807-810

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none in sight. As the proclamation finished I passed through the crowd, recognized my friends as in the movement, saw Col. Soper stripping a towel from a rifle, and at the foot of the staircase saw a man armed with a ritle. I passed upstairs and told my clerk to close up all the rooms and went down again to find arranged in a line from the staircase to the front door a body of armed men in ordinary clothes, and recruits were constantly coming in. I then walked back to the center of the town, which was full of people, all business being suspended and many of the shops shut.

Our fear was that the marshal would attempt to arrest Good, who had shot the policeman, and that this would precipitate a riot. I stood with the crowd and heard all the talk. Soon I learned that the ministers were in the station house with the marshal and a body of armed men with a gatling gun. It was said that when the Americans in the station house heard that the movement was for annexation to the United States they said they would not fight for the Queen on such an issue. We saw the Queen's cabinet go in pairs in carriages from the station house to the Government building and return. Things looked very critical. Some said that Minister Stevens had refused to recognize the Provisional Government, some said that he had or would; no one seemed to know.

I was then quite fatigued with the excitement and lack of food and went home to learn soon after that the force at the station house had surrendered and that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government, and that martial law was declared, etc. No one in the crowd, whether sympathizers with the Queen or not, suggested that the United States troops would help obtaining possession by the Provisional Government of the station house. My two eldest sons had gone off to the headquarters with their rifles in the afternoon, one with my knowledge and the other without it. I was informed by President Dole within a day or two that if the station house had not surrendered the building would have been surrounded, and as the men showed themselves, sharpshooters posted on the high building commanding it would pick them off, and, without food or water, it would only be a matter of time that they surrendered.

The committee when they went to the Government building from W. O. Smith's office believed themselves to be in extreme peril. They were not armed. They were exposed to attack by the Queen's troops coming from the barracks through the palace premises, and every man of the committee could either have been arrested as they came up to the Government building or shot down after they arrived, so far as a spectator could see, for there was no force supporting the movement in sight. An exhibition of force on the part of the revolutionists before the proclamation was read might have caused their arrest to be attempted and this would have precipitated a conflict.

It was evident to me that no one of the Queen's party dared to strike a blow, for at that time the indignation against the Queen was intense and nearly universal among the white people. The natives stood in astonishment, not knowing what was going on and saying nothing. If Marshal Wilson and the cabinet ever intended to resist the movement, they had ample time to do so, as they had from Saturday afternoon to Monday evening before the troops from the Boston had landed to attempt to place guards at all the Government buildings, and even to attempt the arrest of the leaders of the intended movement whom, Wilson well knew. I am informed that Chas. J. McCarthy, a man of military experience, and lately the clerk of the Legislature, spent Monday

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night in the Government building expecting a force of 50 or 100 armed men sent to him from the station-house, chafing because they did not come. By Tuesday night the Provisional Government had such accessions of men and arms that they were amply able to cope with any internal force.

I say, further, that my statement to Col. Blount was in response to explicit questions already apparently formulated in his mind and asked by him, and that I did not feel at liberty to volunteer information upon topics not covered by any of his questions and especially upon the matter of the alleged use by Mr. Stevens of United States troops to overthrow the Queen. My interview was on the 10th of May, 1893, and Col. Blount had evidently already settled that matter in his own mind. When I asked him to see some other gentlemen, naming them, he politely told me it was not necessary, but said he would ask Mr. P. C. Jones—but did not.

A. F. Judd.

Honolulu, December 4, 1893.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM C. WILDER.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

William C. Wilder, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have been a member of the Legislature of the Hawaiian Islands twice; I was elected in 1888 to fill the vacancy caused by my brother's, Samuel G. Wilder, death; and was elected representative for the first Honolulu district in 1892.

The conduct of the Queen became such toward the end of the session as to lead me to believe that she was determined to regain the powers taken away by the constitution of 1887; things went on from bad to worse until the 14th of January, 1893, when the Legislature was prorouged. When it was reported on that morning that the opium and lottery bills were signed and the Cornwell-Parker-Peterson cabinet came in, the tension of public feeling became most intense; every one felt that there was trouble in the air, but it was not on account of the ousting of the Wilcox reform cabinet. If matters had ended there, there would have been no uprising.

The reform members of the Legislature did not attend the prorogation, more as a protest against the unlawful acts of the Queen than anything else. When, however, after the prorogation, the Queen attempted to abrogate the constitution and proclaim a new one, which would have restored the ancient despotic rights of the throne, and would have trampled under foot all further semblance of liberty in Hawaii, the respectable, conservative, and property interests of the country, without any prior meeting or plans, simply arose in protest and to defend their rights. From what I saw, I have no hesitation in saying that the Queen's act in attempting to abrogate the constitution and promulgate a new one brought about the revolution.

The condition of the country was then very critical, politically and

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financially. The latter, because that the solid moneyed people of the country had lost all confidence in the Government, which was not then able to meet demands against it, particularly withdrawals from the postal Savings bank, which were increasing until there was almost a panic; and politically, because the course of the Queen during the whole course of the legislative session had been such as to cause a total loss of confidence of nearly the whole of the white portion of the Legislature and of the business people of the community.

For ten days prior to noon of Saturday, January 14, the day that the Queen attempted her revolutionary act, the U.S.S. Boston with Minister Stevens on board had not been in port. There had been no revolutionary meetings or conferences; such a thing had not been thought of. There had not been any consultation with Minister Stevens with regard to the matter, though of course he must have seen what a perilous condition the country was getting into. There were several meetings at the office of W.O. Smith, that day after the attempted promulgation of the new constitution. I was not present at the first impromptu gathering; at that meeting I was named as one of the committee of safety. A telephonic message was sent to me to meet the committee that evening, and again we met at his office. The only business done besides talking over matters was the appointment of the committee to canvass and report what arms and ammunition and how many men could be secured.

Another committee was appointed, of which I was a member, to call upon Minister Resident John L. Stevens to discuss the situation. We went at once and talked over the whole matter, and we asked what his course would be should we take possession of the Government and declare a Provisional Government. Mr. Stevens replied that if we obtained possession of the Government building and the archives and established a Government, and became in fact the Government, he should of course recognize us. The matter of landing the troops from the Boston was not mentioned at that meeting.

The next meeting of the committee of safety was held at W. R. Castle's house, where we were in session a good part of the day. We reported the result of our conference and received the report of the committee on arms and ammunition; after further discussion of the situation, we finally decided to call a mass meeting, and thereby ascertain the exact sentiment of the community.

The next meeting of the committee was at Thurston's office, Monday morning, at 9 o'clock. During its session Marshal Wilson came and warned us not to hold a mass meeting. Some negotiations had been going on between members of the Queen's cabinet and Mr. Thurston, on behalf of the committee of safety, of which I knew nothing except the fact of such conference; but at that meeting I was appointed one of a committee to wait on the cabinet to receive their communication in answer to the matter discussed by them with Thurston. We went to the government building and met the cabinet; they stated that they declined any further negotiations. I asked Minister Parker what was the meaning of their calling a mass meeting at the same hour at which ours was called; he replied to keep people from going to your meeting. The mass meeting called by the committee was held at 2 o'clock, and, in spite of threats and opposition, was an immense and overwhelming affair, with but one sentiment, and that was to resist further aggression ol the Queen.

At the request of many citizens, whose wives and families were helpless and in terror of an expected uprising of the mob, which would burn and destroy, a request was made and signed by all of the committee,

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addressed to Minister Stevens, that troops might be landed to protect houses and private property. It was not presented until after the mass meeting. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon another meeting of the committee of safety was held, at which it was decided to make the attempt to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Provisional Government. Troops were landed about 5 p.m. from the Boston, about 150, 1 should think. A squad was stationed at the residence of the United States Minister, another at the consulate, and the remainder were lodged, after considerable delay in procuring suitable quarters, at Arion Hall. It seemed to be the only available building that night, and it was also a very central location without regard to any of the government buildings.

I was not present at the next meeting of the committee, which was held that Monday evening at the house of Henry Waterhouse. Another meeting of the committee of safety was held Tuesday morning, at which arangements were completed. The executive and advisory councils were appointed and the proclamation was prepared; it was well known through the town that we would attempt to take the Government that day; the plan was for the two councils to meet the volunteer forces at 3 p.m. at the Government building. We were assured of a force of at least 150 well-armed men at that time. At half past 2 o'clock a wagon loaded with guns and ammunition, on its way through the town to the point of rendezvous, was attacked by some policemen, who attempted to capture it. Our guard shot and wounded one of the police officers, whereupon they desisted and the arms and ammunition were duly delivered. The incident caused great excitement, during which the two councils proceeded to the Government building, getting there about twenty minutes ahead of our forces. On our arrival we asked for the cabinet, and were informed that they had gone to the station house.

We then took possession in the name of the Provisional Government, and the proclamation was then read at the front door. During the reading our forces began to arrive, and in a few minutes we had not less than 130 well-armed and determined men, and after that they continued to arrive all the rest of the day. We had been at the building but a short time when a messenger, Deputy Marshal Mehrtens, arrived from the station house. He asked President Dole to call on the cabinet at the station house for a conference. President Dole informed the messenger that he was at the headquarters of the Government, and if they wished any conference they would have to come there, and assured their messenger of their safety in coming, and stated that a military escort would be furnished if needed. Shortly after two of the ministers, Parker and Corwell I think, came up, followed soon by the other two. On learning that they had not read the proclamation, it was read to them, and a demand was made for the immediate surrender of the station house. It was then getting towards dark, and Parker said he would like to have the matter settled before night to avoid collisions in the street. He said, " I see you have a good many armed men here." He asked if, before giving the answer, they be allowed to confer with the Queen. President Dole said it would be allowed, provided representatives from the new Government were present, and Mr. Damon was sent with them.

Soon after reading the proclamation, notice was sent to all the foreign and diplomatic and other representatives stating the facts and asking that the new Government be recognized. Not very long after this, messengers from Minister Stevens came to see whether the new Government was actually in possession of the Government building,

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archives, etc. After satisfying themselves they retired. As nearly as I can recollect it must have been half past 5 o'clock when an answer from Minister Stevens arrived. The conference was then going on with the Queen, and his answer was not made known and published till after the surrender of the station-house, Queen, and barracks.

Some time between 4 and 5, I think, Capt. Wiltse, of the Boston, visited our headquarters, and he was asked if we would be recognized as the Government. He replied that he would not until we were in possession of the barracks and station-house and were actually the de facto Government.

During the whole of this affair, while it is true the United States forces were on shore, they in no way whatsoever assisted in our capture of the Government or in deposing the Queen. They did not even go out upon the streets; they were spectators merely, and it is very fortunate that their services were not required duriug the previous night. It seems to me very probable that had it not been for the restraining influence of their presence there might have been rioting. As it was, two incendiary fires were started.

A few days later I was sent to Washington as one of the annexation commissioners. I returned early in March, and I think Blount arrived on the 29th of that month. I called upon him and let him know that I was thoroughly acquainted with the incidents connected with the revolution, and would be very glad to furnish him with all the information within my power. Such information, however, has never been asked for, and I furnished no statement in any way to him.

Dated Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4, 1893.

W. C. Wilder.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.


AFFIDAVIT OF J. H. SOPER.

J. H. Soper, of Honolulu, Oahu, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is colonel commanding the national guard of Hawaii; that he has read the published extracts from the report of Col. Jas. H. Blount, late commissioner of the United States in Hawaii, and American minister resident; that certain statements in said report are incorrect and not founded on fact; that it is not true that affiant left the meeting of the citizen's committee held at Mr. Waterhouse's house in Honolulu, on the evening of January 16, 1893, either alone or in conrpany with any other members of the committee until the meeting adjourned; that he did not visit Mr. Stevens, American minister, alone or in company with others at any time on that day; that he did not report to said committee that he had full assurance from said Stevens that he, the latter, would back up the movement, nor did he report any remarks as coming from said Stevens; that he did look for recognition by said Stevens in case a de facto government was successfully established, but he was well aware that no assistance would be given by the American minister in establishing such de facto government.

And he further says that he furnished to Lieut. Bertollette, of the U.S.S. Boston, a full statement of the arms and ammunition surrendered by the Queen's followers to the Provisional Government, and also a

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statement of the arms and ammunition in the hands of the supporters of the Provisional Government prior to such surrender by the Queen; that the supporters of the Provisional Government had a larger number of effective rifles than had the Queen's followers; that at Mr. Blount's request he furnished to him a copy of said report on June 10, 1893; that Mr. Blount appears to have made no mention of the same in his findings; that the arms of the Provisional Government were in the hands of white men who knew how to use them, and about whose determination to use them there could be no question. That affiant informed Mr. Blount, as was the fact, that the chief reason for his hesitating to accept the appointment of colonel was that he had no previous military training.

Dated Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4, A.D. 1893.

Jno. H. Soper,

Colonel Commanding N.G.H.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

Charles F. Peterson,

Notary Public.


AFFIDAVIT OF ALBERT S. WILCOX.

Honolulu, Oahu, ss:

My name is Albert S. Wilcox; was born on the island of Hawaii in the year 1844; my parents were American missionaries. I reside on the island of Kauai; served as a representative from Kauai in the Legislature during four sessions; was a member of the Legislature of 1892. On Saturday, the 14th of January last, I attended a meeting of the citizens of Honolulu at the law office of W.0. Smith. I distinctly remember John F. Colburn, then minister of the interior, being present at that meeting, and hearing him state to that meeting, in substance, that the Queen was intending to force a new constitution, and that she had already attempted to force the cabinet to agree to it; that they had escaped or got away from the palace and desired the assistance of the citizens to oppose her attempt.

A committee of safety of thirteen was appointed at that meeting, of which committee I was a member. That committee met that afternoon late and considered the situation. I attended a meeting of the same committee the next morning at the residence of W.R. Castle. The situation of public affairs was such that it was apparent to my mind, and I am confident that it was apparent to the mind of every member of the committee, that the Queen's Government could no longer preserve the public peace and had not the power to protect life and property, and that it was incumbent upon the citizens of Honolulu immediately to take measures to counteract her revolutionary conduct and to establish a government in the interest of law and order. At that meeting I resigned my position as a member of the committee, deeming that my interests on the island of Kauai required my personal attendance there, and that my place on that committee could be better filled by a permanent resident of Honolulu. At no time did I hear any proposition or suggestion to the effect that Minister Stevens or the United States forces would assist either in the overthrow of the monarchy or in the establishment of the Provisional Government.

I wish to state now that I served in the different sessions of the


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