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Senator Gray. Did you judge that that was the de facto Government upon the information that came to you that a Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. Only in part. I judged it from the condition of the town and all the circumstances. I knew that the Provisional Government had been talked of for sixty hours, and I had it from many persons. I was living on the principal street, and they would hear it on the street and tell my daughter about it, and would come by in a carriage and tell me.
Senator Gray. Had you any knowledge of any other fact in regard to the transactions of that afternoon that bore upon the question at all, except the fact that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed?
Mr. Stevens. I knew the fact an hour and a half before. You will see how importantly this fact bears on the situation, the efforts of the Provisional Government to transfer the arms from the store, and the abortive attempt of one of Mr. Wilson's policemen to interfere, and that was all the resistance for sixty hours—--
Senator Gray. Who told you that?
Mr. Stevens. I learned it probably from twenty different sources. I heard the shot.
Senator Gray. Tell me the names of some who told you?
Mr. Stevens. I guess my own daughter told me first.
Senator Gray. Who told you afterward?
Mr. Stevens. That I could not tell, because events passing so rapidly like that, and a hundred men calling on me, it would be impossible to remember who the individual was. But there were many.
Senator Gray. Why did you not wait until the next day before you sent the note of recognition ?
Mr. Stevens. For the reason that a half century of the study of government on both continents and 13 years of diplomatic experience would have told me it was right.
Senator Gray. That was the result of your study?
Mr. Stevens. My study and experience would have told me so.
Senator Gray. And your study and experience told you that it was right to recognize that government within an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. I do not accept it in that form.
Senator Gray. I ask you as a matter of fact whether you did recognize it within an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. I do not think that material; probably within an hour and a half or two hours.
Senator Gray. Whether it is material or not, answer the question.
Mr. Stevens. I do not know the precise time by the clock.
Senator Gray. That is sufficient; you do not know the time; you can not say whether it was an hour or an hour and a half?
Mr. Stevens. It was probably inside of two hours.
Senator Gray. Were you well acquainted with Mr. Thurston?
Mr. Stevens. Pretty well acquainted with him, because he was a minister of the Government when I went to Honolulu.
Senator Gray. Are you well acquainted with W. O. Smith?
Mr. Stevens. Passably well. He lived near me, within half a mile. I never had much acquaintance with him; met him occasionally, and, as Americans, we went to the same church. In the course of a year he and his wife called at our house two or three times. Senator Gray. Did any of these gentlemen, Mr. Thurston, Mr.
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Smith—any of them connected with the committee on public safety— call upon you on Sunday?
Mr. Stevens. I have already stated that Mr. Thurston called a few minutes at my house Sunday. I would not know when a gentleman called on me whether he was on the committee of safety or not, because I would not know until I saw the list. On Sunday they had not been appointed.
Senator Gray. I say, not whom you knew were on the committee of safety, but whether any of these gentlemen whom you knew afterward were on the committee of safety.
Mr. Stevens. I have said that I think that Mr. Thurston called; stopped in five minutes, as he passed down, and I think Judge Hartwell called also. Others called of both parties during Sunday.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Damon call?
Mr. Stevens. I do not recollect Mr. Damon calling.
Senator Gray. What sort of a person is Mr. Damon?
Mr. Stevens. He is a man of the highest respectability.
Senator Gray. What is his business?
Mr. Stevens. He is a banker. Mr. Damon is the son of an American missionary, who went there forty years ago, and whom our Government recognized officially. He became a clerk to banker Bishop, and a great friend of the natives. He is an excellent financial manager, and largely increased the value of the property of two prominent natives. When the natives get into any financial trouble, Damon is the man they go to to get them out. He is a man of the highest character.
Senator Gray. Did Mr. Damon and Mr. Thurston call on Monday?
Mr. Stevens. I have no reliable recollection in that regard. My acquaintance with Mr. Thurston grew out of the fact that he was minister of the interior for the first thirteen months of my residence in Honolulu. I knew him officially and privately, for he lived in the part of the city in which the legation is situated.
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES F. MORGAN.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
My name is James F. Morgan; I am 32 years old; was born in the city of New York of American parents; came here when I was about 2 years old; was educated and have lived here since; have been in business as auctioneer and commission merchant for about six years; I took the business of E. P. Adams, with whom I had been clerk for about ten years.
I have been a member of the advisory council of the Provisional Government from its formation, January 17, 1893. I have been closely interested in Hawaiian political affairs for many years, and have carefully watched the progress of events. I believe the Hawaiian monarchy came to an end at the time when it could no longer exist; it had survived its usefulness, and with the revolutionary acts of the Queen on January 14 matters culminated, and it was impossible to longer endure such a Government.
I was not a member of the committee of public safety, nor was I present at the meetings at W. O. Smith's office on the afternoon of the 14th; but I knew what was going on. After I was requested by the committee of public safety to become a member of the advisory council, and learning that it was the intention to seek annexation to the
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United States, believing that it was the only way to secure permanent and enduring peace and good government, I met with the members of the two councils at the office of W. O. Smith, on Tuesday. Sometime between half past 2 and 3, we went to the Government building, not armed. When we arrived we found only a few people present; our forces were not there when we arrived. Mr. Cooper read the proclamation; while it was being read, armed men commenced to come in, and in a few minutes there was at least a hundred, all armed and prepared.
Mr. C. McCarthy was there and said he was waiting for 100 armed men, who were to come and defend that building; he said if they had been on hand we would have been opposed and all shot down. We afterwards secured several thousand cartridges which had been stored in the building, in a preparation for the defense against us. Shortly after reading the proclamation we went into session for the purpose of immediately assuming the functions of Government. While we were in session Parker and Cormwell came up, and pretty soon the other two ministers. Before I went away Capt. Wiltse came in with his aids. They looked about and he said that Stevens had sent them to see whether we were actually in possession of the Government building, the Treasury, archives, etc. He was shown about the building.
Before I left I heard him say that we could not be recognized till we captured the barracks and station house. Up to that time and thereafter, I never have known anything about the United States troops supporting or assisting us. If there had been any such plan or expectation I am sure I should have heard it. I knew that the troops had landed, and supposed it was for the protection of women and children; I regarded that as necessary on account of the intense excitement which existed and had existed for several days. A very little thing would have caused an explosion. Shortly after the ministers came up from the station house I went off for a lot of arms and ammunition, which I had collected for the use of the Provisional Government.
When I got back to the Government building I believe the Queen's surrender had been received, and I heard a rumor that Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government, and thought it was started by some of our people to bear on the Queen's people in the station house and barracks to cause them to surrender. At any rate, they did surrender quite early in the evening.
After the commission went to Washington we continued to carry on the Government and could have continued so without any assistance, but there were rumors of uprisings, and a great many thought that if the United States flag was raised it would at any rate prevent bloodshed. This view prevailed against considerable opposition, and, the flag having been raised, there certainly has been no bloodshed.
When Blount arrived, the council learned that he had called on President Dole almost immediately and had stated to him that he must take down the flag for he could not continue negotiations while the flag was flying. This was done on the first of April. Shortly after the provisional council called on Commissioner Blount in a body. He received us courteously, and Mr. Damon, who acted as our spokesman, said that he would willingly give him all the information in our power. Mr. Blount replied that when he wanted any information he would send for us. Damon said that he could tell a good deal about the country, whereupon Mr. Blount slapped him on the shoulder and said: "I guess you're my man," and made an appointment for two or three
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days later. I never was called upon for any information, and saw no more of Commissioner Blount.
Mr. Fred Wundenburg said to me a day or two after the revolution, after Ashley's appointment as marshal, that on Saturday, January 14, he was made a committee to get arms and men, and that he ascertained that night that he could get over 200 armed and ready. He appeared to be angry that he was not made marshal, and seemed to think that such service demanded recognition. He said he had no further use for the Provisional Government from that time on.
While the Queen was attempting her revolutionary act on the 14th I met Marshal Wilson near the station house. He was dressed in his uniform. Said he was very much opposed to what she was doing. That if she did not desist he would go and shut her up in a room by herself. He also added that she was wild and angry, and would not listen to him; whereupon I said, thinking to test his sense of sincerity, and knowing that my suggestion, if followed, would probably bring her to terms: "You go right up to the Palace and tell her that if she does not stop at once and abandon that plan about a new constitution you will resign your position as marshal; and if she won't listen to you, resign then and there." Wilson did not appear to like that, and walked off, saying: "I guess I won't do that." One of the deputies standing near me said, very significantly, "Wilson is fooling you; he does not mean anything of that kind."
Jas F. Morgan
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson, Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R. CASTLE.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
My name is William R. Castle; I was born in Honolulu in March, 1849; my parents were American missionaries. My father arrived here in 1837 and still lives in Honolulu; he is the senior member of the mercantile house of Castle & Cooke. I have always resided in Honolulu, with the exception of two years spent at Oberlin College and five years in New York City, where I studied law and practiced for a short time. I returned to the Islands in 1876, at the request of King Kalakaua, as attorney-general. I have been more or less connected with Island politics ever since, though always unwillingly, as it has interfered with my business. Have been a member of the Legislature five sessions.
Until very recently I have constantly and consistently opposed annexation to the United States; I have a strong regard for the native people and have hoped that the native Government might continue, and it is only recently that I have felt compelled to change my views upon this subject. I do not think that it will ever be possible to have a government of security to person and property in Hawaii under the old forms. This conclusion has been reached very reluctantly, after closely watching political affairs since my return in 1876.
During the latter part of the legislative session of 1892 I felt certain that a climax must very soon be reached, and that some very radical change must take place in the Government, or that the monarchy must come to an end. Aside from conversation upon this subject with a
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few friends, and some speculation as to when a change might come, how it would be forced and who would do it, nothing was done; there was no organization, nor any plans made. During the last week of the Legislature the air was filled with rumors, and the prospect looked very dark. Still, nothing was done, and when the Queen, on the 14th of January, actually attempted her revolutionary act—so far as any preparation was concerned—we were actually taken by surprise.
I was intimately acquainted with Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, with both of whom I often talked over the political situation. We all felt that trouble was impending, but I do not think that anything was more strongly impressed upon my mind by what either of these men said than the thought that if trouble came and our rights, our liberties, and property were threatened, we must help ourselves, for we could have no outside help, unless, indeed, such things should occur as might ensue from a state of anarchy, when, as I understood, Americans might expect assistance to the extent of personal protection and the protection of property against mob violence. Knowing what a Hawaiian mob meant from the illustration given in 1874, considerable uneasiness was felt in Honolulu when the Boston, with Minister Stevens, left Honolulu a week or ten days before the prorogation of the Legislature, and her return was observed with great relief upon the morning of the 14th.
Several days before the prorogation, things were in a very precarious condition. Corruption was open and flagrant in the Legislature; the lottery and opium bills were suddenly taken up and passed, and the same combination immediately ousted the Wilcox cabinet, which was the only one since the session opened which had the entire confidence of the community. Upon this, the Reform members of the Legislature, by way of protest, hoping to prevent the obtaining of a quorum, with which any more outrageous legislation could be enacted, absented themselves from the House. Upon Saturday morning, however, the day set for the prorogation, they succeeded in getting a quorum, a new ministry was immediately anuounced, and the opium and lottery bills, to the consternation and surprise of the community, were returned signed.
After seeing personally what took place I returned to my business and remained at my office closely occupied until nearly 2 o'clock. As I was about to return to my home I heard that the Queen was trying to abrogate the constitution, and at once went to the street in front of the palace, where I could see what was going on. Natives were the favored ones, being allowed ingress and egress, and from them I learned what was taking place. I saw the Queen come out on the veranda and speak to the crowd of natives who assembled below. After speaking some little time a native came and told me that she had said that owing to unexpected opposition and difficulties over which she had no control she would not then promulgate the new constitution, but she stated that the matter was merely deferred for a few days.
Immediately after this I saw William White, the native member for Lahaina, come out of the palace, run part way down the steps where he stood, and began a loud and furious harangue. Twice I observed Maj. Boyd, who was in full uniform, come down the steps and, touching his shoulders, apparently say something to him, but he was furiously shaken off. Upon inquiry from another native who came out I learned that he was making a most incendiary speech; that he was saying that their hope of a new constitution was defeated by tne interference of whites, and he urged them to rush into the palace and kill
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such persons as were opposing this plan. I expected to see another such riot as that of 1874, but learned afterwards that someone else counseled them to wait a few days, when they would get all they desired.
Returning down town I went to the office of W. O. Smith, where an impromptu meeting of foreign residents had assembled. A paper was lying upon the table, which had been extensively signed, in which the signers pledged themselves to oppose to any extent the revolutionary plans of the Queen, and to sustain the cabinet, which was trying to fight her off. If I recollect right, Paul Neumann, Peterson, Colburn, and others who have subsequently come out strongly in favor of the Queen, were then present. I heard Colburn state the situation to the meeting, saying how the lives of members of the cabinet had been threatened in the palace on account of their opposition to the Queen's plans, and Mr. Colburn then called upon the community to support them in this opposition. We were not informed and did not then learn that the Queen had expressed surprise at Peterson's opposition, he having had a month to consider this proposed new constitution and not having made any objections.
The community was now thoroughly aroused; it was felt that life, property, and liberty were seriously imperiled, and the meeting immediately elected a chairman and secretary, and a committee of public safety of thirteen members was at once appointed, of which I was a member. Subcommittees were at once appointed, which went about their business immediately, and the meeting adjourned to meet at my house on Sunday morning. That evening a number of us met at Mr. Thurston's residence to talk over the situation and attempt to make some plans for a provisional government in case the radical measures of overthrowing the Queen should finally be deemed necessary as the only available course. During the evening Mr. Fred. Wundenburg came in and reported on what success he had met in a two or three hours' search for arms and men to oppose the Queen. So far as I can now recollect, he stated that he had not been able to find more than 60, although it was believed that a very much larger number could be obtained as soon as the community should know that it was required.
I think that after Mr. Wundenburg left a messenger came from the Drei Hundred, a well-known organization of Germans, offering the services of their men, numbering, to my recollection now, about 80, and their arms. The next morning the committee of public safety met at my residence and remained in session a considerable part of the day. It was finally decided that the proper method was to ascertain public feeling, for which purpose a mass meeting was called. We felt that if a representative meeting should demand the deposition of the Queen and the establishment of another government which the members of the meeting would back up, the time had come to make the attempt. The question was one of force sufficient to carry out the intention.
The meeting was called for Monday, and its voice was so unmistakable that preparations were concluded as rapidly as possible to take possession of the Government by force, establish a Provisional Government, and ask for annexation to the United States, which was also the almost unanimous desire of the meeting. From the close of the meeting till the final movement preparations were conducted openly and notoriously. The offer of arms, ammunition, and men came in from all sides; the thing lacking was a disciplined force, but there was no doubt as to the enthusiasm and determination of the respectable, conservative
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----60
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portion of the community to make an end of corrupt and misgovernment and get security and peace by good government.
During this period I saw Minister Stevens several times, also Capt. Wiltse, and conversed with them upon the situation. I stated freely that we proposed to fight for good government, and hoped that we should at least have the moral assistance of the United States by a recognition of the Provisional Government which was proposed to be established, but I have no hesitation in saying that we were given to understand clearly and definitely that the usual rule in such cases would be followed and that we could not be recognized unless we became in fact the Government of the country by taking possession of the seat of government, which I certainly understood to mean the various departments, including the treasury, the courts, and the archives of the Government. It was to this end that our efforts were directed and we expected a bloody fight to ensue when we went to the Government building.
According to my recollection now, the request to Minister Stevens to land United States marines was not thought of until Monday forenoon, when it was prepared in response to the request of numerous citizens of many nationalities, some of whom had a vivid recollection of the doings of the mob of 1874. They were people who thoroughly indorsed our course and believed that we would succeed, but who felt that while the attack was being made and the fight going on around the Government building, a brutal mob would, in all probability, be incited by the royalists to burn and destroy property, in the suburbs as well as in the business portions of the town and that outrages would be committed upon the persons of women and children. Threats of such violence were made, and certainly several members of the Legislature, if their words were to be believed, would not only incite, but lead on just such a mob.
The request was therefore made to Minister Stevens for exactly that kind of protection. It was put in writing, signed by all the Committee of Public Safety, and taken to Minister Stevens by Mr. Thurston and myself after the mass meeting. About 5 o'clock that evening troops were landed and disposed about the town where they could be most easily obtained should occasion require. Both Mr. Thurston and myself were ill with very severe colds, which in my case ran into an attack of asthma, and with Mr. Thurston into threatened pneumonia, which prevented our taking part in much which followed during the next twenty-four hours. Monday night was one of suspense and terror throughout the entire community. A riotous uprising of the mob element was feared at any moment; no confidence was felt in the ability or disposition of the Queen's Government to cope with the same. Two incendiary fires did, in fact, occur, but no outbreak happened.
It is my belief, which I think is shared by nearly every one, that the mere presence of United States troops exercised a restraining influence and prevented any riotous uprising. While the troops were landing and marching up Port street, I was in town and met Marshal C. B. Wilson, with several others, near the bank of Bishop & Co. Mr. Wilson quite sternly wanted to know what the troops were landed for. I told him exactly what had occurred, giving him the substance of the note to Minister Stevens, and stating that I believed the object for which the troops were landed would be strictly observed.
At this point I desire to state that if there had been any plan or conspiracy by which the United States troops were to land and assist the revolutionists in overturning the Government, I should most certainly
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have known it. There was no such plan, and I utterly repudiate the attempt to impugn the character and actions of both Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, and state here that it seemed to me at that time, and I believe now that they would have been perfectly justified in giving a quicker and more open support to the Provisional Government than was finally accorded by recognition, and that they still would have been within the requirements of international law upon that subject.
For a few moments on Tuesday evening between five and six o'clock I was able to go to the Government building, where I found the Provisional Government in full possession and exercising the functions of government. A military establishment was being rapidly perfected; there were hundreds of men under arms whose names were being enrolled in companies; patrols were already being set to guard the town, and there was every evidence of the Provisional Government's being in successful control. I inquired at once whether the United States minister had recognized the Provisional Government but was answered that such recognition had not yet been accorded.
The negotiations were going on at that time for the surrender of the barracks and station house, while a conference was held at the palace with the Queen. Going out of the building I saw that all was quiet at the Arion Hall; not a soldier being in sight excepting two or three sentries, who were pacing the yard. Indeed I saw nothing of United States troops after their landing on Monday night until my departure on the following Thursday morning with the annexation commission for Washington. The United States troops did not lift a finger to bring about the result. If the Queen's Government, the police department, thought they would be attacked by United States troops that certainly was their own concern, and nothing with which either the Provisional Government or the United States troops had anything to do.
When in the yard surrounding the Government building, somewhere between 5 and 6 in the evening, I met Capt. Wiltse and asked him with some surprise if they were not going to recognize the Provisional Government. I knew that we were in possession, and knowing the moral strength we should receive from such recognition and that we were certainly the de facto government, I felt that it might have been given sooner. Capt. Wiltse replied quickly: "Oh no, we can't recognize you until you are also in possession of the barracks and station house."
I returned from Washington on the 7th of April upon the same steamer which brought Mr. Charles Nordhoff to Honolulu. Mr. Blount was already here and the flag had already been lowered. Although there was some solicitude in town, I found everything orderly and quiet. Within a few days I called on Commissioner Blount and had a pleasant conversation with him. I informed him that I had an intimate knowledge of what had taken place, and believing that he desired to obtain only the facts and all the facts, should be happy to furnish him all the information in my power; and also put him in the way of receiving information on all subjects connected with the islands. Although I saw Commissioner Blount several times after this, up to the time of his departure, he has never accorded me an interview, nor has he asked for any statement in regard to the matter.
Owing to my intimate knowledge and acquaintance with the Hawaiian people, several deputations from other parts of the country came to me to procure interviews with Mr. Blount. I recollect particularly two instances in which I wrote a note, saying that the natives would like to interview him; that an interpreter would be furnished; that
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they were poor and wanted to return to their homes as soon as possible, and that a steamer would leave within three days after my note was dated, and requested an interview within such time. In each case, Mr. Blount fixed the interview after the departure of the steamer; in one case the natives remained at considerable expense, for another steamer did not go for ten days; in the other they were discontented and disgusted, and went home.
William R. Castle.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 5th day of December A. D., 1893.
[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD D. TENNEY.
Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
My name is Edward D. Tenney; I was born in the State of New York; I am 35 years of age; came to the Hawaiian Islands in 1877, and have lived here ever since. I am a member of the well-known mercantile house of Castle & Cooke; I am a member of the advisory council of the Provisional Government and have been such since the 17th of January, when the Government was proclaimed. Up to that time I have had nothing to do with Hawaiian politics, but have been a careful observer of the progress of events.
If we could have had good government I think the country would have been as well off, at least for the present, to have remained as it was, but the conviction has been growing upon me for several years that the Hawaiian monarchy could not last. It certainly had reached the end of its usefulness; corruption was rife and the Government was certainly upon the verge of financial disaster. The Queen made matters worse by her obstinate determination to assume despotic power and overthrow constitutional government, and I think that she is responsible for the overthrow of the monarchy and her own deposition.
I was present, a close observer of events, during January, 1893; had been at my business Saturday morning the 14th, but was at home most of the day. I heard from a passer-by of the Queen's attempt to abrogate the constitution. Drove into town very soon; found the general feeling was that the Queen had gone to a point where people could not yield any longer. There was a feeling of intense and feverish anxiety as to what might follow. It was so on Sunday and Monday; business was almost entirely suspended. It was very well known that men were preparing for action. In the afternoon all business was stopped and the community thronged en masse to the old rifles armory, where a most enthusiastic, but orderly and determined, meeting was held. All were serious; all in deep earnest. The purpose of the mass meeting, as it was there understood, was that the Queen must be deposed; that she had gone to a point where the community could no longer bear with her.
I knew nothing whatever of the plans which were being made; I had not consulted with any of the committee of safety. I had come to the conclusion that to insure safety, security to property, and good government, the form of Government must be changed; that night was one of intense excitement and uncertainty. There was great fear of what might happen; it was felt that if the mob element became aroused the Queen's Government would have no control whatever,
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and when it became known that United States troops were landed a feeling of security became general—among the women and children more particularly. The Queen's Government was very uncertain; they did not know where they stood, and I do not think they could have afforded protection.
The committee of safety proceeded openly. Its purpose was perfectly well known to dethrone the Queen and establish a new Government. It seemed to me certain that if the Queen's Government had felt themselves masters of the situation, they would have arrested the leaders, instead of which, the committee carried out its work at its own will. The next day, the 17th, there was the same feeling of unrest and uncertainty as to whether the Queen's Government would resist the new Government. About 11 o'clock in the morning, I was waited upon by a committee and asked if I would become one of the advisory council. All arrangements as I then understood were then completed.
I said that while I was somewhat in the dark, I believed the only way we could get settled government was to depose the Queen, and I consented. Nothing was said about Minister Stevens or of any support to be obtained from United States troops, nor had I heard any rumors of that kind. No doubt was felt that we could depose the Queen, and that under the prevailing conditions the new Government would be immediately recognized. At 1 p. m. I met the committee at W. O. Smith's office. The proclamation was read and agreed to and signed by all who were then present. About 2:30 we left for the Government building unarmed and walked up nearly all together. We asked for the ministers. There were none there; waited ten or fifteen minutes for some of them to appear.
There appearing no occasion for further delay, the proclamation was then read, no one being present but the executive and advisory councils, the committee on public safety, some Government clerks, and a few others. While the proclamation was being read, Col. Soper arrived, and it being deemed necessary that we have force at once I went to the armory on Beretania street, whereupon a force of armed men went there immediately. From that time on, dozens and scores of armed men poured in till the buildings and premises were filled to overflowing. I believe that before 5 p. m. 1,000 to 1,500 men were there, not all armed by any means, but asking for arms to support the Provisional Government. Several hundred were armed and all were determined to hold the position at any cost. As an evidence of the feeling of the community, I observed that many former supporters of the monarchy came in and joined us.
When we felt that we had force sufficient to hold our position, and that the monarchy was in fact overthrown, we being in possession of the headquarters and center of the Government, notes were sent to all the foreign ministers and consuls, stating the fact and asking for recognition as the de facto Government. I can not recollect whether, in fact, Stevens's recognition came in just before or just after the Queen's surrender. No one, at any rate, felt that there was any doubt that we were masters of the situation, and that no other government existed. As I recollect, before Stevens's recognition came, the order for the surrender of the station house and barracks had been received.
Although the United States troops were on shore absolutely none were seen, so far as I know. Arion Hall, where they were posted, faced a street opposite the Government building, but no troops were in sight, and they took absolutely no part at all. I recollect Capt. Wiltse came
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in with an aid and looked around, and he asked some questions as to the extent of our possession.
Martial law was immediately proclaimed by the Provisional Government, the town and surrounding country was at once divided into districts, our patrols were sent everywhere to maintain order and quell any possible disturbance. They were in possession of the entire town and surrounding country and maintained perfect order. As soon as it was known that the Provisional Government was established, suspense and anxiety subsided and everything settled down into a sense of security.
The United States flag was subsequently raised because it was thought that the mere act would operate to secure quiet and prevent bloodshed. The Provisional Government had no doubt of its ability to put down any revolt and maintain its position. Although there was some opposition, it was deemed best on the whole to ask for protection, and it was done.
Commissioner Blount arrived late in March, and pulled down the flag April 1. He wanted to do it the afternoon before, but it was deferred until the next day upon the Government's request to give time to have the town again patrolled and insure the maintenance of the peace. No disturbance followed, and the Government has been growing stronger and more secure every day since.
I called upon Commissioner Blount alone; was not with the advisory council when they called, but the commissioner knew that I Avas a member of the advisory council. Learning shortly after that he desired to see a sugar plantation, I was requested to take him to the Ewa plantation, of which our house are agents. I did so. Various matters were discussed, but no politics were talked of in any way. He has not asked me for any information at any time. I would have been glad to have furnished him with all in my power.
E.D. Tenney.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Charles F. Peterson, Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.
We the undersigned hereby upon oath depose and say:
That we are the persons appointed as a citizens' committee of safety, at Honolulu, in January last.
That neither prior to nor after our appointment as such committee, did we or either of us, individually or collectively, have any agreement or understanding, directly or indirectly, with the U. S. minister, Mr. Stevens, or Capt. Wiltse, that they or either of them would assist in the overthrow of the monarchy or the establishment of the Provisional Provisional Government.
That at no time, either before or after such appointment, did Mr Stevens ever recommend or urge us, or either of us, to dethrone the Queen or establish a Provisional Government. That at no time, either before or after such appointment, did Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse promise us, or either of us, that the United States troops would be used to assist in the overthrow of the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government, and such troops, in fact, were not so used.
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That at the time the committee addressed Mr. Stevens concerning the landing of the troops to maintain the peace the Queen's Government was utterly demoralized. The Queen had denounced her cabinet and they had publicly appealed to the citizens to support them in a forcible resistance to the Queen. The new Government had not been organized and the air was full of rumors and threats of violence and conflict. The presence of the troops was a strong feature in preventing the irresponsible and lawless element of all nationalities from outbreak, but was not asked nor used for the purpose of dethroning the Queen nor establishing the Provisional Government.
That the forces that rallied to the support of the Provisional Government were ample to overthrow the monarchy and establish the Provisional Government, and such action would have been taken by the committee regardless of the presence or absence of the American troops.
That the reason of the confidence of the committee m its ability to accomplish its object was that the same men who were supporting the movement had carried through a peaceful revolution in 1887 and suppressed an armed uprising in 1889. The armed supporters of the movement were not a disorganized body, as has been represented, but were composed largely of the volunteer white militia which was in existence and formed the effective strength in the conflicts of 1887 and 1889, and which, although disbanded by the Boyalist Government in 1890, had retained its organization, and turned out under the command of its old officers, constituting a well drilled, disciplined, and officered military force of men of high character and morale, with perfect confidence in themselves, and holding in contempt the courage and ability of those whom they have twice before overawed and defeated.
C.Bolte.
Ed. Suhr.
F.W. McChesney.
J.A. McCandless.
William O. Smith.
Wm. R. Castle.
Andrew Brown.
John Emmeluth.
W.C. Wilder.
Theodore F. Lansing.
Henry Waterhouse.
L.A. Thurston.
Subscribed and sworn before me this 4th day of January, A. D. 1894, by C. Bolte, Ed. Suhr, F. W. McChesney, William O. Smith, Wm. R. Castle, Andrew Brown, John Emmeluth, W. C. Wilder, Theodore F. Lansing, Henry Waterhouse, and L. A. Thurston, as a true and correct statement.
[SEAL.] Thos. W. Hobron.
Notary Public.
STATEMENT OF PERSONS PRESENT AT MEETING OF COMMITTEE OF SAFETY, JANUARY 16.
We the undersigned, hereby depose and say that we were present at the meeting of safety at the residence of Henry Waterhouse on the night of Monday, January 16, last.
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That at such meeting no suggestion was made nor expectation expressed that the United States troops would assist in the overthrow of the Queen or the establishment of the Provisional Government.
That at no time during such meeting did Mr. Soper or any other member thereof go to Mr. Stevens's house, nor did Mr. Soper or any other member of such meeting report that they had seen Mr. Stevens and that he had assured them of the support of the Boston's men.
That the statement of F. Wundenburg upon this subject and others, as published in connection with Mr. Blount's report, are misleading and untrue.
John H. Soper.
J.H. Fisher.
Theodore F. Lansing.
Henry Waterhouse.
William O. Smith.
John Emmeluth.
J.B. Castle.
F.W. McChesney.
Andrew Brown.
C. Bolte.
J.A. McCandless.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of January, A. D. 1894, by John H. Soper, J. H. Fisher, Theodore F. Lansing, Henry Waterhouse, William O. Smith, John Emmeluth, J. B. Castle, F. W. McChesney, Andrew Brown, and C. Bolte as a true and correct statement.
[SEAL.] Thos. W. Hobron,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK BROWN.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
Frank Brown, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that he has resided in the Hawaiian Islands for the past forty-seven years; that he was a member of the Legislature for many sessions; that he was in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17,1893; that the period from Saturday until the troops landed he considered an interregnum; that in his opinion there was no government during those days; that he considered the landing of the United States troops a very good thing to show that there was some protection against incendiarism and destruction of private property in case anything should happen; he was in the riot at the time of Kalakaua's election when troops were landed, and was not sure but there would be a repetition of the trouble at that time; that in his opinion there was much more cause for landing the troops in January, 1893, than there was in 1887, as upon the former occasion the city was thoroughly guarded by the respectable element of the community, whereas in January last no such preparation had been made.
Frank Brown.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
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AFFIDAVIT OF P. F. A. EHLERS.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
P.F.A. Ehlers, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that he was born in Germany; that he has resided in Honolulu since 1866; that he has a family, is a householder, and is engaged in business here; that he was in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 14-17, 1893; that he talked with people, heard rumors, and that there was a state of great excitement and alarm; that the presence of the United States forces when they landed was a good thing, and prevented possible lawlessness which would have resulted in loss of property and possibly life.
P.F.A. Ehlers
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF J. H. FISHER.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
Joseph Henry Fisher, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is 36 years of age, born in San Francisco, Cal., United States of America, and has lived in Honolulu since February, 1883, and has been since that date employed as teller in the bank of Bishop & Co. Is married and has a family. Is a property owner. Was captain of Company B, Honolulu Rifles, disbanded in August, 1890. That on the 14th day of January began to recruit ex-members of Company B and others to join in the movement for deposing Liliuokalani and forming a Provisional Government. Knew that other ex-captains of the Honolulu Rifles were doing the same. Compared notes with them and found nearly all of the old members very prompt in volunteering, and also many who were not formerly members. The roll of Company B on the evening of 16th January had the names of 45 volunteers; nearly all had arms and ammunition.
On that evening at a meeting of the committee of safety were organized as a battalion. Was appointed lieutenant-colonel. On the morning of the 17th January turned command of Company B over to Lieut. Potter. Orders were issued to assemble at the old armory promptly at 3 o'clock on afternoon of January 17. Matters were precipitated by the shot fired by Ordnance Officer Good on Fort street about 2:20 o'clock. Was at the armory immediately after, and at the request of the members of the new Government sent men as fast as they arrived in squads to the Government building, the first sent being Capt. Zeigler with about 36 men. Had not been told nor did not believe the United States marines would take part one way or another. This being the fourth time during his residence in Honolulu that he has taken up arms in defense of good government in the Hawaiian Islands.
J.H. Fisher.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2d day of January, A. D. 1894.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
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AFFIDAVIT OF F. J. LOWREY.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
F.J. Lowrey, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen; that he is married, and a householder in Honolulu, and has large business interests in the Hawaiian Islands; that he was present in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17, 1893; that on Monday, the 16th, there was a general dread of incendiarism, and precautions were taken by himself and others for the protection of property; the feeling was so high that it was liable to break out into lawlessness and violence at any moment; that when he heard of the landing of the United States forces it was a great relief.
F.J. Lowrey.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A.D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF C. B. RIPLEY.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
C.B. Ripley, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen, has a family, and is a householder in Honolulu; that he was present in Honolulu prior to and during the revolution of January 17, 1893; that in his opinion the landing of the United States forces was fully justified by the critical condition of affairs at that time, and unquestionably prevented riotous acts which would probably have resulted in loss of life and property.
C.B. Ripley.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF E. F. BISHOP.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolula, Oahu, ss:
E.F. Bishop, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he was born in the United States and has resided in Honolulu over ten years; that he is secretary of C. Brewer and Company, an Hawaiian corporation; that he is married and a householder in Honolulu; that he took no part in the revolution of January 17, 1893, and has since remained passive politically; that on the evening of Monday, January 16, he heard that the United States forces had landed at about 5 o'clock; he did not understand that they had landed for the purpose of taking any hand in the revolution, but for the purpose of protecting American life and property; that he believed that the landing of the forces for that purpose was justifiable, as there was a great deal of allayed excitement in Honolulu at the time: that during the same evening, at about 8 p. m., he was present with his father-in-law, J. S. Walker, when that gentleman received a note from J. L. Stevens, the American
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minister, asking for the use of Arion Hall as a shelter for the troops; that Mr. Walker immediately wrote a note informing the minister that the hall was leased to Mr. G. J. Waller, and dispatched this answer by the bearer who brought the minister's note.
E.F. Bishop.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th dav of December, A.D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF J. B. ATHERTON.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
J.B. Atherton, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an American citizen; that he has resided in Honolulu for many years, has a family, a home, and large business interests; that on Monday, January 16, as an American citizen he went to see Mr. Stevens, the American minister, at about 2 p. m., to suggest the landing of the Boston's forces for the protection of American life and property; was told by the minister that it was his intention to land the forces, and was promised a guard for his home and property if he wished; that this affiant was very apprehensive and did not know what might happen; that he was present and witnessed the riot in 1874 at the time of the election of Kalakaua, and knew what such a thing meant as soon as the natives should be aroused and incendiarism suggested to them; that in his opinion there was more reason for the landing of the troops in January, 1893, than in 1874.
J.B. Atherton,
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
AFFIDAVIT OF W. L. WILCOX.
Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Oahu, ss:
W.L. Wilcox, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he was born in the Hawaiian Islands, and has resided here during his whole life; that he has acted as interpreter during very many sessions of the Legislature and is permanently employed as Hawaiian interpreter for the courts; that he is perfectly familiar with the native language, and during the three days from January 14 to January 17 circulated among the Hawaiian people in Honolulu; that particularly on the Monday before the landing of the troops threats were made by the natives that they would destroy property in Honolulu by burning; these threats he repeated to members of the committee of safety and others.
W.D. Wilcox
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of December, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.] Alfred W. Carter,
Notary Public.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. CARTER.
ONE INCIDENT IN THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION.
At the meeting of citizens on Saturday, January 14, in response to the call of the Queen's cabinet for help, the anxiety of persons near
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me and their requests for expression of their sentiments led me to ask Mr. Colburn, minister of the interior, at the close of his speech, what assurance there was that the constituted police and military forces would not make an attack? Whether the Queen's adherents would be removed from command of them? To this Mr. Colburn replied that as a cabinet minister he ought not to be asked to answer such a question in public, but that he could give assurances that a satisfactory settlement was even then being made. He then withdrew and called me to him—he was with Judge Hartwell—and to the best of my recollection one of them said in substance that the matter of which I had spoken was all right. A request to Mr. Stevens to land his forces had been prepared and was in Hartwell's hands to be delivered; that Mr. Stevens had consented to this for the purpose of defending the cabinet and the constitution against any possible aggression by the Queen. Later, Mr. Hartwell told me the paper had gone off for Mr. Peterson's signature and asked me to get it. I tried but failed to find Peterson.
I have since been told that Mr. Peterson still has the paper, and that for palpable reasons it was never shown to Mr. Blount.
The next morning the cabinet evaded all this and adhered to the Queen, and Mr. Stevens stated that he could not assist a counter revolution by the committee of safety.
The foregoing ought to explain the half truth upon which the old cabinet bases its charges against the American minister.
Charles L. Carter
Honolulu, January 2, 1893.
STATEMENT OF L. A. THURSTON, HAWAIIAN MINISTER, PUBLISHED NOVEMBER 21, 1893.
Washington, November 21.
"I am urged to make a statement for publication, setting forth the position and claims of the Hawaiian Government and making reply to charges contained in Mr. Blount's report.
"As I have received no official information that Mr. Blount has made a report, have not seen a copy of it, and do not know what it contains, except from reading newspaper abstractions therefrom, and am unaware of the present contentions of the U. S. Government concerning Hawaii, I am unable, at present, in the absence of such knowledge, to intelligently state what the position and claims of the Hawaiian Government are. It would, moreover, be contrary to diplomatic courtesy for me to publish a statement on such subject prior to informing the U. S. Government of the same.
"A large portion of the published extracts from Mr. Blount's report consists, however, of personal attacks upon me and those associated with me in the Provisional Government, impugning our veracity, good faith, and courage, and charging us with fraud and duplicity. I deem it proper, therefore, to make a personal reply to such charges, confining myself to statements of fact, of which, as a principal actor, I am prepared to testify to before any impartial tribunal.
"First, before stating such facts, I desire to call attention to Mr. Blount's method of constructing his report. Although he, in several places, states that I was the leader of the revolutionary movement, he has never asked me a question concerning the same, nor given me opportunity to make any statement, although I have at all times been
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ready and willing to do so. The same is true of a large number of other men who took a leading part in the movement of January last.
"In the second place his evidence consists exclusively of prepared affidavits or of answers to leading questions put by himself, at private interviews, no one else being present but the stenographer. In no instance has there been any cross-examination of witnesses or opportunity given to contradict or explain evidence given or present other evidence.
"A brief examination of the published portions of the report shows numerous incorrect statements. I shall endeavor for the present, however, to answer the more salient points only.
"First, Mr. Blount charges that the American troops were landed under a prearranged agreement with the committee of safety that they should so land and assist in the overthrow of the Queen. In reply thereto, I hereby state that at no time did Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse assure me or the committee of safety, or any subcommittee thereof, that the United States troops would assist in overthrowing the Queen or establishing the Provisional Government; and, as a matter of fact, they did not so assist. I can produce witnesses in support of this statement, of the highest responsibility, in overwhelming number, but Mr. Blount has rendered it unnecessary to do so. The statements of Mr. Wundenburg and Mr. Damon have been put forward as the strongest evidence in support of Mr. Blount's contention. In Mr. Wundenburg's statement he says that when the committee of safety told Mr. Stevens they were not ready to act, he replied: 'Gentlemen, the troops of the Boston will land at 5 o'clock whether you are ready or not.' The reason of this reply and the subsequent landing of the troops is manifest. The troops were landed to protect American citizens and property in the event of the impending and inevitable conflict between the Queen and the citizens, and not to cooperate with the committee in carrying out its plans. In fact, the troops did not cooperate with the committee, and the committee had no more knowledge than did the Queen's Government where the troops were going nor what they were going to do. The whole gist of Mr. Damon's long examination is likewise contained in his statement that when, after the organization and proclamation of the new Government, the request was made for the support of the United States troops it was refused, Commander Swinburne, the commanding officer, sending back word, 'Capt. Wiltse's orders are, "Remain passive.'"
"Second, Mr. Blount charges that the Queen had ample military force with which to have met the committee, and but for the support of the United States representatives and troops the establishment of the Provisional Government would have been impossible. In reply thereto I hereby state that, although the presence of the American troops had a quieting effect on the rough characters in the city and may have prevented some bloodshed, they were not essential to and did not assist in the overthrow of the Queen. The result of the movement would have been eventually the same if there had not been a marine within a thousand miles of Honolulu.
"In support of this statement I cite the following facts:
"1. The troops did not land till Monday night, the 16th of January, after the revolution had been in full progress since the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, during which time the committee of safety was openly organizing for the avowed purpose of overthrowing the Queen.
"2. There was absolutely no attempt at concealment from the Government of the objects and intentions of the committee.
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"3 . The Queen, her cabinet, and their supporters were utterly demoralized, suspicious of one another, and devoid of leadership.
"4. The committee of safety and their supporters were united; had ample force to execute their purpose; knew precisely what they wanted, and proceeded with intelligent deliberation, thoroughness, and confidence to do it.
"There is no conflict concerning the facts of the first proposition. It is admitted by all that the Queen began the revolution at noon on Saturday, the 14th, by attempting to promulgate a constitution; that such attempt was immediately followed by preparation on the part of the citizens for armed resistance, and that the United States troops landed at 5 o'clock Monday, the 16th.
"In support of the second proposition, that there was no concealment from the Government of the intentions of the committee, I submit the following:
"1. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, in reply to the request of the Queen's cabinet for advice as to what they had better do, the Queen then still insisting upon the proclamation of the constitution and supporting it by force, I advised them to declare the Queen in revolution and the throne vacant, and at their request and at the expressed approval of two of them and the tacit assent of the other two, then and there drew up a form of proclamation to that effect.
"2. At half past 4 in the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th, at a meeting of about 200 citizens at the office of W. O. Smith, the Queen was denounced in the strongest terms, armed resistance and a counter revolution were openly advocated, and the Queen's minister of the interior, John Colburn, addressed the meeting, asking their armed support against the Queen. The Queen's attorney-general, Mr. Peterson, and her attorney, Paul Neuman, were both present taking part in the meeting. The committee of safety was publicly then and there named and proceeded forthwith to organize.
"3. At 6 o'clock on Sunday morning, the 15th, I told Mr. Peterson and Mr. Colburn, two members of the Queen's cabinet, that the committee intended to depose the Queen and establish a provisional government; that if they would take charge of the movement, well and good, otherwise the committee intended to take action on its own account. They ask for twenty-four hours in which to consider the matter. I declined to wait, stating to them that the committee intended to proceed forthwith.
"4. The committee met openly that morning at 10 o'clock, with the full knowledge of the Government of the place of its meeting. It remained in session during the greater part of the day, while several police kept watch of the building from the street.
"5. On Monday morning at 9 o'clock the committee, without attempt at concealment, met in my office, within 200 feet of the police station, Marshal Wilson's headquarters, where the entire police force was stationed. While the meeting was in progress Wilson came to the office and asked to speak to me privately, and we went into an adjoining room. Our conversation was, in substance, as follows:
"Wilson said: 'I want this meeting stopped,' referring to the mass meeting for that afternoon.
"I replied: 'It can't be stopped. It is too late.'
"He said: 'Can't this thing be fixed up in some way?'
"I replied: 'No, it can not. It has gone too far.'
"He said: 'The Queen has abandoned her new constitution idea.'
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"I replied: ' How do we know that she will not take it ap again as she said she would?'
"He said, 'I will guarantee that she will not, even if I have to lock her up in a room to keep her from doing it; and I'll do it, too, if necessary.'
"I replied : ' We are not willing to accept that guarantee as sufficient. This thing has gone on from bad to worse until we are not going to stand it any longer. We are going to take no chances in the matter, but settle it now, once and for all.'
"Wilson then left the office. He has since stated that he immediately reported to the cabinet and advised arresting the committee, but the cabinet was afraid and refused to allow it.
"6. At 2 o'clock on the afternoon of Monday, the 16th, a mass meeting of 3,000 unarmed men was held within a block of the palace. The meeting was addressed by a number of speakers, all denouncing the Queen. The meeting, with tremendous cheering and enthusiasm, unanimously adopted resolutions declaring the Queen to be in revolution, and authorizing the committee to proceed to do whatever was necessary. The police were present, but no attempt was made to interfere with the meeting or make any arrests. The meeting adjourned amid the most intense excitement, and the citizens dispersed throughout the town awaiting the further call of the committee. While this meeting had been in progress another was being held by the royalists in the streets, within a block of the armory, which adopted resolutions in support of the Queen.
"Never in the history of Hawaii has there been such a tense condition of mind or a more imminent expectation of bloodshed and conflict than there was immediately after the adjournment of these two radically opposed meetings. Mr. Blount's statement that the community was at peace and quiet is grossly inaccurate. It was at this juncture, two hours after the adjournment of the above meetings, that Capt. Wiltse and Mr. Stevens, acting upon their own responsibility and discretion, and irrespective of the request or actions of the committee, landed the troops, which were distributed in three parts of the city, instead of being massed at one point, as stated by Mr. Blount. The reason that the Queen's Government took no action against the committee, or its supporters, was that they were overwhelmed by the unanimous display of indignation and determination shown by the citizens, and were cowed into submission in the same manner that the King and his supporters were cowed under precisely similar circumstances by the same citizens in June, 1887.
"In support of the third proposition, that the Queen and her supporters were demoralized and devoid of leadership I submit the following:
"1. During the few weeks prior to the revolution Mr. Colburn, minister of the interior at the time of the revolution, had been one of the leaders of the political party opposed to myself, and he was bitterly hostile to me personally. My first intimation of the revolutionary intention of the Queen was at 10 o'clock on the morning of Saturday, the 14th, when Mr. Colburn came to me greatly excited. He told me of the Queen's intention to promulgate a new constitution, and asked my advice. I said to him: 'Why do you not go to the members of your own party?' He replied: 'I have no party. Those who have been our supporters are supporting the Queen. The down-town people [referring to the merchants] have got no use for me, and, unless the members of your party and other citizens will support us, we are going to resign right away.'
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"2. At 1 o'clock the same day I met all the members of the cabinet at the attorney-general's office. They had just come from an interview with the Queen, at which she had announced her intention of promulgating a constitution and demanded their support. They stated that she had threatened them with mob violence, whereupon they had immediately left the palace, each one going out by a separate entrance. While we were talking a messenger came from the Queen requesting them to immediately return to the palace. Peterson and Colburn positively refused to do so, stating that they did not consider their lives would be safe there. I shortly after left them and started down town. After I had gone about two blocks I was overtaken by a messenger from the cabinet asking me to return, which I did. They asked me to ascertain what support they could expect from citizens, and formally authorized me to state the condition of affairs to leading citizens and in their behalf to call for armed volunteers to resist the Queen. I immediately proceeded to comply with their request, and, with the assistance of others, within an hour or two thereafter about 80 leading citizens had signed a written agreement agreeing to support the cabinet against the Queen by force.
"3. Later the same afternoon Mr. Colburn informed me that they had finally gone to the palace and held a stormy interview with the Queen lasting for over two hours. He told me he had no confidence in his colleague, Mr. Peterson, who he believed was playing double with him, and told me to beware of telling Peterson anything further. As a reason for his distrust he said that he knew nothing of the intention to promulgate a constitution, but that, while they were discussing the matter with the Queen, she said, in reply to an objection made by Peterson: 'Why did you not make this objection before? You have had this constitution in your possession for a mouth and raised no objection to it.' Colburn said also that in reply to an objection made by Mr. Parker, minister of foreign affairs, she said: ' Why did you not tell me this last night when we were talking over the subject?' Colburn further stated to me that at a caucus of their party on the previous Friday night one of the members of the Legislature, Kaluna by name, had said that if he could establish the new constitution he would die happy if he could kill some other man before dying.
"4. The Queen was furiously angry at the refusal of the cabinet to join her in promulgating the constitution, and publicly denounced them therefor.
"5. When the Queen made announcement of her failure to promulgate the constitution, two of the leading royalist members of the Legislature, one in the throne room in the palace and one upon the steps of the building, addressed the assembled crowd, denounced the cabinet as traitors, and said that they wanted to shed blood. One of the committee included the Queen in his denunciations.
"6. During the entire time between noon of Saturday, the 14th, and the afternoon of Tuesday, the 17th, when the Provisional Government was proclaimed, the Queen's cabinet was without plan of action, and did practically nothing but rush about the city consulting with various foreign representatives or citizens of all parties as to what they had better do, begging the American minister for the support of the American troops against the committee of safety, and securing from the Queen a declaration that she would not again attempt to abrogate the constitution, which they hurried into print and distributed broadcast to try and appease the indignation of citizens and break up the proposed mass meeting.
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"In support of the fourth proposition that the committee and their supporters were united, had ample force to execute their purpose, and proceeded with deliberation and confidence to do so, I submit the following:
"An essential factor in judging whether the force of the committee was sufficient, and their confidence in themselves well founded, is to know what the same men under similar conditions have done upon previous occasions. Fortunately, there is no dispute as to the facts concerning two recent incidents in Hawaiian history in which the same parties who were brought into conflict in January, 1893, were arrayed against each other under similar circumstances:
"1 . In 1887 the King, by a manipulation of the electorate and the legislature, had encroached upon popular rights and obtained autocratic power over the people. In this course he was supported by practically the same persons who in January last, and now, constitute the Royalist party in Hawaii. The open bribery, corruption, and debauchery of the King and his supporters crystallized the opposition thereto into an organization of practically the same men who organized and now constitute the Provisional Government. Such organization was formed with the openly avowed intention of wresting from the King his autocratic powers or dethroning him. In preparation for the expected movement the King fortified the palace, loopholed its basement for sharpshooters, erected sandbag breastworks at the entrance of tbe building, mounted cannon and Gatling guns at all the approaches thereto, largely increased his regular military force, and defied the organization and public opinion.
The leaders of the revolutionary movement proceeded deliberately to collect such arms as were available and organized their plans. An executive committee of thirteen was appointed, who took entire control of the movement and called a mass meeting in the same building used for that purpose in January last. The King attempted to head off the meeting by sending a letter to it promising certain reforms. The letter had no effect. Resolutions were adopted denouncing the King and demanding the granting of a new constitution depriving the King of all personal power. The resolutions were forthwith presented to the King by the committee, who, unarmed and alone, proceeded direct from the meeting to the fortified palace with the ultimatum that he comply with the demands within twenty-four hours or take the consequences.
"The King was then in absolute control of the regular troops, the especial troops enlisted for the occasion, 4 companies of native militia, the police, all the artillery and Gatling guns, the government buildings, the palace, the barracks, and the station house, with full knowledge of, and weeks of preparation for, the action taken by the citizens. His military strength was greater and his control of the public buildings more complete than was that of the Queen in January last. He did not fire a shot; submitted to all demands; disbanded his troops and turned the whole control of the Government over to the revolutionary party, which, in consideration of his abject submission allowed him to continue on the throne in a figurehead capacity.
"2. In 1889, while the same men who now constitute the Provisional Government were in control of the King's Government, a conspiracy was organized among the royalist supporters by the King and Liliuokalani for the overthrow of the cabinet and the restoration of the old royal power and constitution. The conspirators took the cabinet by surprise, and on the night of July 29 took possession of the Government
S. Doc. 231, pt 6----61
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buildings and palace, and securing possession of all the artillery fortified the palace. The regular troops, by order of the King, refused to assist the cabinet, who called upon the white militia and white citizens for assistance. The call was promptly responded to. The revolutionists were protected by an 8-foot stone wall around the palace, and used artillery as well as rifles, while the cabinet supporters were armed with rilies alone. The fighting opened at 9 o'clock in the morning with less than 30 cabinet supporters in position in front of the palace, which number was later increased to about 500. The royalist revolutionists opened with a furious fire of both artillery and small arms. Within half an hour they were driven from their guns. Seven were killed and 12 wounded, and before dark all of them were dispersed or captured, while not one of the Cabinet supporters was injured.
"Such is the undisputed record of events upon two occasions when the royalists and the organizers of the Provisional Government have come into armed conflict when there has been no suggestion of support to either side by any outside power. Under these circumstances I submit that the burden of proof is upon those who claim that the leaders of the Provisional Government are cowards, or that they are incompetent to organize or successfully carry out a revolution against the royalists in Hawaii.
"It is unnecessary for me here to restate the details of the bitter constitutional conflict which had been carried on between the Queen and the Legislature during the seven months prior to January last, or to speak of the intense indignation existing among all classes of citizens by reason of the open and successful alliance of the Queen with the opium and lottery rings. The political liberties of the people had been trampled upon, and their moral sense shocked. It simply needed the added provocation of the arbitrary attempt to abrogate the constitution and disfranchise every white man in the country, to spontaneously crystallize opposition into a force that was irresistible.
"In reply to the sneer that the persons taking part in the movement were 'aliens,' I would say that every man of them was, by the laws of the country, a legal voter, whose right to the franchise was, by the proposed constitution, to be abrogated; a large proportion of them were born in the country, and almost without exception those who were not born there had lived there for years, owned property there, and had made it their home. They were the men who had built up the country commercially, agriculturally, financially, and politically, and created and made possible a civilized government therein. They were and are such men as to-day are the leading citizens of the most progressive communities of the United States, with interests as thoroughly identified with the interests of Hawaii as are the interests of native and foreign born citizens in similar communities in this country identified with it?"
Adjourned until Monday, the 22d instant, at 10 o'clock a. m.
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Washington, D.C., Monday, January 22, 1894.
The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment.
Present: The Chairman (Senator Morgan), and Senators Gray, Butler and Frye, and Senators Daniel and Davis, of the full committee.
SWORN STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCANDLESS—Continued.
The Chairman. What connection had you with political movements in Hawaii, and when did you first become associated with any political movement in Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. My first connection was in 1887. During the winter of 1886 and 1887 there was organized, under the laws of the Kingdom, an organization called the Honolulu Rifles, and it suddenly became very popular with all the foreigners and whites of the islands. I joined that military organization, and continued to be a member of it until 1888, when I made a visit to the States.
The Chairman. Did you hold any office in that organization?
Mr. McCandless. I was nothing but a private. I was one of a committee of thirteen of the political organization.
The Chairman. At that time?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. What was the nature of that organization ?
Mr. McCandless. That was an organization to compel the King to grant a new constitution, or it was organized with the intention of forming a republic, making a republic—that is, deposing the King, making a republic with a view of annexing the islands to the United States.
The Chairman. Then why was not that purpose persisted in, or was it abandoned?
Mr. McCandless. It was persisted in that a great many people thought we should give the King one last show to redress the wrongs that he had committed, and take a great many of the prerogatives away from him, and perhaps he would do better. That spirit prevailed to such an extent that a mass meeting was called and strong resolutions were drawn up. They were made so strong that they did not think that any man of self-respect could accede to the demands of the resolutions, and so soon as he should refuse they would start the revolution.
The Chairman. How was that mass meeting as to numbers?
Mr. McCandless. The mass meeting of 1887 was a mass meeting of 1,200 people.
The Chairman. Of what class of people was that mass meeting composed?
Mr. McCandless. Of most of the white people of the Hawaiian Islands.
Senator Gray. Where did you go from to Hawaii?
Mr. McCandless. West Virginia.
Senator Gray. Where were you born?
Mr. McCandless. In Pennsylvania. My father moved from Pennsylvania when I was a boy. I went to California and stayed there a year and a half, and went to the Hawaiian Islands in 1881.
The Chairman. Your business out there was sinking artesian wells?
Mr. McCandless. Yes.
The Chairman. Did the King make concessions that reconciled this
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