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they have not the power to do so. Hence their strategic value to the United States, and they can in no way be so well utilized as by the perpetuation of this treaty, which will increase and retain a commanding American influence, such as it needs, and which will be better for all of its wants than annexation. Secretary J.G. Blaine makes the Monroe doctrine to include the islands because of their location.

A San Francisco Bulletin leader of May 2 says:

There seems to be no occasion to distrust what is known as our manifest destiny on this hemisphere, but prudent statesmanship will see that no germs are planted that may bo the cause of unnecessary trouble in the future. Upon this subject of European interference in the affairs of this continent the people are as set and determined in their opinions as they were in their maintenance of the Union of these States.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S.N. Castle.

Hon. Elwood Thorne,
Washington, D. C.

If the United States looks to commercial supremacy or even a participation upon equal terms in the great and growing commerce of the Northern Pacific they need a paramount influence in the Hawaiian Islands, and there is no method by which they can so obtain this object as by making reciprocity treaty perpetual. By doing this the islands become a commercial dependency of the United States, for the prosperity of the islands is made very dependent upon the commerce which the treaty promotes and stimulates and the effect would be to bind them closer and closer to the States, and their proximity gives them an advantage over any other maritime power in this respect. Mr. Lincoln truly says, "Virtually they were once a colony." They were nurtured and civilized and Christianized by its citizens and they have earned their right above any other nation. And as the London Times says, "The maritime power that holds the key to the North Pacific," and Sir Geo. Simpson says, "This archipelago is far more valuable that it neither is nor can be shared by a rival."

These are the recorded views of high British authorities, and I repeat, if the United States wish in the future to participate upon equal terms in the commerce of the North Pacific it seems wise to possess themselves of this "key" by making it a commercial dependency, and there is no way in which it can be done so well as to perpetuate this treaty. If the United States are content to control the commerce in her borders only they have no need of the islands. They have only to fortify impregnably their seaports and they will be secure from molestation, but they must be content to resign all commercial supremacy or even parity to others.

Since the incidents which I have narrated have transpired and the quotations which I have made were recorded, all the reasons which then existed to render the Hawaiian Islands valuable have been intensified and have rendered them more important than they were then. Both Great Britain and France have extended and strengthened their colonial possessions in this ocean, and the United States have added California and Alaska to its territory on the Pacific, and our Pacific commerce with China and Japan has grown up from California and Oregon, and since the reciprocity treaty went into effect imports from and exports to the Hawaiian Islands have been quadrupled.

Every political motive, as well as commercial, calls upon the United States to establish the advantage which the treaty has already given


them by making it perpetual, and to do it without delay, before any complications shall arise with any rival power and the control of the islands shall slip out of their hands. Wisdom calls for this without any loss of time.

The charge of fraud which has been brought by interested parties in regard to the importation of sugars and rice from other countries under its provisions is utterly baseless and has been so proved. Its originators are both base and criminal for taxing serious crimes without the shadow of a reason, and if the United States allows its present vantage to be lost by reason of these charges they will sustain a state loss which others will not be slow to improve for their own benefit.

S.N. Castle.

JUNE 13,1893.

Dear Sir: In conformity with your request I herewith inclose to you "Memoranda and Reminiscences of Incidents in Hawaiian History" which bear chiefly upon the wisdom of the treaty as a state political measure, and remain,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Samuel N. Castle.

Hon. E. E. Thorne.

Senator Gray. Mr. Chairman, I desire that these communications be made a part of this record.

The Chairman. There is no objection to that. The communications are as follows:

U.S.R.S. Dale, 3rd Rate,
Navy-Yard, Washington, D.C, January 25, 1894.
Sir: I respectfully request the necessary permission to forward the enclosed communication to the Hon. George Gray, M. C.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E.S. Houston,
Commander U.S. Navy, Commanding.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
[First endorsement.]
Navy Department,
Bureau of Navigation, January 27,1894.
Respectfully returned to Commander E.S. Houston, U. S. Navy, who is informed that he is authorized by the Department to forward the enclosed communication to the Hon. George Gray, M.C.
F. M. Ramsay,
Chief of Bureau.
[Second endorsement.]
Commandant's Office.
Navy-Yard, Washington, D.C, January 29, 1894.
Forwarded, returned to Commander E. S. Houston, with reference to the above.
J.A. Howell,
Captain, U.S. Navy, Commandant.
U.S.R.S. Dale, 3d Rate,
Navy-Yard, Washington, D. C, January 19, 1894.
Sir: (1) In compliance with your request I submit, with diffidence, my views on the Hawaiian Islands, more especially from a military standpoint, and with reference to their value to the United States in this respect.
Contrary to the views expressed by others, I have differed with them in their conclusions thereon, as to their military value as a colonial possession, holding, that, in time of war and without a navy equal or nearly equal to that of the greatest naval power, their possession would be a source of weakness rather than strength.
(2) In coming to this conclusion I have accepted, as a strategic fact, two conditions existing in our national life, and which will continue to exist for many years to come, which are either ignored or not accepted at their just value, by other writers, in dealing with such fact.
(3) The first condition is, as stated before, the nonpossession of a naval force equal, or nearly so, to that of the greatest naval power; and the second is, the improbability of Congress or our people ever permitting the creation and maintenance of such force. These two conditions, therefore, are, in themselves, sufficient to establish, from a military standpoint, the fact above referred to, as being of a strategic nature, and which must be taken into consideration in dealing with this problem. Being so, we need seek therefore no further for reasons for not acquiring the islands, such as are now being discussed in the public press.
(4) On the assumption that the wish is father to the thought, some military writers are hoping that the islands once being acquired, the United States would perforce be obliged to gradually create a large naval force; to be led into it, as it were, and thus, on the jesuitical plan that the end justifies the means, ultimately find ourselves in a position to successfully defend what we acquired, from their point of view, more for that purpose than anything else. A careful scrutiny of this has convinced me of the fallacy of their reasoning, and, if followed out, will only lead, in my opinion, to further mortification without creating the force desired. Much as I wish, and think necessary, for other just reasons, a larger Navy than that which we now possess, I yet feel convinced that not until a distant future will we have one sufficiently large to warrant our launching out on a policy of colonial acquisition with any degree of military safety.
(5) Turning to the question (Hawaii being our colony) as to what we would do with it in case of war with a great naval power, I could only say that we would ultimately have to let it go after having wasted a lot of money.
With Hawaii as our colony, national prudence would at least dictate that we should at once have to set about putting it in a state of defense, and that in no small way, either.
(6) We can not presume that no great naval war will occur, but we can presume that when such does come, the side which has the greater force and is ready first, stands the better chance of winning. If, then, our first duty is to be ready to defend our colony, and the more so that it is an island, wisdom would dictate that it should be a defense not against the weakest naval power, but against the strongest; and this, as said before, requires such a force as the country is not willing to create. Without, then, we immediately prepare, and on the required scale, we would not be in that state of readiness demanded by the situation. The great time essential to the creation and mobilization of
battle fleets with all their accessories is now too well known not to be seriously taken into account.
(7) The last military consideration that I have to note relates to the probable results of a war between ourselves and a greater naval power, with respect to our island colonies, coupled with our non preparation and non possession of a nearly equal naval force. The breaking out of hostilities would undoubtedly witness the attempt of a fleet of battle ships to wrest the islands from us and hold them by keeping the sea. This would ultimately be done by bringing a second or third fleet to reenforce the first if necessary, nor is the point sustained, which is sometimes advanced, that a great naval power would hesitate to weaken itself elsewhere in order to do this, especially when the result to be attained absolutely requires such action.
(8) In these days of great speeds, large coal radii, with cables and coaling stations, naval forces can quickly be massed, or moved from place to place, while the balance of power among the great nations nowadays in Europe is too precious and too carefully established to risk its disturbance simply to take advantage of each other.
(9) The true American policy with respect to Hawaii, from a military standpoint, would seem to be their neutralization by international treaty, so that all could come to coal and refit there; in all other respects, save perhaps the sentimental side, we have already all the advantages that can ever accrue to us by actual possession.
I am, dear sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,
E.S. Houston,
Commander U.S. Navy, Commanding.
Hon. George Gray, M.C,
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D. C.

Washington, D.C., Tuesday, February 13, 1894.

The subcommittee met pursuant to notice.

Present, the chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Sherman and Frye.

Absent, Senators Butler and Gray.


The Chairman. You can make any statements in explanation of your deposition, which you have just examined, with a view to its correction, that you may think necessary to make more plain your meaning.

Mr. Spalding. I find upon examination of the stenographic report of my former statement that I may be misunderstood regarding my estimate of the capacity of the Hawaiian Islands for supporting a larger population than is now to be found in the country.

I would explain that I mean to convey the idea or opinion that the country is not and never can be a manufacturing or commercial country based upon its own products. It lacks in mineral resources everything required for manufacturing, and can hardly be said to have even agricultural advantages necessary to compete with more favored countries to the point of exporting enough to pay for what necessary imports would be required from abroad. Sugar, coffee, rice, and other staples

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