778-798

From TheMorganReport
Jump to: navigation, search
Previous Page Next Page

-p778-

the paper. The paper I have in mind was in relation to the amount of distribution of the sugar stock—sugar interests of the royalists and annexationists. It occurred to me it was very plainly an unreliable statement, not that he meant to deceive, but he was a man of prejudices.

I did not care to examine him, because I thought that I could get persons whose judgment was better than Dr. Trousseau's. I do not mean to say he was not intelligent and a very fine physician—I knew nothing against him. I must add this qualification: Learning much later on that Trousseau and other persons were with the Queen when she learned of the landing of the troops, I sought from them the effect on her mind and on the minds of those about her. For this purpose I asked Dr. Trousseau to write me his recollections of this matter.

Adjourned to meet on Saturday, the 13th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.


Washington, D. C, Saturday, January 13, 1894.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senator Frye.

Absent: Senators Butler, Gray, and Sherman.

SWORN STATEMENT OF COMMANDER THEODORE F. JEWELL, U. S. NAVY.

The Chairman. Were you attached to the ship Boston in January, 1893?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. Where were you when that ship was in Honolulu?

Mr. Jewell. I was here in Washington.

The Chairman. Have you ever visited the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; I was there twenty years ago, when Kalakaua was elected King.

The Chairman. To what ship were you attached then?

Mr. Jewell. The Tuscarora.

The Chairman. What was your rank and duty on that ship?

Mr. Jewell. My rank in the Navy was lieutenant-commander; I was executive officer of the ship Tuscarora.

Senator Frye. Do you mean that twenty years ago you were lieutenant- commander?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. How long did the Tuscarora remain at Honolulu then?

Mr. Jewell. She was there six weeks. This is to the best of my recollection.

The Chairman. Did the Tuscarora get there before the election of the King, or after it had occurred?

Mr. Jewell. She arrived there the day before the death of the former King; she was there before the election of Kalakaua.

The Chairman. And during the time?

Mr. Jewell. And during the time.

The Chairman. Did you go on shore after the ship arrived in the harbor?

Mr. Jewell. I was on shore occasionally in Honolulu, but not very

-p779-

much. The executive officer of a ship is usually pretty well occupied, and I was ashore only once or twice during the time we stayed there.

The Chairman. Did you attend the meeting of the legislative body that elected Kalakaua King?

Mr. Jewell. No, I did not. I was on board the ship at that time.

The Chairman. The contest at that time was between Kalakaua and Queen Emma?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you ascertain whether the Americans there who claimed Hawaiian denizenship, as well as those who did not, were in favor of Kalakaua or Queen Emma?

Mr. Jewell. It was the general understanding that English influence was supporting Queen Emma and that the Americans were supporting Kalakaua.

The Chairman. That was a marked fact in the situation?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, no question about it.

The Chairman. Did the Americans there, to your knowledge, take any active part in agitations, commotions, or insurrections?

Mr. Jewell. Not at all; no.

The Chairman. They stood aloof?

Mr. Jewell. The riots which occurred during Kalakaua's election were entirely among the natives. There were a number of Americans who were in the Government at that time. The minister of foreign affairs was an American.

The Chairman. Do you recollect his name?

Mr. Jewell. Charles R. Bishop was his name. But I think there was nothing in the nature of inflammatory meetings previous to this election.

The Chairman. Were troops sent on shore from the Tuscarora?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was there any other American ship in the harbor at that time?

Mr. Jewell. Yes, the sloop Portsmouth was there, and men were landed from both ships.

The Chairman. About what number?

Mr. Jewell. I commanded the forces that were landed from the Tuscarora, perhaps 80 men, and perhaps the same number from the Portsmouth.

The Chairman. When you landed did you go armed and equipped for fighting?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you take rations with you?

Mr. Jewell. No; we did not take rations, but we were in close communication with the ship all the time. As a matter of fact, we did not subsist ourselves on shore.

The Chairman. On whom did you subsist?

Mr. Jewell. The Hawaiian Government.

The Chairman. Did you go ashore on the invitation of the Hawaiian Government?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; as I understand, at the request of the cabinet in the interregnum between the death of Lunalilo and the election of Kalakaua. The Government requested that men be landed if a riot should occur. It was anticipated it would happen because of the one that occurred at the election of the other King the year before. Capt. Belknap, who was in command of the Tuscarora, and who was the senior officer there, made some arrangement with Mr. Pierce, the

-p780-

American Minister, by which the men were to be landed if they were wanted.

The Chairman. Lunalilo, the former King, was King by inheritance?

Mr. Jewell. So; he was elected King.

The Chairman. Was it not this way; that he was a King by inheritance, and he ordered a plebiscite to see if the people favored his going to the throne?

Mr. Jewell. I am not prepared to say that; but I am quite certain that he was not King by inheritance.

The Chairman. You understand that at the time of his election riots had occurred?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was it your understanding also on that occasion that American troops had been landed?

Mr. Jewell. I think not, but I am not prepared to say positively.

The Chairman. It was in the time of the interregnum, as you term it, properly between the death of Lunalilo and the election of Kalakaua, that the American Minister requested the commander of these ships to land troops?

Mr. Jewell. To be prepared to land troops in case of necessity.

The Chairman. Had the election of Kalakaua taken place before you landed?

Mr. Jewell. It had; yes.

The Chairman. But you were in a state of preparation?

Mr. Jewell. We were standing by. The captain of the Tuscarora went on shore on the morning of the election, about 9 o'clock, and left me in charge of the ship, with instructions to keep a look out on the American bark where one of our officers was stationed with a signal which was to be given to land the men if needed, and we were in a state of preparation all day. We got the signal about 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

The Chairman. Who was the ranking officer in order at that time?

Mr. Jewell. Capt. Belknap.

The Chairman. He had command of the forces on both ships?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. The senior naval officer, the ranking naval officer, is always assumed by virtue of his rank to be in command of the forces.

The Chairman. How many men did you land?

Mr. Jewell. We landed about 80 men. I do not know exactly as to the Portsmouth, but 80 men from the Tuscarora.

The Chairman. How many from the other ship, the Portsmouth?

Mr. Jewell. 75 or 80. I think the whole force numbered 150 men.

The Chairman. Did you spend the night on shore?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, we stayed a week; I myself was on shore four days; and at the end of that time one-half of the force was withdrawn and the remainder stayed three or four days longer.

The Chairman. What was the disposition of the people there when you landed as to their being peaceful or turbulent?

Mr. Jewell. There were several hundred people around the courthouse, the legislative building, when we got there. The courthouse was pretty well wrecked by the mob, was in possession of a mob of natives. They cleared out of the court-house the instant we arrived on the ground. We sent a small force into the building and the rioters jumped out of the windows and cleared out, although they hung around the grounds. They were making demonstrations and were talking loudly in their own language, which we did not understand, of course.

The Chairman. Did the mob make any fight?

-p781-

Mr. Jewell. They did not offer any resistance at all; no. There was one man who waved a club in front of a petty officer, but he took the man by the back of the neck and gave him a shake, and he was quieted.

The Chairman. Did you bivouack around the court-house that night?

Mr. Jewell. The men from the Portsmouth occupied the court-house, slept in the court-house.

The Chairman. Where did your men go?

Mr. Jewell. To the armory. This was a building in which there were several public offices, among them the captain's of the port; in one story there were some arms belonging to the Government, perhaps 100 stands of rifles.

The Chairman. Did you find the arms there when you got there?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was there any organized force of the Government?

Mr. Jewell. I think nothing but the police. I have an impression that there was a militia company, volunteers or militia, but not in the service of the Government?

The Chairman. At that time did you ascertain that the Government had any regular troops?

Mr. Jewell. It has been so long ago that I can not remember. But my impression is that there was nothing organized in the Government service except the police force.

The Chairman. Did you take command of both forces?

Mr. Jewell. No; the executive officer of the Portsmouth was the ranking officer on shore. But Captain Belknap was in communication with us, and he was supposed to be in command. Although Capt. Belknap stayed on board ship every night, he was on shore every day, and our reports were made to him. The force from the Portsmouth had charge of the fort house and some other public buildings including the mint, the treasury, perhaps. I had charge of the prison and the armory. There was another significant fact connected with that landing. There was an English man-of-war in the harbor at the time. There had not been any prearrangement about the landing of her men; nevertheless, shortly after we got on shore, 75 or 80 men from the English vessel, under arms and organized, put in an appearance.

The Chairman. How long did they remain on shore?

Mr. Jewell. They remained some days; just how long I do not know. The men were not allowed to circulate very much about the town, and I kept myself pretty well confined to the barracks. But after the mob was broken up down at the court-house, the most of them went up to Queen Emma's residence, which was some distance away, and the troops from the English man-of-war, on the suggestion of Mr. Bishop, I believe, went up there to clear out the mob, and remained there. They went there to drive off the mob assembled around Queen Emma.

Mr. Jewell. Yes. I understand there were some incendiary speeches made at that time in the neighborhood of Queen Emma's residence, and perhaps Queen Emma made some remarks herself.

The Chairman. Were there any incendiary fires during the time you were on shore?

Mr. Jewell. No. The first night there were some stones thrown at the men from the Portsmouth, and a pistol shot; but in the part of the town where we were it was pretty quiet. We patrolled the streets the first night, and I do not know but that we did it after that. That

-p782-

is to say, we sent out a small body of men for two or three hours to break up any disorderly gathering.

The Chairman. Were there any arrests made by the American forces?

Mr. Jewell. A few of the rioters were arrested at the court-house; but they were turned over to the police right away. As a rule the native police mingled with the crowd; they were as bad as the rest of them.

The Chairman. Did any of the Kanakas appear to take sides with Queen Emma?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. I mean with Kalakaua?

Mr. Jewell. The popular feeling amongst the natives in Honolulu at that time was against Kalakaua; that is to say, it was in favor of Queen Emma. But there were plenty of the better class of Kanakas who were in favor of Kalakaua.

The Chairman. I suppose it was a question, if I gather it correctly, between the pure native element and the mixed element of whites and half-whites and the better classes of the Kanaka people?

Mr. Jewell. I am sure I would not know how to divide the feeling in that way; I gathered it from very limited communication with the shore; I have only a general impression in regard to it, that most of the lower classes, the commoner Kanakas, were in favor of Queen Emma, and it was generally supposed the English residents were, particularly the English minister-resident, or whatever he may have been. It was an intrigue in favor of Queen Emma, and they had incited these common people to this performance, this riot.

The Chairman. Do you know where Kalakaua was during your stay there?

Mr. Jewell. No, I do not.

The Chairman. Did you see him?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; I saw him frequently.

The Chairman. In his palace?

Mr. Jewell. I think I never saw him in the palace, though he lived there after his election was proclaimed.

The Chairman. Kalakaua remained in his palace after his election was proclaimed?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Before that time, did you know about him?

Mr. Jewell. I simply knew he was a clerk in the custom-house or post-office, or some other office.

The Chairman. Do you know where he was between the time of the death of Lunalilo and the election?

Mr. Jewell. I know he was in Honolulu.

The Chairman. But where—you do not know whether he was under the protection of any foreign ship?

Mr. Jewell. I know he was not.

Senator Frye. Who was it requested the troops to land at that time?

Mr. Jewell. It was understood that the request was made by Mr. Bishop, who was the minister of foreign affairs of the Hawaiian Government, to Mr. Pierce, the American minister resident; and between Mr. Pierce and Capt. Belknap—I do not know whether there was any written communication between them or not—but it was arranged between them that in the event of a riot the men were to be landed.

Senator Frye. Your troops did not bivouac down in the business part of the city?

-p783-

Mr. Jewell. Yes; the armory, where the principal part of my men was was right in the business part of the city.

Senator Frye. But up around the court-house and the Government buildings?

Mr. Jewell. That was not the business part.

Senator Frye. They remained in the court-house and Government buildings three or four days?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

Senator Frye. Under the law and naval regulations, what do you understand to be the rights of a United States naval officer touching the preservation of order in a naval city? I ask you that question because I noticed in reading the wording of the order which Capt. Wiltse gave to Lieut. Swinburne that he recited the protection of the consulate, the legation, the lives and property of American citizens, and to preserve order. What would you do as an officer if you were ordered to go ashore and do those things? What do you understand "preserving order" to be—what right would you have?

Mr. Jewell. Do you mean if I were actually in command of a body of troops which had landed to preserve order?

Senator Frye. Yes.

Mr. Jewell. I should arrest disorderly persons. I should break up incendiary meetings and take the people into custody.

Senator Frye. Would you not do it in cooperation with the Queen or whoever was then in power?

Mr. Jewell. Unquestionably with the constituted authorities—yes.

The Chairman. You say that these troops were landed at the request of the cabinet which had been appointed by Kalakaua?

Mr. Jewell. No; the previous cabinet.

The Chairman. Which had gone out of office?

Mr. Jewell. It had not gone out of office—no.

The Chairman. Was that request communicated in writing?

Mr. Jewell. I do not know about that; but my impression is it was not.

The Chairman. Was the purport of that request communicated to you by your superior officer?

Mr. Jewell. Well, only in conversation. In giving me my instructions Capt. Belknap had told me what this arrangement was.

The Chairman. Were your instructions in writing?

Mr. Jewell. They were not; they were verbal entirely.

The Chairman. Be kind enough to state what orders Capt. Belknap gave you on that occasion, and upon what grounds he based his right to give you such orders?

Mr. Jewell. Do you mean the orders previous to the landing of the troops?

The Chairman. Capt. Belknap was in actual command of the forces while they were on shore?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. But while he was on shipboard you were the next in command?

Mr. Jewell. No; Lieut. Commander Clarke, of the Portsmouth, was the next in rank; but he was at the court-house, which was a quarter of a mile from where I was.

The Chairman. You were in command of the other detachment?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And you received your orders and instructions from Capt. Belknap and not through Lieut. Clarke?

-p784-

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. State what the instructions were that were given to you by Capt. Belknap to be executed by you in his absence.

Mr. Jewell. The general instructions were to preserve order and to keep myself confined as much as possible to the quarters which had been assigned to us; not to excite the natives to opposition. I also had orders to patrol certain streets of the town during the night, to prevent any disorderly gathering of the people and to arrest people who were guilty of disorder. I can not remember any specific instructions otherwise. The idea was that order was to be preserved in the town, and that we were authorized to arrest people and turn them over to the civil authorities.

The Chairman. And you did so?

Mr. Jewell. We had no occasion to arrest anybody.

The Chairman. There were persons arrested, were there not?

Mr. Jewell. Only during the first part of the riot when the troops arrived on the ground. Then men were arrested and turned over to the native police; but not after that.

The Chairman. But you did arrest persons on that occasion and under these orders?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. Capt. Belknap was personally at the court-house when the force arrived there.

The Chairman. Then, if I gather your position correctly, the troops were invited by the cabinet to come ashore for the purpose of preserving the public order.

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was there anything in the situation that required you to participate on the one side or the other in any conflict or civil commotion that might occur among the people?

Mr. Jewell. No; nothing whatever.

The Chairman. You were ordered to preserve order, no matter who was disorderly?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. But you were there by the invitation and consent of the then Government?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Were you placed under the command of any military officer or authority of the Hawaiian Government?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. You were acting under your own orders?

Mr. Jewell. Entirely so; yes.

The Chairman. The King did not appear on any occasion for the purpose of taking control of the forces?

Mr. Jewell. No. He took the oath of office the next day after his election, and all the troops on shore were paraded at that time.

The Chairman. Was that the day after you landed?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. They were paraded how?

Mr. Jewell. The forces from the two American ships, the Tuscarora and the Portsmouth, and those from the Tenedos, the English man-ofwar, were all at the courthouse to receive the King, and all presented arms when he passed into the building to take the oath of office.

The Chairman. Did he pass through the ranks?

Mr. Jewell. I think he did. I do not know exactly what the form was.

-p785-

The Chairman. Were there any other troops there beside the English and American troops?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. And police force?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; I think the police were about, but not as an organized body of troops—not in the nature of a body of troops; they were in the crowd.

The Chairman. They were not a part of the receiving escort or force?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. The King came then and took his oath of office?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. After he took the oath of office did he take any control of the troops under your charge?

Mr. Jewell. No; not the slightest.

The Chairman. You did not look to him for any orders in regard to the conduct of the troops on the island so long as you remained there?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. If Capt. Belknap had any such orders you would have known it?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, I think so; yes.

The Chairman. It was then a body of American soldiery, so far as you were concerned, that was there at the invitation of the cabinet of the former King to preserve order, to put down riot, to arrest disturbers of the peace and those who had been assailing the Legislature?

Mr. Jewell. No; we were not to take any cognizance of anything which took place before the landing; we were only to arrest people whom we saw in the act.

The Chairman. People caught flagrante delicto?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; we took no notice of what happened before. The court-house was full of people; as we came into the front door they went out of the windows. But we did not arrest any of them. Capt. Belknap cautioned us to be discreet in anything we did, and not to assume too much.

Senator Frye. And you regarded what you actually did as very discreet?

Mr. Jewell. I did; yes.

The Chairman. In how many days did you return to the ship?

Mr. Jewell. My impression is that I went back to the ship in four days, when the force was reduced to one-half the original force, and I think the rest stayed four days longer, perhaps only three days longer. I think about a week our men were on shore.

The Chairman. Do you know on whose request it was that the troops retired from the islands?

Mr. Jewell. I think the first reduction of the force was made by Capt. Belknap without any request from the Government; but, after the new cabinet was organized, my impression is that the minister of foreign affairs wrote to the American minister resident and said that the occasion for the troops had passed and they might be withdrawn.

The Chairman. Do you remember whether the English forces were withdrawn before the American forces were?

Mr. Jewell. I think not; I think they remained about the same time.

The Chairman. You do not know, as a matter of fact, which of the forces actually withdrew first?

Mr. Jewell. No. I think our force was reduced before the English force. But to this day I do not remember seeing the English troops

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----50

-p786-

after they marched out of the court-house grounds up to Queen Emma's. I do not remember to have been brought into contact with them. As I said, we were in a different part of the city, and I confined myself and men to the barracks.

The Chairman. Did you have a flag when you went on shore?

Mr. Jewell. We carried our flag with the battalion.

The Chairman. Did you raise any colors on any pole or house?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. You know nothing about these later transactions of January, 1893?

Mr. Jewell. Only what I gathered from the newspapers.

The Chairman. I would be glad to have you state anything that pertains properly to this question.

Mr. Jewell. In regard to this landing in 1874 I would say that there were at that time in the pro-English press of Honolulu, and have been since, charges made that we interfered at that time in the internal affairs of Hawaii. But I think nobody paid any particular attention to them. So short a time ago as December, 1892, an article appeared in a paper called The Illustrated American, published in New York, which charged that the American minister and American troops had interfered in the affairs of Hawaii in 1874, and had kept Queen Emma, who was "the rightful heir to the throne," off of the throne, and put Kalakaua in her place. I wrote a letter denying every statement in that paper, which I felt certain was inspired by some of the English-feeling people in Honolulu. I was told afterward that that was the case. It was full of misstatements, and I felt more or less indignation at the way in which they talked about the disgraceful manner in which the troops had taken part in the affairs of Hawaii. I replied to it. I did not know but what that brought me before this committee.

The Chairman. Possibly so; but in making up your replies to that article did you think over the whole situation as it occurred and refresh your memory about it?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And you are satisfied that your statements here are correct?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

Senator Frye. Have you a copy of that communication?

Mr. Jewell. No; I have not in my possession.

The Chairman. Do you remember whether or not before you left the ship with those troops Kalakaua was elected by the Legislature or was the election pending?

Mr. Jewell. I had not been informed as to the result of the election. We embarked our men by signal from shore—the signal was made on this American bark—and before I knew anything about the election I had my men on shore.

The Chairman. But the preparation about which you spoke as having been made on the ship, to hold yourselves in readiness, to stand by, you say was begun before the election took place?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Some days before?

Mr. Jewell. No, the morning of the day of the election.

The Chairman. You knew that the election was about to take place?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; a special session of the Legislature had been called for that purpose.

The Chairman. And the military preparation on the ship anticipated the election?

-p787-

Mr. Jewell. A few hours; yes.

The Chairman. And view of it, and in expectation that that election would create civil commotion?

Mr. Jewell. In the fear of it, that it might be so. I believe that the cabinet was rather severely criticised for not having made better preparation and for not having asked that the troops be sent on shore earlier.

The Chairman. I suppose that this preparation was made on board ship because of some request that had been made or intimated to the commanding officer by the cabinet?

Mr. Jewell. The arrangement was made between Capt. Belknap and Minister Pierce, but it was at the solicitation of the Hawaiian Government.

The Chairman. And in anticipation of the fact that there might or would be civil commotion at the time the election took place?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Had you ever had anything to do with the landing of troops before that?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Where was it?

Mr. Jewell. At Panama ; we took possession of that town for four or five days; that is, so far as we could. We did not come into contact with the people who were fighting there.

The Chairman. Was there any minister resident at Panama at that time?

Mr. Jewell. No; there was a consul-general.

The Chairman. Was the landing made at his request?

Mr. Jewell. I do not know. I knew very little about what led up to that.

The Chairman. What year was that?

Mr. Jewell. That was in 1872. The force of which I had command was landed to protect the Pacific Mail Company's property. Afterward a larger body was landed from the flagship, and went up into the city under the command of another officer.

The Chairman. Who was that officer?

Mr. Jewell. P. E. Harrington, at present a commander in the Navy.

The Chairman. Hou many ships did he have in port at the time?

Mr. Jewell. Only two. The Tuscarora was lying there, and she was about landing her men when the flagship arrived. The landing of the men was suspended for an hour or so until the captain could communicate with the admiral, when they were sent on shore. My instructions were then that I was not to go into the city, but to confine myself to the Pacific Mail Company's wharf. There was a great deal of merchandise which had just been landed from one of the Pacific Mail steamers.

The Chairman. What port were you at before you went to Panama?

Mr. Jewell. We had come up from Callao, I think.

The Chairman. Did you come up for the purpose of protecting the property?

Mr. Jewell. No. We came up for the purpose of taking a surveying party down on the isthmus, which was surveying for the inter-oceanic canal there. I also landed men when in command of the Essex on the China station at the request of the American minister in the capital of Corea. I landed men at Chemulpo and marched them up to Seoul, Corea.

The Chairman. Coming back to Panama. Was that a political strife that existed in Panama at the time of which you spoke?

-p788-

Mr. Jewell. I believe so—one of the periodical revolutions which nobody can account for.

The Chairman. How long did your troops remain on shore?

Mr. Jewell. I think about six days.

The Chairman. Did they camp on shore?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Was there any disturbance in the vicinity of your camp?

Mr. Jewell. No. Firing was going on all the time between these two parties, around corners, out of windows, etc., and every time we showed ourselves down on the wharf they would fire at us. They would fire at a light at night—amuse themselves that way; but never did any particular damage.

Senator Frye. But the troops from the other ship went up into the city?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. What distance was that; how far did they have to go to get into the city?

Mr. Jewell. Perhaps half a mile.

The Chairman. Did they remain in the city?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And the American troops remained on shore until peace was restored—order was restored?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. You have no particular information as to whether either faction of the people there desired your presence?

Mr. Jewell. No, I do not know about that at all. I think the call was made by the Pacific Mail Company, in the first instance, for the protection of the property in transit—merchandise in transit. I believe we have certain treaty rights down there in regard to landing men.

The Chairman. Now, the Corean incident. What was the occasion for landing there?

Mr. Jewell. It was an excitement in Seaul, the capital. Threats had been made against the foreign population, and I think they were all more or less scared. I do not think they were in any very great danger. But the American minister wrote to me that he would probably call upon me for a small force for the protection of the legation, and soon after I received the letter I received a telegram from him asking me to dispatch the men.

The Chairman. You were in command of the ship at that time?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. How many men did you send?

Mr. Jewell. Twenty-five or 30—I think 30 men.

The Chairman. How long did they stay ashore?

Mr. Jewell. I think about a week; until quiet was restored.

The Chairman. That was not a political revolution, but it was an opposition of the natives to the foreign population in general?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And you really landed for the purpose of protecting the American citizens there and the legation?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. There were other men-of-war there at the time and they all landed troops. That is to say, there was a French man-of- war, a Russian man-of-war, and a Japanese man-of-war. I think they all sent men up there.

The Chairman. Was there any other occasion when you have landed troops?

-p789-

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. IS it one of the standing orders or rules of the Navy that when the minister resident at a foreign port, or consul at a foreign port, requests the naval officer to land troops to protect the peace of the consulate, the naval officer is to do it?

Mr. Jewell. The officer in command of a vessel has to decide that when it comes up.

The Chairman. Upon the facts in every emergency?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

Senator Frye. He can not relieve himself for responsibility except by the orders of a superior officer?

Mr. Jewell. In no other way. He is responsible for any such landing or landings he may make. In my own case I had asked the admiral particularly in regard to the landing of men in Corea. I had asked him to give me instructions, but he said I would have to depend upon my own judgment in case of necessity, in case the request was made.

The Chairman. So that a naval officer in command at any foreign port is thrown upon his individual judgment as to the necessity or propriety of landing forces?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Is he bound to receive from the consuls or ministers of the United States their orders or requests or direction as being military orders?

Mr. Jewell. No.

The Chairman. Their orders address themselves to the naval officer's discretion?

Mr. Jewell. Yes, exactly. They come in the form of a request.

The Chairman. And they do not relieve the naval officer from responsibility as a naval officer.

Mr. Jewell. Not at all.

The Chairman. Whereas if the orders come from a superior authority the naval officer is bound to obey, and he is relieved from any responsibility in obeying?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Have you cruised much in the Pacific Ocean?

Mr. Jewell. No; except that I have been three years on that China station; not otherwise. I was two years and a half in the Tuscarora, and I was in the Pacific then.

The Chairman. Is the Tuscarora a steamship?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Have you been on steamships during all your cruises out there?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. What are the nearest points where a coal supply can be obtained? I do not mean the place where supplies have been accumulated, but where the countries produce the coal?

Mr. Jewell. Nearest to Honolulu?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Jewell. I do not know of any. They have an inferior kind of coal in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, at Vancouvers Island. I think that is the nearest point.

The Chairman. Is that what is called the Seattle coal?

Mr. Jewell. It may be Seattle coal.

The Chairman. It is the same thing?

Mr. Jewell. I have no doubt it is the same thing; but it is not a good quality of coal.

-p790-

The Chairman. And that is the nearest point to Honolulu where coal can be obtained?

Mr. Jewell. I think so; yes.

The Chairman. What is the next nearest point?

Mr. Jewell. I do not know of any natural coal bed nearer than in Japan. I do not know any nearer place where they produce coal.

The Chairman. Have you ever used that Japan coal?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; used it invariably out there on the station.

The Chairman. Is it a good coal?

Mr. Jewell. Very good coal.

The Chairman. Is it abundant?

Mr. Jewell. Quite so; yes.

The Chairman. Where do you take it on board ship?

Mr. Jewell. Anywhere; but Nagasaki was the port nearest the coal mines.

The Chairman. You can get it in sufficient quantities at any point to answer your purpose?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Now, the next nearest?

Mr. Jewell. There are coal mines on the Siberian (Kamchatkan) coast, or it may be in the northern island of the Japan group. There was a coal that I tried out there; I think an inferior coal, and not a very large supply. Of course, there are also Welsh coals, and others to be found in Hongkong.

The Chairman. In Souch America are there any coal mines, the product of which is good for steam navigation?

Mr. Jewell. I do not recall any at this time, until you get down in the Straits of Magellan.

The Chairman. How is that coal?

Mr. Jewell. It is a good deal like Nanaimo (Vancouver Island) coal.

The Chairman. Is it an inferior coal?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Hard to get out?

Mr. Jewell. Not too hard to get out; but it is not entirely carbonized. It is a lignite. It is very light, bulky, and burns up rapidly.

The Chairman. You have no knowledge of coals in South America north of the Straits of Magellan?

Mr. Jewell. No; I do not remember any coal mines.

The Chairman. Where do you get coal in Australia?

Mr. Jewell. I do not know.

The Chairman. Did you ever coal a ship at Sidney, Australia?

Mr. Jewell. No.

Senator Frye. They have coal mines there?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Oh, yes. Suppose a fleet of war ships of a modern pattern, first-class war ships, were to sail from any European port, either through the Mediterranean or around the Cape of Good Hope, or around Cape Horn, for the purpose of attacking San Francisco—I will put that as the objective point—would they be able to bring from any European port coal enough to sustain them in their voyage to San Francisco and during a series of naval operations, which would include a siege, say often days, without the assistance of tenders?

Mr. Jewell. No; I think not.

The Chairman. They could not carry in their bunkers coal enough to include a naval operation of that much voyage and that much sea?

Mr. Jewell. No. There is a certain coal endurance which is assigned

-p791-

to these ships, certain number of miles, which is called the steaming radius of the vessel. I think, as a rule, that is exaggerated; at all events, a vessel would arrive on the ground empty. She would not have any coal left. I do not believe it would be possible for any vessel to arrive at San Francisco, under the circumstances which you have mentioned, without coaling in the meantime.

The Chairman. Then any foreign power that undertook to attack our Western coast and had possession of the Sandwich Islands, with a full supply of naval stores, wood, and coal at that point, would they have very much greater advantages than they would have in the absence of their occupation of that port?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Now, reverse the matter. Suppose the United States were in possession of the Sandwich Islands and had the supplies that would naturally be placed in such a position as that, would not that greatly increase the power of the naval defense of the United States?

Mr. Jewell. I should say, decidedly, yes.

The Chairman. Then I take it that you would regard the possession of the Sandwich Islands, the occupation of the Sandwich Islands, or some place there, as being of great strategic advantage as against any foreign country, either Asiatic or European, upon our coast?

Mr. Jewell. I think it would; yes.

The Chairman. In a commercial sense what would be the advantage of the possession of the Sandwich Islands by the United States?

Mr. Jewell. It is immediately in the track of vessels bound from San Francisco to New Zealand and Australia and all the Southern Pacific islands; and it is not far from the direct track between San Francisco and Japan and China. In fact, the sailing route from San Francisco to Japan and China would be in the immediate neighborhood of the Sandwich Islands.

The Chairman. What advantage would that be to the commerce of the United States, or to the United States as a Government, to have these resting places there in the center of the Pacific Ocean?

Mr. Jewell. It would be an advantage to every steamship as a coaling point, and to other vessels for the purchase of supplies of various kinds, provisions, etc.

The Chairman. Is that very necessary or desirable in passing so vast an expanse of water as the Pacific Ocean?

Mr. Jewell. Very desirable, but, of course, not absolutely necessary— ships can carry them across. If it can be done, it is desirable that the supply should be obtained frequently.

The Chairman. If the Sandwich Islands were in possession of some great commercial nation, like the United States, capable of caring for them and securing neutrality and all the requirements of maritime law, navigation, etc., would such an occupation by the United States as I have indicated be of advantage to the commerce of the world?

Mr. Jewell. Of course, it is always desirable to have a stable government in such an important point in the trade route as the Sandwich Islands, and in that sense it would be, of course, an advantage to the commerce of the world.

The Chairman. It would be to the advantage of the commerce of the world that any stable and great power should have the occupation of those islands, rather than a weak and uncertain power.

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Such as would be furnished by the native population of Hawaii?

-p792-

Mr. Jewell. Yes; I should think so.

The Chairman. I suppose you would consider that the commercial affairs of the world would be benefited by having in Hawaii a strong and just government?

Mr. Jewell. I should say so; yes, beyond question.

The Chairman. It would give confidence to capital to embark in trade, I suppose.

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. And increase the exports and imports of the different countries?

Mr. Jewell. I think so.

The Chairman. Do you know any place in any of the seas of the world where greater advantage can be bestowed upon the commerce of the world than could be obtained by the possession of the Sandwich Islands by a great maritime power, one that had the resources to preserve order and facilitate commerce?

Mr. Jewell. No; I do not know any more important point; no place that occurs to me at this particular moment.

The Chairman. Would you say that in a military sense the possession of Gibralter would be any more controlling or any more important to British interests in the Mediterranean than the possession of Hawaii would be to American interests in the Pacific Ocean?

Mr. Jewell. I consider that Gibralter is an extremely important point for the English to hold, because it is one of a chain of forts which they hold and which connects the Suez Canal with the Atlantic Ocean, and perhaps it would be of greater importance to England to retain possession of Gibralter than that the United States should have possession of the Sandwich Islands.

Mr. Chairman. Because Gibralter is one of a chain of fortifications held by England?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; fortified posts.

The Chairman. Which protect England's access to and outlet from the Suez Canal?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. Suppose that there were a canal under American protection through Nicaraugua of equal capacity with, or greater capacity than, the Suez Canal, as a fortified port or place in a chain connecting Hawaii in the center of the Pacific Ocean with our possessions in the United States, the mouth of the Mississippi River, and the various bays and harbors that we have here and the fortifications at Key West, would you then consider that Gibralter is more important to the British people than the possession of Hawaii would be to the American people?

Mr. Jewell. It is hard to make a comparison of that kind; but if the Nicaragua Canal should be put through I consider that the possession of the Sandwich Islands by the United States would be absolutely essential.

The Chairman. And for the reasons that we have been just adverting to?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. I think it would be absolutely essential that the United States should take possession of those islands if the Nicaragua Canal is to be built.

The Chairman. You consider that the two propositions, the building of the Nicaragua Canal and occupation of Hawaii, either by including it in our territory or getting advantages there to enable us to have a naval station at that place, would be of the greatest importance?

-p793-

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes. I say it would be absolutely essential to retain that control of the canal which we are bound to have.

The Chairman. Have you been to Honolulu more than once?

Mr. Jewell. No; only once.

The Chairman. Did you make any examination of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Jewell. No; I did not.

The Chairman. I will ask you in regard to the Bay of Honolulu, and get you, first, to describe its area and in what way it is protected from the inflow of the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

Mr. Jewell. It would be impossible for me to give any idea of the area from memory, because I do not recollect. I only know that the harbor is inclosed within a coral reef, with the exception of the entrance to the harbor of Honolulu. It is entirely closed by the coral reef.

The Chairman. How does it compare in area, according to your present recollection, with the harbor at Boston?

Mr. Jewell. I should say it is more contracted than the harbor of Boston.

The Chairman. Is it more contracted than the harbor of New York?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. You consider New York Harbor, up East River and North River, out to sea?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. My impression is that Honolulu is not an extensive harbor; perhaps it is a mile and a half long and a few hundred yards wide. It has been twenty years since I was there.

The Chairman. On the land side it is surrounded, I believe, by elevations of land?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Considerable elevations?

Mr. Jewell. Quite high mountains along about the interior of the island.

The Chairman. Down about the coast?

Mr. Jewell. Within a short distance of the city.

The Chairman. Where heavy guns could be mounted to protect the harbor?

Mr. Jewell. Yes; Honolulu could be very easily fortified.

The Chairman. Take the best class of guns that we now have and mount them upon the best elevations, how far out would you say would be the radius of the defense that those guns would afford?

Mr. Jewell. You know the range of modern guns is very much greater than that at which any action would probably be fought. I am quite sure that batteries could be arranged to keep any foreign fleet from approaching Honolulu within 5 miles. But I have no doubt if guns were numerous enough they could keep them away still further.

The Chairman. That would be really a sufficient protection against the attack of a foreign fleet?

Mr. Jewell. I think so.

The Chairman. The fleet might destroy the town, but could not take possession lying out there?

Mr. Jewell. They could not take possession; I am not entirely certain that they could destroy the town, except by chance shots.

The Chairman. Such fortifications as occur to you as being possible on those elevations around Honolulu Bay and around the city of Honolulu would be sufficient ro assist in protecting a fleet that might be in the harbor?

-p794-

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes; a fleet could be protected in the harbor.

The Chairman. There is no land barrier between the city of Honolulu and the sea, the ocean?

Mr. Jewell. No, nothing except this coral reef, which is uncovered at low water.

The Chairman. Barely covered?

Mr. Jewell. Yes. You could walk over it some distance at low water.

The Chairman. Water batteries could be established on those coral reefs for the protection of the harbor?

Mr. Jewell. Well, I do not know about that. I should mistrust those coral reefs as a foundation, but they might be sufficiently strong.

The Chairman. If sufficiently good as a foundation, they are sufficiently high out of the water to form good water batteries ?

Mr. Jewell. Yes.

The Chairman. There is nothing to impede the fighting ship inside the harbor or those steamships outside the harbor that you would maneuver with?

Mr. Jewell. Nothing, except the contracted space within the harbor. There would be no space within the harbor for maneuvering vessels. But vessels could lie in the harbor, and by means of lines could be fought in almost any direction.

The Chairman. So that a vessel lying in Honolulu harbor would not be absolutely without power against ships outside?

Mr. Jewell. No; it is entirely open.

The Chairman. It is entirely open?

Mr. Jewell. Oh, yes.

Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, for the convenience of the committee, I desire to put in the record certain naval regulations, and certain orders which I find scattered through these Executive documents in a very hopeless confusion; so much so, that it is almost impossible to find anything in there. I give in first an extract from every naval officer's commission which has been signed by the President. It is in these words:

"And he is to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as he shall receive from me, or the future President of the United States of America, or his superior officer set over him, according to the rules and discipline of the Navy."

I have a copy of the rules, and it is very difficult to get hold of the book. These are the rules and regulations of 1893. I read from the title page:

"The orders, regulations, and instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy, prior to July 14, 1862, as he may since have adopted, with the approval of the President, shall be recognized as the regulations of the Navy, subject to alterations adopted in the same manner. Section 1547, Revised Statutes."

On the opposite page is the following:

"Navy Department,
"Washington, D. C., February 25, 1893.
"In accordance with the provisions of section 1547 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the following regulations are established, with the approval of the President, for the government of all persons attached to the naval service. All regulations, orders, and circulars inconsistent therewith are hereby revoked.
"B. F. Tracy,
"Secretary of the Navy."
-p795-

On page 9 is the following:

"ARTICLE 18.

"1 . Officers of the line only can exercise military command,
"2. Only officers on duty pay can exercise, or are subject to command, except as provided for in article 211.
"3 . On all occasions where two or more ships' expeditions or detachments of officers or men meet, the command of the whole devolves upon the senior line officer.
"4. At all times and places not specifically provided for in these Regulations, where the exercise of military authority for the purpose of cooperation or otherwise is necessary, of which the responsible officer must be the judge, the senior line officer on the spot shall assume command and direct the movements and efforts of all persons in the Navy present.
"5. The senior line officer shall be held accountable for the exercise of his authority, and must not divert any officer from a duty confided to him by a common superior, or deprive him of his command or duty without good and sufficient reason."

On page 13 I read article 31:

"Officers of the Navy shall perform such duty as may be assigned to them by the Navy Department."

On page 15, article 48:

"Officers can not assume command of Army forces on shore, nor can any officer of the Army assume command of any ship of the Navy or of its officers or men unless by special authority for a particular service; but when officers are on duty with the Army they shall be entitled to the precedence of the rank in the Army to which their own corresponds, except command as aforesaid, and this precedence will regulate their right to quarters."

On page 20, section 5 of Article 54 is as follows:

"The officer in command of a ship of war is not authorized to delegate his power, except for the carrying out of the details of the general duties to be performed by his authority. The command is his, and he can neither delegate the duties of it to another, nor avoid its burdens, nor escape its responsibilities; and his 'aid or executive,' in the exercise of the power given to him for 'executing the orders of the commanding officer,' must keep himself constantly informed of the commander's opinions and wishes thereon; and whenever and as soon as he may be informed or is in doubt as to such opinion or wishes, he must remedy such defect by prompt and personal application, to the end that the authority of the captain may be used only to carry out his own views; and that he may not be, by its unwarranted exercise, in any measure relieved from his official responsibilities, which can neither be assumed by nor fall upon any other officer."

Page 66, Article 280, is in these words:

"1. He shall preserve, so far as possible, the most cordial relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States in foreign countries and extend to them the honors, salutes, and other official courtesies to which they are entitled by these regulations.
"2. He shall carefully and duly consider any request for service or other communication from any such representative.
"3. Although due weight should be given to the opinions and advice of such representatives, a commanding officer is solely and entirely
-p796-
responsible to his own immediate superior for all official acts in the administration of his command."

On page 67, article 284:

"On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, he shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof."

On same page, article 285:

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or against any one within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to states as well as to individuals, and in the case of states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the state or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation can not be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required."

Now, I wish to give in the Consular Regulations of 1888:

"Consular regulations prescribed for the use of the consular service of the United States."

Page following title page:

"Excecutive Mansion,
"Washington, D. C., February 3,1888.
"In accordance with the provisions of law, the following revised regulations and instructions ٭ ٭ ٭ are hereby prescribed for the information and government of the consular officers of the United States.
"Grover Cleveland."
"Department of State,
"Washington, February 3, 1888.
"I transmit herewith for your information and government the accompanying revised regulations and instructions which have been prescribed by the President. They are intended to supersede those which have been heretofore issued by this Department, and are to be carefully observed in all respects.
"I am, sir, your obedient servant,
"T. F. Bayard.
"To the several consular officers of the United States."
"Article 7, clause 96, page 33. They are also reminded that the Navy is an independent branch of the service, not subject to the orders of this Department, and that its officers have fixed duties prescribed for them; they will therefore be careful to ask for the presence of a naval force at their port only when public exigency absolutely requires it,
-p797-
and will then give the officers in command in full the reasons for the request, and leave with them the responsibility for action."

Now, I wish to give in an instruction from Secretary Gresham to Mr. Blount, taken from Executive Document 48, page 2:

"Department of State,
"Washington, March 11, 1893.
"To enable you to fulfill this charge your authority in all matters touching the relations to this Government to the existing or other government of the islands and the protection of our citizens therein is paramount and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn."

Then, in Executive Document No. 48, page 455:

"March 11,1893.
"Sir: This letter will be handed you by the Hon. James H. Blount, Special Commissioner by the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands. You will consult freely with Mr. Blount and will receive any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command. You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.
"Respectfully,
"Hilary A. Herbert,
"Secretary of the Navy.
"Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
"Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, etc."

Then, Document 47, page 6:

"Honolulu, March 31, 1893.
"Sir: You are directed to haul down the United States ensign from the Government building, and to embark the troops now on shore to the ship to which they belong. This will be executed at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of April.
"I am, sir, your obedient servant,
"James H. Blount,
"Special Commissioner of the United States.
"Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett,
"Commanding Pacific Squadron."

Now, on page 487 of Executive Document 48:

"United States Legation,
"Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.
"Sir: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command, for the protection of the United States legation and the United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.
"Yours, truly,
"John L. Stevens,
"Envoy Extraordinary, etc., of the United States.
"To Capt. C. C. Wiltse."
-p798-

Then, page 487 of Executive Document 48:

"Sir: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu

for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order. Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs, and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens. You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any changes in the situation.

"Very respectfully,
"G. C. Wiltse,
"Captain U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Boston.
"Lieut-Commander W. T. Swinburne,
"Executive officer, U. S. S. Boston."

The affidavits I have are as follows:

STATEMENT OF A. F. JUDD, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

A short sketch of my life and antecedents may, perhaps, give more credence to what I may say. I was born in Honolulu on the 7th of January, 1838. My father, Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, came with my mother to these islands in 1828. My father was physician to the American mission that had been established here eight years before his arrival here. His profession necessarily brought him into close and confidential relations with the Regent, Kaahumanu, the young King, Kamehameha III, and the high chiefs, who were then a large and influential class. At their earnest request, my father left the mission in 1843 and took office under Kamehameha III, first as interpreter and as a member of the treasury board, and later as minister, which office he held till 1853. We lived for three years on the palace grounds, and for many years I, with the rest of my brothers and sisters, were in intimate companionship in school and out of it with the young chiefs.

I attended the first royal school for a while in which were the sons of Kinau, who became Kamehamehas IV and V, their sister, Victoria Kamamalu, who was Kuhina Nui under her brother, Kamehama IV. At the same school were Queen Emma, Mrs. Bernice Bishop, David Kalakaua, his brother, James Keliokalani, and Liliuokalani, whose name at that time was Lydia Kamakaeha Paki. Several of these went later with me to the second royal school, under Dr. Beckwith. I learned to speak Hawaiian, and have lived continuously in these islands to the present time, with the exception of four years spent in the United States at Yale College, where I graduated in 1862, and at Harvard, where I studied law, returning to these islands in 1864. I have also made several visits to the United States and one to Europe.

My father's record in doing as much as anyone towards the creation of the Hawaiian Government and preserving its independence against the efforts of Great Britain and France are matters of public history. From my association with the Hawaiian people, my frequent visits to all parts of the group, I consider myself well acquainted with the Hawaiians, and admire and love such good qualities as they do possess. I have not spared myself in efforts to enlighten them, having carried on for years temperance and religious work among them. I

-p799-

was secretary to the constitutional convention of 1864, and witnessed the debates of that body which led to Kamehameha V abrogating the liberal constitution of 1852 and promulgating that of 1864. In 1868 I was elected a member of the Legislature without visiting the district that returned me, and I was again elected in 1872, this time from Honolulu. Kamehameha V having died after the Legislature closed, at a special session I voted for Lunalilo in 1873 (January 7), and was appointed his attorney-general, which office I held until Lunalilo died.

The election of a King again coming to the Legislature in February, 1874, I voted for Kalakaua as the best available candidate. He was unpopular with the natives, and if the members of Lunalilo's cabinet, Messrs. C. R. Bishop, E. O. Hall, R. Sterling, and myself, had thrown our influence, with other prominent whites, in favor of Queen Emma, who was the people's favorite, she would have been chosen in spite of Kalakaua's efforts and bribery. But we felt that the influences surrounding Queen Emma were such that English sentiment and ideas would control. We were threatened with a state church, and feared that all the court atmosphere would be adverse to the cultivation of closer commercial and political relations with the United States, which, owing to our geographical position and growing commerce and the character of our white population, were essential to our progress and prosperity. Kalakaua was elected, and a riot occurred, in which the court-house where the election was held was sacked, native members of the Legislature were attacked and beaten, and the town was at the mercy of the mob.

Owing to the timely assistance of troops from the two United States ships then in port and also from the British vessel the riot was quelled. Kalakaua took the oath of office, stating at the time (which I interpreted) that he had intended to promulgate a new constitution, but the riot had prevented it. The Government went on. I was appointed second associate justice of the supreme court February 18, 1874, promoted to first associate 1, 1877, and on the return of Kalakaua from his tour of the world was by him appointed chief justice November 5, 1881, which office I now hold. Having my chambers in the Government building I have been familiar with the political changes that have taken place during the past twenty years, have known all the twenty-six cabinets during Kalakau's reign, and have been kept informed of all important matters of state.

Our law reports and our published opinions will show nothing that would indicate on the part of the supreme court any aversion to a monarchical form of government for these islands. We maintained the personal veto of the sovereign as a constitutional right against much public pressure and under like circumstances of pressure declared in favor of the Queen Liliuokalani's right to appoint her own cabinet on her accession. It was my wish and hope that the autonomy of this archipelago should be preserved for many years to come. That we would lose it eventually was a belief shared by all—English, Americans and Hawaiians—owing to the fading of the native race and the want of material to make kings and queens of.

The justices of the Supreme Court were kept in ignorance of the league which resulted in obtaining from Kalakaua the constitution of 1887. Just before its promulgation Justice Preston and myself were invited to assist in its revision, which we consented to do under a written protest that we did not approve of the method of its promulgation as being unconstitutional. I think that both the coup d'etat of Kamehameha V and the revolution of 1887, though both were accomplished


Previous Page Next Page