understand, you are a chaplain in the Navy.
Mr. Hoes. In the U. S. Navy.
|
Senator Gray. You were on those islands, for the reasons that you have described, from what date?
Mr. Hoes. From the 25th of September, 1891, until the 9th of March, 1893.
Senator Gray. You were there long enough to become very well acquainted with the residents of the island and the people, as you have related?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you ever observe any considerable annexation sentiment before the emeute of January, 1893?
Mr. Hoes. I observed a very general opinion held by the prominent people there, that annexation was the ultimate solution of the Hawaiian question, but I did not observe any particular sentiment as to when that event would take place.
Senator Gray. Was that a growing sentiment among the American population, so called?
Mr. Hoes. I do not know whether it was growing; it seemed to be generally prevalent.
Senator Gray. I mean during the time you were there?
Mr. Hoes. Yes.
Senator Gray. Was it understood by you during the Saturday and Monday and Tuesday, which were the eventful ones in this revolution, there was a movement for annexation?
Mr. Hoes. I do not believe the people knew or cared what it was for, so long as it resulted in the establishment of good government. I believe the people reposed such absolute confidence in the committee of safety that they would follow them through fire and water.
Senator Gray. What people?
Mr. Hoes. I mean the people who desired law and order and good government.
Senator Gray. That is the portion that started the Provincial Government at the time?
Mr. Hoes. Yes, the portion that started it, and subsequently upheld it.
Senator Gray. Was it not a fact, in your own observation, that on Monday and Tuesday, particularly Tuesday, it was mooted about that this movement was an annexation movement as a fact?
Mr. Hoes. I have not any recollection that it was.
Senator Gray. One of the gentlemen who was a member of the committee of safety and was active in the military operations and has testified before the committee, in stirring up the people, as he was active in doing, he found that he could not do it until he told them it was for annexation to the United States. Have you any knowledge on that subject?
Mr. Hoes. I have no recollection of hearing that talked about at that time. The feeling of the people was simply as I have described it. It was such an intense desire to be rid of royalty, as it had existed and acted in Hawaii, that any solution would have been accepted if advocated by the committee of safety.
Senator Gray. Did you not understand that the proclamation of the Provisional Government declared that it would be established until annexation should be declared between the islands and the United States.
Mr. Hoes. I believe it was so expressed, but, I believe the meaning intended by that phrase----
Senator Gray. Do you not know that Mr. Thurston has always been an ardent annexationist??
|
Mr. Hoes. I have heard Mr. Thurston make a great many addresses in the Legislature, but I never heard him use a phrase advocating annexation.
Senator Gray. Would you expect to hear him in the Legislature?
Mr. Hoes. The Legislature was made up of a band of honest men on one side, pitted against an unprincipled rabble on the other. Mr. Thurston was never afraid to express his honest convictions at any proper time, or in any fitting place, and, had he so chosen, he would nave been as willing to advocate annexation in the Legislature as upon the public rostrum.
Senator Gray. Did you expect him to advocate annexation in their Legislature?
Mr. Hoes. Yes; openly, at the proper time, had he seen fit.
Senator Gray. Why would he do it?
Mr. Hoes. I do not believe that those who might have been in favor of annexation thought the time was ripe for it. That leads me to say that, in my opinion, twenty-four hours, or even ten hours previous to the prorogation of that Legislature the idea of annexation as an event soon to be consummated never entered the head of any man composing the present Government and its band of officials, not even Thurston's.
Senator Gray. Many things that occurred within the course of the revolution, so called, so far as its time is concerned, but after the revolution, after the events commenced to shape themselves, did not you understand that annexation was a part of it?
Mr. Hoes. I did not until the proclamation was read by the Provisional Government.
Senator Gray. Were you present at the meetings of the committee of safety?
Mr. Hoes. Never.
Senator Gray. Were you not consulted by persons who were active in that revolution?
Mr. Hoes. What do you mean by consultation?
Senator Gray. As to their plans.
Mr. Hoes. No; I was in total ignorance of them.
Senator Gray. You were not in the movement?
Mr. Hoes. No.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Stevens during those three days?
Mr. Hoes. I am unable to say, but very likely I did.
Senator Gray. But you have no distinct recollection? You could not say that you saw him at that time?
Mr. Hoes. I could not swear to it.
Senator Gray. And you can not speak of your own knowledge of his conduct during the period of which I have been speaking-three days?
Mr. Hoes. No; if you mean personal knowledge-knowledge that I would derive from Mr. Stevens himself.
Senator Gray. What lawyers call personal knowledge.
Mr. Hoes. No.
Adjourned to meet on notice.
|
Washington, D. C., Monday, February 5,1894.
Subcommittee met pursuant to notice.
Present the chairman (Senator Morgan), Senators Gray, Sherman, and Frye,
Absent, Senator Butler.
SWORN STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. SIMPSON.
The Chairman. When did you first visit the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Simpson. I went to Honolulu on the first ship which left San Francisco after the Presidential election, and was on the ship that carried the news that Mr. Cleveland had been elected. This was in 1892, and I must say that I never witnessed such a public demonstration as there was when the knowledge was given out that Mr. Cleveland was elected. The wish had been so general that he should be elected that of record there was not more than half a dozen wagers that the election would be otherwise. I never saw a community so bound up in the information which they hoped to receive, that Mr. Cleveland would be elected.
The Chairman. Was that common to all classes, natives as well as the white people?
Mr. Simpson. Natives, Germans, English, and Americans. They told me afterward that the oldest inhabitants never knew when the wharves had been so well filled with people as they were upon the arrival of that ship, expecting Mr. Cleveland's election. That impressed me as being a very clear idea of what they wanted down there.
The Chairman. Was there any satisfactory reason stated that was commonly accepted by this mass of people for their rejoicings at Mr. Cleveland's election?
Mr. Simpson. Yes; and it was acquiesced in by all classes. The people at that time believed that the action of the McKinley bill in placing sugar from all countries on the free list and placing a bounty of 2 cents a pound on American-grown sugar was an injustice to the sugar-raisers who are so much Americans that it practically meant all of them, and those who were not Americans secured their profits from the business by their proximity to the American market. They believed it was an injustice, for the reason that, in 1876, when the reciprocity treaty was concluded and put into effect between the United States and the Sandwich Islands, it had been done with the direct purpose of augmenting the sugar interests of the Americans living in the islands, and the best reasons that I could get for the same favor not being shown them when the McKinley bill was put into effect was that the matter had been overlooked by the framers of the bill.
The Chairman. What was the purpose of your visit to Hawaii?
Mr. Simpson. In July, 1892, having previously been in the commission business in Tacoma, it was brought to my attention that the bananas raised in the Hawaiian market would find a much better market in the Northwest if they were brought direct; that in handling the trade the principal profits were made by the San Francisco jobbers and consumed by the extra freights to such an extent that they had been getting their bananas to the Northwest from New Orleans by rail by the way of San Francisco. In looking up the matter, and having been commissioned by some of the business houses there to go to Honolulu and secure a cargo of bananas, I became interested in the subject. I looked the
|
matter up carefully, and from the investigation I had given it I came to the conclusion that there was a splendid market for the merchants and farmers in the Hawaiian Islands. I found that nearly all the bananas that were raised were shipped to San Francisco and reshipped by the San Francisco trader with the Hawaiian Islands. So I collected considerable data, compiled it----
The Chairman. Were your observations confined to the banana trade?
Mr. Simpson. No; confined to all lines of trade. I immediately organized a company for the purpose of running a steamship from Tacoma, in the State of Washington, to Honolulu. When the organization of the company was completed the board of directors requested me to go to Honolulu to see what arrangements could be made for the steamship we hoped to place on the line. Prior to going to Honolulu I made a tour of the principal cities of the Northwest and received orders for 5,000 bunches of bananas per month.
The Chairman. You mean the American cities?
Mr. Simpson. The American cities in the Pacific northwest. That insured us a profitable cargo coming back. I based my calculations on the successful operations of the company with freight transportations, paying no attention to the passenger part of it, because that was not staple; you could not depend upon its being a regular thing. I collected data from the various manufacturers and farmers in the Pacific northwest, and went supplied with samples of all kinds and descriptions ready to do business with Honolulu. When I got there I immediately made myself known through letters of introduction from the chambers of commerce in Tacoma and Seattle and from the governor of the State and various others. A meeting of the chamber of commerce was arranged, and I appeared before those gentlemen and laid the matter before them. They thought quite favorably of it. The great trouble I had to work against the first week was their lack of knowledge of the Pacific northwest, but they became satisfied that they were buying goods in a market that had originated in our country. They entered with considerably spirit into the scheme. I established an agency with the house of C. Brewer & Co., the oldest house doing business in the islands. They were very enthusiastic over the matter.
The Chairman. I do not care about the present details of your business transaction. Did you find the commercial community of Honolulu aroused to an interest in your enterprise?
Mr. Simpson. Yes; and that interest was manifested in the orders that they gave me. They gave me an order for 1,250 tons of merchandise, consisting of oats, wheat, and barley.
The Chairman. Did you start your line in operation?
Mr. Simpson. No, sir.
The Chairman. What prevented it?
Mr. Simpson. The revolution prevented it.
The Chairman. To what revolution do you refer?
Mr. Simpson. The revolution of January 14 to 17, in Honolulu. I left the islands on the steamer prior to the revolution. At that time there was no intimation that any such thing would take place. For months the Legislature had been in session. I had become well acquainted with the leaders on both sides of the question, for the reason that I had made application to the Legislature for a subsidy.
The Chairman. Did you succeed in getting it?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. The subsidy consisting of $500 per trip, mail contract, remission of all port charges, light-house fees, free wharfage,
|
free storage, and remission of all dues upon any goods which were transported to Honolulu for the use of our company. Just prior to the time I made my application Mr. Spreckles was engaged in the same thing. His subsidy was about to run out, and I was told that it cost him considerable money to get his subsidy through. I waited until he got his subsidy through, and I worked mine through on the proposition that what is good for the goose is good for the gander. So soon as the natives learned that I had no money-I was approached by some of them----
The Chairman. You speak of native members of the Legislature?
Mr. Simpson. Some of the native members.
The Chairman. Did you concede anything to them on that score? use any money?
Mr. Simpson. Not the slightest. All the money that was spent was on a prospectus in the American language and the Kanaka language.
The Chairman. Which cabinet signed your concession?
Mr. Simpson. It was known as the Wilcox-Jones cabinet. It consisted of Wilcox, P. C. Jones, and the minister of foreign affairs, a native, but in sympathy with the American movement. The Legislature granted my subsidy with not more than 3 votes against it, whereas Mr. Spreckels's subsidy carried quite a number of votes against it, from the fact that he did not see them all in the proper spirit. Before I went to the Hawaiian Islands the impression I had always had was that Mr. Spreckles controlled things down there. After I had been there a while I found that to be untrue. There were six business houses there, and they practically do all the business in the islands, with the exception of what local retail trade there is done outside of Honolulu. These six houses are either owners, part owners, managers, or agents for all of the sugar plantations and some of the other plantations in the islands. They practically control the entire business of the islands.
The Chairman. In that industry?
Mr. Simpson. Commercially.
The Chairman. You speak that broadly.
Mr. Simpson. I speak that quite broadly. They buy in the round lot for their own sailing vessels. They buy and sell the sugar and rice, and they supply the plantations with whatever they need and operate them, acting for resident and nonresident owners. I do not know that I can better explain my ideas of the situation politically as it stood than by giving you a small extract of an interview which was published in the Portland (Oregon) Telegram, January 15, 1893.
The Chairman. That was while the revolution was going on?
Mr. Simpson. While it was going on and before I returned to the islands, and prior to any information being received in this country.
- "POLITICAL MATTERS.
- "The Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom is composed of representatives and nobles, elected by the people, the representatives being in the same relative standing as our Representatives and the nobles taking the place of our Senators. They all sit together as a body of the whole, and it is a very interesting proceeding to see and hear them transact business, as all speeches delivered by natives and in the native language are immediately interpreted and repeated in English, and everything said by members who speak the English language is likewise interpreted into the native speech. The cabinet of the country
|
- is appointed by the Queen, under the advisement of the leader of the party voting a 'lack of confidence' in the previous cabinet.
- "ANNEXATION QUESTION.
- "A great deal is heard there in reference to annexation to the United States. This agitation doubtless originates from the fact that prior to the passage of the McKinley bill Hawaiian sugar entered the ports of the United States free, while sugars from all other countries paid a duty. The McKinley bill placed the Hawaiian product on an equal basis with that of all other countries, and the American Government pays 2 cents per pound on its homegrown sugar. This the plantation owners of the Hawaiian Islands believe to be an injustice, and with good reason, as of the $36,000,000 assessed valuation of the property in the country American citizens own $22,000,000, or nearly two-thirds of the taxable property in the Kingdom. There is a great difference of opinion even among the American residents of the islands as to whether annexation would be the best method out of the difficulty or not.
- "Among other remedies they mention for placing them on their former footing is for the United States Government to cease the payment of a bounty on sugar grown in this country; or it to place a duty of 1 cent per pound on all other foreign sugars, admitting the Hawaiian product free, and the payment of a bounty of 1 cent per pound by this Government to the Hawaiian sugar planters. Of the foreign population of the Hawaiian Islands, after the Portuguese, the Americans predominate, with the Germans and English about evenly divided. The Germans as a rule take sides with the Americans in all commercial undertakings, while the English of course oppose the annexation of the island to the United States, and in support of their position argue that the natives would lose their identity in becoming suffragists of the American Government."
Now the data that I looked up, prior to the time that the company was organized, begun with the commercial beginning of the islands and extends up to the present time. It is historical, and shows the connected commercial workings of the islands from the time Capt. Cook landed there in 1778.
The Chairman. Before you go into that I would like to ask you something more about the political situation in Hawaii at the time you were there. What time did you leave the islands to go away?
Mr. Simpson. It was a few days before Christmas. I do not remember the date of the month. It was a few days before Christmas, 1892.
The Chairman. Was the subject of annexation, of which you spoke, a matter of much conversation among the people there at that time?
Mr. Simpson. It was.
Senator Sherman. A few days before Christmas, 1892, you left the islands?
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
The Chairman. That was the only visit you made to Hawaii?
Mr. Simpson. That was all. My visit was made for purely commercial enterprises. The only interest I had in getting acquainted with the people was to further the interests of my corporation. The people, as nearly as I can remember now, were in this condition: The Legislature had been in session a number of months longer than its ordinary term. The white members, composed principally of the wealthy citizens in the islands, were sacrificing their business and remaining
|
in Honolulu in attendance upon the Legislature: It was a pecuniary loss to them, but they did it purely in a spirit of defense; that is to say, they expected some action of the Queen, through her henchmen in the Legislature, which would be detrimental to the business interests of the islands; just what it was they did not know. There was nobody there who was willing to say that annexation would likely take place within the near future. The general impression was that it was bound to come. They were to wait, but they feared some action of the Queen. They had no idea that the subject of a new constitution was under consideration. They had no idea that the Queen would be able to pass this opium bill. While, of course, that had been introduced in the Legislature, it had been side tracked. So long as these white members remained in Honolulu there was a feeling that the Queen could not carry it through.
The Chairman. Are the same remarks applicable to the lottery bill?
Mr. Simpson. And the lottery bill. But they finally stayed on so long that one after another would drop out, and very shortly the Queen had control of the legislature, and, as I am informed, she had these bills passed. The people went about their ordinary business. They did not disguise the annexation question, nor disguise any of the Queen's actions at all, but treated the thing as though she and the particular bill she desired to put through were standing menaces of their interests. I had several talks with Minister Stevens while I was there. Minister Stevens had been advocating the same principle of trade in Honolulu that I had been advocating in the Puget Sound region, and when he learned that I had, he very kindly called on me at the hotel and I returned his call. In the course of several conversations we became as intimate as persons might be under the circumstances. We talked principally as to the interests of the country in a commercial way. While we talked in a general way, I can not recall anything that Mr. Stevens said to me that I could construe as being in the light of anything more than a wish.
He told me that frankly and politely-made no bones about it-that the question of annexation was certainly a very live one there, and that it undoubtedly would become an issue sooner or later. He also told me that he did not express his opinion on the subject to anybody in Honolulu. That I remember distinctly. He told me that he could not do that, because it would give a wrong impression. He always stated that he took information from all classes, and I remember that some information he gave me appeared to me as though the thing must necessarily come up in some shape sooner or later. That was that in 1876, when the reciprocity treaty between this country and the Hawaiian Islands was first put into effect, the United States had practically exercised protection over these islands; that it was beyond any question not only the duty of the United States to exercise this protection at that time, but to continue to do it, on account of the monetary interests of its citizens. Mr. Stevens stated that the United States was the only country that had systematically kept a war ship there; that the British Government rarely had a ship there, and then only temporarily on its way to Australia.
The Chairman. I suppose you have stated as fully as you desire to do the political situation out there? Are there any other facts you wish to state?
Mr. Simpson. The natives did not seem to take any particular interest in the matter except that they felt that something ought to be done by the United States to relieve the sugar situation. They had no
|
organized idea as to annexation or a protectorate or a better treaty, or anything of the sort, and they did not look to their own Government; they looked to the United States to relieve them. I guess that is about all I have to say on that subject.
The Chairman. Now, if you will, proceed to give the data which you say you have collected with respect to the commercial situation of Hawaii.
Mr. Simpson. Prior to the settlement of the white men in the islands, the native products were taro (or kalo), sweet potatoes, yams, sugar cane, bananas, calabash gourds, wauke (or paper mulberry), out of which they made their clothes; awa, from which they manufactured their drinks, and also a few hogs and fowls. At that time there was no circulating medium, the trade being carried on by barter. The natives were not an ingenious people, and the improvements they made were quite crude, but apparently carried on with very good judgment. They built extensive irrigation ditches, and leveled terraces, and worked their taro patches with very crude tools and implements. The first trade with the outside world was in January, 1778, when Cook traded them some nails and bits of iron for hogs, vegetables, fresh water, and wood. Portlock and Dixon were the first to recognize the commercial importance of the geographical location of the group in 1786, when they purposely made it a stopping place to replenish their ships. Portlock and Dixon were engaged in buying furs from Indians on the Northwest coast of America and selling them in the Canton market. This trade was augmented to a considerable extent.
In 1791 Capt. Kendrick, of Boston, in the sloop Lady Washington, left 3 sailors at Kauai to collect sandalwood and pearls against his return to England. This was the beginning of the sandalwood trade with China, which reached its height during the period of years covered from 1810 to 1825. Sandalwood was sold on board the vessels in the Hawaiian Islands at that time at $10 a picul, or 1351/2 pounds. The trade averaged $400,000 a year for some years. In 1835 the sandalwood trade had practically ended. Capt. Vancouver first gave the natives the slips and seed for raising orange trees and grapevines and many other subtropical plants, in 1792. The great bulk of marketable vegetation of the islands was not indigenous to the islands. Nearly everything they have there is brought from the different shores, in fact the way the city of Honolulu is located there is no foliage, except 15 or 20 cocoanut trees. Now it is a beautiful city of subtropical trees and foliage. In 1793 Vancouver returned from his trip to California and landed a bull, 5 cows, 3 sheep, the first of the kind placed on the islands. Horses were first taken to the islands in 1803 by Capt. Cleveland. Vancouver superintended the building of the first ship in 1794.
The Chairman. Where was that built?
Mr. Simpson. It was built at Lahawa.
The first organized effort for commercial relations with the United States was made when missionaries landed from New England in 1820. The first whaling ship arrived at Honolulu in 1820, to be soon followed by many others, and Hawaii was made a base of supplies. Much time was saved by ships engaged in whaling by taking their oil to Hawaii, transshipping it to New England, making necessary repairs, laying in supplies, and utilizing natives on their whaling voyages. The Hawaiian proved to be the best sailor obtainable. In 1826 it was estimated that 100 whaling ships annually were putting in at Honolulu, and each ship is said to have expended on an average the sum of $20,000 each, or about $2,000,000 a year. Recognizing the value of this growing traffic merchants
|
established trading houses to gather in this important industry. The whaling trade continued to be the chief source of income to the islands for a number of years. In 1845 there were 500 whaling ships arrived there. In 1878 the whaling trade practically died out. Experiments were made in growing commodities, such as silk, cotton, wheat, sugar, coffee, but nothing of particular value was accomplished, except in raising coffee and sugar. The coffee culture increased rapidly and promised well until there came a drought in the years 1851-'52, which it was said caused a blight. That for a time ended the advancement of this industry.
The Chairman. Coffee, like the other plants you have been speaking of, was not indigenous?
Mr. Simpson. No. They have experimented in coffee for a number of years down there, and the trouble has been that the people who have been engaged in experimenting do not understand their business. They would start their trees at too low an altitude. Whenever they got above 2,000 or 2,500 feet they have had the best results. Now they are going into the matter to a greater extent than they have ever done before. They grow a splendid quality of coffee.
Senator Gray. Have they sufficient area at that altitude and higher to make it an important matter?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. Their area to a certain extent is limited, but there is a vast area that it will take a good many years to set out, especially the island of Hawaii, which has 4,500 square miles, and the greater portion of it is above 1,500 feet. The other islands are not, of course, so large.
Senator Gray. On what island is Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. Oahu.
Senator Gray. Do you know what the area of that island is?
Mr. Simpson. Six hundred square miles.
Senator Gray. Is that all?
Mr. Simpson. It is next to the largest inhabited island in the group. There are five principal islands.
Senator Gray. The city of Honolulu has the greater portion of the population?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. Coffee that they raise there has a splendid flavor, and in time is going to become a very profitable commodity. It is known as the Kona coffee on account of its being raised in a district by the name of Kona, and it has a flavor that resembles a mixture of Mocha and Java. It has never been gone into systematically, but they are going ahead with it now, and they will undoubtedly build up a great business there.
Senator Gray. Mr. Spalding, who was before us, expressed the opinion that it would not be a success there.
Mr. Simpson. That is the opinion of nearly everybody who lives there, but it is not borne out in experiments which have been made by men who understand coffee culture. It is a peculiar industry, and must be given careful attention, and the knowledge of years must be brought to it. The merchants of Honolulu net more money for the coffee that they sell in the San Francisco market grown on the island of Hawaii than for any coffee sold in the San Francisco market, and in spite of the fact that it is not prepared for market in what would be ordinarily termed a marketable condition; it is not separated. The good and the bad are all dumped into the same sack, and while I was there one house in Honolulu had quite a little stock of it, some 1,200 or 1,500 bags, and the proprietor had refused at Honolulu 25
|
cents a pound for that coffee. Anyone who is posted in green coffees knows that that is a pretty good price placed at shipment.
The Chairman. Your inquiries into the industries of Hawaii were stimulated by the trade you were trying to establish between those islands and Puget Sound.
Mr. Simpson. I took up each article to see whether we could handle it, and also took up articles that promised well. In fact, when I returned to Tacoma I completed a good size coffee company to go into the culture of coffee there, but it was killed by the revolution. The sugar business is completely controlled by the American Sugar Refining Company.
The Chairman. You mean in San Francisco?
Mr. Simpson. No; I mean the sugar trust in the United States. The sugar trust now controls all the sugar refineries in San Francisco. Do you want me to give you some sugar data?
The Chairman. Not just now; you may proceed with your statement.
Mr. Simpson. The first plantation for sugar purposes was established in 1835 by Ladd & Co., Americans, and cane was raised in a small way for a number of years. They got quite a valuable charter from the Hawaiian Government. They claimed at that time it was procured for the purpose of selling the charter. It gave them the selection of a vast quantity of land for a nominal consideration. When gold was discovered in California a new market was opened up, and the trade of the islands had greatly increased up to the year 1893. When the gold fever was on in California they had very few supplies there, and the people of the Sandwich Islands went into the raising of commodities to a greater extent than they had before or since. For instance, they started flour mills and went into the raising of wheat on the islands. I do not believe any is raised now. In the fifties sugar sold up to 20 cents a pound in California, and later the acreage was considerably increased in the hope that a reciprocity treaty would be successfully negotiated with the United States. When the reciprocity treaty was finally signed and ratified in 1875-'76 the raising of sugar cane became the chief product of the island. The first commercial treaty that was ever negotiated with the United States was in 1826; the steam navigation between the islands in the group was first started in 1853; the first steamship line between San Francisco and the islands was established in 1870, a line running through to Australia.
The Chairman. Where do they get their coal for the operation of that steam intercommunication between the islands? I want to know whether it is imported.
Mr. Simpson. It is all imported.
The Chairman. And from what part of the earth particularly?
Mr. Simpson. Altogether you may say with one or two shipments of coal it has come from Newcastle in Australia.
The Chairman. Sydney?
Mr. Simpson. New South Wales. It is from the Newcastle mines of Australia. They call it Newcastle coal. It is a bituminous coal, and it costs them in Honolulu from $6.75 to $7.50, according to the cost of shipping from Australia.
The Chairman. Is there any wood or other substance in Hawaii that will be of use in steam navigation hereafter?
Mr. Simpson. No.
|
The Chairman. So that their dependence for fuel for this purpose is upon foreign ports entirely.
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
The Chairman. They ought to make a good market for coal between Honolulu and Seattle?
Mr. Simpson. Do not say Seattle. That is the poorest coal on the Pacific coast.
Senator Gray. Have you good coal in the Northwest?
Mr. Simpson. Yes; we have good coal in the mines that have been worked a long while. Now, about the woods; the indigenous woods of the Hawaiian Islands number 150 kinds. The insects have done considerable damage to them; the most common is the borer, a species of bug. I may say right there, on account of the limited amount of wood on the islands the question of rain has become quite a serious matter. When hogs and cattle became so plentiful they were turned loose, and they rooted up the trees and roamed wild, and the greatest sport they get down there is hunting wild cattle. They have destroyed all the trees below 2,000 feet, and they passed laws while I was there prohibiting them cutting trees except for firewood.
The Chairman. When you say the cattle destroyed the trees you mean they ate the foliage and under plants?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. Of indigenous woods the most common are the Oahea.
The Chairman. I do not care to go into that wood subject. My question was about getting fuel for steam navigation in the islands.
Mr. Simpson. On Oahu is the best, at $13 per cord in 4-foot lengths. And right there I would state that I sold, strange as it may seem, quite a quantity of firewood. I have an order from one firm in Honolulu to fill up whatever space we had with firewood from Puget Sound.
The Chairman. You sold that to be delivered, but you never got a chance to deliver it?
Mr. Simpson. No.
The Chairman. Where did you get the data that you now hand me in relation to the commerce between the United States and Hawaii??
Mr. Simpson. From the annual reports of the collector-general of customs of the Hawaiian Islands, and from reports emanating from the Treasury Department of the United States. One verified the other.
The Chairman. Are you satisfied that the figures that are based upon that data are correct?
Mr. Simpson. I am. The figures are as follows: The total export and import trade of Hawaiian Islands from first year of official data recorded, 1855, to December 31,1892, amounts to $265,136,486, the imports being $98,981,325 and exports $166,155,251. This is with all countries. The first year in which there is a complete record of the business done between the United States and Hawaiian Islands was the year 1870. The total amount of merchandise and bullion exported to and imported from Hawaiian Islands from 1870 to 1892, inclusive, is valued at $203,145,447, divided as follows:
|
Exported to Hawaiian Islands. |
Imported from Hawaiian Islands. |
Total. | |
| Merchandise |
$55,183,611 |
$138,670,737 |
193,854,348 |
| Bullion |
8,108,508 |
1,182,591 |
9,291,099 |
|
|
|
| |
| Total |
63,292,119 |
139,853,328 |
203,145,447 |
|
The above table gives some idea of the profit which has accrued to the American traders from the Hawaiian Islands traffic. The United States secured from the Hawaiian Islands during a period of twenty-two years----
|
Merchandise and bullion to the value of |
$139,853,238 |
|
For which they returned merchandise and bullion to the value of |
63,292,119 |
|
| |
|
Showing a balance of trade in favor of the United States of |
76,561,209 |
The reciprocity treaty went into effect in September, 1876. The net total excess of imports over exports of both merchandise and bullion up to 1877 was $3,139,997. By deducting this amount from the net balance of trade from 1876 to 1892 the amount derived, $73,421,212, represents the balance of trade in favor of American traders under the operation of the reciprocity treaty.
The foregoing figures show the difference in the volume of trade and the value of trade prior to and during the time of the operation of the treaty of reciprocity of 1876.
The Chairman. Does your table show whether there is any material falling off in the trade in consequence of the repeal of the tax on sugar?
Mr. Simpson. The figures do not show that conclusively, for this reason, that the season following the adoption of the McKinley bill the gross tonnage was increased very much, but the price was reduced for that reason. The actual figures show the production of sugar was much greater than it had been prior. Some new sugar plantations came into bearing that were not producing before.
The Chairman. Have the business enterprises with which you have been associated made any examination into steaming coals in what you call the northwestern Pacific, that is, along the line of the United States and the British Possessions on the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Simpson. I have In a general way. Of some particular kinds of coal I made a specific examination for the purpose of using them on our line of steamship.
The Chairman. Where was your line designed to run; from the United States to where?
Mr. Simpson. To points on Puget Sound; that is to say, Victoria, Seattle, and Tacoma.
The Chairman. Where did you expect to get your supply of fuel?
Mr. Simpson. It depended very largely on where we got the greatest amount of our freight. If we could get a sufficient quantity of freight to warrant us in going into Victoria to stop there, we would have to get coal from the Comax mines in California. If it were not advisable to go in there we proposed to get a quantity of coal in Roslyn in Washington, which is mined exclusively by the Northern Pacific. It is equal to any coal in the State of Washington; but the Vancouver coal is a little cheaper, from the fact that the Northern Pacific Railroad Company put an arbitrary rate on carrying coal to the seaboard, because they had to haul over the mountains.
The Chairman. What is the length of the haul to the sound?
Mr. Simpson. About 75 miles.
The Chairman. Is there no coal available on Puget Sound?
Mr. Simpson. That is the Roslyn coal.
The Chairman. Is there no coal on Puget Sound but that which is brought 70 or 75 miles by rail?
Mr. Simpson. Within 7 or 8 miles of the sound.
The Chairman. Is that good coal?
Mr. Simpson. It is fairly good coal, but not so good as Roslyn coal.
S. Doc. 281, pt 6----72
|
The Chairman. Have they many open mines in the State of Washington?
Mr. Simpson. Quite a number; I should say in the neighborhood of 40 or 50. But there are not many of them that are worked. The fact is, the coal deposits are so great that it does not pay to work them, except they have a guaranteed channel for their trade. Nearly all the coal mines are owned or controlled by large corporations, such as the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, the Great Northern, and the Pacific Coast Steamship Company. They are large users of coal, and nearly all of them have gone into the coal business, because they wish to make the profit.
The Chairman. As the mines are worked deeper does the quality of the coal improve?
Mr. Simpson. That is the general belief. Of course, where coal deposits run, as you might say, along the surface, they do not increase; they are rarely worked; they do not bother with them.
The Chairman. What was to be the tonnage of the ships that you were to send out on this line?
Mr. Simpson. About 3,000 gross.
The Chairman. How much of that would be occupied in carrying fuel to and from Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. Do you mean for the use of the ship?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Simpson. We figured that we would put in 1,000 tons of coal.
The Chairman. That would leave how much room for freight-about 1,000 to 1,200 tons?
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
The Chairman. About one-half your cargo would consist of fuel for the ship?
Mr. Simpson. The size of ship we proposed to operate.
The Chairman. That would be still greater on a smaller ship?
Mr. Simpson. The proportion would be still greater.
The Chairman. So that, in making a voyage in a steamship from Puget Sound to Honolulu and return, you would make the calculation that one-half your space in going out to Honolulu and one-fourth of it returning would be occupied by fuel?
Mr. Simpson. In a general way; yes.
The Chairman. How would the cost of coal, if you had to purchase it in Honolulu, compare with what you would have to give for it, say, in Victoria?
Mr. Simpson. A good steam coal sold by the dealers in Honolulu would cost us $14 to $21 a ton, according to the man's ability to make a trade with those fellows. But that is a contingency we would not meet?
The Chairman. What did it cost in Victoria?
Mr. Simpson. The best coal that we could put on at Victoria would cost us $3.50 a ton.
The Chairman. In both cases do you mean on board ship?
Mr. Simpson. Alongside the ship, on a lighter. The Roslyn coal would cost us a trifle more than that; and there is another still nearer the coast, known as the South Prairie coal, which carries a high proportion of steam properties. But it is a small mine, and we could not probably get very much of it. If we could get any we would put that coal on board the ship from coal bunkers at about $3 a ton. Do you want the coal proposition of the Pacific Ocean?
|
The Chairman. I want to know what acquaintance you have with steam communication between the eastern and western shores of the Pacific Ocean. I want to know generally what your acquaintance with the subject is.
Mr. Simpson. The way it is operated now is by two lines of ships from San Francisco to China and Japan, making Yokohama the port of entry, making one line from San Francisco to Australia, stopping at Honolulu, Samoa, Apia, New Zealand, and Sidney; and a line of ships to Vancouver, British Columbia, to China and Japan, operated by the Canadian Steamship Company, and also under subsidy from the English Government and Canadian Government-heavy subsidies, too-and a line of steamships from Tacoma to Yokohama and Hong Kong.
The Chairman. Have you ever had any business connection with any of the trans-Pacific lines?
Mr. Simpson. I have imported a few goods, but nothing of any importance. I have never been employed by any of them.
The Chairman. As a rule, what is the tonnage of ships that cross the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Simpson. Ships running from San Francisco to Yokahoma, on the Oriental and Occidental line, average from 4,000 to 5,000 gross tonnage. On the Pacific Mail, operating between the same points, they run from 3,000 to 5,000. On the Spreckles line, between San Francisco and Australia, they run about 5,000 tons, and they have one ship that runs only between San Francisco and Honolulu, 3,500 tons. One of the ships of the Canadian Pacific Railroad Company, operating between Vancouver, China, and Japan, the Empress of India, is about 14,000 gross tons, and the ships running between Vancouver and Australia on the Canadian Pacific line are about 5,000 gross tons, and those between Tacoma and China and Japan are from 3,000 tons to 5,500 tons.
The Chairman. Would all these ships on leaving the American coast take coal for the entire voyage across the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Simpson. That is according to circumstances. Possibly I can give you full information in reference to that subject. The ships running from San Francisco to Yokahoma, as a rule, only carry enough coal to take them to China and Japan, except the coal market in Yokahoma for Hong Kong is such as to to warrant them in carrying coal from San Francisco, provided they have plenty of space to carry it. They usually take from San Francisco a coal supply for twenty days. The ship going from San Francisco to Yokahoma takes about sixteen days out and about fourteen days to return, and they consume in round numbers from 40 to 50 tons of coal per day. That coal costs them in San Francisco from $6.50 to $7.50 per ton, and they purchase whichever coal is most advantageous to them in price and quality. Coal is taken to Australia from San Francisco, from England, and from the Pacific northwest coast. The prices are of various kinds, averaging about the same; that is, for some coals. Of course, cannel coal for stove or grate purposes from the English mines runs higher. The manner in which that coal is taken from San Francisco is by the operation of established lines of colliers between San Francisco and the mines of the Pacific northwest by ships going from England to San Francisco or points on the Pacific coast, bringing coal in ballast, and by ships carrying lumber from the Pacific northwest to Australia and securing a return cargo of coal.
The Chairman. Is that a large trade?
Mr. Simpson. Quite a large trade. It is very rarely that a ship finds
|
it necessary, a steamship engaged in the transportation business, to stop at any way port for coal. It is very seldom that they do that now.
The Chairman. Does the course of a vessel from San Francisco to Yokohama take in Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. No; Honolulu does not lie in the direct course between San Francisco and Yokohama.
The Chairman. How far away is it?
Mr. Simpson. The Geodetic Survey people make it 952 miles.
The Chairman. How long would it take a steamer to make that distance, running at the ordinary rates at which they run in crossing the Pacific Ocean?
Mr. Simpson. The ships now in that traffic, when they go into Honolulu, lose an average of about three to three and a half days. Now, there is a point that comes up right there.
The Chairman. You are speaking now of Yokohama and San Francisco?
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
The Chairman. Suppose it were between Hong Kong and San Francisco?
Mr. Simpson. Those lines do not go to Hong Kong.
The Chairman. I mean, suppose there were a line between San Francisco and Hong Kong, would not that go by Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. I am not sufficiently posted to say.
The Chairman. A steamship line from San Francisco to Australia, would go by the Sandwich Islands?
Mr. Simpson. It is in direct line.
The Chairman. So that a steamer going from Yokohama to San Francisco would have to leave its course about three days, if it had to go into Honolulu for refreshment, fuel, or anything else? That would be about the length of time?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. But it does not seem to me to be very much of a loss. The Pacific Mail Steamship Company and the Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company, operating between San Francisco and Yokohama, are operating on an agreement between them whereby the ship of one line stops in at Honolulu one month and one of the other line the next month. They have a schedule of a year at a time, and by stopping in at Honolulu they do not make any more trips. Consequently the pay roll goes on the same. In reference to the pay rolls there is less difference between the money spent for labor on board those ships running to China and Japan than there is on the ships running from the American coast to the other points in the Pacific Ocean, for the reason that they employ Chinese and Japanese laborers, and get them very much cheaper. The cost of labor is only 5 per cent less than it is upon ships operating in the Atlantic Ocean and employing English labor; so that, for that reason, they only lose what coal is actually necessary for them to buy in making the trip.
The Chairman. The point of my inquiry was in reference to the advantage of the Hawaiian Islands-of course, Honolulu in particular-as a resting place, place of refreshment, place of repairs in case of any disaster to ships crossing from any portion of the United States to any of the large cities of Asia they might choose to enter. That was the point of my question-what you have to say on that subject. If you have anything to add you may proceed to state it.
Mr. Simpson. There can be no question about the advantage of the Hawaiian Islands in the case either of disaster to ships or the use of the islands as a coaling station for the Navy of this country. In a
|
commercial way the loss of the principal lines in running from the United States to the Orient is practically confined to the extra coal that they may consume in making the trip, which, on the line now in operation between San Francisco and Yokohama, would be in the neighborhood of $600 or $900. Of course, the lines running from points between Vancouver and Yokohama are of no benefit; but the running between Vancouver and Australia, or San Francisco and lines Australia, or Nicaragua and the Orient, are of inestimable value.
The Chairman. If the Hawaiian group of islands were in charge of some great and powerful maritime government, in your opinion would it become a central distributing point of the commerce of the Pacific Ocean in almost every direction-a point of interchange and distribution? Of course, the idea which is couched in my question means that under such conditions would it be likely that Honolulu or the Hawaiian Islands might become a great commercial center?
Mr. Simpson. From a commercial sense, strictly speaking, the Hawaiian Islands can hardly be a commercial distributing point except for the goods used within their own country. But in so far as the protection of commercial shipping is concerned, the islands are certainly of great importance. That is to say, the Hawaiian Kingdom possessed by any maritime power would give to the ships of that nation a particular advantage in times of peril.
The Chairman. What is the objection to productions of India and China and Japan meeting the productions of Mexico and the United States and British America for exchange at Honolulu?
Mr. Simpson. That is a condition that more likely would have existed prior to 1850 than it is likely to exist there now, from the fact that in those days a line of clipper ships was in use, which made it advantageous for an interchange of commodities on through business. But now, with the railroad and steamship traffic, I can not see where it is going to be of any benefit to the commerce of the world, in a strictly commercial sense, in so far as making it a trading post is concerned.
The Chairman. You, therefore, assume that steam power is to supplant the sailing ship entirely?
Mr. Simpson. Certainly. In the days of sailing ships it was common to use that point as a base of supplies where ships were engaged in various kinds of traffic, as, witness the whaling trade. It was better to employ ships to transport the products which the whaling ships procured than it was to send those ships all the way around the Horn; it saved them considerable time for getting oil from the whale.
The Chairman. But transportation on sailing ships is cheaper than on steamers?
Mr. Simpson. That is true, of course, if limited to steady markets. But as that country stands there is no product that passes by that island, no two products, one growing in the Orient and one in the South American Continent, that are interchangeable as a common thing. The usual route of vessels engaged in that trade is, they start from England, go to Australia with commodities, and pick up a cargo there if possible. From there they go to some point on the Pacific coast, load a cargo, and return to the United Kingdom.
The Chairman. Perhaps I can illustrate my question to you better by supposing a case. Suppose you have your choice between sending a cargo of pig iron, hardware of the coarser kinds, heavier kinds, or steel bars for railways, or other material of that sort, on board a sailing ship or steamer?
Mr. Simpson. You mean commodities?
|
The Chairman. Commodities, yes; which do not require too rapid transportation, but one that is cheap and safe, would you not prefer to ship your commodities on a sailing ship if you could save freight by doing so??
Mr. Simpson. Do you mean, if they were going to the Orient, to take them to Honolulu and then ship them to the Orient??
The Chairman. Or as a place of refreshment for ships?
Mr. Simpson. In that case it undoubtedly would be of great advantage.
The Chairman. I do not agree with your assumption that steam transportation or steam navigation is going to supplant the sail. I think it will be found, after a while, that the supply of coal is so limited, or the price will be so great, that for the heavier commodities it will not be used for transportation and sailing ships will come in vogue and be an important part of the commerce of the world.
Mr. Simpson. One reason why I take that ground is, when I was in Honolulu I saw a bill of lading issued by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company of goods shipped from London and routed across the Atlantic and the United States by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, and from San Francisco to Honolulu by steam navigation. Arbitrary rates exist across the American Continent and between San Francisco and Honolulu. The rate fluctuates on the Atlantic according to the displacement of cargo offered, and that transportation was 31 shillings and 6 pence. The same articles taken from New York City to Honolulu overland would cost us in American money $5.30. The same articles taken in a sailing vessel from London to Honolulu, occupying some eight months in time, (and it would be a good trip to make it in eight months), would cost $4.85, according to the then existing rate. Now, the persons shipping those goods preferred steam across the Atlantic and the American Continent, over a sailing vessel, from the fact that the money invested in the cargo in transit would be greater than the cheap rate on the return cargo from Honolulu, except the ship struck there in the sugar season, when they could get a return cargo to the Pacific coast. There would have to be that difference arranged for.
The Chairman. As a general proposition, I suppose, it is not to be disputed that over a long distance the transportation of heavy articles of commerce would be cheaper by sail than by steam?
Mr. Simpson. That was the generally accepted idea, except where you get cheap fuel. The resources of the Pacific Ocean for fuel are greater than on the Atlantic. They have three distinct bases of supply where there is an enormous amount of coal. I speak of the Japanese coal fields, the Australian coal fields, and the coal fields of the Northwestern Pacific coast. The Japanese coal fields and the Northwest Pacific Coast fields are almost inexhaustible. An enormous amount of coal can be produced there. The methods of handling in the Northwest Pacific coast are very crude in comparison with the manner the business is handled in well-settled and well-worked coal fields. It is so much in its infancy that it has hardly gone beyond its experimental stage.
The Chairman. As yet the real value of the coal out there is not known, and can not be known, until they go further down into the seam or vein?
Mr. Simpson. No. Known coal fields are so numerous and known deposits are so numerous at this time that it would be a waste of money to expend it in finding new fields.
The Chairman. You mean in our own country?
|
Mr. Simpson. In the State of Washington, I know that to be true.
The Chairman. Give a general statement of the commercial relations between Hawaii and the United States.
Mr. Simpson. The Hawaiian Islands are to the Pacific Coast and to the country west of the Mississippi River what the West Indies are to the Atlantic and the country east of the Mississippi River. They raise and can raise the same products. They are at present nearly identical in formation, in methods, and manner of doing business, and of articles actually handled. There is, to my mind, no alternative for the United States except to provide conditions and manner of doing business with the Sandwich Islands, from the fact that the country west of the Missouri River is practically dependent upon those islands for the commodities which are raised in the islands, to procure them at anywhere near the price at which the same commodities are sold east of the Mississippi River. In the West Indies sugar, rice, and the fruit culture is in its infancy, but it will be augmented very fast. The principle article, sugar, is dependent upon the Pacific coast market, so called, and the Pacific coast is compelled to reciprocate. For this reason sugar raised in Cuba and refined in the Eastern part of the United States is compelled to pay too great a transportation fee to reach the markets of the Pacific coast. Were there no sugar raised in the Hawaiian Islands the sugar would be received from China and Japan rather than from Cuba, on account of this transportation. The sugar business is controlled by the American Sugar Trust, of which Spreckels and his interest are a part. During the winter of 1892-'93 contracts were made by the American Sugar Trust, through Spreckels as agent, for their product of sugar for five years. The stipulations of that contract are these:
The trust agrees to pay to the grower for sugar laid in San Francisco the same price, that Cuban sugar brings in New York City, less a quarter of a cent per pound. This quarter of a cent per pound difference is for the purpose, as claimed by the sugar trust people, to compensate them for the difference in freight that they would have to pay if they had to take Cuban sugar to the Pacific coast. It is simply a subterfuge for the purpose of obtaining the advantage of a quarter of a cent per pound. That contract also states that all sugar running in grade of 96 per cent saccharine shall pay a thirty-second of 1 cent per pound for each degree over 96 per cent saccharine, and a sixth of 1 per cent on each degree under 96 per cent saccharine. All the planters in the islands engaged in the sugar business have signed this contract from the fact that there is no other outlet. When I was in Honolulu in the winter of 1892 the growing price of sugar was about $90 per ton. The cause of that was that the previous crop of Cuban sugar had been practically a failure, and they were enabled to get a much better price than they are getting at present. The last quotations which I received from Honolulu they were paying for Hawaiian sugar laid in San Francisco 27/8, almost the lowest price it has ever reached, and which price does not pay even a small interest on the investment.
The rice business of the islands is carried on principally by the Chinese and Japanese. The rice they raise grades with what is known commercially as No. 1, or as good as any rice in the South Sea Islands or off South Carolina.
The Chairman. How is it raised?
Mr. Simpson. By irrigation; different from what it is in the fields in the South.
|
The Chairman. You mean irrigation brought on the land by ditches?
Mr. Simpson. No; but they allow the water to stand until the crop ripens, then they draw it off. If they can not, the men go on and do it in rubber boots. Most of that rice is milled by one concern at Honolulu, and very little of it is shipped to the United States in the condition of what is known as paddy. It enters successfully in competition with Japanese and other Oriental rice on the Pacific coast, and very rarely does any rice from the Atlantic seaboard, South Carolina, or Louisiana reach the Pacific coast. I do not know of but one season where any was shipped there, and that was three years ago when there was an enormous crop in the South and they could not find a market.
The next interest of importance in the Hawaiian Islands is the banana business. In the Hawaiian Islands they are raised usually in very small patches by Chinese. They are handled through a middleman, and the cost on board ship at Honolulu is about 100 per cent more for bananas than it is in any of the West India countries. In 1892 there were $175,000 worth of bananas shipped from the Hawaiian Islands. Ten years before there were none. With the decline of the sugar products in the Hawaiian Islands the people have no alternative except to turn their attention to raising of coffee and fruits. It will require some years to bring coffee to a distinctively commercial point, as that requires a system of individuality which fruit does not need. However, experiments are now being made and organized plantations are going into the matter in a scientific way. The fruit culture in the islands will unquestionably take lead in the new departure for other goods to raise beside sugar and rice. That is from the fact that there is no other commodity they can raise and which will have so great and popular a market, particularly, as bananas.
To illustrate that, in 1882 there were 35,000 bunches of bananas landed at New York City. In 1891 there was an average of 35,000 bunches per day arrived in New York City. Today the banana in the New England States is the poor man's food. Down to eight years ago the banana was unknown except as a curiosity, and now they buy them by the carload. I am told that they affect the trade in flour, bacon, and other common foods of the people. One pound of bananas has as much nourishment in it as 4 pounds of bread. There is a great market west of the Missouri River, which is practically virgin, and the cost of raising bananas in the Hawaiian Islands will be undoubtedly decreased with the scientific growing of them, and the conditions are such that they can be transported to points east of the Pacific slope and west of the Missouri River as cheap as they can be brought from west of the Atlantic and east of the Mississippi. At present a bunch of bananas from Honolulu, sold in the markets of the Pacific Slope outside of San Francisco, will bring from $3 to $4.50.
The Chairman. Are not bananas raised abundantly and profitably in southern California?
Mr. Simpson. No; no more than they can be raised profitably in the southern part of Florida. I have seen them raised in Florida, but their growth was stunted. While they are in the same latitude that the Hawaiian Islands are the conditions seem to be different. The pineapple is another food which is being raised systematically, more so probably than bananas. They can raise and mature pineapples every month in the year. That is also true of bananas. It is different in the Hawaiian Islands from what is in any other portion of the world. This would insure a high price in the markets of the Pacific coast. In two months of the year, in August and September, the pineapples
|
are an overproduction, and until a treaty is effected with the United States on a much broader plan than the one now in effect, the raising of these fruits, and especially pineapples, will not be so great a success. The present treaty with the United States admits comparatively a few of the Hawaiian articles into the United States and all of the articles produced and manufactured in the United States into Hawaii, with the possible exception of spirits and tobaccos.
Until a treaty is effected whereby manufactures of all descriptions and canned goods are placed on the free list from that country no marked improvement can be made. The general impression in the Hawaiian Islands when I was there was that when the treaty runs out in 1894, when canned goods in the Hawaiian Islands would certainly go on the free list, the effect would be to accelerate the trade to a greater extent than any other method that could be adopted. Strange as it may seem, the Hawaiian Islands are entirely dependent upon the Pacific coast for their supplies of every kind and description.
The Chairman. What do you mean by supplies? They do not depend upon the Pacific coast for taro?
Mr. Simpson. Of every class and description. That is to say, the chief subsistence are the articles which are procured from the Pacific coast. Of course, the most indigenous article of food the natives live on is what is commonly called poi, a pasty stuff that is made from taro and raw fish. But in spite of that fact, of the 92,000 people in all the islands, they are known as the greatest consumers per capita of any people in the world.
The Chairman. Do you mean of provisions?
Mr. Simpson. Of everything. There is more stuff bought and taken in there than in any other place in the world. To illustrate a little more fully, I will cite some of the articles which I sold while I was there. Brick, lime, apples, potatoes, butter, eggs, fire wood, beer, banana crates, flour, whole barley, rolled barley, chopped feed, cracked corn, bran, shorts, feed wheat, oats, timothy hay, wheat hay, alfalfa, carrots, mules, coal (steam and stove), plaster, shingles, salmon (canned and salted), coarse sand, wire nails, onions, sash, doors, and blinds, crackers, provisions, hardware, etc.
The Chairman. With what do they pay for all this?
Mr. Simpson. The manner of doing business in the Hawaiian Islands is, these principal houses pay cash for what they get; that is to say, nearly all of them carry their profits to San Francisco. One of the large houses showed me its books, disclosing that he had not, since he had been in business, had less than $34,000 of cash on deposit in San Francisco. Goods are paid for in cash in San Francisco when they go on board the ship and discounted.
The Chairman. Is the money actually shipped to San Francisco, or is there exchange?
Mr. Simpson. No; it is carried there.
The Chairman. How do they get hold of this money?
Mr. Simpson. The money that they get from the sale of sugar is deposited to the credit of these concerns in San Francisco, and they pay their bills in that manner.
The Chairman. Is there enough commerce in the Hawaiian Islands to enable them to become the largest consumers per capita in the world?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. The figures that I have heretofore submitted to you prove that assertion, showing that since the year 1870 there has
|
been a profit to the traders in that business of about $76,000,000 in round figures.
The Chairman. If I comprehend your statement correctly the whole population of Hawaii is dependent for subsistence in every way upon the sugar crop?
Mr. Simpson. The sugar crop and the rice crop; they are the two principal crops.
The Chairman. Do they not raise cattle, hogs, and poultry?
Mr. Simpson. No; they are the most improvident people I have ever met with. I have never lived in the South, but in the West Indies and in the several countries where they have cheap labor they have utterly no idea of the value of money. I was standing on the corner talking to a contractor when a native laborer came up and asked for a position. The contractor and I were talking of the improvident character of the native Kanaka. The contractor asked him how much he wished for his work and the fellow said $50 a month. The contractor said, "Jack, I can not pay you that; I will give you $2 a week," and the Kanaka at once said, "When shall I go to work?" That is true, they have no idea or conception of the value of money.
The Chairman. You are now speaking of the very low classes?
Mr. Simpson. Of the natives.
The Chairman. They are not all that way; some of the natives are respectable people, having sense and character.
Mr. Simpson. I do not remember having met more than one or two full-blooded natives who were men of means. I do not wish to question their character, because they are the most honest people that I ever met. Of the so-called 35,000 natives in all the islands, as a matter of fact there are only about 6,000 who are full-blooded natives, the balance having a strain of various kinds of blood. Liliuokalani has a strain of negro blood, and is not a descendant of the ancient chiefs of the islands, as is generally supposed.
The Chairman. You think the mixing of the blood has improved the people?
Mr. Simpson. Yes. There are other articles which can be raised and manufactured with profit in the islands. For instance, common salt can be gathered at a very low price, and if the trade were entered into it could be sold at a very good profit.
The Chairman. There are none of the leading minerals-iron, copper, and lead?
Mr. Simpson. No; the soil is all disintegrated lava, and everything nearly requires irrigation.
Adjourned to meet on notice.
|
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, February 7, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to notice.
Present: The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Sherman, Frye, and Senator Dolph of the full committee.
Absent: Senator Gray.
SWORN STATEMENT OF COMMANDER NICOLL LUDLOW.
The Chairman. At what time have you visited the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Ludlow. I have only been there once. I was commander of the Mohican. I arrived there on the 10th of February last and left there on the 1st of May.
The Chairman. What American ship did you find in port?
Mr. Ludlow. I found the Boston there. Subsequently the Alliance came in and reported. The Adams was sent down to take the place of the Mohican, and on her arrival I went north. The Mohican was Admiral Skerrett's flagship; I was his chief of staff during the time I remained there.
The Chairman. On your arrival at Honolulu, what did you find to be the condition of the community there as to quietude and regularity in the conduct of business?
Mr. Ludlow. I had never been there before, and I am not able to make any correct comparison of the affairs then with what they had been. But the people complained of hard times, as they began to do everywhere. Of course, business went on just the same; they did a good deal of talking; apparently they had not much else to do; stand around and talk on the streets and on the piazzas.
The Chairman. Were you around in the city much during the time you were there?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; I was ashore every day. I was brought in contact with everybody in town of every position. As the admiral's chief of staff, I returned a great many calls with him, and made a great many social calls.
The Chairman. Were you at that time aware of the existence of any organization for the purpose of overturning the Provisional Government?
Mr. Ludlow. None whatever, any more than, of course, the adherents of the Queen on one side and of the Provisional Government on the other; there was some talk. There was no conspiracy or fighting, simply talk. I have been around in different parts of the world, and I thought that Honolulu was as quiet a community as you could find; everybody's doors and windows were unlocked. It was so night and day; as quiet a community as exists on the face of the earth.
The Chairman. Would you describe it as a community satisfied with the existing government?
Mr. Ludlow. The Provisional Government?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Ludlow. A great many were dissatisfied with it; thought that it ought not to be there; thought that it was not the legitimate government of the islands.
The Chairman. Were they satisfied with the administration of the affairs of the Government?
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, yes; I heard nothing said about their honesty and proper administration of the affairs of the Government; never heard
|
any question raised as to what disposition was made of the money and so on. The men who were in the Provisional Government were recognized as as good men as were in the islands.
The Chairman. Was there an established police force in the islands?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; rather an inefficient police force; never had a call for one while I was there. There were some scraps down in the lower part of the town among the sailors; but I never knew of a blow being struck except by two lawyers, who got into some dispute over some politics, when one struck the other over the face. That thing is all exaggerated about people being in a tremble. Ladies are traveling around in their carriages; and there is more exaggeration about fear there than any place I ever saw.
The Chairman. You saw no evidence at all of intense public anxiety?
Mr. Ludlow. No.
The Chairman. Did you have an opportunity to form an opinion of Mr. Dole and his cabinet in respect to their ability as men to conduct public affairs, and the manner in which they demeaned themselves in their positions?
Mr. Ludlow. I have met them all, and consider them all first-rate men-dignified, quiet, and little talk among them. They were inclined all the time to keep these people from talking. A few days after Mr. Blount arrived, and got the American flag down from off the Government building, he asked me what I thought of the state of public opinion; whether it was any quieter after the flag came down than before. I told him there was a change. I told him that it seemed to put the responsibility where it belonged, and the people seemed to go on about their business; there was not so much talk about it as there had been; they simply accepted the thing, while formerly, while our flag was flying, it made us responsible for everything that took place. We were responsible, in a measure. I was very much surprised to see that flag up there.
The Chairman. Did the Provisional Government make any habitual display of soldiery?
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, no. They were recruiting. I do not think at any time up to the time I left there they had to exceed a hundred men. And there was nobody who could drill them or get them in shape. They had to send to Cleveland, Ohio, to get uniforms.
The Chairman. Were they kept in barracks?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; they had two barracks, one was the Government building, that the Provisional Government occupied, south of it; then there was another old barracks, the artillery barracks, north of the Queen's palace. There may have been other posts. They had a review ground just opposite the Government building. I have seen them drill there.
The Chairman. What is your opinion of the advantage that the Hawaiian group of islands would be to the United States as a military base in time of war?
Mr. Ludlow. As a military base for a country like this it is too far away-2,000 and odd miles. If it were Great Britain, it would be another thing. But with a country like this, with our ideas of a standing army and a navy, an outpost 2,000 miles away would not be the thing.
The Chairman. Would that be the case with respect to Bermuda, if we owned that?
Mr. Ludlow. Bermuda is nearer, a day and a half sail of the port of New York; two days' sail, certainly.
|
The Chairman. If you were stationed with a fleet at Honolulu, and the American coast were to be assailed by any great European power with steamships-and they would have to use that class of vessels to make anything like an effective assault-would you not consider that you had an advantage over an advancing or attacking power by having that position?
Mr. Ludlow. No. The Pacific is a very large ocean. You can not keep the track of your enemy on the ocean as you can on land; they could pass you, get in behind you, and you would never know it in the world.
The Chairman. In a naval engagement between the United States and any maritime power, say Great Britain, would it not be their first attempt to take those islands?
Mr. Ludlow. I think there is a treaty between France and Great Britain by which they will never acquire a foot of Hawaiian territory.
The Chairman. That is for civil administration. But in the event of war that would scarcely avail much in a country that wanted to go and establish itself in a military position?
Mr. Ludlow. Great Britain has a better place than that on our frontier.
The Chairman. Where is that?
Mr. Ludlow. Victoria. They have everything they want there.
The Chairman. Victoria, if I understand the geography, is open to a land attack by the United States.
Mr. Ludlow. Yes, but you have to embark your troops; it is an island.
The Chairman. Hardly.
Mr. Ludlow. Vancouvers Island.
The Chairman. You can get plenty of crossings so as to reach Vancouvers Island.
Mr. Ludlow. They keep a pretty good squadron there all the time.
The Chairman. You seem to think, though, in the event of a war with the United States, Great Britain would find it to her advantage, if she saw proper to do so, felt authorized to do so, to seize upon those islands for the purpose of establishing there a base of supplies to recruit her ships, and furnish them with coal and provisions and whatever she needed.
Mr. Ludlow. Undoubtedly they would if they thought it was to their advantage. I never knew Great Britain to hesitate with a question of that kind.
The Chairman. Did you examine Pearl Harbor while you were out there?
Mr. Ludlow. No; nothing more than the surveys. I kept pretty close to the ship. I did not know what would turn up, and if I was to put more men on shore I wanted to be there.
The Chairman. What would be your opinion, with the use of modern guns of high power, as to the ability of any power to control Honolulu by erecting fortifications upon the high lands around the bay and back of the bay to protect that harbor against the invasion of a fleet coming from the open ocean?
Mr. Ludlow. A fleet could shell the place to pieces. You could send a fleet there and could certainly destroy the place.
The Chairman. Could guns be placed around the heights surrounding the bay of Honolulu in such positions as to prevent a fleet coming near enough to Honolulu to shell it and destroy it?
Mr. Ludlow. No. Are you familiar with the harbor?
|
The Chairman. I could not say that I am familiar.
Mr. Ludlow. There is a reef that runs around the island, and wherever there is a stream of fresh water coming down from the hill it cuts a channel-the coral will not grow, and that has left that little pocket in there. It is very small.
The Chairman. How many ships of war could harbor there?
Mr. Ludlow. There is not room enough for a ship to swing at anchor.
The Chairman. How far from the line of the bay are the elevations that surround Honolulu?
Mr. Ludlow. The first one is the hill called the Punch Bowl, an extinct volcano, that lies behind the town a mile and a quarter or a mile and a half from the water. It runs down to a flat plain on the edge of the water with this coral reef.
The Chairman. Could not guns be placed on the hills in such position and with such range as would enable those maintaining them there to keep a fleet off?
Mr. Ludlow. If the fleet fired to destroy the town, they would not pay much attention to the batteries up there. And it would not be a difficult matter to hit the town.
The Chairman. I suppose, therefore, you think that men-of-war that might be in the bay for repairs and for provisions or coal would not be made secure by fortifications around the harbor?
Mr. Ludlow. No; not for Honolulu. It would be a very great expense building forts outside. I do not think it could be done; it would not be practicable.
The Chairman. How would it be in Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Ludlow. There you have different conditions. The harbor is very deep inside and it runs a good ways back. I think it must run 5 or 6 miles back in toward the center of the island.
The Chairman. It also has tongues of land running out into it?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes-side bays. But most of it is quite deep, and that, with the range of modern artillery on board ship, make it pretty warm for anybody inside there.
The Chairman. It is what the naval officers would call a well-sheltered place?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes. There is a good deal of work to be done to make it available. My recollection is that something like a quarter to a half mile of excavations would be necessary. Whether that is sand or coral we do not know; there have not been any borings.
The Chairman. Suppose it is coral. Is that difficult to excavate under water?
Mr. Ludlow. No; not nowadays, with modern dredging.
The Chairman. And once excavated, it is easy to keep it open?
Mr. Ludlow. You can keep it open very readily, I think, as soon as they get the mouth of Honolulu Harbor cleared out. This plant belongs to the Government, and they are going to send it down to Pearl Harbor; that was the intention when I left there-to see if they can not deepen the mouth of it. There is one thing to be said about it, it would make another port there for the people of Honolulu and would throw out some of those who are in business, because it would make a better harbor than at Honolulu.
The Chairman. If you were putting the steamer Boston to sea for a voyage into the Pacific Ocean and back around Cape Horn, could you carry coal enough on the Boston to reach Australia and back to the mouth of the Chesapeake?
Mr. Ludlow. No.
|
The Chairman. How far would you be able to steam with the coal you could carry on the Boston?
Mr. Ludlow. I never served on the Boston; I could only give you my impression. I do not think her steaming radius is over 3,500 miles. She is one of the old type of ships.
The Chairman. Take the best of modern ships-cruisers which have large capacity for carrying coal, and built purposely for that. What is the steaming radius of those ships?
Mr. Ludlow. Probably the steaming radius of the Columbia is the largest. My impression is that at her most economical speed she has something like 10,000 miles. The Philadelphia has probably 6,000 miles, and the San Francisco has probably 5,000.
The Chairman. That means 5,000 miles out and back?
Mr. Ludlow. Five thousand miles alone.
The Chairman. You could not take either of those ships from the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay around to San Francisco, and when you arrived there have them in fighting condition?
Mr. Ludlow. No; you would have to stop on the way.
The Chairman. Where would you stop?
Mr. Ludlow. In time of peace?
The Chairman. Any time.
Mr. Ludlow. We have any number of stations-a dozen or more coaling commercial stations all through the West Indies; Pernambuco, Brazil; Bahia, Rio Janeiro, Montevideo, and Sandy Point, Straits of Magellan, and Callao; and also Panama and Valparaiso.
The Chairman. At Valparaiso you would find coal?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; and at Callao.
The Chairman. In time of war you could not obtain coal supplies for the naval vessels?
Mr. Ludlow. I believe coal is contraband.
The Chairman. So that in time of war if you wanted to carry coal for the best cruiser you have from Chesapeake Bay to San Francisco, you would not find her in fighting trim when you got to San Francisco?
Mr. Ludlow. No.
The Chairman. Do you not think that under such circumstances it would be of advantage to the United States to have at some point in the Pacific, away from our coast, places where we have the right of control, and places where we could protect our coal supplies?
Mr. Ludlow. I see what you are leading up to. We could not reach Honolulu.
The Chairman. We could reach Samoa, could we not?
Mr. Ludlow. No.
The Chairman. Suppose we were already at Samoa and at Honolulu and had our supplies, and we had to combat with the ships that would come from the Mediterranean and around the Horn for the purpose of attacking the coast of California, which country would have the advantage in a military sense in such an arrangement as that?
Mr. Ludlow. Samoa would have to be counted out. It is over 6,000 miles from there, and we are 2,000 miles from Honolulu.
The Chairman. My question is that we are already in possession of Samoa and Honolulu, and we have sufficient coal there to supply any emergency whatever. Then the question would be, having the right to coal your ships at those points, and protecting them and protecting your depot of supplies, would you have an advantage over a maritime power that had to cross the Atlantic and come around the Horn, or
|
had to go through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal for the purpose of attacking the coast of California?
Mr. Ludlow. There might be a slight advantage. But these other nations have all got nearer stations than that; the French and German as well as the English are in possession.
The Chairman. I suppose our Navy would not be of much use to us if we could not do more than to send our ships with coal enough to go out and fight and get back?
Mr. Ludlow. That is all we can do. We have made no effort to get any coaling station abroad.
The Chairman. As a naval officer, do you think it is a wise policy?
Mr. Ludlow. For this country, yes.
The Chairman. Then we do not need a Navy.
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, yes. You can not defend California with fortifications; you have to defend that place on the sea.
The Chairman. The high sea?
Mr. Ludlow. Outside of gunshot. The class of ships we have been building there are battle ships. We have a few cruisers, but not what we would call fighting ships.
The Chairman. Your idea, then, of the use of a navy would be that the best policy is to have strong ships, well-armed vessels, at the principal ports, where they could come inside, get their coal and provisions, and go outside and fight?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; and not to allow our territory to be hurt. It is not so much offense as defense.
The Chairman. When you get up in the country about Puget Sound where they have large military and naval establishments on Vancouver Island, or Victoria Island, wherever it is, you would find difficulty there unless you stationed your ships inside the sound?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; but we have some 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 men in the United States, and we could have 1,000,000 men over there in no time. They would lose that in thirty days.
The Chairman. That is to say, the land forces would go out?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; we could get them across.
The Chairman. In that case, then, your reliance would be upon the land forces and not upon the navy?
Mr. Ludlow. We would have to be there to see that they got there safely. They have to have vessel transportation.
The Chairman. You seem to think that we have little need of a navy, more modern fighting ships, except of the cruising class.
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, no; battle-ship class.
The Chairman. You prefer those?
Mr. Ludlow. We need them both. If a man has certain work to do he wants proper tools to work with. They work together.
The Chairman. Can you name the ports on the Atlantic where you think these battle ships should be stationed to meet the ships of another nation, say British ships?
Mr. Ludlow. You can count those ports very readily because the depth of water comes in. There are several ports on the coast of Maine. Portland is probably the principal one. There is another at Portsmouth, N. H., where we have a naval station. Then you come down, and, although Boston is not a safe port to get into under all the circumstances with a heavy-draft ship, yet it is of great importance that that port should be defended. Then there is New York, of course, and the mouth of the Delaware.
The Chairman. And Newport?
|
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; you have Newport.
The Chairman. Any other places?
Mr. Ludlow. You could mention many harbors up there that have sufficient draft of water for these ships to enter, but other ports could be looked out for with lighter draft ships.
The Chairman. Going on the same principle you would have ships with sufficient power at the entrance of these principal bays on the Atlantic, the Gulf, and Pacific to fight foreign ships as they came in at each of these places?
Mr. Ludlow. They would have to be in a position to be easily gathered together.
The Chairman. Would it not be a little difficult to gather a fleet at particular points-say New York-to defend an attack by English vessels, if you had to bring them from the different ports of the Gulf and South Atlantic and Chesapeake, and so on, in order to meet a military or naval force from Great Britain?
Mr. Ludlow. You have got to move, no matter how the blow is to be struck.
The Chairman. It would be a risky operation?
Mr. Ludlow. Of course there would be some risk.
The Chairman. It would not be so much so if we owned the outside points, say the Bermudas?
Mr. Ludlow. They are near enough as an outpost, and sufficiently near to be supported.
The Chairman. As a naval defense you say that the Atlantic coast would not be so safe against the invasion of a foreign fleet without the possession of these different points that we are speaking of, as if we owned them?
Mr. Ludlow. It would be very much better if we owned them.
Senator Sherman. I would like to have you describe much more fully than has been done here the defense on Vancouver Island. I have been there, and know something about it, but I have not a knowledge of the geographical terms. What kind of fortifications or defenses have been established at Vancouver Island?
Mr. Ludlow. Not very many of them. They have been mounting some high-power modern guns there, I think not to exceed a half dozen, within the last two years. But they have a small naval station on a little harbor that they go into, and it has been principally directed to the defense of that.
Senator Sherman. How far is that from the city of Victoria?
Mr. Ludlow. It is 2 miles, or 2 1/2 miles as I remember it. I was there as a visitor only, a very short time.
Senator Sherman. Have the English any other fortifications or naval stations along the Pacific coast except that one? Is there any up in Canada, farther north?
Mr. Ludlow. No; that is the only one. They have their depot of supplies farther south, down to Coquimbo.
Senator Sherman. How far is Port Townsend from Victoria?
Mr. Ludlow. About 25 miles. You mean the strait where Puget Sound runs in?
Senator Sherman. Land to land-from Port Townsend across to the nearest land; in plain sight of it, is it?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Sherman. Do you think the channel is 10 miles?
Mr. Ludlow. Do you mean the strait?
Senator Sherman. Yes.
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----73
|
Mr. Ludlow. Straight across is from 10 to 15 miles.
Senator Sherman. Your idea is that in case of war our forces could be thrown on the island, and they could practically occupy that island without regard to the Navy?
Mr. Ludlow. They have some ships there, and also naturally they would make the best fight they could. But they realize the fact that war without us would involve all they have to the north of us.
Senator Sherman. Still, there is no other preparation for defense, for any other fort on the island except that?
Mr. Ludlow. I never heard of any and do not believe there is.
Senator Sherman. Is there any difficulty in landing on the inside?
Mr. Ludlow. On the inside; no. There are abundant harbors on the West Pacific coast-some very fine harbors in there that have never been surveyed.
The Chairman. Have you mentioned the depot of supplies at Coquimbo?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; that is in Peru. That is the southern part of their squadron. They have a store ship there, and a direct line of steamers clear up to Callao.
The Chairman. Is it Coquimbo or the Esquimalt?
Mr. Ludlow. Esquimalt is fortified somewhat.
The Chairman. Land fortifications?
Mr. Ludlow. There are some land fortifications there, but not of very great importance. They have a dry dock and can do repairs there.
The Chairman. They have not built ships there yet?
Mr. Ludlow. Oh, no.
The Chairman. They have their coal supplies back on the island?
Mr. Ludlow. Their coal mines are the Nanaimo, which are on the east side of the island of Vancouver, about 60 or 70 miles north of Victoria; and, at Departure Bay, the Wellington mines; 50 miles north is the Comax mine. There is the greatest abundance of coal to the north end of the island; it is only a question of opening it up.
Senator Sherman. Does that coal go to San Francisco?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes. So far as I know, it is the only bituminous coal found on the west coast. The coal is of very excellent quality.
Senator Dolph. Are you acquainted with the coal industry in the State of Washington?
Mr. Ludlow. It is this way. For three years I was the lighthouse inspector at San Francisco, and in that position I had to buy a great deal of coal, and I tried all the coal from all the mines that I could find in the market in San Francisco.
Senator Dolph. How long ago was that?
Mr. Ludlow. That was in 1887, 1888, 1889, and 1890.
Senator Dolph. Are you familiar with the product from the Green River country, the mines opened by the Central and Southern Pacific?
Mr. Ludlow. In Wyoming?
Senator Dolph. No; in Washington.
Mr. Ludlow. The Green River in Washington? No; I have not seen those; I did not know there was any on the market.
Senator Dolph. Do you know the quality of the coal used by the Central and Southern Pacific from mines in Washington east of Tacoma and up in the Cascade Mountains?
Mr. Ludlow. I have not seen them. They get their coal from Coma Vein, Vancouvers Island. They own 30 per cent in those mines, and Dunsmores own 70.
Adjourned to meet on notice.
|
Washington, D. C, Thursday, February 8,1894.=
The subcommittee met pursuant to notice.
Present: The chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Gray and Frye. Absent: Senators Butler and Sherman.
SWORN STATEMENT OF NIC0LL LUDLOW-Continued.
Senator Gray. You have already been sworn?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. And you stated in your examination the other day that you went to the Sandwich Islands, in command of the Mohican, with Admiral Skerrett; that you arrived there on the 10th of February, and were there until when?
Mr. Ludlow. The 1st of May.
Senator Gray. You have already said that you were ashore nearly every day; that as Admiral Skerrett's chief of staff it was your duty to make a great many social and official calls; that you came in contact with the people of those islands, and that you were an interested observer of the condition of things obtaining there. That is so, is it not?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you, with reference to the revolution of January 17, 1893, form any opinion from these sources of observation and information as to whether or not that revolution would have been accomplished when it was accomplished and as it was accomplished if it had not been for the presence on shore of the United States troops??
Senator Frye. Do you consider that a legitimate question?
Senator Gray. I do.
The Chairman. I expect Mr. Ludlow had better answer that question.
Mr. Ludlow. I would like to call attention to a fact in the question.
The Chairman. State your opinion about it.
Mr. Ludlow. The troops were not on shore at the commencement of the revolution; that is, something had been done in the way of the revolution before the men got ashore.
The Chairman. You do not know that of your own knowledge?
Mr. Ludlow. No. The tenor of the Senator's question is what I heard and what I learned and saw.
The Chairman. I do not understand that you are asked for all you heard and learned; but the question is based upon a hypothesis.
Senator Gray. There is no hypothesis about the fact that the revolution, so-called, occurred on the 17th of January, and, when Capt. Ludlow arrived there, it was still a matter of exceeding and absorbing interest and a topic of conversation among those people. The captain was ashore and met all classes of people. I now ask him whether he formed any idea as to whether that revolution would have occurred as it did but for the presence of those United States troops?
The Chairman. State whether you think it would have occurred or not, and then you may give your sources of information.
Senator Gray. State categorically one way or the other.
The Chairman. It is a matter of opinion. You are asked to state whether you formed an opinion. Did you form an opinion about it?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
|
The Chairman. Very good. State what it was.
Mr. Ludlow. My opinion is that the revolution would not have occurred in the way it did, and at the time it did, if the people who were the revolutionary party, had not been assured of the protection and assistance of the United States forces there.
The Chairman. Is that opinion of yours based upon what you heard said in and about Honolulu after you arrived there, or is it an independent opinion based upon what you suppose to be the facts as you derived them from the reports and publications and your own reflections?
Mr. Ludlow. It is an opinion that I formed after I had been there perhaps a week or two, sufficiently long to get acquainted with the people. I had never been there before. I could hear them talk, as they were all talking politics. I did not talk with them, but I heard what they said.
The Chairman. Is your opinion based upon what you heard said there?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; they were specially free in giving vent to it on both sides. Afterwards very little was said about it by the Queen's party, or Monarchists, as they are called.
Senator Gray. Did you meet Mr. Blount?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you ever hear him express an opinion one way or the other about the matter?
Mr. Ludlow. I never did. He was the most remarkably reticent man in that way that I ever encountered.
Senator Gray. Did you meet Minister Stevens?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. Did you meet the members of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Ludlow. I met them all-all the principal people there; called on them officially and socially.
Senator Gray. On both sides?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; I tried not to have any politics of my own.
Senator Gray. You tried not to talk politics?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
The Chairman. Who among the supporters of the Queen's cause in Honolulu were you in the habit of associating with?
Mr. Ludlow. I can not say associations; simply calling officially and socially.
The Chairman. Well, calling on them?
Mr. Ludlow. I can look at a memorandum book and see the calls I made there. I did not have any intimacy with them at all.
The Chairman. I understand that. I simply want to know the names of the persons who were the supporters of the Queen's cause with whom you had social relations.
Mr. Ludlow. Mr. Robinson, the Queen's chamberlain, and wife, a very charming lady, a daughter of Mr. Cleghorn, and Mr. Cleghorn himself. When I arrived he was the governor of Oahu; afterward his title was abolished. But all these people made very little impression on me. I met Mr. and Mrs. Robinson; Mr. Neuman, who was the lawyer to the Queen, and his family. Those I saw the most of; perhaps called a half dozen times at Mr. Robinson's house and Mr. Neuman's house. I would go down in the evening and sit on the piazza with them. Mr. Neuman was not there most of the time, however. But
|
I have a list of the people here, and mixed with them the monarchists, and so on.
The Chairman. Mr. Cleghorn married into the royal family, did he not?
Mr. Ludlow. He married the Princess Likelike.
The Chairman. Mr. Robinson was also connected by marriage with the royal family?
Mr. Ludlow. No; not with the royal family.
The Chairman. With a Hawaiian family?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes. Mr. Cleghorn's first wife was a Hawaiian woman, but not of the royal blood. After her death he married the Princess Likelike, and it is her daughter who is now in England, this princess.
The Chairman. Kaiulani?
Mr. Ludlow. Kaiulani, who comes after Liliuokalani.
Senator Gray. This is the book that you kept referring to memorandum book produced by Mr. Ludlow?
Mr. Ludlow.That is the book I kept. It is my duty to keep a memorandum of them.
Senator Gray. It is a pretty long list?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. It embraces members of the Provisional Government, I suppose?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; everyone. Castle is here, and the Macfarlanes. They, the Macfarlanes, are all monarchists. The fact is, the monarchists showed more taste in their intercourse with me and the other officers than the annexationists did, because the annexationists would insist on talking politics, especially the ladies. They, the monarchists, considered us as foreigners, treated us as foreigners. The other side did not treat us as foreigners, all the officials, judges-Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith----
Senator Gray. Did you visit Mr. Stevens's house regularly?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; called there at once on our arrival.
Senator Gray. When you arrived there on the 10th of February, the flag had been raised on the Government building, had it not?
Mr. Ludlow. We found the flag flying when we came in.
Senator Gray. After you had been there some time, as an officer of the Navy did you form any opinion as to the necessity or propriety of that flag being there. I suppose as such officer you were bound to consider matters of international propriety?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
Senator Gray. What opinion did you form?
Mr. Ludlow. That the flag should never have been hoisted there; there was no authority for it.
Senator Gray. What did you think as to the propriety, if you formed an opinion in respect to that, of Mr. Blount's requesting Admiral Skerrett to have the flag hauled down?
Mr. Ludlow. I think it was a perfectly proper course to take; in fact, the only course to take.
The Chairman. Would you think that the hoisting of a flag on the invitation of a government for the protection of the peace of the country and its tranquillity was an act not to be performed by a naval officer in a foreign port?
Mr. Ludlow. There is no authority for that. We are authorized to defend American lives and property; we are intrenching on the prerogatives of Congress when we do that.
The Chairman. You can go ashore with your troops?
|
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; when called upon.
The Chairman. Very good. When you go ashore do you take your flag?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
The Chairman. For what purpose?
Mr. Ludlow. As an insignia of who we are.
The Chairman. As an emblem of authority?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes.
The Chairman. Is there any difference between holding it on a pole in your hand, or hoisting it at a post?
Mr. Ludlow. Yes; there is a difference.
The Chairman. What is the difference?
Mr. Ludlow. The difference in this case is that there was no post established where that flag was.
The Chairman. Where was it?
Mr. Ludlow. Over the Government building.
The Chairman. But the Hawaiian flag was with our flag?
Mr. Ludlow. No; the American flag was not hoisted until the Hawaiian flag was hauled down.
The Chairman. In that particular your testimony is different from that of other witnesses who have appeared here.
Mr. Ludlow. There was but one flag flying there. It was visible from the harbor. It was flying from the cupola-the steeple.
The Chairman. Was there a Hawaiian flag displayed about the Government building at the time the United States flag was there?
Mr. Ludlow. I did not see any.
The Chairman. Are you certain it was not so? A number of witnesses have testified it was so.
Mr. Ludlow. Then they had it hidden somewhere. It was not in a prominent place-that is, a prominent place, similar to the flag that is flying over the Senate wing of the Capitol.
The Chairman. Can you tell how many flags are flying on this Capitol now?
Mr. Ludlow. I suppose there are two.
The Chairman. Suppose you were told that there were four, would you not be surprised?
Mr. Ludlow. Two are all that I have noticed.
The Chairman. There are four, and you have noticed only two. When you were there in the Hawaiian Islands did you make the acquaintance, socially, of Mr. Wilson, the commander in chief of the police?
Mr. Ludlow. Mr. Wilson is out of office. I do not think I ever saw him.
The Chairman. You did not have any conversation with him about the state of affairs in Hawaii?
Mr. Ludlow. No. That was all in the hands of the United States diplomatic agents on shore. We had nothing whatever to do with that; we had to mind our own business.
Senator Frye. I desire to call attention to a very important communication from Mr. S.M. Castle, whom we all know as one of the best men in the Hawaiian Islands. It gives a brief history of the French and English attempts to take possession of those islands, and of the English hoisting a flag and its being lowered again. It is a very interesting document, and I think it ought to be incorporated in our record.
The Chairman. That order will be made.
|
The document is as follows:
MEMORANDA AND REMINISCENCES OF INCIDENTS IN HAWAIIAN HISTORY, BY S.N. CASTLE.
As some of the incidents which I may mention are entirely personal, and the inquiry will naturally arise as to their credibility, it will not be thought egotistical or indelicate for me to speak first of myself, so that any person reading these memoranda can judge of their credibility. My circumstances have been favorable both for hearing and seeing and for acquiring information generally upon matters spoken of. In July, 1836, I received the appointment of secular or financial agent of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions for these islands. Sailing from Boston December, 1830, and arriving April 9, 1837, I was identified with the mission, whose temporal necessities I came to provide for, of course, and the nature of my work also identified me at once with the business community.
For fourteen years I was devoted solely to the work of my agency. At the end of this time, at the suggestion and by the wish of the American board, Mr. Cooke, my assistant in the agency, and myself established the mercantile house of Castle & Cooke, which has now been in operation for thirty-two years. I continued to act as agent for thirty-two years from the date of my appointment. Thus I have been identified with this business community for forty-six years. I think there are none remaining but myself of those who were prominent in business. One house remains, but with no original partner. I have been honored by my fellow residents with various honorary positions, as president of the Chamber of Commerce, etc., and also in other than business relations in the political, religious, and other organizations. The institutions of the country when I came here were in a formative state, and as I came in a responsible and fiduciary character it was natural that I should be sometimes consulted and my counsel sought in matters in which I was supposed to be more fully informed than those who, from their circumstances, had not had so good opportunities of information as I have enjoyed.
I was invited to honorable positions in the Government service which I declined, but did not hesitate to give my opinion when it was sought upon political, religious, or civil topics, and thus I became acquainted with many things of which I should have known nothing in other circumstances. My position as a privy counselor and noble has added to my opportunities of learning the political status of the country.
In forming my opinion of the purposes of France and Great Britain respecting these islands in the past, I have been influenced by the tendency of events as well as utterances, either oral or written, of both France and Great Britain for the last forty years. They have been particularly active in extending their colonial system among the islands of the Pacific, and their dealings with these islands as well as some utterances, have looked to the same result; while the relations of the United States have seemed to be more those of a guardian for its ward, though not unmingled with interest, for the great body of its commerce has always been American. But, aside from this, citizens of the United States have spent millions of money as well as years of weary labor in Christianizing and civilizing the people; in giving them a written language, and books, and schools, and churches, and laws, as well as a civil polity, in making them what they are; and her military and naval
|
authorities and her statesmen declare the strategic position of the islands to be such that no other country should appropriate them, but American influence must be maintained paramount or they must take possession. Such remarks have been made to me personally by Gen. Schofield and different admirals. Gen. Schofield reiterates the same, with the reasons therefor, in a letter of December 30,1875, addressed to the Hon. J.K. Luttrell, M.C. Admiral Porter sustains these views in a letter to the Hon. Mr. Wood. The London Times says: "The maritime power that holds Pearl River Harbor and moors her fleet there holds the key of the North Pacific." Sir George Simpson says that "this archipelago is far more valuable on this account, that it neither is nor ever can be shared by a rival." Alexander Simpson says: "From the period of my first visit to the Sandwich Islands I became convinced of their value and importance and therefore desirous that they should form a British possession." Mr. Simpson says later: "I cannot but regret now seeing the undecided action of the British Government that some act on the part of Lord Geo. Paulet had not left any other conclusion open than that the dynasty of Kamehameha must cease to reign."
I have deemed the aggressions made by both British and French in former times to enforce demands having in my opinion but little foundation in justice, as part of a system of encroachment, having for its ultimate object the appropriation or possession of these islands.
Indeed it has been stated to me that the French consul said that had they, the French, supposed that the Government could have raised the $20,000 demanded, Capt. Laplace would have placed the sum so high that it could not have been raised, and he would have taken possession as at Tahiti. Shortly before the arrival of the Ambuscade in August, 1842, the French consul told a friend of mine that he had no complaints to make; everything was harmonious with the Government, but shortly the Ambuscade arrived, and the captain presented such a catalogue of inadmissible demands that it must have resulted in a cession had not Mr. Richards and Haalelio just sailed for the United States, England, and France to try to secure the acknowledgment of Hawaiian independence, and adjust any difficulties, if any were found to exist. Under these circumstances Capt. Malet consented to await the result of the mission.
Upon hearing of this, Admiral Richard Thomas, in command of the British Pacific squadron, lying at Valparaiso or Callao, dispatched Lord Geo. Paulet, with the frigate Carysfort, to Honolulu, to secure the settlement of any difficulties between the island Government and the British subjects. The Carysfort arrived on the 4th of February, 1843. On the 14th Lord Paulet presented demands to which the King yielded under protest. On the 20th the King visited the frigate and was received with royal honors, but the next day new demands were presented, amounting to $117,330.89. To satisfy these was beyond the King's power, and after some preliminary negotiations a temporary cessation was made on the 25th, and the administration was committed to two commissioners appointed by Lord Paulet and one by the King.
The French and English were no doubt determined to take and hold possession. They were playing against each other, and the islands were the stake.
Lieut. Frere, the head of the governing commission, told me that they saw the French were determined to have the islands, as they had taken possession of the Society and Marquesas, and they were determined to be beforehand with them. Britons sympathized with the feelings of Mr.
|
Sympson, already quoted, and they expected the session would be permanent. This, I think, was the general expectation of others as well, and, as I believe, it would have been so had not Lord Paulet sent his dispatches directly to the home Government, instead of through the admiral, as the proper channel. When the admiral heard of the session he immediately sailed for Honolulu, where he arrived July 26, and, after some preliminary negotiations, on the 31st a force of British marines with 2 brass field pieces marched to the plain east of the town, with the admiral and King present, when the British flag was lowered and the Hawaiian hoisted and saluted by the marines. The admiral was offended with Lord Paulet, as I plainly perceived by remarks made to myself when spending an evening at my house; and my belief that the flag would not have been restored but for this informality rests partly on the past practice of the British, and the statement made to me by Mr. Richards that the Earl of Aberdeen, the foreign secretary, or Mr. Addington, the under secretary, told him that if Admiral Thomas had not restored the flag the British Government would not have done so, and until they heard this Mr. Richards could not negotiate.
The London Times of August 20 of the same year, in a semi-official article, says:
It obviously becomes the duty of our Government to secure, by the most positive formal pledges, both from France and America, that independence which we now propose to restore to the native princes.
On the 28th of November, 1843, France and Great Britain jointly engaged reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State, and never to take possession, neither directly or under the title of protectorate, nor under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.
In 1846 the French treaty was revised and the $25,000, taken away in 1839, returned in 1849. The French consul, Dillon, with Admiral Tromline, presented a new list of grievances and demands, which the Government could not concede, in consequence of which the admiral landed his force and took possession of the custom-house, treasury, and fort, and held possession three days. After spiking the guns and committing some depredations the force was again embarked and sailed away, taking with them the King's yacht and the consul and family. It was said that they ordered the governor to pull down the Hawaiian flag, which he refused to do, and that they did not do it themselves out of respect to the treaty of November 28, 1843. In 1851 Mr. Perrin, a new French commissioner, arrived, with similar complaints and making similar demands. After long negotiations neither party would yield enough to enable them to come to an understanding, and matters assumed so serious and threatening an aspect that the consul sent to the British commissioner to inquire if in case of necessity he would hoist the British flag and protect the islands. He felt himself precluded from doing so by the obligation of the joint treaty. The United States commissioner was then applied to and consented to do so. I was informed that the French commissioner learned this through the British commissioner, and though the demands were not withdrawn he ceased to press them. The United States were not a party to the treaty, but were the first to recognize the independence of the islands in a Presidential message to Congress December 31,1842.
The demands made were in the main untenable and the claims not well founded, and even when well founded were untenable, because the claimants had refused first to have the local authorities act upon them.
|
By personal request of Admiral George Seymour and Gen. Miller, in company with Mr. Wylie and the Danish consul, I sat in arbitration and settlement of a number of these British claims in 1845, and no doubt satisfactory settlements would have been made by the constituted authorities had they been permitted to take their usual course. Of one large claim, Maj. Low, of the British army, said that in traveling through the islands he had not found one respectable man who believed it to be valid. But I have said enough to show why I thought that possession of the islands has entered into the wishes and plans of both the British and French in the past. I have no comments to make upon these plans. It is the practice of nations, and no doubt will continue to be so until causes of war are removed. The plea of necessity is used to justify it. The interests of the aggressing party require it. But no injustice is intended to individuals, and the general good is enhanced by it. So large numbers of good men felt when Great Britain occupied the Fijis and many other places. It meant safety to persons, stable government, civilization, Christianity, progress, and toleration. So also when the French occupied Algiers and other places, and so I think it will be better for the United States to extend its laws over all Indians in its territory, making them citizens and treating them as they do the white citizens. The case here is a little different, for under the auspices of a highly civilized nation the Hawaiians were making rapid progress in civilization. Safety and justice were as fully secured to all as they were anywhere else. If there were any preempted rights to the islands under any circumstances, it would seem to vest in those under whose auspices and at whose expense these improvements have taken place. And this is what had been done by the labors and at the expense of citizens of the United States. The complaint had been made to the British authorities that Americans, and particularly missionaries, were getting an undue influence and playing into the hands of the United States. Gen. William Miller, the British commissioner and consul-general with whom I had a very friendly acquaintance, invited me to listen to a letter from the Earl of Aberdeen, then the British foreign minister.
He wrote that complaints had been made to him of the undue influence of the missionaries, and the reply said that upon inquiry he could not find that they had acquired or used any influence which they were not legitimately entitled to. These complaints, by whomsoever made, were no doubt made to excite national jealousy and provoke national interference. Mr. Wylie, himself, a British subject, but Hawaiian foreign minister at that time, told me that all the interests of the islands by their local position would attach them to the United States if their independence should lapse, and that upon these views being communicated to Lord Clarendon, the then British foreign secretary, he wrote to the consul that Mr. Wylie was right; that by their adjacent position their interests called for their union to the States. The political question for the States would be: "Does our interest call for any such union or the maintenance of any such paramount influence as shall serve our purpose in case of war with any maritime power?" I have quoted both British and American views from their different standpoints, and I deduce French views from their course of action, and, in an account written by myself and published in the Hawaiian Spectator in October, 1839, giving an account of the French aggressions of July, 1839, I was sustained in my views of its character by a written request that sixteen of the commissioned officers of the United States East India squadron here in October, 1839, to reprint 1,000 copies of the account at their
|
expense for gratuitous distribution, which I did, and an endorsement of my views by the Hon. Rufus Choate in the North American Review.
Mr. Jarves, the historian of Hawaii, says:
They hold the key of the Pacific Ocean, for no trade could prosper or even exist whilst a hostile power, possessing a powerful and active marine, should send out its cruisers to prey upon commerce; but once firmly established upon them it might put to defiance any means of attack which could be brought to bear against them. Hence the commercial countries have been jealous lest some of them should have a superior influence.
Mr. Seward, in a speech in the Senate on the subject of the commerce of the Pacific, says:
Who does not see that henceforth every year European commerce, European politics, European thought, European activities, although actually gaining greater force, and European connections, although becoming more intimate, will nevertheless ultimately sink in importance while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter?
President Lincoln said:
In every light in which the state of the Hawaiian Islands can be contemplated it is an object of profound interest for the United States. Virtually it was once a colony. It is now a near and immediate neighbor. It is a haven of shelter and refreshment for our merchants, fishermen, seamen, and other citizens, when on their lawful occasions they are navigating the Eastern seas and ocean. The people are free and its laws, languages, and religion are largely the fruit of our own teaching and example.
The minority report of the Committee on Ways and Means regarding the treaty says:
Much stress is laid in the report of the majority upon the importance to the United States of obtaining a foothold upon these islands in the interest of our Pacific commerce with the continent of Asia, and of our safety in case of future war with any great naval power.
The undersigned are not insensible to these considerations. No European power should be permitted to claim sovereignty of these islands or to gain such influence in them as to menace our security. To allow this would be contrary to the well established canons of American policy by nearly a century of traditions and the conceded maxims of international law. No European power can deny to us the peculiar right to exclude them from possessing what would be a standing menace of danger to us and the possession of which by us would be no menace of danger to them.
War we hope never to see, and shall bless the time, if we are permitted to see it, when the reign of peace and good will to men shall be universal everywhere. But while the state of men continues to make it wise, "In time of peace to prepare for war."
I think I have shown, by the events related as occurring within the last fifty years and quotations from competent naval, military, and civil authorities, that it is both wise and proper for the United States to seek and retain such paramount influence and control of the islands as will prevent their being used as a menace to them in case of war. It will be noted that the incidents narrated and the remarks quoted from writers and speakers were nearly all of them many years antecedent to the treaty, and could only have related to the intrinsic value of the islands for their location and capability of production, and it is now nearly seventy years, as I am informed, since President Monroe uttered his views on this subject.
I may remark that Kamehameha IV said to me, while yet heir apparent, that if the nation died out and its sovereignty passed away, as it seemed by the course of events must inevitably be the case, they should and would go to the States, and the question when was only a question of time. If the authorities could enforce neutrality against all belligerents their strategic positions would not be so important, but
|
they have not the power to do so. Hence their strategic value to the United States, and they can in no way be so well utilized as by the perpetuation of this treaty, which will increase and retain a commanding American influence, such as it needs, and which will be better for all of its wants than annexation. Secretary J.G. Blaine makes the Monroe doctrine to include the islands because of their location.
A San Francisco Bulletin leader of May 2 says:
There seems to be no occasion to distrust what is known as our manifest destiny on this hemisphere, but prudent statesmanship will see that no germs are planted that may bo the cause of unnecessary trouble in the future. Upon this subject of European interference in the affairs of this continent the people are as set and determined in their opinions as they were in their maintenance of the Union of these States.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S.N. Castle.
Hon. Elwood Thorne,
Washington, D. C.
If the United States looks to commercial supremacy or even a participation upon equal terms in the great and growing commerce of the Northern Pacific they need a paramount influence in the Hawaiian Islands, and there is no method by which they can so obtain this object as by making reciprocity treaty perpetual. By doing this the islands become a commercial dependency of the United States, for the prosperity of the islands is made very dependent upon the commerce which the treaty promotes and stimulates and the effect would be to bind them closer and closer to the States, and their proximity gives them an advantage over any other maritime power in this respect. Mr. Lincoln truly says, "Virtually they were once a colony." They were nurtured and civilized and Christianized by its citizens and they have earned their right above any other nation. And as the London Times says, "The maritime power that holds the key to the North Pacific," and Sir Geo. Simpson says, "This archipelago is far more valuable that it neither is nor can be shared by a rival."
These are the recorded views of high British authorities, and I repeat, if the United States wish in the future to participate upon equal terms in the commerce of the North Pacific it seems wise to possess themselves of this "key" by making it a commercial dependency, and there is no way in which it can be done so well as to perpetuate this treaty. If the United States are content to control the commerce in her borders only they have no need of the islands. They have only to fortify impregnably their seaports and they will be secure from molestation, but they must be content to resign all commercial supremacy or even parity to others.
Since the incidents which I have narrated have transpired and the quotations which I have made were recorded, all the reasons which then existed to render the Hawaiian Islands valuable have been intensified and have rendered them more important than they were then. Both Great Britain and France have extended and strengthened their colonial possessions in this ocean, and the United States have added California and Alaska to its territory on the Pacific, and our Pacific commerce with China and Japan has grown up from California and Oregon, and since the reciprocity treaty went into effect imports from and exports to the Hawaiian Islands have been quadrupled.
Every political motive, as well as commercial, calls upon the United States to establish the advantage which the treaty has already given
|
them by making it perpetual, and to do it without delay, before any complications shall arise with any rival power and the control of the islands shall slip out of their hands. Wisdom calls for this without any loss of time.
The charge of fraud which has been brought by interested parties in regard to the importation of sugars and rice from other countries under its provisions is utterly baseless and has been so proved. Its originators are both base and criminal for taxing serious crimes without the shadow of a reason, and if the United States allows its present vantage to be lost by reason of these charges they will sustain a state loss which others will not be slow to improve for their own benefit.
S.N. Castle.
|
|
JUNE 13,1893.
Dear Sir: In conformity with your request I herewith inclose to you "Memoranda and Reminiscences of Incidents in Hawaiian History" which bear chiefly upon the wisdom of the treaty as a state political measure, and remain,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Samuel N. Castle.
Hon. E. E. Thorne.
Senator Gray. Mr. Chairman, I desire that these communications be made a part of this record.
The Chairman. There is no objection to that. The communications are as follows:
- U.S.R.S. Dale, 3rd Rate,
- Navy-Yard, Washington, D.C, January 25, 1894.
- Sir: I respectfully request the necessary permission to forward the enclosed communication to the Hon. George Gray, M. C.
- Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
- E.S. Houston,
- Commander U.S. Navy, Commanding.
- The Secretary of the Navy,
- Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
- [First endorsement.]
- Navy Department,
- Bureau of Navigation, January 27,1894.
- Respectfully returned to Commander E.S. Houston, U. S. Navy, who is informed that he is authorized by the Department to forward the enclosed communication to the Hon. George Gray, M.C.
- F. M. Ramsay,
- Chief of Bureau.
- [Second endorsement.]
- Commandant's Office.
- Navy-Yard, Washington, D.C, January 29, 1894.
- Forwarded, returned to Commander E. S. Houston, with reference to the above.
- J.A. Howell,
- Captain, U.S. Navy, Commandant.
|
- U.S.R.S. Dale, 3d Rate,
- Navy-Yard, Washington, D. C, January 19, 1894.
- Sir: (1) In compliance with your request I submit, with diffidence, my views on the Hawaiian Islands, more especially from a military standpoint, and with reference to their value to the United States in this respect.
- Contrary to the views expressed by others, I have differed with them in their conclusions thereon, as to their military value as a colonial possession, holding, that, in time of war and without a navy equal or nearly equal to that of the greatest naval power, their possession would be a source of weakness rather than strength.
- (2) In coming to this conclusion I have accepted, as a strategic fact, two conditions existing in our national life, and which will continue to exist for many years to come, which are either ignored or not accepted at their just value, by other writers, in dealing with such fact.
- (3) The first condition is, as stated before, the nonpossession of a naval force equal, or nearly so, to that of the greatest naval power; and the second is, the improbability of Congress or our people ever permitting the creation and maintenance of such force. These two conditions, therefore, are, in themselves, sufficient to establish, from a military standpoint, the fact above referred to, as being of a strategic nature, and which must be taken into consideration in dealing with this problem. Being so, we need seek therefore no further for reasons for not acquiring the islands, such as are now being discussed in the public press.
- (4) On the assumption that the wish is father to the thought, some military writers are hoping that the islands once being acquired, the United States would perforce be obliged to gradually create a large naval force; to be led into it, as it were, and thus, on the jesuitical plan that the end justifies the means, ultimately find ourselves in a position to successfully defend what we acquired, from their point of view, more for that purpose than anything else. A careful scrutiny of this has convinced me of the fallacy of their reasoning, and, if followed out, will only lead, in my opinion, to further mortification without creating the force desired. Much as I wish, and think necessary, for other just reasons, a larger Navy than that which we now possess, I yet feel convinced that not until a distant future will we have one sufficiently large to warrant our launching out on a policy of colonial acquisition with any degree of military safety.
- (5) Turning to the question (Hawaii being our colony) as to what we would do with it in case of war with a great naval power, I could only say that we would ultimately have to let it go after having wasted a lot of money.
- With Hawaii as our colony, national prudence would at least dictate that we should at once have to set about putting it in a state of defense, and that in no small way, either.
- (6) We can not presume that no great naval war will occur, but we can presume that when such does come, the side which has the greater force and is ready first, stands the better chance of winning. If, then, our first duty is to be ready to defend our colony, and the more so that it is an island, wisdom would dictate that it should be a defense not against the weakest naval power, but against the strongest; and this, as said before, requires such a force as the country is not willing to create. Without, then, we immediately prepare, and on the required scale, we would not be in that state of readiness demanded by the situation. The great time essential to the creation and mobilization of
|
- battle fleets with all their accessories is now too well known not to be seriously taken into account.
- (7) The last military consideration that I have to note relates to the probable results of a war between ourselves and a greater naval power, with respect to our island colonies, coupled with our non preparation and non possession of a nearly equal naval force. The breaking out of hostilities would undoubtedly witness the attempt of a fleet of battle ships to wrest the islands from us and hold them by keeping the sea. This would ultimately be done by bringing a second or third fleet to reenforce the first if necessary, nor is the point sustained, which is sometimes advanced, that a great naval power would hesitate to weaken itself elsewhere in order to do this, especially when the result to be attained absolutely requires such action.
- (8) In these days of great speeds, large coal radii, with cables and coaling stations, naval forces can quickly be massed, or moved from place to place, while the balance of power among the great nations nowadays in Europe is too precious and too carefully established to risk its disturbance simply to take advantage of each other.
- (9) The true American policy with respect to Hawaii, from a military standpoint, would seem to be their neutralization by international treaty, so that all could come to coal and refit there; in all other respects, save perhaps the sentimental side, we have already all the advantages that can ever accrue to us by actual possession.
- I am, dear sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,
- E.S. Houston,
- Commander U.S. Navy, Commanding.
- Hon. George Gray, M.C,
- Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D. C.
|
|
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, February 13, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to notice.
Present, the chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Sherman and Frye.
Absent, Senators Butler and Gray.
SWORN STATEMENT OF Z.S. SPALDING-Continued.
The Chairman. You can make any statements in explanation of your deposition, which you have just examined, with a view to its correction, that you may think necessary to make more plain your meaning.
Mr. Spalding. I find upon examination of the stenographic report of my former statement that I may be misunderstood regarding my estimate of the capacity of the Hawaiian Islands for supporting a larger population than is now to be found in the country.
I would explain that I mean to convey the idea or opinion that the country is not and never can be a manufacturing or commercial country based upon its own products. It lacks in mineral resources everything required for manufacturing, and can hardly be said to have even agricultural advantages necessary to compete with more favored countries to the point of exporting enough to pay for what necessary imports would be required from abroad. Sugar, coffee, rice, and other staples
|
may be produced in a limited way, but not in sufficient quantities or at low enough cost to compete in the world's market and furnish a revenue to be depended on.
As a part of the United States, and useful as the commanding point in the North Pacific Ocean, Hawaii would become a land of high civilization and attract to its shores a large and intelligent population. Left to itself, and without connection or encouragement from some great nation, Hawaii might support even a million inhabitants, but they would necessarily be restricted to the commonest modes of living and be confined to the bare necessaries of life.
The Chairman. You have been to the island of Cuba since you gave your former statement to the committee. Was your purpose in going there connected with the production of sugar on that island? If so, will you please give any data or facts that have come under your observation which tend to show the comparative value of Cuba and Hawaii as sugar-producing countries, in those parts of Hawaii which were adapted to the culture and production of sugar and also coffee. In what does labor employed in Cuba differ from that in Hawaii, and what differences are there, if any, in the methods of cultivation and production of the sugar from the cane? How does the general population of Cuba, including the persons who are engaged in the raising of sugar, compare with the population of Hawaii in respect of education, cultivation, civilization, and general improvement? How does Cuba compare with Hawaii, and any other facts that you might consider to be instructive connected with these suggestions.
Mr. Spalding. My visit to the island of Cuba was made on account of my interest in the sugar-producing industry, but not in a financial or business way.
I found Cuba to be almost the opposite from Hawaii in every sense. The island is some 750 miles long and an average of about 100 miles width, covering over 25,000,000 acres of land of which probably 5,000,000 acres are arable, and most of it good sugar, tobacco, coffee, cotton, corn, or pasture lands. Some of the finest timber trees in the world are standing in its untouched forests, and its mineral wealth has been demonstrated but not developed. I think the country has within itself the natural resources and ability for supporting 10,000,000 of people and give them every luxury of life in proportion to and in compensation for their labor. Hawaii, on the other hand, has but about 100,000 acres of arable land, or such as will admit of profitable cultivation with the plow, even making no deduction for lack of rainfall, and has no minerals whatever. The immense plains and plateaus of Cuba, where hundreds of thousands of acres of rich sugar land may be brought within economical reach of the factories by means of cheap transportation, are entirely unknown in Hawaii, where the country is almost wholly mountainous and the fertile valleys few and far between.
But while Hawaii has, under the fostering influence of the United States, developed from a state of barbarism in the beginning of this century to a condition of universal education unknown in any other part of the world, Cuba has been four hundred years demonstrating the problem of how not to advance. Within less than a hundred miles of the United States, and receiving from this country nearly its entire revenue, amounting to, say, $100,000,000 per annum, there is not the first trace of "Americanism" to be found in the whole island. That the natives of Hawaii would prove more apt in acquiring the manners and customs of the United States and become better citizens than the average Cuban, I have no doubt.
|
In regard to the particular business you inquire about, viz, the sugar industry, I may say I found much to astonish me. The methods of cultivation are such as would have ruined the country long ago had there not been such an enormous amount of virgin soil to fall back upon. The yield of sugar cane does not average more than 25 tons per acre, and this cane (by their methods of treatment) does not average more than 2 tons of sugar. By the introduction of proper methods and more intelligent labor these averages might be nearly doubled.
I found no attempt at fertilizing the lands or improving the yield and quality of the sugar cane. The system in vogue is that known as the "central factory," and the cane is all bought by weight (without regard to quality) and paid for in proportion to the price of sugar. The labor used is a combination or result of the changes that have been made in the country by the abolishing of slavery and the introduction of Chinese and others. The price for labor is very high during the few months of the year the factories or mills are at work, and during the "dead season" (as it is called) there is little done, the growth of the sugar cane being left pretty much to the generous efforts of nature. With a population of 1,500,000 people they are able to produce less than 1,000,000 tons of sugar per annum, although one man's labor is generally considered quite sufficient to produce 10 tons.
With every natural advantage in its favor Cuba stands today almost on the brink of ruin. But few of its plantations are really remunerative; its mining industries are practically stopped; manufacturing is at a standstill, and its towns and cities almost without business. The administration of the Government is defective to extremes, and the lack of intelligence, lack of comfort, and even lack of cleanliness among the lower classes are all certainly in very great contrast to Hawaii.
If you ask my opinion as to why this is so, I answer, because of the "Americanism" which has been instilled into Hawaii, even to its lowest strata. And if this Americanism shall be allowed to grow and increase under the fostering influence of a close commercial and political union or relationship with the United States, Hawaii will make another star in the galaxy, not less bright, and repay tenfold the favors that have been lavished upon her. That is why I am an "annexationist."
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----74