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The Chairman. Are fish abundant off the coast of those islands?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; but fish commands a higher price in Honolulu than in any seaport town I have ever lived in. That is because the native will not go fishing unless the price of fish is high.
The Chairman. They are expert fishermen?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. And they have control of the fisheries?
Mr. McCandless. No; the Chinese have most of the fishing rights. There is a peculiar condition of affairs there in regard to the fisheries. The water front of the islands is owned by the landlords—the people who own the land—and the privilege of fishing on this water front is leased out.
The Chairman. By the owner of the soil?
Mr. McCandless. By the owner of the soil. So that the Chinese have been rather encroaching on that privilege and getting most of the valuable fishing rights.
The Chairman. How far out in the sea does this privilege extend?
Mr. McCandless. I can not say as to that.
The Chairman. Do the Hawaiians and Chinese fish offshore in boats and with seines and other tackle?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. When they are fishing offshore this water privilege does not interfere with them, does it?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; it interferes, except in the case of Government lands; there it is open to the natives.
The Chairman. There must be some limit to this right. Is it three miles?
Mr. McCandless. I think that would be the limit, the international limit.
The Chairman. You do not know about that?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. In this way the Chinese and Hawaiians have what we term a practical monopoly of the fishing industry, and will not fish unless the market price justifies them in going out?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; that is the case with the Hawaiians; but the Chinese do not stop at all, they fish right along.
The Chairman. Around the islands other than Oahu is this fishing carried on by the natives?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; principally by the natives, because there is no market on the other islands.
The Chairman. What I want to get at is whether fishing in combination with the taro is the real, substantial food support of the common people of Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Taro supplies the want for vegetable food?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. And takes the place of bread?
Mr. McCandless. Yes. I was going to say in regard to the natives, to show their indolence in regard to their crop, I have found it the case that the natives have leased out their taro patch to a Chinaman, and the Chinaman has worked it and paid the Hawaiian in taro, and still made a living off it himself. I have seen it many times.
The Chairman. Do the women in Hawaii work in the taro patches?
Mr. McCandless. Yes; but the men mostly. It is a crop easily taken care of.
The Chairman. Easily raised?
Mr. McCandless. Easily raised. Of course, there must be an abundance of water—it grows in a pond; it must be flooded with water.
The Chairman. Have you, prior to January 17, 1893, been in any way engaged in the political affairs of Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Have you been in any office there?
Mr. McCandless. No.
The Chairman. Your connection with it then was as a private citizen?
Mr. McCandless. It was as a private citizen—to help right wrongs.
The Chairman. We will suspend the examination of Mr. McCandless, for the purpose of hearing Mr. Stevens, who, I am informed, is not well and is desirous of returning to his home.
SWORN STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN L. STEVENS.
The Chairman. What is your age?
Mr. Stevens. Seventy-three.
The Chairman. Your place of nativity?
Mr. Stevens. Mount Vernon, Me.
The Chairman. When did you first go to Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. I arrived there in September, 1889.
The Chairman. Was that your first visit?
Mr. Stevens. My first visit to Hawaii.
The Chairman. You went as Minister of the United States to that Government?
Mr. Stevens. I did.
The Chairman. Who was then the sovereign?
Mr. Stevens. King Kalakaua was the sovereign.
The Chairman. Under what administration were you sent there?
Mr. Stevens. By President Harrison.
The Chairman. Were you present at the time Liliuokalani succeeded to the regal authority in the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Stevens. I was.
The Chairman. And you remained there until what time—what time did you leave the islands?
Mr. Stevens. The 24th of May, 1893.
The Chairman. Proceed and state what you know of your own personal knowledge in respect of the political affairs of Hawaii since your arrival there, the changes in political conditions, the circumstances that led to such changes, the effects produced by such changes; and we wish you to state also what participation you had at any time during your residence there in promoting the interests or welfare of any political party connected with the Queen's Government or opposed to the Queen's Government. When you shall have made your statement, or at any time while you are making it, the members of the committee will interpose such questions as they may desire, for the purpose of keeping your attention to the testimony we desire to elicit.
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I will, of course, be under the necessity of condensing so far as possible. That inquiry might require a volume; but, of course, I understand the committee desires the salient facts. I will read what I think is better than I could verbally state, and we will have before us the events beginning twelve days prior to the overthrow of Liliuokalani. I can read of events prior to that; but I think I had better take twelve days prior.
The Chairman. Take your own course, so that you answer the questions.
Mr. Stevens. The biennial Legislature assembled in May, 1892. The body very soon asserted its constitutional prerogative in voting out a ministry that had consented to the maladministration of the Queen and her favorite at the palace, who exercised dictatorial powers and rioted in official police corruption. Instead of appointing ministers possessing the confidence of the Legislative majority and of the business men of the islands, she continued to select those of her own type of character, those whom she knew would retain her palace favorite in power. Three successive ministers of this description were voted out by the Legislature, with the warm approval of all the best men of the islands. At last the Queen appeared to yield to the pressure of public opinion and consented to the appointment of four responsible men, three of them persons of wealth, and all of them men of good financial standing, who took the official places with reluctance, all four of them sharing the public confidence.
Known as the Wilcox-Jones ministry, it was believed that they would safely carry the country through the following eighteen months to the election and assemblage of the next Legislature. Fully sharing this belief, the United States minister and naval commander left Honolulu January 4, in the U. S. cruiser Boston, for Hilo and Volcano, the distance of nearly 300 miles. It was the first time for many months I had felt it safe for the United States minister and naval commander to be away from the Hawaiian capital. We were absent ten days. When we arrived in the harbor of Honolulu on our return from Hilo, in the forenoon of January 14, there came to us the startling news that the Queen and the ring of white adventurers who surrounded her had, by intrigue and bribery, carried the lottery and opium bills through the Legislature; had forced out the Wilcox and Jones ministry, had appointed in their places four of her palace retainers, two of whom the Legislature and the responsible public had recently and repeatedly rejected, headed by the man who had carried the lottery and opium bills through the Legislature.
In spite of numerous petitions and protests from all the islands, both of whites and native Hawaiians, and the earnest remonstrance of the chamber of commerce and the principal financial men of the country, the Queen immediately signed the iniquitous bills. Both she and the ring of adventurers who surrounded her expected thus to get the money to carry on the Government by making Honolulu a fortress of gamblers and semipirates amid the ocean, from which they could, by every mail steamer to the United States, send out the poisoned billets of chance by which to rob the American people of their millions of money—a method of gaining silver and gold as wicked and audacious as that of the freebooters who once established themselves in the West Indian seas and made piratical forays on American commerce. But even this was not enough for the semibarbaric Queen and the clique of adventurers around her. To fortify themselves in their schemes of usurpation and robbery they must have a new constitution. They were afraid the supreme court would decide their lottery bill unconstitutional. The supreme court must be reconstructed, so that the Queen could reappoint the judges and give the final appeal to the Queen herself. The new constitution was to be proclaimed in a way that the existing constitution expressly prohibits. Her four new ministers were in the plot.
While the Boston was coming into the harbor of Honolulu, on the forenoon of January 14, the mob of hoodlums, at the call of the Queen and her retainers, were gathering in the palace grounds. The Legislature was prorogued at 12 a. m. The revolutionary edict of Hawaii's misguided sovereign was ready to be proclaimed, rumors of which were already in the public ear. The storm of public indignation began to gather. A few minutes before the appointed hour for the coup d'etat, immediately after my reaching the legation from the Boston, I was urged to go at once to the English minister to ask him to accompany me to the Queen and try to dissuade her from her revolutionary design. I promptly sought to comply with this request, went immediately to the English minister, who was ready to cooperate with me if there were any possibility of effecting any good. We went immediately to the foreign office to seek access to the Queen in the customary manner.
The hour of proroguing the Legislature had arrived. The ceremony concluded, the Queen went immediately to the palace, around which the mob was gathering. It was too late for the American and English ministers even to attempt to reason with the maddened, misguided woman, who had already launched the revolution which could not be arrested, though her cowardly ministers of the lottery gang became alarmed and drew back. She scorned their cowardice and pushed on to her doom. Saturday night told every intelligent man in Honolulu that the Hawaiian monarchy was forever at an end—that the responsible persons of the islands, the property holders and the friends of law and order, must thereafter take charge of public affairs. The great mass meeting of January 16—worthy of the best American towns, of the best American days, was held. It was made up of the best and chief men of the country—the owners of property, the professional and educated citizens, merchants, bankers, clerks, mechanics, teachers, clergymen.
This assemblage was a unit in opinion and purpose. It was stirred by a common sentiment, the love of country and the desire for public order and public security. It took its measures wisely and prudently. Its committee of public safety asked us to land the men of the Boston lest riot and incendiarism might burst out in the night, for no reliable police force longer existed, and whatever there was of this force was now in the control of the usurpers and the lottery gamblers who had initiated the revolution. Under the diplomatic and naval rules, which were and are imperative, the U. S. minister and naval commander would have shamefully ignored their duty had they not landed the men of the Boston for the security of American life and property and the maintenance of public order, even had the committee of public safety not requested us to do.
As American representatives, 5,000 miles from our Government, we could not have escaped our responsibilities even had we desired to do so. Fortunately the commander of the Boston and those under his command had no desire to shirk their duty. They appreciated the obligations of American patriotism and the honor of the American Navy. The allurements of a semibarbaric court and palace had not blinded their eyes to the condition of things in Honolulu. On shore in perfect order, they stepped not an inch from the line of duty. They never lifted a finger in aid of the fallen monarchy.
The Chairman. Who was then chamberlain?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Robertson.
The Chairman. Who was prior to him?
Mr. Stevens. MacFarlane.
S. Doc 231, pt 6----56
The Chairman. Who preceded him?
Mr. Stevens. MacFarlane was the chamberlain when I went there.
The Chairman. Was Mr. Carter ever chamberlain?
Mr. Stevens. I think not. The brother of Chief Justice Judd was, and my impression is that no one was between him and McFarlane. When Liliuokalani came in she wanted this favorite of hers to be in the cabinet as minister of the interior, which was an important place, and he could not get any responsible person to serve with him. Then they compromised it by allowing him to be made marshal, which is an office of great power and patronage, under which Chinese and Japanese lottery gambling can be carried on. It requires a man of great integrity, lest there be abuses, and the office was one having the most power under the administration. Wilson wanted that, and he was made marshal and installed in the palace.
There is a good deal of history between that, and contained in my despatches, of wrangling, by which the different ones were put in. I have the legislative votes that took place prior to that. Three cabinets had been voted out in the course of a few weeks. Parker, Spencer, Wideman, and Paul Neuman voted out August 30,1892, by 31 yeas to 10 nays. Parker, Maefarlane, Gulick, and Paul Neuman appointed September 12, 1892, and voted out October 17, 1892, by 31 yeas and 15 nays. November 1, 1892, Queen appointed Cornwell, Nawahi, Gulick, and Creighton, who were voted out the same day by 26 yeas to 13 nays.
The Chairman. Have you named all the persons?
Mr. Stevens. Peter C. Jones, W. L. Wilcox, Mark P. Robinson, and Cecil Brown. Jones and Wilcox were two strong financial men, worth more than $200,000 each; were not politicians; but they accepted their offices as a matter of duty to the country. Mark P. Robinson was a prominent business man, and Cecil Brown was a lawyer. All four of this Cabinet are gentlemen of integrity, having the confidence of the financial public. We were away from the Hawaiian capital but ten days.
The Chairman. Just there, if you please. In reference to what expected difficulty or complication of political affairs in Hawaii do you speak when you say that it was for the first time safe for you to leave the islands?
Mr. Stevens. The first time I deemed it safe for me to be away?
The Chairman. Yes; why?
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that there was liable to be trouble.
The Chairman. Do you mean it was safe for the interests of the United States?
Mr. Stevens. Safe for the interests of the United States.
The Chairman. Do you not mean safe for the opposing power to the then government?
Mr. Stevens. I mean the American interests in the islands, the commercial interests. In general terms that means nearly the whole, so far as commercial interests are concerned.
The Chairman. Proceed.
Mr. Stevens. It came to us.
The Chairman. You say it came to us. Whom do you mean?
Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiitse and to me. They sent out in boats. We got into the harbor about half past 10, and it took sometime to get to the wharf, and they came out in boats.
The Chairman. Who were the persons who informed you?
Mr. Stevens. We were informed.
The Chairman. Any official information given to you?
Mr. Stevens. No official communication, as I remember now.
The Chairman. Who was your aid-de-camp at that time?
Mr. Stevens. I had none; there was no person allowed me.
The Chairman. Did any person come from the legation or the United States consulate to give you information of the situation there?
Mr. Stevens. My impression is that Mr. Severance, the consul, sent a verbal message as soon as possible. And others sent verbal messages. There would be perhaps twenty boats to come off.
The Chairman. Was any message sent to you by the United States consul, Mr. Severance, or anybody else?
Mr. Stevens. I do not know that there was; but I know that I received the information at once. My daughter with my carriage met me at the wharf with the most full information.
The Chairman. Well?
Mr. Stevens. In spite of protests and earnest remonstrances by the Chamber of Commerce and a number of financial men of the country, the Queen immediately signed the iniquitous bills. Both she and the ring of adventurers who surrounded her expected there would thus be established a scheme to rob the people of millions of money.
The Chairman. Those expressions are intense and liberal. Do you mean that they are your personal conclusions, based upon your knowledge of the affairs there?
Mr. Stevens. Knowledge of the bills before the Legislature and common rumor that had been going on all winter. The men in the lottery charter were, one man from St. Louis, another from Chicago, and several in Honolulu.
The Chairman. Did you, as the American minister resident in the Hawaiian Islands, receive any information in regard to the state of affairs which you have stated, and the purpose which actuated the Government, upon which you based the conclusions which you as minister came to as against the Queen's Government.
Mr. Stevens. The information came to me from all sources. I will say here that my many years' experience prior to these three years in revolutionary countries, had taught me that it was absolutely necessary to keep myself informed, and in order to keep myself informed I had to have somebody in the different cliques or parties on whom I could rely to get information. I kept myself constantly posted.
Senator Gray. And were you in communication with such persons?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. There was a contest about this lottery charter. It was controverted in the newspapers for months and months, and all the facts were as notorious as facts would be in Washington about any great national measure here.
The Chairman. In seeking information about these matters, did you confer also with members of the Queen's Government, or persons officially connected with the Queen's Government?
Mr. Stevens. From the time I went to Honolulu to the time I left, the adherents of the Queen, the royalists, had access to the legation more freely than anybody else.
The Chairman. Did you converse with them?
Mr. Stevens. I conversed with them. Of course, I had to exercise a good deal of caution in conversing with anybody, and had to pick out those I conversed with.
The Chairman. You have stated that your conclusions were reached after conferences and consultations with the persons you have mentioned, and also from the debates as printed in the newspapers?
Mr. Stevens. Upon debates. The newspapers published the debates
just as you do here, and the bills were published. They have three newspapers, and everything of that character comes out.
Senator Gray. Did you avail yourself of the opportunities that were presented, of correspondence with other intelligent people than those connected with the Government, in order to inform yourself?
Mr. Stevens. That is a very important point; I am glad you have asked me in regard to it. I wish to say that five islands constitute the main portion of the islands. Those islands are separate, and on them live influential men. In order to know exactly the state of affairs in Hawaii, you must know what is going on in the different islands, and who these important men are. It took me one year of careful investigation to find out who they were, and to find out the state of things— who is who and what is what. In doing that I availed myself of all the agencies in the community.
Senator Gray. And you did not decline correspondence with anybody?
Mr. Stevens. Not any. Of course I had to avoid compromising myself with anybody.
Senator Gray. I meant, for the purpose of gaining information for yourself, not imparting it to anybody. You understood that?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. In order to amend the constitution of Hawaii, the amendment must be submitted to one Legislature. Their sessions are biennial, and the amendment must be passed by one Legislature and resubmitted to the succeeding Legislature and passed.
The Chairman. By a majority vote?
Mr. Stevens. I am not sure whether it is a two-thirds vote or a majority vote; but it must be submitted to the two Legislatures. Just at this moment I can not say whether it is a two-thirds vote or a majority; my impression is that it is two thirds.
The Chairman. Before you left Honolulu on board the Boston to go to Hilo, did you have any knowledge or information of the movements of which you have just been speaking, in regard to a change of the constitution by the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. Oh, that had been a mooted matter before. I ought to give some prior facts. In the Legislature before Liliuokalani came to the throne, Kalakaua was opposed by some persons, and he wanted to get his original power back.
The Chairman. By original power you mean the power he had prior to the constitution of '87?
Mr. Stevens. Prior to that. In order to accomplish that, in the winter of '90 he had delegations of natives from the islands to demand a new constitution through a constitutional convention. That would have been revolutionary, and it alarmed the business men of the islands. They came to me and asked me to go to the King and advise him of the danger of that. I said I would provided they got those having English affiliations to have the English minister do the same. They got the English minister; he arranged the meeting.
The Chairman. Mr. Wodehouse?
Mr. Stevens. Wodehouse. He strongly urged the King not to go into it, stating that it would be fatal to him. Then I followed, and went into it elaborately, stating that in my opinion he could not have gotten up a better scheme than that to overthrow the monarchy. I said, "If it is started, you do not know where it will end." The whites had made up their minds, if Kalakaua ever attempted that, they would break down the monarchy. It was hard for Kalakaua to take that advice. I stated it very courteously and kindly, and in a day or two he came around good naturedly and accepted our advice. When he was dead, and Liliuokalani came to be the sovereign, she said to the
chief justice, "What will be the consequence if I do not take the oath to that constitution?" The chief justice, who had been a supporter of the monarchy, said in his courteous way, "You could not be Queen." With this answer of the chief justice Liliuokalani took the oath to support the constitution.
The Chairman. If I understand you, the subject of changing the constitution so as to restore to the monarchy the ancient power that it possessed before 1887 was the subject of discussion and action also on the part of Kalakaua as well as Liliuokalani?
Mr. Stevens. Certainly.
The Chairman. When you left on the Boston to go to Hilo did you know that the Queen had in contemplation, at that time or at any earlier period, to promulgate this constitution by apronuuciamento?
Mr. Stevens. I had come to the conclusion, as many men had, that so many ministries having been voted out and she accepting this Wilcox- Jones ministry, and Wilson, the marshal, being on friendly relations with the attorney-general, Mr. Brown, he thinking he was going to be kept in—putting all the facts together, the lottery bill dead, and the opium bill dead, we had made up our minds that the Queen and her favorite would abide by the ministry for eighteen months, or until the meeting of the new Legislature, and I did not dream of any revolution that the Queen had on foot.
The Chairman. Let me ask. After the Queen prorogued the Legislature would she have had authority to dismiss the ministry and reappoint another without assembling the Legislature?
Mr. Stevens. She could not remove the ministry except upon a vote of want of confidence by the Legislature. That was the constitution.
The Chairman. That is the only way in which she could do it?
Mr. Stevens. The only way—by a vote of want of confidence.
The Chairman. And, as I understand, you felt that no change of the constitution could take place?
Mr. Stevens. Certainly.
The Chairman. And that relieved your mind of any apprehension that there would be any effort made to revolutionize the Government with respect to the constitution?
Mr. Stevens. Certainly. We considered that those four ministers for the next eighteen months would be the Government—for all practical purposes.
The Chairman. Let me ask whether, if you had in contemplation anything of that kind, you would have felt authorized, as the American minister resident, to go away as you did?
Mr. Stevens. I would not. If I had thought she had that revolutionizing plan on hand, it would not have been proper for me to have gone away.
The Chairman. Why?
Mr. Stevens. Because I think I could have given her advice. I would have given her the advice that it would ruin public business and endanger life.
The Chairman. You felt at that time that the interests of the people of the United States would be exposed to danger?
Mr. Stevens. Exposed to danger.
The Chairman. And you felt---
Mr. Stevens. It would be my duty to go to her, as I had before gone to Kalakaua.
The Chairman. Ships of war of the United States had been kept in the harbor of Honolulu for some time?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. How many years?
Mr. Stevens. Probably thirty-five or forty.
The Chairman. Was there ever a time during your residence there as minister of the United States when there was no ship of war in the harbor, no ship assigned to duty there?
Mr. Stevens. I do not think there was any time when there was no ship of war there, unless the ship was out of the harbor for target practice, or gone to Hilo, a trip of a few days.
The Chairman. But assigned to duty there?
Mr. Stevens. I do not think there was a single month, while I was there, that a United States ship was not assigned for duty at Honolulu?
The Chairman. What is the necessity of the United States keeping a ship of war in Honolulu, or in reach of the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Stevens. Because of the liability to anarchy. And why? To illustrate that point, this was no new thing—the landing of troops. It was done at least three times prior to January, 1893, if not more. I remember three. Prior to this at different times the official representatives of the Queen came to me and asked me to be in readiness to land soldiers; that there were certain contingencies before them that they could not provide for; and more than that number of times the naval officers of the different ships got everything in readiness.
Senator Gray. What was the nature of those contingencies?
Mr. Stevens. I will give this one: Prior to the overthrow of the Queen and the uprising of the business men to have a new government, many of the natives under the lead of Robert Wilcox, half white, and others who were hostile to Wilson, the favorite, because he stood between the natives and the Queen, engaged in revolutionary efforts.
Senator Gray. They were jealous of him?
Mr. Stevens. Jealous of Wilson, and that was the key to their action. For many months they were organized, my information was. It came in many ways, not only from those who were engaged in it, but from the Queen's Government. They contemplated her overthrow. That party was led by Mr. Wilcox, the same man who was in collusion with Liliuokalani in 1889, a few months before I arrived there, to change the constitution. Mr. Wilcox and several prominent white men of the adventurers class had organized what they called a Liberal Hawaiian League, and they had a military organization as well. Their constant fear was that we would not permit the Queen to be overthrown, and of course they always took occasion to find out what the naval officer and American minister would do if they undertook to overthrow the Queen. I could not make my instructions and intentions known.
The Queen was anxious to have me informed of her danger, and the Wilcox faction was anxious to know whether I would interfere in defense of the Queen. Of course, I had to keep noncommittal. That party would have dethroned the Queen if they had had the help of the white people. But the whites said, "No; we can not accept the Government from their hands." Consequently, there was a state of uneasiness, of uncertainty, all the time, as there had been months before I arrived there. Mr. Merrill had an experience with it for two years,, beginning with the revolution of 1887. After they got in the cabinet of 1887 they had a peaceful time up to the Wilcox outbreak, a few weeks before I arrived in the country.
The Chairman. Is the Wilcox of whom you speak the man who was educated in the military school in Italy?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Is there any other man of prominence of that name there?
Mr. Stevens. There are three or four who are prominent.
The Chairman. I mean of that name?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; the Wilcox in the Jones ministry was a very different person from the Wilcox who led the outbreak of 1889—he had been a member of the Legislature, but was not a politician. I refer to the member of the Jones cabinet. There were three or four of the name of Wilcox; but they were not related to Robert, the man at the head of the revolutionary movement.
The Chairman. Is the man who was in the Jones ministry an American?
Mr. Stevens. An American of pure blood. His father was a missionary. He lives on the island of Kauai—a man of business, education, and of high character.
The Chairman. Is he officially connected with the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Only as an adviser and supporter.
The Chairman. Not officially?
Mr. Stevens. He was in the Jones ministry.
The Chairman. Which was succeeded by the Peterson cabinet?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; the Peterson cabinet.
The Chairman. Proceed.
Mr. Stevens. I need not restate, I suppose, what I have already said, and will proceed as requested.
The Chairman. The matters of which you are speaking occurred before you landed?
Mr. Stevens. Before we landed and while we were landing.
The Chairman. Before you personally landed?
Mr. Stevens. Before 12 o'clock was when I arrived. I am coming to that. As soon as I had arrived at the legation I was informed of the strong rumor that the Queen was about to attempt to proclaim a new constitution; and I was urged to go at once to seek the cooperation of the English minister to dissuade the Queen from her design.
The Chairman. Who made that request of you?
Mr. Stevens. That came through Judge Hartwell. He has been there twenty years, an American by birth, but married his wife there. He is a graduate of Harvard, and one of the leading lawyers of the islands and has been one of the supreme judges. As before stated, I at once endeavored to comply with this request. I went as soon as possible to the English minister and asked him to go with me to see the Queen. We went to the foreign office to seek an interview with the Queen in the customary manner.
The customary manner was to send it, of course, through the minister of foreign affairs.
Senator Butler. Did you get access to the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had gone to the ceremony of proroguing the Legislature. He came into the foreign minister's office. We staid in there two or three minutes—asked two or three questions. That was the first time I was let into the plot that there was to be a new constitution. He was very cautious as to what he said. I was not there when the invitations were sent out to come to the palace and receive a glass of wine.
I did not go to the palace, but the other officials did. Before the time arrived Mr. Wodehouse, who had been there so many years, said: "It is unusual for us to have this at the close of the Legislature," and the whole thing came into my mind what the Queen
intended—she intended to have all the foreign officials there, with all the eclat possible. There were only five minutes left, and she had already gone into the palace. If we had been two hours earlier, we could perhaps have gotten at her and accomplished something. I did not go to the palace with the other foreign officials. Being absent on the Boston when the cards of invitation were sent out, I had received none to go to the palace, nor to the proroguing of the Legislature at 12 o'clock that day.
And only those present in Honolulu could know how thoroughly the monarchy was dead after the Queen's revolutionary attempt to proclaim a new constitution on the afternoon of July 14. I have already given account of the mass meeting, mostly of white citizens, of the appointment of a committee of safety, and of their request of us to land the naval force.
The Chairman. You say "us." Whom do you mean?
Mr. Stevens. Myself and Capt. Wiltse.
The Chairman. Do you mean that they made a joint request of you, or separate?
Mr. Stevens. They made the request to me.
The Chairman. And not to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. Not to Capt. Wiltse. They always make it to the diplomatic officer.
The Chairman. In what form is that request made?
Mr. Stevens. In a note.
The Chairman. By whom?
Mr. Stevens. The committee of public safety.
The Chairman. Addressed to you, where?
Mr. Stevens. At the legation.
The Chairman. How long before you had arrived there?
Mr. Stevens. I arrived there on Saturday, and this meeting of the committee of public safety was on Monday. After the committee of public safety had been chosen, they made this request.
The Chairman. Was there any reason for making the request for the landing of the troops?
Mr. Stevens. Only the fears of the citizens.
The Chairman. I want to know whether any request had been made upon you before that time?
Mr. Stevens. No, only so far as individual citizens made representations of the danger.
The Chairman. Individual citizens did appear before you to represent the danger?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. Especially did I have a note from Rev. Mr. Bishop, a man 65 years of age, born on the islands. He has everybody's confidence. He informed me on Sunday that the Kahunas of the Queen, the sorcerers, were evidently around the Queen, and there were serious times ahead. He did not ask me, but he stated that that I might know the danger. I learned from other sources, of persons who knew perfectly well, if I did not do so, the legation would be crowded with many people fearing what might happen during the night.
The Chairman. They would come there for protection?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Who is this Rev. Mr. Bishop of whom you spoke?
Mr. Stevens. He was born on the islands; his father was a missionary; he was educated at a New York college. He has been identified with the islands for sixty-five years.
The Chairman. There is another Mr. Bishop who is very wealthy?
Mr. Stevens. He is a banker.
The Chairman. Are they related?
Mr. Stevens. No. Mr. Bishop, the banker, is a native of New York; the other, I rather think, is the son of a Connecticut man.
The Chairman. A missionary?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Is this man, the Rev. Mr. Bishop, of whom you speak, a man of substance and property?
Mr. Stevens. He has some property; I do not know how much.
The Chairman. Any wealth?
Mr. Stevens. Not wealthy.
The Chairman. Is he reputable?
Mr. Stevens. Highly reputable. He is known outside of the islands as a man of science.
The Chairman. In addition to Mr. Bishop did other persons come to you and admonish you of the state of danger?
Mr. Stevens. Prior to my arrival—I had left one daughter at home and my wife---
The Chairman. You were informed of that on your return ?
Mr. Stevens. Before we returned, for many hours, persons in anxiety had been coming to the legation, hoping for the Boston to come back, lest something should turn up. The royalists were divided into two cliques, and loyalists came to the legation in anxiety as well as others.
The Chairman. To make it a little more clear, I will ask you whether, on your arrival, your family, including your wife, informed you that persons had been there to inform you in regard to the state of the public mind?
Mr. Stevens. Precisely; and of their anxiety that the Boston should return.
The Chairman. Did they give you that information immediately on your arrival?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did they seem to be concerned about it?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; they thought they were safe when the Boston got there and I got back.
The Chairman. After your arrival there, and after receiving this information from your family, you spoke of Mr. Bishop coming to talk with you personally. Were there other persons who came to talk with you?
Mr. Stevens. I came in contact with a good many persons.
The Chairman. At the legation?
Mr. Stevens. At the legation, where I kept myself except for two or three hours that I was at the Government buildings, for the new ministers had got frightened and they sent to me. They sent to Mr. Wodehouse and the other diplomatic representatives to come to the Government building, and we went there and waited two hours.
The Chairman. What ministers do you speak of?
Mr. Stevens. Foreign ministers.
The Chairman. Representatives of foreign governments.
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Were they all invited?
Mr. Stevens. They all came over to the Government building while all this wrangling was going on about the Queen's constitution.
The Chairman. Did you join that party?
Mr. Stevens. I went over that afternoon to hear what they had to say, to find out about the constitution and obtain other information.
The Chairman. Did you meet them at the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; we were there probably two hours.
The Chairman. Was any representative of a foreign government missing on that occasion ?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember any.
The Chairman. You can state that it was a general conference.
Mr. Stevens. Oh, they invited the whole of them.
The Chairman. Who invited them?
Mr. Stevens. The invitation to come came from the clerk of the new minister of the interior, who got alarmed.
The Chairman. Who was the minister of the interior?
Mr. Stevens. I do not positively remember, but I think Colburn.
The Chairman. And the invitation came from Liliuokalani's minister of the interior to you?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; the chief clerk, Mr. Hassinger, who had been there for years, brought it to me at the legation.
The Chairman. Did he ask you to come to the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did he tell you that there was an assemblage of the foreign ministers at the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. I am not sure; but I think he did.
The Chairman. Well, when you got there---
Mr. Stevens. One or two came in after I arrived; but we all left about the same time. We waited for the denouement at the palace, but two of the new ministers were afraid to go back to the palace.
The Chairman. What two ministers were afraid?
Mr. Stevens. Colburn and Cornwall seemed to be alarmed.
The Chairman. What made you think they were alarmed?
Mr. Stevens. Their appearance, and in sending for us. Then it came out that they were afraid to go to the palace. Their manner showed it.
The Chairman. Was there anything that indicated it?
Mr. Stevens. Only their sending for us and their general appearance— their going backwards and forwards from and to the palace.
The Chairman. Were they passing backwards and forwards between your meeting and the palace?
Mr. Stevens. Not between us. Finally, when Cornwall and Colburn left us, the message came from Mr. Parker, the minister of foreign affairs, and they left us and went to the palace, and I waited perhaps an hour or more and I went back to the legation and remained.
The Chairman. On those occasions when Liliuokalani's ministers were present, was any intimation given or proposition submitted to the foreign representatives in respect of the protection that should be extended to American citizens or anyone else?
Mr. Stevens. They made no intimation to us. They asked us at first to come there. We went there and waited, and did not confer with each other what to do.
Senator Butler. What day was that?
Mr. Stevens. That was on Saturday afternoon, January 14, the same Saturday afternoon when the Queen was present at the palace with the mob and the Queen's guard around it, and the chief justice was with her.
Senator Butler. That was the day the Boston returned?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Butler. That was the day before this public meeting of which you spoke?
Mr. Stevens. Two days before.
The Chairman. You spoke of a mob about the palace. Do you mean a disorganized body of men?
Mr. Stevens. Disorganized body of natives; retainers who had been dressed up respectably, and their leader had a constitution on a velvet cushion.
The Chairman. I am going into the inquiry whether, in the American acceptation of the word, that was a mob or an assemblage of the Queen's supporters.
Mr. Stevens. That was, in the general acceptation of the word, a mob; you may call it an assemblage.
The Chairman. Was there any mob violence?
Mr. Stevens. The information came to me direct that when the Queen was baffled, when they learned that the Queen would not proclaim that constitution at that time, they swore they would kill her. I suppose that was a temporary outbreak. While I was not in that crowd, I received more reliable information from the chief justice of what took place, and of the wrangle between the Queen and Peterson about the constitution—of the Queen turning upon him and stating, "You have had that in your pocket for two or three weeks." I am not positive that I received these words from the chief justice. It came to me in such a form that I took it as correct.
The Chairman. Who was it informed you?
Mr. Stevens. Several parties.
The Chairman. Can you name them?
Mr. Stevens. The strongest testimony came from the chief justice. Whether he used that specific language or not, or I received that specific language from the chief justice, I could not say, because there were so many talked to me on the subject. But information as to the scenes in the palace and the revolutionary state of things came from the chief justice, who was there four hours.
The Chairman. All of which transpired before you went to the palace?
Mr. Stevens. No; all that transpired while we were over at the Government building and after we had left.
The Chairman. Before you went to the palace?
Mr. Stevens. I did not go to the palace that day. The officals were at the palace at 12 o'clock.
The Chairman. At the palace?
Mr. Stevens. Where the scenes took place.
The Chairman. I was going to ask the question, where the mob was assembled?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. It was at the palace that this constitution was expected to be proclaimed.
The Chairman. You did not enter into that crowd?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all. I went home to dinner, and this invitation of the minister of the interior was for us to come at half-past one. We went over to the Government building, and were there from one to two hours.
The Chairman. My point is that you did not go to the palace that afternoon.
Mr. Stevens. No; I attempted to go, but failed, as I have before testified, owing to it being too late.
The Chairman. Are you able to state from information that came to you, beside that from the committee of safety, that you would be
willing and found yourself authorized, and, of course, compelled as a matter of public duty, to ask Capt. Wiltse to land troops?
Mr. Stevens. I would have felt it necessary if the committee of safety had not made any request.
The Chairman. Based upon your judgment of the situation?
Mr. Stevens. Upon my judgment of the situation. My only fear was that I delayed it twenty-four hours too long. Had anything happened Sunday night it would have been my risk. The landing of troops is something serious. I had previously discouraged it. When I did request it, I said it must be solely for the protection of American life and property. I used the old formula, which does not go so far as the formula given by Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill in 1887. I will read the substance of the Bayard dispatch.
- "United States Department of State,
- "Washington, July 12,1887.
- "In the absence of any detailed information from you of the late disorders in the domestic control of Hawaii and the changes which have taken place in the official corps of that Government, I am not able to give you other than general instructions, which may be communicated in substance to the commander of vessel or vessels of this Government, in the waters of Hawaii, with whom you will freely confer, in order that such prompt and efficient action may be taken as the circumstances may make necessary.
- "While we abstain from interference with the domestic affairs of Hawaii, in accordance with the policy and practice of this Government, yet, obstruction to the channels of legitimate commerce under existing law must not be allowed, and American citizens in Hawaii must be protected in their persons and property, by the representatives of their country's law and power, and no internal discord must be suffered to impair them.
- "Your own aid and council, as well as the assistance of the officers of the Government vessels, if found necessary, will therefore be promptly afforded to promote the reign of law and respect for orderly government in Hawaii.
- "T. F. Bayard,
- "Secretary of State."
The Chairman. Have you any further statement to make in regard to the matter?
Mr. Stevens. Not on that point. I can answer any questions. Perhaps I will put in here that when I went on board to Captain Wiltse with my request, which said only for the protection of life and property, I found that he had his order to the officers already drawn. I found it was copied from the naval order, standing order, which covered more than mine did. He said to me, "If you think it better to strike that out, I will do so." I said, "Inasmuch as it is in the naval order and Mr. Bayard's instructions, I have no right to ask you to strike it out."
The Chairman. That conversation between you and Captain Wiltse occurred on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. That occurred on Monday, after I went on board.
The Chairman. About what hour?
Mr. Stevens. I should think not far from 4 o'clock; he landed about 5 and it may have been 4 o'clock.
The Chairman. When Capt. Wiltse landed where?
Mr. Stevens. Landed from the Boston on shore.
The Chairman. Landed the troops?
Mr. Stevens. The troops. I went on board to confer with him, carrying with me my request with him to land the troops.
The Chairman. That was the first communication you had with the ship?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you send any message to Capt. Wiltse before that?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. To any officers of the ship?
Mr. Stevens. Not that I remember.
The Chairman. And when you got on board Capt. Wiltse had his orders already drawn up?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. In writing?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. And they were submitted to you?
Mr. Stevens. Submitted to me.
The Chairman. In what form?
Mr. Stevens. One that had been in the Navy for years. Mr. Bayard's was the last one issued, and it seems that the Navy Department's instructions covered all that Mr. Bayard's covered. When I drew my request, I had forgotten Mr. Bayard's instructions. I read them when I went to the legation. Mine simply recited, "for the protection of American life and property;" but when I saw Capt. Wiltse's, I saw that it was in substance the same as Mr. Bayard's. I have Mr. Bayard's here.
The Chairman. Was the order that Capt. Wiltse had drawn up identical with the instructions you are about to read?
Mr. Stevens. Identical in substance; and I think the wording is exactly the same.
My request to Capt. Wiltse is the following:
- "United States Legation,
- "Honolulu, January 16, 1893.
- "Sir: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States Legation and United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.
- "Very truly, yours,
- "John L. Stevens,
- "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
- of the United States.
- "Capt. G. C. Wiltse,
- "Commander of the U. S. S. Boston."
The order of Capt. Wiltse, as read by him to me when I went on board the Boston, goes farther than mine. It not only requires the protection of American life and property, but the preservation af public order.
That goes considerably further than my request went.
The Chairman. Here is the order of Capt. Wiltse under which the troops were landed from the Boston.
- "U. S. S. Boston, Second Rate,
- "Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.
- "Lieut. Commander W. T. Swinburne
- "U. S. navy, Executive Officer U. S. S. Boston:"
- "Sir: You will take command of the battalion, and land in Honolulu, for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order.
- "Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs, and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens.
- "You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any change in the situation.
- "Very respectfully,
- "G. C. Wiltse,
- "Captain, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Boston."
You say when you got on board ship that Monday afternoon, that order of Capt. Wiltse had been drawn up?
Mr. Stevens. Had been drawn up, a rough draft; whether Capt. Wiltse changed it afterwards, I could not say.
The Chairman. Is it your recollection that that order which was drawn up before you arrived on the ship and presented to you after your arrival, was identical with this order I have just read?
Mr. Stevens. As nearly as I can remember.
The Chairman. That is the best of your recollection—that it is identical with the order Capt. Wiltse read to you?
Mr. Stevens. It so strikes me.
The Chairman. Did you and Capt. Wiltse have any discussion on the subject?
Mr. Stevens. Only on this one point—the preservation of public order. I said first, that is not in my request; but I recalled that it was in Mr. Bayard's, and Capt. Wiltse was ready to strike it out.
The Chairman. You speak of "my order."
Mr. Stevens. I did not say "my order." The order that I referred to, my order, was a mere request.
The Chairman. What do you mean by "my" order; the request you sent to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. My request that I meant to send to Capt. Wiltse for landing the troops.
The Chairman. Had you sent that request before you went aboard the ship?
Mr. Stevens. No; I carried it in person.
The Chairman. Had you any way of communicating with Capt. Wiltse before you went on board the ship ?
Mr. Stevens. I do not know that I had any. But I had conferred with Capt. Wiltse at different times, and he knew what would be the form.
The Chairman. Had you conferred with him between Saturday and Monday afternoon?
Mr. Stevens. I do not recall. He may have called at the legation a half dozen times; probably he did; but I could not say.
The Chairman. Do you remember whether you had any conference with him between Saturday and Monday afternoon with regard to the form of the orders that he would give to his troops, or the form of the request you would make of him?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest. The only talk about form was on board the ship.
The Chairman. If I have a correct view of your testimony it is that when you arrived on board the ship you found that Capt. Wiltse had drawn up this order, which I have just read to you?
Mr. Stevens. I think it is identical.
The Chairman. He had drawn up this order and had it ready to deliver to his subordinate?
Mr. Stevens. That is it.
The Chairman. Did you find a complete state of military preparation for landing the troops when you got on board the ship?
Mr. Stevens. So far as I could judge; I saw the officers in the cabin and I got that statement, that they were ready to land.
The Chairman. Do you know on what request or demand Capt. Wiltse responded when he prepared this order for the landing of the troops on shore?
Mr. Stevens. On my request as the American minister.
Senator Frye. But you had not made it?
Mr. Stevens. When I got on board of the ship---
Senator Frye. Before that. The chairman asks if the troops were ready when you got on board—whether the order of Capt. Wiltse was in writing when you got on board.
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Frye. But had not been delivered?
Mr. Stevens. No.
Senator Frye. At whose request or demand had Capt. Wiltse made this preparation in advance?
Mr. Stevens. Undoubtedly on his knowledge of the situation. He may have come to the legation, and the consul was around and had written to the captain about it. He had gotten ready so many times, and these all knew perfectly well that mine would be a mere form of official request.
The Chairman. Would you, as United States minister at Honolulu, have extended to Capt. Wiltse any order or request not in writing, which you would have expected him to comply with or obey about so grave a matter as the landing of troops?
Mr. Stevens. No; I made no request except one in writing. I have no remembrance of any verbal request, but he called at the legation frequently.
The Chairman. And it is quite likely you discussed the situation?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; we had discussed it running up to Hilo and back.
The Chairman. Now, I understand you to testify that Capt. Wiltse, commanding that ship, did not have from you any written request or authority to put his troops in condition for landing and conducting military operations before the time you arrived, at 4 o'clock or thereabouts, on Monday, and that you then took the request in writing with you?
Mr. Stevens. I think I did. That is my memory.
The Chairman. Have you any recollection of having communicated with him—made any written request whatever before that?
Mr. Stevens. I have no recollection of it.
The Chairman. Are you sure you did not?
Mr. Stevens. I think I did not. It is barely possible I sent him a note speaking of the danger on shore; but I think not, because the naval officers were as well aware of that danger.
The Chairman. Did you send him any request?
Mr. Stevens. None except that which is on file.
The Chairman. And which you took with you ?
Mr. Stevens. I think I took it with me; I have no recollection of sending it by any person. That is my memory.
The Chairman. Is that the paper which you prepared and presented to Capt. Wiltse and upon which the discussion arose as to a more enlarged scope of the order which he gave to Capt. Swinburne?
Mr. Stevens. That is all; and perhaps it was not more than two minutes' talk. After I carried my note, we compared them and found out the difference.
The Chairman. Your attention was called to the fact that Capt. Wiltse's order---
Mr. Stevens. Went further than mine.
The Chairman. Upon what precedent had you formulated the order which you took with you on board the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I had been in a revolutionary country before as minister, and I had gotten used to the formula, and the request that I carried to Capt. Wiltse was the formula I was then familiar with. The files of the legation show that. I knew that Mr. Bayard's instructions went further; but they had passed out of my recollection. When I saw Capt. Wiltse's order, I remembered that Mr. Bayard's went further than mine.
The Chairman. Where were you a minister before?
Mr. Stevens. In 1867,1870,1871, and 1873 in Paraguay and Uruguay. Uruguay was in civil war nearly all the time.
The Chairman. You were minister there?
Mr. Stevens. Had charge of the legation.
The Chairman. How long did you stay there?
Mr. Stevens. Three years. Paraguay had just gotten through that struggle with Brazil, and Uruguay was in a state of war for two years and a half, which was settled during my residence there.
The Chairman. So that you had gotten familiar with the duties of U. S. minister under the circumstances you have given?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; and the responsibilities of a naval commander, which made me exceedingly careful on every point.
The Chairman. Had you returned on shore before the troops left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. Before the troops left the ship.
The Chairman. Where did you go?
Mr. Stevens. To the legation.
The Chairman. Did you give any orders or advice as to the manner of landing the troops, the streets through which the troops were to proceed or march, the place at which they were to be posted, or the place where they were to be encamped?
Mr. Stevens. At first we arranged that a portion should go to the United States consulate.
The Chairman. Who arranged ?
Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse and I.
The Chairman. Where was that done?
Mr. Stevens. On board the ship. And as many at the legation as we could take. If our grounds could take any more, we would ; but we could not encamp more than 15 or 18. I assumed that the marines
had their camp utensils, and I then learned that they needed a hall for the first time---
The Chairman. Why did you request that any troops be sent to the legation?
Mr. Stevens. Why did I?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that the state of anarchy in which the city was, and knowing that the only government which existed there was that committee of safety and the citizens back of it, and the military force that we had—knowing that the legation is the one of all other places around which there should be some men, and that was a more important part of the city where a dozen men could be sent this way or that way to take care of the contingencies of fires. By stating a little more in this connection you will understand it better. The only two things that were new to me on the part of the request of the naval officers was this: So soon as we found that they were to land I learned from Capt. Wiltse and his officers that they must have a hall to stay in and maps of the city for use in case of fires. So that from the time I struck the legation, at 4 o'clock, up to nearly 10 o'clock, my entire time was consumed in finding maps and a hall for the officers and men for the night.
The Chairman. Did you go out in town?
Mr. Stevens. I stayed at the legation and sent a messenger.
The Chairman. Whom did you send?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Pringle.
The Chairman. Your aide-de-camp?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you, at the time you left the ship and made this arrangement with Capt. Wiltse, have any apprehension that there was any danger of life and property at the American legation?
Mr. Stevens. I knew this, that there was a liability of a crank—or irresponsible persons—liable to come there and alarm my family.
The Chairman. Did you expect that the Queen's government or any mob of citizens of Hawaii would possibly or probably attack the American legation?
Mr. Stevens. No. What we alluded to were irresponsible parties in the night setting fire to property.
The Chairman. You apprehended that danger?
Mr. Stevens. We apprehended that danger.
The Chairman. Did you apprehend that danger?
Mr. Stevens. I apprehended it, or I would not have consented to the landing of the troops.
The Chairman. Did you apprehend it as an attack on the legation?
Mr. Stevens. I did not apprehend that the representatives of the Government or the Queen would have anything to do with that.
The Chairman. You also agreed that Capt. Wiltse should send a detachment to the consulate?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Had Mr. Severance requested the presence of any troops there?
Mr. Stevens. Prior to my visit on board ship, without my knowledge, Mr. Severance had communicated his fear to Capt. Wiltse.
The Chairman. Did Capt. Wiltse so tell you?
Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse so told me. And, still more, Capt. Wiltse had the note, and while I was on board the consul telephoned Capt. Wiltse that he would give a signal in case there was an outbreak.
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----57
The Chairman. Was there telephonic communication between the ship and the shore?
Mr. Stevens. Between the ship and shore. All our naval vessels, so soon as they get in the harbor, make telephonic connection.
The Chairman. You say Mr. Severance sent a note to Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. Sent a note.
The Chairman. Did you see it?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. What was in it?
Mr. Stevens. It was a brief note. I think I have it. Moreover, he telephoned at the time that I was on board.
The Chairman. Where is that note?
Mr. Stevens. That is it [producing paper].
The Chairman. Is this the original note, or a copy of it?
Mr. Stevens. That is the original.
The Chairman. I will read this. It is headed personal:
- "Honolulu, January ----, 1893.
- "My dear Captain: In case of any outbreak or collision with the committee of safety at the mass meeting to-day and the Government forces with a view of suppressing said meeting, it might be necessary to land a force to preserve order or protect our property. In such case, should the telephone wires be cut, I can send you a signal by lowering my flag at half mast, and you will, of course, be governed by instructions from Minister Stevens. It is reported this a. m. that the mass meeting of the citizens will be interfered with or broken up by the Queen's forces. A mass meeting is reported to be held at the same hours.
- "Very truly,
- "H. W. Severance,
- "Capt. Wiltse,
- "Captain of the United States Ship Boston."
Before you left to go on board the ship did you have any conference with Mr. Severance?
Mr. Stevens. I did not.
The Chairman. Was there any?
Mr. Stevens. I did not know that that note was written until I got on board, or thought that a note was written.
The Chairman. Was it by virtue of that note that you and Capt. Wiltse agreed that troops should be left there at the consulate?
Mr. Stevens. I think I could have recommended, even if the consul's note had not been sent, because that is the usual way when there is trouble in a country, that the legislation and consulates are provided for. I made the same rule there.
The Chairman. When these troops were so disposed as to place a detachment at the consulate and another at the legation, was it the honest and bona fide intention of yourself, and, so far as you know, of Capt. Wiltse, to give protection to those American establishments, or was it the intention and purpose to make a display of the American forces at these respective points under the assurance of the American flag, or was it because of the movement of a popular character which you knew to be on foot for the purpose of overthrowing the Queen and the establishment of a new government?
Mr. Stevens. It had sole relation to the protection of American life and property and, if you wish to cover it by Mr. Bayard's order, for the preservation of public order, I did not feel like going so far as that.
The Chairman. At the time you made this request upon Capt. Wiltse, and at the time you made this disposition of the troops, did you know of the existence of a purpose on the part of any of the citizens of Hawaii to organize an opposition to the Queen's Government, with a view to overthrowing or subverting it in any respect?
Mr. Stevens. All day Sunday and Monday when the meeting was held, everything was open and public, just as in a railroad meeting in any city—everybody knew it; reasons to believe there was no effective opposition. I believed the movements of the opponents of the monarchy were irresistible, and everybody understood what was going on.
The Chairman. Did you know of the actual organisation on Monday evening?
Mr. Stevens. I did not, only by such information as I could get. I put myself in contact with the Queen's representatives; they had access to the legation, and I would inquire very cautiously about this and that and a great many things. Many of the friends of the Provisional Government I knew, and a great many I did not.
The Chairman. Did you know of a programme, or whatever it was, before you went on board the ship, for the establishment of the new Government?
Mr. Stevens. I could not help but know it; it was all the talk Sunday and Monday. I knew it by the general appearance of things and the talk; the leaders did not communicate their plans to me.
The Chairman. As I understand, the public meeting had not been held at that time?
Mr. Stevens. It had been arranged for.
The Chairman. How did you know that?
Mr. Stevens. By constant reports to the legation, both from royalists and others.
The Chairman. It was information that you had?
Mr. Stevens. I did not go to church that day; I think I remained home all day.
The Chairman. Did you derive that information, before you went on board that ship, from a report or statement made to you by any member of a body that had organized or had agreed they would organize a Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. No; I think the representative men who were in it refrained from communicating their details.
The Chairman. Did they communicate it to you?
Mr. Stevens. I think not.
Senator Gray. Or did you have any conversation with any of them?
Mr. Stevens. I think I did not. I may have asked what they were doing, and they may have said they would have a Provisional Government. I should say that is probable. I could not learn what was going on; I would have to catechise somebody, and they would answer me.
The Chairman. But you knew at the time you went on board the ship that the state of public feeling there would culminate in an effort to overthrow the Queen's Government and establish a government in place of it?
Mr. Stevens. I understood that the Queen's government was at an end. The Queen's government ended on Saturday afternoon. There
was no government of the Queen's for more than forty-eight hours; from 4 o'clock Saturday afternoon, the 14th of January, the Queen's government was absolutely dead, as much so as was that of Louis Phillipe's government was after he left the city of Paris in 1848.
The Chairman. From the time you spoke of going on board ship and conferring with Capt. Wiltse about troops going on shore, was there any government in Honolulu which could have issued any authentic order which the people would have respected?
Mr. Stevens. There was none. As I stated before, the only government was the thousand white citizens who were acting as a unit; they were absolutely masters of the situation, and their unity and self-possession and the presence of the Boston kept the city as it was.
The Chairman. The period of time from Saturday afternoon to Monday afternoon you regard as an interregnum?
Mr. Stevens. Absolutely an interregnum—theoretically and practically.
The Chairman. During that time did you receive any information to the effect that the Queen's forces were under arms and under orders in any way to protect the public order, or to protect life and property, or were engaged in any military operation?
Mr. Stevens. No authentic information.
The Chairman. Did you receive any information that that was the state of the case?
Mr. Stevens. I remember that Mr. Peterson and his associates called on me Sunday evening and made certain inquiries about the situation, and from them I got some impression. But it was only his story; I got no reliable information. It was the general situation that taught me my duty.
The Chairman. What was Mr. Peterson's story about the military preparation on the part of the Queen to protect the public security?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Peterson was then between the opposing forces; he was expecting the natives and white citizens would support him, and he came to see what the United States officials would do. I did not promise him anything.
The Chairman. What was his story?
Mr. Stevens. His story was just what I have stated—that he was expecting
Senator Frye. The chairman asked you if you had any information that the Queen's troops or Queen's forces were in any condition to make any attack upon the Provisional Government or to preserve order and life or property?
Mr. Stevens. None at all.
The Chairman. Did you see any array of the Queen's troops anywhere in Honolulu between the time of your landing from the Boston on Saturday and your going back on the Boston on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. Not any.
The Chairman. No parade through the streets?
Mr. Stevens. No parade through the streets that I saw.
The Chairman. Did you see any parade through the streets, of any organization, or any police force in charge of Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Stevens. None whatever.
The Chairman. So that, as a part of the interregnum during these days, between Saturday noon and Monday afternoon, there was no display of military force on the part of the Queen's government?
Mr. Stevens. None whatever that I was made cognizant of.
The Chairman. Or on the part of the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. None whatever.
The Chairman. Within your knowledge or information, did she during that time exercise any governmental act except the promulgation of the proclamation on Monday giving up the enterprise of overthrowing the constitution?
Mr. Stevens. That was all. She made a communication to me on Sunday—it may have come from the Queen or ministers—that I should meet at the Government house the English ministers and others. On Sunday, knowing the situation, I declined to go to the meeting, because, first, I did not want to leave the legation, and secondly, when this communication came I could not make a tripartite with Mr. Wodehouse and the Japanese minister, and I declined to go to this meeting. That meeting was evidently for the purpose of making an appeal for our assistance to save her.
The Chairman. The proclamation was the only effort on the part of the Queen to assert her government from the time you got off from the Boston on Saturday afternoon to Monday afternoon, when you went back on the Boston"?.
Mr. Stevens. That is all. I got a note from the Queen on Tuesday. That was twenty-two hours after the troops were landed. That is the only one.
The Chairman. I have not come to that; I am speaking of the period you are pleased to call the interregnum.
Mr. Stevens. That is all.
The Chairman. During that interregnum what military array, if any, was there on the part of citizens of Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. You mean the citizens?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. My information was—of course I had to obtain from A, B, and C---
The Chairman. Did you see any military array?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. What was your information?
Mr. Stevens. My information was that the citizens were preparing for a public meeting, and they were going to be governed by the exigencies of the case. All the information that I could get was that they were notifying all parts of the city and island to be at the mass-meeting and have their arms at the right time. I could not get reliable information of that; but it was such that I had no doubt about it.
The Chairman. Did you see any military organization or assemblage of the citizens during this period of interregnum, or have any knowledge of the fact?
Mr. Stevens. No; only at this meeting at the armory it came to me, not officially, but I learned it from others.
The Chairman. At the armory?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did that meeting occur before you went on board the ship?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. And you knew of it?
Mr. Stevens. Knew of the results of it. I think they had not gotten entirely through when I went on board the ship. I could not swear to that; I did not go to the meeting.
The Chairman. Was there any meeting of the retainers or supporters of the Queen at the same time or about the same time?
Mr. Stevens. I think they had one on the palace grounds the same afternoon.
The Chairman. You do not know?
Mr. Stevens. I think so; I cannot swear to it. I know they had one there the same afternoon, or preceding afternoon, and my impression is, the same afternoon.
The Chairman. Did you know that before you went on board the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I think so, because there were handbills posted in the street, handbills on both sides nearly all through the city, as well as I remember.
Senator Frye. Mr Chairman, if you can hold in your mind just where you want to start, I would like to ask a few questions at this point.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Frye. Mr. Stevens stated that he requested certain of the troops to be sent to the consulate, and certain of them to be sent to the legation; but he did not give any account of the disposition of the balance of the troops. Now, Mr. Stevens, answer my questions, and answer them only. You say you thought when the troops came ashore they would bring their tents with them?
Mr. Stevens. When I made my request?
Senator Frye. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. I stated that.
Senator Frye. When the troops came to the shore, you found they had no tents?
Mr. Stevens. And they had to have a hall.
Senator Frye. Up to that time did you ever know that there was such a hall in Honolulu as Arion Hall?
Mr. Stevens. Never, until the time the Opera House was refused.
Senator Frye. Did you call upon them for a place to have the troops?
Mr. Stevens. The officers said they would have to have a place to stay during the night.
Senator Frye. Did you send a man for a place?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Frye. What did you send him after?
Mr. Stevens. The Opera House.
Senator Frye. Is the Opera House a place that was before occupied by United States troops?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say as to that.
Senator Frye. Do you know it by report?
Mr. Stevens. I think it had been occupied before by a military force.
Senator Frye. Why did you send for the Opera House.
Mr. Stevens. Because I knew of that hall, and I knew of its capacity.
Senator Frye. And the only one that you knew of in the city as suitable for the purpose you wished to use it for?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Frye. Your man returned?
Mr. Stevens. He had to go 3 miles to find the man in charge, and returned with a negative—that the owner of the hall was not on the island and he would not like to have the hall used for that purpose. I found out that he was an Englishman and against the Americans.
Senator Frye. Then you heard of Arion Hall?
Mr. Stevens. I sent the same messenger, the same man.
Senator Frye. How far did you send him?
Mr. Stevens. About a mile, to a man known to be a royalist—Kalakaua's minister. Mr. Walker had been a minister, and had been all through these troubles. He said he would be very glad to let us have the hall. He gave me the name of the manager. I sent a third man to the one who had the management of the hall, and he granted the right to use it. It was then well on to 10 o'clock. Consequently the men had to stay in the street that night to that hour.
Senator Frye. At Mr. Atherton's house?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; he had extensive grounds---
Senator Frye. In selecting Arion Hall for the use of those troops, did you have any reference whatever to their location as regards the Provisional Government or the Queen's Government?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest; it never entered into my head.
Senator Frye. Had anyone made any suggestion to you on behalf of the Queen or the Provisional Government that Arion Hall should be selected on account of its location near the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. Never.
Senator Frye. When you selected Arion Hall for the troops did you have any reference whatever to its being near the palace and the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
Senator Frye. Did you have any reference whatever in your selection to the location of the troops being effective to prevent the Queen's troops attacking the Provisional Government's troops?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
Senator Frye. As a matter of fact, is Arion Hall, so far as American property is concerned—and I mean by that, of course, residences as well as anything else—a reasonably central location?
Mr. Stevens. A reasonably central location.
Senator Frye. DO you know of any place large enough, other than that, for quartering those troops in the city of Honolulu?
Mr. Stevens. Not obtainable. I had thought of another on my own street. If Arion Hall had not been gotten we would have tried another hall, which was nearer me, but the owner was not there.
Senator Frye. The only purpose you had was to place the troops where they could be protected during the night?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; and where they would be useful in case of fire.
Senator Gray. You said that this was arranged on the Boston in a conference with Captain Wiltse. What was to be the route the troops were to take?
Mr. Stevens. No; I do not remember any arrangement as to the route; the arrangement was as to where they were to land.
Senator Gray. And where they were to go?
Mr. Stevens. No; we had not found this hall.
Senator Gray. How was it they came to go to Mr. Atherton's?
M. Stevens. Simply because he had extensive grounds, and he was an American.
Senator Gray. That was a matter of arrangement before you left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say that; I presume so. It was arranged where they would land, because they were going up the principal streets.
Senator Gray. You knew they were going to Mr. Atherton's?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say positively.
The Chairman. Did you know that before you left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say positively, for I do not remember it.
The Chairman. Proceeding from this period when you say there was an interregnum to the time when you ordered the American flag to be hoisted in Hawaii, I will ask you what was the condition of the people as to order and quietude and the conduct of their ordinary vocations?
Mr. Stevens. You mean between the time of the recognition of the Provisional Government and the raising of the flag?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. I will say that the people were generally at their avocations, except that the citizens had constituted themselves soldiers— the men from stores, the banks, and the workshops, responsible men— were constituted the military force for the time being.
The Chairman. To what extent had this volunteer military organization increased?
Mr. Stevens. Volunteer and otherwise I could not tell precisely; but I should say all the way from 400 to 600 men.
The Chairman. Armed men?
Mr. Stevens. Men they could place arms with. They were white men accustomed to the use of muskets. But the men actually on military duty probably would not be half that number.
The Chairman. Were the men organized for the purpose of repressing mobs and incendiarism, or organized and armed for the purpose of supporting the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. The public order.
The Chairman. I want to ask you whether they were organized for the purpose of preserving public order, or for the purpose of supporting the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. They regarded the Provisional Government as the instrument through which they would preserve order.
The Chairman. They were considered troops of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. They were supporters of the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Were they under the control of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. Those volunteers would never be called upon except in an emergency. They had a military force which was disciplined, and they had this force from the workshops.
The Chairman. What was the number of the disciplined force?
Mr. Stevens. I could not speak with accuracy at this moment.
The Chairman. What is your opinion?
Mr. Stevens. I should say 150 men—possibly 200.
The Chairman. Were they organized in military companies?
Mr. Stevens. Military companies.
The Chairman. Under the command of Col. Soper?
Mr. Stevens. Under Col. Soper, I think.
The Chairman. Were there captains of companies?
Mr. Stevens. I do not know Capt. Ziegler; but I think he was the captain of the German company at the Government house.
The Chairman. Were there other captains?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. I think there was another captain, Fisher, from one of the banks, who was the captain at the barracks; the third company, Capt. Goud.
The Chairman. In that period which you call the interregnum, was there any outbreak?
Mr. Stevens. There was no outbreak; they feared an outbreak.
The Chairman. Was there any demonstration to show that an outbreak was contemplated?
Mr. Stevens. I think their fears came from private information. I think there was no external signs of it. Of course the authorities put themselves as much in touch with the facts as they possibly could, and they sometimes may have been alarmed unduly, as men would be in such circumstances.
The Chairman. Did you believe that there was a general public apprehension in that time, covering the period that I have just referred to, of any armed demonstration against the Provisional Government, or any incendiarism, or any mob violence?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; very strong; so strong they got information that they barricaded the Government building and got ready for anything. It is very likely half the time that the alarms were bogus?
The Chairman. During this period of time where was the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. The Queen was in her Washington house. That was the house left to her by her husband, and by the husband's mother left to him. It is the Washington house; well-known place, close to the tpalace.
The Chairman. Did the Queen have any guards about her?
Mr. Stevens. As nearly as I remember the Provisional Government allowed her a guard.
The Chairman. Of how many? What was your information on that subject?
Mr. Stevens. I think 12.
The Chairman. Armed men?
Mr. Stevens. I presume so; I never went to see.
The Chairman. Were the troops taken from the organization under the authority of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. As nearly, as I remember at first they allowed her 12 of her own guards. But, of course, the Government kept an eye on them, and subsequently they were changed to men of the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Were they changed at the Queen's request?
Mr. Stevens. That I could not say. I probably knew at the time; but I would not be sure. I think they were changed. They regarded her native guard as of no consequence whatever. The reason I had for raising the flag, I will give you in as condensed form as I have it, when you reach that.
The Chairman. I have not reached that. I am trying to find out what the situation was at the time. Was there any interruption of the relations between the Provisional Government and the American Government or between the Provisional Government and any foreign government during this period of time after the proclamation of the Provisional Government and up to the time of the raising the flag?
Mr. Stevens. I should say no interruptions; but I would have to give the facts, that you might understand my answer fully. That will enter right into the reasons for raising the flag. I will give those reasons very specifically.
The Chairman. There were no interruptions of the relations?
Mr. Stevens. Do you mean the diplomatic relations?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. Not so far as I know.
The Chairman. What Governments had recognized the Provisional Government before the time of the raising of this flag?
Mr. Stevens. Every one represented there.
The Chairman. Which were—--
Mr. Stevens. The English Government, the German Government,
the Austro-Hungary the Portuguese, the Japanese. The Chinese are only represented by a commercial agent. I think he recognized the Provisional Government in some form.
The Chairman. You do not know?
Mr. Stevens. I think he did.
The Chairman. Did you have any official information as minister of the United States from these respective Governments that their representatives there had recognized this Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. It was published in the papers the next morning. I heard of it the night before.
The Chairman. I am not speaking of that; I am asking whether you had any official information from the officers of these respective Governments?
Mr. Stevens. They did not call upon me to notify me; but they authorized the publication of their recognition in the paper of the next morning.
The Chairman. Is there an official paper?
Mr. Stevens. There is a paper the royal Government had used, "The Bulletin," which is the English organ, and the Provisional Government used "The Daily Advertiser," and they published that in the Advertiser. And I think the Bulletin got it too.
The Chairman. Was it understood by you that the publications in this gazette were official ?
Mr. Stevens. I understood that they were duly signed by the officials, and I learned that evening they were recognized by all in thirty minutes except by the English minister; he did not do it until the next morning. But he got ahead of me in calling on the Provisional Government. I was too ill, and did not call for several days; and he called within forty minutes after they were constituted.
The Chairman. Did these foreign governments officially communicate their recognition to the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; and it was published in the papers the next morning. That was the way I got at it.
The Chairman. You say that the English minister---
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Wodehouse.
The Chairman. Was he the minister?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. You say he withheld his written recognition until the next morning?
Mr. Stevens. Until the Claudine sailed for Washington.
The Chairman. What time did you make official recognition of this Government.
Mr. Stevens. I could not say positively, because the legation was thronged all the afternoon, and I was sick on the couch; but probably not far from 5 o'clock. My wife and daughter think it was a little later.
The Chairman. What day?
Mr. Stevens. The day they were constituted—perhaps three hours after they were sworn in and took possession of the buildings and were conducting the Government.
The Chairman. You were at the legation?
Mr. Stevens. At the legation.
The Chairman. And lying sick on a couch?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. How did you get information that this Provisional Government had been established?
Mr. Stevens. There were messengers coming from both sides.
The Chairman. I am speaking of official information from the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. I can not say now, because I received it in so many ways. I can say that the ministers of the Queen had access to me all that afternoon, and others, and it was borne to me in various ways.
The Chairman. What did you regard as the official information of the Government on which you, as the American minister, were authorized to act in recognition of that Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say; but there is probably a note on file in the legation in Honolulu; I presume there is—stating that they were constituted. But I learned it in very many ways outside of that. There was a complete want of government, an interregnum, from Saturday afternoon, and my purpose was to recognize the first real government that was constituted; and if Mr. Wilson had gone forward and shown any force and organized a government I should have recognized that.
The Chairman. You received a note informing you of the organization of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Probably I did; I can not swear to that.
The Chairman. You wrote a note?
Mr. Stevens. Oh, yes; I wrote a note.
The Chairman. When did you write that note?
Mr. Stevens. In the afternoon.
The Chairman. What time in the afternoon?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say. I got up off the couch---
The Chairman. About what time?
Mr. Stevens. I could not swear to that. I prepared a note before; had it in readiness, because it was open as any railroad meeting would be in your city or mine; and I probably got the note ready without signature beforehand.
Senator Gray. A note to whom?
The Chairman. To the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. I looked up the matter of form in the legation, and got it ready.
The Chairman. To whom did you send that note?
Mr. Stevens. My impression is I sent it by Mr. Pringle. I might have sent it by Mr. Carter. I had not been asleep for four nights; I could not sleep on the Boston, all this excitement going on, and about 1 o'clock I was violently attacked. I took my couch. A medical man would have said, "Don't speak to a man this afternoon;" but under the excitement they keep coming; I had no clerk, and my daughter— consequently, in this state of my health I could not stop to look at the clock when every man who came—the Queen's messenger this minute and another messenger another minute. I went over it, and I think, as I recall the incident, it was about 5 o'clock. Mrs. Stevens and my daughter afterward said they thought it was half past 5, because they knew when the messenger went.
The Chairman. During that afternoon, while you were still on the couch sick, as you say, some members of the recent cabinet of Liliuokalani came in to see you?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. I wish to know who they were?
Mr. Stevens. They were Mr. Peterson, Mr. Parker—the whole four. But I was too ill, so that I received them one at a time, and only two at all.
The Chairman. You received only one at a time?
Mr. Stevens. I received two—Mr. Parker first. Mr. Parker was more of a gentleman, and he wanted to know if Mr. Peterson could come in. Mr. Peterson was the leader.
The Chairman. During your interviews with these two ex-ministers of Liliuokalani did they give you any intimation as to the proclamation of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Their only errand was this---
The Chairman. What did they say to you? Did they give you any intimation that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Not so far as I remember.
The Chairman. What did they communicate to you?
Mr. Stevens. I will make that clear. Before I had this violent attack, say about 1 o'clock, I received this note from the Queen asking me to come to the palace, and I received it about fifteen minutes before the time appointed. There were two reasons for not responding. I declined the Sunday before to go into a tripartite, especially with Mr. Wodehouse. After I received that note, probably forty-five minutes or an hour, these ministers arrived, and their message was this: whether I could not properly ask the aid of Capt. Wiltse's forces to sustain the Queen. Mr. Peterson went into a legal argument, while his associate, Mr. Parker, was silent. Mr. Parker said to Peterson: "You must make this very brief;" and the only answer I made was: "Gentlemen, these men were landed for one purpose only, a pacific purpose; I can not use this force for sustaining the Queen." Now, they say that they put the other alternative—"assist the Provisional Government." There was no alternative spoken of or hinted. I said: "These men were landed for a pacific purpose, and I can not use them to sustain the Queen."
The Chairman. A pacific purpose?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; what I have just stated is the substance of what occurred.
The Chairman. Was that the substance of what occurred?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. And that was argued by Mr. Peterson on a legal point. I ought to state the reason for that. In 1874 Kalakaua was elected, and the natives were opposed to it, as history will show. The American forces from the ship were landed to suppress the mob, and the suppression of that mob was practically the putting of Kalakaua on the throne. But that was not the specific intention; but, inasmuch as he had been elected and his opponents had control of the city and had driven the Legislature out, it resulted that way.
Now, in putting down the riot in 1874, which put Kalakaua on the throne, from that time on the Kalakaua family got the idea that the United States would do the same; that the minister was obliged to do it. I received formerly several times messengers from the Queen; whenever they called I would, as a matter of duty, use that force to sustain them, and in this belief Mr. Peterson made the argument that they were the legally constituted Government, and that I could properly do as he suggested—he knew that I did not claim to be a lawyer, and he thought he knew more about law than I did—that I could properly use the force. I made as brief an answer as possible—"that these men were on shore for a pacific purpose, and we can not take any part in any contest; can not use the force to sustain the Queen or anybody else."
The Chairman. Now, at that that time it seems, from what occurred and the argument that was addressed to you by these gentlemen, that
the question arose as between the Provisional Government and the Queen's Government?
Mr. Stevens. His whole argument was on the point whether I could properly use the force. At the suggestion of Mr. Parker, because of my condition of health, he made it brief.
The Chairman. But you were simply contemplating the question at that time whether you could sustain the Queen's Government or the Provisional Government ?
Mr. Stevens. No; the other alternative was not put by him at all.
The Chairman. At the time that conversation occurred were you aware of the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Probably I was. That was in the course of two or three hours recognized. I can not recognize the precise hour at which they took possession of the Government building and issued their proclamation.
The Chairman. Did you at that time know that it related to a controversy between the Queen's Government and the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. I knew from the conversation that they called upon me from the Queen—to save her.
The Chairman. To save her against dethronement?
Mr. Stevens. Against anybody—that their only hope for possession of that Government by the Queen was by my assistance.
The Chairman. Was there any suggestion made by these ministers when they came to the legation that the Queen's person or the person of any member of her cabinet was in any danger?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. So that, what you had to say in regard to it had no reference to the preservation of the life or security of the Queen or her ministers?
Mr. Stevens. Nothing whatever.
The Chairman. But it had reference to whether the Government of the United States would recognize---
Mr. Stevens. Put her in possession of the Government which she had lost.
The Chairman. How long was it after that interview with the Queen's ministers before you sent this note of recognition by Mr. Pringle to the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. I could not tell.
The Chairman. About how long?
Mr. Stevens. I would suppose it might have been two hours; might have been three.
The Chairman. That is your recollection—two or three hours?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; two or three hours. Probably it might have been—most likely was, two hours and a half; but that I would not swear to—whether it was two, two forty-five or three, because I had no record or watch at the time.
The Chairman. On that day, which was Tuesday, had you visited the Government building?
Mr. Stevens. I did not leave the legation from Monday evening until several days after—remained constantly in the legation.
The Chairman. Had you any conferences with members of the Provisional Government during that interval and while you remained at the legation?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Had no conferences with any of them?
Mr. Stevens. No. AS an individual, some member of the Provisional Government may have called. But the Provisional Government leaders were intelligent, and they would not embarrass me with questions I could not answer—they were better posted men than their opponents. They kept their plans from me for reasons of their own.
The Chairman. I suppose you are not speaking of the official communications between you and the members of the Provisional Government— that they did not make any official communication?
Mr. Stevens. I presume they sent a communication asking recognition, and I presume that note is at the legation in Honolulu.
The Chairman. Beside that?
Mr. Stevens. Beside that I did not see one of them—they did not call; they probably sent their messenger, because they kept coming to the legation, representative men on both sides, constantly, and it would be impossible to make a record of every one. The whole town had been in excitement for days.
The Chairman. Was it your purpose in anything you did, from the time you left the Boston on Saturday up to the time of your making an official recognition in writing, to use the forces or the flag or the authority of the United States Government for the purpose of dethroning the Queen?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest—absolute noninterference was my purpose.
The Chairman. Was it your policy in any of these things that you had done to aid any plan or purpose of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all. That was not the plan.
The Chairman. Since your residence in Hawaii as a minister have you personally—I do not speak of your ministerial character—favored the annexation of Hawaii to the United States? Have you been in favor of that movement?
Mr. Stevens. After I had been in Honolulu one year I came to the conclusion that the annexation of those islands was inevitable, or something else; that the then condition of things could not last very long, and therefore my official communications to our Government disclose just what my views were. But in my calculations for annexation I never supposed, nor was it expected by the friends of annexation, that it would be by revolution, but through negotiation, legislative action, and the assent of the Queen on the lines of the treaty of '54. That was the only plan thought of.
In that time I kept my own counsel, and nobody except the United States Government knew what my real view was. In that time I may have chatted with individuals and given an opinion when talking of the situation of the islands—with Judge Hartwell or Rev. Dr. Hyde, and I may have agreed with them that that would be the inevitable, sooner or later, because that had been the form of expression, as the records will show, for forty years. But that was merely an academic opinion privately expressed.
The Chairman. As a matter of interest to the people of Hawaii, and also the people of the United States and the Government of the United States, were your personal wishes or inclinations in favor of or against annexation?
Mr. Stevens. In the first twelve months I supposed something like a protectorate would be preferable.
The Chairman. After that what?
Mr. Stevens. I came to the conclusion that while a protectorate
would be possible, annexation was the only logical and practical solution.
The Chairman. Did you favor it?
Mr. Stevens. Only as I reported to the Department.
The Chairman. I do not mean whether you advocated it, but whether, in your own mind, you favored it.
Mr. Stevens. In my own mind I came to the conclusion that annexation was better than protectorate, or something like what they have in Sweden and Norway. I know that there were some men when I first went there who have had the idea that it would be better to have the foreign relations managed at Washington and have an independent kingdom like Norway.
The Chairman. During this period of time in Hawaii, did you believe that it would be advantageous to the Government of the United States, in a commercial sense, to acquire the ownership of the islands?
Mr. Stevens. Most emphatically. I came to that conclusion after a study of the future of the Pacific.
The Chairman. You believed that the future of the islands lay in that direction?
Mr. Stevens. Exactly. I followed Mr. Seward for 25 years; I am a believer in his philosophy as to the future of America in the Pacific, and, of course, my investigations after I went to the islands confirmed me.
The Chairman. Having such an opinion and such a belief and such a trend of judgment about this important serious matter, have you in any way, at any time, or on any occasion employed your power as a minister of this Government for the purpose of promoting or accelerating that movement?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest, except in writing to Washington, and that was marked confidential. There I expressed my views of the situation. When I suggested a customs' union, I pointed out in that that the customs union had more difficulties than annexation, and that the protectorate system was a system which I could not see would work with the American system.
The Chairman. Was it your observation of the condition of feeling and sentiment amongst the Hawaiians, the native Kanaka population, that they felt friendly toward and grateful to what was termed the missionary element for their education and civilization in building up their institutions and towns and other things that have occurred, or were they possessed of a feeling of hostility toward the missionary element? By the missionary element I mean not all who are classed now as missionaries, but those men and their descendants who went to the islands for true missionary purposes?
Mr. Stevens. I would say in answer to that, that nearly all, if not all, the responsible natives of the islands (I mean the men of education and standing) are nearly all Americans, and the representative men would be the four members of the Legislature who resisted the threats and bribes in the struggle about the lottery bill, led by Mr. Kauhana, who had been a member of the Legislature for fifteen years. He is a man of character, and his three associates said, "The United States is our mother; let her take our children."
The Chairman. I want to know whether it was a custom amongst the Hawaiians with the white people there to celebrate our anniversaries, such as the Fourth of July?
Mr. Stevens. The 4th of July on all the four principal islands is celebrated with more uniformity and earnestness than in any part of the
United States. I am familiar with the celebration of the 4th of July in my country fifty years ago, when they celebrated as they now do in Hawaii.
The Chairman. Is it regarded as a fete day?
Mr. Stevens. As a fete day.
The Chairman. How about the proclamations of Thanksgiving that go from the President out there?
Mr. Stevens. That is used in the churches, and much regarded, but not the same degree as the 4th of July; but it is still a very important day.
The Chairman. Is that regaded by the Kanaka population? Do they participate in the sentiment upon the request of our President?
Mr. Stevens. I think so.
The Chairman. Are you aware of the existence of a similar state of feeling on the part of the Hawaiian people, the Kanakas, toward any other foreign government?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Do you understand and do you believe and do you state, upon your understanding and belief, that there is an affectionate regard or sentiment on the part of the Kanaka population toward the people and Government of the United States?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; I will say the responsible portion of them.
The Chairman. How about the irresponsible, the ignorant people?
Mr. Stevens. The irresponsible, what we call the hoodlum—I use that term for convenience—are gathered in Honolulu, as they would be in any country, at the capital. That element is comparatively small in numbers, but it makes a good deal of noise, and is under the control of the white adventurers. And there is another element, which is quite numerous, and if they only get their point and things go on, they are satisfied.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the principal body of the Hawaiian people, who reside in the country.
Mr. Stevens. I would divide those in three classes: the first led by Mr. Kanhana and others like him. That makes the responsible and the religious element, led by the Americans. Then there would be the portion living in the country districts who do not care one way or the other.
The Chairman. Indifferent?
Mr. Stevens. Indifferent. If the demagogues were to go to them and say, "The Americans are going to take away your lands," they would get up a feeling, and they would all act at once. And then the hoodlum element—a few hundred dollars would buy them and use them, as the worst element in our cities.
The Chairman. Subject to be controlled, because they are purchaseable?
Mr. Stevens. Purchaseable. They would not do any very great harm, but they are corrupt.
The Chairman. Considering the condition that Honolulu is in, and considering all the facts that you have been commenting upon, what was your reason for requesting or directing the raising of the flag and the establishment of a protectorate in Honolulu?
Mr. Stevens. I have it here in writing; but I think I can condense it better.
Senator Frye. One moment before that question is answered, if the chairman please.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Frye. You have been over the recognition of the Provisional Government and closed that chapter. In the recognition of the Provisional Government did you ask anything about the barracks and the station house?
Mr. Stevens. I did not go into the particulars.
Senator Frye. What importance on the question of the recognition of the Provisional Government did the barracks and the police station have?
Mr. Stevens. None whatever. As I have stated before, there was an absolute interregnum, and there was no effective force for the Queen at any time.
Senator Frye. In determining upon the question of recognition, did you take into consideration at all the surrender of the barracks or the police station?
Mr. Stevens. No.
Senator Frye. Capt. Wiltse is reported to have said that he would not recognize the Provisional Government until the barracks and police station had surrendered. Had Capt. Wiltse any authority in the premises, if he said so?
Mr. Stevens. I would say that he never had any such conversation with me, and I have no idea he said anything of the kind.
Senator Frye. Is not the question of recognition a question entirely and solely for the American minister?
Mr. Stevens. I would say so. So far as the American Government is concerned, absolutely and entirely.
The Chairman. Was that request of the Provisional Government made in writing?
Mr. Stevens. I think so.
The Chairman. Is it there?
Mr. Stevens. I think it is on file at the legation. In answer to the question of the chairman put a few moments ago I will proceed to state: These volunteer troops had been taken from their business for two weeks. The Japanese Government had a powerful ironclad that was soon expected. They had one ship there, but they had sent it off to Hilo, and of that visit to Hilo we got information, which I sent to the Department, that the Japanese were testing the sentiment of the men upon the plantations as to whether they would aid the Japanese. Now, right here, it is important that I should be specific. The Japanese Commissioner had but recently arrived. He came to me prior to my going to Hilo and prior to the fall of the Queen and said that he wanted the same rights of suffrage for the Japanese that other nationalities had. He wanted to get my encouragement, to find out what I was about. That was before I went to Hilo. Of course I had to be very diplomatic and did not make him any pledges or any signs.
At about the same time he had made this demand on the Queen's Government, which was before the overthrow, and which was followed up immediately on the Provisional Government—to give them the right of suffrage. On the island of Oahu, as the reports came to me, they had 700 or 800 Japanese who had been in the Japanese army. Information came to the Provisional Government and came to me that the adherents of the Queen, in a revolutionary attempt to replace her just at this time before the flag was put up, might call upon the Japanese laborers and residents, and that the Queen would promise them, for the sake of their aid, that they should have the right of suffrage. There was a good opportunity for the Japanese and the Queen's supporters. The commissioner had sent a request to Tokio by the Claudine, which
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I found out afterwards, following the Japanese training ship which had arrived from San Francisco, and in the meantime the training ship had gone up to Hilo. We found out from what appeared to be a reliable source that some political action in concert with natives was in view. There was no proof of that except as this messenger conveyed it to us in writing and the manner he had gained the information. That might not be so, but there were outward signs of it.
The Provisional Government felt, as I felt, if the Queen's adherents should make that promise, and they could get the aid of the 700 or 800 Japanese soldiers, a revolutionary attempt would be dangerous. In the meantime the English minister, who had always insisted upon a tripartite action in anything that took place in Honolulu, expected the arrival of a British ship. The Provisional Government got the information that the attempt would be made for two purposes: First, that those representing the Queen and Mr. Neumann would want the information to go to Washington that there was a chaotic condition of things in Hawaii, and that the Provisional Government had no real, stable, authority—that an outbreak, although it might and would be crushed out, would have a very bad effect.
Fear on the part of the mob of adventurers who had surrounded the Queen—fear of the use of the Japanese force that might be used, the fear of the pressure of the Japanese commissioner, with two ships at his command (one of them larger than the Boston, with the attitude of the British minister, with the ship he expected, all combined to make me yield to the request to put up the flag. And the understanding on their part was expressed in their note and was expressed in my answer when we put it up—"That this must only go to the extent of supporting the Government against these outside contingencies," both from the English vessel and Japanese, but much more from the Japanese, because he was thoroughly in earnest to get that right of suffrage for his thousands of Japanese. Now, we may have been unduly alarmed, but the Provisional Government was alarmed, and that was the state of the case.
It was specifically understood that there should be no interference with the internal affairs of Hawaii, and there was no period in which I was more absolutely unconnected with internal affairs than in that period when the flag was up.
The Chairman. Did you receive any official or other information prior to the time of the raising of this flag that any government represented in Hawaii was opposed to the project of annexation, which information had been submitted to the United States?
Mr. Stevens. Opposition from any Government? I had this information, that Mr. Wodehouse, when he found that the Provisional Government was in favor of annexation, thought they ought to submit it to popular vote, and they thought that was a very cool proposition for any English minister to make. He made that proposition very soon after he found out that they favored annexation, and I think sent a note to that effect to the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. You had that information?
Mr. Stevens. I had that positively from Mr. Dole himself, and other information. I had repeated interviews with the Japanese commissioner. He stated his point, and wanted me to assent to the idea that the Japanese should have the right to vote. I had in a formal, diplomatic way, given him to understand that that was beyond my province and responsibility.
The Chairman. At the time of the raising of the flag, as well as
before, the Japanese commissioner insisted upon the suffrage proposition?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. And he furthermore said if we were to annex the islands he hoped the American Government would give the Japanese the same rights as Americans or Englishmen or Germans. And he was very earnest and very tenacious about it. And the sending of a great war vessel under the circumstances was the one that caused the most outside fear.
The Chairman. And those were the reasons?
Mr. Stevens. The fear of anarchy and the fear of the Japanese, and the fear that Mr. Wodehouse and the Japanese commissioner would insist upon the same right with dealing with the affairs that I had, which I knew my Government was opposed to.
The Chairman. Those were the reasons which influenced you to accept the proposition from the Provisional Government for a protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. It was a modified and strictly limited protectorate.
The Chairman. It is a protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. To the extent specified, yes.
The Chairman. After that flag was raised and that protectorate was declared, did you, as the American minister, or in any other capacity, take any control or direction of any of the affairs of the Provisional Government, or any control or direction of the people there in any way?
Mr. Stevens. Not in the remotest degree. For two reasons, if you will allow me to state the reasons.
The Chairman. Never mind the reasons. I can think of a dozen reasons why you would not want to do it. Did you intend it, or did the Hawaiian Provisional Government intend it, so far as you know, as an attempt on the part of the United States to establish the right of sovereignty over the islands of Hawaii—I mean this protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. No; I understood then, as I understand now, that that was to sustain the sovereignty of the Provisional Government— that their sovereignty was threatened under the circumstances.
The Chairman. To prevent other governments from coming in there to interfere?
Mr. Stevens. That is it exactly.
The Chairman. It was pending the protectorate that Mr. Blount arrived?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Had you, before Mr. Blount arrived, received information from Mr. Secretary Foster that your act in establishing that protectorate had been disavowed?
Mr. Stevens. No; I understood his note as I understand it now. It is in exact accordance with the little document I have just read. In the liability of its being misunderstood, he thought it best to enlarge upon it and define how far our limited protectorate could go. I so understood it at the time. Secretary Foster went on to decide what we could do and what we could not; and what we could do was what we did.
The Chairman. When he disavowed what seemed to be a protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; he defined how far our protectorate could go.
The Chairman. Then he disavowed what seemed to be a protectorate. We will take his own language as conveying his actual meaning. Did you understand that that disavowal reached the point or
proposition that you were forbidden, as American minister, to preserve or protect the public peace?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all; but just the opposite, because the language of the dispatch is explicit on that point.
The Chairman. And it was for that reason you considered his disavowal comported with the purpose of raising the flag ?
Mr. Stevens. Precisely. Everything I had done was in accordance with his dispatch. President Dole was familiar with international law, as well as Mr. Foster and myself, and never thought of asking more than Secretary Foster's dispatch allows.
The Chairman. How long did you remain there after Mr. Blount arrived?
Mr. Stevens. I think he arrived the 28th of March, and I left the 24th of May.
The Chairman. Did Mr. Blount carry over with him the dispatch of Mr. Foster regarding the protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. No; Mr. Foster's dispatch came by telegram, and in due course of mail afterward.
The Chairman. So that Mr. Foster's dispatch, whatever it meant, had been received by you before Mr. Blount's arrival?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; I think thirty days before.
The Chairman. Did you think, from Mr. Foster's dispatch, that you should haul down the flag and order the troops to go on board ship?
Mr. Stevens. Not in the slightest.
The Chairman. Is there anything which you can state except what you have already stated, about the Japanese, and foreign interference— any turbulence or danger that would require you to keep that flag flying and keep the protectorate in authority?
Mr. Stevens. My judgment was for its retention until there was an order to the contrary. The same reason that caused me to raise it, in my mind, continued. I do not know of any other than those I have stated.
The Chairman. You have stated all the reasons that then induced you to put up the flag and all the reasons that induced you to maintain it and maintain the protectorate after you received Mr. Foster's dispatch?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; certainly. My documents explain why I would do that and not do otherwise when negotiations were pending.
The Chairman. In the course which you took in maintaining the protectorate and in maintaining the flag over Hawaiian soil, did you understand that you were violating in any sense any order of the United States Government given through the State Department?
Mr. Stevens. No. I stated in my dispatch the serious responsibility I was under; that there was a contingency I knew no other way to meet than the method in which I met it.
The Chairman. How long before you received that dispatch was it that Admiral Skerrett came?
Mr. Stevens. I can not recall.
The Chairman. But it was before you received that dispatch disavowing---
Mr. Stevens. I shall object to the term disavowal; I do not admit it was a disavowal.
The Chairman. I use the word disavowal.
Mr. Stevens. Admiral Skerrett might have arrived ten days or two weeks after. There might have been a day more or a day less, but
it would not vary from several weeks between the arrival of Admiral Skerrett and the dispatch of Mr. Foster.
The Chairman. The flag was flying when Admiral Skerrett arrived.
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett make any objection to it?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Did he ever suggest to you that it was an improper attitude for the Government of the United States to maintain toward Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Or that he would refuse to maintain it with his troops on shore?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Did you have conferences with Admiral Skerrett?
Mr. Stevens. Not on that specific point.
The Chairman. Were you in association with him?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; constantly.
The Chairman. Did you converse about Hawaiian affairs.
Mr. Stevens. I think after Admiral Skerrett had been there a certain length of time he said he would rather a portion of the troops would be on board ship. We conferred with the Provisional Government, and we reduced the number all around.
The Chairman. The number was reduced under Admiral Skerrett's suggestion and order, and with your assent?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Where was Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. He had gone home. He remained thirty days after his time had expired.
The Chairman. He remained after the flag was raised?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. But Admiral Skerrett reduced the force on shore?
Mr. Stevens. After conference with me and the Provisional Government. We thought it was safe to do it.
The Chairman. That was while the flag was up?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett undertake to interfere with the existence of the protectorate?
Mr. Stevens. Not in the slightest. This was a mutual friendly arrangement all around; what the state of the case required—the reduction of the force.
The Chairman. Did Admiral Skerrett ever state to you before the arrival of Mr. Blount that he thought it his duty as the admiral in command to withdraw his entire force from the shore and haul down that flag?
Mr. Stevens. No; he never even spoke to me that it was bad policy to have it up—nothing of the kind. I think he had a captain who was there a while. I heard of his making that remark. But it was only a matter of chitchat. He did not agree with and could not get along with the missionary people, and he wanted to go with another class of people. I can not recall his name at this moment.
Senator Gray. Was he on Admiral Skerrett's ship?
Mr. Stevens. He was sent shortly up to Bering Sea.
Senator Gray. You might mention his name.
Mr. Stevens. I can not recall it.
The Chairman. He had formed and expressed an opinion, as you
understood, contrary to the attitude of the Government of the United States at that time?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. And he thought that the whole thing was a mistake; but when he was conferred with by some of the citizens he denied it. So that I could not say what his real position was.
The Chairman. We do not want to go into that. When Mr. Blount arrived, did he communicate to you any of the special instructions that he had received?
Mr. Stevens. Not his instructions; but he gave me a copy of the instructions from Washington, by which his authority was paramount over mine, and that I should keep on with the ordinary duties of the legation. But he never showed me his instructions nor gave me a hint as to what they were.
The Chairman. You had only a conjecture as to what they might be?
Mr. Stevens. Only a conjecture.
The Chairman. Mr. Blount was cautious in withholding his instructions, was he? Did you ask to be informed of his mission there?
Mr. Stevens. Oh, no; I introduced him to the Provisional Government, and was courteous as I could be to him.
The Chairman. Did you demur, dissent, to his coming there as minister of the United States with authority paramount to your authority there?
Mr. Stevens. No. I kept that locked up in my breast.
The Chairman. So that, whatever his mission was, it was not a matter to arouse your antagonism?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest. On the other hand, I treated him with the utmost kindness. I knew that he came with a great deal of prejudice, and I was careful---
The Chairman. How do you know that he came with prejudice?
Mr. Stevens. By his conduct. It was very brusque with me in the start. It was brusque in his refusal to accept the offer of the American citizens that he should take a house rather than go the royalist hotel.
The Chairman. That offer was made by whom?
Mr. Stevens. That was a committee of American citizens. I can give you who they were and what they were.
The Chairman. Was it the committee of safety?
Mr. Stevens. They were not members of it. The chairman of it was Judge Hartwell, who had nothing to do with the revolution whatever, and the next member was Mr. Scott, a Kentucky gentleman, who has had charge of the high school for many years—not connected with the Government or even with politics.
The Chairman. How came the citizens to provide a house for Mr. Blount any more than for you as minister?
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that they knew that the Hawaiian Hotel was organized in the interest of the Queen's supporters and organized in a very corrupt way.
The Chairman. Was there no other hotel there except the one at which Mr. Blount stopped?
Mr. Stevens. That was the principal hotel. There were other good hotels.
Senator Gray. That was the principal hotel?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. There were other hotels.
Senator Gray. Mr. Blount says he went there because it was the leading hotel, and that he never saw its proprietor to speak to him for many weeks after he had been there, and he saw no men who were
royalists, except they came for the purposes of examination. Do you know anything to the contrary?
Mr. Stevens. I know altogether to the contrary. The Hawaiian Hotel had been for many months as complete a lodge for all the Queen's supporters, to the extent that they watched every boarder who was brought there. The man who kept that hotel was of a firm that cheated the Government out of $80,000. One of the firm was sent to Washington as Kaiulani's counsel. The active manager of that hotel at the time is a graduate from the Oxford University, England. He was divorced from his wife in the United States. He wrote those vile letters in behalf of the Queen attacking me and Judge Dole.
Senator Gray. Do you know that Mr. Blount had any association with those people?
Mr. Stevens. That I can not swear to. I was giving the character of the hotel, the reasons why these citizens suggested that he go to a private house.
Senator Gray. Do you know that Mr. Blount associated with the people whom you have described on terms of intimacy or otherwise?
Mr. Stevens. I think it would be impossible for Mr. Blount to know, because they were strangers to him.
Senator Gray. Do you know that he did?
Mr. Stevens. I know that when I called at the cottage that they were generally there.
Senator Gray. Where?
Mr. Stevens. At the cottage where he stopped, close to the hotel. I found some of those parties were there.
Senator Gray. Who were some of those parties?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Peterson was one. You asked me why these citizens made this offer. It was because while he was at the hotel he would be under espionage of the royalists.
Senator Gray. Do you say that Mr. Blount when he arrived went to the Hawaiian Hotel, and he there associated intimately or otherwise with those objectionable characters?
Mr. Stevens. I do not believe that he did.
Senator Gray. I will ask you whether or not that hotel is where all American tourists and strangers would go?
Mr. Stevens. More likely to go.
Senator Gray. Did not the tourists all go to that hotel?
Mr. Stevens. More or less. But so soon as they had been there any length of time, they generally left it. A good many Americans left it because of its anti-American character.
The Chairman. Now, as I understand your statement, this body of citizens undertook to provide quarters for Mr. Blount in order to prevent him from falling under what they conceived to be and you conceived to be evil influences?
Mr. Stevens. I will state it my own way. These citizens were of the highest respectability. This lady offered it because it was more convenient to the legation, and where both parties would have access without espionage, as the American citizens knew that they could not go to the royalists hotel without espionage. And I had to caution Mr. Blount that his papers would be seen by the representatives of the royalists. I think he regarded that caution.
Senator Gray. Did he make any objection to accepting the hospitality of any one, or simply that he preferred to go to the public hotel where he could pay his own expenses?
Mr. Stevens. I think he said Mr. Mills had arranged to go to the hotel. At that time he did not mean anything out of the way.
Senator Gray. I ask you if he did not mean what I have said, or indicate something of that meaning?
Mr. Stevens. I think he indicated to me that Mr. Mills had arranged for going to the hotel. I can not say that is the form of the statement, but that is the implication.
Senator Gray. That he refused the hospitality?
Mr. Stevens. That would not be a fair statement. They did not propose free hospitality. They simply said he might pay the same as would be charged at the hotel. I only took the message from them. They asked me to give the message. I do not know—it was arranged that they would be willing to furnish him accommodations at the same rate as at the hotel.
Senator Gray. Was anything said about "from nothing up"?
Mr. Stevens. Some other parties might have used that expression, but I was asked to make no such offer.
Senator Gray. Did anybody go out with you?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; this committee went out.
Senator Gray. Who were the committee—a committee of what?
Mr. Stevens. Committee of citizens. Judge Hartwell, Dr. McGrew, and Mr. Scott. Judge Hartwell has been one of the supreme judges, a leading lawyer.
Senator Gray. Was Judge Hartwell one of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. No; he had no connection with it. And Mr. Scott is the teacher of the high school, a man of very high standing, and has been there for years. He was for six years at the royal college in Japan.
Senator Gray. Was there any committee from the Annexation Club who went out, or communicated with Mr. Blount in regard to it?
Mr. Stevens. I think the three gentlemen already named were members of the Annexation Club. I am not sure that Judge Hartwell was. They took these gentlemen because they were disconnected with the Provisional Government and were American citizens. The Provisional Government had nothing to do with it and did not know of it.
Senator Gray. After Mr. Blount's arrival there, and after he was established at his headquarters, did he ask any information of you about the situation of affairs in Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Did you offer to communicate to him any information which you had in regard to the situation of affairs there?
Mr. Stevens. It was not possible for me to do so without being discourteous.
The Chairman. Did you ask him to have any conference about the condition of affairs in Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Did he ask you whether it would be politic or safe or unsafe to haul down the flag and order the troops on board ship?
Mr. Stevens. Not the least—not a word; never a hint of what he was going to do.
The Chairman. Did he ask you what your relations were to Hawaii and other foreign governments?
Mr. Stevens. Not the least. He did not ask me to do what is usual for a retiring minister to do—to go and introduce him to the foreign representatives. I do not think he meant any harm in that. I do not think he was posted as to diplomatic usage. But that is what custom requires.
The Chairman. Did you in any way interfere in any investigation that he made while he was there?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Did you enter any protest or objection to his removing troops from the shore?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
The Chairman. Or hauling down the flag?
Mr. Stevens. Not the least.
The Chairman. Did that act of removal, etc., produce any commotion in the community?
Mr. Stevens. An intense silent feeling.
The Chairman. I speak of outbreak or commotion?
Mr. Stevens. Just the opposite of that—intense silence. But in the homes of the families you would see the exhibition.
The Chairman. What is your information in regard to the power of Liliuokalani, as Queen of Hawaii, to organize and conduct any enterprise, political or military, for the purpose of displacing the Government that exists there now?
Mr. Stevens. I think she would have very little power. But I think there are parties who might in her name do it; but I do not think it probable.
The Chairman. Parties who might displace the existing Government?
Mr. Stevens. No; I do not say that. But I think it possible that an expedition organized in California or Vancouver might attempt it, if they could obtain the money to do it.
The Chairman. But I am speaking of the power of the Queen.
Mr. Stevens. Her own power—nil.
The Chairman. I understand you, then, that without assistance from foreign governments any enterprise of the character that I have just asked about would be a failure?
Mr. Stevens. An utter failure. There is not the least danger of any attempt being made except by outside aid. That is my opinion.
The Chairman. Suppose that Liliuokalani had the undivided support of the native born, of the Kanaka population, with all the resources at their command, do you believe that she would be powerful enough with that support to overturn the existing civil government in those islands?
Mr. Stevens. I think one-fourth of the force of the Provisional Government could resist all the native force on the islands.
The Chairman. Then your answer must be, she would not be powerful enough?
Mr. Stevens. Not powerful enough. Two hundred American soldiers could resist them all.
The Chairman. Do you consider the Hawaiian population, native-born Kanaka population, as being a warlike population?
Mr. Stevens. They are the reverse of that in every sense.
The Chairman. How would they compare with the American born?
Mr. Stevens. I should say that a native Kanaka force of 2,000, two hundred United States soldiers would more than equal.
The Chairman. So that you do not think the Provisional Government is in any danger from the Hawaiian population?
Mr. Stevens. Not the least. From the native population? It would be the whites from whom the organized opposition would come.
The Chairman. Did you ascertain before you left Hawaii, and after
the declaration of the Provisional Government, that there was any white organization being attempted against the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. My information was to the effect that the same men who put the lottery bill through, what they called the lottery and opium men, had been acting together for a good while.
The Chairman. Did you hear of any attempt at organization amongst these, people, or any other white people, to overthrow or dislodge the Provisional Government, or impair it?
Mr. Stevens. Those rumors of attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government? They were constantly getting information of attempts to do it.
The Chairman. Attempts to do what, to form an organization?
Mr. Stevens. To catch them unawares—to surprise the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. Did you understand from any information that you had—of course anything like a reliable character—that there existed an organization?
Mr. Stevens. I should say that my information is that there are two or three organizations, mainly political. They have one organization called the Native Hawaiians; they have another, with a native name.
The Chairman. Are they natives?
Mr. Stevens. They are natives. They have political organizations among themselves.
The Chairman. State any other.
Mr. Stevens. They had at one time what they called the "Liberty League"; but I think that is disbanded. Those cliques have run together; but the same men can extemporize an organization within a week; because they drift together as naturally as similar men in our cities.
The Chairman. I will try to get back to the question whether you know or had any information of the existence of an organization amongst the white people in Hawaii against the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. What was it?
Mr. Stevens. I have forgotten the name of it; I think it is "Liberty League." But they had so many names that I can not remember; but I think it was "Liberty League."
The Chairman. Who was the leader of that organization, if it had any?
Mr. Stevens. It was understood that Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson were in it.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the time that this Provisional Government was established.
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt that those things have varied so that there would be one clique in the League and then another clique.
The Chairman. I am speaking of the time of the organization of the Provisional Government, not any anterior time.
Mr. Stevens. Those since the Provisional Government was established would be the same as they had before.
The Chairman. Is there such an organization?
Mr. Stevens. There are several organizations of years' standing.
The Chairman. Is there now in existence, or was there at any time while you were in Hawaii, any political organization of white men for the purpose of antagonizing and breaking down that Provisional Government. Can you answer that?
Mr. Stevens. I can give my opinion.
The Chairman. I do not want your naked opinion. I want your information.
Mr. Stevens. My information is that the men who controlled the Queen's Government mainly, and ever since she was in, have acted together so often that that is virtually an organization.
The Chairman. Do you understand that there is such an organization existing in Hawaii to-day?
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt that it exists to-day.
The Chairman. Do you know anything about it?
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt it does.
The Chairman. Have you any information about it?
Mr. Stevens. No; I see in Mr. Blount's report—--
The Chairman. I am not speaking of Mr. Blount's report.
Mr. Stevens. I knew it was when I left.
The Chairman. I want to get at the proposition whether or not there is any hostile opposition to the Provisional Government existing amongst the white people of Hawaii at this time, or was when you left there.
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt there is. I have no doubt the men who acted before are acting now.
The Chairman. I want your information, if you have any information about it.
Mr. Stevens. I have no information that an organization exists sincel left there, because that was six or eight months ago.
The Chairman. When you were there did it exist?
Mr. Stevens. It existed.
The Chairman. Who were the leaders of it?
Mr. Stevens. The reason I referred to Mr. Blount's report is this: You will find the committee, of which Mr. Cummings was one—I have understood that he was; he was one of the leading members. That was one organization. Then another organization is the one that Nawahi was at the head of. When I was there he was one of the leaders of a political organization under Kalakaua, and it is possibly in existence to-day, for it has been in existence for years.
The Chairman. I am trying to ask you of organizations formed for the purpose of opposing the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. I can not say that there is any such organization; I can only reason from cause to effect—that those organizations would be hostile to the Provisional Government.
The Chairman. You are not aware of the existence of any such organization now?
Mr. Stevens. No. In Mr. Blount's report I see he mentioned Mr. Bush and Mr. Nawahi. But I can not swear to it.
The Chairman. Now, what I want to get at is, whether among the white people resident in Hawaii, who are not American citizens or persons of American origin, there exists any opposition of an organized character, whether political or military, against the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. What exists to-day? I cannot testify to that.
The Chairman. Was there in your knowledge at the time you left there?
Mr. Stevens. Only as it appeared in the papers.
The Chairman. Did it appear?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. You will see it in Mr. Blount's report, and that
is what I referred to. Mr. Cummings is in it, and Mr. Nawahi. It ran, to some degree, all over the islands. But I can not say that it exists to day.
The Chairman. I want to know now whether any of these foreign people who are not Americans had any organization or association, within your knowledge, to oppose the Provisional Government of Hawaii, with a view to diverting Hawaii from the control or influence of the United States, either in the conduct of its current affairs or in the ultimate purpose of annexation ?
Mr. Stevens. I will begin with the Portuguese first; I will take them seriatim.
The Chairman. No; answer the question.
Mr. Stevens. No, I could not give any information to which I could testify. If you want to know the attitude of these different populations I will give it to you.
The Chairman. I have understood that some Germans are for us and some against us?
Mr. Stevens. As you have asked the question, let me answer it in a way that will enlighten it.
Senator Gray. The question is, whether you have any knowledge or information of any such association or combination?
Mr. Stevens. I will begin with the Portuguese, which were far the more numerous Caucasian population there; the Germans and English were smaller in numbers. The Portuguese number from 9,000 to 10,000. They are nearly, if not quite, a unit for America and for annexation. Why is it so? The young men have been educated in American schools, which are as positive in their American character as you can find in any of our American cities. Nearly all these Portuguese came from the Azores and Madeira poor. They saw the energy and vim of the Americans, and are largely employed by Americans. Then there is some antagonism between the Portuguese and the natives. I have stated the principal causes, and the Portuguese are a unit with us. When you come to the Germans, a very large majority is with us, except such Germans as may (and they are not very many) gather around Claus Spreckels. I will mention two German houses, at the head of which are men who have been there a long time. Their children were born there, and they expect to die there. Both those houses, and they are heavy houses, are with America, just as the English merchant is in New York—they know that their business and their future interests are entirely with us. They all talk English, and they are like Americans.
Take the English. A majority of the English affiliate with us. Why? For the reason that they do all their business with California, Washington, and Oregon. They go to American schools, and many of them have married in American families. There is Mr. Davies. He is one of the heaviest merchants, but is opposed to us having Pearl Harbor, and is very hostile to American predominance in Hawaii. With the exception of what gathers around Mr. Davies and Mr. Wodehouse (which is a very marked minority of the English), the English are with us as much as the Portuguese. When you come to the Norwegians, whose number is small, you may say it is a unit for us. Reduce the opposition to the Provisional Government to the white population, and you have the men whom the lottery and opium rings have had in their power, and who will respond to the beat of the political drum. Any one familiar with the political organizations in the cities of the United States knows what that is.
They have what is called the hoodlum element in Honolulu. Pay them and you will have them. But what are called the missionary people are not persons to bribe voters, and if a man were to throw in $50,000 to carry a project against the missionary element, he could buy up the hoodlums, just as they bought the votes in the Legislature with lottery stock, and those who would not have lottery stock got cash down.
The Chairman. You have made that statement. Do you know anything of the payment of lottery stock or money to carry through the lottery scheme?
Mr. Stevens. I will answer the best I can. The facts are as notorious as they would be in any American capital where anything of the kind had been going on for years. I will give you this fact, and I will give you the name. Mr. Emuleuth, who is a native of Ohio, but who has been out there fifteen years, an enterprising and respectable man so far as I know. He is a member if the Provisional Government. The day before the lottery cabinet was appointed, which must have been the day before the coming back of the Boston, Emuleuth went into a commercial house in Honolulu, and as he was going upstairs, he heard Peterson and Colburn talking. Peterson did not want to put Colburn in the cabinet. Colburn had been the man who raised the money; and Emuleuth heard this as he stopped on the stairs. Colburn wanted to go into the cabinet, and Peterson was trying to reason him out of going in. Peterson knew Colburn was a hard man to carry, and it ran in this way: "Peterson, I paid this money, and if you don't put me in the cabinet, I will join the other side and blow you to hell."
The Chairman. Emuleuth gave you this information?
Mr. Stevens. Emuleuth.
The Chairman. When ?
Mr. Stevens. He gave that to me some days after the overthrow of the Government.
The Chairman. When?
Mr. Stevens. A week or ten days after the overthrow; merely as a historical fact, he gave it to me.
The Chairman. Prior to the time of your leaving Honolulu on the Boston, to go down to Hilo, did you have any information or reason to suspect that such influences were to be employed in favor of either the lottery or opium bill?
Mr. Stevens. No; just as I stated in my opening, after the Wilcox and Jones defeat of the lottery bill and the opium bill, I thought the fate of those bills were settled, and the cabinet would be carried over for eighteen months.
The Chairman. What information you gathered from Emuleuth or any other source in regard to corruption in the Legislature to procure these votes of want of confidence in the ministry and for the lottery and opium bills was communicated to you after you returned?
Mr. Stevens. Yes, and as a matter of history. Colburn knew his power. Then Peterson said, "if we put you in, will you agree to the constitution which the Queen is going to promulgate?" Colburn was opposed to it, but he answered, "damn, it, Pete; whatever you sign I will sign." Emuleuth said, "those four men were going in that cabinet for sure." They laughed at him; but when the cabinet was constituted they went in.
The Chairman. You, as the American minister, were forming opinions upon the public situation there?
Mr. Stevens. Public situation.
The Chairman. And you included, of course, the action of the Legislature upon these respective measures?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; I got that not by going to the Legislature, but from the best sources I could.
The Chairman. You received that information from those sources which you considered most reliable?
Mr. Stevens. Most reliable.
The Chairman. I want to know whether you formed the opinion as minister of the United States before you left Honolulu to go down to Hilo that, if such measures as the lottery or opium bill should pass, they would produce a commotion or revolution? Were you of that opinion before you left for Hilo?
Mr. Stevens. I considered that settled, or I should not have gone off. The repeated attempts and their failure, the petitions from all the islands, the opposition of the chamber of commerce, and the Queen's assurance to the ladies who called on her, satisfied me that they were dead.
The Chairman. If, before you left Honolulu to go down to Hilo, you had been informed that the Queen intended to promulgate a new constitution, reversing the constitution of '87 and restoring the ancient powers of the monarchy, would you have expected that to create a revolution?
Mr. Stevens. I could not expect otherwise. I knew it, but I had repeatedly said so in conversations with Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, and others—that whenever an attempt should be made to undo the action of 1887, by the Queen going back on her oath and promises, there would be an end of the monarchy forever.
The Chairman. Had you been possessed of any information that Liliuokalani, after the prorogation of the Legislature, would promulgate this new constitution upon her own autliority, would you have left Honolulu?
Mr. Stevens. No; I would have stayed there. I considered it settled when those four men went in, because of their character and their means, and the information that the Queen's favorite had reason to think he should remain marshal.
The Chairman. You speak of the Wilcox-Jones cabinet?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; I considered that those men would be the Government for the next eighteen months.
Senator Frye. When you went on board the ship to go down to Hilo, did you not have conversations with the officers of the ship, in which you expressed yourself as satisfied that peace was restored to Hawaii, and that it would continue until your term of office would expire, and that you could go home in comfort?
Mr. Stevens. I did.
Senator Frye. Was not that your belief?
Mr. Stevens. It was.
Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg in his testimony says that the overthrow of the monarchy could not have been accomplished had it not been the general understanding that the American minister would make use of the troops. In your opinion, did the American troops have any effect on the overthrow of the monarchy?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
Senator Frye. And whether the troops were on shore or not, your opinion is that the monarchy would have been overthrown?
Mr. Stevens. Certainly.
Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg also states that shortly after the
committee of safety met, on the 16th of January, it decided that they were not ready for the landing of American troops; that a committee of three, with Mr. Thurston, went to the American legation and asked Mr. Stevens to delay landing the Boston's men, and that it was reported that Mr. Stevens said, "The troops will land at 5 o'clock, whether you are ready or not."
Mr. Stevens. I am sure that no such committee came; but the fact is, the troops were landed aside from any wishes of the committee of safety.
Senator Frye. William H. Cornwall testified---
Mr. Stevens. He was one of the new cabinet.
Senator Frye. He states that Ministers Parker and Peterson called upon Minister Stevens and gave him to understand that the Government was able to take care of the situation, and asked him to keep the troops on board.
Mr. Stevens. Not true.
Senator Frye. Did Ministers Parker and Peterson ever call upon you and inform you that the Queen's Government was able to take care of the situation, and ask you to keep the troops on board?
Mr. Stevens. No. You had better ask about Gov. Cleghorn's protest. A great deal of importance was given to the island governor's protesting after the troops were landed. Cleghorn, I have no doubt, under the inspiration of the English minister—if you will ask me the reasons, I will answer, but not now—came to me and wanted to know why I landed them. I stated that the circumstances were such that I was compelled to take the responsibility. I was very polite to him. I said to him, "I do not blame you for coming, and if I were in your place I would make the protest"; and I was just as courteous as I could be. He went home, and I have no doubt he consulted the English minister and had done so before coming to me.
Senator Davis. Did you tell Mr. Cleghorn then for what purpose you had landed those troops?
Mr. Stevens. Probably my remarks implied that it was the necessity of the case. As nearly as I can recollect I said this: "The situation is such that I felt it necessary to take the responsibility." I probably put it in that form. My reason for saying that Cleghorn came by the inspiration of the English minister is this: I knew for months dating back in our intercourse that whatever the English minister wanted Mr. Cleghorn to do he would do. He was a good-natured man, and entirely under Mr. Wodehouse's influence. The governorship was of no account; it was abolished in 1887, and they reestablished it in 1890 as a mere honorary office, because Cleghorn was married to the sister of the Queen.
Senator Frye. Cornwall stated that Mr. Hopkins insisted upon knowing whether or not you intended to recognize the lawful Government or the revolutionary Government, and that you said that you should recognize the Provisional Government, because they were in possession of the Government building, and that you intended to support them?
Mr. Stevens. I am very glad you asked that question. I had no conversation with Mr. Hopkins whatever. I did not even know him. Mr. Hopkins brought me a note, and I sent an answer.
Senator Frye. Did you say that to anybody?
Mr. Stevens. Never. I want to say that Mr. Hopkins brought the note—they said it was Hopkins; I never had any conversation with
Hopkins at any time. After he had left the legation my daughter said it was Mr. Hopkins.
Senator Frye. John F. Colburn testified that Thurston had an interview with them (him and Peterson) January 15, at 6 o'clock a. m., Sunday, and desired him and Peterson to depose the Queen; that in the course of the conversation he said that he could inform us that Mr. Stevens had given the committee of safety the assurance that if we two signed a request to land the troops of the Boston, he would immediately comply and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work.
Mr. Stevens. Who put that question?
Senator Frye. John F. Colburn testifies that Thurston in an interview with him and Peterson said that Stevens had given the committee of safety the assurance that if we two (that is, Colburn and Peterson) would sign a request to land the troops of the Boston he would immediately comply and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work.
Mr. Stevens. Nothing of the kind; as perfectly romantic as if born of another age. I am sure Mr. Thurston never said anything about it; he is a man of too much sense.
Senator Frye. Mr. Colburn says further that immediately on the landing of the troops he and Parker had an interview with you.
Mr. Stevens. Parker is the one who came with Mr. Cleghorn to protest.
Senator Frye. And he says that he (Colburn) had an interview with you; that in the course of that interview you said that there were a number of women and old men in town besides children, who were alarmed at the rumors of a revolution, and you wanted to offer them protection; whereupon Colburn said, "You want to annex the country," and you replied, "No, those troops are ashore to preserve the Queen on the throne, you gentlemen in your office, and to offer protection to the community at large."
Mr. Stevens. That is absolute, pure fiction.
Senator Frye. Mr. Colburn says further: "We had under arms 600 men with rifles, 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 8 brass Austrian field cannon, and 2 Catling guns."
Mr. Stevens. Why did they not use them?
Senator Frye. Did they have such a force?
Mr. Stevens No; they would have used it on Sunday and Monday, if they had had any such force. You have to look at the facts. I have answered that before. There was a complete collapse of the Queen's Government from Saturday afternoon of January 14. There was only one attempt at an exhibition of authority, which was by a policeman attempting to prevent two men carrying arms and ammunition up to the Government building. They had two men only. That is the only resistance they dared to make. Wilson knew every step that was taken, knew that the Provisional Government was being organized, just as you gentlemen would know of a railroad meeting in your town.
The Chairman. If there had been any force of 600 men under arms and under the control of the Queen would you have known it?
Mr. Stevens. There was nothing of the kind, or I should have known it. The royalists party had two or three factions, one made up with the Robert Wilcox element. So far as it was possible for me to know—I used all the judgment and experience I had—I was kept posted of the purposes and intentions of the various organizations that were opposed to the Queen and those in her favor; and just as I have stated before,
there were two distinctive parties amongst the natives about the Queen.
The Chairman. I wanted to know whether your sources of information and the diligence of your inquiries made in regard to the actual situation in the islands gave you an opportunity to know satisfactorily to yourself whether they had as many as 600 armed force, or whether they had any organization of a military character that was considered dangerous?
Mr. Stevens. My information was directly the contrary; the only force that I understood they had was the native police force under the marshal and the Queen's guard of 70, men made up of native boys, not equal to 10 white soldiers. Ten American soldiers were equivalent to the whole of them. They never made any resistance, and did not dare.
Senator Frye. The Queen's ministers delivered an address which is given by Mr. Blount in his report, in which they stated that Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson reported that a committee of safety had been formed at the house of Mr. L. A. Thurston and had made overtures to them to assist in dethroning the Queen, and they intended to go ahead, and that your assistance, together with that of the United States Government, had been guaranteed to them. Is there any truth in that?
Mr. Stevens. None; I never knew of it until I saw it in that report. I never heard of it before. I never heard of it until I saw it in that report, as also that other inquiry about my promising Soper. You might ask me if that is in there.
Senator Frye. Mr. Wundenburg further says that Mr. Soper was offered the position of commander-in-chief; that he hesitated to take it; that he and others went over to see you, and then came back, saying, "I understood them to say that Mr. Stevens had told them that if they would take possession of the Government building and read their proclamation, he would immediately recognize them and support them, or, failing to get the Government building, any building in Honolulu."
Mr. Stevens. I never heard anything about it until I saw it in Blount's report. It is pure fiction, absolute fiction, as well as that other statement that Soper wanted to take military command. I did not know that Soper was to have the military command until I saw his appointment in the newspapers. Soper never came to me to ask me anything about it. The first I knew of Soper being appointed to the command was one or two days afteward.
Senator Frye. Kaulukou in his affidavit says that Minister Stevens wrote a letter, which he gave to Charles L. Hopkins, in which he said he would back and help the Provisional Government and not her Majesty the Queen's Government.
Mr. Stevens. That is all fiction.
Senator Frye. Did anything like that ever occur?
Mr. Stevens. No. I maintained one fixed policy.
Senator Frye. And that was utter impartiality between the two?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. To the representations made to me before to have the men landed, my answer was always the same, "The emergency must be a striking one, and then only for the protection of life and property."
Senator Frye. Paul Neumann, in his testimony, says that on Tuesday, the 17th of January, Mr. Peterson and Mr. Parker, about 3 o'clock, informed him that Mr. Stevens had told them categorically that he would support with the United States forces a provisional government if such were proclaimed. Did you ever tell Peterson or Parker anything like that?
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Mr. Stevens. Nothing of the kind. The only interviews in which, as I have already stated, they asked my assistance to support the Queen; but they did not put the other alternative, because they would not insult me with that after I had refused the other. I said to them squarely that the troops were landed for a pacific purpose and could not take part in any contest.
Senator Frye. He also says that at a meeting at which J. O. Carter, Macfarlane, Widemann, and Damon were present, the statement was repeated that Mr. Stevens unqualifiedly stated that he would by force of arms sustain the Provisional Government. Did you say anything of the kind?
Mr. Stevens. No; just like the other.
Senator Frye. He also states that the U. S. legation had been at various times the meeting place of persons who had conspired to overthrow the Hawaiian Government.
Mr. Stevens. There never was any such meeting in the four years that I was there, at the legation. The people who had the entree of the legation and who dined there and had other attentions there were royalists quite as many as of their opponents. The dinner party spoken of was made up by my two parties; the Portuguese charge d'affaires made one; the French commissioner another; Judge Hartwell another; Mr. Thurston another, and, I think, one of the officers of the Boston, besides Capt. Wiltse. My daughter's conversation was with Mr. Thurston, and I talked with the Portuguese charge d'affaires. The meeting was of such a character that if we had wanted to talk politics we could not have done so.
Senator Frye. Mr. Charles T. Gulick testifies that the presence of the American troops and certain rumors with regard to the attitude of the American minister, caused the Hawaiian cabinet to confer with that official before taking action, and that they learned from him in writing that he recognized the Provisional Government and would support it with the United States troops. Was there anything of that kind?
Mr. Stevens. No. It was all done in the form that came from this note. The man Hopkins, whom I did not know, and my daughter happened to know, he returned, but did not have any conversation, did not speak to him, did not know him until that afternoon. My daughter happened to know him by sight. He never submitted me any question; he brought a note, and all he wanted was an answer. I think my daughter took the note out of his hand and put it in mine, if I remember correctly. I was sick at the time. Hopkins was one of those who had been engaged in the grossest maladministration.
Senator Frye. Mr. John Lot Kaulukou in his testimony says: "Next morning I read a letter from Minister Stevens in the newspaper. He said, 'I recognize the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, because it takes the palace, the station house, and the barracks. That is my reason why I recognize the Provisional Government.'" Did you write any such letter?
Mr. Stevens. No; the only one that I ever wrote on the subject is in that official pamphlet published by vote of the Senate last February. I never wrote any communication to any newspaper about it. Kaulukou is one of the most corrupt men in the country, formerly one of Kalakaua's ministers.
Senator Frye. He says further: "If Mr. Stevens had never sent any word of that kind, if he had never interfered, you would see these
people cleaned out in fifteen or twenty minutes and the Queen remain on her throne till to-day." Did you interfere?
Mr. Stevens. Not the slightest.
Senator Frye. Do you think if the troops had been in the United States of America the Queen would have been on her throne to-day?
Mr. Stevens. If our troops had remained at Hilo, 260 miles from Honolulu, and had known nothing of what was going on, it would have been the same. The Wilcox Jones cabinet was composed of some of the best men in the islands. The men who were leading this revolution were irresistible; they had the complete command of the situation. Wilson knew that, and that is the reason why his associates did not arrest anybody.
Senator Frye. Do you know Dr. G. Trousseau?
Mr. Stevens. I do.
Senator Frye. Is he regarded in the Hawaiian Islands as a truthful man?
Mr. Stevens. He is so notoriously untruthful that any story going the round of the capital they would say "That is one of Trousseau's lies." He is an adventurer who came from Paris. He is a man of a good deal of genius; he practices medicine in some American families because of his genius; but there are physicans who have no affiliations with him, because he has not his diploma. He has already apologized to Judge Hartwell and others because of statements he made with respect to them that he thought would not come back to the islands.
Senator Frye. Trousseau in his statement says that Dole, Charles Carter, and W. H. Castle, and one or two others, naming them, were in the habit of meeting at your house, the house of the American minister, and conspiring for overturning the Queen. Is there any truth in that?
Mr. Stevens. Not a particle. One of the parties was Mr. Castle; he had not been at my house but once for a year. I got acquainted with him and his venerable father when I first came to Hawaii, and I wondered why he had not called upon me. William Castle had only stopped at our house once in the year. Mr. Dole and Mr. Thurston were men of too much sense to be willing to have a meeting at my house. Although I was intimate in Mr. Dole's family, I never got a hint from Mr. and Mrs. Dole that he was to go into the Provisional Government. He was a man of too much culture to embarrass me with the knowledge that he was to take part in the revolutionary movement. It is the fact that he left the bench to which he had been appointed, with his salary of $5,000 a year, purely as a sense of duty, to take the responsibilities of the position he now holds. He is delicate, not a strong man, and the pressure of responsibility and anxiety is liable to break him down.
The Chairman. Who comprised the supreme court at the time you left Hawaii?
Mr. Stevens. At the time I left it was composed of Chief Justice Judd, who had been chief justice for nineteen years, and Judge Bickerton and Judge Frear. Judge Judd was educated in law at Harvard. Judge Bickerton is English.
The Chairman. After the revolution occurred there in the executive government, did that court continue to sit and discharge its functions?
Mr. Stevens. I so understood it; yes—right along. The Provisional Government interfered as little as possible with the statutes; they promptly repealed the lottery act and opium act, and I think that is
about all they did. The courts went right on, stopping only a few days in the excitement.
The Chairman. Have you heard of any effort on the part of the Provisional Government or the Queen's Government, or the followers of the Queen or her cabinet, to deny the power and authority of the supreme court of Hawaii since the revolution?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Or any change in it?
Mr. Stevens. I have not. I know the constitution which it was intended to proclaim was intended to change the supreme court. I learned that when we had the conversation with Kalakaua before, and from other sources in the later case.
The Chairman. To hold for six years.
Mr. Stevens. And a final appeal from their judgment to the Queen.
The Chairman. I understand you to say, as a matter of fact, that since the Provisional Government was instituted there has been no one who has made any question of the authority of the supreme court and its power to go on and administer justice?
Mr. Stevens. I am not aware of anybody. There may be some lawyer.
The Chairman. The number of judges was reduced from five to three by an act of the Legislature ?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
The Chairman. So that as their terms expired there would be no reappointment until below the number of three?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; as one died they were able to reduce to three quite promptly.
The Chairman. Who took Judge Dole's place?
Mr. Stevens. Judge Frear.
The Chairman. Who appointed him?
Mr. Stevens. He was appointed since the Provisional Government was established. Mr. Dole resigned to take the place of President of the Provisional Government, and they filled his place by the appointment of Judge Frear.
Senator Frye. In the testimony of Mr. Sam Parker, pages 439 and 440, or in an interview with him, he produced a statement signed by A.B. Peterson, in which Mr. Peterson says: "On Sunday evening, January 15, at half past 7 o'clock, Samuel Parker, Her Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, and myself as attorney-general, called upon J. L. Stevens, American minister, at his residence, to talk over the situation." Did they call?
Mr. Stevens. They called Sunday evening. They did all the talking.
Senator Frye. He says, "Mr. Stevens stated that he desired to protect the Government and advised Her Majesty's Government not to resign, but said, in answer to a direct question put to him by me, that in case the Government called upon him for assistance he did not see how he could assist them as long as C. R. Wilson remained marshal of the Kingdom, terming Mr. Wilson a scoundrel."
Mr. Stevens. That is not true. I think there was some conversation that they made as to the embarrassment that Wilson was making as to the Queen's rule, because some of the Queen's supporters were as anxious to get rid of Mr. Wilson as were her opponents.
Senator Gray. Did you say that Wilson was a scoundrel?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember that I did.
Senator Frye. Did you give them as the cause of your opposition to Wilson that he had caused the arrest of your Chinese coachman?
Mr. Stevens. No. Let me tell the truth about that Chinese story. I had three Chinese servants. The man who drove my carriage was a Chinaman, as you have to have all the servants of one nationality. This coachman was a faithful fellow. His friends had lost money by lottery gambling, which Wilson allowed to go on, and he complained without my knowledge, and Wilson's police arrested him for having in his possession a knife which cost 15 cents. All I did was to telephone to the police station. I never had any conversation with Wilson, and he was never in my house. I telephoned to the police station to send back my servant and send back the money which they had taken from him when they arrested him, which was promptly done.
Senator Frye. Peterson says he and Parker called on you again on Tuesday, January 17.
Mr. Stevens. That was in the afternoon.
Senator Frye. And that you promised that if a proclamation declaring a provisional government was issued, you, on behalf of your Government, would immediately recognize it and support it with the United States forces at your command.
Mr. Stevens. That is pure fiction. That is the afternoon I was sick upon the couch.
Senator Frye. He says that he asked you what action you would take if he called upon you for assistance, and that you said that in that case you could not come to the assistance of the Government; that he then asked what your action would be if they replaced the Government, and you replied that in that case you would interfere with the forces at your command.
Mr. Stevens. That is all fiction. His argument was that I could legally and properly use the force to sustain the Queen. I replied that the troops were landed for a pacific purpose, and could not interfere. Nothing was said about the other side. They did not have the impudence to ask me that, because they were courteous in their manner.
Senator Gray. Do you know Mr. Waterhouse?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Henry Waterhouse? There are several Waterhouses.
Senator Gray. The one who is a member of the Provisional Government.
Mr. Stevens. That is Henry Waterhouse.
Senator Gray. He lived near you?
Mr. Stevens. Near me.
Senator Gray. Did you see him after you came ashore from the Boston on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. I do not recollect that I did.
Senator Gray. At any time that Saturday, Monday, or Tuesday?
Mr. Stevens. I have no remembrance; but if you want me to be more specific as to Mr. Waterhouse I would say in this way, not officially. It is rarely that we ever talked about politics at all. He was a gentleman who would not embarrass me, and he knew how cautious I was. He never conversed with me at all about the formation of the Provisional Government, and the first news that I had that any meeting was held in his house, the first hint, I found in Mr. Blount's report. Henry Waterhouse was a man of character; he respected me, and would not insult me by any such proposition as aiding the overthrow of the Queen.
Senator Gray. Did you ever during those four days, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, see at your house or elsewhere any of these gentlemen who were in the committee of safety, or were afterward in the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. The committee called and presented their document, which I have made of record among the documents.
Senator Gray. When did they call?
Mr. Stevens. I think they called right after the close of their mass-meeting.
Senator Gray. That was on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. Monday.
Senator Gray. Did you see any of them on Saturday or Monday?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember that I did. If I did, I saw them as individuals.
Senator Gray. I mean as individuals?
Mr. Stevens. I may have seen one or more of them; I can not say that I did. If I saw them, I saw them just as I did the other side. They had every access, both sides, to the legation; but the leaders of the Provisional Government were men of brains, and they did not embarrass me by coming there and letting me know their plans. And that is what I said of Mr. Dole, who is alleged to have conspired with me. He nor his wife never hinted to me his intention, and it was so of all the others.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Thurston call upon you during any of those four days?
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Thurston, I think, called upon me once. Mr. Thurston was taken sick, if I remember aright, on Monday, after the mass meeting. I think he was sick and did not go out. I did not see him again until he left on the Claudine for Washington. I saw him for a few moments only before he went on board the Claudine.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Cooper during these days?
Mr. Stevens. Not at the legation.
Senator Gray. Or anywhere else?
Mr. Stevens. Nor anywhere else.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Cooper on board the Boston?
Mr. Stevens. No.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. Castle on board the Boston?
Mr. Stevens. I did not. Mr. William R. Castle was a member of the committee of safety, and he called when they presented their request.
Senator Gray. Did you see Mr. W. O. Smith ?
Mr. Stevens. That is when they called and presented the request of the committee of safety. I think only the subcommittee of three called. Of course, there were so many who called during the three or four exciting days that I can not remember in each case who did call; I have to go on memory.
Senator Gray. Did you state to Mr. Thurston when he called, that the troops would have to be landed from the Boston?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all. My answer was the same—when the troops landed it would be for the purpose of protecting life and property.
Senator Gray. You say you made no statement to Mr. Thurston about landing troops?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember any. I may have stated, as I did to other gentlemen—that the troops might be landed. I used great caution in my language; and you may be quite sure of this, that I was quite as courteous to the royalist emmissaries as I was to the others. There was reason: Mr. Thurston and Mr. Dole and others were men of too much sense to embarrass me with improper questions.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Thurston state to you on that occasion that they had a proposition for establishing a provisional government?
Mr. Stevens. No; it would have been absurd for him to have so stated. It was generally talked that the opponents of the Queen would form a new government.
Senator Gray. That they were going to establish a provisional government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. When the Queen failed on Saturday, at the churches and everywhere else they were talking over the situation, and what they would do. They called a mass meeting for Monday, and appointed a committee of safety and proposed to establish some form of government, and that was notorious, and they would not have to give me any special information.
Senator Gray. Whom did you get your information from; you say it was notorious?
Mr. Stevens. Such parties as would call there at the legation. Men and ladies called there from both sides.
Senator Gray. Did you state to Mr. Thurston on the occasion when you state he may have called—I think you said he did call?
Mr. Stevens. I think he called on Sunday. If he did he remained but a few minutes.
Senator Gray. Did you say to him when the Government was established and actually in the possession of the archives and buildings that you would recognize it?
Mr. Stevens. It was not necessary. He and those acting with him knew perfectly well that the de facto government would have to be recognized, and Judge Dole and Mr. Thurston understand international law and usage as well as any of us. Judge Dole was too intelligent to ask me what I would do in the contingency named.
Senator Gray. When did the communication come to you at the legation, asking you to land the troops?
Mr. Stevens. That came to me on Monday just after the mass meeting.
Senator Gray. Who brought it?
Mr. Stevens. It was this committee of safety; I presume it was only a part of them; I think there were three.
Senator Gray. The committee of safety was composed of 13 members?
Mr. Stevens. I think there was a subcommittee of three. Mr. Castle was one, Mr. Smith another; the third I can not recall.
Senator Gray. That was before you went on board the Boston?
Mr. Stevens. Yes. I could not state the precise hour—whether it was 3, or half-past 3, or 4.
Senator Gray. And immediately after you went on board the Boston and requested the landing of the troops?
Mr. Stevens. Very soon. And my note was drawn up before the committee called, and if it had not called I would have made the request.
Senator Gray. And you saw Capt. Wiltse that day?
Mr. Stevens. Capt. Wiltse called at the legation probably nearly every day after we got back from Hilo.
Senator Gray. I understood you to say that you went on board the Boston some time about 4 o'clock, you could not be precise as to the time, but it was after you received this communication from the subcommittee of safety. Now, I understood you to say, that prior to your going on board the Boston that day you had a full conference with Capt. Wiltse?
Mr. Stevens. No; I did not say that. I presume I had. I think he called there on Sunday.
Senator Gray. On that Saturday or Sunday, when you had this conference with Capt. Wiltse, was it arranged that he should land the troops upon your making the request?
Mr. Stevens. The understanding was, if I did make the request, the troops would be landed.
Senator Gray. What was necessary?
Mr. Stevens. If it became necessary to land, that I would have to make the request. That was the official way, and I had the legation records before me running back twenty-five years. They could not land until the request came from me.
Senator Gray. When you went out to the ship, Capt. Wiltse was not surprised to have you make this request, because you had arranged with him before for such a contingency?
Mr. Stevens. Not at all.
Senator Gray. But you handed him the paper which you took out with you?
Mr. Stevens. The official paper which had been used time after time by my predecessors.
Senator Gray. And you have already stated that the arrangements were made then and there between you for the landing of the troops.
Mr. Stevens. Only contingently—if landed at all the request had to come from me. And Capt. Wiltse knew that as well as I did.
Senator Gray. After you left the Boston, I understood the arrangement was made between you for landing the troops, and you understood they would carry their camp equipage with them, and it would not be necessary that you should provide quarters for them?
Mr. Stevens. It never entered my mind; I took it for granted without consultation that the marines had their own tents.
Senator Gray. And you were there informed that a hall would have to be provided?
Mr. Stevens. Yes; and maps for the city.
Senator Gray. And when you left the ship it was understood that the troops were to march out to Mr. Atherton's place?
Mr. Stevens. They were to do exactly as was done in 1889; march through the streets and get a lodging as soon as they could.
Senator Gray. Was it understood that they were to go to Mr. Atherton's when you left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember.
Senator Gray. Was Mr. Atherton talked about on the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I could not remember that; I think it was a mere casual idea—that Mr. Atherton had those extensive grounds, and was one of the leading American citizens, and they marched through the street to get grounds somewhere, and his grounds were large enough.
Senator Gray. Do you undertake to say it was not understood they were to go to Mr. Atherton's when they left the ship?
Mr. Stevens. I do not remember. Whatever it was, it was a mere incident, and with no special relation to anything in view. They had to go somewhere and secure a hall.
Senator Gray. When you sent the note of recognition to the Provisional Government, to whom did you send it?
Mr. Stevens. I have no doubt I sent it to the minister of foreign affairs. Mr. Dole, under their organization, was President and minister of foreign affairs. Of course, the official usage is to send such
notes to the minister of foreign affairs. I have no doubt I sent it to the minister of foreign affairs. I presume I conformed to the custom.
The Chairman. Had you previously heard of the proclamation of the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
Senator Gray. Had you a copy of that proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say.
Senator Gray. Had you read that proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say that I had.
Senator Gray. Could you say that you had not?
Mr. Stevens. I could not say that I had not.
Senator Gray. Was any proclamation sent to you?
Mr. Stevens. Things had to be done very rapidly that afternoon. I had no clerk and I was a sick man, and it was impossible for me to make notes. I have no doubt I received the proclamation.
Senator Gray. And you can not say one way or the other whether a copy of that proclamation was sent to you?
Mr. Stevens. I can not; I presume so. Mr. Pringle brought me information and so did Mr. Carter, and so did others. I had it in various ways.
Senator Gray. Were you aware when it was sent to you that the terms of the Provisional Government were not settled until there was annexation to the United States?
Mr. Stevens. I did not understand that.
Senator Gray. Were you aware that the proclamation was so made?
Mr. Stevens. I never heard of it?
Senator Gray. Never heard of the proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. I did not know that that was the limit of the Provisional Government until this controversy of Mr. Thurston and Mr. Gresham.
Senator Gray. When you were acting for the Government, you did not understand the terms in which the Government you were about to recognize had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. The only fact that I took under consideration was that it was a de facto Government, and if that de facto Government had proposed to annex to Mormondom I should have recognized it. I should have recognized it regardless of any ulterior purposes of that Government.
Senator Gray. In this important condition of affairs in Hawaii, you did not consider it necessary to examine the terms on which that Government was established?
Mr. Stevens. All I wanted to know was that it was a de facto Government, and that information I had.
Senator Gray. Where did you get it, except from the proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. From parties who came from the Government house and informed me, and I presume they sent a copy of the proclamation.
Senator Gray. Who were they?
Mr. Stevens. My impression is that Charles Carter was one and Mr. Pringle was another. Mr. Pringle was acting as my aid. Others gave me the information. Which one brought it first I could not swear. I think I first received the information from my daughter.
Senator Gray. What time in the afternoon did this fact come to your knowledge that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Probably—I can not say positively; I did not look at the watch—half past 2 or 3. It might have been earlier or a little later.
Senator Gray. By whom did you send your note of recognition?
Mr. Stevens. That I can not say positively.
Senator Gray. Did you send it back by the messenger from the Provisional Government?
Mr. Stevens. I sent it by some one whom I considered a reliable messenger.
Senator Gray. And you can not say who it was?
Mr. Stevens. No; I can not say that. It may have been Mr. Pringle, or it may have been one of the clerks in the foreign office.
Senator Gray. How soon after you were notified of the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed that you sent your note of recognition?
Mr. Stevens. That I could not swear positively. I put it on record. I think it was about 5 o'clock. Mrs. Stevens and my daughter think that when this gentleman, meaning Hopkins, called with the note from the Queen's recent ministers it was later. But not regarding that a vital point I put it down in the records about 5. And the fact that the chief justice called on me shortly and said that they had the rumor all through the streets that the American minister had refused to recognize the Provisional Government. He came to see if it were so, and it was about dusk when Judge Judd called, when I said to him I had just recognized. But I put it down as my opinion that it was about 5.
Senator Gray. You do not claim to be accurate about that?
Mr. Stevens. No; the official records will show that.
Senator Gray. Have you the official record?
Mr. Stevens. I think that is in Honolulu. I do not know that Mr. Blount has put that on paper. My wife and daughter afterward said they thought it was later.
Senator Gray. After the messenger who first came from the Provisional Government to notify you that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed, what other intelligence did you receive of its proclamation?
Mr. Stevens. Now, I have to answer that in the way I have already answered, that I considered that there was an absolute interregnum between the afternoon of the 14th and the establishment of the Provisional Government, and my relief from the situation was that there was a de facto Government. The moment I got information that a de facto Government was established and was master of the situation, master of the archives, I thought it was my duty to recognize it, and all the other foreign officials immediately did the same. And the English minister called on the Provisional Government in person before I did.
Senator Gray. Recognized it before you did?
Mr. Stevens. The English minister in person went before I did and offered his congratulations.
Senator Gray. Did you before that get your note?
Mr. Stevens. I can not say. All those members of the official corps knew the circumstances under which the Provisional Government had been constituted as well as I did.
Senator Gray. I understood you to say, in answer to that question as to whether you had any other information of the proclamation of the Provisional Government than the messenger conveyed to you, although not directly responsive, that it was not necessary, because it was thoroughly understood for the last two or three days there was an
interregnum, and that any government or any proclamation of any set of people would constitute a de facto government.
Mr. Stevens. I did not say that. Let me answer it.
Senator Gray. What did you say when I asked you in regard to the fact that it was notorious that there was an interregnum and it was not necessary to have the information?
Mr. Stevens. I do not put it in that form. I say that the collapse of all government on the islands took place on the attempted coup d'etat of the Queen on the 14th, and from that time up to the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings the only government was the 1,000 citizens who called the mass meeting, and the presence of ship Boston in the harbor. I had got information that I deemed reliable that a government springing out of that condition of things had become a de facto government, and by the invariable usage of the world I was bound to recognize it.
Senator Gray. Then, I suppose, you give that answer as accounting for the fact that you did not need any other information than the first reliable information which you received that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. I had the most thorough information on that.
Senator Gray. I ask you what that was?
Mr. Stevens. I said before, probably by a note. But by various means I got that information perhaps twenty times within an hour.
Senator Gray. From whom?
Mr. Stevens. The parties who called.
Senator Gray. Who were the parties?
Mr. Stevens. I will give you one instance. Chief Justice Judd is one of the representative men of the islands. He came, I may say, at 5 or a little later, and he said the rumor had got on the street that I had not recognized the Provisional Government. I am sure during those hours there were many persons who called and talked of what had been done.
Senator Gray. Who were the many persons?
Mr. Stevens. I could not be positive.
Senator Gray. Who was one?
Mr. Stevens. I presume that Mr. Dole sent his clerk of the foreign office, and in addition to that Mr. Cooper, Carter, and Pringle, and I presume there were many other persons who told me.
Senator Gray. Were they sympathizers with the Provisional Government who told you?
Mr. Stevens. They were men who would give me absolute information.
Senator Gray. I ask if that was a fact?
Mr. Stevens. That was a fact.
Senator Gray. You were not out of your house?
Mr. Stevens. Not out of my house.
Senator Gray. And on this information that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed you sent the note?
Mr. Stevens. So soon as I had evidence of the fact.
Senator Gray. What fact?
Mr. Stevens. The fact that out of that interregnum had sprung a de facto government.
Senator Gray. The fact of its being a de facto government is a conclusion?
Mr. Stevens. Of which I had to be the judge.
Senator Gray. Did you judge that that was the de facto Government upon the information that came to you that a Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Only in part. I judged it from the condition of the town and all the circumstances. I knew that the Provisional Government had been talked of for sixty hours, and I had it from many persons. I was living on the principal street, and they would hear it on the street and tell my daughter about it, and would come by in a carriage and tell me.
Senator Gray. Had you any knowledge of any other fact in regard to the transactions of that afternoon that bore upon the question at all, except the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. I knew the fact an hour and a half before. You will see how importantly this fact bears on the situation, the efforts of the Provisional Government to transfer the arms from the store, and the abortive attempt of one of Mr. Wilson's policemen to interfere, and that was all the resistance for sixty hours—--
Senator Gray. Who told you that?
Mr. Stevens. I learned it probably from twenty different sources. I heard the shot.
Senator Gray. Tell me the names of some who told you?
Mr. Stevens. I guess my own daughter told me first.
Senator Gray. Who told you afterward?
Mr. Stevens. That I could not tell, because events passing so rapidly like that, and a hundred men calling on me, it would be impossible to remember who the individual was. But there were many.
Senator Gray. Why did you not wait until the next day before you sent the note of recognition ?
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that a half century of the study of government on both continents and 13 years of diplomatic experience would have told me it was right.
Senator Gray. That was the result of your study?
Mr. Stevens. My study and experience would have told me so.
Senator Gray. And your study and experience told you that it was right to recognize that government within an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. I do not accept it in that form.
Senator Gray. I ask you as a matter of fact whether you did recognize it within an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. I do not think that material; probably within an hour and a half or two hours.
Senator Gray. Whether it is material or not, answer the question.
Mr. Stevens. I do not know the precise time by the clock.
Senator Gray. That is sufficient; you do not know the time; you can not say whether it was an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. It was probably inside of two hours.
Senator Gray. Were you well acquainted with Mr. Thurston?
Mr. Stevens. Pretty well acquainted with him, because he was a minister of the Government when I went to Honolulu.
Senator Gray. Are you well acquainted with W. O. Smith?
Mr. Stevens. Passably well. He lived near me, within half a mile. I never had much acquaintance with him; met him occasionally, and, as Americans, we went to the same church. In the course of a year he and his wife called at our house two or three times. Senator Gray. Did any of these gentlemen, Mr. Thurston, Mr.
Smith—any of them connected with the committee on public safety— call upon you on Sunday?
Mr. Stevens. I have already stated that Mr. Thurston called a few minutes at my house Sunday. I would not know when a gentleman called on me whether he was on the committee of safety or not, because I would not know until I saw the list. On Sunday they had not been appointed.
Senator Gray. I say, not whom you knew were on the committee of safety, but whether any of these gentlemen whom you knew afterward were on the committee of safety.
Mr. Stevens. I have said that I think that Mr. Thurston called; stopped in five minutes, as he passed down, and I think Judge Hartwell called also. Others called of both parties during Sunday.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Damon call?
Mr. Stevens. I do not recollect Mr. Damon calling.
Senator Gray. What sort of a person is Mr. Damon?
Mr. Stevens. He is a man of the highest respectability.
Senator Gray. What is his business?
Mr. Stevens. He is a banker. Mr. Damon is the son of an American missionary, who went there forty years ago, and whom our Government recognized officially. He became a clerk to banker Bishop, and a great friend of the natives. He is an excellent financial manager, and largely increased the value of the property of two prominent natives. When the natives get into any financial trouble, Damon is the man they go to to get them out. He is a man of the highest character.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Damon and Mr. Thurston call on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. I have no reliable recollection in that regard. My acquaintance with Mr. Thurston grew out of the fact that he was minister of the interior for the first thirteen months of my residence in Honolulu. I knew him officially and privately, for he lived in the part of the city in which the legation is situated.
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES F. MORGAN.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
My name is James F. Morgan; I am 32 years old; was born in the city of New York of American parents; came here when I was about 2 years old; was educated and have lived here since; have been in business as auctioneer and commission merchant for about six years; I took the business of E. P. Adams, with whom I had been clerk for about ten years.
I have been a member of the advisory council of the Provisional Government from its formation, January 17, 1893. I have been closely interested in Hawaiian political affairs for many years, and have carefully watched the progress of events. I believe the Hawaiian monarchy came to an end at the time when it could no longer exist; it had survived its usefulness, and with the revolutionary acts of the Queen on January 14 matters culminated, and it was impossible to longer endure such a Government.
I was not a member of the committee of public safety, nor was I present at the meetings at W. O. Smith's office on the afternoon of the 14th; but I knew what was going on. After I was requested by the committee of public safety to become a member of the advisory council, and learning that it was the intention to seek annexation to the
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