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Senator Frye. Yes. Or the testimony of Mr. Swinburne?

Mr. Coffman. I read Lieut. Commander Swinburne's testimony; yes. I spoke about it to Mr. Swinburne, and he said he was probably not in the cabin at the time, as he had so much to do.

Senator Frye. Whom was the note from?

Mr. Coffman. Mr. Thurston.

The Chairman. And addressed to Mr. Stevens?

Mr. Coffman. Cadet Pringle brought the note.

Senator Frye. And he was a messenger from Mr. Thurston?

Mr. Coffman. Yes. He had been at the legation most of the time.

Senator Frye. Which company were you with; where did your troops go?

Mr. Coffman. With the main battalion—the blue jackets.

Senator Frye. To Arion hall?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Frye. Was it not for the protection of life and property, when you took into consideration the state of the city, the situation of the houses, etc., as central a place for their protection as any you could find—I mean Arion Hall?

Mr. Coffman. I do not know what you would call a central location.

Senator Frye. Were not the houses of American citizens on one side as well as on the other side of Arion Hall?

Mr. Coffman. I think there was more American property on Nuuanu avenue, not in the immediate vicinity of Arion Hall.

The Chairman. By American property, do you mean business houses?

Mr. Coffman. Business houses and private residences.

Senator Frye. Private residences, I mean. They are more likely to be burned up?

Mr. Coffman. Yes. I really do not know much about the ownership of property in Honolulu, with the exception of that which is the property of those who claim to be Hawaiians, who, to a certain extent, are of American parentage, and a few Americans.

Senator Frye. Were maps left with the captain?

Mr. Coffman. That I do not know.

Senator Frye. And the instructions were, as you understood them, to protect American life and property?

Mr. Coffman. Yes.

Senator Frye. That you were not to be connected with either government, the establishment of one or the overthrow of the other.

Mr. Coffman. That I do not understand. I went as an officer simply to obey the instructions as I received them.

Senator Frye. And having read Capt. Swinburne's statement, you concur otherwise in what he said?

Mr. Coffman. I have only seen what he said as published in the papers. The Evening Star has a different account from that in the Baltimore Sun. I tried to get something out of it, but it was somewhat mixed.

Senator Gray. When you said you read Capt. Swinburne's testimony you meant that you read the newspaper accounts?

Mr. Coffman. I have not read the testimony before the committee; I have not seen it.

Senator Gray. You have talked it over with Lieut. Swinburne?

Mr. Coffman. Yes; the general situation.

Senator Gray. Do you differ?

Mr. Coffman. We do in some minor points.

Senator Gray. State the minor points in which you differ.


Mr. Coffman. I thought that the battalion was badly placed, if they were there for the sole purpose of protecting American life and property.

Senator Gray. Do you differ in any other respect?

Mr. Coffman. Lieut. Swinburne differs with me as to where was a central place. I will give my reason: If there was to be trouble, that was the place where the trouble would be; and I did not see why we should go to the point where the trouble would occur if persons who were engaged in this trouble should go to that place and claim to be Americans and ask for protection. That is my point. That is the only thing we differed about at all—the mere fact of statements as to where we went and what was done. Mr. Swinburne has, I know, from talking to him time and again, given the facts. We agree on those things.


Senator Frye. What is your age?

Mr. Oleson. I am 43.

Senator Frye. How long have you been living in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Oleson. I have been living there fifteen years.

Senator Frye. What fifteen years?

Mr. Oleson. From August, 1878, until June, 1893.

Senator Frye. Were you in Honolulu through the entire revolution— the recent revolution?

Mr. Oleson. I was.

Senator Frye. And through the revolution of 1887?

Mr. Oleson. Through the revolution of 1887; yes.

Senator Frye. What has been your business in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Oleson. I have been a school-teacher during my residence there.

Senator Frye. What charge have you had?

Mr. Oleson. Two schools. I was appointed to one before I left this country on the large island of Hawaii, and of the Kamehameha Manual- Labor School at Honolulu in 1886. Mrs. Bishop, the last of the Kamehameha royal line, known as Princess Pauahi, left a large sum of money, some half million of dollars, to establish a manual-training school at Honolulu.

The Chairman. Mr. Bishop seems to have been a man of great wealth?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Do you know whether he accumulated his wealth in Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. In what business was he employed?

Mr. Oleson. Commission business at first, and most of the time in the banking business. I think he got the most of his money, or at least he got the large nucleus of his capital, during the whaling days.

The Chairman. He was not connected with planting?

Mr. Oleson. Not planting; but he is a stockholder.

The Chairman. In sugar companies, you mean?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. What companies?


Mr. Oleson. Several. He had more stock in the Lihue company. I think sugar stock in the islands is like railway stock here.

The Chairman. Where was Mr. Bishop originally from?

Mr. Oleson. He came from New York State.

Senator Frye. Have you reduced to writing an account of the proceedings in the Hawaiian Islands during the disturbing times, to which you are willing to testify?

Mr. Oleson. I have. I thought likely I might be called upon for something of the kind.

Senator Frye. You may read it as part of your testimony.

Mr. Oleson. I have made this as personal and as specific as possible.

Senator Gray. And it includes matters within your own knowledge?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I have said nothing here that I was not personally cognizant of, unless it may be some deductions based on what I was personally cognizant of.


Have been a resident of the Hawaiian Islands since August, 1878. Went there from Ohio. During my residence of fifteen years was engaged in educational work among Hawaiians, first as principal of the largest school on the island of Hawaii, and later as organizer and principal of the Kamehameha Manual Training School, established by bequest of Princess Panahi, the last of the Kamehameha royal line.

My fifteen years' residence brought me into close contact with Hawaiians, first at Hilo, and later at Honolulu. Have known, by personal observation, of the changes that have taken place in the political history of Hawaii since 1878, and was present in Honolulu during the revolutions of 1887, 1889, and 1893, being an eyewitness of those events.

Have never held any office or appointment under the Hawaiian Government, and never acted in an official capacity, except in 1887, when, as a member of the committee of thirteen, appointed by the mass meeting of citizens, I went with others to present the demands of the citizens to the King, Kalakaua. My evidence is that of a citizen who knew what was in the minds of the people.

Attended the prorogation of the legislature, Saturday, January 14. I had the impression that it was to be an historic event. I do not know to what I am to lay the impression, except that things were culminating. I had not been in the habit of attending the prorogation of the legislature, having been there only once prior to that time. Noted the absence of the better class of citizens, and of many of the most upright legislators. Later, met some of the legislators on the street, who said, in reply to my question, "What are we going to do?" "We have done all we could in the legislature, and we can do nothing more."

This was the common feeling. Men were disheartened at the dismissal of the Jones-Wilcox cabinet and the passage of the lottery bill, but no one thought of anything else but submission to the inevitable until the next Legislature should meet two years after. It was hoped that the supreme court might decide the lottery bill to be unconstitutional, but I know there was no thought of organized opposition to the Government.

The foreign population that had been united in 1887 in the movement for a new constitution had lost its cohesion through the operation of several causes.


Notably among these was the anti-Chinese agitation, which enlisted the mechanics and tradesmen against the planters and their sympathizers. So long as the foreigners were united they were able to guide the legislation and administration of the Government. When they became divided the leaders of the anti-Chinese agitation joined forces with the natives, and the political leadership fell into the hands of men who had little sympathy with the reform movement of 1887. I wish to state here that when I say foreigners I mean voters in the Hawaiian Islands of foreign extraction, and when I say natives I do not intend to raise any race question, but simply to show that the majority in Honolulu were natives.

The depressing effect of this division was apparent in January. Men despaired of accomplishing anything through organization, and many went to the mass meeting January 16, believing that it would accomplish nothing because of lack of unity. This fact accounts in a measure for the guarded utterances on that occasion. The speakers and the committee of safety were uncertain as to how far they would have the support of the citizens.

I know that the report about the city the forenoon the meeting was held, that Marshal Wilson had forbidden citizens to meet at the armory, created strong feeling and aroused opposition that vented itself in increasing the attendance.

I know that the speakers, with a possible exception, did not voice the indignation of the citizens. During the meeting, and afterwards on the street, men were angry that the resolutions were so tame. It was not until attention was called to the large powers voted the committee that men became satisfied that something adequate would be done to restore public confidence.

The emergencies of 1887 and 1889 had prepared the citizens for decisive action. Word went around, "Have your rifle ready."

Col. Fisher, the real, though not nominal, head of the armed forces of the Provisional Government, told me on Monday afternoon, January 16, "I can get about a hundred of my men out with rifles in ten minutes." Monday afternoon there was suppressed excitement throughout Honolulu. The marshal's antagonism to the gathering of the citizens, the manifesto issued by the cabinet, the counter-meeting to allay excitement, the determination of the citizens at the meeting at the armory, were all cumulative, indicating the certainty of collision, and emphasizing the fact that the city was nominally in the control of a government not having the respect or confidence of its influential citizens, who were at work taking steps to secure for themselves what they otherwise despaired of getting. I know that there was great apprehension of disorder and incendiarism that night.

The landing of the troops allayed this.

Tuesday, January 17, I went into Honolulu (my residence being nearly 2 miles from the city), and learned that definite action was to be taken by the committee of public safety at about 2 o'clock. This was at 1:30 p.m.

I went directly to the office of W. O. Smith, where the committee were in consultation. At the door I learned that the committee would go to the Government building at 2 o'clock to take possession, and that their supporters were to rally at the same hour at the armory. The streets were filled with groups of men earnestly canvassing the situation, and there was a general purpose to stand by the committee at any cost. Men were going home for their rifles and clerks in stores were hurrying to close up.


Starting for the armory, I heard a pistol shot close at hand, around the corner of Fort and King streets, and presently saw a policeman running to the police station with his hands on his chest, where he had been shot in attempting to capture a wagon load of ammunition.

I believe that shot decided the contest. It certainly distracted the marshal and his forces, for they forthwith shut themselves up in the police station instead of proceeding at once to quell the uprising. It revealed the determination of the citizens and resulted in a rapid massing of their forces.

From this time, 2:15 p.m. (that I will not be absolutely positive about, but I judge it is very nearly correct), until the surrender of the police station at about 7 o'clock, citizens were hurrying with their rifles from every part of the city to the Government building, passing through the streets unmolested by the forces under the marshal, or by the soldiers at the barracks.

These men could have been arrested easily except for the panic that had seized the supporters of the old Government.

Marshal Wilson and his supporters remembered the spirit shown by these same men in 1889, when they rallied in a similar way, and, without organization, by their courage and promptness, suppressed the Wilcox insurrection.

Senator Gray. Are you quoting Marshal Wilson there?

Mr. Oleson. No; I say undoubtedly, he remembered that. He remembered the spirit of those men, and that was the reason for the panic.

After the incident of the shooting I hurried to the armory, but before reaching there met Capt. Zeigler with about 40 men marching down Punchbowl street, in military order, all armed, toward the Government building. Just as I reached the armory another company marched in the same direction. There were about 3O men in the latter company.

At the armory there were more men, and others constantly reporting, some with arms, others without, the latter being furnished both with arms and ammunition. As soon as a squad got together Col. Fisher, in charge, sent them to the Government building in charge of officers.

After noting these matters I went past the barracks, noting that the soldiers were all out of sight. When I reached the Government building the last words of the proclamation were being read. The citizens whom I had seen marching from the armory were at the Government building and guards had been stationed. There must have been a hundred men at that time, and they came trooping in from all directions until the station house surrendered. At that time I should estimate there were 4 companies of 60 men each, every man well armed, and the whole well officered.

The United States troops were not in sight when I reached the Government building, with the exception of their two sentinels, and did not show themselves or make any demonstration after that.

I know that the men in the ranks had no expectation of any aid whatever from United States troops. In 1889 they had fought all day against a determined insurrection, with United States troops within a stone's throw, drawn up in line, but absolutely neutral, and they knew they had nothing to expect in 1893 but the same absolute neutrality.

I know by conversation with men in the ranks that they realized that everything depended on their own courage. I know men who, as in 1889, on their own hook, had banded together to occupy buildings in the neighborhood of the police station, intending to lay siege and cut it


off from supplies. The feeling among the citizens was one of indifference towards the United States troops as not being an element in the conflict. I speak of the sentiment and conviction of men on whom was to fall the brunt of the conflict.

I did not learn that Minister Stevens had recognized the Government until the next day, and I am quite sure that it was not generally known until then among the armed supporters of the new Government. I did not hear the matter mentioned, though I was constantly among the men. They were talking rather about laying siege to the station house and about the likelihood of several days' desultory fighting under cover.

There was no mention about the soldiers in the barracks. I explain this as a very natural ignoring of them as combatants in the light of their performances in 1887 and 1889, when they had shown themselves averse to conflict. The citizen soldiers treated them absolutely as though they had no existence.

Senator Frye. That is the Queen's guard you are speaking about?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The conviction was that the citizens were masters of the situation as soon as they took possession of the Government building, and that possession of the other buildings was sure to come as a matter of course.

This conviction was based on the evident panic that had seized the forces under the marshal's command, and on the belief that there was no concert of action among the leading adherents of the Queen, and no fighting material behind them.

In the movement of 1887 I was opposed to the project of a republic, deeming it better to secure safeguards under a continuation of the monarchy.

I have been a consistent supporter of the Hawaiian monarchy, in public and in private, out of deference to the prejudices of the aborigines.

It seemed wise to avoid any such radical change until it was actually thrust upon the community by the inevitable collapse of the monarchy.

The events of Saturday, January 14, convinced me that there was no option left to the intelligent and responsible portion of the community but to complete the overthrow initiated by the monarch herself. It was essentially either a return to semibarbarism or the continued control of the country by the forces of progress and civilization, and few men hesitated in making the choice, and the development of events has confirmed their decision.

Senator Frye. You made a more general statement at Worcester.

Mr. Oleson. No; at Boston.

Senator Frye. Have you that in print?

Mr. Oleson. It was printed, but not by me.

Senator Frye. You have it in print?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Frye. I have looked over the statement just referred to, and I would like, Mr. Oleson, to put that in as additional testimony. It is a little broader than that just read.

Senator Gray. I do not like to object, because we have large latitude; but when a witness is before us, and has read a statement which he has carefully prepared, he should stand on that, and not put in statements that he has made at a public meeting.

Mr. Oleson. This is to explain. It is quite different from the one I have just made. This is a sort of general consideration of the causes leading up to this change. It goes back to twenty years ago.

Senator Gray. It does not relate to these three important days.

Mr. Oleson. It touches upon those days very little indeed.


Senator Frye. It touches it only so far as to indicate that this thing was of gradual growth. As we have been taking testimony this is undoubtedly admissible. It is nothing that you would object to.

Senator Gray. I withdraw my objection.

The Chairman. Do you confirm the statements made in that paper?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I would say that I have incorporated facts here that I was not cognizant of. That is not the case with my statement just read. But such facts have gone on record in the papers and records of the Legislature.

The Chairman. So far as the statements in that paper are within your knowledge they are true?

Mr. Oleson. Exactly.

The statement is as follows:

"At a recent meeting of the Congregational Club, in Horticultural Hall, Mr. William Brewster Oleson read a very interesting paper on Elements in the Political Evolution of Hawaii, as follows:
"I shall confine myself on this occasion to the period of twenty years ago, from January, 1873, to January, 1893. I shall also limit myself to a mere allusion to the more salient events in that brief period of constitutional development.
"An important factor in the political evolution of Hawaii was furnished by the career of Kalakaua, the immediate predecessor and brother of Liliuokalaui.
"In 1873 he advocated his election to the vacant throne by promising to abolish the poll tax, to fill all Government offices with natives, and to remove the prohibitions on the sale of liquor to the aborigines. He was unpopular with his own people, and his rival, Lunalilo, was enthusiastically elected King.
"Soon after Lunalilo died, and on February 12, 1874, Kalakaua was elected King by the Legislature. It was charged, and generally believed, that he was elected by the use of bribes. It is sufficient here to say that he was protected from a mob of his own people, for a period of five days after his election, by United States troops.
"During his reign he dismissed capable and upright officials and filled the civil service with political adventurers, who brought scandal to every department of the Government. He caused grogshops to be licensed in the country districts against the protests of his own people.
"He raised the cry, 'Hawaii for Hawaiians,' hoping thus to curry popularity by exciting race jealousies against foreigners. He sought to create a state church of which he should be the head. His visits to the other islands were utilized for the recrudescence of lascivious orgies of the old heathen religion. He rehabilitated the trade of sorcery, and turned the influence of the Kahunas to his own political advantage.
"He stationed soldiers with side arms in double rows at polling places, thus intimidating voters and pushing men out of line who were suspected of opposition to his schemes, thus forcibly preventing their voting. He appointed legislators to lucrative Government positions while they continued to retain seats in the Legislature.
"He had the Legislature in 1886 adjourn for three weeks so that members who were tax assessors might go home and perform their duties. These men he employed to carry through the Legislature pernicious and extravagant legislation in opposition to the sentiment of the people. He used the royal franking privilege to pass through the custom-
house, free of duty, liquors belonging to certain firms, thus, In one instance, defrauding the Government of revenue to the amount of $4,749.35.
"For this service he received hundreds of cases of cheap gin, which he sent to every voting precinct to secure the election of his candidates to the Legislature. He went personally to one country district, with a company of soldiers, and by their votes defeated Pilipo, the lion of North Kona, Kalakaua's staunchest opponent in the Legislature.
"He laid claim to the 'primacy of the Pacific,' and sent royal commissioners to the New Hebrides and Gilbert Islands and Samoa to prepare for a Hawaiian protectorate over those islands. He warned the great powers of Europe, in a grandiloquent protest, against any further annexation of islands in the Pacific Ocean, claiming for Hawaii exclusive right 'to assist those islands in improving their social and political condition.'
"Finally, he accepted a bribe of $71,000 from a Chinaman, named Aki, for an opium license, which he had already sold and delivered to another Chinaman, who had paid $80,000 for it.
"This career of Kalakaua's had a twofold effect, viz, of arranging in increasing antagonism and bitterness the progressive and retrogressive elements in the population, and of bestowing leadership, on one hand, on the servile partisans of the King, and, on the other, on intelligent Anglo-Saxons, who have, from that time to this, counted as their adherents the more stalwart and independent Hawaiians.
"Another element in the political evolution of Hawaii has been the decay of the native race.
"The census of 1823 showed the population to be 130,313. According to the census of 1890 the native Hawaiians numbered 34,430, a decrease since 1823 of 95,877. The annual decrease since 1866 has averaged 1,085. Thus, since 1860, when the native Hawaiians numbered 66,984, the decrease has been 50 per cent.
"The native Hawaiians now number about one-third of the population. Thus the total population in 1890 was 89,990, of which the Hawaiian numbered 34,430, the Chinese, Japanese, and Polynesians 28,249, and the white foreigners, many of whom were born in the land, 27,305. This decrease of Hawaiians and the corresponding increase of foreigners have depressed the native race, but with an opposite effect on the two radically diverse wings. Thus, on those more susceptible to the corrupting influences of the throne who have fallen into dissipation, and who are seeking their own personal advancement at the expense of all political morality, this alarming decrease has had the effect of exciting intense race hatred.
"Of those, however, who are allied to the churches, who have been stalwart in their resistance to Kalakaua's demoralizing influences, who are to-day the personification of the character and conscience of this remnant of a race, this decrease has had the effect of drawing them into closer and trustful fellowship with the better class of Anglo-Saxons.
"Another element in the political evolution of Hawaii has been the growth of the Anglo Saxon population, which has naturally resulted in the bestowment of political privileges, not otherwise enjoyed even by the Hawaiian people themselves.
"This foreign population pays four-fifths of the taxes. It has furnished the capital and skill in the development of every business and industrial enterprise in Hawaii. It is a resident population, with permanent homes and schools and churches and libraries, and social,
commercial, and industrial organizations. Under its influence the instruction in all the schools is in the English language. It has its chamber of commerce, its social science association, its historical society, its banks and railroads, and electric lighting, and manual training schools, and benevolent organizations, and elemosynary institutions. It constitutes the intelligent, progressive, patriotic, governing ability of Hawaii. Hawaiian churches and schools, and every good work among them, rely on this foreign population for financial assistance.
"The best elements among Hawaiians have in the past twenty years uniformly cast in their lot with the white foreigners, and have gratefully accepted their leadership.
"This foreign population did not possess suffrage rights until 1887. Under the comparatively wholesome reign of the Kamehameha dynasty there had arisen no occasion for foreigners to feel the need of suffrage rights to protect their interests.
"The career of Kalakaua led to several indignation mass meetings. The first, in August, 1880, protested against the summary dismissal, at 1 o'clock in the morning, of a worthy cabinet, having a majority of twenty-four in the legislature. This cabinet was dismissed at the instance of Claus Spreckels, because it would not permit his acquisition of certain Government water privileges in defiance of public interests.
"Two days later another mass meeting compelled the dismissal of the infamous Moreno ministry.
"On June 30, 1887, the patience of the foreign element having exhausted itself, an enthusiastic mass meeting passed resolutions to the effect 'that the administration of the Hawaiian Government has ceased, through corruption and incompetence, to perform the functions and afford the protection to personal and property rights, for which all governments exists, and exacting of the King specific pledges, within twenty-four hours, of future good conduct on the basis of a new constitution.
"The constitution of 1887, subsequently signed by the King, in conformity with the demands of this mass meeting, made 'every male resident of Hawaii, of American or European descent, after one year's residence, a legal voter.' Other privileges were conferred, distinctly enlarging the measure of Hawaiian citizenship, and effectually removing the throne from interference in the Government.
"This arrangement deferred to the traditions of the land, retaining the King as a figurehead, while it placed the responsibility for the Government on a cabinet subject to removal by vote of the Legislature elected by the people.
"Emerging thus from an era of bombastic display and political corruption and gross immorality, for six years Hawaii had a wise administration of affairs.
"Liliuokalani abhorred the constitution of 1887, and after she came to the throne, at the death of Kalakaua, sought to recover the ancient prerogatives of the throne. January of this year, after being baffled in her attempts for months by the majority in the Legislature, found Liliuokalani ready to resort to drastic measures.
"She secured enough votes to oust the best cabinet Hawaii had enjoyed, by agreeing on her part to sign the odious lottery bill. She appointed a ministry in sympathy with her desire for absolute power, prorogued the legislature, and undertook in the presence of her armed
troops to abrogate the constitution of 1887 and to promulgate a new one, making her well-nigh an absolute monarch.
"This lead to the great mass meeting of January 10, 1893, which took steps to organize a new government and to seek annexation to the United States.
"In all their efforts since 1880 to gain reasonably good government and, having gained it, to retain it, the foreign population have never had the slightest aid from any foreign government, either by force of arms or by stroke of diplomacy.
"In 1889, when the police and royal troops proved unreliable and the citizens had to rally and suppress a thoroughly organized rebellion, they learned that the forces of law and order were not to expect, even in such crises, the slightest aid from United States troops, although those troops were ashore and under arms all day in close proximity to the scene of conflict.
"If a timid man, last January, was frightened and hoped for aid and protection from United States troops he had nothing to base that hope upon. The aroused citizens were better prepared to cope with the Queen's forces last January than in 1889, when they so successfully quelled the Wilcox insurrection; and, moreover, the Queen and her cabinet knew it, and discreetly avoided a conflict. Men in the ranks who had the fighting to do knew they must do it themselves. Any other representation is false to facts, which can be amply demonstrated.
"Granting that Mr. Blount sought an honest and impartial verdict on the circumstances attending the establishment of the Provisional Government, the nature of all the evidence submitted is such that another man, equally just and impartial, could have arrived, legitimately, at a diametrically opposite conclusion, with an abundance of facts to establish it.
"This foreign population, that has been such a potent factor in the political evolution of Hawaii, has never taken united action except in behalf of good government. It has been moderate in its demands, humane in its action, patient with the frailties of an effete monarchy, and uniformly considerate of the political rights of native Hawaiians.
"Twenty years of progressive participation in public affairs prepared the foreign population, when the monarchy collapsed, to assume the responsibility for initiating stable and efficient government in the interests of all. This it has courageously undertaken, and with a remarkable measure of success, while awaiting the decision of the United States on the proposal for annexation. It must be borne in mind that the United States was not requested to adjudicate domestic differences in Hawaii, nor was that the ground on which the Provisional Government was accorded recognition by all the civilized nations. Because of its peculiar relations to Hawaii, covering a period of fifty years, this great country was appealed to to provide a basis for progressive, responsible, republican government.
"Such an evolution as I have briefly outlined has crystallized antagonisms and prejudices which it will take years to dissolve, and which would menace and imperil any purely independent national existence. The liability to political unrest, if not actual revolution, would prove as disastrous to Hawaii as in so many instances it has proved to Central American republics.
"The situation is so peculiar as to call for the fostering supervision of some strong foreign power under which it would be possible for an efficient and progressive government to grow up, advantageous alike
to Hawaii and the commercial and humanitarian interests of that vast ocean.
"Such a protective relation the United States has officially declared it will not permit any other nation to assume toward Hawaii. The progress of events demonstrates that, sooner or later, foreign intervention from some quarter is inevitable. If the United States insists that no other nation shall assume the responsibility of guaranteeing in Hawaii the blessings of civilized government, that responsibility the United States is morally bound to accept itself.
"Boston, November 29,1893."

Senator Gray. You say that you arrived at the Government house on the 17th when the last words of the proclamation of the Provisional Government were being read?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. And that you observed about 100 men there?

Mr. Oleson. I immediately went into the Government yard and looked about. I should say that there must have been 100 men inside and outside the building.

Senator Frye. Armed men?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. I understand you did not count them?

Mr. Oleson. No; did not count them. But I have been used to seeing military companies.

Senator Gray. As there have been other estimates, I want to understand whether you counted the men there.

Mr. Oleson. No; I did not count them.

Senator Gray. Did you that afternoon go over to Arion Hall, where the United States troops were?

Mr. Oleson. No; they did not make the slightest impression----

Senator Gray. I asked if you went over there.

Mr. Oleson. No. Coming down Richard street Arion Hall is in full view. I did not see any troops, as I say; I saw but 2 sentries. Richard street is to the west of the palace. If you have a map here, I will trace my course. Here [indicating on the diagram] on the corner of King and Bethel streets was the point from which I started. I went along King to Fort street. I went down to the corner of Merchant, to Mr. Smith's office; came back Fort street to King street to the spot I started from, to see some friends. I came here [indicating], nearly to the corner of King and Fort streets, when I heard the shot. Then I went up Fort street to Hotel street and came through Hotel street to Palace lane. Coming along Hotel street, I went up Palace lane past the barracks. This [indicating] is Palace lane. I went through here up to Punchbowl street; up Punchbowl street to Beretania street, where the armory is. As I arrived here on Palace lane, in full view of Punchbowl street, Capt. Ziegler was passing—going down Punchbowl street. When I got up to the corner of Punchbowl and Beretania there was another company started down Punchbowl street. I went into the armory and shortly afterward came down Punchbowl street to Palace lane, and noted that there were none of the royal soldiers in sight; came down Richard street, and in coming down Richard street Arion Hall is in full view, back of the opera house. I came down through Richard street to Palace Square, down through that little lane [indicating], and went into the Government yard.

Senator Frye. And all the troops that you saw at Arion Hall were the 2 sentries?


Mr. Oleson. Yes. They may have been there, but I did not see them, and I think I should have seen them. I was walking down Richard street with Prof. Scott, and we were talking about the situation and hurrying toward the Government building. We might have been in conversation, and for that reason not have seen them. But my impression is they were not there.

Senator Frye. Not in view.

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. Did you know at that time that the soldiers were stationed there?

Mr. Oleson. Oh, yes; I knew they were there.

Senator Gray. And you did not look to see if they were there?

Mr. Oleson. No. I know they landed the night before and stopped on Mr. Atherton's grounds the night before.

Senator Gray. Who is Mr. Atherton, an American?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. Where is his house?

Mr. Oleson. He is a commission merchant.

Senator Gray. Will you point out his house?

Mr. Oleson. It is right out on King street.

Senator Gray. Has it large grounds around it?

Mr. Oleson. Yes—another house here [indicating], and then his grounds go clear through—extensive grounds.

Senator Gray. Were you out there when the troops were there?

Mr. Oleson. I went out when they were there; yes.

Senator Gray. That was on Monday evening?

Mr. Oleson. That was on Monday evening.

Senator Gray. Were you there when they marched away?

Mr. Oleson. I was not; no.

Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Stevens that day?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. Of course you had no conversation with him if you did not see him ?

Mr. Oleson. I did not see him after his trip to Hawaii.

Senator Gray. Did you know many of these men whom you saw with arms around the Government building that day?

Mr. Oleson. I lived outside of the city; I know a good many men, having little to do with the affairs of the city; I know a good many by name. I know a good many of them were engaged in the revolution of 1887 and 1889.

Senator Gray. Did you talk with any of them that day?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; while we were at the Government building.

Senator Gray. How many of them?

Mr. Oleson. I went from one group to another to see what the sentiment was.

Senator Gray. The men were in groups?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. Not in military array?

Mr. Oleson. A large guard and two companies in line; the others were in the Government building, with arms stacked in the legislative hall.

Senator Gray. They were the men you talked to?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; not the men in line.

Senator Gray. Not the men in the line?

Mr. Oleson. I talked with some of them.

Senator Gray. Whom?


Mr. Oleson. Mr. Adnerson, who was one of my teachers. He was in one of the companies. I had special permission to go to the gate to see some friends who called to see me.

Senator Gray. Were you under arms?

Mr. Oleson. I was under arms; yes.

Senator Gray. Were you attached to any company?

Mr. Oleson. I was attached to one of the companies; yes.

Mr. Gray. Were you walking around all this time while you were under arms and attached to a company.

Mr. Oleson. I did not get my rifle until just before the police station was surrendered; so I was not in line with the other men until that time. I had reported and had been assigned to a company.

Senator Gray. But you were still walking around among the people and around the Government building?

Mr. Oleson. We were allowed to do that; yes.

Senator Gray. Were you in Honolulu when the troops were landed Monday evening?

Mr. Oleson. I was not in the city.

Senator Gray. You did not see them when they landed and marched out?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. It was afterward you heard they were there and went out?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I saw them in the evening, in Mr. Atherton's yard.

Senator Gray. And you saw them in Arion Hall?

Mr. Oleson. I heard the next day that they were in Arion Hall.

Senator Gray. I thought you said you were there when the troops marched back to Arion Hall?

Mr. Oleson. No; I just dropped off a horse car that evening where the troops were. I stopped to see what they were doing there. I asked the people what they were about, what the troops were there for, and the people did not seem to know.

Senator Gray. Did you not know they were there before you started out in the horse car?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. Where were you going?

Mr. Oleson. Out to make a call, I think.

Senator Gray. Where?

Mr. Oleson. I think I went out to Mr. W. A. Bowen's, a friend of mine.

Senator Gray. Where does he live?

Mr. Oleson. It is a street that runs parallel with King street—the second street to the north, running parallel to King street.

Senator Gray. How far out-past Mr. Atherton's?

Mr. Oleson. Oh, yes.

Senator Gray. Beyond Mr. Atherton's?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; quite a distance beyond.

Senator Gray. And you got out when you got to Mr. Atherton's for the purpose of seeing the troops?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. How long were you there?

Mr. Oleson. Just a few minutes.

Senator Gray. Then you went on and made your call?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.


Senator Gray. Hid you come in on the horse cars? When you came in did you see the soldiers ?

Mr. Oleson. I think I came in on the Beretania street line, the next street running parallel with King street.

Senator Gray. And you did not see the soldiers?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. And you did hear where they were?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. You did not hear until the next day, Tuesday?

Mr. Oleson. Tuesday.

Senator Gray. How did you learn it?

Mr. Oleson. I learned it through the morning paper. When I received that I do not know. I did not go into the city until about 1 o'clock.

Senator Gray. And you had your paper before you went into the city?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. You have been an instructor of education and connected with the islands for fifteen years?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. Does that bring you in contact with the native population?

Mr. Oleson. Altogether.

Senator Gray. What do you find among the common people—those whom you come in contact with—in regard to learning, manners, and the ordinary intellectual conditions?

Mr. Oleson. I have a great regard for the Hawaiians, having mingled with them so much, and I have a high estimate as to their good nature and imitative faculties, and as to their fitness for manual employment. I do not think the higher education is suitable for them—I do not think they are fit for it, and having obtained it, they can not make a right use of it.

Senator Gray. But they have had the opportunities?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. Since I have been in the islands my efforts have been to pull down the course of study. They had previously taught them calculus and trigonometry in the schools, but the Kamehameha school did not go beyond algebra. That was put in to please the boys.

Senator Gray. You thought it was better to adhere to the average native capacity?

Mr. Oleson. Certainly. We had extensive manual-training shops there, blacksmith, iron and machine works, wood turning, printing, carpenter work; and it was my aim in organizing the school—I had to overcome many difficulties—to make it a manual-training school, so as to develop the Hawaiians on the side they showed the most aptitude for.

Senator Gray. Do you think they are susceptible of as high training and as broad culture as the white race?

Mr. Oleson. They have very little faculty for originating—they are great imitators. That is shown in their manual-training work; they can do a thing after they are shown how to do it.

Senator Gray. Is not that a characteristic of the inferior races?

Mr. Oleson. Certainly.

Senator Gray. And you would consider them an inferior race?

Mr. Oleson. As compared with the Anglo-Saxon. They have many good traits, lovable traits, and I have cherished a high estimate for the Hawaiians since my residence in the islands. I do not know any men more stalwart than some of them have been under temptation.


Senator Gray. You think that the population is capable of self government in the sense we understand it in the States and with our own race?

Mr. Oleson. With some conditions. Under the leadership of Anglo- Saxons, the Hawaiian population up to 1880 was pretty well divided up, with a majority against any encroachment on the part of the throne on the rights of the people. There was a demand for larger popular rights, and those people stood together. But, as I have undertaken to show in my paper, that majority was dissipated, as the effect of Kalakaua's reign in matters of bribery and intimidation and the revival of the old kahuna system in the country, which tended to subvert and to intimidate the Hawaiians. So that, while I have stayed there, I have witnessed that change. But to-day there is a good proportion of the Hawaiians who are stalwart and firm in their support of annexation as the best outcome for that country—staunch friends of the white man. And the effort made by the white men who have been allied with the reform movement has been to advance the interest of Hawaiians as well as those of the Anglo-Saxon. But there is a large element that is affected, intimidated by the throne, and they are indifferent to-day. They do not dare to do anything, much less take one side or the other. They can be appealed to by race prejudice in ways that the Anglo-Saxon can not approach them; and in that way the electorate is subverted, and, in my opinion, no matter how much I may think of the native, it is impossible to get an adequately representative vote among them

Senator Gray. Do you think a successful and prosperous government for the good of all interests, native as well as all others, is possible on those islands, except under a strong government ruled and controlled by men of our own race?

Mr. Oleson. Our race has always ruled the government, and I do not see any reason to change my opinion as to the necessity; that is history; that is the outlook. I do feel that the continuation of such a government as they have there now will eventually swing over to the side of the present government a large number of the natives, it may be a majority.

Senator Gray. The government you have there is a Provisional Government, and under the control of the superior race of the islands?

Mr. Oleson. It is entirely.

Senator Gray. And it is strong?

Mr. Oleson. It is strong in every sense of the word.

Senator Gray. It is autocratic?

Mr. Oleson. No; it is oligarchy.

Senator Gray. Oligarchy describes it better than the word I used?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. I accept your word as better than mine.

Mr. Oleson. I think it is an important matter to show how it was that the men who formed the committee of safety were able to take possession of that Government, and to call attention to that public meeting that was held in the public square on the same day that the meeting was held in the armory.

It was the general opinion on every side that the public manifesto of the Queen and cabinet announcing that there would be no further attempt from the throne to promulgate a constitution was a desperate move to placate the indignant foreign population. The mass meeting in Palace Square was engineered by the cabinet and the marshal who publicly stated that such men as Wilcox and Nawahi were not to be


speakers. He said "We have given orders that the tone of the speaking must be moderate." Nawahi and Wilcox did speak, men who had always been fiery agitators and persistent in their demands for a new constitution. This meeting, made up of advocates of a new constitution, the leaders of which had conspired with the Queen to secure such constitution, voted an expression of thanks to the Queen for her manifesto.

Men knew that this action was insincere, as they also believed the Queen's to be, and the effect of the meeting and of the manifesto was to convince the community of the panic that had seized the Government and of their readiness to resort to any expedient to allay the indignation of the people and to prevent their organization. It was these considerations that help to explain the passivity of the Queen's forces and the ease with which the Provisional Government assumed control.

Senator Gray. Did you hear those orders given?

Mr. Oleson. Marshal Wilson told it to a gentlemen who told it to me.

Senator Gray. Marshal Wilson did not tell it to you?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Gray. You were asked to confine yourself to facts that came within your own observation and what you knew. That is argumentative.

The Chairman. You are evidently speaking of matters which you know of only by common repute.

Mr. Oleson. I speak of matters in addition—matters of common talk on the streets after the mass meeting.

The Chairman. But not of matters within your personal knowledge?

Mr. Oleson. Certainly; knowledge of the character of these men who were speaking.

The Chairman. You believed it, but you did not hear it?

Mr. Oleson. I passed by the meeting. I know that those men were there.

The Chairman. Were they speaking?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I believe they were speaking.

The Chairman. Which one?

Mr. Oleson. Mr. Robert Wilcox, I think.

Senator Gray. Were you present at both meetings?

Mr. Oleson. I passed by one to the other; yes.

Senator Gray. What is your estimate of the number of persons present at the two meetings—a fair estimate?

Mr. Oleson. I should say that the numbers at the armory were considerably in excess of those at the public square. But there were men continually going to and fro.

Senator Frye. The public square meeting was a Royalist meeting, and the armory meeting was the Provisional Government meeting?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. You say that you think the numbers in the public square were less than those in the armory ?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I judge so.

Senator Gray. The meeting in the armory was in the building?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. And the meeting in the square was in the open?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Gray. Were you not a little careful of comparing the numbers of those in the open to those in the four walls of the building?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I have been used to judging audiences, and I judged at the armory there were some 1,200 present. One of the

S. Doc. 231, pt 6----55


editors of the paper stated that by actual count there were a little less than 1,100. He gave the actual numbers at the time.

Senator Gray. How far were those meetings apart?

Mr. Oleson. A little less than a quarter of a mile.

Senator Gray. Short distance enough to allow a shifting back and forth?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; there were very few went away from the meeting in the armory; but there were others outside, representing the indifferent class, to see how the thing was going. They would range themselves at the public square meeting, as on other similar occasions, on the sidewalk toward the palace, when the meeting was on the other side of the railroad track.

Senator Gray. You were at both meetings?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. You spoke of having a feeling of friendship for the Hawaiian people?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. And the Hawaiian character?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Will you state whether that is a common feeling amongst the white men of Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. That is a very difficult question to answer. There are two classes of white men in the country: it is doubtful which class is the more numerous. The more recent class in the country have a low estimate of the native character; but the older residents of the country have always been friendly, and have had an attraction toward the Hawaiians, and have always done a great deal for them.

The Chairman. That is the body of the people which you call missionaries?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; the older residents, who have known Hawaiians outside of Honolulu—known them under circumstances different from those which have come up since 1880.

The Chairman. In the Hawaiian Islands, who are classed as missionaries?

Mr. Oleson. Any man who is in favor of good order and against pernicious legislation is a missionary.

The Chairman. And so classed?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. And it is no matter whether he is of correct life or not.

Senator Gray. Because the missionary element leads that movement?

Mr. Oleson. I do not know, except that it comes about incidentally.

Senator Gray. Is it not a fact that the descendants of those missionaries, being descendants of our own race and blood, and living there and having an interest in the islands, are supposed to have an interest that does not belong to the later comers, to those more transient?

Mr. Oleson. In the native race, you mean?

Senator Gray. Yes.

Mr. Oleson. Yes?

The Chairman. The native race have a respect for the real missionary?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. There is hardly a man, an old resident, who has been in public life, who has any prominence in this movement, who has not at one time or another represented an almost entirely native constituency in the legislature.


The Chairman. There seems to be a progress made in all educational development, Christian development, etc. Is that the work of the class called missionaries?

Mr. Oleson. I think it comes from the fact of their residence among the missionaries; yes.

The Chairman. And that gives impulse to all these movements to enlightenment and civilization in Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. The conditions have changed now. In earlier times, when the white population was less in number than now, the affiliations were greater between the Hawaiians and the whites, because they were thrown among each other in matters of residence— they were out in the country nearer together. The plantation system has broken that up; and the political situation—I speak of the revolution— has also brought about that change.

The Chairman. Is the progress of education in Hawaii due to the efforts of this party called the missionaries—the old missionaries there?

Mr. Oleson. I should say that all the intelligent and law-loving members of the community (with possible exceptions which can be explained) are in this movement. Those exceptions are men who are more or less connected with the embassies, or who are agitators of anti- American ideas, who, being adventurers in that country, have but little or no property interests—are interested in the schemes for smuggling opium, or laws which are intended for their personal interests. They use the natives, but they have no real regard for them. I can put in, use and abuse. I know about the attitude of this class who are at the head of the Government in relation to the schools.

The Chairman. Do you mean the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; men who are influential in it. I know of their generosity in the way of support of Hawaiians in the schools. I have had connection not only with the two schools I mentioned, but others; and I know the help granted by these men has been enormous. They have supported individuals in the schools, and have done it because of aloha for the natives.

The Chairman. Has there been a general dissemination of knowledge of English amongst the Hawaiians in the elementary studies?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. But a great many of them are able to read in an English book who can not talk English, except indifferently.

The Chairman. My question had reference to the extent.

Mr. Oleson. It is extensive in the sense that the Hawaiians can read and write as perhaps no other people can according to population.

The Chairman. Since you have been living in Hawaii, have you seen any marked progress in morality or personal respectability amongst what you call the Hawaiians, the native Kanakas?

Mr. Oleson. I think that in the city of Honolulu there is much more immorality than there is out in the country. I shall have to associate my observation in Honolulu with that of an observer in Hilo. In the country, the commingling of the races and the immoralities which are the bane of Hawaiian social life are not so excessive and flagrant as in the city of Honolulu. But there are causes for that, of course.

The Chairman. But as a general rule or result, has the influence, the efforts of the missionary party (I will call them), in Hawaii been beneficial or otherwise to the people?

Mr. Oleson. Beneficial to the people. I do not think there has been


a single thing gained by the Anglo-Saxon population that has not been shared with the Hawaiians. There has been no race feeling whatever on the part of the influential foreigner in the political reforms of recent years. One point showing race animosity on the part of Hawaiians was when the appointive power of the King for nobles was taken away from him and the nobles were made elective by the people. This was not to be by the fullest, broadest suffrage rights, but by limitations, educational and property, and the Hawaiians claimed that was inimical to them. But as a matter of fact there are a great many Hawaiians who are noble voters who are within those qualifications. I was present when some of the articles of that constitution were discussed, and I personally, with others, made a strenuous movement at the time, and it was pretty well supported, to make that property qualification less than was proposed, so as to take in the Hawaiian ministers. The Hawaiian ministers have, in a measure, been the backers of good government.

The Chairman. Let me ask you if these kindly measures and good efforts of the party which you now call the missionary party seem to have been influenced by the motive of selfish gain or aggrandizement, acquisition of power, or one of real generosity toward the people of Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. I think it has been one of generosity toward the people of Hawaii; a movement in their own interest. You may speak of it as a selfish movement, if you take the demand and determination to have a good government as selfish interest. It was not any sordid movement; it had its source in moral considerations.

The Chairman. That has characterized the whole interests of Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. Yes, one little fact will show you the character of the members of the Provisional Government and of the advisory council as men who, giving a great deal of valuable time to the necessary legislation of the present Government, are men receiving no salary whatever. The nobles received no salary whatever under the constitution of 1887.

The Chairman. Was there, at the date of this revolution, to your knowledge, any organization whatever, secret or open, for the purpose of dethroning the Queen?

Mr. Oleson. No.

The Chairman. Or for the purpose of annexing the islands to the United States?

Mr. Oleson. No.

The Chairman. If such an organization or combination had existed, would you have kncwn it?

Mr. Oleson. I would have known it.

The Chairman. Are you satisfied to state that there was no such organization ?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. When did you first hear of the movement to dethrone the Queen?

Mr. Oleson. That was whispered after the mass meeting. Men came from that and said: "Why don't they do something?" Large powers were given to the committee of safety to go on and organize the government, and men said, "That means that the Queen is out."

The Chairman. That was the first time you heard of it?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. After the mass meeting?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; I do not know that that committee, previous to


the meeting, expected to be backed to such an extent as to warrant them to go on; but, as I say, that is my opinion.

The Chairman. Amongst the Americans there in Hawaii, since you have resided on the islands, has there been any evident disposition to promote annexation to the United States?

Mr. Oleson. There has been no concerted attempt; it has been written on publicly in the papers. Men have advocated it in the papers, and Hawaiians have advocated it more than the Americans.

The Chairman. Do you speak of the Kanakas?

Mr. Oleson. Native Hawaiians. I am not speaking of the white people.

The Chairman. You said the Americans?

Mr. Oleson. No, the Kanakas, the native Hawaiians.

The Chairman. That they have advocated it more strenuously than the white people?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. I mean in public.

The Chairman. Then it was a subject of open political discussion?

Mr. Oleson. Yes—only that it was not very common; once in a while there would be something about it in the papers; some one would say something of it.

The Chairman. It is a topic that has been discussed?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; for a good many years.

The Chairman. Has there been any disposition evinced, to your knowledge, of annexation to any other country, or toward claiming a protectorate of any other country than the United States?

Mr. Oleson. No. When that has been broached in my presence I have uniformly heard disapprobation of it. That is the sentiment of the native Hawaiians, Kanakas, as well as amongst the Americans, and also among many of the English.

The Chairman. Do you know whether they celebrate our National days there?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; the Fourth of July has been the celebration day since I have been in the country.

The Chairman. Do the Kanakas celebrate?

Mr. Oleson. They do not participate in the speeches; but they do in the sports, the prizes, etc.—boat races.

The Chairman. They enter with enthusiasm into the celebration as a national fete.

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. How about the Thanksgiving that is proclaimed by the President of the United States?

Mr. Oleson. That day is observed in a quiet way; it is a semiholiday— the Hawaiians do not size that up, quite.

The Chairman. I notice that Mr. Willis mentions that it is observed?

Mr. Oleson. It is observed; but not anything like the Fourth of July.

The Chairman. Would you say that there was a feeling amongst the general population, white and Kanaka, of the Hawaiian Islands of a decided character in favor of the United States as a friendly government, or as the one to which they would ultimately look for protection in any emergency?

Mr. Oleson. I think that that is the majority sentiment in that country among all classes.

The Chairman. Has it been such since you have resided there?

Mr. Oleson. No; I think it has been gradually growing, as men of


all classes have faced what they uniformly agreed was inevitable for Hawaii.

The Chairman. Upon what ground do you base that conclusion— that the monarchy must inevitably collapse?

Mr. Oleson. To, first, the dying out of the Kamehameha line; second, the abuses of the reign of Kalakaua among the Hawaiians, not yet become extinct. There was intense opposition to him when he became King. That lies dormant in the minds of the Hawaiians— that these kings are not high chiefs, that there must be an end to their rule sooner or later, and that they must have a government from elsewhere.

The Chairman. If you believed Kalakaua to be a heathen, why did you not attempt to overthrow him in 1887?

Mr. Oleson. There was a very strong sentiment to do it at the time.

The Chairman. Do you know the reason why it was not put into effect?

Mr. Oleson. As I said in my statement, because those men who were influential felt that it was better not to make any such radical change until the country was ripe for it and the situation demanded it.

The Chairman. You have been waiting for public sentiment to ripen upon this question and the coming of events to show that it was better for the safety and security of good government in Hawaii that the monarchy should fall?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Be substituted by a different form of government?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; as a logical sequence.

The Chairman. Monarchy through the world is regarded as being a stronger form of government than a republic. Did the people of Hawaii expect that when the monarchy should cease they would be able to establish and maintain a republican government in Hawaii of their own resources and without assistance from any other country?

Mr. Oleson. No; I did not, personally; and those that I talked with did not. We felt that it was impossible in the light of past experience, and of the facts that we knew, for us to sustain an independent national existence there.

The Chairman. So that, at the collapse of the monarchy, whenever that should occur, it was intimately associated, as I understand, with the idea of annexation to the United States?

Mr. Oleson. That was the solution of it.

The Chairman. And the two ideas ran together?

Mr. Oleson. Ran together. It was just as if the men had said "We will go on with the monarchy as long as we can, and when we can not the United States will take us."

The Chairman. That was the whole idea?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. The idea of going on separately from the United States without the protection of the United States or the other countries has not been entertained?

Mr. Oleson. That has not been entertained, except by Ashford and Wilcox, as I deem very natural, when we consider their personal interests lay in the direction of maintaining a republic. They would then be able to dicker with the United States and get appointments in that way. But I do not think men of intelligence have for a moment thought of it. They may be able to do it, after all, and sustain their rights. But when men followed this movement, they followed it as a tentative matter and thought that was the only responsible government


they could get in the islands at the time. But the ultimate out come must be annexation to the United States.

The Chairman. The present provisional forces of the Provisional Government, that the Government seems to be able to equip, arm, and pay, as I gather from this testimony, are about 1,200 men.

Mr. Oleson. I do not know that there are as many as that to pay. Some of the volunteer forces are not under the pay of the Government.

The Chairman. Omitting the question of pay, the present military force of the Provisional Government is 1,200 men.

Mr. Oleson. I think between 1,200 and 1,500.

The Chairman. Are those men well armed and equipped?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. With modern guns?

Mr. Oleson. With modern guns; yes.

The Chairman. And modern ammunition?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Are they composed most largely of the white race?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

The Chairman. Are there any native Kanakas enrolled in this force?

Mr. Oleson. I think there are some. Kanakas are not fighters.

The Chairman. They are not belligerent?

Mr. Oleson. They are in talking; but not beyond that.

The Chairman. They are a passionate people, and might be roused into hostility?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; but in cold blood I do not think the native would fight.

The Chairman. Suppose the Queen had the means of arming 1,000 or 1,200 natives, an equal number of natives, with equal facilities of all kinds, arms, ammunition, equipments, such as the Provisional Government forces have, and of placing such men under such drill as would make of them soldiers who could be handled in action, what would be your opinion of the ability of that number of Kanakas, thus armed and equipped, to stand against 1,200 white men?

Mr. Oleson. Wholly hypothetical.

The Chairman. What is your opinion?

Mr. Oleson. I do not think they would stand at all.

The Chairman. DO you think they would ever attempt to stand?

Mr. Oleson. No.

The Chairman. You think they have such an estimate of the courage of the white race, and of that race's fighting quality, that they would not make a stand against them?

Mr. Oleson. They would not.

The Chairman. Although they were perfectly armed, equipped, organized as an army ready to defend the Queen?

Mr. Oleson. Yes; they could not be depended upon—that has been proven repeatedly.

The Chairman. By actual experience?

Mr. Oleson. By actual experience.

The Chairman. Take the Queen in her present condition, with her present resources, present playing upon the affections of the Hawaiian natives, do you apprehend that she has any possible chance of reinstating herself upon the throne?

Mr. Oleson. Not at all; and she has not had any chance since January 14; not the ghost of a chance to reinstate herself by any force she could marshal in the islands.


The Chairman. So that, in a conflict, native Kanakas under the leadership of the Queen could not stand against the forces under the leadership of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. That would be out of the question. That is my personal opinion.

The Chairman. That is what I am after, your personal opinion.

Mr. Oleson. In saying that I do not impute anything against the natives; it is simply due to the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon people.

The Chairman. As I understand your opinion, the Kanakas are not a military people, not aggressive?

Mr. Oleson. No, not aggressive. They will expose themselves to danger; are physically strong and able men. They are the reliance of the industries of that country, so far as the demand is for strength and daring. The interisland steamers, which require dexterity, courage, and strength, are manned by the Hawaiians. It is the only force in the islands to do that work.

The Chairman. Then you think they would make excellent sailors?

Mr. Oleson. They are. I have met them in New England. They had been sailors, and they had been all around the world.

The Chairman. Are they fond of their calling?

Mr. Oleson. Yes. Very much attracted to it.

The Chairman. Would you say that the Kanaka population, taking them at large, are what we would call a governing people?

Mr. Oleson. No; they are not.

The Chairman. Do you think they would have the requisite skill in the enactment of laws (if that were left entirely to them) to build up and maintain good government?

Mr. Oleson. They could not do it.

The Chairman. You think a legislature composed entirely of Kanakas, without respect to their intelligence, and including the highest order of intelligence, and a Kanaka cabinet, could not control the Government of Hawaii?

Mr. Oleson. No; they could not.

The Chairman. You are perfectly satisfied on that point?

Mr. Oleson. Perfectly satisfied on that point. That is the case. By a late paper from Honolulu—I do not know whether you would rather have it or not—I see that President Dole has called upon Dr. Trousseau to explain certain testimony which he had given against President Dole, and calls for retraction. It is very brief. If you would like to have it I will pass it to you.

The Chairman. You can put it in if you think it will reflect any light.

Mr. Oleson. I think it will show that President Dole was not concerned in any conspiracy. And another thing, where Dr. Trousseau said he knew by personal knowledge of these things, in his retraction he states he got his information from a source which he supposed was reliable.

The Chairman. Have you seen any denial of their authenticity by Trousseau or Dole?

Mr. Oleson. No. In a later paper he made a retraction to 3 other men whom he had mentioned in the same connection—4 other men.

Senator Frye. In reference to the protection of Ameiican life and property, was the location of the troops at Arion Hall a central location?

Mr. Oleson. It was a central place for a rendezvous. The two main streets are at an angle—King street and Nuuanu street—and Arion


Hall was a central location from which to scatter the troops in squads to available points. I do not well see how they could have been better located for the protection of life and property to better advantage than there.

The Chairman. Was there anything to prevent the location of those troops in Arion Hall when you went out to the Government building and the proclamation was being read—anything to prevent the loyalists from making an attack on the men who entered the Government building?

Mr. Oleson. No; the Queen's forces had plenty of ways in which they could have gotten there without passing by the United States troops, even if the United States troops had been out, which I do not admit.

Senator Frye. But if the United States troops were in their quarters there was nothing to prevent an attack being made by the loyalists on the men of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. No.

Senator Frye. Was there anything in those mass meetings which were held to prevent an attack by the Queen's forces?

Mr. Oleson. No; the nominal Government could have suppressed by the force they had in their hands that mass meeting; but they did not dare to do it, because it would have aggravated things so that they would have gone to their worst.

Senator Frye. Peterson, and Colburn, and Neumann, and Rosa, being then the agents of the Queen and the Queen's cabinet as she formed it after she had removed the Wilcox-Jones cabinet, were they reputable men in the islands?

Mr. Oleson. I never considered any of them to be.

Senator Frye. Did you have any acquaintance with Mr. Stevens?

Mr. Oleson. Yes.

Senator Frye. What was your estimate of him?

Mr. Oleson. I had a high estimate of Mr. Stevens as a man who was exceedingly discreet in his bearing toward events there. I feel that he was placed in a very difficult position at the time the troops were landed, on account of the merely nominal hold which the Government had on the situation—it was practically in the hands of the irresponsible portion of the community; there was practically no government that had any respect of the people. I have heard since that Minister Stevens did not request permission of the Government that the troops be allowed to land. If he had made any such request and it had been denied, I do not think Minister Stevens would have been justified in not landing the troops. There was no government; there was no agreement on a plan of action among the leaders of the nominal government; there were disagreements amongst them; there was no confidence, on the part of the intelligent portion of the community, in them, so that in that sense, while they had nominal control of things, it was simply a nominal government.

Senator Frye. Did you at any time, in your investigations and in your conversations with the men who were connected with the Provisional Government, obtain from them any idea that they expected any assistance from United States troops?

Mr. Oleson. No; not the slightest. I never heard it whispered, and I was in a way to meet a great many of the men on whom the fighting was to depend, if there was to be any fighting. They did not look for any assistance at all.

Senator Frye. Is it your opinion that it was a fact that the presence


of the United States troops on shore had any effect in dethroning the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. I do not think it had the slightest.

Senator Frye. And if the troops had remained on board ship the same thing would have happened?

Mr. Oleson. I think the same thing might have happened. But I think something else would have happened—there might have been irresponsible parties turned upon the community, and incendiary fires and bloodshed might have followed.

Senator Frye. But as to the establishment of the Provisional Government?

Mr. Oleson. As to the establishment of the Government, I do not think it made any material difference.

Senator Frye. Mr. Chairman, I received by this morning's mail, from Charles L. Carter, one of the commissioners, three or four statements which were printed in the public papers of Honolulu, containing, over the signatures of the men who are purported to have written them, contradictions of the testimony of Dr. Trousseau, who appears several times as a witness in Mr. Blount's report. I ask that they be incorporated in this testimony. One is from Sanford B. Dole, one from Chief Justice Judd, and one from Alfred S. Hartwell in answer to some statements made by Dr. Trousseau that these gentlemen, together with others named, had been for a long time in the habit of meeting at the office of the minister of the United States and conspiring to produce the revolution of 1893. They contradict Dr. Trousseau right straight through. They are as follows:

Trousseau once more—He is again brought to a reckoning—This time President Dole secures a retraction of some statements to Blount.

Honolulu December 27, 1893.
George Trousseau, M. D.:
Dear Sir:I notice in Mr. Blount's report, of which I have a copy on page 284 of Part II, the following statement in your letter to Mr Blount, dated May 16, 1893:
"Almost daily, to my personal knowledge, meetings were held at Mr. Stevens's house in which the possibilities of a peaceful revolution with the prospects of annexation were discussed. Prominent at these meetings were the chief justice, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, Charles Carter, and others, also Capt. Wiltse."
This statement, which has been published in the Commercial Advertiser at Honolulu, is incorrect as regards myself. I was never present at any such meetings, nor was I aware that such meetings were held until informed of it by the publication of your statement to that effect.
I desire that you will make due reparation in the matter with the same publicity which the above statement has already received.
I am, very sincerely, yours,
Sanford B. Dole.

December 28, 1893.
Hon. S.B. Dole,
President of the Provisional Government:
Dear Sir: When I made to Mr. Blount the statements you refer to in your letter of the 27th, I believed them to be correct, as my information came from a source that I could not consider but reliable.
In spite of difference of opinion and bitterness of feeling on my part engendered by the vile abuse I have been submitted to by your political side, I have always considered you as a gentleman.
You say that you attended no meetings at Mr. Stevens's house; let it be so; I accept your word for it.
Very respectfully yours,
G. Trousseau.

Trousseau and truth—Where they fail to agree in their evidence—Chief Justice Judd and Judge A. S. Hartwell deny statements of his to Blount.

Editor Star:
Dr. Trousseau's statements to Mr. Blount, so far as they refer to me, are totally untrue. I never met any of the gentlemen named by him at Mr. Stevens's house. I never attended any meeting with the gentleman named or with any others at Mr. Stevens's house, or at any other place, where annexation was discussed.
I do not consider that I owe my "social and pecuniary position" to the natives, although I believe I have their confidence and good will. Before my appointment to the bench, now nearly twenty years ago, I was receiving a handsome income from my practice at the bar; greater than my salary as second associate justice, which was my first appointment.
I took no part whatever in the revolution of January, 1893, nor was I informed of the plans of the movers in it. I had no more information than any other "outsider."
A. F. Judd.
Honolulu, December 26, 1893.

Gen. Hartwell's denials.

Editor Star:
When Dr. Trousseau, in his statement to Blount and letter to Nordhoff, says that "meetings were held at Mr. Stevens's house in which the possibilities of a peaceful revolution were discussed," and that "prominent at these meetings were the chief justice, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, Charles Carter, and others, also Capt. Wiltse," Dr. Trousseau says, as far as I am concerned, that which is untrue. Mr. Charles T. Gulick's statement to Blount contains similar language with that of Dr. Trousseau, adding the expression that the persons named were so managing as to "save their precious carcasses." Mr. Gulick will be pleased to consider my denial of the truthfulness of both Nordhoff's and Dr. Trousseau's statements of the meetings in question, as applying also to his untruthful statement, in so far as I am concerned.
But while it so happens that I never attended any such meetings as Dr. Trousseau and Mr. Gulick have taken the grave responsibility of asserting, it is true that talk of revolutions has been rife here for years. The dread of it has been the main cause of many financial difficulties.
The viciousness of the above-mentioned statements of Messrs. Trousseau and Gulick is in the impression which they were meant to fix that we were plotting revolution, since otherwise such statements would be nothing but old women's gabble
So far from plotting revolution, the people who are today supporting the Government of Hawaii, and who aided in its establishment, were to a man, as I believe, opposed to the attempts at revolution which were under several discussions in the early part of the year 1892, and for which attempts the arrests for treason were made spring before last.
For even defending those treason cases in court I found myself the subject of harsh criticism from many persons who are now staunch Government men and annexationists.
Messrs. Blount and Nordhoff have fallen into the absurd but grave error for which Dr. Trousseau and Mr. Charles T. Gulick have made themselves responsible, of supposing that Mr. Stevens and his friends were trying to bring about the revolutionary results, for attempting which Robert Wilcox, V. V. Ashford, and some 16 other Hawaiians were examined before a judge on a charge of treason.
Dr. Trousseau's suggestion to Blount that the ex-Queen propose a cession of Hawaii to Grover Cleveland and then abdicate, and that "all of us will assist," such result shows his view of the situation apart from his "point of view,"
Alfred S. Hartwell

Adjourned to meet to-morrow, the 20th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.

Washington, D. C, Saturday, January 20, 1894.

The sub-committee met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan) and Senators Butler, Gray, Sherman and {{sc|Frye}, and Davis of the full committee.


The Chairman. What is your age?

Mr. McCandless. I am 40 years of age.

The Chairman. What is your occupation?

Mr. McCandless. In the Hawaiian Islands, an artesian-well driller.

The Chairman. What is the place of your nativity?

Mr. McCandless. Pennsylvania.

The Chairman. Are you of American parentage?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. When did you go to Hawaii?

Mr. McCandless. I went to Hawaii in 1881.

The Chairman. Did you go there to experiment in the boring of artesian wells?

Mr. McCandless. No; at that time it had passed that state, and the fact had been proven that they could get an artesian well. They had half a dozen at the time I arrived there.

The Chairman. To what part of the Islands did you go?

Mr. McCandless. Except seven months I have been on the island of Oahu all the time.

The Chairman. Did you get wells there?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you get water enough from the wells for sugar planting?

Mr. McCandless. Yes. On the island of Oahu they get water from artesian wells as well as from the mountain streams.


The Chairman. Are there large plantations on the island?

Mr. McCandless. Yes. In 1890 one plantation had a capitalization of half a million, and they ran in debt another half a million before they got started.

The Chairman. How many hands does that sugar plantation employ?

Mr. McCandless. 600. On the island of Kauai we get artesian wells, but the water does not rise over 6 feet above the sea level. In most cases they have to pump the water.

The Chairman. Can not siphons be run out?

Mr. McCandless. No.

The Chairman. Do you bore in the flats?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; the flats near the sea level.

The Chairman. Is the geological construction of the islands of such a character as would warrant, in your opinion, the belief that that is going to be a valuable source of water supply in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. McCandless. There is now invested in artesian wells in the Hawaiian Islands about a half million dollars. We have ourselves done $100,000 worth of the work, and it is quite an industry.

The Chairman. It is on the windward that they have the wells?

Mr. McCandless. On both sides of the island of Oahu. The artesian-water belt extends all around the island of Oahu, with a few exceptions, where we were unable to get water.

The Chairman. Do you find the water in pockets or in the stone?

Mr. McCandless. We find it in the lava formation of the islands.

The Chairman. You drive the well down until you find the percolation of the water of sufficient strength to force an overflow?

Mr. McCandless. It is in the decomposed lava and the washing of centuries, which make a packing to keep it in, and of course we go to the open rock and get the water.

The Chairman. Do you look forward to the artesian system as one that is going to be valuable to that country?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Your labors in Hawaii, I suppose, have carried you amongst the people in the country?

Mr. McCandless. Yes.

The Chairman. Have you familiarized yourself with the character and condition of the people of Hawaii?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; our business has taken us all around the island of Oahu.

The Chairman. Have you had occasion to visit other islands also?

Mr. McCandless. The first well we drilled in the Kingdom was on the island of Hawaii. We were there seven months. That was a complete failure. Outside of that I have not been off the island of Oahu.

The Chairman. I will ask you now to state briefly what you found to be the condition of those people as to the comfort of living at their abodes.

Mr. McCandless. They lived in the country there just about as the poor do in any country that I have ever been in, except, perhaps, they are more indolent than the poor of our country.

The Chairman. Does nature furnish a larger supply of food to the natives of the Hawaiian Islands than it does to the natives of most countries, to relieve them of the necessity for labor?

Mr. McCandless. Yes; it does in this way: The taro patch (that is the food there)—I judge an acre of taro land, perhaps a half acre— will keep a large family in food the year round. That is in addition to the fish they catch.

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